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To what extent do you believe we have free will
The simplest philosophical definition of freedom of will is those conditions which are necessary for meaningful moral choices. And most would agree that at some level, there must be a power of contrary choice (i.e. I cannot be held morally responsible for an inability to fly around the room, as I have no wings--I am incapable of choosing to do so even if I want to). The disagreements are over the details of this.
Most Calvinists before Edwards were not causal determinists, but Edwards changed the discussion significantly, at least in the English-speaking world.
This assumes we have no ability to do something that we do not desire, an opinion that many people hold, but not all.The simplest philosophical definition of freedom of will is those conditions which are necessary for meaningful moral choices. And most would agree that at some level, there must be a power of contrary choice (i.e. I cannot be held morally responsible for an inability to fly around the room, as I have no wings--I am incapable of choosing to do so even if I want to). The disagreements are over the details of this.
Most Calvinists before Edwards were not causal determinists, but Edwards changed the discussion significantly, at least in the English-speaking world.
Suppose someone has the ability to do A or B. However, he has the desire to do A, but no desire to do B. He cannot conceive of having any desire to do B. Does this mean he lacks the power of contrary choice?
To what extent do you believe we have free will (not in regards to salvation).
LBC Chapter 9: Paragraph 3. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, has wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good...
LBC Chapter 9: Paragraph 4. When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He frees him from his natural bondage under sin,7 and by His grace alone enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good;8 yet so as that by reason of his remaining corruptions, he does not perfectly, nor only will, that which is good, but does also will that which is evil.
Suppose someone has the ability to do A or B. However, he has the desire to do A, but no desire to do B. He cannot conceive of having any desire to do B. Does this mean he lacks the power of contrary choice?
It seems to me, the only important question is whether mankind has the free will to do good.
I do believe a key question is whether a person has the ability to do what they do not desire. As I understand Edwards, one does not. Every decision is a process of our minds weighting a host of factors and reaching a decision on which choice has the most going for it.
A big part of our depravity may well be simply having messed up desires because we are blind to the supreme majesty, goodness, and desirability of God over any created thing, especially ourselves.
The simplest philosophical definition of freedom of will is those conditions which are necessary for meaningful moral choices. And most would agree that at some level, there must be a power of contrary choice (i.e. I cannot be held morally responsible for an inability to fly around the room, as I have no wings--I am incapable of choosing to do so even if I want to). The disagreements are over the details of this.
Most Calvinists before Edwards were not causal determinists, but Edwards changed the discussion significantly, at least in the English-speaking world.
Suppose someone has the ability to do A or B. However, he has the desire to do A, but no desire to do B. He cannot conceive of having any desire to do B. Does this mean he lacks the power of contrary choice?
I know the some of your Reformed Orthodox thought we had freedom of contradiction and contrareity.