# Finding "Common sense" principles



## Afterthought (Mar 7, 2012)

For the "common sense" realists. This is probably a basic question, but: How do you know that the fundamental principles of the mind--alleged to be common to all (hence sometimes called "common sense")--are universal? If you claim they are self-evident, how do you know that such are self-evident to all (if that even matters?)?


----------



## MW (Mar 7, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> For the "common sense" realists. This is probably a basic question, but: How do you know what principles of the mind--alleged to be common to all (hence sometimes called "common sense")--are universal? If you claim they are self-evident, how do you know that such are self-evident to all (if that even matters?)?



You just asked someone to explain something he believes to another person. The presence of mind in an individual and of other minds has just been presupposed. Correspondence of some kind between the thing and its conception has also been presupposed. Then you have asked, How do you know? Presumably there are criteria to that knowledge such as the ability to draw a conclusion from a premise, which demands a whole range of self-evident universals. The idea that something is self-evident, emphasising self, requires the law of identity and non contradiction. And every law of discursive thought justifies a common sense realist approach to knowledge.


----------



## Philip (Mar 7, 2012)

Try having a conversation without assuming the laws of contradiction, the presence of other minds, human responsibility and basic rationality, empirical sense-perception and induction and let me know how it goes. Common-sense assumptions are, quite simply, practical assumptions. Even Hume admitted that his philosophy worked only in theory and that in practice he couldn't be a consistent empiricist (this was Reid's critique).


----------



## Afterthought (Mar 7, 2012)

Thanks! So these "assumptions" are known to be universal because an individual cannot imagine any person functioning rationally without them? Or is knowing these are universal more like "proving" the law of noncontradiction: Someone must use it to deny it?

Although....


P. F. Pugh said:


> Common-sense assumptions are, quite simply, practical assumptions.


If they are practical assumptions, then they need not be inherent within each individual mind as fundamental laws of thought (which I thought common sense realism claimed?) but are merely the only way we can function rationally?



armourbearer said:


> Presumably there are criteria to that knowledge such as the ability to draw a conclusion from a premise, which demands a whole range of self-evident universals.


A separate question from that of the OP (for you or anyone else): How does one determine something is self-evident? I notice that what is self-evident to some isn't self-evident to all; and what some claim is self-evident others deny is self-evident. What is it about something that carries its own evidence with it that makes it evident enough to be self-evident? Is it again something that cannot be denied without denying rational ability or perhaps that cannot be consistently denied (which assumes that action shows true belief)?


----------



## MW (Mar 7, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> A separate question from that of the OP (for you or anyone else): How does one determine something is self-evident? I notice that what is self-evident to some isn't self-evident to all; and what some claim is self-evident others deny is self-evident. What is it about something that carries its own evidence with it that makes it evident enough to be self-evident? Is it again something that cannot be denied without denying rational ability or perhaps that cannot be consistently denied (which assumes that action shows true belief)?



I suppose the best way to answer is to say it must be an irreducible complexity in order to be self-evident. It is that without which the mechanism of reason simply cannot function. A philosophical analyst likes to break thought up into tiny section but the fact is those anatomised sections must be united together as a whole in order to work.

Like any science, there is disagreement over details, even when there is agreement over the approach. The very mention of something being self-evident suffices for a realist framework. Sometimes differences are simply a matter of taxonomy in that different schemes overlap their classifications of universals. I will have to look up a text book to remember the bare minimum of self-evident truths agreed upon by all realists, classical or otherwise. My mind, other minds, and non contradiction is certainly among them. If you would like a beginner's course I highly recommend Ronald Nash's textbook; I think it is called Life's Ultimate Questions, or something like that. Just be wary of some of his Clarkian tendencies. He also has his lecture series available in Itunes from Reformed Seminary.


----------



## Philip (Mar 7, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> If they are practical assumptions, then they need not be inherent within each individual mind as fundamental laws of thought (which I thought common sense realism claimed?) but are merely the only way we can function rationally?



But that's the same thing. The rules of rationality apply as much in theoretical thought as anywhere else. If it's ridiculous in practice, then it's ridiculous from the philosopher's chair. If Hume can't deny induction when talking with friends, then it's ridiculous for him to question it in philosophy except to examine how it works.


----------



## PuritanCovenanter (Mar 7, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> How does one determine something is self-evident?



This might be rather simplistic but on what level do you want to address this specifically? 

1. To Whom shall I address this question? Is it to someone or self? Is self common to all?

2. What level do the senses play in this?

3. When laws are broken or kept and destruction or profit happen what makes it correct or wrong? 

Do those questions make sense guys?


----------



## Afterthought (Mar 7, 2012)

Big thanks to Philip and Rev. Winzer! I'll definitely have to get ahold of Nash's book (and maybe I'll be back asking for more suggestions afterwards!).



P. F. Pugh said:


> The rules of rationality apply as much in theoretical thought as anywhere else. If it's ridiculous in practice, then it's ridiculous from the philosopher's chair.


Fascinating observation! And I think I'll have to concede that to you.




PuritanCovenanter said:


> This might be rather simplistic but on what level do you want to address this specifically?


Rev. Winzer answered it in on the "level" I was asking for. The sense in which I was asking the question comes closest to your number 3., but more accurately, the question I was asking was along the lines of: What quality does something have to have in order for that something to be self-evident?


----------



## Rogerant (Mar 8, 2012)

*Finding "Common sense" principles*

You start off with a premise that I don't neccessarily accept as being the right discussion to be having. Back in history "Common Sense" meant "The unreflective thought of ordinary (common) people". In other words it was based one sound prudent judment based upon common experience. Therefore common sense does not deal with transcendent realities outside of experience. However "Reason" deals with the meaning of the universe and life. It is man's reason that must be redeemed, not his experience or his senses. It is my opinion that when man was created with a soul it provided him the capacity to contemplate the meaning of life, that which the animals don't consider. When dealing with the senses or experience alone a living being cannot establish meaning to life, not can he state that man's will is free from the natural environment around us. Man is then a puppet to nature around him. In having "Reason" he is now in the state where he can freely act apart from nature. Now this "Reason" has been corrupted in relation to thinking rightly about God in redemption. But he can reason about God's existance. 

So then if you are discussing the meaning of life with a "Common Sense Realist" about the meaning of life they are already demonstrating that they are operating in the sphere of Reason, not experience. Therefore they are living in a contradiction. I know that they try to establish some how that they have a free will apart from nature and her laws and have a definition for Reason but I find it weak.

Roger


----------



## Philip (Mar 8, 2012)

Rogerant said:


> So then if you are discussing the meaning of life with a "Common Sense Realist" about the meaning of life they are already demonstrating that they are operating in the sphere of Reason, not experience.



A common-sense realist isn't going to admit this separation, considering common sense to be just as rational as any other part of our God-given constitution. Why privilege reason over other God-given faculties?


----------



## VictorBravo (Mar 8, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> A common-sense realist isn't going to admit this separation, considering common sense to be just as rational as any other part of our God-given constitution. Why privilege reason over other God-given faculties?



Thanks, Phillip, I was thinking something similar. And I'd add that the common-sense-realist who is a Christian has a great advantage.

First, like all thoughtful people, he observes himself and others and notes that there is thinking and observation. There is some sort of natural behavior going on that operates according to reason.

Second, this personal experience is confirmed and explained when he opens up a Bible and reads God's Word. 

So the common-sense-realist then knows that he was created in a certain fashion to interact with his world in a certain way. "By faith we understand" our origins and why we employ reason. What is personally self-evident is confirmed by God himself.

The search for the meaning of life is transformed into a more productive search: understanding God's creation to further glorify Him.


----------



## jwright82 (Mar 10, 2012)

The problem with common-sense notions is not that we have them or that they are obviously true but how to prove them or distinguish them in the first place? What makes a common-sense notion what it is? We can and many posters have come up with a short list of common-sense beleifs but o.k. where does that leave us? Pretty quikly you will relize the limitations of such a common-sense aproach to knowledge when you consider those beleifs that are not so obvious or based on common-sense notions. In our culture it is common-sense, or should be, not to murder someone but in a canabalistic culture it is common-sense to murder and eat people, which common-sense beleif is correct? 

You simply cannot account for the vast complexity of our beleif systems if they are based on common-sense beleifs alone. In the above example the only way to settle the dispute is to appeal to some other more foundational beleif that is not in fact a common-sense beleif at all, but this contradicts the goal of common-sense realism which is to base all beleifs on common-sense beleifs. 

Since you can't do that because to provide one counter-example like the one I did is to dismantle the theory. This leaves you with a problem and certian beleifs that are rightfully in a class called common-sense but that is all you have at the end of the day. You still need to account for the vast majority of our beleifs.


----------



## Afterthought (Mar 10, 2012)

jwright82 said:


> In our culture it is common-sense, or should be, not to murder someone but in a canabalistic culture it is common-sense to murder and eat people, which common-sense beleif is correct?


From what I understand (and the "common sense" realists on the board correct me if I'm wrong), that isn't what the "common sense" realists propose (which is why I put "common sense" in quotes). They do not refer to common sense as meaning "what makes sense to most" but rather they mean common sense as "those fundamental principles and rules of thought that make reason function." Or to put it in terms of what has been discussed in this thread, I understood "common sense" to be the "rules of rationality" that Philip mentioned and "a priori equipment" that Rev. Winzer has mentioned before. I have not read Reid except what I read about him in the Stanford encyclopedia (which is quite helpful, nevertheless), so I cannot comment on the accuracy of the quotation, but James McCosh states (though later he admits that he is imposing categories on these people--in describing their thought--that they might not have explicitly stated or been aware of):

"In the use which [Reid] makes of [the term "common sense"] there is an unfair ambiguity. It denotes the combination of qualities which constitutes _good sense_, being, according to an old saying, the most uncommon of all the senses. This valuable property is not possessed by all men, and is the result of a number of gifts and attainments, such as an originally sound judgment and a careful observation of the ways of mankind. In this sense common sense is not entitled to be appealed to as the arbiter in philosophy, though it may keep us from much error. But the phrase has another and a different signification in philosophical works, including Reid's. It denotes the aggregate of original principles planted in the minds of all. It is only in this latter sense that it can be legitimately employed in overthrowing scepticism or for any philosophic purpose. Reid rather dexterously takes advantage of both these meanings. He would show that the views he opposes, though supported by men of high intellectual powers, have the good sense of mankind against them."(_Realistic Philosophy Defended_ McCosh p.180)


Some more from McCosh.

"By the observations of consciousness, principles are reached which are prior to and independent of experience. This is another grand characteristic of the school, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism; and, on the other hand, from the dogmatism and _a priori_ speculation of all ages and countries. It agrees with the former in holding that we can construct a science of mind only by observation, and out of the facts of experience; but then it separates from them, inasmuch as it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original, and necessary. Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intutions simple and original. Hamilton view them under a great many aspects, but seems to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as _a pirori_ forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws or principles or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them."(_The Scottish School_ p.6-7)


----------



## Philip (Mar 10, 2012)

jwright82 said:


> The problem with common-sense notions is not that we have them or that they are obviously true but how to prove them or distinguish them in the first place



Why do they need proof?



jwright82 said:


> Since you can't do that because to provide one counter-example like the one I did is to dismantle the theory.



No it doesn't. You missed the point. The point is that theoretical accounting is always second-order and if it starts to contradict common-sense beliefs, it should be rejected. It's also to make sure that the burden of proof is always on the skeptic.



jwright82 said:


> In our culture it is common-sense, or should be, not to murder someone but in a canabalistic culture it is common-sense to murder and eat people, which common-sense beleif is correct?



It's murder by our standards, not theirs. This is like a liberal saying that conservatives defy common sense by wanting to murder criminals. The debate is not over whether murder is wrong, but over what constitutes murder.



jwright82 said:


> You simply cannot account for the vast complexity of our beleif systems if they are based on common-sense beleifs alone.



I'd say that the fact that they are based on common sense beliefs is precisely the reason why they are so complex. The reason we have philosophical problems is because there are common-sense intuitions that we have that seem to be in conflict.

Or were you referring to attitudes that manifest themselves propositionally?


----------



## jwright82 (Mar 10, 2012)

Yeah it is clear that I should elaborate on what I meant, the "logic" I used to reach my conclusions about common-sense realism. Thats my fault.

What is fundamental to common-sense realism is that there is a certian class of beleifs that are beyond the need of proof. They are obvious, self-evident, etc. What proof do I really need to establish that I am on a computer right now? So it is obvious that if any beleif that is thought to be a common-sense beleif ends up in a situation in which it requires more proof than it ceases to be a common-sense beleif. How many common-sense beleifs about ethics pass this test? None. They all are dependant upon some foundation for deciding what is moral or not, a theory of ethics. That is no valid logical argument can be made to prove that murder is wrong from common-sense beleifs, it will always be a fallacy of mass appeal. But it seems obvious to us that murder is wrong, even criminals try to give good reasons for commiting their crimes. 

My beleif in the world of my experience is an obvious common-sense beleif. But what about the "brain in the vat problem"? Well contemporary philosophy has come up with a paradigm-case argument that settles the question but that is in fact "further proof" of what was suppossed to be a common-sense beleif. This problem goes away though if in fact we can prove that all of our beleifs are based on common-sense beleifs. For instance my beleif that person x beleives such and such a thing is based on the common-sense beleif that I and person x exist but if that common-sense beleif can be brought into question than it ceases to be a common-beleif and my original beleif is now unfounded. 

In fact almost all of the criticisms leveld against the various philosophical theories of foundationism can be properly applied to common-sense realism. But lets say that conservativly speaking all common-sense realism is trying to do is not provide a foundation for all of our knowledge but simply to place certian beleifs in the class of beleifs dubbed stupid to doubt. Well so what, what does that have to do with anything else, unless you are trying to use these beleifs as foundation for something else, knowledge or apologetics for instance. But once you do that you right back in the same boat that I laid out before. 

Also it has been pointed out by thinkers that no satisfactory criterion has been established to what rightfully constitutes a common-sense beleif. Lastly the most devastating argument in my opinion is to use Godel's incompleness theorms on this and all other philosophical versions of foundationalism. To try to explain his theorms we need to look at how they work. Take any formal system, like a beleif system, in which certian elements, common-sense beleifs in this case, are the axioms from which all other beleifs are to be derived and you can produce at least one beleif that cannot be proven by the original axioms.

In short this means that no finite number of axioms can ever be produced to account for the rich complexity of our beleif system in the same way that no finite number of axioms can ever be produced that will account for the rich complexity of mathmatics, where these theorms were originally desighned for. In an ironic way you can springboard off of these theorms and give an argument for the neccessity of a transcendental argument to establish common-sense beleifs for being what they are.


----------



## Philip (Mar 10, 2012)

jwright82 said:


> But what about the "brain in the vat problem"?



What about it? Why is it a problem? It's only a problem if you think that skeptics must be satisfied.



jwright82 said:


> For instance my beleif that person x beleives such and such a thing is based on the common-sense beleif that I and person x exist but if that common-sense beleif can be brought into question than it ceases to be a common-beleif and my original beleif is now unfounded.



No---just because a belief is questioned does not make it unfounded.



jwright82 said:


> Well so what, what does that have to do with anything else, unless you are trying to use these beleifs as foundation for something else, knowledge or apologetics for instance. But once you do that you right back in the same boat that I laid out before.



What problem? You seem to think that there's a problem with having beliefs that it's silly to question and which are also counted as rational knowledge-claims. Why? Who made the skeptic king?



jwright82 said:


> Also it has been pointed out by thinkers that no satisfactory criterion has been established to what rightfully constitutes a common-sense beleif.



So? There are plenty of concepts that fall into the category of family resemblance.



jwright82 said:


> In short this means that no finite number of axioms can ever be produced to account for the rich complexity of our beleif system in the same way that no finite number of axioms can ever be produced that will account for the rich complexity of mathmatics, where these theorms were originally desighned for. In an ironic way you can springboard off of these theorms and give an argument for the neccessity of a transcendental argument to establish common-sense beleifs for being what they are.



Actually, this would apply as much to coherentist views as to foundationalist ones. We all have a finite number of beliefs or presuppositions. This is a non-unique argument.


----------



## jwright82 (Mar 10, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> What about it? Why is it a problem? It's only a problem if you think that skeptics must be satisfied.



No I don't really think that extreme skeptic has to be satisfied. But I do find it odd that the common-sense realist involves themselves in a circle of reasoning. The obvious response to this would be "why should I doubt that? It is obvious that I am not a brain in a vat". O.K. but that already assumes that common-sense realism is true. But with all the problems I laid out that is doubtful at some level. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> No---just because a belief is questioned does not make it unfounded.



True but the point is that the original assumption of common-sense realism is brought into question once this happens. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> What problem? You seem to think that there's a problem with having beliefs that it's silly to question and which are also counted as rational knowledge-claims. Why? Who made the skeptic king?



It's not that I am making the skeptic king, I am only calling into question the theory of knowledge espoused in common-sense realism. I don't have a problem with a class of beleifs like these, I do have a problem with where the common-sense realist tries to go from there. If all he or she is saying is that there is a class of beleifs like this than what relevence do they have on the rest of our thinking?

Why should I as a philosopher care about these beleifs? If what they are saying is that these beleifs should be the benchmark of a theory, than that is fine and neccessary. But that by itself does not rule out a theoretical perspective that accounts for those beleifs as well. It does not prove that such an accounting is uneccessary in some sense. It only proves that these beleifs are the most basic beleifs to be explained by such an argument.

But if they want to make more out of these beleifs and make them the foundation for something else than that is different and they than come into the aim of critical philosophy, and just trying to blow their common-sense nature out of proportion won't answer those questions. It's at this point that the common-sense realist goes wrong. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> So? There are plenty of concepts that fall into the category of family resemblance.



Yes but it is when the common-sense realist is trying to use those beleifs as a foundation or theory of knowledge than it is legitemate to raise the question of what counts as common-sense? You than need a more systematic theory for that. I am not critical of common-sense philosophies critical assesments of things. They are right to point out what we shouldn't doubt. Where I am being critical is in their constructive attempts. Either the attempt to build a theory of knowledge or the attempt to rule out any questioning of their general unsystematic view as mere confusion or skepticism. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Actually, this would apply as much to coherentist views as to foundationalist ones. We all have a finite number of beliefs or presuppositions. This is a non-unique argument.



Correct but it is only harmful to a philosophical theory of foundationalism because it contradicts their most basic theory.


----------



## Afterthought (Mar 13, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Afterthought said:
> 
> 
> > P. F. Pugh said:
> ...


I'd like to explore this a little more, if you (or anyone else) don't mind. I don't know if I'm going to state this properly, but what is the difference between viewing common sense assumptions as practical assumptions and pragmatism like Charles Peirce's? It seems the difference is that the justification for the practical assumptions is different. In pragmatism, they are justified because they are practical, because they are needed in order for a human to function in practice. Common sense realism takes this a step further and states that the reason these assumptions are practical is because they are "rules of rationality." Being "rules of rationality," one cannot deny them in theory any more than in practice because denying them in any case is to cease to be rational. Because of that link between theory and practice, one can identify practical assumptions as common sense assumptions too. Do I understand properly?

It would make sense that there's a link between pragmatism and common sense realism because Reid's language as quoted in the Stanford encyclopedia does make the common sense assumptions sometimes seem to be pragmatic assumptions, e.g., by explaining common sense assumptions as those things we humans cannot help but believe because of our nature. I've also been told that some forms of pragmatism (like Charles Peirce's) in America drew on Reid (Peirce affirmed "critical common-sensism").

And if I do understand properly, why do you go a step further than the pragmatists (so how would you respond to a pragmatist like Peirce? Like James?)? And why not just have these practical assumptions remain practical assumptions that we cannot help but believe while realizing that there is no rational justification for making them (like, for example, Hume stated we should do with cause and effect in the sciences)?


----------



## Philip (Mar 13, 2012)

jwright82 said:


> O.K. but that already assumes that common-sense realism is true. But with all the problems I laid out that is doubtful at some level.



Not really.



jwright82 said:


> True but the point is that the original assumption of common-sense realism is brought into question once this happens.



No it isn't. A common-sense realist merely shifts the burden of proof to the skeptic to give him a good reason why he should doubt that person x exists and is a rational agent. The original assumption has not been brought into question---it is only brought into question if the skeptic can provide a good reason to think it untrue.



jwright82 said:


> But that by itself does not rule out a theoretical perspective that accounts for those beleifs as well. It does not prove that such an accounting is uneccessary in some sense. It only proves that these beleifs are the most basic beleifs to be explained by such an argument.



It does say that it is unnecessary, in the sense that one's warrant for believing these things is independent of one's theoretical accounting for them. The common-sense realist is simply claiming that a five-year-old child can have warranted true beliefs without coming up with a philosophical system.

Remember that epistemology deals with how we come to hold our beliefs rationally. The paradigm for epistemic warrant is education.



jwright82 said:


> Where I am being critical is in their constructive attempts. Either the attempt to build a theory of knowledge or the attempt to rule out any questioning of their general unsystematic view as mere confusion or skepticism.



Here, I think though, our friend Ludwig might be of use. To determine what the word "knowledge" entails, examine the various contexts (even make it "Biblical contexts") in which the word arises. Common sense is merely trying to be descriptive in its account of knowledge rather than creating a Procrustean definition of knowledge to which all beliefs must be subjected.



jwright82 said:


> Correct but it is only harmful to a philosophical theory of foundationalism because it contradicts their most basic theory.



Not really. All humans have a finite number of beliefs. You're assuming that the foundationalist is also a rationalist or empiricist rather than a common-sense thinker who believes that we have belief-forming faculties that are capable of producing true beliefs of various sorts. Our belief-structures are also affected by our precommitments and preconceived notions. There's nothing in this that fails to account for the vast complexity of our belief systems.

---------- Post added at 08:35 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:31 PM ----------




Afterthought said:


> Because of that link between theory and practice, one can identify practical assumptions as common sense assumptions too. Do I understand properly?



That's fair.



Afterthought said:


> And if I do understand properly, why do you go a step further than the pragmatists (so how would you respond to a pragmatist like Peirce? Like James?)? And why not just have these practical assumptions remain practical assumptions that we cannot help but believe while realizing that there is no rational justification for making them (like, for example, Hume stated we should do with cause and effect in the sciences)?



For the simple reason that ordinarily-functioning humans are rational. The mistake of Peirce, James, and Hume is in having an overly-narrow view of what is rational. They've defined rationality as simple deductive logic rather than as proper function (Plantinga) or according to practical uses of the word. In other words, they are inconsistent with the actual practical use of the term "rational."


----------



## jwright82 (Mar 13, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> I'd like to explore this a little more, if you (or anyone else) don't mind. I don't know if I'm going to state this properly, but what is the difference between viewing common sense assumptions as practical assumptions and pragmatism like Charles Peirce's?



I think Philip's point was that if I offer a theory that like calls into question the existance of reality around us, common-sense and practicality say that that is obviously absurd. The later Wittgenstein, and Pragmatism to a degree, wanted ordinary experience to be the limitation on theoretical considerations. Before him philosophers were trying to correct the way ordinary people thought through theories desighned to clean up the way we think. He made it clear that common-sense should dictate philosophy and not the other way around. I think that Wittgenstain makes an excellant point but I think that at some level philosophy does improve everyday thinking.




Afterthought said:


> It seems the difference is that the justification for the practical assumptions is different. In pragmatism, they are justified because they are practical, because they are needed in order for a human to function in practice. Common sense realism takes this a step further and states that the reason these assumptions are practical is because they are "rules of rationality." Being "rules of rationality," one cannot deny them in theory any more than in practice because denying them in any case is to cease to be rational. Because of that link between theory and practice, one can identify practical assumptions as common sense assumptions too. Do I understand properly?



I would say so. 




Afterthought said:


> It would make sense that there's a link between pragmatism and common sense realism because Reid's language as quoted in the Stanford encyclopedia does make the common sense assumptions sometimes seem to be pragmatic assumptions, e.g., by explaining common sense assumptions as those things we humans cannot help but believe because of our nature. I've also been told that some forms of pragmatism (like Charles Peirce's) in America drew on Reid (Peirce affirmed "critical common-sensism").



There are differences though. A pragmatic theory of truth is basically this. If you believe that the bus coming down the road is just an illusion and you walk out in front of it and are hit and killed, did your belief have very good practical consequences to it? So in the case of the bus lets look at the differences between the common-sense realist and the pragmatism.

Lets say that Hume, Reid, and James walk out of a bar (I've always wanted to twist that into a philosophy joke) Hume sees the bus and says "how can you prove to me that that bus isn't just an illusion and why I shouldn't walk into the street now?" Reid would say "well common-sense would say that that is kind of a stupid question anyway it is obvious that there is a bus coming down the street, why would I doubt that?" James would respond with this "well practically speaking if I side with Hume I chance getting run over by a bus but if I side with Reid than I practically speaking won't get run over by the bus if in fact it is real, so pragmatically I side with Reid".

Imagine Pascal's Wager for all beleifs that are indeterminant, that is we can't prove either way wether or not the bus exists using traditional methods of proof. 




Afterthought said:


> And if I do understand properly, why do you go a step further than the pragmatists (so how would you respond to a pragmatist like Peirce? Like James?)? And why not just have these practical assumptions remain practical assumptions that we cannot help but believe while realizing that there is no rational justification for making them (like, for example, Hume stated we should do with cause and effect in the sciences)?



Because although common-sense is a limit to philosophy we may still provide a transcendental basis for such beleifs.

---------- Post added at 09:07 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:51 PM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> Not really.





P. F. Pugh said:


> No it isn't. A common-sense realist merely shifts the burden of proof to the skeptic to give him a good reason why he should doubt that person x exists and is a rational agent. The original assumption has not been brought into question---it is only brought into question if the skeptic can provide a good reason to think it untrue.



A. Why does a TC not provide "good reason to think it untrue"?
B. Why is common-sense realism immune to legitimate logical analysis?




P. F. Pugh said:


> It does say that it is unnecessary, in the sense that one's warrant for believing these things is independent of one's theoretical accounting for them. The common-sense realist is simply claiming that a five-year-old child can have warranted true beliefs without coming up with a philosophical system.
> 
> Remember that epistemology deals with how we come to hold our beliefs rationally. The paradigm for epistemic warrant is education.



Sure but that still doesn't disprove the neccessity of someone coming up with a TA for everything.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Here, I think though, our friend Ludwig might be of use. To determine what the word "knowledge" entails, examine the various contexts (even make it "Biblical contexts") in which the word arises. Common sense is merely trying to be descriptive in its account of knowledge rather than creating a Procrustean definition of knowledge to which all beliefs must be subjected.



Ah but a meaning and use of "knowledge" is used by ordinary people to mean to have true knowledge. Is the average person wrong in theory to believe that certian things are truely the case and they *know* that to be so?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Not really. All humans have a finite number of beliefs. You're assuming that the foundationalist is also a rationalist or empiricist rather than a common-sense thinker who believes that we have belief-forming faculties that are capable of producing true beliefs of various sorts. Our belief-structures are also affected by our precommitments and preconceived notions. There's nothing in this that fails to account for the vast complexity of our belief systems.



Actually that proof proves that some beleifs will be true but not based on common-sense basic beleifs. That is a death nail to these theories.


----------



## Philip (Mar 13, 2012)

jwright82 said:


> I think that Wittgenstain makes an excellant point but I think that at some level philosophy does improve everyday thinking.



I think that's what he's trying to do as well, actually, at least for a good deal of our thinking. For him, philosophy is the untangling of ordinary language.


----------



## jwright82 (Mar 13, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> I think that's what he's trying to do as well, actually, at least for a good deal of our thinking. For him, philosophy is the untangling of ordinary language.



That makes sense.


----------

