# Ultimate Epistemology



## amishrockstar (Oct 5, 2009)

Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right? 
When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say? 

Thanks


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## Zenas (Oct 5, 2009)

Surely there are multiple ways to come to the same conclusion is many areas. For instance, we know from Scripture, i.e. revelation, that Jesus was a real man. We also know from empirical evidence that Jesus was a real man.


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## ChristianTrader (Oct 5, 2009)

amishrockstar said:


> Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
> When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?
> 
> Thanks



I would say, yes to the question, because at some level you have to determine how you are going to answer the question. You have to know when to pull the empirical lever and when to pull the rational lever etc.

CT


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## JTB (Oct 5, 2009)

Zenas said:


> Surely there are multiple ways to come to the same conclusion is many areas. For instance, we know from Scripture, i.e. revelation, that Jesus was a real man. We also know from empirical evidence that Jesus was a real man.



While there are multiple arguments to arrive at the same conclusion, not all of them are valid, nor do all rely upon a valid epistemological foundation.

Empiricism is not a sound empistemological foundation because it cannot establish a universal basis for truth. All conclusions would therefore be contingent, and "knowledge" would be identical to "belief." A poor lot that would be.

For example, you cannot establish Christ's humanity empirically, because you cannot establish a definition of humanity by empirical methods. What observation can dictate to you the definition of man? Only Revelation can establish such definitions, from which empirical conclusions may proceed with sufficient warrants. For example, I cannot establish the existence of tomorrow based upon empirical data, for no empirical data warrants causal relationships. Only an a priori acceptance of a causally structured reality justifies such conclusions. Who can supply such a priori principles but the only absolute and eternal God?

-----Added 10/5/2009 at 01:00:46 EST-----



amishrockstar said:


> Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
> When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?
> 
> Thanks



Epistemology is different from simple argumentation. There are plenty of empirical evidences that support the truth of Christianity, but empirical evidence is not sufficient to establish the truth of Christianity. Epistemology is not simply about how we can know, but also how we justify what we know. Only Revelation provides a sufficient warrant for establishing the truth.


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## Philip (Oct 5, 2009)

JTB said:


> Empiricism is not a sound empistemological foundation because it cannot establish a universal basis for truth.



Why must an epistemology establish a _universal_ basis for truth? Is it possible that certain truths can be known empirically while others can be known by other means? Why must we only have one epistemological source?



> Only Revelation can establish such definitions, from which empirical conclusions may proceed with sufficient warrants.



This, of course, assumes that you as the interpreter are correct in your interpretation. How do you know, revelationally, that you can even understand revelation?



> Epistemology is different from simple argumentation. There are plenty of empirical evidences that support the truth of Christianity, but empirical evidence is not sufficient to establish the truth of Christianity. Epistemology is not simply about how we can know, but also how we justify what we know. Only Revelation provides a sufficient warrant for establishing the truth.



What do you mean by "establish"? I would say I can establish that it is raining outside from the fact that when I look out the window, I see water coming from the clouds. Can I doubt my senses? Yes, but I don't see indubitability as a criterion for knowledge.


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## Julio Martinez Jr (Oct 5, 2009)

amishrockstar said:


> Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
> When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?
> 
> Thanks



Wow. Great question. This has been an unending struggle for me personally. Ever since this question has plagued me in my philosophy class, I have dug my nails in Van Til and some of Sproul. I'm currently reading Plantinga--when I have time, of course--and he has a lot of insights that I think clarifies a lot. I think that there is an ultimate starting point in epistemology, but it is an interplay of revelational and an incipient epistemology. For Van Til, all knowledge must and has to begin with God, but more specifically with the Trinity. His justification for that is that if we have just a general idea of God, much like the debate that took place between Bertrand Russell and the Jesuit priest, Frederick C. Copleston, there will be plenary problems with other formulations or causal problems in theology; and for Van Til, theology is very important before the apologist's task. Van Til called this the problem of the One and the Many. Since this problem is placated by the doctrine of the Trinity, then other causal problems will not ensue. However, the doctrine of the Trinity or a Transcendental proof cannot solve for me the doctrine of innerency. This is why I take an interplay view of epistemology. I don't think that I am violating anything Van Til said, but I definitely think that the ultimate starting point should be transcendental.

This, of course, is a hypothesis that I'm working with. Reading Plantinga could raise significant issues that I might have, like the problem of existence having properties, but I will see. Does existence have properties? If so, how does Plantinga solve this problem? These are just questions that I am concerned with. I don't want to stray from the general question of this thread.


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## JTB (Oct 5, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> JTB said:
> 
> 
> > Why must an epistemology establish a _universal_ basis for truth? Is it possible that certain truths can be known empirically while others can be known by other means? Why must we only have one epistemological source?
> ...


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## Philip (Oct 5, 2009)

> The Bible supplies the propositions. When the Bible says 1) God does not lie, and 2) The Bible is God's Word, then I have a sound argument that revelation is true. It is self-attesting and does not depend upon my interpretation. Not only is it self-attesting, but is established by the impossibility of the contrary--we cannot know anything without God revealing it, for He is the possessor of truth.



How do you know what the proposition "God does not lie" actually means? How do we define the terms in which the Scriptures speak?

My point here is that at some point, you are making an interpretation. Unless you are content to say that we can know the propositions without understanding their content (at which point I would contend that the "knowledge" is of no value), then you have to admit that you are getting your definitions from outside the Scriptures.



> Truths are not contingent. Even historical truths, such as George Washington crossed the Delaware are universally true, or not true at all. Finite men cannot establish such truths, because we lack the foundation in and of our own thinking. You cannot justify the validity of your senses simply by using them. David Hume proved as much.



David Hume rejected inductive logic: I don't. I maintain that knowledge is justified true belief. That is a) you have a good reason for it b) it's actually true (though you obviously don't have 100% certainty) c) you actually believe it. This is the classic pre-Cartesian definition.



> I'm talking about logically valid conclusions that have maximal warrant.



Then you can establish nothing except your own existence. After all, your faculties of reasoning could be wrong (eg: you could commit a fallacy and not know it). Maximal warrant on any other issue is impossible for anyone except God.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 5, 2009)

I don't get what is being said here, JTB--all truths are not contingent? What about the truth that Barack Obama is the current president? That's contingent, isn't it? Perhaps you are using contingent in a different-than-normal sense...

Also, surely empiricism can give us knowledge even if we cannot get knowledge of universal truths like "All dogs are of a certain DNA structure" or "Every instance of X is Y." We can still have knowledge of things that are (frankly) more down-to-earth and useful, like knowledge of what the world around me looks like, or things like that.


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## JTB (Oct 5, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> > How do you know what the proposition "God does not lie" actually means? How do we define the terms in which the Scriptures speak?
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Philip (Oct 5, 2009)

> Either you weren't paying attention, or you are being intentionally misdirecting. I stated that the Scripture's are self-affirming and do not depend upon my interpretation for their validity. By your argument, knowledge would be impossible because everything depends upon the idiosyncrasies of an individual's interpretation.



Assuming your definition of knowledge, yes knowledge is impossible for anyone but God. In order for me to truly "know" (by this definition) one must not only be 100% certain but one must have at least some degree of understanding of the meaning of the proposition.

For example, take the sentence "God exists." Now, we have two terms that need definition: "God" and "existence." If our epistemological foundation is Scripture alone, then we don't have these definitions because Scripture itself assumes the definitions.

As another example, take the story of Balaam's ass. In order for the propositions to be understood, one must understand the nature of things like roads, angels, asses, speech, animals, etc.

Suppose I say "All slithey toves are capable of gyreing." This is a meaningless proposition to you because the terms are meaningless. For them to mean anything, you must interpret or have the definitions provided propositionally. Let's assume that I have provided a definition. Even then, unless you understand the terms I use to define it, the proposition is meaningless. At some point, the definitions are assumed.

My point is that Scripture cannot exist in an epistemological vacuum. A newborn cannot know the Scriptures because the Scriptures are written in a language, and the infant does not know language and can therefore have no knowledge of propositions. Is the capacity there? Yes, but he or she must learn things like language _before_ he or she can know/understand the Scriptures.

No, the Scriptures do not depend on you for their validity, but neither can you really know them unless you interpret. Otherwise you are left with propositions that you cannot, in any meaningful sense, be said to know. Knowledge without understanding is meaningless.



> If I look at a clock on the wall, and that clock stopped at 12 o'clock three days ago without my knowledge, but it happens to be 12 o'clock when I look at the clock, then I meet all of your criteria: 1) I have good reason to believe that a clock will reflect the time, 2) it is true that it is 12 o'clock, and 3) I believe it. But the clock isn't working, so obviously my assumption about the clock working is false--but according to your definition, I have knowledge!



No, you don't have knowledge here. What you just gave me is an utter _non sequitor_. The actual time has nothing to do with whether the clock is working. All that you have good reason to believe is that it is 12:00. Then, a couple minutes later, you look at the clock and say "My goodness! It stopped!" and you go fix it or throw it out.

I would also say that one can arrive at true belief by faulty means. At the point at which you discover that the justification for that belief is faulty, you have to find a new reason or else be stuck in fideism.



> Maximal warrant can only be given by God. The Word of God is given to us so that we may know with maximal warrant. I couldn't even establish my own existence without the justification provided from scriptural propositions.



I'd like to see that. Afterwards, I'll just ask "Define 'I' from Scripture." Proving one's own existence assumes a reasoner just as knowing assumes a knower. One's own existence is an axiom.


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## D. Paul (Oct 5, 2009)

I see Clark in an Avatar but no one has ID'd his argument even though it sure sounds like a Clark argument to me e.g. "One's own existence is an axiom." and Axioms can't be proven.


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## amishrockstar (Oct 5, 2009)

*Thanks for all the posts.
* 
So, as Christians, can we say that we can understand things empirically, rationally, and even inductively because we *first* believe that God exists and is actively involved in this world? 

In other words, A Christian scientist can say that the sun will rise and set tomorrow based on empirical methods *and* the fact that God has spoken that he will cause our planet to keep spinning (until He returns). But a non-Christian scientist cannot make the same claim because empiricism alone cannot prove that the sun will rise? 

Is it a matter of coupling induction, empirical evidence, etc. with a belief in God? _*Is it an either/or situation or a both/and situation?*_

Thanks again,
Matthew

P.S.
If it's either/or, then how can we prove "revelationally" things that are typically proved empirically? In other words, how can I prove that I'm sitting in my room if "revelation" doesn't directly tell me that I'm sitting in my room?

If it's both/and, then can we even speak about an ultimate foundation --as Christians-- in epistemology?


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## Philip (Oct 6, 2009)

Metaphysically, yes we might be able to say that as Christians. Not only that, but philosophically, we can reason backwards from what we know to say that the is a God and that Jesus Christ is His Son.

There are two kinds of epistemology: there are those that start with a narrow definition of knowledge and try to figure out what we can know. Then there are epistemologies that begin with what we know and reason backwards to figure out how we know it.


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## JTB (Oct 6, 2009)

Pugh said:


> No, the Scriptures do not depend on you for their validity, but neither can you really know them unless you interpret. Otherwise you are left with propositions that you cannot, in any meaningful sense, be said to know. Knowledge without understanding is meaningless.



You have ignored for the third time my basic premise. God imposes knowledge upon the mind. It does no depend upon my interpretation or senses, although God may use such occasions to impose upon my mind what He will. If you won't form a response to that view in particular, I'm just going to let it stand and bow out of the conversation.



> No, you don't have knowledge here. What you just gave me is an utter non sequitor. The actual time has nothing to do with whether the clock is working. All that you have good reason to believe is that it is 12:00. Then, a couple minutes later, you look at the clock and say "My goodness! It stopped!" and you go fix it or throw it out.
> 
> I would also say that one can arrive at true belief by faulty means. At the point at which you discover that the justification for that belief is faulty, you have to find a new reason or else be stuck in fideism.



I know I don't have knowledge there, but by your definition you have to accept it as knowledge, _in the moment in which the judgment was made._ Looking at a faulty clock at the moment it happens to be correct meets all of your criteria for knowledge and is based upon a false assumption; therefore your basis for knowledge is undermined. A couple of minutes later is irrelevant to the time in which you made the initial judgment. You may have corrected yourself, but at the initial moment you had "knowledge" according to your definition.

True belief is not the same as knowledge, even by your own definition. If you have to find new justification, then obviously you don't have knowledge. This is why I want you to provide me with what you consider to be sufficient warrant (justification) for knowledge. Induction will always have a margin of error, which means your justification will always be subject to change. How can knowledge be changing? To imply such is to imply that we can never know what God knows, for our knowledge is always changing while His is ever the same.

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 08:44:29 EST-----



D. Paul said:


> I see Clark in an Avatar but no one has ID'd his argument even though it sure sounds like a Clark argument to me e.g. "One's own existence is an axiom." and Axioms can't be proven.



One's own existence is not Clark's axiom. The Bible is God's Word is Clark's axiom.

If anything other than God's Revelation is one's axiom, then one has no justification for the laws of logic or any universal abstract entities, as Greg Bahnsen so marvelously demonstrated against Gordon Stein.

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 08:51:55 EST-----



amishrockstar said:


> *Thanks for all the posts.
> *
> So, as Christians, can we say that we can understand things empirically, rationally, and even inductively because we *first* believe that God exists and is actively involved in this world?
> 
> ...



Every subsequent form of proof depends upon its foundation. Induction always asserts the consequent, and is therefore fallacious--that is to say, although it may sometimes arrive at a true conclusion, it can never do so validly, as a matter of logical implication.

We need God's Revelation as the foundation for assumptions like causality, the laws of logic, and all other abstract, universal laws. Without a transcendental starting point, a finite mind cannot justify any universal conclusions whatsoever.

Empirical arguments and induction are only plausible because we have universal abstract laws based in the very nature of God. But unless God reveals Himself in some way, we cannot _know_ anything, because there is no adequate justification for our conclusions apart from God's Revelation.


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## jwithnell (Oct 6, 2009)

> So, as Christians, can we say that we can understand things empirically, rationally, and even inductively because we _first believe_ that God exists and is actively involved in this world



I hope I'm not quibbling here, but we can _know_ because God chose to revealed it to us either through his word or through his works (natural revelation) and gave us the ability to receive that knowledge (either through the teaching of the Holy Spirit through his word or through our senses in discerning natural revelation). 

The latter, I'm convinced, is different from empiricism for two reasons. First, it recognizes that God is the source of all knowledge and secondly because empiricism does not account for the fact that man interprets the natural world through fallen senses.


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## Philip (Oct 6, 2009)

> You have ignored for the third time my basic premise. God imposes knowledge upon the mind. It does no depend upon my interpretation or senses, although God may use such occasions to impose upon my mind what He will. If you won't form a response to that view in particular, I'm just going to let it stand and bow out of the conversation.



Ok, I see what you're saying.

Really, though, this constitutes a couple problems:

1) If God can impose knowledge via the written word, why can He not do so via general revelation?

2) If God is imposing knowledge of His word, then can a Christian be wrong about what that word says?

3) How do you know that you are a Christian? You argue that in order to know anything, God must impose that knowledge on your mind, so how do you know that He has done so?

I argue that any attempt to explain or understand the Scriptures constitutes an interpretation. Even to bring in other Scriptures constitutes interpretation because someone is deciding which Scriptures are relevant.



> I know I don't have knowledge there, but by your definition you have to accept it as knowledge, in the moment in which the judgment was made.



All you knew is that is was twelve o'clock. Knowledge by faulty justification is still knowledge. All that a critique of the justification does is to cause one to re-examine the belief, which is a healthy thing. Doubt can be constructive as well as destructive.

Would the people of Israel have been right to question their senses at Mount Carmel?



> Induction will always have a margin of error, which means your justification will always be subject to change. How can knowledge be changing? To imply such is to imply that we can never know what God knows, for our knowledge is always changing while His is ever the same.



And I would argue that only God can have unchanging knowledge. We are changeable, God is not. The truth does not change, but our knowledge of it does. I am perfectly willing to say that I am fallible, even with the help of the Holy Spirit. I am still a finite sinner who has been saved by Grace Alone.



> If anything other than God's Revelation is one's axiom, then one has no justification for the laws of logic or any universal abstract entities, as Greg Bahnsen so marvelously demonstrated against Gordon Stein.



I read the text of the debate and Bahnsen did nothing of the kind. He simply asserted things and gave no coherent argument as to _why_ atheism does not account for logic/etc. Granted, Stein was just as sloppy (and didn't understand what Bahnsen was saying--probably because he wasn't familiar enough with philosophy), but I can't say that Bahnsen won: his case for Christian Theism was not _prima facie_. He failed to establish that God should be assumed because he failed to establish any necessary connections. Neither side fulfilled their burden of proof.


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## JTB (Oct 6, 2009)

> 1) If God can impose knowledge via the written word, why can He not do so via general revelation?



He can, and He does. But the premise that God imposes knowledge upon the mind is not provided by induction, or empiricism. Therefore induction and empiricism cannot account for the foundation of their validity.



> 2) If God is imposing knowledge of His word, then can a Christian be wrong about what that word says?



Of course. God is not bound to impose upon the mind all truth, and the reality of sin's effects upon the mind means that Christians (still under the corruption of sin) do not reason from the Scriptures infallibly. But that fault does not in any way impinge upon the premise that God is still the one who imposes knowledge upon the mind, when the mind in fact knows.



> 3) How do you know that you are a Christian? You argue that in order to know anything, God must impose that knowledge on your mind, so how do you know that He has done so?



My axiom is the same as Clark's: The Bible is God's Word. When the Bible says that the Holy Spirit testifies with the individual spirit that the individual is saved, and when combined with the various propositions indicating what must be believed in order to be saved, I can, with maximal warrant, discern my own salvation. If I believe and have the testimony of the Spirit, then I am saved. I believe and have the testimony of the Spirit, therefore I am saved.



> I argue that any attempt to explain or understand the Scriptures constitutes an interpretation. Even to bring in other Scriptures constitutes interpretation because someone is deciding which Scriptures are relevant.



I have never denied that explanation of the Scriptures is an interpretation. I have simply said that interpretation is not the basis of knowledge. The very fact that symbols on the page are intelligible to the mind depends upon the truth of propositions set forth in Scripture. Those proposition do not depend upon the marks on the page, nor my interpretation of those marks, but rather upon their nature as God's Revelation.

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 12:11:34 EST-----



> All you knew is that is was twelve o'clock. Knowledge by faulty justification is still knowledge. All that a critique of the justification does is to cause one to re-examine the belief, which is a healthy thing. Doubt can be constructive as well as destructive.



You are contradicting your own definition. You defined knowledge as "justified true belief," and now you are arguing that one does not need justification to have knowledge! Either justification is adequate, or it is not. Until you provide what you think is adequate justification, you haven't articulated your theory of knowledge. I actually agree with your stated definition of justified true belief, but I have a very different notion of justification (maximal warrant, which is defined by the axiom of God's Revelation).

Are you prepared to explain what you consider to be the justification necessary for knowledge?

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 12:19:27 EST-----



> And I would argue that only God can have unchanging knowledge. We are changeable, God is not. The truth does not change, but our knowledge of it does. I am perfectly willing to say that I am fallible, even with the help of the Holy Spirit. I am still a finite sinner who has been saved by Grace Alone.



You reduce knowledge to human belief. But belief, in order to be sound, requires an unchanging foundation. Yes, our beliefs may change, but that is why our beliefs are not knowledge. If so, then our assurance of salvation, our understanding of God, and every other indispensable truth of Christianity is reduced to human opinion.



> I read the text of the debate and Bahnsen did nothing of the kind. He simply asserted things and gave no coherent argument as to why atheism does not account for logic/etc. Granted, Stein was just as sloppy (and didn't understand what Bahnsen was saying--probably because he wasn't familiar enough with philosophy), but I can't say that Bahnsen won: his case for Christian Theism was not prima facie. He failed to establish that God should be assumed because he failed to establish any necessary connections. Neither side fulfilled their burden of proof.



I think you need to read the transcript again, perhaps several times.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 6, 2009)

Alright JTB, if you want, you can place the restrictions on knowledge so high that you do not have knowledge if there is the possibility of your belief being wrong. But I will go so far as to say that you don't have any knowledge at all, if that is the case. Furthermore, _no one_ is inclined to agree that that is a reasonable restriction to put on knowledge.


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## JTB (Oct 6, 2009)

steven-nemes said:


> Alright JTB, if you want, you can place the restrictions on knowledge so high that you do not have knowledge if there is the possibility of your belief being wrong. But I will go so far as to say that you don't have any knowledge at all, if that is the case. Furthermore, _no one_ is inclined to agree that that is a reasonable restriction to put on knowledge.



First, you are wrong that one cannot have knowledge. I'll even give you proof based upon my axiom.

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

I don't think you understand what is the restriction upon knowledge. Strictly speaking, the argument is about how knowledge is justified, and not specifically how it is granted. And I'm certainly not the only one to restrict knowledge in such a way. And even if I were, it would irrelevant whether or not anyone agreed. Consensus is not the basis of whether or not an argument is true.


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## Philip (Oct 6, 2009)

> He can, and He does. But the premise that God imposes knowledge upon the mind is not provided by induction, or empiricism. Therefore induction and empiricism cannot account for the foundation of their validity.



Ok, so where do you get this premise?



> Of course. God is not bound to impose upon the mind all truth, and the reality of sin's effects upon the mind means that Christians (still under the corruption of sin) do not reason from the Scriptures infallibly. But that fault does not in any way impinge upon the premise that God is still the one who imposes knowledge upon the mind, when the mind in fact knows.



Given that we are still fallible, can you provide an example of a fact that you know? Again, unless there is interpretation, you cannot be said to understand even a simple sentence like "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." You can say that this sentence is eternal truth with content behind it, but still, the question is whether you know for certain what that content is.

To do this, you need to understand several things:

1) The grammatic structure of the sentence.

2) The meanings of the words.

3) Context.

Two out of three things change with culture. All three are hermaneutical and therefore interpretive.

My point is that you cannot be sure of the meaning of anything that Scripture says and therefore cannot be sure of anything deduced from scripture.

This, in the end, leads to further skepticism. For example, since the Scriptures nowhere directly say "God exists" how can we be absolutely certain that He does? Unless you admit some measure of induction, we really do know nothing, at least nothing practical.



> When the Bible says that the Holy Spirit testifies with the individual spirit that the individual is saved, and when combined with the various propositions indicating what must be believed in order to be saved, I can, with maximal warrant, discern my own salvation.



How do you know that that interpretation is correct? As soon as you start reasoning, you could be wrong.



> The very fact that symbols on the page are intelligible to the mind depends upon the truth of propositions set forth in Scripture. Those proposition do not depend upon the marks on the page, nor my interpretation of those marks, but rather upon their nature as God's Revelation.



Let me put it this way: suppose I have a 100% accurate translation of the Scriptures in Old Gothic. Now, I may be able to discern the symbols and even memorize them with no comprehension of their meaning. Yes, the symbols express truth, but unless I know Old Gothic, that truth is meaningless to me. My question is one of whether you can be absolutely sure of what Scripture means. If you are not absolutely certain of what truth means, then it is of no value to you. How do you know that God's revelation is intelligible by you?



> You are contradicting your own definition. You defined knowledge as "justified true belief," and now you are arguing that one does not need justification to have knowledge!



No--I would argue that a true belief reached by a faulty justification is still knowledge. If the justification is challenged, then we may say that one has mere belief that needs a justification.

Justification is just a good reason--yes, it's subjective, as all human knowledge is.



> You reduce knowledge to human belief. But belief, in order to be sound, requires an unchanging foundation.



I would say it needs an unchanging object.



> If so, then our assurance of salvation, our understanding of God, and every other indispensable truth of Christianity is reduced to human opinion.



If you mean that we don't ultimately know that we know, then yes: that's an unrealistic criterion.



> First, you are wrong that one cannot have knowledge. I'll even give you proof based upon my axiom.
> 
> 1) The Bible is the Word of God.
> 2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
> ...



Define "God" and "lie" and "ability". How do you know what the Scriptures mean by "know"? How do you know that these verses have not been taken out of context?

In answer to the question that you're about to ask, Steven, yes my position has changed slightly since our discussion.


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## JTB (Oct 6, 2009)

P.F. Pugh,

Your position reduces all knowledge to opinion, leading inevitably to the skepticism you accuse my position of implying.

You continue to fail to acknowledge my axiom, nor have you demonstrated how it is false.

Read Augustine's De Magistro. Symbols do not provide knowledge. They are but occasions for the Teacher, Christ, to impose knowledge upon the mind.

You asked where I get that premise, and it comes from Scripture in numerous places.

Here's a couple: 
Psalms 94:10 "He who chastens the nations, will He not rebuke, Even He who teaches man knowledge?"
Proverbs 2:6 "For the LORD gives wisdom; From His mouth come knowledge and understanding"


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## jwithnell (Oct 6, 2009)

> axiom, nor have you demonstrated how it is false.



um, guys, an axiom is a statement that is not proven or demonstrated.


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## Philip (Oct 6, 2009)

Why should I be skeptical just because I might be wrong? Just because I might be wrong doesn't mean I know nothing. I'm fine with the fact that some things I claim to know may, in the end, turn out to be false.

Your axiom is not axiomatic--that's different from it being false.

Basically, if your axiom can be proven, even inductively, from other axioms, then it is not axiomatic.

As for language, the fact is that for God to communicate _via_ language, we must first know language. Language, I would argue, is axiomatic. In addition, every word in language must have a referent, or else it is meaningless.


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## JTB (Oct 7, 2009)

jwithnell said:


> > axiom, nor have you demonstrated how it is false.
> 
> 
> 
> um, guys, an axiom is a statement that is not proven or demonstrated.



Any axiom can be demonstrated to be incompatible with subsequent premises within a person's set of beliefs.

-----Added 10/7/2009 at 07:28:11 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> Why should I be skeptical just because I might be wrong? Just because I might be wrong doesn't mean I know nothing. I'm fine with the fact that some things I claim to know may, in the end, turn out to be false.
> 
> Your axiom is not axiomatic--that's different from it being false.
> 
> ...



You're a skeptic because you have no viable justification for the truth. "Good reason" hasn't been defined, and when I gave what I thought was a good reason (looking at the clock on the wall) you didn't say why it was a bad reason, only that it was wrong.

I'm not asking you to prove my axiom. I'm asking you to demonstrate why it is inadequate as a foundation. 

How does language function as an axiom for epistemology?


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## Philip (Oct 7, 2009)

> You're a skeptic because you have no viable justification for the truth.



I'm mostly skeptical about skepticism. When you talk about a justification for the truth, do mean an epistemological justification or a metaphysical one?

Your axiom alone is inadequate because it gives us knowledge of symbols without knowledge of content. According to you, I can be certain that "In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth" but unless I can claim to know the meanings of those words, I have no knowledge of their content.

This is why you must assume language as an axiom: because without language, the Scriptures are epistemologically meaningless. I cannot be said to "know" the story of Balaam's Ass because I don't "know" for certain that the definition of a donkey as given by God and my own definition of a donkey are the same. Unless we assume that communication via symbolic language is possible as an axiom, and that God is using words in the same sense that we are, then we can have no real knowledge of Scripture.

As for proving your axiom, I would say that your axiom is demonstrable by a means other than a _reductio_ and is therefore not axiomatic.

As for the clock on the wall, I think it was a good reason--it just didn't turn out to be a true belief. One can reason inductively and be wrong--unlike in yours, absolute certainty isn't necessary in my epistemology because I recognize that it is, in the end, impossible.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 7, 2009)

JTB said:


> steven-nemes said:
> 
> 
> > Alright JTB, if you want, you can place the restrictions on knowledge so high that you do not have knowledge if there is the possibility of your belief being wrong. But I will go so far as to say that you don't have any knowledge at all, if that is the case. Furthermore, _no one_ is inclined to agree that that is a reasonable restriction to put on knowledge.
> ...



All of those beliefs are possibly false, so you don't know them.


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## Philip (Oct 7, 2009)

He is stating "The Bible is the word of God" as His axiom, so it's a given. The problem is that he cannot answer with 100% certainty to the content of those statements, as that would involve some measure of interpretation.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 7, 2009)

His axiom is possibly false so by his own standards he can't know it.


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## Philip (Oct 7, 2009)

He wouldn't say that it is. An axiom cannot be proved or disproved, by definition.

Part of the problem that I have with Scripture being axiomatic is that Islam claims the same for the Koran. You may attempt to show that the Koran contains inconsistencies, but even then, the Koran claims that God, and therefore the Koran, is not bound by logic.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 7, 2009)

Impossible to prove or disprove _does not_ equal not possibly false or true.

_The Bible is the Word of God_ is a proposition and as such has a truth value. It is possibly false. So JTB does not know it.


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## Julio Martinez Jr (Oct 7, 2009)

This is another reason why I can't accept that the Bible in its content is axiomatic. I like R.C. Sproul's method for the topic of innerency.


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm mostly skeptical about skepticism. When you talk about a justification for the truth, do mean an epistemological justification or a metaphysical one?



Without having anything stronger than a reasonable belief, you are ultimately reduced to skepticism.



> Your axiom alone is inadequate because it gives us knowledge of symbols without knowledge of content. According to you, I can be certain that "In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth" but unless I can claim to know the meanings of those words, I have no knowledge of their content.



The axiom itself establishes language as meaningful.



> This is why you must assume language as an axiom: because without language, the Scriptures are epistemologically meaningless. I cannot be said to "know" the story of Balaam's Ass because I don't "know" for certain that the definition of a donkey as given by God and my own definition of a donkey are the same. Unless we assume that communication via symbolic language is possible as an axiom, and that God is using words in the same sense that we are, then we can have no real knowledge of Scripture.



What language? English? Hebrew? Symbolic logic? Language as you describe it isn't an axiom at all.



> As for proving your axiom, I would say that your axiom is demonstrable by a means other than a _reductio_ and is therefore not axiomatic.



I don't understand what you are saying in this sentence.



> As for the clock on the wall, I think it was a good reason--it just didn't turn out to be a true belief. One can reason inductively and be wrong--unlike in yours, absolute certainty isn't necessary in my epistemology because I recognize that it is, in the end, impossible.



You do not understand the example. Why don't you look at it again, more closely. I would really encourage you to pick up Augustine's "Against the Academicians" and "On the Teacher." You haven't demonstrated to me that you understand the basics of this discussion.

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 07:39:30 EST-----



steven-nemes said:


> JTB said:
> 
> 
> > steven-nemes said:
> ...



How are they possibly false? Do you really think it is possibly false that the Bible is God's Word? By what standard can you even draw that conclusion?


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> He is stating "The Bible is the word of God" as His axiom, so it's a given. The problem is that he cannot answer with 100% certainty to the content of those statements, as that would involve some measure of interpretation.



Certainty is riddled with problems because it has so often been understood in terms of psychological conviction, rather than epistemological validity.

The point is, what has the maximal warrant. Obviously, anything that God reveals propositionally can be known as true. God has revealed His Word, which contains propositions. They are true, I believe them, and they have maximal warrant; thus I have knowledge.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 9, 2009)

It is possible that Christianity is false.

Are you saying that it isn't possible that Christianity is false? Could you care to _prove_ that?


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> He wouldn't say that it is. An axiom cannot be proved or disproved, by definition.
> 
> Part of the problem that I have with Scripture being axiomatic is that Islam claims the same for the Koran. You may attempt to show that the Koran contains inconsistencies, but even then, the Koran claims that God, and therefore the Koran, is not bound by logic.



Anyone who denies the validity of logic ultimately undermines his own theory, unless he can propose an alternative system for determining meaning. The basic laws of logic (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) are assumed by every single system, but only one can justify them.

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 07:47:13 EST-----



steven-nemes said:


> It is possible that Christianity is false.
> 
> Are you saying that it isn't possible that Christianity is false? Could you care to _prove_ that?



I've already given you a proof. You have simply asserted that any of my propositions might be false. But that doesn't mean they are false. You have to present an argument demonstrating that any one of the propositions is indeed false, or contradictory.

If Christianity could be false, then it cannot be true with maximal warrant. You can never know God, but only believe that He may exist. That is skepticism Steven.


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## Philip (Oct 9, 2009)

JTB said:


> Without having anything stronger than a reasonable belief, you are ultimately reduced to skepticism.



Give me a good reason to doubt my senses and I will be a skeptic. Give me a good reason to think that I am not, at this moment, typing out a response to your post. Could it be doubted? Yes, but the doubt would be unreasonable.



> The axiom itself establishes language as meaningful.



How?



> I don't understand what you are saying in this sentence.



I was trying to say that if an axiom is provable, then it is no longer axiomatic. The truth of Scripture is, I believe, inductively provable and therefore is not axiomatic.



> The point is, what has the maximal warrant. Obviously, anything that God reveals propositionally can be known as true. God has revealed His Word, which contains propositions.



But that's assuming that you know God and that you know the scriptures. You are believing based on an authority backing up those beliefs (ie: God).

I would be more comfortable with saying that God's existence is axiomatic than that Scripture is simply because Scripture derives its authority from God.

The problem is that, even granted Scripture as your axiom, you can't be 100% certain that it is the right axiom. The right axiom might just be unknowable by you.

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 07:58:26 EST-----



> The basic laws of logic (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) are assumed by every single system, but only one can justify them.



Metaphysically, maybe. Epistemologically, no--no system can justify them because they are axiomatic.


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

Pugh said:


> Give me a good reason to doubt my senses and I will be a skeptic. Give me a good reason to think that I am not, at this moment, typing out a response to your post. Could it be doubted? Yes, but the doubt would be unreasonable.



I already have given you a good reason to doubt the validity of your senses in the clock example. The light switch example also applies. I don't "know" that walking into a dark room and flipping a light switch will turn on a light because there are several things that could reasonably occur to prevent that conclusion from being true (the light bulb is broken, the circuit is blown).

You have yet to establish the criteria for "good reason," and you've accepted my examples as good reasons even though they aren't true. You've gone through several permutations of contradictory conclusions.



> How? [is language established as valid]



If my axiom is that "The Bible is God's Word," then it follows that communication must be possible, therefore the meaningful nature of language is established.



> But that's assuming that you know God and that you know the scriptures. You are believing based on an authority backing up those beliefs (ie: God).
> 
> I would be more comfortable with saying that God's existence is axiomatic than that Scripture is simply because Scripture derives its authority from God.
> 
> The problem is that, even granted Scripture as your axiom, you can't be 100% certain that it is the right axiom. The right axiom might just be unknowable by you.



The right axiom is demonstrated by its continued veracity. There is no reason to doubt it until it has been proven false. Just because I assume its truth does not imply that its truth is therefore unknowable. That is absurd.



> Metaphysically, maybe. Epistemologically, no--no system can justify them because they are axiomatic.



A few posts above you said language was axiomatic. How many axioms do you retain? Plus, having the laws of logic and language as axioms does not allow you to have knowledge of God. Logic and language cannot be axiomatic because they do not establish God as true.


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## Ron (Oct 9, 2009)

steven-nemes said:


> It is possible that Christianity is false.
> 
> Are you saying that it isn't possible that Christianity is false? Could you care to _prove_ that?



It's not an issue of proof, it's an issue of what you will accept at authoritative. Proof is child's play. All one needs is a valid argument with true premises. Don't confuse a sound argument with persuasion.

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 10:19:07 EST-----

"_I already have given you a good reason to doubt the validity of your senses in the clock example. The light switch example also applies. I don't "know" that walking into a dark room and flipping a light switch will turn on a light because there are several things that could reasonably occur to prevent that conclusion from being true (the light bulb is broken, the circuit is blown)._"

Josh,

I'm sure I would like much of what you wrote but that one jumped out at me as a bit rushed. The problem with the clock and light examples don't speak to the limitations of the medium of the senses but rather to the limits of non-deductive reasoning. It's an inference that the clock and light will function. Accordingly, when the belief about the time is false due to a faulty clock, one need not distrust his senses but rather gain a greater appreciation of the limits of inference. We are perefectly justified in trusting our senses. The Scriptures presuppose that they are reliable. 

Ron


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

> Josh,
> 
> I'm sure I would like much of what you wrote but that one jumped out at me as a bit rushed. The problem with the clock and light examples don't speak to the limitations of the medium of the senses but rather to the limits of non-deductive reasoning. It's an inference that the clock and light will function. Accordingly, when the belief about the time is false due to a faulty clock, one need not distrust his senses but rather gain a greater appreciation of the limits of inference. We are perefectly justified in trusting our senses. The Scriptures presuppose that they are reliable.
> 
> Ron



Ron, I agree that the senses are reliable upon the basis of Scriptural presupposition. The point at issue was that Pugh was unwilling to provide a sound basis upon which his senses should be considered reliable as leading to knowledge.

Part of the problem as well is that Pugh seems to change his mind about how knowledge is to be defined. In one post, he calls it justified true belief, with justification being "good reason." He recognizes my inductive conclusion about the clock or the light as a "good reason" that leads to true belief (since the clock just-so-happens to have stopped at the correct time), but then he denies that my example fits his definition--he acknowledges "good reason," but says it isn't really a true belief, because the "good reason" isn't actually a good reason, because it is fallacious.

I don't know how such an obvious contradiction in applying the definition can be ignored, but it has been--unless I'm missing something.


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## Ron (Oct 9, 2009)

Josh,

I appreciate what you were aiming at (see blog posts below), and I also agree the thread is an absolute mess. My single "complaint" was that the inferring of the wrong time should not be indexed to faulty senses; in fact, the senses are presupposed as reliable in order to draw the false (yet rational) inference about the time. I'm not quite sure you made the point you were trying to make and I thought that possibly you made a different point than you intended. I'll read it again tomorrow. 

Grace and peace,

Ron

p.s. Man it was hot and humid in Houston! 

Reformed Apologist: Induction and Knowledge

Reformed Apologist: More on Induction and Knowledge


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## Philip (Oct 10, 2009)

Those aren't good reasons to distrust the senses, just examples of how inductive logic can be wrong, _but more often than not, it isn't_. In both of your examples, yes experience says that we can reasonably expect certain results--but it also says that these expectations may not be met exactly because we are not able to account for all the factors that may be involved. It is no count against experience that we may be wrong in our predictions--it's just indicative of our finitude.

It was a good reason--it just happened to be wrong. One can do this in deductive reasoning too--one can have one or two false premises and a true conclusion.

Even in deductive logic, there may be problems with our reasoning that we are not--and possibly cannot--be aware of. Would you call that a count against the validity of deductive logic?

No, we may not be able to call our senses infallible, but nonetheless we are forced by necessity to rely upon them. If you are able to find a way to connect with the external world in some way other than _via_ the senses, then please do so. However, I have a principle: any epistemology that cuts one off epistemologically from the external world is categorically false. Why? Because impractical epistemology is useless epistemology.

I apply this principle presuppositionally--if your worldview cannot be consistently lived out, then it is false (I refer to this as Schaeffer's Anvil).

Setting the bar of knowledge at absolute certainty is unnecessary. My good reason for trusting the senses is this: like it or not, we have to trust them--even to read the Scriptures. Just how do you know, deductively from your axiom, that the book that you may or may not be holding is the word of God?



> If my axiom is that "The Bible is God's Word," then it follows that communication must be possible, therefore the meaningful nature of language is established.



Just because the Bible is God's word doesn't mean that it is intelligible by finite human beings. Where's the necessary connection between "The Bible is the Word of God" and "Communication must be possible"?


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## Ron (Oct 10, 2009)

Philip,

I know you wrote that to Joshua and I think it is succinct enough for him to deal with, so I’ll let you guys go at it for a while. I think much of what you wrote is fine. I wanted to touch on one thing though because I think that something might be driving your statement below. 

_"Setting the bar of knowledge at absolute certainty is unnecessary. My good reason for trusting the senses is this: like it or not, we have to trust them--even to read the Scriptures. Just how do you know, deductively from your axiom, that the book that you may or may not be holding is the word of God?"_

If knowledge is so broad as to include things believed by inductive inference, then in common parlance we’d have to distinguish between knowing something “for sure” and knowing something that we’re not 100% sure about. Imagine the judge saying: “Do you know that Mr. Smith killed his wife?” “Yes” says Mr. Jones, "I’m nearly 90% certain that it is true!" What is it to “know” something without certainty after all? My question to you would be, at what point does one truly “know” anything through induction? What does it mean to say "I know something, but I can't be certain"? 

I don’t say this applies to you, Philip, but I find it remarkable that so many Reformed thinkers are willing to redefine knowledge so as to include inductive inference in order that they can “know” more things, such as that they are saved! If it is true that induction cannot yield absolute certainty and if it, also, true (as some would have us believe) that we come to embrace God’s word through induction, then we must concede that we cannot know with absolute certainty the truth of the gospel! Yet we can know with 100% certainty the truth of the gospel and that we are saved. Induction cannot yield 100% certainty, but it is also false that we ultimately come to know the gospel by way of induction. The knowledge of my existence or that Jesus died for me is not ultimately obtained through induction, which is precisely why one can know with infallible certainty he has eternal life. We don't have to redefine or lower the definition of what qualifies as knowledge. It's the Spirit that confirms God's revelation and that is no mere inference. 

Someone on the second blog post that I linked above wrote this to me:

_I was just thinking about deduction today and I really don't see how (outside of revelation) it escapes the problem of induction.

For example:

p1: All men are mortal
p2: Socrates is a man
c: Socrates is mortal.

The above argument is true as far as its premises are true but without revelation p1 cannot be justified without faulty appeal to induction as far as I can see.

I might be missing something but this leads me to think that deductive arguments are no 'surer' than induction outside of revelation._

I responded with:

You are correct. Christians know that all men are mortal because we have it on God’s authority. For instance we know by revelation that “it’s appointed for a man once to die and then the judgment.” The unsaved have to _justify_ this general revelation, which they know, by way of inductive inference.

The above argument, however, is an inference for the Christian as well, since p2 is not deducible or revealed by God. However, we can deduce that Alexander the Coppersmith is a mortal since we know it is true that he existed, whereas it is only a most rational inference that Socrates existed.

The person who wrote to me saw no difference between the Socrates syllogism and this one:

p1: God reveals Christianity
p2: What God reveals is true
c: Christianity is true

I responded with: 

_I know the premises are true through Scripture. They are not arbitrary in the least (as you suggested they were) because they are grounded in God’s word. Such an argument may not be very useful, however, because it doesn’t deal with preconditions of intelligible experience. Nonetheless, the premises are not mere inductive inferences, as is the case with “Socrates existed in the past…” The point, which is clear, is that such an argument is sound, as is TAG; whether they persuade another person or not is not a necessary condition for sound argumentation. Needless to say, the above deductive argument for the truth of Christianity will not be very useful, though TAG can be._

Philip,

I’ll let you get back to Joshua. I simply wanted to put out there that we don’t need to lower the definition of knowledge to include inductive inferences in order to know biblical truth or that we are saved. Induction is very useful but at the end of the day, our assurance of our salvation is due to the internal witness of the Spirit. 

Finally, that one can make mistakes while trying to employ deduction does not discredit anything I've said, lest we would have to abandon _any_ criteria for knowledge!

Ron


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## Philip (Oct 10, 2009)

> Induction is very useful but at the end of the day, our assurance of our salvation is due to the internal witness of the Spirit.



I agree here. However, belief on testimony is never deductive, no matter how convinced we may be of the witness's authority. If you can construct a valid set of syllogisms, then I'll reconsider. However, in reality what we have is an ongoing miracle in our own lives that bears witness to the truth of the Gospel: that's how I know I am saved and that's why I believe--but it is a belief based on authority, not my fallen deduction.


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## Ron (Oct 10, 2009)

I couldn't agree more that revelation is not discursive. 

I think we agree. 

Ron


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## steven-nemes (Oct 11, 2009)

JTB: You seemed to me to be saying that if one of your beliefs is possibly false, then it cannot count as knowledge. That is an absurd requirement on knowledge that I think you would be hard pressed to find modern epistemologists making.

Your belief that the Bible is the word of God is possibly false: you could be deceived by a malevolent demon into believing it. So it follows by your own standards that you don't know it.

-----Added 10/11/2009 at 04:39:38 EST-----



Ron said:


> It's not an issue of proof, it's an issue of what you will accept at authoritative. Proof is child's play. All one needs is a valid argument with true premises. Don't confuse a sound argument with persuasion.



Well in the first place "prove" means--exactly that, prove. Show that it is true in such a way that is convincing to anyone who is rational and sane. I didn't say anything about providing a sound deductive argument or anything of that sort; in fact I'm not sure why it is you made the observation you did.


To JTB: Is this supposed to be your proof?

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

How is that a proof? It isn't even an argument, really.


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## Ron (Oct 11, 2009)

Steve,

If I were to prove that there is a box of crackers in the pantry, yet someone who was a philosophical skeptic denied that I proved anything, would the proof become invalidated? Of course not! That’s because proof is not a sufficient condition for persuasion and persuasion is not a necessary condition for proof. A sound proof is sound whether anyone is even there to consider it or not, let alone whether an alleged rational or sane man embraces it or not. Accordingly, when you say that I must prove Christianity so that any “rational” or “sane” person will be persuaded, you seem to be suggesting that I must persuade the intelligent so-called atheist that Jesus has been raised from the dead. What you are obviously missing is that the professing atheist who rejects God’s revelation of Christ is in many ways as dysfunctional as the one who would deny the crackers he sees in the pantry. 

_The former days of ignorance are gone_, Steven. God’s clear revelation of Christianity is proof enough. It’s a moral problem, not an intellectual one, that all people are not persuaded by God’s word and the conviction of the Holy Spirit. It’s not an issue of proof. It’s a matter of “Has God said?” You may not find the proof that God offers in His word and is confirmed by the Holy Spirit as indubitable, but that can only be because you are listening to voices other than God. 

In the bonds of Christ,

Ron


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## Philip (Oct 11, 2009)

The fact is, Steven, that the Atheist is right when he says that it will take a miracle for him to believe--it takes regeneration.


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## JTB (Oct 12, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Those aren't good reasons to distrust the senses, just examples of how inductive logic can be wrong, _but more often than not, it isn't_. In both of your examples, yes experience says that we can reasonably expect certain results--but it also says that these expectations may not be met exactly because we are not able to account for all the factors that may be involved. It is no count against experience that we may be wrong in our predictions--it's just indicative of our finitude.



Let me back up a step. I don't distrust my senses, but the justification I have for trusting the senses is grounded in the rational nature of God, which I can only know from His revelation (and we can say that revelation is both discursive in His Word, and non-discursive in the sensus divinatatis).

So, my point is that without revelation, we have no justification for trusting our senses apart from Christian presuppositions.



> It was a good reason--it just happened to be wrong. One can do this in deductive reasoning too--one can have one or two false premises and a true conclusion.
> 
> Even in deductive logic, there may be problems with our reasoning that we are not--and possibly cannot--be aware of. Would you call that a count against the validity of deductive logic?



No, I agree with you here, and I hope I've clarified what I think is the difference above. I would also hold that the laws of logic and deductive reasoning can only be justified upon God's revelation.



> No, we may not be able to call our senses infallible, but nonetheless we are forced by necessity to rely upon them. If you are able to find a way to connect with the external world in some way other than _via_ the senses, then please do so. However, I have a principle: any epistemology that cuts one off epistemologically from the external world is categorically false. Why? Because impractical epistemology is useless epistemology.



I'll grant you this point as well, although I'll suggest that you consider the individual whose senses have been cut off (the blind, the deaf, etc.). Can he not still know about the external world apart from these sensations?



> I apply this principle presuppositionally--if your worldview cannot be consistently lived out, then it is false (I refer to this as Schaeffer's Anvil).
> 
> Setting the bar of knowledge at absolute certainty is unnecessary. My good reason for trusting the senses is this: like it or not, we have to trust them--even to read the Scriptures. Just how do you know, deductively from your axiom, that the book that you may or may not be holding is the word of God?



Setting the bar of knowledge at anything less than maximal warrant reduces knowledge to belief, and sets up a true dilemma with things that the Bible tells us we can know without a doubt, such as the assurance of our own standing with God in Christ. It is not my sensations that discover the word of God, even when I use my eyes to read ink on a page. It is still the Spirit of God speaking directly to my mind that gives me understanding. The occasion is most often as I read with my eyes, but it isn't the occasion that causes the knowledge.



> > If my axiom is that "The Bible is God's Word," then it follows that communication must be possible, therefore the meaningful nature of language is established.
> 
> 
> 
> Just because the Bible is God's word doesn't mean that it is intelligible by finite human beings. Where's the necessary connection between "The Bible is the Word of God" and "Communication must be possible"?



Perhaps I am assuming more in the proposition than is warranted, since I assume that the Bible is something delivered to men for their understanding.

-----Added 10/12/2009 at 07:43:12 EST-----



steven-nemes said:


> JTB: You seemed to me to be saying that if one of your beliefs is possibly false, then it cannot count as knowledge. That is an absurd requirement on knowledge that I think you would be hard pressed to find modern epistemologists making.
> 
> Your belief that the Bible is the word of God is possibly false: you could be deceived by a malevolent demon into believing it. So it follows by your own standards that you don't know it.



No, it follows by your standards that I don't know it. If the Bible is the Word of God, then it is impossible that a malevolent demon has caused me to believe it, for the Bible as the Word of God, says that God does not lie, and that He has revealed Himself to men in His Word, and a host of other propositions that are true upon the axiom that the Bible is God's Word.




> To JTB: Is this supposed to be your proof?
> 
> 1) The Bible is the Word of God.
> 2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
> ...



How is it not a proof, or an argument? There are four propositions. I've attempted to put them into a logical order. They have a conclusion. What is it that is missing?


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## steven-nemes (Oct 12, 2009)

I was simply going by _JTB_'s own standard, that of if a belief is possibly false then it cannot be known, and concluding that _by his own standard_ he does not know that the Bible is the word of God.

I don't even understand how some of the replies I've received are germane. JTB seems to me to be saying that if a belief is possibly false, then it cannot be known. Well it's just a fact of the matter that a whole lot of beliefs which are worth believing are all possibly false; they are only contingent truths. It follows by his own standards that any of his beliefs which really count cannot count as knowledge.

_1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge._

Alright. You gave this as a proof that there is knowledge. Fine. Sure. That's agreeable. But I said that, given your assertions, no one would have knowledge if any thing they know is possibly false. Every single one of those assertions is possibly false. Furthermore, your axiom, whether you want to admit it or not, is possibly false. So it follows you don't know it.


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## Ron (Oct 12, 2009)

_1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

Every single one of those assertions is possibly false._

1. The first statement is true by definition. Therefore, it cannot possibly be false.
2. The word of God states that God cannot lie. (Titus 1:2)Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that God cannot lie.
3. The Word of God states that men know God. (Romans 1:18-21). Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that men know God.
4. The fourth statement is logically necessary (and somewhat tautological). To know God obviously implies to know something, which presupposes having knowledge. Therefore, the statement cannot possibly be false. 

Ron


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## Philip (Oct 13, 2009)

JTB said:


> So, my point is that without revelation, we have no justification for trusting our senses apart from Christian presuppositions.



What you have given is a metaphysical justification. Epistemologically, I maintain that we have to trust them regardless of any other presuppositions. We cannot have a metaphysic without an epistemology.

Here I am going to state a principle: any proposition that is not _a priori_ is dubitable and therefore does not have maximal warrant.



> I'll grant you this point as well, although I'll suggest that you consider the individual whose senses have been cut off (the blind, the deaf, etc.). Can he not still know about the external world apart from these sensations?



Apart from all external senses, he could not.



> Setting the bar of knowledge at anything less than maximal warrant reduces knowledge to belief, and sets up a true dilemma with things that the Bible tells us we can know without a doubt, such as the assurance of our own standing with God in Christ.



Here I would like to make a distinction between reasonable doubt and skeptical doubt. Setting the bar of knowledge at maximal certainty automatically leads to skeptical doubt. I think that when the Bible is talking about doubt, it is mostly talking about reasonable doubt, suggesting that we can know our standing with Christ without a reasonable doubt. That is, the our standing with God stands up to the test of reasonable doubt. Nothing will ever stand up to the test of skeptical doubt.

The real question here is whether we trust our God-given faculties for knowledge (sight, induction, deduction, etc) or whether we trust only our rational intuitions for maximal warrant. The problem here is that only God actually has maximal warrant and in the end, our conclusion (if we're consistent) will be that we know nothing.

On the other hand, while no our senses, intuitions, etc. are not infallible, nonetheless they are God-given and we ought to trust them unless given a good reason not to in a particular situation. What we are trusting, in the end, is that God has given us faculties that lead to knowledge. The question is not whether we can doubt, but whether or not the doubt is reasonable.



> It is still the Spirit of God speaking directly to my mind that gives me understanding. The occasion is most often as I read with my eyes, but it isn't the occasion that causes the knowledge.



Why should I assume this?



Ron said:


> 1. The first statement is true by definition. Therefore, it cannot possibly be false.



Why is this true by definition? Why should I accept it?



> 2. The word of God states that God cannot lie. (Titus 1:2)Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that God cannot lie.



It's also circular to prove that the Bible is always right based on the fact that the Bible says that it is always right.

For theology, we can take the Bible as axiomatic, as well as for many kinds of philosophy. For epistemology, I'm not so sure that we can.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 13, 2009)

Ron said:


> _1) The Bible is the Word of God.
> 2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
> 3) The Bible states that men know God.
> 4) To know God is to possess knowledge.
> ...



Very well, my writing was quick and rushed. The first proposition _is_ possibly false. God can exist and the entire Bible be the product of men's imaginations. That's possible.

What I meant was rather that those things that the Bible states are possibly false. Sure, it's true that the bible says God cannot lie, but that proposition (_God cannot lie_) is possibly false. Same with _Men know God_. That is what I meant, but communicated very badly.


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## Ron (Oct 13, 2009)

“_Very well, my writing was quick and rushed. The first proposition is possibly false. God can exist and the entire Bible be the product of men's imaginations. That's possible._”

Dear Steven,

Please assume for argument’s sake that the Bible is the inspired word of God. If that premise is true, then it would be impossible that it be the product of the imaginations of men. Added to the assumption that the Bible is not the product of the imaginations of men but rather the word of God, I would ask you also to assume that the Holy Spirit can grant men full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority of the Bible. I’m here to tell you that the Holy Spirit has persuaded me and I trust many people of what you are not yet 100% persuaded. To put it another way, if God, who cannot lie, has revealed to anyone that the Bible is the word of God, then it is not possible that it is not the word of God. Consequently, the only thing you may assert is that God has not persuaded _you_ to the point of confession that the Bible cannot possibly be the product of the imaginations of men, or that God cannot lie. As I have told you before, the issue is not about proof but persuasion. 

“_What I meant was rather that those things that the Bible states are possibly false._”

The propositions of the Bible are not possibly false if the Bible is God’s word and God cannot lie. So again, if I know that to be true (along with a myriad of Christians), then it is impossible that it not be true for one cannot know as true that which is false. So once again, the only thing you may assert is that _you_ are not able to confess that God cannot lie or that the Bible is His word, and for that I am truly sorry. In other words, you cannot know that I cannot know that the Bible is God's word and that God cannot lie. 

Steven I will try to remember to pray for you. And for what it’s worth, I would encourage you in the Lord to submit your reasoning to the epistemic lordship of Christ and in doing so you will give up on what I trust is at worst an _unwitting_ quest for autonomy, which appears to be taking you captive. I would also encourage you to pray earnestly in the Spirit, asking God to grant you full assurance of the knowledge that He cannot lie and that the Bible is His word. That you would leave such ideas open to possibility is terrifying to me. 

In His grace,

Ron


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## Philip (Oct 13, 2009)

I think that what Steven is trying to say is that, if we are going to take the statement "The Bible is the word of God" as axiomatic, then we need a good reason to think that it is, in fact, axiomatic. One could do this with the TAG iff one could refute every possible worldview that did not accept the axiom. The trouble here is that this project is humanly impossible--the best we could do would be probability, and even then we don't know how many possible alternate axioms there are.

My other concern with this statement as an axiom is that it is _a posteriori_--that is, it presupposes a knowledge and understanding of Scripture and what it teaches.


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## Ron (Oct 13, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> I think that what Steven is trying to say is that, if we are going to take the statement "The Bible is the word of God" as axiomatic, then we need a good reason to think that it is, in fact, axiomatic. One could do this with the TAG iff one could refute every possible worldview that did not accept the axiom. The trouble here is that this project is humanly impossible--the best we could do would be probability, and even then we don't know how many possible alternate axioms there are.
> 
> My other concern with this statement as an axiom is that it is _a posteriori_--that is, it presupposes a knowledge and understanding of Scripture and what it teaches.



I would prefer to deal with what Steven is actually saying. He thinks it is possible that God can lie. I know it's impossible. Steven needs to appreciate that he cannot refute that I know it is impossible for God to lie. The issue is, and has always been, "Has God said?" 

Ron


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## Peairtach (Oct 13, 2009)

The Triune Personal and Absolute Living and True God is Man's ultimate

(i) Metaphysic

(ii) Epistemology

(iii) Ethic

(iv) Aesthetic

As Van Til said, He is the All-Conditioner. He is the ultimate standard for everything. After Him there is nothing and no standard.


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## JTB (Oct 13, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> What you have given is a metaphysical justification. Epistemologically, I maintain that we have to trust them regardless of any other presuppositions. We cannot have a metaphysic without an epistemology.
> 
> Here I am going to state a principle: any proposition that is not _a priori_ is dubitable and therefore does not have maximal warrant.



Why is it unacceptable to argue, a priori, that "The Bible is the Word of God"?

Also, would you please provide me a succinct statement distinguishing metaphysical and epistemological justification?



> me said:
> 
> 
> > I'll grant you this point as well, although I'll suggest that you consider the individual whose senses have been cut off (the blind, the deaf, etc.). Can he not still know about the external world apart from these sensations?
> ...



How do you then explain how the soul in its intermediate state can possess knowledge of the world?



> Here I would like to make a distinction between reasonable doubt and skeptical doubt. Setting the bar of knowledge at maximal certainty automatically leads to skeptical doubt. I think that when the Bible is talking about doubt, it is mostly talking about reasonable doubt, suggesting that we can know our standing with Christ without a reasonable doubt. That is, the our standing with God stands up to the test of reasonable doubt. Nothing will ever stand up to the test of skeptical doubt.



You'll have to provide more than the assertion that this is the sort of doubt of which the Bible speaks. Also, by having the axiom, "The Bible is the Word of God," we are assured that all its propositions, including those deducible by necessary consequence have maximal warrant. I'd say that is a sufficient amount of knowledge upon which to live life without being a skeptic. Moreover, the usefulness of beliefs not having maximal warrant is recognized by my position, without surrendering the character of knowledge as having maximal warrant.



> The real question here is whether we trust our God-given faculties for knowledge (sight, induction, deduction, etc) or whether we trust only our rational intuitions for maximal warrant. The problem here is that only God actually has maximal warrant and in the end, our conclusion (if we're consistent) will be that we know nothing.



No, we have maximal warrant because God has testified to us in His Word. We can know it is His Word because He reveals it directly to us, as you yourself have admitted in the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit. I don't prove the axiom, because it has been given to me as a starting point.



> On the other hand, while no our senses, intuitions, etc. are not infallible, nonetheless they are God-given and we ought to trust them unless given a good reason not to in a particular situation. What we are trusting, in the end, is that God has given us faculties that lead to knowledge. The question is not whether we can doubt, but whether or not the doubt is reasonable.



But the point is, without revelation, you cannot justify that you know that what you possess is God-given in the first place. We are talking about the justification of knowledge.



> me said:
> 
> 
> > It is still the Spirit of God speaking directly to my mind that gives me understanding. The occasion is most often as I read with my eyes, but it isn't the occasion that causes the knowledge.
> ...



I didn't say you should assume it. But I'm saying you cannot justify that the uses of your senses is even the proximate cause of knowledge. I'm saying that my conclusion provides a better explanation for how knowledge occurs.



> Ron said:
> 
> 
> > 1. The first statement is true by definition. Therefore, it cannot possibly be false.
> ...



So you can know theology by the axiom of the Bible, but you cannot know knowledge by the axiom of the Bible. Such a conclusion seems like alternative theories of epistemology to me. How can you retain both and not lead to incoherence? Is knowledge a divided subject matter?

-----Added 10/13/2009 at 02:31:50 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> I think that what Steven is trying to say is that, if we are going to take the statement "The Bible is the word of God" as axiomatic, then we need a good reason to think that it is, in fact, axiomatic. One could do this with the TAG iff one could refute every possible worldview that did not accept the axiom. The trouble here is that this project is humanly impossible--the best we could do would be probability, and even then we don't know how many possible alternate axioms there are.
> 
> My other concern with this statement as an axiom is that it is _a posteriori_--that is, it presupposes a knowledge and understanding of Scripture and what it teaches.



I think we would all agree that the persuasion that the axiom is good comes directly from the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration.

As for your second assertion, I'd like to hear you support just how it is that the axiom requires a further presupposition.


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## Philip (Oct 13, 2009)

> Why is it unacceptable to argue, a priori, that "The Bible is the Word of God"?



Because the Bible is known _a posteriori_.



> Also, would you please provide me a succinct statement distinguishing metaphysical and epistemological justification?



Metaphysical justification of knowledge entails an accounting for why we can have knowledge (eg: God imposes knowledge).

Epistemological justification entails an accounting of how that happens _a priori_. You cannot have a metaphysical justification unless you first have an epistemological one.



> How do you then explain how the soul in its intermediate state can possess knowledge of the world?



Define "intermediate state."



> You'll have to provide more than the assertion that this is the sort of doubt of which the Bible speaks. Also, by having the axiom, "The Bible is the Word of God," we are assured that all its propositions, including those deducible by necessary consequence have maximal warrant.



That's a theological axiom, not an epistemological one. Why I say this is that the axiom presupposes the existence of God and of the Christian God. One has to have knowledge of this prior to the axiom.

In addition, I think I've already made it clear that human deduction is fallible and therefore anything that you deduce from Scripture is fallible.



> No, we have maximal warrant because God has testified to us in His Word.



Circular--we have maximal warrant for God's word because God has testified to us in His word?



> We can know it is His Word because He reveals it directly to us, as you yourself have admitted in the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit.



The regenerative work of the Holy Spirit is demonstrative of the truth of God's word. It constitutes proof in the same way that God sending fire from heaven constituted proof of God's word on Mount Carmel.



> But the point is, without revelation, you cannot justify that you know that what you possess is God-given in the first place. We are talking about the justification of knowledge.



Granted, I did give a metaphysical justification there.

Nonetheless, of necessity we are forced to trust them and therefore are unreasonable to doubt them unless given good reason. The burden of proof is on the skeptic to prove that, in a given instance, doubt is reasonable.



> So you can know theology by the axiom of the Bible, but you cannot know knowledge by the axiom of the Bible. Such a conclusion seems like alternative theories of epistemology to me. How can you retain both and not lead to incoherence? Is knowledge a divided subject matter?



The Bible is indeed _a_ source of knowledge about God, provided that we are presupposing the same things that it does.

What I mean to say is that while we can, I think, take the Bible to be a source of knowledge, we are not justified in taking it to be the _only_ source of knowledge. 



> As for your second assertion, I'd like to hear you support just how it is that the axiom requires a further presupposition.



In order to assume your axiom, one would have to know enough about the Scriptures to understand that such is the case. Further, as I stated, in order to assume this, one has to already have a knowledge of God. There can be no word of God without God.


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## Ron (Oct 13, 2009)

PFP,

I overlooked some questions asked of me that were burried in a post of yours to Josh. Let me address them now. 

_*Ron Stated:* The word of God states that God cannot lie. (Titus 1:2)Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that God cannot lie.

*PFP Responded:* It's also circular to prove that the Bible is always right based on the fact that the Bible says that it is always right._

The challenge before me was not to demonstrate that the Bible is always right. Rather, the challenge was simply to refute the claim that it is possibly false that a book called the Bible _states_ that God cannot lie. I met that challenge simply by quoting the Bible where _it states that God cannot lie._ Steven seemed to concede the point, saying he was “rushed” when he made the initial claim. I’m happy to take him at his word. In fact, he was so rushed he later had to retract three of his assertions! 

_*Ron Stated:* The first statement [the Bible is God’s word] is true by definition. Therefore, it cannot possibly be false.

*PFP Responded: *Why is this true by definition? Why should I accept it?_

It is a definition held by Christians. For instance, the Westminster Standards calls what we call the books of the Bible, Holy Scripture - the word of God. Secularists define it differently, as historical or ancient writings. Since I was dealing with Christians, I thought I’d use the Christian definition. (How foolish of me!) It’s hard for me to wrap my mind around so-called Christians questioning whether the Bible could be the writings of mere men and God’s truthfulness. 

As for why you should accept the Bible as the word of God, I don't think I can improve upon the Confession: "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture. And the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it does abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God: yet notwithstanding, *our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.*

I think it's time for me to bow out of this thread. I believe every challenge set at my door has been met and overcome. I could only wish I had the time to try to clear up some of the confusion I believe I see between you and Josh, but I simply do not. 

Best wishes,

Ron


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## Philip (Oct 13, 2009)

Ron,

Given those presuppositions, I agree. I will defend to the death the fact that I know that the Bible is God's Word. What I will not agree to is that the Bible is epistemologically axiomatic because its authority rests on other truths.


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## JTB (Oct 13, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> > Why is it unacceptable to argue, a priori, that "The Bible is the Word of God"?
> 
> 
> 
> Because the Bible is known _a posteriori_.



No it isn't. What the Bible is truly, is only known when one knows it as the Word of God. That conclusion comes only from the Holy Spirit, and then becomes the axiom by which Christians organize their knowledge of God, man, and the world.



> > Also, would you please provide me a succinct statement distinguishing metaphysical and epistemological justification?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I don't recognize that distinction as valid. Why we have knowledge (God imposes it upon the mind) is the same as how we have it (God imposes it upon the mind).



> Define "intermediate state."



The soul that is present with Christ and absent from the body.



> That's a theological axiom, not an epistemological one. Why I say this is that the axiom presupposes the existence of God and of the Christian God. One has to have knowledge of this prior to the axiom.



I don't understand how the axiom is presupposing something other than what it says. Obviously the axiom contains the definition of its terms within itself, otherwise every term is itself presupposed prior to the proposition, which would be the case with every axiom.



> In addition, I think I've already made it clear that human deduction is fallible and therefore anything that you deduce from Scripture is fallible.



Yes, the noetic effects of sin lead to faulty deductions. But that individuals fail does not make deduction faulty. If the premises are true, then the conclusions that necessarily follow are true.



> Circular--we have maximal warrant for God's word because God has testified to us in His word?



Self-justifying. God's word is the axiom, so it has maximal warrant by definition. You cannot get out more than is put in. We know because God revealed it to us. There is no other conclusion, and the search for something more is, I think, a form of autonomy.



> The regenerative work of the Holy Spirit is demonstrative of the truth of God's word. It constitutes proof in the same way that God sending fire from heaven constituted proof of God's word on Mount Carmel.



But that goes back to my earlier point that we don't "know" what the word of God is until the Spirit confirms it to us. The pagan understands what the Bible claims to be, but he doesn't believe it is true, so he doesn't know it is God's Word.



> Nonetheless, of necessity we are forced to trust them and therefore are unreasonable to doubt them unless given good reason. The burden of proof is on the skeptic to prove that, in a given instance, doubt is reasonable.



I agree that the skeptic bears the burden of proof, but that doesn't mean you escape the requirement to justify why the senses are reliable.



> > So you can know theology by the axiom of the Bible, but you cannot know knowledge by the axiom of the Bible. Such a conclusion seems like alternative theories of epistemology to me. How can you retain both and not lead to incoherence? Is knowledge a divided subject matter?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The Bible is the only justification for knowledge. Recall that this is the key issue in our discussion. I agree that the senses are reliable, but not that they can justify the truth of what we experience by them.



> > As for your second assertion, I'd like to hear you support just how it is that the axiom requires a further presupposition.
> 
> 
> 
> In order to assume your axiom, one would have to know enough about the Scriptures to understand that such is the case. Further, as I stated, in order to assume this, one has to already have a knowledge of God. There can be no word of God without God.



Of course, but by containing the term in the axiom, how does it not also contain the definition? We are back to the problem I mentioned above, namely, that if an axiom does not include the definitions of each of its terms, then any axiom must presuppose those definitions and cannot truly be an axiom at all!


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## steven-nemes (Oct 14, 2009)

I think you are all misunderstanding my point in my posts. My point is that JTB's restrictions on knowledge are absurdly high, so high that even he does not have knowledge by his own standards.

It appeared to me that what JTB said was this: if your belief is possibly false (whether he meant logical possibility or epistemic possibility I don't know--either one isn't any good for him), then you do not know it. That is an absurd restriction on knowledge. Almost all of my beliefs are possibly false, both epistemically and logically, and the same would hold true with JTB. His belief that the Bible is the word of God is possibly false; his belief that the Bible states that God cannot lie is possibly false; it could be that he is being deceived all the time by a malevolent Cartesian demon to believe those things.

So the purpose of my posting is not that the Bible ought not be taken as axiomatic (though I don't think this), but rather that JTB's restrictions on knowledge are unreasonable.


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## Philip (Oct 14, 2009)

JTB said:


> No it isn't. What the Bible is truly, is only known when one knows it as the Word of God. That conclusion comes only from the Holy Spirit, and then becomes the axiom by which Christians organize their knowledge of God, man, and the world.



Nonetheless, it is _a posteriori_. One cannot know that the Bible is the word of God unless one has had contact with the Bible or has heard of the Bible. The Bible cannot be known to be true in an epistemological vacuum.



> I don't recognize that distinction as valid. Why we have knowledge (God imposes it upon the mind) is the same as how we have it (God imposes it upon the mind).



How do you know that God imposes it upon the mind? Is that a theory or do you have maximal warrant?

Epistemology cannot presuppose a metaphysic--God would be a metaphysical justification for why knowledge is possible because we cannot know that until we have established how we actually come to have knowledge, which is a matter of how we learn things and come to have warrant for beliefs.



> But that goes back to my earlier point that we don't "know" what the word of God is until the Spirit confirms it to us.



And how does He do this? By means of a miracle--by demonstration, not proposition.



> I agree that the skeptic bears the burden of proof, but that doesn't mean you escape the requirement to justify why the senses are reliable.



I think I've established this: because we have to rely on them.



> The Bible is the only justification for knowledge.



Why think this? Again, why this "maximal warrant" definition of knowledge?



> Of course, but by containing the term in the axiom, how does it not also contain the definition?



It assumes a definition. Depending on that definition, the proposition may be true or false. All axioms presuppose the definitions of their terms--unless those terms are commonly understood, there is no content.

As I said, the truth of the proposition "The Bible is the Word of God" rests on two presuppositions: that God is there and that He has spoken. If this were not so, we could say, in good Barthian fashion, "There is no God and the Bible is His word" (incoherent) or "God is silent and the Bible is His word" (also incoherent). The "axiom" can be broken down into further presuppositions and is therefore not axiomatic.


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## christianyouth (Oct 14, 2009)

I've enjoyed this thread so far.

Steven,

If it's true, that some demon may be deceiving us, then we certainly can't make positive statements of knowledge about the existence of God or the resurrection of Christ, since the events that lead us to those two beliefs could have just been engineered by a demon, or our perception of those beliefs could be faulty.

So how can I act with certainty, even to the point of risking my life because of certain beliefs, if what I perceive and call 'reality' is justan illusion created by Descartes' demon?

btw, I'm not saying that your argumentation(and Descartes) is wrong simply because your conclusions(and Descartes) seem counter-intuitive and dangerous. I'm just honestly wondering about this. 

Thanks


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## JTB (Oct 14, 2009)

Pugh said:


> Nonetheless, it is a posteriori. One cannot know that the Bible is the word of God unless one has had contact with the Bible or has heard of the Bible. The Bible cannot be known to be true in an epistemological vacuum.



The definition is contained within the axiom, as I've said. An elect infant that dies in infancy goes to be with the Lord without ever having heard of or touched a Bible will know that the Bible is God's Word in the intermediate state. Knowledge does not require sensation in order be possessed. God can, and does, deliver knowledge directly to our minds apart from any intermediary sensations. That He desires to use our sensations as occasions for that imposition does not make them necessary for knowledge to be had.



> How do you know that God imposes it upon the mind? Is that a theory or do you have maximal warrant?



How do you know that God brings about knowledge through the senses and not simply in coincidence with them?



> Epistemology cannot presuppose a metaphysic--God would be a metaphysical justification for why knowledge is possible because we cannot know that until we have established how we actually come to have knowledge, which is a matter of how we learn things and come to have warrant for beliefs.



How can epistemology NOT presuppose a metaphysic? Something must exist to be known, therefore some metaphysic is presupposed. The issue is one of logical priority. We need to know how we know what is, before what is can be known truly.



> And how does He do this? By means of a miracle--by demonstration, not proposition.



Sure. The proposition doesn't contain persuasion. But persuasion doesn't occur apart from a proposition. Otherwise, what are you persuaded to accept as true?



> I think I've established this: because we have to rely on them.



You haven't demonstrated it at all. I asked about souls in the intermediate state--souls that have no bodies with which to have sensations. Do those souls lose all the ability to know because they can no longer use their bodies' senses? Knowledge cannot be tied to sensation if disembodied souls are to possess it.



> Why think this? Again, why this "maximal warrant" definition of knowledge?



Because if you cannot know with maximal warrant that God is not a liar, then you could possibly be wrong that God is not a liar, which, presumably, you would not accept. If you accpt that it is possible that God is a liar, you deny the truth that Scripture affirms.



> It assumes a definition. Depending on that definition, the proposition may be true or false. All axioms presuppose the definitions of their terms--unless those terms are commonly understood, there is no content.
> 
> As I said, the truth of the proposition "The Bible is the Word of God" rests on two presuppositions: that God is there and that He has spoken. If this were not so, we could say, in good Barthian fashion, "There is no God and the Bible is His word" (incoherent) or "God is silent and the Bible is His word" (also incoherent). The "axiom" can be broken down into further presuppositions and is therefore not axiomatic.



It doesn't "assume" a definition, it contains the definition within itself. What axiom can you provide that does not require you to define its terms so as to make the full meaning of the axiom known? By asserting "The Bible is the Word of God" you automatically assume the existence of all the terms as they are defined within the axiom. They aren't presupposed, but asserted as true in the axiom.


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## Philip (Oct 14, 2009)

JTB said:


> The definition is contained within the axiom, as I've said. An elect infant that dies in infancy goes to be with the Lord without ever having heard of or touched a Bible will know that the Bible is God's Word in the intermediate state. Knowledge does not require sensation in order be possessed. God can, and does, deliver knowledge directly to our minds apart from any intermediary sensations. That He desires to use our sensations as occasions for that imposition does not make them necessary for knowledge to be had.



Example please: sensations include all emotional and rational capacity for understanding, not just physical sensations.

Also, how do you know that physical sensation depends on the physical body? After all, spiritual realities can become visible to physical beings, I see no reason why physical realities would not be visible to incorporeal beings.



> How do you know that God brings about knowledge through the senses and not simply in coincidence with them?



Can you provide an example of anything that God has revealed to you without the use of any other means?



> How can epistemology NOT presuppose a metaphysic? Something must exist to be known, therefore some metaphysic is presupposed. The issue is one of logical priority. We need to know how we know what is, before what is can be known truly.



But even here you state that epistemology must have priority because we must understand what it is to know before we can know what there is to be known.



> Because if you cannot know with maximal warrant that God is not a liar, then you could possibly be wrong that God is not a liar, which, presumably, you would not accept. If you accpt that it is possible that God is a liar, you deny the truth that Scripture affirms.



Just because I accept that I could possibly be wrong in my persuasion that God cannot lie does not mean that I do not affirm most emphatically that God cannot lie. This is no more logical than that my acceptance of the possibility that you don't exist means that I would not affirm that you actually do exist. It's a _non sequitor_.



> It doesn't "assume" a definition, it contains the definition within itself.



What I'm perceiving here is circularity. If an axiom contains the definitions upon which it depends within itself, then it is circular and therefore fallacious.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 14, 2009)

christianyouth said:


> If it's true, that some demon may be deceiving us, then we certainly can't make positive statements of knowledge about the existence of God or the resurrection of Christ, since the events that lead us to those two beliefs could have just been engineered by a demon, or our perception of those beliefs could be faulty.



Yes that's true.



> So how can I act with certainty, even to the point of risking my life because of certain beliefs, if what I perceive and call 'reality' is justan illusion created by Descartes' demon?



Well surely it is possible that we are being deceived by demons. But it does not follow that we cannot be certain about some of our beliefs. I am certain that I am typing on a computer at the moment even though I am possibly deceived. I suppose there are two ways of construing "certainty."

There is one sense of certainty, which I would take to be _knowing that your belief is true_. So if you are certain in the first sense, you not only _know_ that belief, but also you know that your belief is true. I suppose a second sense of certainty would be just holding a belief very strongly and not regarding as plausible alternative explanations. 

If certainty in the first sense is a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge would be impossible. I suggest that when we use the term "certain," we mean something like the second sense.


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## JTB (Oct 15, 2009)

Pugh said:


> Example please: sensations include all emotional and rational capacity for understanding, not just physical sensations.
> 
> Also, how do you know that physical sensation depends on the physical body? After all, spiritual realities can become visible to physical beings, I see no reason why physical realities would not be visible to incorporeal beings.



Sensation has never, to my knowledge, been defined as all emotional and rational capacity for understanding beyond what arises through physical bodies.

Physical sensation depends upon a physical body by definition. If I don't have a hand, I cannot sense anything by means of a hand. If I am incorporeal, I cannot sense the world corporeally. It doesn't mean I don't know the world, it only means I don't know it through sensation, which is my point.

I'd like a proof for how spiritual beings "see" the world, if by "visible" you mean seeing with eyes. I'd say that spiritual beings understand the world through intellection, apart from any physical stimulus.



> Can you provide an example of anything that God has revealed to you without the use of any other means?



I can provide numerous examples. The problem isn't with the examples, but with how those examples are being defined. You won't accept the definition, so you won't recognize them as examples. For example, I believe God is imposing upon my mind this moment the understanding of the words I see on the screen. But I've already given you a valid example: those in the intermediate state possess knowledge that cannot come through sensation.



> But even here you state that epistemology must have priority because we must understand what it is to know before we can know what there is to be known.



Presuppose was a mistaken choice on my part. I'd prefer to amend it to "entail." Epistemology entails metaphysics, because to know anything is to know something; therefore something exists.



> Just because I accept that I could possibly be wrong in my persuasion that God cannot lie does not mean that I do not affirm most emphatically that God cannot lie. This is no more logical than that my acceptance of the possibility that you don't exist means that I would not affirm that you actually do exist. It's a non sequitor.



But believing that you could be wrong about God being a liar implies that you don't really know if God is a liar. Skepticism is the only conclusion for epistemology built upon psychological conviction. The point isn't that you affirm that God is a liar, but that you cannot know whether or not He is, in fact, a liar. And this despite the fact that God has revealed it to you that He is not a liar. Is God's revelation not entirely trustworthy beyond doubt?



> What I'm perceiving here is circularity. If an axiom contains the definitions upon which it depends within itself, then it is circular and therefore fallacious.



You don't seem to recognize the nature of every axiom as begging the question. If it cannot be proven, and must be assumed, then the validity is accepted on the basis of the axiom's assertion (which is circular--I state that it is true, therefore it is true). Your own axiom requires the same condition, whatever that axiom may be (you've said at least two).

So let me summarize what I'm still waiting for you to give an argument for:

1. How does a soul in the intermediate state have knowledge? Or, stated differently, how can an incorporeal being have the corporeal sensations required for knowledge upon your definition? An example would be beneficial, if possible.

2. How can any axiom be stated without presupposition, and without having its terms defined within the statement itself? An example would be beneficial, if possible.

3. If you cannot be sure in your persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does not lie," how can you be sure that someone's persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does lie," is not valid?


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## Philip (Oct 15, 2009)

JTB said:


> Sensation has never, to my knowledge, been defined as all emotional and rational capacity for understanding beyond what arises through physical bodies.



Actually, that's Locke's definition.



> Physical sensation depends upon a physical body by definition.



Physical sensation, as I am using it, merely means sensation of physical realities.



> I'd say that spiritual beings understand the world through intellection, apart from any physical stimulus.



I'm curious as to how this works. I've never thought without using my brain before or without having emotions engaged. If we can have thought without a physical body, then why not sensation and emotion?

I'm not going to suggest an alternative, because it would be pure speculation on my part.



> I believe God is imposing upon my mind this moment the understanding of the words I see on the screen.



My question is not whether you believe it--it's whether you _know_ that this is how knowledge works? If so, then how do you know, for example, that 2+2=4 is among the pieces of knowledge that God has imposed on you? In order to have maximal warrant, you must know that you know and also you must know that you know that you know etc etc _ad infinitum_. At some point you have to admit either a) you don't know anything because your axiom is held non-rationally (not necessarily irrationally) b) the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant is flawed.



> Presuppose was a mistaken choice on my part. I'd prefer to amend it to "entail." Epistemology entails metaphysics, because to know anything is to know something; therefore something exists.



But how do you know that you know anything?



> But believing that you could be wrong about God being a liar implies that you don't really know if God is a liar.



That depends on the definition of knowledge, doesn't it? What reason do I have to doubt that God cannot lie?



> Is God's revelation not entirely trustworthy beyond doubt?



Beyond _reasonable_ doubt. Nothing, from our finite perspective, is trustworthy beyond skeptical doubt.



> You don't seem to recognize the nature of every axiom as begging the question.



Granted. So no axiom ultimately withstands the test of skepticism which the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant naturally produces.



> How does a soul in the intermediate state have knowledge? Or, stated differently, how can an incorporeal being have the corporeal sensations required for knowledge upon your definition?



That would be pure speculation, just as your idea of intellection (whatever that means) is.



> How can any axiom be stated without presupposition, and without having its terms defined within the statement itself?



If the terms are assumed and the axiom is so basic as to be obvious or unreasonable to doubt. Obvious: 2+2=4. Unreasonable to doubt: my senses are generally a reliable source of information.



> If you cannot be sure in your persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does not lie," how can you be sure that someone's persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does lie," is not valid?



But I _am_ sure--reasonably sure, that is.


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## JTB (Oct 15, 2009)

Pugh said:


> Actually, that's Locke's definition.



I'd like a reference to the specific passage so that I may read it for myself, if you don't mind.



> Physical sensation, as I am using it, merely means sensation of physical realities.



Does the sensation of physical realities require physical sensory receptors?



> I'm curious as to how this works. I've never thought without using my brain before or without having emotions engaged. If we can have thought without a physical body, then why not sensation and emotion?
> 
> I'm not going to suggest an alternative, because it would be pure speculation on my part.



Brain is not mind. Body is not soul. When your body dies, your soul goes to be with the Lord. Your brain deteriorates with the rest of your body in the ground. Emotions arise through the changes of state we experience in our physical bodies. Sensations and emotions require a physical body that experience changes of state in order to be experienced. Thoughts do not require a physical body, or else God would require a physical body, and so too would souls who have departed from the body.



> My question is not whether you believe it--it's whether you know that this is how knowledge works? If so, then how do you know, for example, that 2+2=4 is among the pieces of knowledge that God has imposed on you? In order to have maximal warrant, you must know that you know and also you must know that you know that you know etc etc ad infinitum. At some point you have to admit either a) you don't know anything because your axiom is held non-rationally (not necessarily irrationally) b) the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant is flawed.



2+2=4 is formulated by mathematical theories, but basic addition is demonstrated in Scripture, which provides the necessary maximal warrant upon my axiom. It isn't an ad infinitum, because of the axiom. Again, I am not convinced that you understand what an axiom is, or how it works.



> But how do you know that you know anything?



What God has revealed cannot be rationally doubted. That is one reason why the Bible calls the unbeliever a fool.



> Beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing, from our finite perspective, is trustworthy beyond skeptical doubt.



But if God has given you true propositions, then those propositions aren't subject to your finitude. They come from God, and are not to be doubted--skeptically or otherwise. I maintain that you have yet to produce a sound refutation of the axiom, nor have you provided a better alternative.



> Granted. So no axiom ultimately withstands the test of skepticism which the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant naturally produces.



Of course it withstands the test of skepticism, because skepticism is self-refuting. A self-refuting position cannot mount a justified counter-claim that axioms cannot be circular. The difference between the circular autonomous arguments of man and the circular argument of Scripture is that Scripture comes from a transcendent and unchanging source of truth, whereas autonomous men do not, and cannot justify the necessity of universal principles necessary for argument itself (i.e. the laws of logic) upon their autonomous presuppositions.



> That would be pure speculation, just as your idea of intellection (whatever that means) is.



Do you think it pure speculation because you have no direct experience of it? Intellection is thinking, or perceiving with the mind. Unless you think that the mind is a physical body, or that an immaterial being has physical sense receptions that are themselves non-physical (how exactly would that be possible, by the way?) then you have to acknowledge that the mind does not require physical sensations in order to posses knowledge.



> But I am sure--reasonably sure, that is.



You are psychologically convinced, but not epistemologically sound. If assurance boils down to nothing more than your psychological conviction of a reasonable judgment, then you can never offer anything but contingency. Thus, justifying the truth of any universal statement becomes impossible: you cannot justify that God never lies, because it is possible that he does, since you have only your own finite experience by which to judge.

I think you are allowing your autonomous judgment to be the final arbiter or authority of knowledge. If so, then I don't see what makes your view different from the unbeliever in his state of rebellion.


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## Philip (Oct 15, 2009)

JTB said:


> I'd like a reference to the specific passage so that I may read it for myself, if you don't mind.



_Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ Book II, 4-5, Locke defines all mental thought as "internal sense" even though he refers to this later as reflection. I am not agreeing with Locke on his general epistemology, just that he has a good definition of what comprises our senses (or what Reidians call cognitive equipment).



> Does the sensation of physical realities require physical sensory receptors?



Not necessarily--but I couldn't give you a definitive alternative as I have never been disembodied and the Bible is silent on the subject, so any attempt at epistemology here would be speculation.



> Sensations and emotions require a physical body that experience changes of state in order to be experienced.



Why do they require a physical body? I believe that God is compassionate and has emotions--and I certainly think that He can sense things without a physical body. 



> 2+2=4 is formulated by mathematical theories, but basic addition is demonstrated in Scripture, which provides the necessary maximal warrant upon my axiom.



Are you capable of heresy? If so, then you may not have interpreted Scripture correctly because God might not have imposed the knowledge on your mind.



> What God has revealed cannot be rationally doubted. That is one reason why the Bible calls the unbeliever a fool.



So what separates you and I from the unbeliever?



> But if God has given you true propositions, then those propositions aren't subject to your finitude.



It's God accommodating Himself to my language, and I am still capable of misunderstanding.



> Of course it withstands the test of skepticism, because skepticism is self-refuting.



No--it just ends in "I know nothing or maybe I do and just don't know it."



> A self-refuting position cannot mount a justified counter-claim that axioms cannot be circular.



The axioms of the critic have no bearing on the validity of the criticism. Regardless, skepticism is the only conclusion of the axiom that knowledge is maximal warrant.



> The difference between the circular autonomous arguments of man and the circular argument of Scripture is that Scripture comes from a transcendent and unchanging source of truth, whereas autonomous men do not, and cannot justify the necessity of universal principles necessary for argument itself (i.e. the laws of logic) upon their autonomous presuppositions.



I've never seen this actually done. I argue that the Bible assumes these laws just as it assumes the existence of God and other matters of general revelation. The unbeliever cannot be without excuse if he knows nothing.



> Do you think it pure speculation because you have no direct experience of it? Intellection is thinking, or perceiving with the mind.



I think it pure speculation because all that we know is thinking within a physical body.

To think, one must have terms with which to think, and therefore must have a reality backing them up. All that intellection is, then, is a machine for processing--and sometimes the machine doesn't work.



> You are psychologically convinced, but not epistemologically sound. If assurance boils down to nothing more than your psychological conviction of a reasonable judgment, then you can never offer anything but contingency.



Explain to me how a contingent being can have anything but contingency. I necessarily think contingently.



> Thus, justifying the truth of any universal statement becomes impossible



That depends on how high your standard of justification is. You base things on an axiom, and I base mine on a set of axioms. However, could you be mistaken in your acceptance of that particular axiom? A Muslim could make nearly an identical argument for the Koran and be consistent--in fact, he would probably be more consistent because he can at least account for errors in his system--Allah doesn't necessarily have to be logical. What separates you from the Muslim epistemologically?



> I think you are allowing your autonomous judgment to be the final arbiter or authority of knowledge. If so, then I don't see what makes your view different from the unbeliever in his state of rebellion.



It's different for this reason: I have a witness on whose word I base my knowledge. The unbeliever has no witness. The only reason why I know better than the unbeliever is the Grace of God. It's not by reason alone that I know.


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