# My interactions with a Physicalist/Naturalist...



## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

I brought up the question in my Philosophy Seminar class the other day of, "How can naturalists account for the laws of logic, math, etc. if there is nothing immaterial or metaphysical?"

Here is a reply on our class forum:



> In class thursday, Gabe asked the question: How does a naturalist or a physicalist account for his use of mathematics or language or logic? (If I`ve misrepresented this, please let me know)
> 
> Here`s what I see as an answer:
> 
> ...



I have asked him a few more questions, but I was wondering what you all had to say about his thoughts here?


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

I asked this in a preliminary response:



> 1. Do you believe that all factual questions are answered the same way?
> 
> 2. Are there laws of nature?
> 
> ...


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## JohnV (Mar 27, 2006)

Gabe:

Just ask him if what he says is true? or just a state of relationships of concepts in his physical brain? Is there any relationship, either stated or implied, that relates to another's physical brain? In other words, What is truth, in his conceptualization? 

He still uses the words as if in the same way you or I would use them, but he still has given no account for them as such. To be consistent, he ought to have typed a bunch of question marks to the same effect as what he did type. Why would that not also equally satisfy the concept/relationship scenario he put forward? There still is no definable difference between gobblety-goop and sense. It is still up the the whim of the individual to "appeal to his intuition", whatever that may be.


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

I was thinking the same thing, John.


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

A reply ... there are numerous problems with what he's saying, epistemologically!



> 1. Do you believe that all factual questions are answered the same way?
> 
> I`m not sure what you mean by this, I was a little lost on it in philosophy of religion the other day, as well. Surely I would cite one evidence type to answer the question "Do you have a hand?" and another evidence type to answer the question "Is modus tollens valid?" The first type would be straight forwardly empirical, I would raise my hand and show it. The second type would be conceptual, I might draw out a truth table, and explain why the truth-functionality of conditional statements works in such a way, etc. Now, this second type would be empirically describable (in terms of brain processes, for example), but not straightforwardly empirical.
> 
> ...


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

If there are regularities in nature and then propositions that express these regularites, there must be propositions for the propositions that express regularites, ad infinitum. Infinite regress.


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

> This is because philosophical naturalism is very much like its brother scientific naturalism in the following: they hold that the best explanation is the simplest explanation. A simple explanation does not (unless necessary) appeal to anything supernatural (or in other words, you should appeal only to what is necessary for explaining a phenomenon). Appealing to supernatural things only introduces a much bigger thing to have to explain.



To which, I would ask him, why do we exist? Why did an infinitely compressed point of matter expand into the universe? Who/what caused it and why? Where did human beings, in all of their complexity, derive their being from?

To answer any of these questions, the naturalist must appeal to faith or - irrationality - violating his own worldview.


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## JohnV (Mar 27, 2006)

Gabe:

Here's my advice, for what it's worth:

Don't be afraid to pursue him on the empirical evidence he wishes to present ( his hand. ) It seems to me that you have to push him to the logical conclusions that follow from his own sense of _modus tollens_ and _modus ponens_ concerning the presentation of his evidence. Only you don't have to get lost in the terms. Simple terms will get the same result. In fact, I personally think that it shows more depth of understanding of the subject if you can state the same precepts in simpler yet as definitive terms. _Indirect proof_ and _direct proof_ are quite good enough, and keeps the attention on the evidence he's presenting instead of the nuances of the terms. Then push him to define "truth" as either universal, as utilitarian, or individual. And then push whichever route he takes either to its logical conclusion or to his "final apologetic", as Schaeffer used to say. 

It will take time, but you will find out if he is serious or if he is being coy for the sake of disagreeing with Christianity. If the latter, then you can leave the discussion with the clear proviso that you are serious, and that if he is not, that he cannot hope to persuade you of anything worthwhile. That would leave his argument totally dissatisfied, and yet not waste your time on a worthless pursuit.


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Mar 27, 2006)

Well, when I brought it up in class, he was speechless. He had to take a few days to think about it before responding, so I'm thinking he hasn't really thought everything through yet, obviously. My only goal is to at least show him that his worldview is not rational completely, or that it reduces to absurdity, while mine does not.


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