Moreland's Argument against Physicalism

[Toasty]

The following is JP Moreland's argument against physicalism taken from this site:
http://www.reasons.org/articles/body-and-soul-part-2-why-the-soul-is-immaterial

What do you think of his argument? I reject physicalism, but I don't agree with libertarian freedom and I don't think that all kinds of determinism are inconsistent with human freedom.

God predestines the actions of men and at the same time holds them accountable for their actions. One example of this is found in Acts 4:27-28. Herod, Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel did what God predestined them to do. They were still accountable for their actions. The kind of determinism taught in Acts 4:27-28 is not inconsistent with human responsibility. Their actions proceeded from their will and heart. They were not acting like unconscious, mindless machines.

To say that a human is a free will being is to say that humans exercise what is called libertarian freedom: Given choices A and B, a person can literally choose either one. No circumstances exist that are sufficient to determine a choice. A person’s choice is up to the individual, and if Mom does A or B, she could have done otherwise. She acts as an agent who is the first cause or ultimate originator of her own actions. Moreover, her reasons for acting do not partially or fully cause her actions, she does. Rather, her reasons are the teleological goals—the purposes or the ends—for the sake of which she acts. If Mom takes a nap because she’s tired, the desire to satisfy her need for rest is the end for the sake of which she acts freely.

If physicalism is true, then human free will does not exist. Instead, determinism is true. If Mom is purely a physical system, nothing in her has the capacity to freely choose to do something. Material systems, at least large-scale ones, change over time in deterministic fashion according to the initial conditions of the system and the laws of chemistry and physics to which such systems are subject. A pot of water reaches a certain temperature at a given time in a way determined by the amount of water, the input of heat, and the laws of heat transfer.

Moral obligation and responsibility make little or no sense if determinism is true. Morality seems to presuppose freedom of the will. If Mom “ought” to do something, it seems necessary to suppose that she can do it, that she is in control of her actions. No one would say that she ought to jump to the top of a fifty-floor building to save a baby, or that she ought to stop the American Civil War. Clearly, she does not have the ability. If physicalism is true, Mom does not have any genuine ability to choose her actions. Further, since free acts seem to be for the sake of goals or ends, if physicalism (or mere property dualism) is true, there is no ultimate purpose and, thus, there can be no libertarian free acts.

One may safely say that physicalism requires a radical revision of common-sense notions about freedom, moral obligation, responsibility, and punishment. On the other hand, if these common-sense notions are true, physicalism is false.

 

[MW]

Their actions proceeded from their will and heart. They were not acting like unconscious, mindless machines.

The question is whether this "will" had the power to choose another course of action or whether the eternal pre-determination of God also internally determined the will to follow this course of action.

 

[Philip]

What do you think of his argument? I reject physicalism, but I don't agree with libertarian freedom and I don't think that all kinds of determinism are inconsistent with human freedom.

Certainly physical determinism, which is the target of Moreland's proposal, is ruled out.

There are a couple of questions that have to be addressed in order to figure out whether, as Reformed folks, we are committed to determinism about human choices. I should preface what I'm going to say by mentioning that I have severe doubts as to most accounts of libertarian free will (starting with the language) but I'm setting that aside for now.

1) What is God's relationship to time? More specifically, if we hold (as most of us do) that God is time-free both in terms of causation and in terms of knowledge, then passages that speak of "foreknowledge" and "foreordination" are speaking analogically when it comes to the "before" of God. How God interacts with time and experiences it (which clearly He does) and its cause-effect relationships is very mysterious. What kind of bearing does that have, then, on how God influences and guides free human decisions?

2) Some in the reformed camp (Edwards and Clark for instance) have held a hard line on determinism, and the results are minor heresy in both cases. Edwards ends up nearly a panentheist, while Clark makes God the author of evil and then gets Him off on a technicality. So clearly at least some versions of Divine determinism are problematic.

3) How do we cash out the conditions necessary for moral responsibility? At the very least, there has to be at least a hypothetical or counterfactual possibility of contrary choice. That is, there has to be some sense in which I could have chosen differently for me to be morally responsible. For example, if I am pushed and break a leg and have to wear a cast, I can't be held morally responsible for not coming in to work at a construction job, as I am physically unable to do so. On the other hand, if I don't come in to work because I have a hangover, I am morally responsible, because I could have chosen differently. Even if psychological determinism holds, I still could have chosen differently, had I been differently disposed.

However, many would like to claim that the principle goes beyond that because psychological determinism does seem to end up in reductionism.

he kind of determinism taught in Acts 4:27-28 is not inconsistent with human responsibility.

You're right. But is this different from the kind of philosophical determinism that Moreland thinks is not tenable?

 

[Toasty]

Their actions proceeded from their will and heart. They were not acting like unconscious, mindless machines.

The question is whether this "will" had the power to choose another course of action or whether the eternal pre-determination of God also internally determined the will to follow this course of action.

God determined the will to follow that course of action. What God has ordained will surely come to pass. Does this mean that the person lacks the ability to do otherwise or the ability to desire otherwise? I was just curious because there is a difference between doing and desiring.

 

[Toasty]

What do you think of his argument? I reject physicalism, but I don't agree with libertarian freedom and I don't think that all kinds of determinism are inconsistent with human freedom.

Certainly physical determinism, which is the target of Moreland's proposal, is ruled out.

There are a couple of questions that have to be addressed in order to figure out whether, as Reformed folks, we are committed to determinism about human choices. I should preface what I'm going to say by mentioning that I have severe doubts as to most accounts of libertarian free will (starting with the language) but I'm setting that aside for now.

1) What is God's relationship to time? More specifically, if we hold (as most of us do) that God is time-free both in terms of causation and in terms of knowledge, then passages that speak of "foreknowledge" and "foreordination" are speaking analogically when it comes to the "before" of God. How God interacts with time and experiences it (which clearly He does) and its cause-effect relationships is very mysterious. What kind of bearing does that have, then, on how God influences and guides free human decisions?

2) Some in the reformed camp (Edwards and Clark for instance) have held a hard line on determinism, and the results are minor heresy in both cases. Edwards ends up nearly a panentheist, while Clark makes God the author of evil and then gets Him off on a technicality. So clearly at least some versions of Divine determinism are problematic.

3) How do we cash out the conditions necessary for moral responsibility? At the very least, there has to be at least a hypothetical or counterfactual possibility of contrary choice. That is, there has to be some sense in which I could have chosen differently for me to be morally responsible. For example, if I am pushed and break a leg and have to wear a cast, I can't be held morally responsible for not coming in to work at a construction job, as I am physically unable to do so. On the other hand, if I don't come in to work because I have a hangover, I am morally responsible, because I could have chosen differently. Even if psychological determinism holds, I still could have chosen differently, had I been differently disposed.

However, many would like to claim that the principle goes beyond that because psychological determinism does seem to end up in reductionism.

he kind of determinism taught in Acts 4:27-28 is not inconsistent with human responsibility.

You're right. But is this different from the kind of philosophical determinism that Moreland thinks is not tenable?

I think that God is time-free like you said.

Does that hypothetical power of contrary choice entail the ability to do otherwise or the ability to desire otherwise?

What kind of ability does the hypothetical power of contrary choice entail? The strength of one's muscles? The ability of one's will or mind? If someone who is a slave of sin cannot resist the temptation to think lustful thoughts towards someone, this would have to do with the person's heart or mind, not their muscles. They don't have weak muscles; they have a problem with their spiritual condition or heart.

Suppose God ordained that person X would not throw a rock through a window on a certain date. Person X cannot choose contrary to what God ordained. What does it mean that he could not have chosen to throw that rock through the window on that certain date? Does this mean that his muscles were too weak? Does it mean that his mind or will could not have conceived of that kind of behavior? Does it mean that he lacked the desire to do it? Does it mean that he lacked the opportunity to do it?

I think it is different from the kind of philosophical determinism that Moreland holds as untenable.

 

[Philip]

oes that hypothetical power of contrary choice entail the ability to do otherwise or the ability to desire otherwise?

Ability to do otherwise, yes. Ability to desire otherwise, no. Desires, like beliefs, are involuntary. We may be responsible for them in the sense that, as with beliefs, decisions made may influence future desires. The question is whether desires exhaustively explain my actions (Edwards thought so, but I'm less sure).

What kind of ability does the hypothetical power of contrary choice entail? The strength of one's muscles? The ability of one's will or mind? If someone who is a slave of sin cannot resist the temptation to think lustful thoughts towards someone, this would have to do with the person's heart or mind, not their muscles. They don't have weak muscles; they have a problem with their spiritual condition or heart.

Someone who is a slave of sin might well be able to resist lustful thoughts out of some other motive. Surely a consistent Pharisee would.

And again, is this psychological determinism? As Calvinists, is that a philosophical position that we are necessarily committed to?

Suppose God ordained that person X would not throw a rock through a window on a certain date. Person X cannot choose contrary to what God ordained. What does it mean that he could not have chosen to throw that rock through the window on that certain date? Does this mean that his muscles were too weak? Does it mean that his mind or will could not have conceived of that kind of behavior? Does it mean that he lacked the desire to do it? Does it mean that he lacked the opportunity to do it?

Certainly any of the above conditions might obtain, or there are other possibilities as well. It might well be that our hypothetical person has means, motive, and opportunity to do so and simply chooses not to for reasons that are otherwise inscrutable. God's foreordination here would function as a final cuase, but the particular contingent cause may not be deterministic at all.

 

[Justified]

God's foreordination here would function as a final cuase, but the particular contingent cause may not be deterministic at all.

Are you suggesting that God may not have determined every individual cause or volition, but has ordained at least a final cause? It's an interesting thought, if so. Do you think it is an acceptable Reformer position, however?

 

[Philip]

Are you suggesting that God may not have determined every individual cause or volition, but has ordained at least a final cause?

Ah, my confused language. Ok, so here's what I mean: final cause=ultimate cause of an event, that which allows it to happen. God is the final cause of all things.

Causal determinism, though, is a theory that all events are determined by the flow of prior events in a closed causal system. On this view contingent causes produce contingent effects in a causally necessary way. On this view, all of our actions are determined in a causally explainable manner such that if we knew every variable in a particular situation, we would know the future outcome. Behaviourism is one form of this view.

Some Calvinists have tried to argue for a theological version of this where God intervenes at certain moments in the ordinary course of events. However, this view seems to lean toward deism.

More likely is that there are many events which are causally indetermined (so far as the natural order is concerned), but God is working in and through them in ways that can't be measured or seen. How does God influence and direct free human choices? It's probably a variety of things, some of which we know, others of which are deeply mysterious.

 

[Toasty]

oes that hypothetical power of contrary choice entail the ability to do otherwise or the ability to desire otherwise?

Ability to do otherwise, yes. Ability to desire otherwise, no. Desires, like beliefs, are involuntary. We may be responsible for them in the sense that, as with beliefs, decisions made may influence future desires. The question is whether desires exhaustively explain my actions (Edwards thought so, but I'm less sure).

What kind of ability does the hypothetical power of contrary choice entail? The strength of one's muscles? The ability of one's will or mind? If someone who is a slave of sin cannot resist the temptation to think lustful thoughts towards someone, this would have to do with the person's heart or mind, not their muscles. They don't have weak muscles; they have a problem with their spiritual condition or heart.

Someone who is a slave of sin might well be able to resist lustful thoughts out of some other motive. Surely a consistent Pharisee would.

And again, is this psychological determinism? As Calvinists, is that a philosophical position that we are necessarily committed to?

Suppose God ordained that person X would not throw a rock through a window on a certain date. Person X cannot choose contrary to what God ordained. What does it mean that he could not have chosen to throw that rock through the window on that certain date? Does this mean that his muscles were too weak? Does it mean that his mind or will could not have conceived of that kind of behavior? Does it mean that he lacked the desire to do it? Does it mean that he lacked the opportunity to do it?

Certainly any of the above conditions might obtain, or there are other possibilities as well. It might well be that our hypothetical person has means, motive, and opportunity to do so and simply chooses not to for reasons that are otherwise inscrutable. God's foreordination here would function as a final cuase, but the particular contingent cause may not be deterministic at all.

I don't know if it would be called psychological determinism. It is a kind of determinism. If someone is a slave of sin, he cannot please God. He cannot refrain from sinning 100% of the time from birth to death. It is true that believers in Christ are not slaves of sin, but even they cannot refrain from sinning 100% of the time.

 

[Philip]

I don't know if it would be called psychological determinism. It is a kind of determinism. If someone is a slave of sin, he cannot please God. He cannot refrain from sinning 100% of the time from birth to death.

Right, but that's a fairly broad category of thoughts, words, actions, and attitudes. And there may be choices within these confines.

An analogy would be Bill. Bill can choose to walk around the room or not to walk around the room. Both are options for him. Flying, though, is beyond his capacity. However, one day Bill sprouts a pair of wings. Soon, Bill has the ability to fly around the room as well as to walk around the room. God's indwelling Spirit gives us spiritual wings, in this analogy. The power of the Spirit enables us to perform the good works for which (as opposed to by which, the Roman Catholic view) we are saved.

 

[MW]

God determined the will to follow that course of action. What God has ordained will surely come to pass. Does this mean that the person lacks the ability to do otherwise or the ability to desire otherwise? I was just curious because there is a difference between doing and desiring.

You could mean two things by "God determined the will." (1) God determined in Himself concerning the will as an indirect object, or (2) God determined the will as a direct object. Reformed theology maintains that God has determined all things that shall come to pass, but it also maintains that things come to pass according to the freedom and contingency of second causes. It is only in the case of effectual calling that God "determines the will" as a direct object of His grace. We never hear of God determining the will to evil. In fact the word "permission" is used in relation to things which are contrary to God's holiness.

In this context there is no material difference between doing and desiring because the will desires to do. Limiting freedom of will to doing is not genuine freedom of will. If the person can reasonably conceive of an object as good, the will is capacitated to incline towards the thing as good, and this creates new desire. The will is bound to choose according to the judgment of the person, but the judgment itself can be altered so as to create new objects for the will.

Let's be clear what the bondage of the will is for man in his naturally fallen condition. He has no freedom to will "spiritual good." So far as man's psychological constitution is concerned, he still has the power to will "the good" as he conceives it. Fallen man cannot will spiritual good -- his chief end -- to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

At the very least, there has to be at least a hypothetical or counterfactual possibility of contrary choice.

Are there Reformed thinkers (not Molinists) that actually believe true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom actually exist in Scripture, e.g., 1 Cor. 2:8? Unlike the Molinist, would not the Reformed say that any possible world would have been feasible for God to actualize had God wanted?

 

[Justified]

Are you suggesting that God may not have determined every individual cause or volition, but has ordained at least a final cause?

Ah, my confused language. Ok, so here's what I mean: final cause=ultimate cause of an event, that which allows it to happen. God is the final cause of all things.

Causal determinism, though, is a theory that all events are determined by the flow of prior events in a closed causal system. On this view contingent causes produce contingent effects in a causally necessary way. On this view, all of our actions are determined in a causally explainable manner such that if we knew every variable in a particular situation, we would know the future outcome. Behaviourism is one form of this view.

Some Calvinists have tried to argue for a theological version of this where God intervenes at certain moments in the ordinary course of events. However, this view seems to lean toward deism.

More likely is that there are many events which are causally indetermined (so far as the natural order is concerned), but God is working in and through them in ways that can't be measured or seen. How does God influence and direct free human choices? It's probably a variety of things, some of which we know, others of which are deeply mysterious.

In Aristotilean terms, isn't a final cause the telos of a thing?

I think your right that most Calvinist's would affirm that many of our actions are outside the normal/natural chain of cause and effect. However, the skeptic may contend that a theological determinism is no better. Many would deny that there remains any human responsibility. I have struggled a lot with this issue.

However, most accounts of libertarian freedom fail, so perhaps we need to change the criteria of moral responsibility.

 

[Philip]

I think your right that most Calvinist's would affirm that many of our actions are outside the normal/natural chain of cause and effect. However, the skeptic may contend that a theological determinism is no better. Many would deny that there remains any human responsibility. I have struggled a lot with this issue.

The skeptic here is usually forgetting God's unique relation to time and the way that this might effect causality.

In Aristotilean terms, isn't a final cause the telos of a thing?

Yes. Ultimately there is only one final cause.

However, most accounts of libertarian freedom fail, so perhaps we need to change the criteria of moral responsibility.

Right. But so do most of the compatibilist accounts I have seen. I'm not happy with Edwards' solution and most of the others I have seen end up with similar problems.

Are there Reformed thinkers (not Molinists) that actually believe true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom actually exist in Scripture, e.g., 1 Cor. 2:8?

Not aware of any. I'm mainly using the term here to denote differing states of mind whereas a Molinist would argue for counterfactuals that result from indeterminate choice (libertarianism).

Unlike the Molinist, would not the Reformed say that any possible world would have been feasible for God to actualize had God wanted?

Yes. So would Thomas Aquinas, actually.

 

[Toasty]

God determined the will to follow that course of action. What God has ordained will surely come to pass. Does this mean that the person lacks the ability to do otherwise or the ability to desire otherwise? I was just curious because there is a difference between doing and desiring.

You could mean two things by "God determined the will." (1) God determined in Himself concerning the will as an indirect object, or (2) God determined the will as a direct object. Reformed theology maintains that God has determined all things that shall come to pass, but it also maintains that things come to pass according to the freedom and contingency of second causes. It is only in the case of effectual calling that God "determines the will" as a direct object of His grace. We never hear of God determining the will to evil. In fact the word "permission" is used in relation to things which are contrary to God's holiness.

In this context there is no material difference between doing and desiring because the will desires to do. Limiting freedom of will to doing is not genuine freedom of will. If the person can reasonably conceive of an object as good, the will is capacitated to incline towards the thing as good, and this creates new desire. The will is bound to choose according to the judgment of the person, but the judgment itself can be altered so as to create new objects for the will.

Let's be clear what the bondage of the will is for man in his naturally fallen condition. He has no freedom to will "spiritual good." So far as man's psychological constitution is concerned, he still has the power to will "the good" as he conceives it. Fallen man cannot will spiritual good -- his chief end -- to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever.

Just out of curiosity, how did God go about hardening Pharaoh's heart? I know that God does not determine the will to evil.

 

[MW]

Just out of curiosity, how did God go about hardening Pharaoh's heart? I know that God does not determine the will to evil.

Different explanations have been given. As I see it, Pharaoh's softening in letting the people go was owing to the restraints of providence. There was no real change of nature. When these restraints were withdrawn he was left to follow his original purpose and was thereby hardened under God's providence.

WCF 5.6: "As for those wicked and ungodly men whom God, as a righteous judge, for former sins, doth blind and harden; from them he not only withholdeth his grace, whereby they might have been enlightened in their understandings, and wrought upon their hearts; but sometimes also withdraweth the gifts which they had; and exposeth them to such objects as their corruption makes occasion of sin; and withal, gives them over to their own lusts, the temptations of the world, and the power of Satan; whereby it comes to pass that they harden themselves, even under those means which God useth for the softening of others."

Robert Shaw: "God cannot possibly solicit or seduce any man to sin; for this is inconsistent with the purity of his nature. - James i. 13,14. But, in righteous judgment, God sometimes permits persons to fall into one sin for the punishment of another."