# Help with a section from Edwards' "On the Freedom of the Will"



## TheThirdandReformedAdam (Aug 12, 2016)

In Part III, Section VIII - _Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions Considered_, Edwards says this: "The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly without difference, are two. 1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another: and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects, between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference."
I am having a hard time understanding this objection. Is the hypothetical objector saying that since God created an infinite universe, He exhausted all possible options and, therefore, didn't prefer one act of creation over another?


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## moral necessity (Aug 12, 2016)

At first glance, it seems to me that the objector is trying to prove that God makes choices without being motivated towards a certain choice; that he makes them from a state of indifference.

Infinite space and time is the same throughout.

Nothing in infinite space and time could have compelled him to make the universe where or when he did.

Therefore, God chooses from a position of neutrality.


Edwards, of course, will disagree...


Blessings!


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