# Scripturalism Revisited



## Brian Bosse

Hello Civbert and the Puritan Board,

What is the basis for being able to claim to have any knowledge whatsoever? Just today, Civbert answered this question in the following manner…



> A Christian need not adopt the subjectivistic presuppositions of modern epistemology. We have the objective Word of God as the foundation of knowledge.



Scriptuarlists trumpet the idea that Scripture alone is the foundation for knowledge, and point to the axiomatic system of Gordon Clark as the practical development of this. Gordon Clark says that his axiomatic system has one axiom, and that from this one axiom propositions can be derived that are rightly called knowledge. Clark’s axiom (the Axiom) is as follows…

*Axiom:* The Bible alone is the Word of God.

Essentially, a proposition is rightly called justified knowledge if and only if the proposition is derived _via_ deduction from the one Axiom. (Induction invalidates any argument, and thereby disqualifies any conclusion as being justified knowledge.) Scripturalists mean to be able to draw such conclusions as ‘Jesus is Messiah’ from the one axiom alone. However, it is my contention that when pressed they are unable to draw any conclusions from the one axiom that can be rightly called justified knowledge. That is to say, given their own criteria, they cannot justify any proposition as being knowledge. At this point this is just mere assertion on my part. But before going further, I want to allow the Scripturalist to comment in case I have not been accurate in my representations. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Semper Fidelis

Can I add one other axiom that seems to be unstated. Clark also presupposed that God thinks using Aristotalean logic. Thus it is not only the single Axiom that the Bible alone is the Word of God but the second axiom that all logical deductions from that axiom must use Aristotalean logic because both God and man univocally reason that way.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Rich,



> Clark also presupposed that God thinks using Aristotalean logic. Thus it is not only the single Axiom that the Bible alone is the Word of God but the second axiom that all logical deductions from that axiom must use Aristotalean logic because both God and man univocally reason that way.



I have a couple of thought regarding this. *(1)* When Clark says that one can go from the one axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture _via_ deduction he has in mind the syllogistic deductive form that Aristotle expounded on. However, I do not believe that either Clark or other Scripturalists would insist that the deductive argument be _via_ syllogism for it to be considered justified. Their beef is that it must be deductive. So, _Reductio Ad Absurdum_, _Modus Ponens_, _Modus Tollens_, etc...would be considered acceptable forms of deductive argumentation. *(2)* You are correct in pointing out that there must be more than the one axiom to derive a proposition from Scripture. The deductive apparatus itself must be axiomatic. This is one major flaw in Scripturalism.

With that said, I really appreciate what Clark was trying to do. In principle, I agree with him. However, it does not appear that Clark was sophisticated enough in his understanding of formal axiomatic systems. These types of systems are very explicit, and Clark was not very explicit. Clark resisted this type of explictness referring to it as "clanking machinery." The problem with this is that "the devil is in the details." When one begins to drill down on the axiomatic system, Scripturalism fails to deliver. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Semper Fidelis

Brian,

The reason I'm saying that is that I was listening to an MP3 lecture by Frame recently and he recounted a conversation he heard with Clark one time at a conference.

Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.

Thus, the interesting thing is that one must not only accept Scripture as the one axiom but must also reason like God does using Aristotalean logic on the basis of Clark's paper.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Rich,

Thank you for the backgound information. 



> Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.



I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Arch2k

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Rich,
> 
> Thank you for the backgound information.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...

 
I would be interested in looking into this more. As I understand Clark, he would agree with Brian's understanding about what is known as traditional logic (deductive in nature) and not narrowly Aristotelian.


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> .. The deductive apparatus itself must be axiomatic. This is one major flaw in Scripturalism.
> 
> With that said, I really appreciate what Clark was trying to do. In principle, I agree with him. However, it does not appear that Clark was sophisticated enough in his understanding of formal axiomatic systems. These types of systems are very explicit, and Clark was not very explicit. Clark resisted this type of explictness referring to it as "clanking machinery." The problem with this is that "the devil is in the details." When one begins to drill down on the axiomatic system, Scripturalism fails to deliver.



I think you are hitting on the answer - Clark was not interested in developing a formal axiomatic system. However, this does not mean that Scripturalism fails to deliver - only that Clark did not strictly formalize his epistemology. 

The laws of logic are assumed valid as they are necessary for any rational system of thought. If not the law of contradiction (LC), we would not be able to speak to each other in any meaningful manner. So the LC is much a part of language and thought that to say it is an axiom of the system is redundant. Clark said basically that the laws of logic are so embedded into Scripture, that simply making Scripture the logical starting point of his epistemology is entirely sufficient.


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> ...
> *Axiom:* The Bible alone is the Word of God.
> 
> Essentially, a proposition is rightly called justified knowledge if and only if the proposition is derived _via_ deduction from the one Axiom. (Induction invalidates any argument, and thereby disqualifies any conclusion as being justified knowledge.) Scripturalists mean to be able to draw such conclusions as ‘Jesus is Messiah’ from the one axiom alone. However, it is my contention that when pressed they are unable to draw any conclusions from the one axiom that can be rightly called justified knowledge. That is to say, given their own criteria, they cannot justify any proposition as being knowledge. At this point this is just mere assertion on my part. But before going further, I want to allow the Scripturalist to comment in case I have not been accurate in my representations.



As you noted, Clark did not formalize his system into a mathematically precise system. But if he were going to do so, he would have started by noting that in traditional Aristotelian logic, the A form implies the I form. 

That is: All (a is b) [the A form] implies Some (a is b) [the I form].

An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).

The application of this to the Axiom of Scripturalism is: All Scripture is the Word of God implies that some Scripture ("Jesus is the Christ") is also the Word of God. Basically, when Clark says that Scripture is the axiom of Christian knowledge, he means that every proposition of Scripture is true. We can trust God's Word for true knowledge.


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## Civbert

While we at this, I would like to challenge anyone to provide a reasonable alternative to Scripturalism. What would it be, and how would you formulate it? 

One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it. So I wonder, if not Scripturalism, then what?


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## Cheshire Cat

Modified Van Tilianism. By modified, I mean not in 100% agreement w/ Van Til on everything. I'm off to go camping for the weekend, so I won't be able to respond to anything, but others can defend that claim anyways.


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## MW

Civbert said:


> While we at this, I would like to challenge anyone to provide a reasonable alternative to Scripturalism. What would it be, and how would you formulate it?
> 
> One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it. So I wonder, if not Scripturalism, then what?



Realism is the biblical alternative. See Ronald Nash's "Life's Ultimate Questions."


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## Semper Fidelis

That's interesting that this question should come up.

I've been reading _The Sensualistic Philosophy_ by Dabney (see http://www.naphtali.com). While reading it, I'm struck by how much Dabney critiques in a way that is "pre-suppositional". By that I mean that, on the surface, he has the very same critiques of materialistic worldviews that you'll hear from a modern pre-suppositionalist.

I was actually thinking about a thread on this subject and don't want to sidetrack this discussion. I do know that Bahnsen in his History of Western Philosophy audio series and Frame too in his Apologetics audio both critique Common Sense Realism for being simplistic and not really very good philosophy.

Part of me is left thinking this after studying the history of philosophy: Why are we constantly trying to construct a philosophical system that is all encompassing? By that I mean an epistemology, metaphysic, and ethic. I've heard both Van Til and Clark criticized because it's not a full-orbed philosophical treatment.

But then (it seems to me) the way that a valid view of the world is judged is by academia and whether you've gotten everything to fit into the categories they've built over the last few thousand years.

My gut reaction is to say: Why do we need another system? The tools are useful to critique our thinking but one thing I do like about realism as opposed to some more insistent view is that it still insists on reasonable thinking but doesn't insist that all our thinking be shoehorned into a system external to the Word. My criticism of Clarkianism is primarily that it turns everything in the world into propositions but life is more than that. Philosophy has then become less a tool than a controlling influence.


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## MW

Rich, all realists were presuppositionalists before the term became trendy. There are two ways to combat Kant's wall. Deny sense perception altogether, as idealists do; or insist that man's capacity to think is itself a rational category, as realists do. A rational capacity prior to the thought process is what we now call a presupposition. This is what Dabney was arguing for. Nash puts it is more modern terms that we would be familiar with.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Civbert,



> An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).



Civbert, your example is not valid. The A proposition, “All men in Italy are Italian,” leads to the I proposition, “Some men in Italy are Italian.” No more and no less. You have added additional information to your I statement. Not only did you do this here, but you made the very same mistake in the next more pertinent example. 



> The application of this to the Axiom of Scripturalism is: All Scripture is the Word of God implies that some Scripture ("Jesus is the Christ") is also the Word of God.



The A proposition, “All Scripture is the Word of God,” leads to the I proposition, “Some Scripture is the Word of God.” No more and no less. There is no parenthetical “Jesus is the Christ.” My contention is that when everything is laid bare, Scripturalism fails. It cannot give us any knowledge that we can call justified. 



> One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it.



This is beside the point. You claim that Scripturalism solves epistemological problems. Whether or not a challenger can present a better alternative is irrelevant. So here is my challenge to you: Present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Be a good logician by being very precise. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. Show me that I am wrong. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Semper Fidelis

Jeff_Bartel said:


> Brian Bosse said:
> 
> 
> 
> Hello Rich,
> 
> Thank you for the backgound information.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I would be interested in looking into this more. As I understand Clark, he would agree with Brian's understanding about what is known as traditional logic (deductive in nature) and not narrowly Aristotelian.
Click to expand...


If you go to http://itunes.rts.edu and then click to launch iTunes, you'll be taken to the RTS store inside of iTunes where you can download tons of audio files for free. Under Theology you'll find Christian Apologetics. I think his statements are in lesson 16. He's definitely talking about Clark in that lecture. I'm not saying you have to agree with Frame but rather than third hand reporting you might as well listen to what Frame says.


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## VictorBravo

SemperFideles said:


> Jeff_Bartel said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Brian Bosse said:
> 
> 
> 
> Hello Rich,
> 
> Thank you for the backgound information.
> 
> 
> 
> I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would be interested in looking into this more. As I understand Clark, he would agree with Brian's understanding about what is known as traditional logic (deductive in nature) and not narrowly Aristotelian.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> If you go to http://itunes.rts.edu and then click to launch iTunes, you'll be taken to the RTS store inside of iTunes where you can download tons of audio files for free. Under Theology you'll find Christian Apologetics. I think his statements are in lesson 16. He's definitely talking about Clark in that lecture. I'm not saying you have to agree with Frame but rather than third hand reporting you might as well listen to what Frame says.
Click to expand...


This is very subjective, Rich, but I listened to that lecture too, and I've also listened to some of Clark's lectures. I have a suspicion that he was being a bit facetious on the question. I know Frame remembers it as being a serious answser, but listening to Clark, he often says something outlandish and you can almost hear a wink.


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## Semper Fidelis

Fair enough Vic. I provided the link so that listeners can get a better sense of the truth of the matter than my reporting what Frame said that Clark said.


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Civbert,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Civbert, your example is not valid. The A proposition, “All men in Italy are Italian,” leads to the I proposition, “Some men in Italy are Italian.” No more and no less. You have added additional information to your I statement. Not only did you do this here, but you made the very same mistake in the next more pertinent example.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The application of this to the Axiom of Scripturalism is: All Scripture is the Word of God implies that some Scripture ("Jesus is the Christ") is also the Word of God.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> The A proposition, “All Scripture is the Word of God,” leads to the I proposition, “Some Scripture is the Word of God.” No more and no less.
Click to expand...


Much more, much much more. When you say the Bible is true, the world "Bible" in not merely a sound. The term itself implies it's definition. Your restriction "no more and no less" is incorrect. Every term in a sentence logically implies it's definition. And it's definition is both connotative and denotative. 

So "Jesus is the Christ" is a valid deduction of "Scripture is true" because Scripture implies the denotative definition that includes the proposition "Jesus is the Christ". It is valid and sound by definition of Scripture.



Brian Bosse said:


> One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is beside the point. You claim that Scripturalism solves epistemological problems. Whether or not a challenger can present a better alternative is irrelevant. So here is my challenge to you: Present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Be a good logician by being very precise. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. Show me that I am wrong.
Click to expand...


Done. See above.


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Rich, all realists were presuppositionalists before the term became trendy. There are two ways to combat Kant's wall. Deny sense perception altogether, as idealists do; or insist that man's capacity to think is itself a rational category, as realists do. A rational capacity prior to the thought process is what we now call a presupposition. This is what Dabney was arguing for. Nash puts it is more modern terms that we would be familiar with.



Interesting. But "deny sense perception altogether, as idealists do; or insist that man's capacity to think is itself a rational category, as realists do." are not mutually exclusive. 

Since you keep bringing up realism and idealism - perhaps you would care to define and contrast them. I've read that materialism is the contrary of idealism. 

Also, are you speaking of "common sense realism", "Platonic realism", "epistemological realism", what?

Was not Jonathan Edwards an idealist?

Also interesting that Ronald Nash was a student of and heavily influenced by Gordon Clark. Maybe he was a realist, but it makes me wonder if realism vs idealism is actually a critical point of contention.


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## Civbert

Another interesting observation:

I believe Clark may have been an idealist, but he was also an "epistemological realist." He believed that knowledge consists of propositional truths and these truths define reality (idealism), but also these truths exist independently of human minds (epistemological realism). That is, two people can know A in the same sense because the proposition A exists independent of any one person. I suppose Clark was a metaphysical idealist and an epistemological realist.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Civbert and Board,



> Much more, much much more. When you say the Bible is true, the world "Bible" in not merely a sound. The term itself implies it's definition. Your restriction "no more and no less" is incorrect. Every term in a sentence logically implies it's definition. And it's definition is both connotative and denotative.



There is a distinction between _Material Logic_, and _Formal Logic_. Material logic is concerned with the truth of propositions and the meaning of terms. Formal logic is concerned strictly with the form. The validity of arguments is strictly a formal concern; whereas, the soundness of an argument is both a formal and material matter. My criticism is strictly a formal criticism. The logical law called the rule of subalternation is as follows:

If “All S is P” is true, then “Some S is P” is true. 

Notice, this law applies no matter what S and P stand for. That is to say, the inference from the A statement to the I statement is _independent_ of the meaning of the terms. You violate this law when you go from “All S is P” to something other than “Some S is P” as you did twice in previous posts. 



> So "Jesus is the Christ" is a valid deduction of "Scripture is true" because Scripture implies the denotative definition that includes the proposition "Jesus is the Christ".



This is an informal argument. My criticism is that when push comes to shove, the Scripturalist cannot present a valid formal argument from the one axiom to any proposition that can be justifiably called knowledge. In fact, your one axiom is not even mentioned in the argument you gave. You make my point for me. 

Civbert, allow me to take your informal argument and make it formal. 

*Argument A*

*Premise A1:* All the Bible is the word of God.
*Premise A2:* All the word of God is that which is true.
*Conclusion A:* All the Bible is that which is true.

*Argument B*

*Premise B1:* Jesus is the Christ is the Bible
*Premise B2:* All the Bible is that which is true.
*Conclusion B:* Jesus is the Christ is that which is true.


Ok, these arguments are valid and take one from the one axiom to the assertion of the truth of a particular Biblical proposition. Here are the problems with this:

*(1)* Premise A2 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner. Therefore, premise A2 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge. 

*(2)* Premise B1 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner. Therefore, premise B1 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge. 

*(3)* A consequence of (1) and (2) is that conclusion A, premise B2 and conclusion B cannot be properly called knowledge. 

*(4)* Even at a more fundamental level, the argument form (_Barbara_) being used has not been justified. 

Civbert, it really does not matter how your S and P’s are defined (denotative or connotative)*, you cannot go from the one axiom to the thousands of propositions Clark wishes to be able to derive. By the way, all denotative definitions ultimately rely on connotative definitions. I even think Clark makes this observation in his book on logic. 

In conclusion, you have yet to present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. The goods still have not been delivered. 

Sincerely,

Brian 

*The distinction between _denotative_ and _connotative_ definition can be simply stated as follows: a _denotative_ definition is a definition made up of the conjunction of all members making up the term. For instance, if the term was ‘residents of Arizona’, then the denotative definition would simply be all those members who are residents of Arizona: Brian Bosse, Kathleen Gelardi, Bill Terry, John Elam, etc… The denotative definition of the Scriptures might be the individual sentences that make up the Scriptures. For example, (1) In the beginning…, (2) You cannot serve both God and mammon…, (3) For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ…, etc… However, what actually determines what members actually belong to these various groups is the _connotative_ definition. This is a description of the qualities or properties necessarily for a particular to be considered part of the term. For instance, the connotative definition for ‘residents of Arizona’ might be those members who currently live within the boundaries of the State of Arizona. This means that Brian Bosse, Kathleen Gelardi, Bill Terry, John Elam, etc… all have the property of currently living within the boundaries of the State of Arizona. It really is quite simple. Scripturalists often appeal to this, but it does not help their position, but simply obfuscates matters. It does not matter in what manner terms are defined. Scripturalists cannot get from the one axiom to any particular proposition of Scripture without bringing in additional information that is not properly justified. Again, they hang themselves by their own requirements.


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## Civbert

Brian,

Not sure how to go with this because you have already confirmed with you post what I've already said. The main thing you have done it try to force a artificial restriction on Scripturalism that the Scripturalist does not. 



Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Civbert and Board,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Much more, much much more. When you say the Bible is true, the world "Bible" in not merely a sound. The term itself implies it's definition. Your restriction "no more and no less" is incorrect. Every term in a sentence logically implies it's definition. And it's definition is both connotative and denotative.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There is a distinction between _Material Logic_, and _Formal Logic_. Material logic is concerned with the truth of propositions and the meaning of terms. Formal logic is concerned strictly with the form. The validity of arguments is strictly a formal concern; whereas, the soundness of an argument is both a formal and material matter. My criticism is strictly a formal criticism.
Click to expand...

 Does not matter if it's formal of material. The problem with the criticism is the same. 



Brian Bosse said:


> The logical law called the rule of subalternation is as follows:
> 
> If “All S is P” is true, then “Some S is P” is true.
> 
> Notice, this law applies no matter what S and P stand for. That is to say, the inference from the A statement to the I statement is _independent_ of the meaning of the terms.


 This is almost correct. The implication is valid only as long at the definition of S and P retain the same meaning in each proposition. If the meaning changes in any sense, it invalidates the implication.



Brian Bosse said:


> You violate this law when you go from “All S is P” to something other than “Some S is P” as you did twice in previous posts.


 I can only violate the law of inference if I changes the meaning of the terms. 

And again I repeat, all terms imply their own definitions. So the Bible means all the propositions of Scripture. So if something is true for all the Scripture, it is true from some of Scripture - even the 'true/false' state of the propositions. 

Recall that Clark said a proposition is the _meaning _of a declarative sentence. This assumes that the words actually have meaning and are not just names. He was not a nominalist. So when he used terms, the definitions of the terms are implied logically. So I did not add any information to show the the Bible is true implies that Jesus is Christ. 




Brian Bosse said:


> So "Jesus is the Christ" is a valid deduction of "Scripture is true" because Scripture implies the denotative definition that includes the proposition "Jesus is the Christ".
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is an informal argument. My criticism is that when push comes to shove, the Scripturalist cannot present a valid formal argument from the one axiom to any proposition that can be justifiably called knowledge. In fact, your one axiom is not even mentioned in the argument you gave. You make my point for me.
Click to expand...

 The axiom can be said various ways because the meaning is essentially the same: 'The Bible is the Word of God', 'All Scripture is God's revealed truth', 'The Scriptures are God's Word and therefore true'. My argument is formally valid and sound. What part of "The Bible is the Word of God" do you disagree with? 




Brian Bosse said:


> Civbert, allow me to take your informal argument and make it formal.
> 
> *Argument A*
> 
> *Premise A1:* All the Bible is the word of God.
> *Premise A2:* All the word of God is that which is true.
> *Conclusion A:* All the Bible is that which is true.
> 
> *Argument B*
> 
> *Premise B1:* Jesus is the Christ is the Bible
> *Premise B2:* All the Bible is that which is true.
> *Conclusion B:* Jesus is the Christ is that which is true.
> 
> 
> Ok, these arguments are valid and take one from the one axiom to the assertion of the truth of a particular Biblical proposition. Here are the problems with this:
> 
> *(1)* Premise A2 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner.


 See that's where you are missing the point. The meaning of "the Word of God" is implied by A1 simply by being stated. And in premise A2, you have simple expressed the definition of the second term. "the word of God is that which is true". True by definition.



Brian Bosse said:


> Therefore, premise A2 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge.


 I call knowledge the Scriptures and that which can be deduced therefrom. A2 is true because "All the word of God is that which is true." "the Word of God" is equivalent to Scripture (therefore knowledge) and "All the word of God is that which is true" is nothing more than the definition of "the word of God".



Brian Bosse said:


> *(2)* Premise B1 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner. Therefore, premise B1 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge.



Is "Jesus is the Christ" part of Scripture? If yes, then it is knowledge. It's that simple. 



Brian Bosse said:


> *(3)* A consequence of (1) and (2) is that conclusion A, premise B2 and conclusion B cannot be properly called knowledge.


 I believe terms have meaning, and are not just "names" without content. 



Brian Bosse said:


> *(4)* Even at a more fundamental level, the argument form (_Barbara_) being used has not been justified.
> 
> Civbert, it really does not matter how your S and P’s are defined (denotative or connotative)*, you cannot go from the one axiom to the thousands of propositions Clark wishes to be able to derive. By the way, all denotative definitions ultimately rely on connotative definitions. I even think Clark makes this observation in his book on logic.


 Not true. You can define a term denotatively without giving any connotative definition. In essence, the denotative definition would be dependent on the connotative definition. 

I can define X as (x1, x2, x3, x4, x9, x17, y3, and z). That is a denotative definition. The connotative definition would be 'X is the elements of the list given'. 




Brian Bosse said:


> In conclusion, you have yet to present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. The goods still have not been delivered.


 This is an informal criticism. I have delivered the good several times. You have even supported my arguments simply by acknowledging the definition of denotative and connotative. 



Brian Bosse said:


> *The distinction between _denotative_ and _connotative_ definition can be simply stated as follows: a _denotative_ definition is a definition made up of the conjunction of all members making up the term. For instance, if the term was ‘residents of Arizona’, then the denotative definition would simply be all those members who are residents of Arizona: Brian Bosse, Kathleen Gelardi, Bill Terry, John Elam, etc… The denotative definition of the Scriptures might be the individual sentences that make up the Scriptures. For example, (1) In the beginning…, (2) You cannot serve both God and mammon…, (3) For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ…, etc… However, what actually determines what members actually belong to these various groups is the _connotative_ definition.


 That's easy. The members of that belong the the term Scripture are found in the first chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith:


> 1:2 Under the name of Holy Scripture, or the Word of God written, are now contained all the books of the Old and New Testament, which are these:
> 
> 
> Books of the Old Testament
> Genesis	1 Kings	Ecclesiastes	Obadiah
> Exodus	2 Kings	Song of Songs	Jonah
> Leviticus	1 Chronicles	Isaiah	Micah
> Numbers	2 Chronicles	Jeremiah	Nahum
> Deuteronomy	Ezra	Lamentations	Habakkuk
> Joshua	Nehemiah	Ezekiel	Zephaniah
> Judges	Esther	Daniel	Haggai
> Ruth	Job	Hosea	Zechariah
> 1 Samuel	Psalms	Joel	Malachi
> 2 Samuel	Proverbs	Amos
> 
> 
> Books of the New Testament
> Matthew	2 Corinthians	1 Timothy	2 Peter
> Mark	Galatians	2 Timothy	1 John
> Luke	Ephesians	Titus	2 John
> John	Philippians	Philemon	3 John
> Acts	Colossians	Hebrews	Jude
> Romans	1 Thessalonians	James	Revelation
> 1 Corinthians	2 Thessalonians	1 Peter



Notice clearly that this is a denotative definition and does not depend on any connotative definition. It's simply a list. 



Brian Bosse said:


> It does not matter in what manner terms are defined. Scripturalists cannot get from the one axiom to any particular proposition of Scripture without bringing in additional information that is not properly justified. Again, they hang themselves by their own requirements.



The definition of Scripture matters very much, because that is the meaning of the term 'Scripture'. Every proposition of Scripture is part of the meaning of the term. So what ever is predicated of Scripture is predicated of each proposition of Scripture by direct _formal _implication.

In summary, I see to critical flaws in you argument.

that stating the definition of terms is adding information
that denotative definitions depend on connotative definitions

Terms imply their definitions. And definitions can be simply denotative. You do not have to "prove" or deduce the definitions of the terms in the Scripturalist Axiom, because it they are implied in the axiom itself. Each term has meaning. 

There appears to be some nominalist constraints being pushed in your criticism. But Clark was not a nominalist. He believed terms have meaning, and are not just "names". You can see this because Clark rejected "existential implication" simply by asserting the validity of the A to I form of implication. (I know this last part is rather condensed and I can try to unpack it for anyone who has questions about it. Brian understands what I am saying because we have debated "existential implication" in the past.)

Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:

*Knowledge is the meaning of:* _(In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21))_ *and what can be deduced therefrom*.

*Therefore,* _Jesus is the Christ_ *is knowledge*.​


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Civbert,



> Does not matter if it's formal of material. The problem with the criticism is the same.



You stated explicitly that my problem had to do with a misunderstanding of the meaning of the terms. That is strictly a material matter. My criticism was a formal criticism. Let me spell it out for you:

*Civbert’s Invalid Inference*

*A:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
*I:* "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.

*The Valid Inference*

*A:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
*I:* Some Scripture is the Word of God.

The problem with your inference, Civbert, is that you are missing a necessary premise to go from the one axiom to the proposition you want to infer; namely, you are missing the premise: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.” However, this premise does not come from the one axiom. It is determined some other way. Here is the proper argument…

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
*Premise 2:* ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.
*Conclusion:* ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.

Now, what I just presented is the most famous of all argument forms (_Barbara_). As such, I think it is safe to say that the argument I presented above is the proper valid argument that allows one to go from the one axiom to the conclusion: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.” The problem for Scripturalists is that they cannot account for premise 2. That is to say, they want it to be true, but they cannot justify it. There is no inference allowing the Scripturalist to go immediately from the one axiom to the premise. Therefore, the conclusion of this argument is not justified. 



> Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:
> Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.
> 
> Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.



The conclusion you want to draw is: “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” So, your subject term is ‘Jesus is the Christ’ and your predicate term is ‘knowledge.’ What is the middle term and what are the missing premises? 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Vytautas

Civbert said:


> There appears to be some nominalist constraints being pushed in your criticism. But Clark was not a nominalist. He believed terms have meaning, and are not just "names". You can see this because Clark rejected "existential implication" simply by asserting the validity of the A to I form of implication. (I know this last part is rather condensed and I can try to unpack it for anyone who has questions about it. Brian understands what I am saying because we have debated "existential implication" in the past.)



I would like to know what you mean when you write "existential implication". Is this the same as "existential import"? Paul Manata used that term thinking I knew what that I meant. I had to bluff him at that point. Also, I asked my Math Prof at one time and he said if you are given All A is B you can then write Some A is B. It seems logical to me. Is this controversial?


----------



## Arch2k

Brian Bosse said:


> The problem with your inference, Civbert, is that you are missing a necessary premise to go from the one axiom to the proposition you want to infer; namely, you are missing the premise: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.” However, this premise does not come from the one axiom. *It is determined some other way.* Here is the proper argument…


 
Would you care to share your opinion on how this premise IS obtained?


----------



## Civbert

Vytautas said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> There appears to be some nominalist constraints being pushed in your criticism. But Clark was not a nominalist. He believed terms have meaning, and are not just "names". You can see this because Clark rejected "existential implication" simply by asserting the validity of the A to I form of implication. (I know this last part is rather condensed and I can try to unpack it for anyone who has questions about it. Brian understands what I am saying because we have debated "existential implication" in the past.)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would like to know what you mean when you write "existential implication". Is this the same as "existential import"? Paul Manata used that term thinking I knew what that I meant. I had to bluff him at that point. Also, I asked my Math Prof at one time and he said if you are given All A is B you can then write Some A is B. It seems logical to me. Is this controversial?
Click to expand...



Oop! Your are correct. I thought that didn't sound right. I meant "existential import".

The idea of existential import according to modern logic is that when one says "all a is b", we are not really asserting or assuming that there are any "a"s existing. "a" can be an empty set. So one can not assert the implication that some a is b - because when we say some a is b, we are assert the existence of at least some a (it has existential import). I think that is roughly how it works. 

An example Brian used in our debate was: "All trespassers will be shot." This does not imply some trespassers will be shot. (That's not the exact way he put it, but you can see how this raises some issues that should be considered.


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Civbert,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Does not matter if it's formal of material. The problem with the criticism is the same.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You stated explicitly that my problem had to do with a misunderstanding of the meaning of the terms. That is strictly a material matter. My criticism was a formal criticism. Let me spell it out for you:
> 
> *Civbert’s Invalid Inference*
> 
> *A:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
> *I:* "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.
Click to expand...


The implication is valid. I have shown this repeatedly. 



Brian Bosse said:


> *The Valid Inference*
> 
> *A:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
> *I:* Some Scripture is the Word of God.
> 
> The problem with your inference, Civbert, is that you are missing a necessary premise to go from the one axiom to the proposition you want to infer; namely, you are missing the premise: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.” However, this premise does not come from the one axiom. It is determined some other way. Here is the proper argument…
> 
> *Premise 1:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
> *Premise 2:* ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.
> *Conclusion:* ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.
> 
> Now, what I just presented is the most famous of all argument forms (_Barbara_). As such, I think it is safe to say that the argument I presented above is the proper valid argument that allows one to go from the one axiom to the conclusion: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.” The problem for Scripturalists is that they cannot account for premise 2.


 You don't need a syllogism. The conclusion follows by direct implication from Premise 1. The construction of the syllogism is just machinery clanging as Clark might say. 



Brian Bosse said:


> That is to say, they want it to be true, but they cannot justify it. There is no inference allowing the Scripturalist to go immediately from the one axiom to the premise. Therefore, the conclusion of this argument is not justified.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:
> Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.
> 
> Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The conclusion you want to draw is: “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” So, your subject term is ‘Jesus is the Christ’ and your predicate term is ‘knowledge.’ What is the middle term and what are the missing premises?
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...


It's an immediate implication. No middle term is required. All A is B implies Some A is B. That was the form of the argument. "Jesus is the Christ" is a member of "A" which is "Scripture".

I tried to make that more explicite when I wrote:


> Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.
> 
> Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.



*Premise 1:* Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

This is in the form of "All A is B".

*Conclusion:* Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

This is in the form of "Some A is B".


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> Since you keep bringing up realism and idealism - perhaps you would care to define and contrast them.



I'm not sure what you're asking for here, since every time I bring up realism and idealism I have been defining and contrasting them. The idealist thinks every time he sees something in this world he is looking at a shadow on the wall. The realist sees the world as itself possessing a reality which can be known.


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> Since you keep bringing up realism and idealism - perhaps you would care to define and contrast them.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure what you're asking for here, since every time I bring up realism and idealism I have been defining and contrasting them. The idealist thinks every time he sees something in this world he is looking at a shadow on the wall. The realist sees the world as itself possessing a reality which can be known.
Click to expand...


That's not true from what I've been able to find:


> Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality and that every new observation brings us closer to understanding reality. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism



This sounds more like your description of idealism. 



> Idealism is the doctrine that ideas, or thought, make up either the whole or an indispensable aspect of any full reality, so that a world of material objects containing no thought either could not exist as it is experienced, or would not be fully "real." Idealism is often contrasted with materialism, both belonging to the class of monist as opposed to dualist or pluralist ontologies.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism



And then from: Miller, Alexander, "Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/realism/


> The nature and plausibility of realism is one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary metaphysics, perhaps even the most hotly debated issue in contemporary philosophy. The question of the nature and plausibility of realism arises with respect to a large number of subject matters, including ethics, aesthetics, causation, modality, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties. Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take.



And from the rest of the articles I've read, almost everyone is a realist in some sense, which makes generic realism somewhat pointless as a philosophical position. You'll need to be more specific. Realism is too broad a brush to paint with, it covers everyone. 

And I'm sure the same could be said for idealism. 

So from what I've read, there are both positive and negative aspects for both realism and idealism - but I would tend to find idealism better for supporting spiritual knowledge since it give strength to abstract concepts like propitiation, justice, mercy, knowledge, love, etc. You know, all those terms we use to describe the Christian faith. It seems these ideas are consider real if you are an idealist. In contrast, these terms seem to be less meaningful (or even unreal) when looked at within the paradigm of realism. But again, the brush is too broad to be meaningful. And all the debate about realism and idealism (and materialism) seems to be found among secular philosophers who want to either find or reject knowledge apart from the God of Scripture. So I suspect and criticism of Christian philosophy using the concepts of realism or even idealism may be tainted with secular presuppositions. I'm not sure they are truly problems for the Christian - just like "the one and the many" is a Greek worldview problem easily answered by/within the Christian worldview.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Jeff said:


> Would you care to share your opinion on how this premise IS obtained?



The premise is obtained through biblical exegesis, which is primarily an inductive exercise. Deduction plays a part as well, but induction's role is certainly much larger. 



Civbert said:


> The implication is valid…It's an immediate implication. No middle term is required.



Here is what you have said is a valid immediate implication:

*A:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
*I:* "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.

In the universal affirmative statement, the subject term is ‘Scripture’ and the predicate term is ‘the Word of God’. We will substitute ‘Scripture’ for the symbol ‘S’ and ‘the word of God’ for the symbol ‘P’. Applying this to the two categorical propositions above we get… 

*A:* All S is P.
*I:* “Jesus is the Christ” is P. 

Notice, that “Jesus is the Christ” is neither ‘S’ nor ‘P’. It is a different term. Regarding this Gordon Clark says on page 32 of his book on logic…



Clark said:


> Such a set of inferences is called *immediate inference* because there is no middle term…At any rate immediate inferences are composed of two propositions with two terms. They cannot have three terms…



At this point, I would charge not only are you disagreeing with me, but you are at odds with Gordon Clark. But it is not just Clark with whom you are odds. The Logic Classroom says:



> Under what conditions are subalterns both true? Follow this reasoning: what is true of _All_ will also be true of _Some_, assuming, of course that we use the identical subject and predicate terms.



Notice, the valid immediate inference called subalternation requires that the subject in the particular sentence be identical to the subject in the universal sentence. The subject in the universal sentence is ‘Scripture’. The subject in the particular sentence is ‘Jesus is the Christ’. These are _not_ identical. So, you find yourself at odds even with the site you yourself maintain. 



> Premise 1: Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.
> 
> This is in the form of "All A is B".
> 
> Conclusion: Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.
> 
> This is in the form of "Some A is B".



As I said and still maintain, Scripturalists are unable to be precise and derive one proposition that can be called justified knowledge from the one axiom. You should be able to put your argument precisely into the form All ___ is ____ and be able to explicitly tell us what goes in the spaces. Also, “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge” is not a particular statement. It is a universal affirmative statement. What you essentially are arguing for is that it is valid to go immediately from “All men are mortal” to “Socrates is mortal.” If this is the case, then exactly what was Aristotle doing by insisting one needed “Socrates is a man” to make the conclusion valid?

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gentlemen,
> 
> 
> 
> Jeff said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would you care to share your opinion on how this premise IS obtained?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The premise is obtained through biblical exegesis, which is primarily an inductive exercise. Deduction plays a part as well, but induction's role is certainly much larger.
> 
> 
> 
> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> The implication is valid…It's an immediate implication. No middle term is required.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Here is what you have said is a valid immediate implication:
> 
> *A:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
> *I:* "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.
> 
> In the universal affirmative statement, the subject term is ‘Scripture’ and the predicate term is ‘the Word of God’. We will substitute ‘Scripture’ for the symbol ‘S’ and ‘the word of God’ for the symbol ‘P’. Applying this to the two categorical propositions above we get…
Click to expand...



Only one question: what does Scripture _mean_?


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Civbert,



> Only one question: what does Scripture mean?



It does not matter. Your mistake is a formal issue. Let 'S' stand for 'Scripture'; let 'P' stand for 'is the word of God'; let 'Q' stand for 'Jesus is the Christ'. You are going from from "All S is P" immediately to "All Q is P"*** and calling it valid. You are not even using the rule of subalternation which allows one to validly conclude "Some S is P" from "All S is P". 

Sincerely,

Brian

***"'Jesus is the Christ' is the word of God" is a universal affirmative statement and not a particular statement.


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> So from what I've read, there are both positive and negative aspects for both realism and idealism - but I would tend to find idealism better for supporting spiritual knowledge since it give strength to abstract concepts like propitiation, justice, mercy, knowledge, love, etc. You know, all those terms we use to describe the Christian faith. It seems these ideas are consider real if you are an idealist.



The problem you face as a result of adopting the idealist worldview is that propitiation, etc., are time/space realities. They are not mere ideas. Your worldview might very well be able to account for the concept, but it cannot account for the historical manifestation, 1 Tim. 3:16; 2 Tim. 1:10. Your idealism better suits the demythologising program of Bultmann and co., than the historicism of conservative evangelicalism.

Concerning your quotations of realism, yes, there will be an intramural discussion between transcendental and immanentist strains, but that does not detract from the vital difference it has with idealism, or for that matter with anti-realism.


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Civbert,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Only one question: what does Scripture mean?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It does not matter. Your mistake is a formal issue. Let 'S' stand for 'Scripture'; let 'P' stand for 'is the word of God'; let 'Q' stand for 'Jesus is the Christ'. You are going from from "All S is P" immediately to "All Q is P"*** and calling it valid. You are not even using the rule of subalternation which allows one to validly conclude "Some S is P" from "All S is P".
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian
> 
> ***"'Jesus is the Christ' is the word of God" is a universal affirmative statement and not a particular statement.
Click to expand...



If it doesn't matter, then answer the question. What does Scripture mean?


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> The problem you face as a result of adopting the idealist worldview is that propitiation, etc., are time/space realities. They are not mere ideas. Your worldview might very well be able to account for the concept, but it cannot account for the historical manifestation, 1 Tim. 3:16; 2 Tim. 1:10. ...



I'm a _Scripturalist_! Of course I can account for 1 Tim. 3:16 and 2 Tim. 1:10. Even if I could not account for any other "historical manifestation", I can account for all Scriptural occurrences.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> If it doesn't matter, then answer the question. What does Scripture mean?



When I say it does not matter what I am meaning to convey is that it is beside the point. My second to last post prior to this one drove what is the point home. I used both your Logic Classroom site and Clark's book not to mention Aristotle himself to show the error in your logical reasoning. I wish you would just comment on that post. Here is the one main point made in two different ways:

*(1)* The implication you want to draw is not an instance of the rule of subalternation. You claim to be arguing from a universal affirmative statement to a particular affirmative statement when in fact you are arguing from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement. You are going from "All S is P" directly to "All Q is P". There is no logic authority be it book, professor, or whomever that would say this is a valid deduction. So, what say you?

*(2)* The implication you want to draw would make the syllogistic argument form _Barabara_ unnecessary. This form allows one to go from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement where the second universal affirmative statement is simply an instance of the first universal statement. Aristotle, Clark, and all logicians felt that this argument form was needed to make the inference valid. In other words, they did not think one could validly go directly from a universal statement to a universal instance of that statement. However, this is what you want to claim is valid. So, is everyone but you wrong?

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If it doesn't matter, then answer the question. What does Scripture mean?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> When I say it does not matter what I am meaning to convey is that it is beside the point. My second to last post prior to this one drove what is the point home. I used both your Logic Classroom site and Clark's book not to mention Aristotle himself to show the error in your logical reasoning. I wish you would just comment on that post. ...
Click to expand...



If wishes were fishes! 

Please answer the question. It's my turn to lead.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,

By refusing to answer the pertinent questions, you make my point. Scripturalists are unable to present explicit valid deductive inferences from the one axiom to a single proposition of Scripture such that the proposition would be considered knowledge rightly justified. At this point, as your friend I will play along even though I think it will not be productive. 



> What does Scripture mean?



It depends on how the term is defined. I believe Clark uses the WCF's definition, which lists sixty-six books. In an earlier post of yours you stated that the list did not depend on a connotative definition. If this were in fact the case, then this list of books is completely arbitrary. However, the Westminster Assembly did not construct this list arbitrarily. There were definite rules followed by which different books were determined to be in the list. So, to say that the definition is not connotatively dependent is historically incorrect. It is not just simply a list. In fact, to say so is a rejection of the special nature of these books; namely, that these books are recognized as being the inerrant word of God. They are the word of God not because man put them into a list and called it the word of God, which your position leads to if this list is simply an arbitrary list. Therefore, the connotative definition rules what is to be included and not included in this list. With all of that said, this is all a side issue. No matter how you define your terms, you still cannot present a valid inference rightly called knowledge from the one axiom. 

_Quid Pro Quo_ - it is now your turn. 

*(1)* The implication you want to draw is not an instance of the rule of subalternation. You claim to be arguing from a universal affirmative statement to a particular affirmative statement when in fact you are arguing from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement. You are going from "All S is P" directly to "All Q is P". There is no logic authority be it book, professor, or whomever that would say this is a valid deduction. So, what say you?

*(2)* The implication you want to draw would make the syllogistic argument form _Barabara_ unnecessary. This form allows one to go from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement where the second universal affirmative statement is simply an instance of the first universal statement. Aristotle, Clark, and all logicians felt that this argument form was needed to make the inference valid. In other words, they did not think one could validly go directly from a universal statement to a universal instance of that statement. However, this is what you want to claim is valid. So, is everyone but you wrong?

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> By refusing to answer the pertinent questions, you make my point. Scripturalists are unable to present explicit valid deductive inferences from the one axiom to a single proposition of Scripture such that the proposition would be considered knowledge rightly justified. At this point, as your friend I will play along even though I think it will not be productive.



We shall see. 



Brian Bosse said:


> What does Scripture mean?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It depends on how the term is defined. I believe Clark uses the WCF's definition, which lists sixty-six books. In an earlier post of yours you stated that the list did not depend on a connotative definition. If this were in fact the case, then this list of books is completely arbitrary. However, the Westminster Assembly did not construct this list arbitrarily. There were definite rules followed by which different books were determined to be in the list. So, to say that the definition is not connotatively dependent is historically incorrect. It is not just simply a list. In fact, to say so is a rejection of the special nature of these books; namely, that these books are recognized as being the inerrant word of God. They are the word of God not because man put them into a list and called it the word of God, which your position leads to if this list is simply an arbitrary list. Therefore, the connotative definition rules what is to be included and not included in this list. With all of that said, this is all a side issue. No matter how you define your terms, you still cannot present a valid inference rightly called knowledge from the one axiom.
Click to expand...


OK. So even if the meaning of Scripture is denotative or connotative, you agree that the Scriptures are the sixty-six books listed in the WCF. Is that correct?





Brian Bosse said:


> _Quid Pro Quo_ - it is now your turn.


 I'm not done yet, please be patient and answer the question. Do you agree that the Scriptures are the 66 books listed in the WCF?


----------



## Arch2k

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gentlemen,
> 
> 
> 
> Jeff said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would you care to share your opinion on how this premise IS obtained?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The premise is obtained through biblical exegesis, *which is primarily an inductive exercise. Deduction plays a part as well, but induction's role is certainly much larger*.
Click to expand...

 
This is the part that needs expounding upon. How is propositional revelation (information) transferred to the human mind? Do we read propositions and translate them into a mental image as some suggest? What is your theory?

In other words, how do images (i.e. words on a page) result in abstract ideas?


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony and Jeff,



Anthony said:


> Do you agree that the Scriptures are the 66 books listed in the WCF?



All Scripture is those writings comprising of the sixty-six books making up the Protestant Bible. This last universal affirmative statement is another proposition different from the one axiom. It is not derived from the one axiom. Rather, it is in addition to the one axiom. 



Jeff said:


> How is propositional revelation (information) transferred to the human mind? Do we read propositions and translate them into a mental image as some suggest? What is your theory?



Jeff, I apologize, but this question just does not interest me. This is not to say that your question is not important, but it just is not pertinent. What is pertinent is that the inductive exercise of Biblical exegesis intimately involves sense perception even when one introduces the work of the Holy Spirit. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony and Jeff,
> 
> 
> 
> Anthony said:
> 
> 
> 
> Do you agree that the Scriptures are the 66 books listed in the WCF?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> All Scripture is those writings comprising of the sixty-six books making up the Protestant Bible. This last universal affirmative statement is another proposition different from the one axiom. It is not derived from the one axiom. Rather, it is in addition to the one axiom.
Click to expand...



OK. So you agree that Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible. And I'll assume that you agree that the books are the words, sentences, propositions, etc that they contain. Correct?

Now then, if *Scripture *= the *66 books of the Protestant Bible *= the *words, sentences, propositions, etc that the 66 books of the Protestant Bible contain*. 

Then:
"All *Scripture *is *knowledge*" has exactly the same _meaning_ as:​"All *the words, sentences, propositions, etc that the 66 books of the Protestant Bible contain* is *knowledge*.​
Are you with me so far?

If P = p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn, 

then All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X is the exact the same as all P is X. 

Nothing has been added or subtracted.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,

I am going to list the mounting number of propositions. I begin with the one axiom:

*Axiom:* All Scripture is the word of God.



> So you agree that Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.



*Proposition 1:* All Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.



> And I'll assume that you agree that the books are the words, sentences, propositions, etc that they contain.



*Proposition 2:* All the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible are the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.



> All Scripture is knowledge…



*Proposition 3:* All Scripture is knowledge.



> All Scripture is knowledge" has exactly the same meaning as:
> "All the words, sentences, propositions, etc that the 66 books of the Protestant Bible contain is knowledge.



*Anthony’s Valid Syllogism*

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
*Premise 2:* All the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible are the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
*Conclusion:* All Scripture is the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.

*Anthony’s Invalid Syllogism*

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
*Premise 2:* All Scripture is the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
*Conclusion:* All the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible is knowledge.



> Are you with me so far?



Not only is the above argument invalid, but we have three additional propositions that are not derived from the one axiom that must be accounted for. So, I guess I am not with you so far.



> If P = p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn,
> 
> then All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X is the exact the same as all P is X.
> 
> Nothing has been added or subtracted.



We have four different propositions. One is “All P is X,” another is “All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is X,” another is “All P is (p1, p2, p3…, pn),” and the last one is “All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is P.” Now to go from “All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X” to “All P is X”, the required additional proposition is “All P is (p1, p2, p3…, pn).” If you wanted to go from “All P is X” to “All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X,” then the additional proposition needed is “All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is P.” And if you wanted to go to the equivalence of the two propositions, then you would have to have both of the other propositions. 

Now, will you reciprocate? 

*(1)* The implication you want to draw is not an instance of the rule of subalternation. You claim to be arguing from a universal affirmative statement to a particular affirmative statement when in fact you are arguing from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement. You are going from "All S is P" directly to "All Q is P". There is no logic authority be it book, professor, or whomever that would say this is a valid deduction. So, what say you?

*(2)* The implication you want to draw would make the syllogistic argument form _Barabara_ unnecessary. This form allows one to go from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement where the second universal affirmative statement is simply an instance of the first universal statement. Aristotle, Clark, and all logicians felt that this argument form was needed to make the inference valid. In other words, they did not think one could validly go directly from a universal statement to a universal instance of that statement. However, this is what you want to claim is valid. So, is everyone but you wrong?

Brian


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> The problem you face as a result of adopting the idealist worldview is that propitiation, etc., are time/space realities. They are not mere ideas. Your worldview might very well be able to account for the concept, but it cannot account for the historical manifestation, 1 Tim. 3:16; 2 Tim. 1:10. ...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm a _Scripturalist_! Of course I can account for 1 Tim. 3:16 and 2 Tim. 1:10. Even if I could not account for any other "historical manifestation", I can account for all Scriptural occurrences.
Click to expand...


Can you? How do you account for the fact that the New Testament stakes its claim on the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and that this fact is established on the basis of eye-witness, Acts 1:3? If in your idealist world no person can know anything by means of sight, how did the disciples know Jesus Christ was raised from the dead?


----------



## Arch2k

Brian Bosse said:


> Jeff said:
> 
> 
> 
> How is propositional revelation (information) transferred to the human mind? Do we read propositions and translate them into a mental image as some suggest? What is your theory?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jeff, I apologize, but this question just does not interest me. This is not to say that your question is not important, but it just is not pertinent. What is pertinent is that the inductive exercise of Biblical exegesis intimately involves sense perception even when one introduces the work of the Holy Spirit.
Click to expand...

 
Brian,

No need to apologize, but I do disagree that it is pertinenet to the discussion at hand. If the knowledge that "Jesus Christ is Lord" or any other biblical proposition does not directly come from scripture (i.e. deduced) than it must come from some other place. In other words, I guess I am asking, what is the role of induction in coming to a knowledge of any given biblical proposition? Is it probable that "Jesus Christ is Lord"? Are you certain that this is the case? For as any student of logic can tell you, certainty is not the goal of induction, but rather probabliity.


----------



## Semper Fidelis

[Lamb Chop]
These are the threads that never end.

They just go on an on my friend.

Somebody said if A then B not knowing what it was.

And they'll continue saying P forever just because...
[/Lamb Chop]


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HNTxr2NJHa0


----------



## Arch2k

I didn't *know* you were such a talented singer Rich! In fact, come to think of it, I still don't!

Yuk yuk yuk.


----------



## Semper Fidelis

I'm sorry, I couldn't help myself but why is it when we discuss the Scipturalism of Scripturalism that we have to constantly get into logical notation? Isn't it possible to argue for it apart from using P, A, and B (unless used as letters in a word).


----------



## MW

SemperFideles said:


> I'm sorry, I couldn't help myself but why is it when we discuss the Scipturalism of Scripturalism that we have to constantly get into logical notation? Isn't it possible to argue for it apart from using P, A, and B (unless used as letters in a word).



If Pumpkin, then Asparagus and Beans. My order for roast lunch.


----------



## Arch2k

SemperFideles said:


> I'm sorry, I couldn't help myself but why is it when we discuss the Scipturalism of Scripturalism that we have to constantly get into logical notation? Isn't it possible to argue for it apart from using P, A, and B (unless used as letters in a word).


 
I think it comes with the territory. A system built on logical deduction needs to be precise, and those wishing to refute it will need to be every bit as precise in order to show its (apparant) inconsistency. Using symbolic notation, while it may be confusing for those who aren't as familiar with logic, is often far easier to see the formal fallacies in a person's reasoning.

But hey, what do I know? 

(trying to lighten the mood if you can't tell)


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> The problem you face as a result of adopting the idealist worldview is that propitiation, etc., are time/space realities. They are not mere ideas. Your worldview might very well be able to account for the concept, but it cannot account for the historical manifestation, 1 Tim. 3:16; 2 Tim. 1:10. ...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm a _Scripturalist_! Of course I can account for 1 Tim. 3:16 and 2 Tim. 1:10. Even if I could not account for any other "historical manifestation", I can account for all Scriptural occurrences.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Can you? How do you account for the fact that the New Testament stakes its claim on the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and that this fact is established on the basis of eye-witness, Acts 1:3? If in your idealist world no person can know anything by means of sight, how did the disciples know Jesus Christ was raised from the dead?
Click to expand...


Christ spoke to them. And the Spirit testified to them that it was true. And you do not know it except that the Scriptures tell you. You did not witness it. 

[bible]Act 1:3[/bible]


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> Christ spoke to them. And the Spirit testified to them that it was true. And you do not know it except that the Scriptures tell you. You did not witness it.



Correct, I am depending upon the testimony of others who witnessed it; but your worldview rules out the possibility that they witnessed the risen Jesus, and therefore undermines the testimony upon which I am depending.


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> I am going to list the mounting number of propositions. I begin with the one axiom:
> 
> *Axiom:* All Scripture is the word of God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So you agree that Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *Proposition 1:* All Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And I'll assume that you agree that the books are the words, sentences, propositions, etc that they contain.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> *Proposition 2:* All the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible are the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> 
> *Proposition 3:* All Scripture is knowledge.
> 
> *Anthony’s Valid Syllogism*
> 
> *Premise 1:* All Scripture is the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> *Premise 2:* All the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible are the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> *Conclusion:* All Scripture is the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> 
> *Anthony’s Invalid Syllogism*
> 
> *Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
> *Premise 2:* All Scripture is the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible.
> *Conclusion:* All the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible is knowledge.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Are you with me so far?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Not only is the above argument invalid, but we have three additional propositions that are not derived from the one axiom that must be accounted for. So, I guess I am not with you so far.
Click to expand...

Brian, 

Look at the _meaning _of the sentences. If you don't get the meaning correct, you can not correctly analysis the logic. When I say "All Scripture is the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible." It is the same as "All Scripture is the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible" _and_ "All the "words, sentences, and propositions" contained in the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible is Scripture". I.e. A is B and B is A. That is the nature of a definition. If B is the definition of A, then A is B and B is A. 



Brian Bosse said:


> If P = p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn,
> 
> then All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X is the exact the same as all P is X.
> 
> Nothing has been added or subtracted.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We have four different propositions. One is “All P is X,” another is “All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is X,”
Click to expand...

 That is the same proposition.



Brian Bosse said:


> another is “All P is (p1, p2, p3…, pn),”


 That is a definition of the term P. It is a proposition, but the effect of a definition is you can substitute the definition for the word defined WITHOUT CHANGING THE MEANING OF THE PROPOSITION. You are not creating a new proposition by subsituting (p1, p2, p3…, pn) for P. 



Brian Bosse said:


> and the last one is “All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is P.” Now to go from “All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X” to “All P is X”, the required additional proposition is “All P is (p1, p2, p3…, pn).” If you wanted to go from “All P is X” to “All (p1, p2, p3, p3,...pn) is X,” then the additional proposition needed is “All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is P.” And if you wanted to go to the equivalence of the two propositions, then you would have to have both of the other propositions.
> 
> Now, will you reciprocate?



Not yet. Now the next step.

"All P is X" is logically equivalent to "All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is X" because the defintion P is (p1, p2, p3…, pn). This is the same proposition, not a new one. It _means _the same thing. 

Now we can use the direct implication from the A form to the I form.

"All (p1, p2, p3…, pn) is X" 

Therefore "p3 is X".

Why, because p3 _is_ Some (p1, p2, p3…, pn).

To put it in short: 
* All P is X, 
* therefore p3 is X.


The word "one" and "uno" and "1" are the same words. I can switch these in a sentence and mean the same thing. The same is true for definitions. 



Brian Bosse said:


> *(1)* The implication you want to draw is not an instance of the rule of subalternation. You claim to be arguing from a universal affirmative statement to a particular affirmative statement when in fact you are arguing from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement. You are going from "All S is P" directly to "All Q is P". There is no logic authority be it book, professor, or whomever that would say this is a valid deduction. So, what say you?



No, I argued from All S is P to Some S is P. The Some S is a subset of All S. Any verse of Scripture is "Some Scripture".

Words have meaning, and a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence.

*All Scripture is knowledge *implies *Jesus is the Christ is knowledge *because *Jesus is the Christ* is *some Scripture*.


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> Christ spoke to them. And the Spirit testified to them that it was true. And you do not know it except that the Scriptures tell you. You did not witness it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Correct, I am depending upon the testimony of others who witnessed it; but your worldview rules out the possibility that they witnessed the risen Jesus, and therefore undermines the testimony upon which I am depending.
Click to expand...


You depend on their written testimony and the Spirit, and they depended on the spoken words of Christ and the Spirit. They did not simply believe what they say, they believed because of the regenerating power of the Spirit. Simply seeing was not enough. They had to believe also. You don't just "know what you see" - You have to understand what you are seeing, and that understanding has to be correct, and you have to believe it. "Seeing is not believing" as the empiricist would have it.


----------



## Arch2k

armourbearer said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> Christ spoke to them. And the Spirit testified to them that it was true. And you do not know it except that the Scriptures tell you. You did not witness it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Correct, I am depending upon the testimony of others who witnessed it; but your worldview rules out the possibility that they witnessed the risen Jesus, and therefore undermines the testimony upon which I am depending.
Click to expand...

 
This is why I like revelation more broadly as an axiom rather than JUST the propositions contained in the scriptures. As long as it can be classified as revelation from God, who is to doubt it? I can't believe even Clark would have a problem with this.


----------



## Civbert

Jeff_Bartel said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> Christ spoke to them. And the Spirit testified to them that it was true. And you do not know it except that the Scriptures tell you. You did not witness it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Correct, I am depending upon the testimony of others who witnessed it; but your worldview rules out the possibility that they witnessed the risen Jesus, and therefore undermines the testimony upon which I am depending.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> This is why I like revelation more broadly as an axiom rather than JUST the propositions contained in the scriptures. As long as it can be classified as revelation from God, who is to doubt it? I can't believe even Clark would have a problem with this.
Click to expand...


He doesn't. In fact, he makes the point that very point.


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> You depend on their written testimony and the Spirit, and they depended on the spoken words of Christ and the Spirit. They did not simply believe what they say, they believed because of the regenerating power of the Spirit. Simply seeing was not enough. They had to believe also. You don't just "know what you see" - You have to understand what you are seeing, and that understanding has to be correct, and you have to believe it. "Seeing is not believing" as the empiricist would have it.



In order to believe the Scripture I have to believe they "saw" the resurrected Jesus. I agree with you that there is a direct act of faith in Scripture needed in order to believe the resurrection, etc.; but belief in the reliability of the senses follows indirectly as a result of believing the Scriptures.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,

*The Standard*

*Major Premise:* All men are mortal.
*Minor Premise:* Socrates is a man.
*Conclusion:* Socrates is mortal.

The subject term in this syllogism is ‘Socrates’, the middle term is ‘man’ (‘men’), and the predicate term is ‘mortal.’ This syllogism is a first figure AAA syllogism. Sometimes you see it as AAA-1. According to the Scholastic mnemonic device, this syllogism is commonly referred to as _Barbara_. The reason for this is that if you look at the vowels in the name it tells you the type the categorical propositions are that make up the syllogism. Other names are _Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Cesare, Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris,_ etc… All logicians since Aristotle taught that one could not go directly from the major premise of this syllogism to the conclusion. In other words, it is considered invalid to go from “All men are mortal” directly to “Socrates is mortal.” Rather, one needed the minor premise “Socrates is a man” to validly draw the conclusion. 

*The Abstract Version of the Standard*

*Major Premise:* All M is P.
*Minor Premise:* All S is M.
*Conclusion:* All S is P.

At this point, we have the same syllogism as above where we have substituted ‘S’ for the subject term, ‘P’ for the predicate term, and ‘M’ for the middle term. This is the abstract version of the AAA-1 syllogism. Again, to go from “All M is P” to “All S is P” requires a minor premise. There is no direct implication according to all logicians since Aristotle. 

*Anthony’s Direct Derivation*

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is the word of God.
*Conclusion:* “Jesus is the Christ” is the word of God. 

According to the rules of logicians from Aristotle onward, they would say that both the premise and the conclusion are universal affirmative statements, i.e. A statements. Just as “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is mortal” are both universal affirmative statements so is “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the word of God” a universal affirmative statement. In fact, one technically could write “All Socrates is mortal” or for that matter “All ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the word of God.” The English may be poor, but logically it is most precise. Anthony, if you doubt this, then please contact Dr. Elihu Carranza and ask him. I have no doubt that he will confirm _everything_ I have said here. 

One of the consequences of this is that the immediate inference from Premise 1 to the conclusion is an inference from a universal affirmative statement to another universal affirmative statement. Stated negatively, the inference _is not_ an instance of the rule of subalternation. 

*The Abstract Version of Anthony’s Direct Derivation*

*Premise 1:* All M is P.
*Conclusion:* All S is P.

At this point, we have the same direct derivation as above where we have substituted ‘S’ for ‘Jesus is the Christ,’ ‘P’ for ‘is the word of God,’ and ‘M’ for ‘Scripture.’ No logician from Aristotle onward would say that this is improper. In fact, they would say this is the proper procedure for formal analysis. Once again, Anthony, if you think this is wrong, then please ask Dr. Elihu Carranza. 

One of the consequences of this is that we have three terms. From Aristotle onward, all logicians would say that there is no valid direct implication from the premise to the conclusion. If you look carefully at your argument you will see that premise 1 and the conclusion take the same form as the AAA-1 syllogism’s premise 1 and conclusion. As has already been mentioned, all logicians since Aristotle taught that one could not go directly from the major premise of this syllogism to the conclusion. If one could go directly from the premise to the conclusion, then all of these logicians were wrong. Not only that, the argument form AAA-1 would be completely unnecessary. That is to say, _Barbara_ is nothing more than an exercise in redundancy. I think you may have already said this, Anthony. Doesn't it cause you to give pause that this is where you end up? Talk about kicking against the goads!

I think I have done all that I can here. You seem to be willing to do anything you can to hold onto your Scripturalism...even if it means going against the teachings of the worlds greatest logicians for the last two millenia. If you have the least bit of respect for what little I know about logic, then please run this by Dr. Carranza. I suspect you trust him more than me. What have you got to lose? Oh, yeah...Scripturalism. 

Your Weary Friend, 

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> *Anthony’s Direct Derivation*
> 
> *Premise 1:* All Scripture is the word of God.
> *Conclusion:* “Jesus is the Christ” is the word of God.



This is the wrong construction. You are forcing my statements into the wrong argument form - and you have ignored the most important thing I said. 

Read carefully what I posted:


Civbert said:


> *All Scripture is knowledge *implies *Jesus is the Christ is knowledge *because *Jesus is the Christ* is *some Scripture*.



Notice that last part is "because *Jesus is the Christ* is *some Scripture*".

Do you deny that "Jesus Christ" is "some Scripture"???? 

A short answer would be appreciated.


----------



## Civbert

joshua said:


> Man, I read some of these threads and feel like I'm reading what Charlie Brown's teacher's speech would look like translated into words.
> 
> Now, that lies with my inability to comprehend the material, not the coherence with which you gentlemen opine.



I'm sorry about that. It seems that the more carefully I explain it, the more confusing it seems. But really, it's all quite simple. 

Scripturalism says that all the Scriptures are God's Word, and are therefore knowledge. If it's Scripture, you know it's true because it's God's Word. It's quite simple.

But the attempt to defeat Scripturalism takes a lot of hard work and complication. It takes a lot of complex reasoning to take something simple and turn it into something that doesn't make sense. And the more complex the reasoning gets, the more prone to error it is. Working with propositions and argument forms to critique a position only works as long as the propositions and forms actually retain the same meaning of the arguments and sentences given. 

With formal logic, you take an authors natural (informal) language and translate it into propositions and argument forms that convey the exact meaning the author's words and arguments. You don't simply parse the given sentences into subject, predicate, and the copula. You have to form propositions that convey the complete meaning the author intends. Often this will look very different than the natural sentence - but the meaning will be the same.


----------



## Civbert

I was thinking maybe if we went back to step one...



Brian Bosse said:


> An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Civbert, your example is not valid. The A proposition, “All men in Italy are Italian,” leads to the I proposition, “Some men in Italy are Italian.” No more and no less. You have added additional information to your I statement. Not only did you do this here, but you made the very same mistake in the next more pertinent example.
Click to expand...


Let's say you have the following: a large bag of red marbles. Now reach into the bag and pull out a handful. What color are those marbles?

Logic says that if "all the marbles in the bag are red", then "the handful I pull out of the bag" must necessarily be red". This is correct reasoning using simple logic. That's what the implication of the 'All a is b' form to the 'Some a is b form' means. 

Notice that I used a lot of words in my conclusion that are not in my first sentence. "the handful", "pull out", etc. I also could make the marbles more complicated. Maybe some have blue dots, and some have numbers, and some are smaller, and some are larger. But they are all "red" marbles in the basic sense of being primarily red.

So now I can pull out the marble with the number 3, and the marble that has stripes, and the marble that is big with yellow dots. Very complex with all that information. But the logic is still the same. I know those marbles will be red, because all the marbles in the bag are red. This is still perfectly formal valid deductive logic.

Now the Scripturalism principle is that same. All Scripture is knowledge, therefore "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge. I am not adding any new information to the premise "All Scripture is knowledge". And I can pull out any verse or proposition from Scripture and say, by the rules of logic that it is knowledge. The logic is completely valid and sound and formally correct. It may be difficult to "formalize" the reasoning, but the principle is simple. The "Jesus is the Christ" marble is knowledge because I pulled that proposition directly out of the Scripture bag, and my premise is everything in the Scripture bag is knowledge. That is a legitimate deduction by _direct implication_ from the single premise. 

I hope I've done a better job this time around. Does anyone else not follow this reasoning? Did anything I say cause any problems?


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> This is the wrong construction. You are forcing my statements into the wrong argument form - and you have ignored the most important thing I said.



You say that I am somehow misrepresenting you by forcing statements into wrong argument forms. It is certainly is not my intention to do so, and I will deal with the argument form you say you are using. But first, I want to go back and visit the histry in this thread. Here is what I have deemed to be the key implication in this discussion:

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is the Word of God.
*Conclusion:* "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.

You are the one that initially stated it, and when I pointed out that it was not valid and needed another proposition to make it valid you said…



> The implication is valid…it's an immediate implication. No middle term is required.



This is not ambiguous. This is the immediate contention. So, I am not sure what your beef is. You may have changed your position, and that is fine. But you have never given us any indication that you have made a change. In fact, you have yet to concede one point. So, I think it is unfair to cry foul at this point in the discussion. Now, let's consider what it is that you say is your main point. 



> All Scripture is knowledge implies Jesus is the Christ is knowledge *because* Jesus is the Christ is some Scripture.



This is a syllogism. (Note: you have explicitly argued against then need for a syllogism as will be pointed out in a moment.) Let’s make explicit your argument. 

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
*Premsie 2:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is some Scripture.
*Conclusion:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.

This is *not* a valid syllogism. You have four terms: ‘Scripture,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘Jesus is the Christ,’ and ‘some Scripture’. Here is the argument you are intending to make…

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
*Premise 2:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is Scripture.
*Conclusion:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.

This is a valid syllogism, and it was presented to you in an earlier post. (Note: premise 2 cannot be accounted for by the one axiom. It's justification lies in the arena of Biblical exegesis, which is fundamentlly an inductive process.) Your earlier response to me concerning this syllogism was...



> You don't need a syllogism. The conclusion follows by direct implication from Premise 1. The construction of the syllogism is just machinery clanging as Clark might say.



I am at a loss, Anthony. When I initially presented this argument, you stated that it was not needed. The minor premise was unecessary. So began the debate. Now you want to go back and say that this is in fact your argument. Your position is bordering on incoherency. Perhaps, you will hear someone like Dr. Carranza? I do not seem to have the ability to convince you. 

Your Friend,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> .... Your position is bordering on incoherency. Perhaps, you will hear someone like Dr. Carranza? I do not seem to have the ability to convince you.
> 
> Your Friend,
> 
> Brian



Read the prior post here http://www.puritanboard.com/showpost.php?p=297877&postcount=62

If you are still confused ... well I don't know what to say.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> If you are still confused ... well I don't know what to say.



It is not that I am confused. I am amazed at how you are unmoved by plain reasoning. These issues are very elementary, and you do not grasp them. Your understading of logic is not what I thought it was. In fact, not one argument you have presented in this whole thread has been in proper valid form. Not one! Every syllogism or immediate inference you have listed has been formally invalid. Yet, you are unmoved by any of this. That is why I am appealing to you to contact Dr. Carranza. Maybe, you will listen to him? 

I guess I should have been prepared for this. As I started out in this thread, the Scrupturalist is unable to present one valid deduction that can be rightly called knowledge from the one axiom. You have illustrated this better than I would have imagined. What saddens me is that you still desperately cling to your tradition. If you think this is nothing but charged rhetoric then go back and deal with my prior posts. Point out what you agree with, and point out where you think my logic is flawed. Stand up and stake out your position. Make it clear for everyone to see. Tell them where I am wrong and where you are right. 

Sincerely, 

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If you are still confused ... well I don't know what to say.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It is not that I am confused. I am amazed at how you are unmoved by plain reasoning. ...
Click to expand...


Please interact with the post I referred to. I was hoping that you'd read and comment on that particular post directly. Otherwise, I have no idea if you really understand my argument. 

http://www.puritanboard.com/showpost.php?p=297877&postcount=62

I noticed that you are not using the "Quote" button which automatically adds a link back to the original post and quotes the whole post. Perhaps you are missing my argument because of that.

P.S. Would anyone else like to comment on the post linked above? Really I think it's very clear and I see no flaws in the logic formally or informally.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> Please interact with the post I referred to.



I will do so. However, I would appreciate it if you would show the same courtesy. 



> Let's say you have the following: a large bag of red marbles. Now reach into the bag and pull out a handful. What color are those marbles?



The marbles will be red. 



> Logic says that if "all the marbles in the bag are red", then "the handful I pull out of the bag" must necessarily be red". This is correct reasoning using simple logic. That's what the implication of the 'All a is b' form to the 'Some a is b form' means.



This is not correct. Here is what is going on:

*Major Premise:* All marbles in (from) the bag are red.
*Minor Premise:* All marbles in my hand are marbles in (from) the bag. 
*Conclusion:* All marbles in my hand are red.

This involves three universal statements. The rule of subalternation is _not_ being used. 



> Notice that I used a lot of words in my conclusion that are not in my first sentence. "the handful", "pull out", etc. I also could make the marbles more complicated. Maybe some have blue dots, and some have numbers, and some are smaller, and some are larger. But they are all "red" marbles in the basic sense of being primarily red.



Ok, fine. It still does not change the fact that there are two premises needed to draw the conclusion. 



> So now I can pull out the marble with the number 3, and the marble that has stripes, and the marble that is big with yellow dots. Very complex with all that information. But the logic is still the same. I know those marbles will be red, because all the marbles in the bag are red. This is still perfectly formal valid deductive logic.



Let’s make the “perfectly formal valid deductive logic” explicit by putting everything into proper logical form.

*Major Premise:* All marbles in (from) the bag are red.
*Minor Premise:* All marbles in my hand are marbles in (from) the bag. 
*Conclusion:* All marbles in my hand are red.

This is the valid argument. If you do not have the minor premise, then the argument is invalid. 



> Now the Scripturalism principle is that same. All Scripture is knowledge, therefore "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge. I am not adding any new information to the premise "All Scripture is knowledge". And I can pull out any verse or proposition from Scripture and say, by the rules of logic that it is knowledge. The logic is completely valid and sound and formally correct.



I refer you to the posts #43, #59 and #63 where I in a somewhat thorough manner demonstrate your error. 



> It may be difficult to "formalize" the reasoning, but the principle is simple.



It is not difficult to formalize the reasoning. I have been formalizing it all along.



> The "Jesus is the Christ" marble is knowledge because I pulled that proposition directly out of the Scripture bag, and my premise is everything in the Scripture bag is knowledge. That is a legitimate deduction by direct implication from the single premise.



You have now contradicted yourself, again. In a previous post you said, “_All Scripture is knowledge_ implies _Jesus is the Christ is knowledge_ because _Jesus is the Christ is some Scripture_” Notice the two premises and conclusion. Here they are…

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
*Premise 2:* Jesus is the Christ is some Scripture.
*Conclusion:* Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

Technically, this is not a valid argument (you have four terms); however, this is not my main concern here. (Note: in this whole thread, this is the closest you have come in terms of actually presenting a formally valid argument. You still fall short, but your reasoning is on the right track. Too bad it contradicts what you have been saying all along.) The main point is that you claim this syllogism is “the most important thing” you have said. So, the most important thong that you have said is that the way you go from premise 1 to the conclusion is through premise 2. However, in the above quote you say that this is not what you are doing. Rather, the implication is direct from “the single premise.” Your position is now incoherent. 

Ok, I have interacted with your post as you requested. Will you do the same for me? Just concern yourself with this post and post #59. 

Thanks,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Quick reply until later. Brian, I think what this comes down to is a disagreement of what entails a valid direct implication. Later I will list a few points that you have not conceded, but that I believe you agree with. Also, your translation of my arguments into propositional form are incorrect. And finally, I have also provided the deduction of "Jesus is the Christ is knowledge" in correct propositional form at the end of this post: http://www.puritanboard.com/showpost.php?p=296997&postcount=22

I think I know what you are trying to say, but it's based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Scripturalism: you believe the Scripturalist must deduce the propositions of Scripture from the term "Scripture". But the denotative definition of Scripture includes all the propositions of Scripture. The propositions of Scripture are implied directly by the meaning of the word Scripture. I've shown this repeatedly. You have agreed with this definition. You have not said terms have no meaning. 

Also, the deductive principle of Scripturalism applied to the propositions of Scripture. The axiom of Scripturalism says that all Scripture and what ever can be deduced _therefrom_ is knowledge. The axiom is the assumption of the truth of Scripture. I don't have to deduce the Scriptures, I am assuming them as the denotative definition of Scripture. The foundation of Scripturalist knowledge _is_ the propositions of Scripture.

And just to be clear: I did not deduce: "Jesus is the Christ". I deduced: "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> Brian, I think what this comes down to is a disagreement of what entails a valid direct implication.



Yes. 



> Also, your translation of my arguments into propositional form are incorrect.



Maybe, but I have quoted your arguments and have presented the analysis. So far, you have not directly interacted with any of this. 



> And finally, I have also provided the deduction of "Jesus is the Christ is knowledge" in correct propositional form at the end of this post….



I commented on this explicitly in post #63. You still have not responded to it. 



> I think I know what you are trying to say, but it's based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Scripturalism…



The problem is not my understanding of Scripturalism. My claim has been all along that the Scripturalist is unable to provide a valid argument from the one axiom to any proposition of Scripture in such a manner that it is rightly called knowledge. You say you have presented such arguments, but I have rebutted your presentations (see posts #43, #59, #63 and now #69). 



> …you believe the Scripturalist must deduce the propositions of Scripture from the term "Scripture".



First off, propositions are not deduced from terms. Propositions are deduced from other propositions according to rules of form, i.e. formal logic. Secondly, I believe that the Scripturalists must deduce the propositions of Scripture _from the one axiom_ as Gordon Clark stated. 



> But the denotative definition of Scripture includes all the propositions of Scripture. The propositions of Scripture are implied directly by the meaning of the word Scripture. I've shown this repeatedly. You have agreed with this definition. You have not said terms have no meaning.



The issue has _nothing_ to do with how you define your terms whether it be connotatively or denotatively. The issue has everything to do with how you form your argument. Every argument you have presented has been invalid in one way or another. 



> The axiom of Scripturalism says that all Scripture and what ever can be deduced therefrom is knowledge.



According to Clark, the one axiom is “The Bible alone is the word of God.” Referring to another proposition as “the axiom of Scripturalism” could cause confusion. I agree that the Scripturalist defines knowledge as those propositions properly deduced from the one axiom. However, this definition of knowledge is not the axiom. It happens to be another proposition not derived from the one axiom. 



> I don't have to deduce the Scriptures, I am assuming them as the denotative definition of Scripture.



You are contradicting Gordon Clark himself. He said that the reason he picked the one axiom rather than making every proposition of Scripture its own axiom was that every proposition of Scripture could be deduced _via a syllogism_ from the one axiom. This comes from his _Introduction to Christian Philosophy_. 



> And just to be clear: I did not deduce: "Jesus is the Christ". I deduced: "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge.



You have yet to validly deduce “Jesus is the Christ,” “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the word of God,” or “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” The deduction you provided for “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge” was in the form of an invalid syllogism (see post #63 where this is explained). 

Anthony, is the term ‘Scripture’ and the term ‘Jesus is the Christ’ identical? That is to say, do they relate to each other in the same manner as ‘bachelor’ relates to ‘unmarried man’? Or, would you say their relation is more like ‘men’ is to ‘Socrates’? 

Your Friend,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Brian, I think what this comes down to is a disagreement of what entails a valid direct implication.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yes.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Also, your translation of my arguments into propositional form are incorrect.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Maybe, but I have quoted your arguments and have presented the analysis. So far, you have not directly interacted with any of this.
> 
> I commented on this explicitly in post #63. You still have not responded to it.
Click to expand...


The post I referred to and provided a link to was #22:


Civbert said:


> Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:
> 
> *Knowledge is the meaning of:* _(In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21))_ *and what can be deduced therefrom*.
> 
> *Therefore,* _Jesus is the Christ_ *is knowledge*.



You claim to have responded to this in post #63 is incorrect. 

However, in post #23 you did reply with:


Brian Bosse said:


> The conclusion you want to draw is: “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” So, your subject term is ‘Jesus is the Christ’ and your predicate term is ‘knowledge.’ What is the middle term and what are the missing premises?



There are no middle terms needed with a direct implication. I explained that in post #27.

I could have written:

_*(In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21))*_ is *knowledge*.
Therefore, *Jesus is the Christ* is *knowledge*.

The meaning of the argument is the same. The form is correct. The direct implication is valid. 

Perhaps you were confused by the word order in the premise: 
 The subject is: *(In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21))*, 
and the predicate is *knowledge*.
 
That is the A form "All a is b".


And the conclusion is I form "Some a is b":
 *Jesus is the Christ * is the subject 
is *knowledge* is the predicate.

Notice that "*Jesus is the Christ* is explicate in the subject of the premise. It is literally spelled out. 

When _P_ is predicated of all of subject _S_, then _P_ is predicated of some of subject _S_. 

If all Scripture is knowledge, then "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge.


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> ...
> 
> The issue has _nothing_ to do with how you define your terms whether it be connotatively or denotatively. The issue has everything to do with how you form your argument. Every argument you have presented has been invalid in one way or another.


Not at all. The problem has been your construction of my arguments. This shows you have still not understood me. Perhaps I have not been clear - but that does not mean I have given and invalid argument. You should know that it is the logician's job to correctly translate informal language into the correct propositional forms. You have failed to do this. 



Brian Bosse said:


> According to Clark, the one axiom is “The Bible alone is the word of God.” Referring to another proposition as “the axiom of Scripturalism” could cause confusion. I agree that the Scripturalist defines knowledge as those propositions properly deduced from the one axiom. However, this definition of knowledge is not the axiom. It happens to be another proposition not derived from the one axiom.



Actually, the definition of "knowledge" is also part of the axiom. Terms imply their definitions. 



Brian Bosse said:


> I don't have to deduce the Scriptures, I am assuming them as the denotative definition of Scripture.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You are contradicting Gordon Clark himself. He said that the reason he picked the one axiom rather than making every proposition of Scripture its own axiom was that every proposition of Scripture could be deduced _via a syllogism_ from the one axiom. This comes from his _Introduction to Christian Philosophy_.
Click to expand...

 If Clark said "via syllogism" I'd be surprised. But if he did, it would have been a technical foul. But it is clear from my reading of Clark that he means that it is that since Scripture includes the propositions found therein, then it is just a technical detail to produce them via logical implication. 



Brian Bosse said:


> And just to be clear: I did not deduce: "Jesus is the Christ". I deduced: "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You have yet to validly deduce “Jesus is the Christ,” “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the word of God,” or “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” The deduction you provided for “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge” was in the form of an invalid syllogism (see post #63 where this is explained).
Click to expand...


See post #70 where I explain again why it is valid.



Brian Bosse said:


> Anthony, is the term ‘Scripture’ and the term ‘Jesus is the Christ’ identical? That is to say, do they relate to each other in the same manner as ‘bachelor’ relates to ‘unmarried man’? Or, would you say their relation is more like ‘men’ is to ‘Socrates’?



More like 'Socrates" to 'men'. "Jesus is the Christ" is an explicate member of "Scripture".


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> The post I referred to and provided a link to was #22:



Yes, I know this and I have dealt with this explicitly. I will do so in an even more pedantic manner hoping that you will actually respond to my analysis. Here is the quote in post #22: 



> *(1)* Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:
> *(2)*Knowledge is the meaning of: *(3)*(In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom. *(4)* Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.



In *(1)* you say that in a very strict manner you are going to formally deduce “Jesus is the Christ”. However, the conclusion you reach is not “Jesus is the Christ,” but “Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.” These are two different propositions. Whatever it is that you did, you did not formally deduce “Jesus is the Christ.” Also in *(1)* you say that your deduction would be from the “axiom of Scripturalism.” The one axiom is “All Scripture is the word of God.” Whatever it is that you did, you did not use this one axiom. Lastly, you state that the very strict formally deduced argument would take a particular form. We will now look at that form.

*(2)* begins with “Knowledge is the meaning of:…” This is not in proper logical form. Proper logical form in the realm of Aristotelian categorical propositions is a proposition that takes one of the following forms: *(A)* All S is P; *(I)* Some S is P; *(O)* Some S is not P; *(E)* No S is P (or All S is not P). So, maybe you meant something like this: All knowledge is the meaning of…? Let’s assume that is what you meant. 

*(3)* is the balance of the predicate term of the proposition started in *(2)*. So, here is what the initial proposition looks like:

All knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)), and what can be deduced therefrom. 

Since we are speaking about a technically precise formal deduction, we should identify your terms. The subject term is “knowledge.” We will label this ‘M’. The predicate term is “the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)), and what can be deduced therefrom.” We will label this ‘P’. At this point we have a universal affirmative statement of the following form: All M is P.

*(4)* Your conclusion is “Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.” Technically, this sentence is properly stated “All ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” The subject term is ‘Jesus is the Christ,’ which we will label ‘S’, and the predicate term is ‘knowledge,’ which we have already labeled ‘M’. So, we have a conclusion of the following form: All S is M.

With all of this said, the formal argument you have presented is:

*Premise:* All M is P.
*Conclusion:* All S is M. 

This is not a valid argument. In fact, this argument is so bad that there isn't a premise one could add to make it valid! Also, it does not even use the one axiom (All Scripture is the word of God). Anthony, this argument is horrible. I taught a logic class at a local Christian school. I would have failed any student that presented this to me. Now concerning this argument, you have commented elsewhere on it calling it “the most important thing said.” Here is what you said is so important:



> *(6)* All Scripture is knowledge implies Jesus is the Christ is knowledge because Jesus is the Christ is some Scripture.*(7)*



This is a syllogism. Let’s make explicit your argument. 

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
*Premsie 2:* (All) 'Jesus is the Christ' is some Scripture.
*Conclusion:* (All) 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.

This is not a valid syllogism. You have four terms: ‘Scripture,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘Jesus is the Christ,’ and ‘some Scripture’. Also, this premise 1 is different from your premise above. You have switched the position of the terms. With that said, this is the closest you have come in all of this thread in presenting a valid formal argument. It is very close to being correct, and it is a good argument. However, it undermines your position that the inference from premise 1 to the conclusion is direct. 



> The problem has been your construction of my arguments. This shows you have still not understood me.



The problem with this complaint is that I have explicitly laid out my constructions using the very words you used. Why not quote those sections and point out what exactly is my error? It sure would help us get to the bottom of things. 



> You should know that it is the logician's job to correctly translate informal language into the correct propositional forms.



I do know this. However, I no longer think you understand what proper logical form is. 



> Actually, the definition of "knowledge" is also part of the axiom. Terms imply their definitions.



The axiom is: All Scripture is the word of God. Notice, this is in proper logical form. The subject term (S) is ‘Scripture.’ The Predicate term (P) is ‘the word of God.’ I do not see ‘knowledge’ in either of these terms. If you want to infer knowledge from this, then you will need additional propositions. 



> If Clark said "via syllogism" I'd be surprised. But if he did, it would have been a technical foul. But it is clear from my reading of Clark that he means that it is that since Scripture includes the propositions found therein, then it is just a technical detail to produce them via logical implication.



I am not at home to provide the direct quote, but if you want it I will be more than happy to quote it tonight. What logical rule did Clark break that created this “technical foul?” 



Brian said:


> Anthony, is the term ‘Scripture’ and the term ‘Jesus is the Christ’ identical? That is to say, do they relate to each other in the same manner as ‘bachelor’ relates to ‘unmarried man’? Or, would you say their relation is more like ‘men’ is to ‘Socrates’?
> 
> 
> Anthony said:
> 
> 
> 
> More like 'Socrates" to 'men'. "Jesus is the Christ" is an explicate member of "Scripture".
Click to expand...


Every logician from Aristotle onward claimed that a minor premise was needed to go from “All men are mortal” (All M is P) to “Socrates is mortal” (All S is P). Your position says that it is valid to go directly from “All Scripture is the word of God” (All M is P) to ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is the word of God” (All S is P). So, you are at odds with every logician since Aristotle. Another way to phrase this using your terminology is as follows: You are implying that if a term is an "explicate member of" another term, then it is valid to immediately (directly) conclude from the proposition containing the latter term to the proposition containing the explicate member as long as both predicates are the same. This is the "rule" you are arguing for. 'Socrates' is an "explicate member of" 'man'. So, one should be able to immediately conclude to "Socrates is mortal" from "All men are mortal." However, all logicians from Aristotle onward disagree with you. What do say to this?

Brian


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Board,

At the beginning of this thread I claimed that when asked to be very explicit the Scripturalist would not be able to validly derive one proposition of Scripture that could rightly be called knowledge from the one axiom "All Scripture is the word of God". At the time I thought the discussion would go a different direction than it did. The direction it went surprised me. Essentially, Anthony presented the following argument...

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge. (Note: he flipped back and forth on this. Sometimes he used "All knowledge is Scripture". He also is not using the one axiom.)
*Conclusion:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.

Regarding this argument, Anthony claims it is valid to conclude directly from premise 1 to the conclusion. In other words, it is an immediate inference. His thinking is along these lines: 'Jesus is the Christ' is an explication of 'Scripture.' That is to say, 'Jesus is the Christ' is one of the propositions that make up the set of propositions properly called 'Scripture'. Therefore, whatever is true of this set is true for any individual of this set. Since 'Jesus is the Christ' is an individual proposition of the set, and since all the propositions of this set are considered knowledge, then 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge. This line of thinking is excellent. The problem for Anthony, however, is that the logically proper formulation of this argument is a syllogism along these lines:

*Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
*Premise 2:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is Scripture.
*Conclusion:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.

Notice, it is not an immediate implication from premise 1 to the conclusion. Another proposition is needed. To support this, I have used an exact parrallel to this argument. It is as follows...

*Premise 1:* All men are mortal.
*Premise 2:* Socrates is a man.
*Conclusion:* Socrates is mortal.

From Aristotle onward, all logicians have required premise 2 to make the deduction valid. Yet, Anthony's position necessarily entails that this is not correct. He says one can go directly to the conclusion from premise 1. So, is Anthony correct and all logicians since Aristotle wrong? I seriously doubt this. In the end, Scripturalism fails to achieve the solutions to epistemological difficulties it wishes to overcome. I appreciate what it is trying to do. In fact, I am even sympathetic towards their goal. However, it falls considerably short. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Cheshire Cat

I found this thread very helpful Brian. Thank you for your contribution to the board.


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> At the beginning of this thread I claimed that when asked to be very explicit the Scripturalist would not be able to validly derive one proposition of Scripture that could rightly be called knowledge from the one axiom "All Scripture is the word of God". At the time I thought the discussion would go a different direction than it did. ...



Brian,

I thing you give a reasonable description of my position - enough so that I think you basically understand it. 


Brian Bosse said:


> Essentially, Anthony presented the following argument...
> 
> *Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge. (Note: he flipped back and forth on this. Sometimes he used "All knowledge is Scripture". He also is not using the one axiom.)
> *Conclusion:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.


 The point to note though is I am always using the _meaning _of the "one axiom".


Brian Bosse said:


> Regarding this argument, Anthony claims it is valid to conclude directly from premise 1 to the conclusion. In other words, it is an immediate inference. His thinking is along these lines: 'Jesus is the Christ' is an explication of 'Scripture.' That is to say, 'Jesus is the Christ' is one of the propositions that make up the set of propositions properly called 'Scripture'. Therefore, whatever is true of this set is true for any individual of this set. Since 'Jesus is the Christ' is an individual proposition of the set, and since all the propositions of this set are considered knowledge, then 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge. This line of thinking is excellent. ....


Thank you. It seems you understand my position. But ...


Brian Bosse said:


> .... The problem for Anthony, however, is that the logically proper formulation of this argument is a syllogism along these lines:
> 
> *Premise 1:* All Scripture is knowledge.
> *Premise 2:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is Scripture.
> *Conclusion:* 'Jesus is the Christ' is knowledge.
> 
> Notice, it is not an immediate implication from premise 1 to the conclusion. Another proposition is needed. ...


That is a proper formulation, but misses the point. The conclusion "Jesus is the Christ" is knowledge follows immediately from the claim that "all Scripture is knowledge". 

Recall the axiom - "All Scripture is the word of God". What are the implications of this statement? What is meant by this? Understanding this is important because unless you do, no "formulation" you present will matter. But I think the meaning is reasonably clear, and so are the implications - if all Scripture is the Word of God, then is must be true. And if we believe it, then we can rightly claim it as the foundation of knowledge. We can rightly say that knowledge is what ever God reveals to us in Scripture, and whatever we can (by good and necessary consequences) deduce from Scripture. 

Basically, it means that _Scripture is knowledge_.

And if we look at the implications of "Scripture is knowledge", we know that by immediate implication, all propositions of Scripture are knowledge. 

Notice that I am using syllogistic reasoning to explain an immediate implication - if _A_ and _B_, then _C_. Does this invalidate "immediate implication"? No. It is simply an explanation of how "immediate implication" works. (BTW. When I say "immediate implication" and "direct implication", I mean the same thing.) 

If one predicates _Y_ of all of _X_, then the predicate _Y_ applies to each and every member of _X_. That is why one my say if all _A_ is _B_, then some _A_ is _B_. It's important to understand the concept. 

In a way, Brian goes on to illustrate this in his "exact parallel" argument:



Brian Bosse said:


> ... To support this, I have used an exact parallel to this argument. It is as follows...
> 
> *Premise 1:* All men are mortal.
> *Premise 2:* Socrates is a man.
> *Conclusion:* Socrates is mortal.
> 
> From Aristotle onward, all logicians have required premise 2 to make the deduction valid. Yet, Anthony's position necessarily entails that this is not correct. He says one can go directly to the conclusion from premise 1. So, is Anthony correct and all logicians since Aristotle wrong? I seriously doubt this. ...



Appeal to authority? That doesn't work, especially when you fail to understand what most logicians, from Aristotle onward have understood - the the syllogism is based on the principle of direct implication. Lets look at carefully at the argument.


> *Premise 1:* All men are mortal.
> *Premise 2:* Socrates is a man.
> *Conclusion:* Socrates is mortal.



Why does the syllogism work? Why does Premise 1 and Premise 2 imply the Conclusion? First we have predicated mortality to "all men". And we know that whatever we predicate of the whole, applies to each and every member of the subject. 

Draw a large circle, and label it "Mortal". Everything that falls within with circle is mortal. 


Code:


Mortal(                   )


Now draw a smaller circle within the larger circle and call it "Men". What can we say about "Men". Well by "immediate implication" we can say that they are all mortal. 


Code:


Mortal( Men(            ) )


Now lets draw a smaller circle within "Men" and label it "Socrates". The immediate implication of this is that Socrates is a man. That is what Premise 2 means.


Code:


Mortal( Men( Socrates() ) )


But now notice that there is no way to draw the circle for "Socrates" outside of the circle for "Mortal". So Socrates must also be mortal by direct/immediate implication because he is a _member_ of "Men" - for whatever is predicated of the whole ("Men"), is predicated of each and every member of the whole ("Socrates").

So you see how immediate implication underlies syllogistic reasoning. 


Now lets look at "Jesus is the Christ". Only we are going to work from the inside out. 

We know the "Jesus is the Christ" is Scripture because it is explicit in Scripture.


Code:


Scripture( "Jesus is Christ"() )


Now let's predicate "knowledge" of Scripture. Basically, we are claiming that since Scripture is the Word of God, it is true and ought to be believed. 


Code:


Knowledge( Scripture( "Jesus is Christ"() ) )


Immediately we see that "Jesus Christ" is knowledge because of the principle of direct implication ("all _A_ is _B_" logically implies "some _A_ is _B_" for whatever is predicated of the whole, is predicated of each and every member of the whole. 

We can formulate this with a syllogism, but that is working backward. The syllogism is validated by the principle (rule) of direct implication. 

So there we are. If one understands "direct implication", specifically the rule that "all _A_ is _B_" logically implies "some _A_ is _B_", then one can see that "Jesus is Christ" is knowledge follows from a Scripture is knowledge. 

...

Thank you. Thank you very much. _[using best Elvis impersonation] _


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> Appeal to authority?



Yep. I am making a shameful appeal to authority.  I would like you to stake out your position concerning these "authorities" explicitly. You came close in the last thread, but not quite. Here are the positions:

*Anthony's Position*

It is an immediate inference from "All men are mortal" to "Socrates is mortal". 

*All Logicians from Aristotle Onward*

It is not an immediate inference from "All men are mortal" to "Socrates is mortal". 

These positions are contradictory. So, one is right and the other is wrong. (They cannot be both right, and they cannot be both wrong.) Is it your position that all of the "authorities" are wrong? I would like a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. Thanks!

Your Friend,

Brian


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Appeal to authority?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yep. I am making a shameful appeal to authority.  I would like you to stake out your position concerning these "authorities" explicitly. You came close in the last thread, but not quite. Here are the positions:
> 
> *Anthony's Position*
> 
> It is an immediate inference from "All men are mortal" to "Socrates is mortal".
> 
> *All Logicians from Aristotle Onward*
> 
> It is not an immediate inference from "All men are mortal" to "Socrates is mortal".
> 
> These positions are contradictory. So, one is right and the other is wrong. (They cannot be both right, and they cannot be both wrong.) Is it your position that all of the "authorities" are wrong? I would like a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer. Thanks!
> 
> Your Friend,
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...


Now a 'false dilemma'?! 

Brian, to put it bluntly, I think _you_ are wrong and Aristotle is right. You have merely claimed Aristotle agrees with you, which is a "appeal to authority". I disagree with your claim. If anything, the authority is on my side.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> Now a 'false dilemma'?!



I presented you with a contradiction. This means you must agree with one of the propositions and disagree with the other. Now, you may not agree with me as to who supported what proposition, but you necessarily must take sides as to the truth or falisty of the propositions themselves. I am going to press the matter. Here are three propositions:

*P1:* It is an immediate inference from "All men are mortal" to "Socrates is mortal". 
*P2:* It is not an immediate inference from "All men are mortal" to "Socrates is mortal". 
*P3:* Aristotle taught P2 as being true.

What is the truth status of each of these propositions? 



> You have merely claimed Aristotle agrees with you, which is a "appeal to authority".



Fine. We will clear this all up after you give your answers. 



> I disagree with your claim. If anything, the authority is on my side.



Cool. Once we get your answers and compare them to my answers, then we can take our answers and present them directly to Dr. Carranza. You do not have to do anything here other than answer the questions. I will contact Dr. Carranza, and ask him permission to publish his response. By the way, my answers are as follows:

*P1:* False
*P2:* True
*P3:* True

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Brian Bosse

********<BUMP>********


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## Vytautas

Civbert said:


> So Socrates must also be mortal by direct/immediate implication because he is a _member_ of "Men" - for whatever is predicated of the whole ("Men"), is predicated of each and every member of the whole ("Socrates").
> 
> So you see how immediate implication underlies syllogistic reasoning.



Anthony, 

You are arguing that "Socrates is mortal" is proven by the proposition "All men are mortal" alone. But, notice you said that Socrates is must be mortal, *because* he is a man. You are implicitly relying on a premise without making it explicit. You should have said Socrates must be mortal, because all men are mortal, in order to stick with your argument of direct implication. 

The argument is not valid because it could be true that all men are mortal and false that Socrates is mortal if Socrates is not a man. So you must make explicit the hidden premise.


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## Civbert

Vytautas said:


> Civbert said:
> 
> 
> 
> So Socrates must also be mortal by direct/immediate implication because he is a _member_ of "Men" - for whatever is predicated of the whole ("Men"), is predicated of each and every member of the whole ("Socrates").
> 
> So you see how immediate implication underlies syllogistic reasoning.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Anthony,
> 
> You are arguing that "Socrates is mortal" is proven by the proposition "All men are mortal" alone. But, notice you said that Socrates is must be mortal, *because* he is a man. You are implicitly relying on a premise without making it explicit. You should have said Socrates must be mortal, because all men are mortal, in order to stick with your argument of direct implication.
> 
> The argument is not valid because it could be true that all men are mortal and false that Socrates is mortal if Socrates is not a man. So you must make explicit the hidden premise.
Click to expand...



My point wasn't to prove ""Socrates is mortal", but that that direct implication underlies syllogistic reasoning.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,

I am still waiting for your three answers. If you are not going to give them, then please just let me know.

Thanks,

Brian


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> I am still waiting for your three answers. If you are not going to give them, then please just let me know.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Brian



There a difference between the arguments: 
 'All Men are Mortal' therefor 'Socrates is Mortal' " 
and 'All Scripture is Knowledge' therefore 'Jesus is the Christ is Knowledge'. 

The difference in the nature of the subjects in the premise and the conclusion.

With 'Men', we do not have a definition the includes 'Socrates' denotatively as a member.

With 'Scripture', we have a definition that denotatively includes 'Jesus is the Christ' as a member. When we say 'Scripture' in the argument above, we mean all the propositions found within the 66 books of the Bible - which includes 'Jesus is the Christ'. 


Now we can form an argument more directly similar to the argument for 'Jesus is Christ is Knowledge' using the Socrates example.

We start with the premise: 'Joe, John, Jim, and Socrates' are Mortal'. One direct implication is 'Socrates is Mortal'.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> There a difference between the arguments: 'All Men are Mortal' therefor 'Socrates is Mortal' " and 'All Scripture is Knowledge' therefore 'Jesus is the Christ is Knowledge'.



Fine. We can argue that later. Are you going to give me your three answers?

Brian


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## Brian Bosse

*****<bump>*****


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## Brian Bosse

Anthony,

Tell me it ain't so. I heard rumors you were leaving the Scripturalist camp! 

Brian


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