RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
In this collection of sermons Dr. Thornwell demonstrates the connection between truth (identified as epistemic realism--not Thornwell’s term) and virtue. The book is a glowing tour-de-force. I have some major disagreements with sections of the book, but even then Thornwell anticipated current debates in epistemology and showed why a commitment to knowledge as justified, true beliefs necessitates internalism in epistemology (well, to a degree).
Anthropology
Before one discusses knowledge and how we can know, we must be clear on the knowing faculties. Again, this is where the common-sense school thrives. First, the human will directs the appetitive powers. Our appetites are not self-directed. They are directed by the will (Thornwell 25).
Thornwell insists, rightly I think, that will is not synonymous with volition (38). What then is the difference? He really doesn’t expand on it and here we can only fall back upon Dabney and Muller.
Knowledge as Justification or Warrant?
Like the rest of the godly 19th century theologians, Thornwell was a student of the wonderful Thomas Reid. Interestingly enough, Thornwell did not take Reid in the direction that later thinkers like Plantinga took Reid.
While Thornwell speaks often of man’s constitution in relation to truth, which would seem to point him towards Plantinga’s warrant, Thornwell is just as forceful in seeing knowledge as justified, true belief within a foundationalist context. He is correct that “the duty to seek knowledge should never transcend our capacities” (45).
However, he then makes a hard, internalist turn. By internalism I mean the claim that the mind has internal access to the “truth-realm” and that all knowledge is justified, true belief. Thornwell asserts, “The whole duty of man in regard to the conduct of his understanding may be referred to the single comprehensive principle that evidence is the measure of assent” (49). The only thing I may say in response is “what is the evidence for that statement?” There is none.
Ethics of Belief
Thornwell echoes earlier foundationalists and anticipates Wolterstorff’s study (John Locke and the Ethics of Belief) in connecting moral obligations with the act of knowing. “It is the prerogative of Truth alone to invigorate the mind” (Thornwell 28). He expands upon this idea: “The moral and intellectual natures of man are so intimately connected...that confusion of understanding is always accompanied by corresponding lucibrity of principle” (29). This is standard Reformed anthropology that reason and will are conjoined faculties of the soul.
Realism as Ethics
Thornwell anticipates virtue epistemology and shows a connection between a commitment to truth and a sober lifestyle. He does not leave it there, though. What is truth in terms of practice--in terms of telling the truth? Is it a sin to not tell the whole truth, say, to the proverbial Nazis at the door? Thornwell (and Hodge) would say, “No.” Thornwell makes the astute point that there is a difference between “deception” and “concealment.” He writes, “There are things which men have a right to keep secret, and if a prurient curiosity prompts other officiously to pry into them, there is nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to such a spirit” (80).
But the moralist will respond, “You still have to tell the truth to the Nazis at the door.” Perhaps, let’s flesh this out. Let’s say the Nazis ask if there are Jews upstairs (which there are for this scenario)
(1) Is it a “good” to tell the truth and surrender the Jews?
Only the most officious moralist will say yes. They will define the ethically right thing as “satisfying” one’s duty to truth. (How many are closet Kantians without realizing it?)
(1*) Is it a good to mislead the Nazis and save the Jews?
(1’) Is it a good to save the Jews?
Unless you think a young girl getting tortured by Eichmann is a result of doing “good,” you have to answer “yes” to (1’).
With knowledge of (1’) as affirmative, can we then affirm the entirety of (1*)? I think we can but the officious moralist still has doubts. Therefore, we take Thornwell’s statement:
(2) There are things which men have a right to keep secret...spirit.
(2) satisfies the conditions in (1*a), but will it satisfy the moralist? Maybe not, but at this point the moralist must justify a new proposition:
(~2): All men should receive exhaustive truth statements.
This is absurd and impossible to justify. Therefore, (2) is warranted.
The Application of Truth
Truth is a lifestyle. Truth is sanctification. And Thornwell ends with some stirring chapters on the nature of God and Truth.
Anthropology
Before one discusses knowledge and how we can know, we must be clear on the knowing faculties. Again, this is where the common-sense school thrives. First, the human will directs the appetitive powers. Our appetites are not self-directed. They are directed by the will (Thornwell 25).
Thornwell insists, rightly I think, that will is not synonymous with volition (38). What then is the difference? He really doesn’t expand on it and here we can only fall back upon Dabney and Muller.
Knowledge as Justification or Warrant?
Like the rest of the godly 19th century theologians, Thornwell was a student of the wonderful Thomas Reid. Interestingly enough, Thornwell did not take Reid in the direction that later thinkers like Plantinga took Reid.
While Thornwell speaks often of man’s constitution in relation to truth, which would seem to point him towards Plantinga’s warrant, Thornwell is just as forceful in seeing knowledge as justified, true belief within a foundationalist context. He is correct that “the duty to seek knowledge should never transcend our capacities” (45).
However, he then makes a hard, internalist turn. By internalism I mean the claim that the mind has internal access to the “truth-realm” and that all knowledge is justified, true belief. Thornwell asserts, “The whole duty of man in regard to the conduct of his understanding may be referred to the single comprehensive principle that evidence is the measure of assent” (49). The only thing I may say in response is “what is the evidence for that statement?” There is none.
Ethics of Belief
Thornwell echoes earlier foundationalists and anticipates Wolterstorff’s study (John Locke and the Ethics of Belief) in connecting moral obligations with the act of knowing. “It is the prerogative of Truth alone to invigorate the mind” (Thornwell 28). He expands upon this idea: “The moral and intellectual natures of man are so intimately connected...that confusion of understanding is always accompanied by corresponding lucibrity of principle” (29). This is standard Reformed anthropology that reason and will are conjoined faculties of the soul.
Realism as Ethics
Thornwell anticipates virtue epistemology and shows a connection between a commitment to truth and a sober lifestyle. He does not leave it there, though. What is truth in terms of practice--in terms of telling the truth? Is it a sin to not tell the whole truth, say, to the proverbial Nazis at the door? Thornwell (and Hodge) would say, “No.” Thornwell makes the astute point that there is a difference between “deception” and “concealment.” He writes, “There are things which men have a right to keep secret, and if a prurient curiosity prompts other officiously to pry into them, there is nothing criminal or dishonest in refusing to minister to such a spirit” (80).
But the moralist will respond, “You still have to tell the truth to the Nazis at the door.” Perhaps, let’s flesh this out. Let’s say the Nazis ask if there are Jews upstairs (which there are for this scenario)
(1) Is it a “good” to tell the truth and surrender the Jews?
Only the most officious moralist will say yes. They will define the ethically right thing as “satisfying” one’s duty to truth. (How many are closet Kantians without realizing it?)
(1*) Is it a good to mislead the Nazis and save the Jews?
(1’) Is it a good to save the Jews?
Unless you think a young girl getting tortured by Eichmann is a result of doing “good,” you have to answer “yes” to (1’).
With knowledge of (1’) as affirmative, can we then affirm the entirety of (1*)? I think we can but the officious moralist still has doubts. Therefore, we take Thornwell’s statement:
(2) There are things which men have a right to keep secret...spirit.
(2) satisfies the conditions in (1*a), but will it satisfy the moralist? Maybe not, but at this point the moralist must justify a new proposition:
(~2): All men should receive exhaustive truth statements.
This is absurd and impossible to justify. Therefore, (2) is warranted.
The Application of Truth
Truth is a lifestyle. Truth is sanctification. And Thornwell ends with some stirring chapters on the nature of God and Truth.
