Hobbes - State of Nature

[Claudiu]

I'm reading the Leviathan and having some issues following the state of nature argument. After explaining the state of nature in Ch. 13, Hobbes goes on in Ch. 14 to say something along the lines of: According to the Natural Right of Liberty, rationality seems to require us to attack others. According to the Laws of Nature, however, rationality seems to require us to seek peace. But how can rationality require us to be both at peace and at war? The difference seems to come down to Collective Rationality (Laws of Nature) vs. Individual Rationality (Right of Liberty). The individual rationality seems to be the one when we are in the state of nature and collective rationality when we form the social contract/create a government so that Collective rationality requires that we pursue peace, but individual rationality requires that we attack one another. In this way, individual rationality threatens the collectively rational position.

Is Hobbes saying that it would be rational for individuals to resort to anticipatory violence in pursuit of their ends, or is it rather that their passions lead them to act in ways that are at odds with their own prudential interests? Do you agree with Hobbes about the rationality (or irrationality) of anticipation in the state of nature? Why of why not?

---------- Post added at 04:06 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:44 PM ----------

Also, what assumptions about human nature contribute most significantly to Hobbes's argument? Is it equality?

 

[jwright82]

Hobbes, as you know, stated basicaly that in nature it is war of all with all. So it is the job of the state, the Leviathan, to prevent this from happening through, I believe correct me if I am wrong here, basicaly a dictatorship. So it might make sense to me to kill my neighbor (individual rationality) but the it makes sense to the state (collective rationality) that this would lead to war of all with all.

For Hobbes, and I would say even Derrida to a degree, creation itself is fallen. So we were created evil. The very structure of reality leads to violence. So it makes sense that the state's only responsability is to keep us from killing eachother by any means. The christian cannot except this idea because God created things good. The very structure of creation is good not bad. Violence and difference are the results of the fall and happen because of sin. So this implies a basic two-kingdom structure where the state is to keep order and the church is to preach the gospel that alone can change our hearts.

 

[Claudiu]

But looking at the two rational states (one in the state of nature and the other under the leviathan) which one is actually rational? I think ultimately Hobbes is arguing that being under a social contract and the leviathan is the rational thing to do. The problem is that he says both are rational. So I want to say that in the state of nature it would be rational to use force, but only for the short term. In the long term I think people would realize that it would be better to form a social contract with a sovereign. It's like the prisoners dilemma. Short term, sure it might be good to use individualistic rationality, but if repeated prisoner dilemma's keep coming up, one will ultimately act in favor of the group (group rationality). I don't know if this interpretation of Hobbes will work, but I would argue that in the state of nature it is not reason that compels us to use force, but our passions. (Keeping in mind that rationality is used in the short term, but over a longer period of time it is our passions that compel us). Is this a plausible interpretation of Hobbes based on Ch. 13 and 14?

---------- Post added at 05:11 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:09 PM ----------

In other words, I'm trying to get this answered:

Is Hobbes saying that it would be rational for individuals to resort to anticipatory violence in pursuit of their ends, or is it rather that their passions lead them to act in ways that are at odds with their own prudential interests? Do you agree with Hobbes about the rationality (or irrationality) of anticipation in the state of nature? Why of why not?

Depending on what interpretation we have, we will come to different conclusions of what Hobbes is trying to say.

---------- Post added at 05:33 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:11 PM ----------

By passions I take it to mean the greed, general condition of distrust and insecurity.

To elaborate on the state of nature, Hobbes argues that every individual shares in the following (-> means 'leads to'):
a. Equality -> equally hope for attainment
b. Scarcity -> competition
c. Competition -> diffidence (general condition of distrust and insecurity)
d. But the condition of general diffidence or distrust makes it rational for each to try to attain what he/she needs, not by productive industry, but by anticipation, that is, using force or wiles to master the persons of others; or a tendency to strike first, before waiting around to be taken advantage of.
e. This general tendency to resort to force first, in securing scarce resources and goods, just is the state of nature of war of all against all, when it becomes publicly known.

 

[Claudiu]

One last point to add to my interpretation on Hobbes' state of nature. I think the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is big. In the PD the best option, or rather the intuitive action would be to defect. However, in the IPD the best option, the most reasonable thing to do is to cooperate. I take the IPD to be where the total number of rounds are random or unknown (as it would in the state of nature). Otherwise, if the number of rounds were fixed the Nash equilibrium leaves us with the only possible option of defecting (since the proof is inductive: one might as well defect on the last turn, since the opponent will not have a chance to punish the player. Therefore, both will defect on the last turn. Thus, the player might as well defect on the second-to-last turn, since the opponent will defect on the last no matter what is done, and so on. The same applies if the game length is unknown but has a known upper limit. source).

In other words, in the state of nature if using force one time (PD) is rational in the long run (IPD where the number of rounds is unknown) it won't be. The question that now remains is if Hobbes was thinking along these lines?

For more on the Prisoners Dilemma visit this link.

 

[jwright82]

But looking at the two rational states (one in the state of nature and the other under the leviathan) which one is actually rational? I think ultimately Hobbes is arguing that being under a social contract and the leviathan is the rational thing to do. The problem is that he says both are rational. So I want to say that in the state of nature it would be rational to use force, but only for the short term. In the long term I think people would realize that it would be better to form a social contract with a sovereign. It's like the prisoners dilemma. Short term, sure it might be good to use individualistic rationality, but if repeated prisoner dilemma's keep coming up, one will ultimately act in favor of the group (group rationality). I don't know if this interpretation of Hobbes will work, but I would argue that in the state of nature it is not reason that compels us to use force, but our passions. (Keeping in mind that rationality is used in the short term, but over a longer period of time it is our passions that compel us). Is this a plausible interpretation of Hobbes based on Ch. 13 and 14?

First off I have never read this book, in fact it is one of those philosophical books for my libraray that I keep meaning to get. But I have read a lot about him and his thought. If this invalidates my P.O.V. in your opinion than I'll understand but I think that I can offer you help and a lively discussion. In Scholasticism they had a saying "when faced with a contradiction make a distinction" (quoted from William James in Pragmatism). So you are right to ask why he uses rational for two opposing ideas. But I think that he anticipates what postmodern thinkers have said and that is there is different kinds, or uses, of reason.

This makes sense in ordinary language when we say that someone is giving a rational for their bahavior, even if it is wrong. So what Hobbes seems to be saying is that for the individual it makes perfect sense to even use anticaporaty violence against someone but it makes (more?) sense to the state (collective wisdom or reason) to not allow that because if everyone did that than we would resort to our natural, in his mind, ways of anarchy or war of all with all. So I would say, that based on what I have read, Hobbes is trying to come up with a way to avoid anarchy. You will have to decide if that works as an interpratation of chp. 13 and 14. I think all in all you are correct, and clever in bringing in the prisoner's dilemma (I never thought of it that way!).

In other words, I'm trying to get this answered:


Is Hobbes saying that it would be rational for individuals to resort to anticipatory violence in pursuit of their ends, or is it rather that their passions lead them to act in ways that are at odds with their own prudential interests? Do you agree with Hobbes about the rationality (or irrationality) of anticipation in the state of nature? Why of why not?
Depending on what interpretation we have, we will come to different conclusions of what Hobbes is trying to say.

I would say that if we are trying to interpret him than yes you are right and it is our passions, according to him, that lead us to reason that anticipatory violence makes sense but that the collective reason of the leviathan cannot allow this to take place or else it is war of all with all. I do not agree with him for the reason's I mentioned in my first post about the difference between saying that creation is in essence evil or good. And the effects of sin being the reason for war at all.

By passions I take it to mean the greed, general condition of distrust and insecurity.

To elaborate on the state of nature, Hobbes argues that every individual shares in the following (-> means 'leads to'):
a. Equality -> equally hope for attainment
b. Scarcity -> competition
c. Competition -> diffidence (general condition of distrust and insecurity)
d. But the condition of general diffidence or distrust makes it rational for each to try to attain what he/she needs, not by productive industry, but by anticipation, that is, using force or wiles to master the persons of others; or a tendency to strike first, before waiting around to be taken advantage of.
e. This general tendency to resort to force first, in securing scarce resources and goods, just is the state of nature of war of all against all, when it becomes publicly known.

Yes, again it his idea that this is natural for this to take place (hence not just an effect of sin and not restrained by God's commen grace, he was an atheist). He sees only two options war of all with all or a dictorship that absolutly restrains this. I think that history has proven him wrong. Democracy has worked much better.

---------- Post added at 08:27 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:16 AM ----------

One last point to add to my interpretation on Hobbes' state of nature. I think the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is big. In the PD the best option, or rather the intuitive action would be to defect. However, in the IPD the best option, the most reasonable thing to do is to cooperate. I take the IPD to be where the total number of rounds are random or unknown (as it would in the state of nature). Otherwise, if the number of rounds were fixed the Nash equilibrium leaves us with the only possible option of defecting (since the proof is inductive: one might as well defect on the last turn, since the opponent will not have a chance to punish the player. Therefore, both will defect on the last turn. Thus, the player might as well defect on the second-to-last turn, since the opponent will defect on the last no matter what is done, and so on. The same applies if the game length is unknown but has a known upper limit. source).

In other words, in the state of nature if using force one time (PD) is rational in the long run (IPD where the number of rounds is unknown) it won't be. The question that now remains is if Hobbes was thinking along these lines?

For more on the Prisoners Dilemma visit this link.

First off thank you for the links, I have always been fascinated by this problem. Secondly, I think that you may have stumbled across a new way to view social relations and Hobbes through the prisoner's dilemma. I think though that again his major problem to solve was war of all with all, how do we prevent this? So he came up with the leviathan to be a solution. You can use Nash's ideas to better understand why came up with this but the two men were obviously thinking in two different times and worldviews. If we both defect than we both lose, if we both cooperate than we might win.

If we both rat on eachother than we both get convicted, if we cooperate with eachother than we might not be convicted at all. Hence a bad result comes from people acting selfishly (individual rationality) but a good result may come from people cooperating with eachother (collective rationality). So I think you are right to point to the point of contact between these two, Hobbes and the prisoner's dilemma.

 

[Claudiu]

James, I really appreciate your response. Thanks!

 

[jwright82]

James, I really appreciate your response. Thanks!

Anytime! If there is more you wish to discuss than just post it and I will try to respond as best I can.

 

[Claudiu]

I'm also taking a Philosophical Methods course (a writing one where an essay is due every week) and the subject of the course if personal identity. With that said, I'm sure I'll be on here for discussion more often.

 

[JennyG]

The whole "state of nature" idea always seemed to me to be predicated on a back-to-front view of human history. Doesn't it fit best with an evolutionary account of Man emerging from the jungle (in a state of nature) and then having civilisation and law imposed on that - ? Whereas I don't think according to the Bible there ever was such a state.
But I haven't opened Hobbes since I was a student so I may just be misunderstanding - that may not be the point at all.

 

[Claudiu]

The whole "state of nature" idea always seemed to me to be predicated on a back-to-front view of human history. Doesn't it fit best with an evolutionary account of Man emerging from the jungle (in a state of nature) and then having civilisation and law imposed on that - ? Whereas I don't think according to the Bible there ever was such a state.
But I haven't opened Hobbes since I was a student so I may just be misunderstanding - that may not be the point at all.

Hobbes doesn't think there was an actually state of nature in past. The state of nature argument is a hypothetical. Meaning, if we were to take the state away today, we would have the state of nature, theoretically. Afterwards, the only way to get out of the state of nature is the social contract and the rule of the sovereign. We have to keep in mind the time he was writing in England (during the Civil War) and the argument he's ultimately making is for the rule of a monarch. During the Civil War he saw the chaos as the state of nature and the only way to get out is with a strong central government ruling.

But the evolutionary view of man that you mention is popular among some contemporary readings of Hobbes because the only way they can see man come out of the jungle is with something along the lines of a social contract. It does fit neatly into an evolutionary view.

 

[jwright82]

I'm also taking a Philosophical Methods course (a writing one where an essay is due every week) and the subject of the course if personal identity. With that said, I'm sure I'll be on here for discussion more often.

Aw personal identity, how do we know we are the same person from time to time?

 

[Claudiu]

I'm also taking a Philosophical Methods course (a writing one where an essay is due every week) and the subject of the course if personal identity. With that said, I'm sure I'll be on here for discussion more often.

Aw personal identity, how do we know we are the same person from time to time?

 

[JennyG]

Hobbes doesn't think there was an actually state of nature in past. The state of nature argument is a hypothetical.

I understand, thanks.
It's no wonder though if evolutionists jump on it with relish. He seems to let his imagination rip in that memorable "nasty brutish and short" passage.

 

[Claudiu]

He seems to let his imagination rip in that memorable "nasty brutish and short" passage.

 

[Philip]

So it is the job of the state, the Leviathan, to prevent this from happening

Not exactly. What happens is that the many agree to hand over some of their sovereignty to create Leviathan which then has sovereignty to do all that is necessary to keep order and protect the individual.

But looking at the two rational states (one in the state of nature and the other under the leviathan) which one is actually rational?

Both are rational, but he recommends the second because it gets us past the destructive war of every man with every man.

Whereas I don't think according to the Bible there ever was such a state.

One might think of a state right after Babel when everything is confused. He seems to have a pretty realistic view of man as fallen, actually.

 

[jwright82]

Not exactly. What happens is that the many agree to hand over some of their sovereignty to create Leviathan which then has sovereignty to do all that is necessary to keep order and protect the individual.

How is that different from a dictatorship? All dictators fro the most part were elected by the people.

 

[Philip]

How is that different from a dictatorship? All dictators fro the most part were elected by the people.

Because Hobbes does not think that the sovereign necessarily has to be a single person---it could be a deliberative body: even a representative one. In addition, monarchy is also possible for Hobbes (and far more appealing, given its stability and clear line of succession).

 

[Claudiu]

In addition, monarchy is also possible for Hobbes (and far more appealing, given its stability and clear line of succession).

Not only possible, but preferred.

 

[jwright82]

Because Hobbes does not think that the sovereign necessarily has to be a single person---it could be a deliberative body: even a representative one. In addition, monarchy is also possible for Hobbes (and far more appealing, given its stability and clear line of succession).

Fair enough. Like I said I have never read the book. I have read about him, so will defer to you and Claudiu on the details of his thought. Thank you for the clarification.

---------- Post added at 09:55 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:38 AM ----------

One might think of a state right after Babel when everything is confused. He seems to have a pretty realistic view of man as fallen, actually.

Yes doesn't he, along with Derrida and Levanis, view the world as inherently fallen? That is that the state of nature is war of all with all. That is different from the christian view because we affirm that creation is good, after God's pronouncement, and the fall is responsible for war of all with all. Derrida and Levinas both view the very nature of things as being inherently violent, they both refer to an ontology of violence. In fact their thoughts, not to go off on a tangent, have influenced the rhetoric of the whole homosexual movement. Ayone who disagrees with them is just spreading hate, ontology of violence. But that is for another discussion. I have been working on an apologetic against this and an analysis of the concept of "hate speach" along these lines.

---------- Post added at 09:56 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:55 AM ----------

Not only possible, but preferred.

Thanks for the clarification. I always read that Hobbes was the forunner to fascism because of his ideas but I guess that idea was not as true as I thought.