# What is a justified belief?



## Brian Bosse (Feb 22, 2008)

Hello Everyone,

The most common definition for 'knowledge' is something along the lines of justified true belief. I think this definition is good; however, it is problematic in that the term 'justified' is not well defined. What is a justified belief? 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Philbeck (Feb 22, 2008)

Another question could be: Does the definition of 'knowledge' change as the 'object' of knowledge changes?


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## Civbert (Feb 22, 2008)

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Everyone,
> 
> The most common definition for 'knowledge' is something along the lines of justified true belief. I think this definition is good; however, it is problematic in that the term 'justified' is not well defined. What is a justified belief?
> 
> ...



One of the most basic questions of philosophy. 

Does 'justify' modify 'true' or 'belief' or both. Does 'justify' modify 'true' modify 'belief'? Are the three terms a list that defines knowledge, each a predicate of knowledge by itself. Can we say knowledge is justified AND true AND belief? 

Can one say he knows something if it is false? That is, is all knowledge true such that a person can not know a falsity (false proposition)? Or is knowledge simply that which we believe is justified true?

And we have to get from 'knowledge' to 'know'. Even if we can demonstrate something is knowledge, how do we then go about knowing it?

This should be an interesting discussion. 

P.S. We should also qualify if we are speaking about the epistemological meaning of the word "knowledge" or the word as found in Scripture. For many, the only "true" definition of a word is the meaning found in the Bible. In that case, "to know" takes us to a whole new realm - and you better look out for the local biblicists. 

Should we talk about the meaning of "definition"? 

 where to start?

Let's begin with Webster.

Don't try to answer each question in one post. Hope I'm not scaring anyone off. 


So I will start out with: 'justified' is deducible from prior true premises.


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## Presbyterian Deacon (Feb 22, 2008)

Isn't that like saying, "It depends on what your definition of 'IS' is!"?


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 22, 2008)

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Everyone,
> 
> The most common definition for 'knowledge' is something along the lines of justified true belief. I think this definition is good; however, it is problematic in that the term 'justified' is not well defined. What is a justified belief?
> 
> ...



Hi Brian,

I don't think the definition is good (of course, I guess that all depends on how 'justified' is defined!) since it carries deontological, internalist, and/or evidentialist baggage.

Thus, following Plantinga, I'd opt for 'warrant' as that elusive property that turns a mere true belief into knowledge. (Unless you're using the terms interchangeably.)

Obviously just holding a true belief isn't sufficient for knowledge since we wouldn't be able to rule out coincidence or lucky guesses. And who wants to call a lucky guess, 'knowledge?'

I think Plantinga has demonstrated the deontological, internalist, and evidentialist constraints tied up in the notion of 'justification' (see esp. Warrant: The Current Debate, and Warrant and Proper Function).

So, as in much of the literature, a 'justified belief' is a belief you are entitled to hold. One flouts no epistemic duties in holding it. You are within your 'epistemic rights' in holding it. Or, given the rest of what we believe, they fit within our ken. That is, they submit to the standards of what we may reasonably believe. To this Audi adds, "That, in turn, is roughly what we may believe without being subject to certain kinds of criticisms, say as intellectually lax, sloppy, overhasty, or the like" (Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, p.2). Note the deontologism.

But since this term has been debated vigorously, I don't see any conclusion being reached on the PB.

And, there are some who add 4th conditions. So, justified, true belief isn't enough. The belief must be formed by a reliable cognitive faculty. But this doesn't rule out cognitive malfunction, which seems to be a necessary component for knowledge (_ruling out_ malfunction, not malfunction, that is!).

Furthermore, not only do epistemologists debate what 'justification' means, some say you must also have the right kind of justification, e.g., a belief that is indefeasible (cf. Leher). There are positive and negative defeater conditions too.

Anyway, to answer the basic question, it appears that a survey of the literature tells us that a 'justified belief' is one that has deontological, internalist, and/or evidential requirement associated with it. Since I'm an externalist (with a negative account of defeat, thus intimating an internalist flair), and a proper function epistemologist (with the caveats of a good design plan, a design plan aimed at producing mostly true beliefs, and being in the right environment, i.e., one sufficiently similar to those my cognitive faculties were made to function in), I obviously take issue with how 'justification' is normally understood. I admit people can be justified in many of their beliefs (even someone deceived by an evil demon who nevertheless does his epistemic duty), yet that doesn't mean that they have knowledge (even if the belief is justified and true).

In answer to *Civbert's def*, I take issue thusly:

Justification = df 'justified' is deducible from prior true premises.

Seems to me this has numerous problems, not the least of which is an invitation to an infinite regress.

If 'justified' = 'deducible from prior true premises' then we must ask if _this belief_ is justified? Either it is, or it isn't. If it isn't, why should we take his definition? If it isn't, then where are the 'true premises' he deduced this definition from. And, say he gives those premises. Are they also justified? If not, then why take them as offering support for an answer to our first question? Do they have any positive epistemic status, at all? If so, then what 'true premises' are these ones deduced from. And on and on...


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## Brian Bosse (Feb 23, 2008)

Hello Gentlemen,



Civbert said:


> Does 'justify' modify 'true' or 'belief' or both. Does 'justify' modify 'true' modify 'belief'? Are the three terms a list that defines knowledge, each a predicate of knowledge by itself? Can we say knowledge is justified AND true AND belief?



I am not sure if these questions where rhetorical or not, but I will answer. For the sake of this discussion, take belief as fundamental. The class of all beliefs can be divided up into four ways: (1) true beliefs that are justified, (2) true beliefs that are not justified, (3) false beliefs that are justified and (4) false beliefs that are not justified. We are speaking about (1). This means that ‘justify’ does not modify ‘true’ nor does ‘true’ modify ‘justify’. The two terms modify the type of belief we are talking about.



Civbert said:


> We should also qualify if we are speaking about the epistemological meaning of the word "knowledge" or the word as found in Scripture.



Ultimately, our answer needs to be informed by Scripture. There is no agreed on “epistemological meaning of ‘knowledge’”. That is why I started the thread. 



Civbert said:


> So I will start out with: 'justified' is deducible from prior true premises.



Assume premises (1) and (2) are true in both cases. 

*Premise:* Tucson is in Arizona.
*Premise:* Phoenix is in Arizona.
*Conclusion:* Tucson is in Phoenix. 

The conclusion was _deduced_ from prior true premises. However, I would not say that it is justified. 

*Premise:* Every electron we have seen repels each other.
*Premise:* ‘x’ and ‘y’ are electrons.
*Conclusion:* ‘x’ and ‘y’ will repel each other.

Is the conclusion justified? I want to say that it is. However, others may not.

As Tom B points out, is "'justified' deducible from prior true premises" deducible from prior true premises? If so, I would like to know what those premises are. If not, then where are we? 



Tom B said:


> I don't think the definition is good (of course, I guess that all depends on how 'justified' is defined!)



In my opening post I pointed out that ‘justified’ is not well defined. The purpose of this thread is to explore the issue. 



Tom B said:


> Thus, following Plantinga, I'd opt for 'warrant' as that elusive property that turns a mere true belief into knowledge. (Unless you're using the terms interchangeably.)



We may end up in this thread adopting Plantinga’s view of warrant as our definition for ‘justification’. 



Tom B said:


> Obviously just holding a true belief isn't sufficient for knowledge since we wouldn't be able to rule out coincidence or lucky guesses.



This is a good point.



Tom B said:


> …a 'justified belief' is a belief you are entitled to hold…they submit to the standards of what we may reasonably believe.



This just pushes us one step back. What do we mean by ‘entitlement,’ or what are the standards of reasonable belief?



Tom B said:


> And, there are some who add 4th conditions. So, justified, true belief isn't enough. The belief must be formed by a reliable cognitive faculty.



I would think ‘justified’ is broad enough to include this, and as such there is no 4th condition. If the equipment we use to justify the conclusions we reach (our cognitive faculties) is not aimed at true belief production, then the conclusions reached cannot be said to be justified. In other words, if the conclusions reached are based on faulty equipment, then they are not justified. What do you think?

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Davidius (Feb 23, 2008)

Isn't it part and parcel to presuppositional apologetics that knowledge is what can be deduced from prior true (in this case "presupposed") premises, and that we don't have to demonstrate the truth of the prior premises because this requires the "testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart"?


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 23, 2008)

Davidius said:


> Isn't it part and parcel to presuppositional apologetics that knowledge is what can be deduced from prior true (in this case "presupposed") premises, and that we don't have to demonstrate the truth of the prior premises because this requires the "testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart"?



1) No it's not 'part and parcel.' Indeed, the majority of "presuppositionalists" disagree with your statement.

2) We're specifically talking about _justification_ not _knowledge_ here.

3) The 'demonstration' comment of mine was _inherent_ in the "presuppositionalist" I was responding to. That is, if what you say is correct, then you must reject your fellow Clarkian's definition of justification. He had no qualifier built in. So, if some beliefs can be 'justified' while also not being 'deduced from prior true premises' then his definition that 'justified' = deductions from prior true premises is false.

4) I'd agree that we don't _have to_ 'demonstrate' our basic beliefs, but certainly that's not something unique to 'presuppositionalism.'

5) As a Clarkian, you don't know anything you said since you can't deduce any of it from Scripture.


**************************

Hi Brian,



> In my opening post I pointed out that ‘justified’ is not well defined. The purpose of this thread is to explore the issue.



That's fine. I was assuming some familiarity with my comment. Given all the background info, I don't think that tripartite analysis of 'knowledge' to be a good one. Now of course, one can define 'justification' any way one wishes, I was just trying to stand in the mainstream. That is, given the mainstream analysis of the debate epistemologists have had, I don't think it is helpful to use the term.



> We may end up in this thread adopting Plantinga’s view of warrant as our definition for ‘justification’.



Don't take offense here, but I have already adopted this perspective (with caveats of my own that don't affect the overall thrust of his project). I wasn't intending on getting involved in a lengthy discussion, I think the relevant literature sufficiently answers the main question of the thread. I merely sketched some of the conclusions of the relevant literature and also pointed others in the general direction where they could verify my conclusions for themselves.



> This just pushes us one step back. What do we mean by ‘entitlement,’ or what are the standards of reasonable belief?



It doesn't really push the question back if the background knowledge of some of my claims are allowed to function in as well as my explicit claims of the deontological (internalist, and/or evidentialist) constraints are read into my statement which you quote. Given the historical survey of the assumptions involved in requiring 'justification' of ones beliefs, then the talk of 'entitlement' makes perfect sense. Given this picture, filled out with notions of epistemic duties and rights, my observations should fit right in. Given the above, 'entitlement' fits right in with my brief sketch. One could say it goes hand in hand with the deontological baggage associated with talk of 'justification.'



> Originally Posted by *Tom B *
> And, there are some who add 4th conditions. So, justified, true belief isn't enough. The belief must be formed by a reliable cognitive faculty.





> originally posted by *Brian B*
> I would think ‘justified’ is broad enough to include this, and as such there is no 4th condition. If the equipment we use to justify the conclusions we reach (our cognitive faculties) is not aimed at true belief production, then the conclusions reached cannot be said to be justified. In other words, if the conclusions reached are based on faulty equipment, then they are not justified. What do you think?



i) Then your argument is with those epistemologists who have said this is a 4th condition (cf. Audi's discussion here in his book I cited in my original post).

ii) It wouldn't be "included" with 'justification' as _classically conceived of_ as having deontological and _internalist_ constraints precisely because reliabilism is a form of _externalism_.

iii) I think talk of 'equipment we use to justify the conclusions' is dripping with internalist assumptions. One externalist lines, we can have a belief produced by a reliable faculty, reliably aimed at producing true beliefs, in a congenial epistemic environment, etc., and still not be '_justified_' in the classical sense. I may have 'knowledge' even though I haven't 'done my epistemic duty.' 

iv) I think conclusions based on faulty equipment _can_ be '_justified_,' though not _warranted_. Plantinga shows this (as one illustration among many), if you recall, in his discussion of ‘The Case of the Epistemically Inflexible Climber.’ See *here* (p. 82).

Another example might be: Consider Jim. Halfway through the day Jim's co-worker asks Jim what he had for breakfast. A strong memorial belief presents itself to Jim---he had eggs and bacon. This belief is vivid and imposes himself on Jim. He can almost smell the bacon, as it were. Memorial beliefs, especially of this kind, I take it, are normally justified. Now suppose that at the exact time the friend asked Jim about his breakfast, those nasty aliens bent on raising Cain, the Alpha Centauries, shot a gamma ray down to earth and caused cognitive malfunction to occur in the part Jim's cognitive apparatus that governs memorial beliefs, producing the phenomenologically strong memorial belief that he ingested eggs and bacon while, in actuality, he had mere oatmeal (apologies to fans of the Quaker Oats Man!). So, Jim's belief was due to cognitive malfunction, but nevertheless, for him, he was justified in believing that he had eggs and bacon. Not warranted, though.

Examples can be easily supplied. Take a case of a parent teaching their child about Santa Clause. One is usually justified in basing beliefs off the testimony of another, especially ones parents. Note Thomas Reid's remarks,

_"I believed by instinct whatever my parents and tutors told me, long before I had the idea of a lie, or a thought of the possibility of their deceiving me. Afterwards, upon reflection, I found that they had acted like fair and honest people, who wished me well. I found that, if I had not believed what they told me, before I could give a reason for my belief, I had to this day been little better than a changeling."_

So the child would be justified, but not warranted in believing in Santa Clause. (Note that this is a case not of cognitive malfunction, but in malfunction of the cognitive environment. That all these parts must be functioning properly, I think lends support to all of Plantinga's qualifications about what it takes for a belief to have warrant.)

Those are some of my thoughts.


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## Brian Bosse (Feb 23, 2008)

Hello Tom B,

The reason I started this thread to explore epistemology without assuming all the intricacies of the current debates in the field. Rather, I was hoping to let the discussion develop these ideas. If someone came up to you and asked you what knowledge is, how would you answer them? My guess is that you would read your audience, and answer accordingly. In this thread I was hoping we would not assume much epistemological sophistication. I was hoping to spark discussion that would develop into more sophisticated ideas. The thread would be kind of like an introduction to epistemology that would start with justified true belief, explore the problems with this, and then explore different solutions. It seems my idea is misplaced and this is not a good thread. 

Brian


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 23, 2008)

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Tom B,
> 
> The reason I started this thread to explore epistemology without assuming all the intricacies of the current debates in the field. Rather, I was hoping to let the discussion develop these ideas. If someone came up to you and asked you what knowledge is, how would you answer them? My guess is that you would read your audience, and answer accordingly. In this thread I was hoping we would not assume much epistemological sophistication. I was hoping to spark discussion that would develop into more sophisticated ideas. The thread would be kind of like an introduction to epistemology that would start with justified true belief, explore the problems with this, and then explore different solutions. It seems my idea is misplaced and this is not a good thread.
> 
> Brian



Brian, 

I was just answering. I didn't know that you were intending it to be a mini, intro course on epistemology. Didn't mean to rain on your parade.

I'll bow out from making further comments.


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## Davidius (Feb 23, 2008)

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Tom B,
> 
> The reason I started this thread to explore epistemology without assuming all the intricacies of the current debates in the field. Rather, I was hoping to let the discussion develop these ideas. If someone came up to you and asked you what knowledge is, how would you answer them? My guess is that you would read your audience, and answer accordingly. In this thread I was hoping we would not assume much epistemological sophistication. I was hoping to spark discussion that would develop into more sophisticated ideas. The thread would be kind of like an introduction to epistemology that would start with justified true belief, explore the problems with this, and then explore different solutions. It seems my idea is misplaced and this is not a good thread.
> 
> Brian



I think it's a good thread, and I'd be more interested in discussing if you would be, too.

Paul says in Colossians 2 that all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Christ. Would that be a starting point for defining knowledge? And just so you don't assume that in asking a simple question I'm trying to espouse Clarkianism, please know that I am not doing so. Even if Scripturalism as defined by Clark is wrong (which I know you believe, and of which I am presently not sure), I know of no other place to start than Scripture.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 23, 2008)

Davidius said:


> Brian Bosse said:
> 
> 
> > Hello Tom B,
> ...



David, 
What do you take Paul to be saying in Colossians 2?

CT


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## Davidius (Feb 23, 2008)

ChristianTrader said:


> Davidius said:
> 
> 
> > Brian Bosse said:
> ...



I'm not totally sure, which is why I asked the question whether this would be a good place to start. It sounds to me like Paul is saying that knowledge and wisdom, whatever they are, are found in Christ, whatever that means.


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 24, 2008)

Davidius said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> > Davidius said:
> ...




Might proto-gnosticism be referred to here? Rather than try to find some hidden, secret gnosis, by means of which one would attain salvation, or special spiritual status, look no futher, it is deposited in Christ! 

See v.2 "in order that they may know the mystery of God, namely, Christ."

The "mystery" of God is a frequent reference to the _Gospel_, by which men are _saved_. Gnosticism taught men were saved by attaining mysterious or hidden knowledge. Not the case here. There's nothing hidden, Christ came down into history, and made himself known to man. We can see reference to the actual, historical teachings about Hesus, as given by the apostles, and accessible to anyone who chose to search these things to find out if they were true:

" 6 So then, just as you received Christ Jesus as Lord, continue to live in him, 7rooted and built up in him, strengthened in the faith as you were taught, and overflowing with thankfulness."

They were "taught" the things of the faith. The teachings were accessible to all men, salvation is found in the Lord. No need to go searching for salvation elsewhere, it's depositied in Christ.

Reference to the real, corporeal world is made:

9For in Christ all the fullness of the Deity lives in _bodily_ form,

Not secret, mystical, gnostic gestures.

Salvation is in mind here:

"13When you were dead in your sins and in the uncircumcision of your sinful nature, God made you alive with Christ. He forgave us all our sins, 14having canceled the written code, with its regulations, that was against us and that stood opposed to us; he took it away, nailing it to the cross. 15And having disarmed the powers and authorities, he made a public spectacle of them, triumphing over them by the cross.

Paul isn't giving a talk about epistemology here, especially the questions 21st century epistemologists are asking.


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## Davidius (Feb 24, 2008)

Ok, thank you.


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## cih1355 (Feb 24, 2008)

Suppose someone says that he will not believe something unless there is a reason for doing so. Is he assuming evidentialism?


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 24, 2008)

cih1355 said:


> Suppose someone says that he will not believe something unless there is a reason for doing so. Is he assuming evidentialism?



Not the way you stated it. There are _some_ things I won't believe if I don't have a reason (or any evidence) to. Say you get charged with a horrible crime. Say I'm a juror. Say the prosecutor offers absolutely zero reasons to think you committed the crime. I therefore would not believe that you did it since I would require evidence for that belief.

Now, if someone were to say that if one were to believe _anything whatever_ without a reason for doing so, that would be closer to the mark.

And I use 'evidence' in this instance to mean what most epistemologists do: propositional evidence in favor (or against) a belief.

A classic statement of the evidentialist constraint is given to us by W.K. Clifford:

_"To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."_

Well, given that statement, you can see why he titled his paper The _Ethics_ of Belief (emphasis added).


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## Civbert (Feb 25, 2008)

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gentlemen,
> 
> 
> 
> ...


That's why I asked. I take the phrase to mean knowledge is a belief that is justified true. I think a justified false belief is a contradiction. You can deduce a false proposition, but only if one starts with false premises. 




Brian Bosse said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> > We should also qualify if we are speaking about the epistemological meaning of the word "knowledge" or the word as found in Scripture.
> ...


 OK





Brian Bosse said:


> Assume premises (1) and (2) are true in both cases.
> 
> *Premise:* Tucson is in Arizona.
> *Premise:* Phoenix is in Arizona.
> ...



I would say the conclusion was not deduced from the premises. A fallacious conclusion is not a true deduction. When I say, deducible from true premise, I mean the deduction is valid. 




Brian Bosse said:


> *Premise:* Every electron we have seen repels each other.
> *Premise:* ‘x’ and ‘y’ are electrons.
> *Conclusion:* ‘x’ and ‘y’ will repel each other.
> 
> Is the conclusion justified? I want to say that it is. However, others may not.



The correct conclusion is "it is reasonable to believe (strongly) that ‘x’ and ‘y’ will repel each other. 



Brian Bosse said:


> As Tom B points out, is "'justified' deducible from prior true premises" deducible from prior true premises? If so, I would like to know what those premises are. If not, then where are we?


 It is a valid question. We are examining the justification of what we consider our knowledge. 


As for Plantinga, does he even get to "knowledge". He speaks of warranted belief. I don't think he concludes that this implies knowledge. Merely that there is a way to judge what is reasonable to believe, and particularly, if Christians have sufficient warrant to hold their beliefs. Knowledge, seems to go on step further.

And still not addressed is the difference between knowledge and knowing. It's one thing to say I have good reason to believe something - my believe is warranted; it's another thing to say what I believe is knowledge. 

How one answers this depends on ones understanding of the definition of knowledge. Can someone "know" a false proposition? And consider the implications of either answer.


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## Civbert (Feb 25, 2008)

Tom Bombadil said:


> In answer to *Civbert's def*, I take issue thusly:
> 
> Justification = df 'justified' is deducible from prior true premises.
> 
> ...



Now we are getting into _definitions_. Do definitions even qualify as knowledge - as "justified true belief"? 

But if we assume the definition of justification is true (and isn't that how we examine definitions), your issue then is can I demonstrate that the premises of my conclusion are also justified true. And how do I demonstrate that the prior premises are also justified true? But this begs the question. It assumes that according to the assumed definition of justification, one must personally go through a process of "justifying" prior premises in order to know something. 

My defintion of justified was carefully stated: 'deducible from prior true premises'. It does not necessitate that one must personally be cognizant of the means of deducing the conclusion. Rather, it says that the conclusion must be deducible from prior true premises. 

So if one needs to do the deducing personally is another issue. Does one need to be cognizant of the "justification" of a proposition in order to "know" it? 

We are still trying to examine the meaning of "justification" in the defintion of "knowledge is justified true belief". We still have to deal with how one personally knows knowledge. 

Can I know *A* and Brian know *-A*? This will impact what we mean by justification. It also impacts the idea of absolute objective truth.


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 26, 2008)

Civbert said:


> My defintion of justified was carefully stated: 'deducible from prior true premises'. It does not necessitate that one must personally be cognizant of the means of deducing the conclusion. Rather, it says that the conclusion must be deducible from prior true premises.




Anthony,

I'm very familiar with your 'built in' out. But it isn't as messianic as you would hope.

For every proposition you believe, it is either justified or it is not. 

Now, one cannot have a vicious infinite regress in a system. This is like writing a bad check to cover a previous bad check, and so on. Sooner or later, payment needs to be made.

So, I ask you about your belief regarding what 'justification' means.

That belief is either justified or it isn't.

If it is, then it's 'deducible' from prior true premises.

So, I want to inquire into this definition. You know, see if it stands, 'n all. See if one is justified in believing it. 

Now, you can either deduce it, or you cannot.

Since you didn’t offer the deduction, then I'm assuming that you can't.

'But,' you say, 'my definition was very precise, I only said it has to deducible, not that one must involve themselves with actually deducing.'

'Very well,' I say, 'that's fine by me, but I still want to know if you're justified in believing it.'

Strikes me at this point your 'out' doesn't serve you too well.

Some options:

i) I'm just supposed to take Anthony's word for it.

ii) I'm supposed to make a leap of faith and *grant* that it *is* 'deducible,' *in principle.*

But why should I do a thing like that? Seems to me that without the deduction, one can rightly ask about what positive epistemic status your definition has? That is, why believe it? In other words, are you justified in believing it. But we saw you don't want to go down that road. (Which, by the way, is a wise, and safe, maneuver.

Moving on, let's scratch the above. There are still problems.

Say that your belief in the proposition 'a justified belief is ________' *is* deducible from prior true premises.

So we have something like this: 1 is based on 2. If one believed 2, one would either be justified in believing it or not. Say one is. That would be because of 3. Now, one is or isn't justified in believing 3. This would go on to _n_, whether in fact or _in principle_. So, you have an _in principle _infinite regress problem.

So you can't escape the regress. Either justification goes on for ever, or it stops and your entire chain rests on an (in principle) _unjustified_ belief.

I should also point out that your apologetic methodology here (not Clarkianism, you defense of your statement sin this thread) seems to open up the door for some loosey goosey behavior.

Take a Muslim. He tells you that he is justified in believing that Allah is God.

You ask him why.

He says, "All that matters is that belief be deducIBLE."

I should also point out that things most people think they are justified in believing, cannot be, on your definition. No more being justified in believing in the reliability of memory, the existence of a past, the existence of other minds, the reliability of testimony, etc.

Most people think that they are justified in, say, believing that the people that told him they were his parents, are. Thus your position requires us to swallow some pretty big claims, and thus bears a large burden.

I will lastly comment that it appears that you must say that we are not justified in believing in basic laws of logic.

Indeed, is there anything you think we can be justified in believing? Anything at all.

If so, lay it out, along with the prior true premises.

I will then question each premise as to whether it is justified or not.

You will either have to plead ignorance, or you will get caught in an infinite regress. If infinite, then we should abandon your position. If ignorance, you offer no one any reason to believe the things you say are justified. You seal yourself off from the world. I guess this is why Clark said: "At this point it's dogmatism." If you yell loud enough, perhaps you'll bully a few into accepting propositions that have no positive epistemic status.

My advice would be to scrap your entire approach here.


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## MW (Feb 26, 2008)

Brian Bosse said:


> The reason I started this thread to explore epistemology without assuming all the intricacies of the current debates in the field. Rather, I was hoping to let the discussion develop these ideas.



Kind of like watching the house being built in order to learn something about its structure -- good idea.

I'd like to see a discussion on the basis of 1 Cor. 10:23-33, and Paul's exhortation to accommodate other men's knowledge, granting that "conscience" is a form of knowledge. There are at least three levels of knowledge at work in this scenario. There is the knowledge of the believer that an idol is nothing and there is only one God. There is the knowledge of the unbeliever that the meat is sacrificed to an idol. And there is the knowledge of the believer that the unbeliever knows the meat is sacrificed to an idol.

Now we would accept that the believer's knowledge is true on the first level -- there is only one God and an idol is nothing. On the second level we would say that the object of the unbeliever's knowledge is false. The meat is not offered to anything, seeing an idol is nothing. But then on the third level the unbeliever's knowledge would appear to be regarded as true by the believer, at least so far as the proposition itself is concerned. The meat has been offered to an idol in the unbeliever's view, and the believer is to regard the "conscience" of the unbeliever.

So what does this leave us with in terms of defining knowledge? Are we bound to distinguish at least two types of knowledge -- the phenomenal and the real; one which operates on the functional level of personal beliefs and another which is concerned with the truth of what is believed?


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## Civbert (Feb 26, 2008)

Tom Bombadil said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> > My defintion of justified was carefully stated: 'deducible from prior true premises'. It does not necessitate that one must personally be cognizant of the means of deducing the conclusion. Rather, it says that the conclusion must be deducible from prior true premises.
> ...


 

If you want, I can go through and point out all the mistakes, but that would be tedious and probably won't advance the discussion. Rather than addressing the compounding errors in your response, let me ask you this: What _is_ a definition? What makes a definition a definition?


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## Civbert (Feb 26, 2008)

armourbearer said:


> So what does this leave us with in terms of defining knowledge? Are we bound to distinguish at least two types of knowledge -- the phenomenal and the real; one which operates on the functional level of personal beliefs and another which is concerned with the truth of what is believed?


So are you proposing that there is false knowledge? Or that knowledge can be justified false belief?

Would you expound on phenomenal versus real?


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## Neopatriarch (Feb 26, 2008)

As I understood it, knowledge is warranted true belief where , as Plantinga defines it in Warranted Christian Belief, "a belief has warrant if and only if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief." (p. 498)

But I'm not clear on why justification should be defined as 'deducible from prior true premises.' I thought of it more generally as the matter of giving or having reasons for your belief. Somehow, you want to show, or at least have, a basis for believing your belief is true, but must this come by way of deduction? What about induction or even a transcendental argument?

Also, if justification is defined as 'deducible from prior true premises', then it seems you need to have reasons for your reasons and reasons for the reasons for your reasons and so on ad infinitum (the infinite regress problem) in order to be justified in any belief. Of course the ultimate reason for anything we justifiably believe is God, and I don't need another reason for that reason.


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## Civbert (Feb 26, 2008)

Good questions. 



Neopatriarch said:


> As I understood it, knowledge is warranted true belief where , as Plantinga defines it in Warranted Christian Belief, "a belief has warrant if and only if it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief." (p. 498)


 Plantinga is not defining "knowledge". He doesn't go that far. He is merely saying the one is "warranted" in believing something if "it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly....". This still does not say anything about knowledge, just what beliefs are reasonable to believe. Plantinga is basically saying that Christian beliefs are reasonable. He is not saying that they are universal truths. He is not even saying Christianity has more warrant that Judaism or Islam. 



Neopatriarch said:


> But I'm not clear on why justification should be defined as 'deducible from prior true premises.' I thought of it more generally as the matter of giving or having reasons for your belief. Somehow, you want to show, or at least have, a basis for believing your belief is true, but must this come by way of deduction? What about induction or even a transcendental argument?


Well giving a reason for believing something is good, but doesn't determine if what you believe rises to the level of knowledge. I believe my wife will be home before 8pm. Do I know this? No. I have good reason to believe this, but I don't know it.

Second - I put this forward again, can you know a false proposition. This is a key question to how you understand epistemic knowledge. If knowing means simply to be certain, you can be certain about many false things. And then I can know A and you can know -A, and who can say either is wrong. Both could be equally valid warranted beliefs.

Induction leads to possible conclusions. If we say induction can justify knowledge, we must accept both A and -A can be true. 

The "transcendental argument" is a deductive argument. I won't go into the validity of it here, just simply note that it is deduction, not induction. 



Neopatriarch said:


> Also, if justification is defined as 'deducible from prior true premises', then it seems you need to have reasons for your reasons and reasons for the reasons for your reasons and so on ad infinitum (the infinite regress problem) in order to be justified in any belief. Of course the ultimate reason for anything we justifiably believe is God, and I don't need another reason for that reason.



This depends on another issue regarding "justification". Does one need to be cognizant of the "justification" for one to have knowledge. I know the square root of 36 is 6. However, I can't tell you why this is true. Is this knowledge on my part or opinion. It is a justified true belief. It is knowledge. 

Say you take a test and score 98%. Yet on most of the answers you could not explain to me _how_ you knew the answers. At one time, you were fully cognizant of how the answers were derived - but now you just know what the answers are. At least, that is the question - do you know the answers or not. Are they just your opinions? 

So you might understand why I keep returning to the questions like: Can one know a false proposition? Can one person know A, and the another know -A? Can A and -A both be knowledge? Are we going to include both true and false proposition in our understanding of knowledge? If we lower the bar on what constitutes knowledge too far, we will need to allow for contradictions in our knowledge. And we need to allow for the implications of allowing contradictions.


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## Neopatriarch (Feb 26, 2008)

> Second - I put this forward again, can you know a false proposition. This is a key question to how you understand epistemic knowledge. If knowing means simply to be certain, you can be certain about many false things. And then I can know A and you can know -A, and who can say either is wrong. Both could be equally valid warranted beliefs.



I thought being true was one of the conditions for having knowledge. Your belief must correspond with the way things are. Now you could justifiably claim you know something because you have reasons for believing you are *warranted* in your belief, but still that knowledge claim could turn out to be false. So then, wouldn't you say, "Well, I guess I didn't know that after all? I just thought I knew it."



> This depends on another issue regarding "justification". Does one need to be cognizant of the "justification" for one to have knowledge. I know the square root of 36 is 6. However, I can't tell you why this is true. Is this knowledge on my part or opinion. It is a justified true belief. It is knowledge.



I suppose you could have nonpropositional reasons (justification) for believing something just as you could have warrant for it. I don't see why being "produced by cognitive faculties . . ." would require a belief to be at the end of a deductive chain of arguments stretching back to infinity. You could say you are immediately justified in believing something and not have propositional reasons you could give or even be aware of.



> So you might understand why I keep returning to the questions like: Can one know a false proposition?



Perhaps one can just justifiably *claim* to know a false proposition.


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## Civbert (Feb 26, 2008)

Neopatriarch said:


> I thought being true was one of the conditions for having knowledge. Your belief must correspond with the way things are. Now you could justifiably claim you know something because you have reasons for believing you are *warranted* in your belief, but still that knowledge claim could turn out to be false. So then, wouldn't you say, "Well, I guess I didn't know that after all? I just thought I knew it."


 Yes. But could we really claim to know anything is true if it might be false? Would knowlege ever be obtainable? There would be your beliefs and my beliefs and both could be reasonable, even if contradictory. 



Neopatriarch said:


> I suppose you could have nonpropositional reasons (justification) for believing something just as you could have warrant for it. I don't see why being "produced by cognitive faculties . . ." would require a belief to be at the end of a deductive chain of arguments stretching back to infinity.


 Why infinity? But the chain of reasoning would still need to go back whether it's deductive or inductive. Usually, you demonstrate claims to knowledge by reasoning from some prior knowledge and some form of reasoning. It can not go on forever. It goes until you reach a point where you can go no further - where you say, 'this I must assume is true'. This is what needs to be done if one is to demonstrate the reasons for believing something is true. It's the argument for the conclusion. If the conclusion follows logically from true premises, it is justified true. That might only take one step. 

And I think, for the reasons I gave, that one would not need to be cognizant of the reasoning that justifies the truth of a proposition. But I think at minumum, to _claim_ to know a truth, you should be _able_ to demonstrate it to the extent that you can deduce it from prior true premises. 



Neopatriarch said:


> You could say you are immediately justified in believing something and not have propositional reasons you could give or even be aware of.


 I think this is possible. All men know God exists and suppress that knowledge. This would be immediate knowledge. This is knowledge we are born with - and the reason all men need to be justified by Christ, including infants. 



Neopatriarch said:


> Perhaps one can just justifiably *claim* to know a false proposition.


Now we've come full circle. If a proposition is false, can it be justified? 

If justified is "deducible from true premises", a false proposition can not be justified - and therefore you can not know it. You can not correctly deduce a false conclusion from true premises. 

If justified means that a false proposition can be justified, then one can know two contradictory propositions. After all, both propositions can be equally warranted. But knowledge becomes subjective and relative. Maybe that is the best model of knowledge. But we need to be aware of the consequence -and not claim to hold objective knowledge. Knowledge is relative and subjective if justified knowledge is not better than warranted belief.


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 26, 2008)

Civbert said:


> Tom Bombadil said:
> 
> 
> > Civbert said:
> ...



No thanks, me and my (many) errors are fine. Pay us no attention. Go outside and look at some rocks. I'm dumber than them.


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## Jim Johnston (Feb 26, 2008)

Civbert said:


> Plantinga is not defining "knowledge". He doesn't go that far. He is merely saying the one is "warranted" in believing something if "it is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly....". This still does not say anything about knowledge, just what beliefs are reasonable to believe. Plantinga is basically saying that Christian beliefs are reasonable. He is not saying that they are universal truths. He is not even saying Christianity has more warrant that Judaism or Islam.



Just stopping buy to make sure people aren't led astray by falshoods.

That is flat out false, Civbert. Granting that I've read over 3,000 pages of material---either by or about Plantinga---I think I can say with almost complete epistemic certainty (  ) that you're flat out mistaken.

For Plantinga, a belief is warranted only if there is a high objective probability of its being true. 

Plantinga takes 'knowledge' to be 'warranted, true belief.' Thus 'warrant is that property that turns mere true belief into knowledge.' Given his discussion on sin and cognitive malfunction, why would you even think that he thinks an unregenerate Muslim or Jew has 'just as much warrant?" Frankly, I doubt if you've even read his books yourself. For mistkaes, therse are too big!

Lurkers- beware what you read on the web. Test everything.


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## MW (Feb 26, 2008)

Civbert said:


> Would you expound on phenomenal versus real?



"Phenomenal" would be knowledge of the action considered in itself. The meat has in fact been sacrificed to idols. "Real" would be the action as interpreted by the Christian system of truth. The idol is nothing and therefore there is no *real* sacrifice. Nevertheless, the believer must accept the knowledge of the unbeliever as genuine and act accordingly.


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## Civbert (Feb 26, 2008)

I don't have any problem being corrected. All I've gone on is what others have written here, some quotes I've read, and some of Plantinga's mp3s I've listened to. 


Tom Bombadil said:


> For Plantinga, a belief is warranted only if there is a high objective probability of its being true.


 But I don't recall reading this before.



Tom Bombadil said:


> Plantinga takes 'knowledge' to be 'warranted, true belief.' Thus 'warrant is that property that turns mere true belief into knowledge.' Given his discussion on sin and cognitive malfunction, why would you even think that he thinks an unregenerate Muslim or Jew has 'just as much warrant?" Frankly, I doubt if you've even read his books yourself. For mistakes, these are too big!


 Nope. I haven't read any of his books. They are on my Amazon wish list - but no one have bought them for me (hint hint). I'm stuck mainly with public domain books and those things I can get at a deep discount (my Calvin's Commentaries, and my set of The Works BB Warfield. I got them by going in with several others at church for a big bulk discount.) 

So you can give a quotation and citation of Plantinga's work were he defines knowledge as you have said (warranted belief)? I can't look it up personally.

Please take a list at my wish list and let me know which books you thing should be priority and what else I should add. My Amazon Wish List - Theology and Apologetics List


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