VanDrunen on The Moral Law and Forgiving Others

[Puritan Sailor]

In his inaugural lecture, "The Two Kingdoms and the Ordo Salutis", David VanDrunen made this statement attempting to explain how the practice of the moral law changes for those who have been justified and enter into the covenant of grace (WTJ 70 (2008), pg. 220).

Clearly, love in some sense is a requirement of the natural law, known apart from justification.26 But there is a love revealed in Christ's redemptive work and in justification that is unknown in natural law or even in pre-redemptive special revelation. This is a love of mercy, of forgiveness. That we would be merciful, forgiving, is not something known to pre-fall Adam or to non-justified sinners. But now mercy and forgiveness have become central, defining characteristics of the Christian life of the justified.27 In this sense (at least), justification has effected a change not merely in the context of morality but even in its substance.

The explanatory footnotes are here:

26 If the moral law and natural law are summarized in the Decalogue and the Decalogue is summarized by the two great love commandments (as commonly taught in Reformed theology and in the Reformed confessional standards), then this statement must be true. The love prescribed in the covenant of works and in the natural law is a love apparently to be practiced without considerations of mercy and forgiveness. This is also strikingly true of the Decalogue, whose precepts make no mention of mercy or forgiveness either.

27 How do such claims relate to the image of God? This is a point I hope to develop at more length in the future, but a few comments may indicate a helpful direction. As a general consideration, it seems correct to say that morality ought always to reflect the image of God, and hence should reflect the moral nature of God that is revealed. First, then, perhaps we might say that the love prescribed in the covenant of works reflects the moral nature of God as revealed in that original covenant. God revealed himself as a just God, but not as a merciful God, so that the law of the covenant of works (both as naturally and supernaturally revealed) prescribed a love that was to be expressed only in terms of the strict administration of justice. This seems to make sense of Gen 1:26 in the context of Gen 1-3. Second, perhaps we might say that the love prescribed to fallen sinners, in the context of common grace, reflects the moral nature of God as revealed in the common grace covenant. In the covenant of common grace God continues to reveal himself as just, but as just in a way tempered by tolerance and forbearance (which are not the same as mercy and forgiveness). Hence, the law of the covenant of common grace prescribes a love that entails the practice of justice, though tempered with forbearance. This seems to make sense of Gen 9:6, in the context of Gen 9 (I take the appeal to the image of God here to refer primarily to the authority of a human being to execute justice rather than to the value of human life). Third, perhaps we might say that the love prescribed to redeemed sinners reflects the moral nature of God as revealed in the covenant of grace. Hence, the law of the covenant of grace prescribes a love in which the claims of justice are no longer applied strictly or even simply delayed through forbearance, but instead transcended through the rendering of mercy and forgiveness made possible because of God's forgiveness of believers in Christ. This seems to make sense of Rom 8:29 and other texts that speak of being restored unto the image of Christ in redemption. This also seems consistent with the fifth petition of the prayer that Jesus taught his disäples to pray: Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors. There is no practice of forgiveness prescribed in God's law unless that law comes in the context of the forgiveness bestowed in Christ."

My question regards his assertion about the obligation of forgiveness as a unique duty for those within the covenant of grace. Perhaps I may be misunderstanding him (and if so please correct me), but it seems to me that he is asserting that the obligation to "forgive our debtors" was not an intrinsic part of the moral law from the beginning or even binding upon those still under the covenant of works, but an additional duty imposed after we experience redemption through Christ.

So my questions are as follows:
1) Is this true that mercy and forgiveness are not required by the moral law for people outside the covenant of grace? (I know magistrates must execute justice per Gen 9/Roman 13 etc., but what about the common ethics of mankind under the covenant of works apart from that judicial office?) And if so, how can this be reconciled with our Confession's assertion that the same moral law given in the beginning continues to be "the perfect rule of righteousness" which binds "both justified persons and others" (WCF 19)?

2) Is there any historical precedent (i.e. references) in the Reformed tradition to understand the obligations of the moral law evolving progressively in this way for those coming into the covenant of grace, or that forgiveness is not a duty for those still under the covenant of works?

3) Perhaps a more "rubber meets the road" angle to this question: Should a pastor tell an unbelieving married couple that they must forgive one another in order for their marriage to work?

* I don't want this to turn into a "blast all things 2K" thread. Please stick to this particular question of forgiveness as it relates to the moral law and provide some references if you know of any.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I don't want to speak for DVD. I think this will turn into a "blast all things 2K" thread and I'm guessing it won't take long.

1. I think the point that mercy and forgiveness wouldn't be an obligation, per se, to Adam. To whom would Adam need to extend forgiveness? I also think the structure of the CoW is such that no forgiveness is given for the transgression under the CoW itself. There is no "mercy" because mercy requires a propitiatory sacrifice - hence the immediate introduction of the CoG.

2. I think there is some use of moral law as if it is co-extensive with the notion of the CoW itself. This is a common mistake.

3. I think natural revelation reveals that there is a God and I also agree with Van Til that it also reveals that there is a Fall. I believe that man knows that he's under a Curse and that the God under Whom he is cursed is longsuffering. That is to say that he ought to understand that there's no reason why he still has breath. I would agree that the remedy to his plight does not come through natural revelation (that is the Gospel) but he at least understands some notion that he is not getting what he deserves (at least not yet). It could be said that the moral law, written on his heart, condemns him when he refuses to be at all good to people who harm him. It's not mercy in the sense of propitiation but I believe men are under greater condemnation if they exercise rights to "vengeance" when the Lord Himself delays it in their own case.

4. I think the light of nature testifies that many societies exercise a form of "forgiveness" apart from Christian teaching. If only to their own children, almost all people express some level of tolerance for the hurts that others inflict upon them and don't exercise complete justice.

I don't know if this is what you're thinking about but these are my random thoughts.

 

[MW]

Hopefully Rich's comment will suffice to keep this from turning into another bombardment.

It is likely the covenantal justice/grace dichotomy of Meredith Kline is working in the background here.

The question of forgiveness is similar to whether faith is required in the moral law. Theologians distinguish between faith as a moral duty and the specific exercise of faith in Jesus Christ for salvation. The duty to believe, however, is moral. Likewise, the duty to love would require forgiveness in the event of a fall which renders all human actions less than perfect. This means the duty to forgive must be moral. In Matthew 7, our judgment of others is brought under the consideration of rational-moral principles such as our own faults and the golden rule. In the parable of the unforgiving servant, Matthew 18, our Lord appeals to the inequity of the servant's actions.

The new commandment adds a fresh motivation and perspective to love, but it does not redefine its nature or quality. Love is and always will be the fulfilling of the law. If it were otherwise we would be faced with the possibility that there might be works of supererogation. In opposition to a supererogating attitude our Lord teaches us to look on everything we do, when we do it, as having done what was only our duty.

 

[Puritan Sailor]

Yes, I can understand that Adam pre-Fall would not have to forgive others due to having no opportunity. My concern is Van Drunen's inclusion of "the non-justified" from the duty to forgive others after the Fall while still living under the moral law and the covenant of works. The illustrations of parenting and marriage are prime examples where I see a conflict. Van Drunen is clear in the article that under the covenant of works, the "works principle" applies to everything from business to friendship to even art. It would seem the family institutions fall under this as well? It seems hard to reconcile God's use of parental and marital metaphors (as expounded in the law) as illustrations of the covenant of grace if these institutions are in fact strictly based upon justice under the covenant of works.

This conception just sounds very different and seems to be redefining how love relates to the law. And I'm sure Kline's covenant formulation does play a role in this. I just don't remember reading anything like this in historical theology. And I wonder what the logical implications will be in the long run as this line of thinking plays out...

Any other thoughts or references would be helpful.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I agree with you Patrick. DVD also abandons a bi-covenantal scheme and introduces another covenant - the Covenant of Common Grace.

I think Paul in Galatians 5 notes that love is the fulfillment of the Law. I don't think it's accurate to think that simply because a person remains under the Covenant of Works that they are freed from an obligation to forgive. While there is no forgiveness for transgression under the CoW it is because the party offended for sin is God. Man is not God. If a person is sinned against under the CoW, I think Matthew is right to note that the faith is a duty of the moral law.

That is to say that it is a duty, because men are fallen, not to reason that they are yet under the CoW and must accomplish the duties of the moral law on their own strength. Man is no longer in a state where he can obey the moral law perfectly and to try to do so (reasoning that they are under the CoW) is a sin itself.

While fallen man may lack special revelation, which indicates where he is to turn for remedy, it is still a moral duty that he realize that the observance of the moral law by himself or another is sinful because general revelation reveals his inability. Man, therefore, must reason that the only fulfillment of the demand would have to come by another if anyone is going to fulfill it.

Under the CoW, it's true again that there is no mercy but if a husband sins against his wife there is no forgiveness from God for that sin apart from Christ but the wife is not God. The man is not under a CoW with reference to the woman but with reference to God. He is in a marriage covenant and I don't think it follows that because God demands and deserves perfect righteousness from his servants that we are able to demand the same.

 

[mvdm]

The question regarding the place of forgiveness/mercy in the "common kingdom" relates to Propositions #10, 11, & 25, found here:

27 Propositions and Counter Points Concerning Two Kingdom Theology

 

[Puritan Sailor]

So has there been any written response to your comments Mark since you posted that?

 

[mvdm]

So has there been any written response to your comments Mark since you posted that?

To my knowledge, there have been no direct responses by any of the principal neo-2k advocates.

 

[Reformed Covenanter]

I noticed the below (Neo-2K) proposition:

25. The Christian lives under a dual ethic, namely, the natural law-justice ethic governing life in the common kingdom and the grace-mercy ethic governing life in the spiritual kingdom.

So, does that mean that we do not show grace and mercy to those outside of the spiritual kingdom?

 

[mvdm]

I noticed the below (Neo-2K) proposition:

25. The Christian lives under a dual ethic, namely, the natural law-justice ethic governing life in the common kingdom and the grace-mercy ethic governing life in the spiritual kingdom.

So, does that mean that we do not show grace and mercy to those outside of the spiritual kingdom?

Would seem to be the natural (pun intended) implication of the proposition.

It would also suggest that even Christians interacting with other Christians would be governed by the natural law/justice ethic whenever they are operating in the common kingdom.

 

[TheOldCourse]

I noticed the below (Neo-2K) proposition:

25. The Christian lives under a dual ethic, namely, the natural law-justice ethic governing life in the common kingdom and the grace-mercy ethic governing life in the spiritual kingdom.

So, does that mean that we do not show grace and mercy to those outside of the spiritual kingdom?

He seems to want to distinguish common and special grace not only with respect to God's disposition towards man, but also man's disposition toward one another. Since he's trying to maintain that our actions in the common kingdom are consistent with common grace but not special grace, I don't think he's really saying that we don't show grace and mercy per se to those outside of the spiritual kingdom, but that there is an essential difference in the character of the grace we show. When he says grace-mercy in that context he's using those in the sense of the electing, special grace of God. I don't really understand how he sees how human analogs of the common/special grace distinction really works out in practice (of course, I've read little DvD myself) , but I think his position is a bit more nuanced than that sentence in isolation would indicate.