# Analogical Knowledge of God



## Justified (May 10, 2016)

I read another thread on the aforementioned topic, but could not find a particularly satisfying answer. What exactly did the Reformed divines mean when they said that our knowledge of God was an analogical knowledge. Analogy is tricky concept. Often how I hear analogy explained (relative to this discussion) ends up making our knowledge of God equivocal.

Is analogy conceived of as some degree of similarity in the things we say about God (a sliver of univocity) and a degree of dissimilarity in the same statement (a sliver of equivocation)?


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## Contra_Mundum (May 10, 2016)

A good way to get at the issue from the Reformed standpoint, is to go back to the Reformed Scholastics, a prince of whom (which we can access fairly easily) is Francis Turretin, http://www.wtsbooks.com/institutes-of-elenctic-theology-volumes-francis-turretin-9780875524566. So, examine him in discussions that relate mainly to _prolegomena_ (i.e. preliminaries) on the distinction between *archetypal* and *ectypal* theology: that is, the distinction between theology as God knows it (as God knows himself), and how we know God-revealed.

Richard Muller surveys Reformed theology from the Reformation through the post-Reformation period--really all the way up to the age of Westminster--in his Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics volumes (review here: https://www.monergism.com/legacy/mt...reformation-reformed-dogmatics-richard-muller). It is hard to overestimate the utility of these volumes, when it comes to helping us see what is really packed into our Confessional commitments on paper. The tendency is to interpret what has been bequeathed to us apart from the theology that bore it as fruit, thus pouring our own meanings into the words that were first intended as the distillation of over 150yrs of ferment.

Muller helps on this question of "analogy" also. John Bugay's recent posts seeks to show (http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/04/no-such-thing-as-reformed-thomism-among.html, http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/04/reformed-scotism.html, http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/04/the-reformed-orthodox-were-anti-thomist.html, and http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2016/04/thomas-train-wreck-and-analogia-entis.html) how the terminology "analogy" comes to us mediated through Aquinas; but despite the term's continued employment even into the Reformation era, our theologians jettisoned significant assumptions once tied to it.

Bottom line: it isn't equivocal to use that which God has accommodated to man's limitation as vehicle for truth-conveyance concerning itself, and to accept what he "lisps to us" (Calvin's expression) as perfectly true, even if not ideally true (that is to say, Truth unmediated).


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## Justified (May 10, 2016)

Contra_Mundum said:


> A good way to get at the issue from the Reformed standpoint, is to go back to the Reformed Scholastics, a prince of whom (which we can access fairly easily) is Francis Turretin, http://www.wtsbooks.com/institutes-of-elenctic-theology-volumes-francis-turretin-9780875524566. So, examine him in discussions that relate mainly to _prolegomena_ (i.e. preliminaries) on the distinction between *archetypal* and *ectypal* theology: that is, the distinction between theology as God knows it (as God knows himself), and how we know God-revealed.
> 
> Richard Muller surveys Reformed theology from the Reformation through the post-Reformation period--really all the way up to the age of Westminster--in his Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics volumes (review here: https://www.monergism.com/legacy/mt...reformation-reformed-dogmatics-richard-muller). It is hard to overestimate the utility of these volumes, when it comes to helping us see what is really packed into our Confessional commitments on paper. The tendency is to interpret what has been bequeathed to us apart from the theology that bore it as fruit, thus pouring our own meanings into the words that were first intended as the distillation of over 150yrs of ferment.
> 
> ...


Thanks for the links to the blog posts. I have Muller. I have started volume one, but have really only just started it.


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## Justified (May 10, 2016)

Franciscus Junius, _A Treatise on True Theology_, pg. 103:


> We call that pure equivocation in which there is obviously and completely a differing meaning of those things which are said equivocally. For thus we may speak in the manner of the scholastics. *But an analogical equivocation is one in which,, of those things which are said equivocally, the meaning is the same in one respect or relatively, and the same time differs in another respect.*


 This is the type of discussion I am looking for. Is Franciscus suggesting that analogy is a partial equivocation and univocation, as I talked about above? It seems like that is the most reasonable way of construing analogy.


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## Contra_Mundum (May 10, 2016)

I suppose it so. The vital thing is proper definition for terms. We need to say two critical things, against errors from one side and another. The first is against identifying creature and Creator. This distinction is too (so very) fundamental; our knowledge does not equal God's at any point.

But this commitment may lead the unsubjected mind to conclude that we are therefore shut away from the truth, since God _alone_ would know the truth. In this is a failure to acknowledge that two subjects can apprehend the same _object of knowledge,_ each one apprehending it according to his nature. God knows that object in a qualitatively divine manner; men may know it at best after a qualitatively human manner.

Nor are we speaking simply of a case of quantity of knowledge, that God just knows _more_ about the object (or *all *things in relation to the object). God's knowing a thing _makes it so._ Man's knowledge of anything can never, ever come anywhere close to that quality of knowing, because that is a god-like way of knowing, a divine attribute. Our minds make nothing "so," but what we call "imagination"--which is a poor "analogy" (but a real one) to God's activity of mind.

So, we must affirm that our minds are able to know what is true, to possess true knowledge of those realities we contact and did not invent (but only think God's thoughts after him); but we know the truth we possess in a mediate way. Here is where we use a term such as "analogy," or ectypal knowledge. In modern terms, perhaps we can say, "it is true, as far as it goes," but it does not (and cannot) go _all the way._


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## Pergamum (May 10, 2016)

Just because something is analogical, doesn't mean it isn't true.



> “‘All our knowledge of God is derived from His self-revelation in nature and in Scripture. Consequently, our knowledge of God is on the one hand ectypal and analogical, but on the other hand also true and accurate, since it is a copy of the archeypal knowledge which God has of himself’
> 
> (Berkhof, ST, 35).”


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## MW (May 10, 2016)

Developments in philosophy take the term in different directions. Under the realist school of reformed theology "analogy" serves a good purpose. The statement by Junius is a good example because it can refer to a point of univocity. Terms like being, soul, heart, mind, will, etc., are applied to God so as to make Him a personal object of knowledge. This is the result of His condescension. He voluntarily makes Himself an object of knowledge and is known as such by human personalities. We do not know His essence, but realistically with a belief in creation we do not claim to know the essence of anything since everything is constituted by divine power and will; and yet we can meaningfully attribute qualities to God because He has revealed Himself to us, just as we attribute qualities to other creatures because God has given us this ability.


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## vchia (May 10, 2016)

I would strongly recommend Ronald Nash's book "The Mind of God and the mind of man". It furnishes us with a different perspective of this problem from a philosophical-theological vantage point.

The whole issue can be boiled down to this: does 1+1=2 means the same (notice I didn't say similar) thing to God and to man? In other words, does 1+1 equal 2 for man and for God?


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## Justified (May 10, 2016)

MW said:


> The statement by Junius is a good example because it can refer to a point of univocity.


 Thank you so much. This is what I was wondering. I always thought there had to be at least some point of univocity, otherwise we would just have equivocation.


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## MW (May 10, 2016)

vchia said:


> The whole issue can be boiled down to this: does 1+1=2 means the same (notice I didn't say similar) thing to God and to man? In other words, does 1+1 equal 2 for man and for God?



2 what? "2" has no meaning in your statement. As it cannot mean anything, a relation between God's knowledge and man's knowledge cannot be established. You could say one orange plus one orange equals two oranges. In every day functionality that would be true, but then you are likely to find a more precise mind wanting to measure and weigh the oranges, and at that point the numeric value of "1" will come to mean different things and change the sum. This means the problem has boiled down to functionality. What function does the knowledge serve. God creates. Man is created. God is independent. Man is dependent. So the knowledge serves two different functions. It cannot be the same for God and for man.

These are issues Ronald Nash does not explore in his book. It is an useful book to read on the subject, but it assumes a rationalist approach, and it doesn't really address the core issues related to rationality.


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## Justified (May 10, 2016)

vchia said:


> I would strongly recommend Ronald Nash's book "The Mind of God and the mind of man". It furnishes us with a different perspective of this problem from a philosophical-theological vantage point.
> 
> The whole issue can be boiled down to this: does 1+1=2 means the same (notice I didn't say similar) thing to God and to man? In other words, does 1+1 equal 2 for man and for God?


While appreciating much of Ronald Nash's work. I do not agree with his clarkianism in this matter. The question is _not_ whether 1+1=2 is true for God and true for me-- of course it is. When we talk about the knowledge of God we must remember several things. How God knows things is qualitatively different (for example, we much of our knowledge we receive through experience and discursive reasoning, whereas God has immediate knowledge of things); unlike ours, his knowledge is not contingent on any created thing, and also he knows certain things as they are in themselves.


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## vchia (May 10, 2016)

Dear Rev Winzer,

I am referring to the mathematical statement 1+1=2.

It's really very plain and simple.

Do you KNOW that 1+1=2 is true for you and true for God in the SAME way?


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## vchia (May 10, 2016)

Dear Rev Winzer,

Page 100 of Ronald Nash's book addresses this very issue, and I beg to differ - Ronald Nash didn't approach this matter as a Rationalist in this book.

If you have read this book, please refer to page 100-101. Thank you.


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## MW (May 10, 2016)

vchia said:


> Do you KNOW that 1+1=2 is true for you and true for God in the SAME way?



You haven't said anything substantive. If you gave me a bunch of adjectives with no nouns your statement would be meaningless. That is what you are doing when you create a mathematical sum of numeric values which do not represent anything in space and time. 1 is nothing and 2 is nothing without something to which to apply them.


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## vchia (May 10, 2016)

Dear Rev Winzer,

There's no point for me to further this discussion as you couldn't seem to understand the simple mathematical logic of 1+1=2. Just refer to page 100 of Ronald Nash's book (if you have truly read it you should know what he discussed there).

Thank you for the interaction.


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## MW (May 10, 2016)

vchia said:


> There's no point for me to further this discussion as you couldn't seem to understand the simple mathematical logic of 1+1=2. Just refer to page 100 of Ronald Nash's book (if you have truly read it you should know what he discussed there).



There's no point because there is nothing to understand. If you say "good" without qualifying the object to which it refers it is meaningless. Likewise when you say "1" without qualifying the object to which it refers it is meaningless. The statement is meaningless and the discussion is meaningless. So yes, there's no point going on in this discussion.


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## vchia (May 10, 2016)

If 1+1=2 is meaningless for you, do you mean to say that you didn't do elementary math in your education? Do you write "meaningless" on your math test paper in elementary school?


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## MW (May 10, 2016)

vchia said:


> If 1+1=2 is meaningless for you, do you mean to say that you didn't do elementary math in your education? Do you write "meaningless" on your math test paper in elementary school?



Not only did I do elementary mathematics in my education, I actually learned it; and I learned that 1+1=2 because the objects are of the same class and share an equality to begin with. What does 1 orange + 1 apple equal? 1 orange and 1 apple. What does 1 man + 1 God equal? 1 man and 1 God. In these cases there is no sum issuing in an equality because they do not belong to the same class of objects. You are assuming the objects are of the same class. You are assuming the objects exist and that they are equal to start with.

So to return to the point, you haven't said anything when you give mere numeric symbols which do not relate to any object. It is impossible to say what relation exists between the knowledge of God and of man concerning an object you have not identified.


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## Pergamum (May 10, 2016)

Justified,

God is not reducible to a series of logical propositions.

Here is a thread over at the Heidelblog which discusses this topic: http://heidelblog.net/2010/06/the-categorical-distinction-in-berkhof/



> Scripture tell us that something is so but it doesn’t tell us what that something is in substance. We know that God is. We know what is he to us (Deus erga nos) but not what he is in himself (in se). The Reformation inherited that distinction from Scotus, among other sources. It was basic to Protestant theology. Luther articulated it as the distinction between the theology of glory and the theology of the cross and between God hidden and God revealed. As H. Selderhuis shows in his work on Calvin’s commentary on the psalms it was basic to Calvin’s theology too. F. Junius articulated the distinction as archetypal v ectypal. It was adopted and advanced by the Reformed orthodox through the 17th centuury. Turretin wrote, “But when God is set forth as the object of theology, he not to be regarded simply as God in himself (for thus he is incomprehensible [akataleptos] to us) but as revealed and as he has been pleased to manifest himself to us in his word, so tha the divine revelation is the formal relation which comes to be considered in this object.” (1.5.4)


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

Pergamum said:


> God is not reducible to a series of logical propositions.


 I do not think I have claimed such.


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

[Pastor] Winzer,

Do you know of any place, like the Junius I quote, among Reformed theologians that has an extended discussion on analogy and analogical predication?


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## NaphtaliPress (May 11, 2016)

How about addressing each other properly?


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

MW said:


> It is impossible to say what relation exists between the knowledge of God and of man concerning an object you have not identified.


If one is a Platonist, then mathematical entities exist; and then such a statement is meaningful.


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## earl40 (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> > It is impossible to say what relation exists between the knowledge of God and of man concerning an object you have not identified.
> ...



If God tells "one" to take the life of a person and tells another "one" to not kill then you would understand what Rev. Winzer is speaking of. The person designated by the number "one" makes all the difference in the world.


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## Philip (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> > It is impossible to say what relation exists between the knowledge of God and of man concerning an object you have not identified.
> ...



Even if that was granted, God would know the entities in themselves, whereas we, as psychosomatic semiotic beings, can only apprehend numbers through concepts, rather than directly.


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

Philip said:


> Justified said:
> 
> 
> > MW said:
> ...


I think that's right. I think I mentioned that earlier in the discussion.

For clarification to all, I'm not a clarkian. I believe in analogical knowledge. I'm just trying to think through this.


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## MW (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> > It is impossible to say what relation exists between the knowledge of God and of man concerning an object you have not identified.
> ...



Being a Platonist is not going to make something to exist which does not exist. But you have identified an erroneous system which blinds people's eyes to the truth. If we believe in the Maker of heaven and earth we have no place for the Platonist world. We recognise the blessing of our physical existence and trace the evils of life to spiritual causes.


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## Philip (May 11, 2016)

MW said:


> Being a Platonist is not going to make something to exist which does not exist.



I believe Evan is referring to the position on the question of universals known as Platonism, rather than the entire systematic philosophy propounded by Plato. That is, the position that universal concepts (including numbers) have subsistent entities as their objects. This view, in the philosophy of mathematics, is primarily associated with Bertrand Russell (oddly enough).

Cf. Platonism in Metaphysics


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

MW said:


> Justified said:
> 
> 
> > MW said:
> ...


Well, a Platonist is just committed to the existence of mathematical entities. I guess saying so does not make it so, but that is not exactly the point. How is Platonism (a christianized Platonism {exemplarism}, like Augustine's, Bonaventure's, and Anselm's) not an option for a Christian? Perhaps, that is my fault for not qualifying Platonism when I was referring to it.


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

Philip said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> > Being a Platonist is not going to make something to exist which does not exist.
> ...



Thanks, Phillip. That was what I was referring to. I also implicitly was qualifying the Platonism as a christian form of it (exemplarism).


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## MW (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> Do you know of any place, like the Junius I quote, among Reformed theologians that has an extended discussion on analogy and analogical predication?



James Buchanan's book on Analogy is well worth the study. He traces the different views from the period prior to Bishop Butler to his own time (1860s), and he shows the systematic impact these views can have on apologetics, biblical interpretation, and theology.


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## MW (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> How is Platonism (a christianized Platonism {exemplarism}, like Augustine's, Bonaventure's, and Anselm's) not an option for a Christian?



I suppose if you transfer the non-personal concepts of Platonism to the person of Jesus Christ you have created an "option" for a Christianised form of Platonism, but how healthy is it? What impact is this going to have on the doctrine of the person of Christ? The Logos ends up being a third nature of Christ. And how much of the Platonic world comes with it? Ontology and epistemology work hand in hand.


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

MW said:


> Justified said:
> 
> 
> > How is Platonism (a christianized Platonism {exemplarism}, like Augustine's, Bonaventure's, and Anselm's) not an option for a Christian?
> ...


 You're probably right. I would still say that it is a matter of Christian liberty, as long as it doesn't lead to anything heretical or heterodox.

Were there any post-reformation theologians who were Platonists? I know that most were either Aristotelian (e.g., Zanchi, I believe) or nominalists (e.g., Luther).


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## MW (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> Were there any post-reformation theologians who were Platonists?



The Cambridge Platonists form a study in themselves, especially since they emerged from the same institution as Puritanism. They came up with all kinds of doctrines inimical to the reformed faith.


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

Were there any post-reformation _reformed_ theologians?


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## MW (May 11, 2016)

Justified said:


> Were there any post-reformation _reformed_ theologians?



Theophilus Gale is one prominent theologian who comes to mind. His fourth book of "Court of the Gentiles" is perhaps the best philosophical treatment of the attributes of God in reformed perspective. But he taught a distinctive Christian interpretation of Plato. That is, he Christianised Plato; he didn't Platonise Christianity.


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## Philip (May 11, 2016)

For what it's worth, Scotism and Thomas's _via media_ would also (probably) entail some sort of realism regarding mathematics.


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## Justified (May 11, 2016)

Philip said:


> For what it's worth, Scotism and Thomas's _via media_ would also (probably) entail some sort of realism regarding mathematics.


I think your probably right.


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