# Possible reason why the war in Sudan wouldn't end soon



## Anton Bruckner (Jun 1, 2006)

*Possible reason why the war in Sudan wouldn\'t end soon*

Sudan invited to join OPEC

May 24, 2006 (KHARTOUM) "” President Omer al-Bashir received a written message from Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo inviting Sudan to join the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Sudan currently produces some 500,000 barrels of crude oil a day, mainly from fields in the south with output projected to rise by 150,000 barrels per day this year.

Full Article:

Sudan Tribune
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15850

OPEC's output is about 27.5 million barrels per day.


and they are probably using the oil proceeds to fund the building of this



















[Edited on 6-1-2006 by Slippery]


----------



## Contra_Mundum (Jun 1, 2006)

As someone who has lived in Africa, who has visited subsaharan Africa, (which is about 2/3 of Sudan) I guarantee ya, the day Muslim-run Sudan has a "showcase" city like that "artist's conception," one that makes Abu Dubai or Doha look pallid in comparison, and Riyadh and Cairo look like "Hoovervilles"--will be the 12th of Never.

There's no way to convince me that a statist government can build anything elegant (and those graceful "towers" are anything but utillitarian); and even less that an elitist, thugish government will ever build multiple demi-palaces on tree-lined boulevards with river-views (see picture!) for her "elected public servants."

Even if they broke ground on 1/100 of this vast design, you must remember how the "money breakdown" goes in third world countries:
The president (usually for life, or generalisimo, or dear leader, or king, etc...) gets his take: at least 1/2 (whether that is "foreign aid" or oil money or whatever). Then about 5% gets sent to some photo-op "project" that will make the regular news outlets, electronic and print. The remaining 45% is doled out to the chief's closest relatives and sycophants, in varying amounts, but NEVER in so much quantity as to make any one of them a financial rival to El Numero Uno (because then he could hire a rival army and "Its Coup de Ta Time" (sung to the tune of "Its Howdy Doody Time").

This rule is invariable. Any dictator who fails to follow this formula will be overthrown faster than if he does.

Anyway, the design firm who produced this artwork probably got the last 5% that I was mentioning. That 5% just bought Khartoom another $10 billion in your tax dollars, plus additional Saudi oil investment, which translates to constant cash-flow into the kleptocrats Swiss bank accounts. All management fees, of course, as in "for the right price, I'll manage to let you make a modest profit."


----------



## Anton Bruckner (Jun 8, 2006)

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/07/opinion/edsomalia.php
Somalia goes down the Afghan road
The New York Times

Published: June 7, 2006
Terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda may just have won a new foothold in the strategic Horn of Africa, as radical Islamist militias captured Somalia's capital, Mogadishu.

The immediate concern among many Somalis is a forcible imposition of harsh Islamic law, Taliban style.

The larger international concern is that Mogadishu's new rulers may follow the Taliban's example in another way, sheltering international terrorist operations in a region within tempting striking distance of vulnerable countries on the Arabian peninsula and in East Africa.

The Bush administration wasn't exactly caught looking the other way. But with more than 130,000 U.S. troops tied down in Iraq and some 20,000 more in Afghanistan, and with America's reputation in the Islamic world driven to an all-time low, Washington's ability to respond effectively to a very real danger was severely compromised.

For want of better options, the United States had thrown its support to a different set of warlords with few visible merits beyond their willingness to fight their Islamist rivals. But by some accounts, Washington's support for these warlords only discredited them in the eyes of many Somalis.

The parallels to Afghanistan when the Taliban took power in 1996 are uncanny, and frightening. The sequel, however, does not have to turn out quite as horribly. Mogadishu's new masters claim to be interested mainly in establishing peace, stability and Islamic rule at home.

They insist that they are willing to talk with anybody, which at least raises a possibility that they could be talked out of sheltering international terrorists.

With good luck, perhaps a new battlefront with international terrorism may yet be avoided. Luck, however, is no substitute for a more supple and effective U.S. strategy against a highly mobile foe like multinational Islamist terrorism.

Washington needs to develop more agile responses of its own. It especially has to avoid getting drawn into quagmires that force it to fight on the terrorists' terms and timetable.


Terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda may just have won a new foothold in the strategic Horn of Africa, as radical Islamist militias captured Somalia's capital, Mogadishu.

The immediate concern among many Somalis is a forcible imposition of harsh Islamic law, Taliban style.

The larger international concern is that Mogadishu's new rulers may follow the Taliban's example in another way, sheltering international terrorist operations in a region within tempting striking distance of vulnerable countries on the Arabian peninsula and in East Africa.

The Bush administration wasn't exactly caught looking the other way. But with more than 130,000 U.S. troops tied down in Iraq and some 20,000 more in Afghanistan, and with America's reputation in the Islamic world driven to an all-time low, Washington's ability to respond effectively to a very real danger was severely compromised.

For want of better options, the United States had thrown its support to a different set of warlords with few visible merits beyond their willingness to fight their Islamist rivals. But by some accounts, Washington's support for these warlords only discredited them in the eyes of many Somalis.

The parallels to Afghanistan when the Taliban took power in 1996 are uncanny, and frightening. The sequel, however, does not have to turn out quite as horribly. Mogadishu's new masters claim to be interested mainly in establishing peace, stability and Islamic rule at home.

They insist that they are willing to talk with anybody, which at least raises a possibility that they could be talked out of sheltering international terrorists.

With good luck, perhaps a new battlefront with international terrorism may yet be avoided. Luck, however, is no substitute for a more supple and effective U.S. strategy against a highly mobile foe like multinational Islamist terrorism.

Washington needs to develop more agile responses of its own. It especially has to avoid getting drawn into quagmires that force it to fight on the terrorists' terms and timetable.


----------

