# Can the will be compelled and voluntary simultaneo



## RamistThomist (Oct 16, 2007)

Can the Human Will be both compelled and voluntary simultaneously? This objection was raised by the Thomist Peter Kreeft. To Kreeft's credit, it was done in a thoughtful and irenic spirit, which is often lacking today. He considers the "compulsion by God" aspect to be a fundamental premise to Calvinism. He then attempts a rebuttal:



> What it forgets is that grace, however infinitely powerful, deals with nature according to its nature, and that even divine omnipotence does not extend to logical contradictions such as a human will being simultaneously voluntary (uncompelled) and compelled (involuntary).



Peter Kreeft, _Summa of the Summa_, 401 note 101.

While I only came across his argument briefly, I will note a few responses from the top of my head:

1. Might not there be other alternatives to viewing the will other than the voluntary vs. involuntary dichotomy?
2. Does Calvinism really maintain that way of formulating the issue?
3. Is the nature/grace dichotomy essential to this formulation? If so, then would a rebuttal of Thomism's nature/grace constitute a rebuttal of this critique?
4. Given that many forms of Calvinism seek to preserve the genuine moral choice component of the will, does this really critique Calvinism at all? Isn't this more of a critique of behaviorism and hard determinism? In that case, the Calvinist agrees with the critique!


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## BobVigneault (Oct 17, 2007)

Can the Human Will be both compelled and voluntary simultaneously?

The answer is yes. The terms are not mutually exclusive and we complicate matters by lining them up against each other. The voluntary aspect is a function and a necessary result of the compulsion. It's primary and secondary means. I won't get into all the questions you brought up but I believe the first can be answered by way of an illustration.

Have you ever noticed as you're driving down the freeway, a fly buzzing around inside your car. I moves and weaves in seemingly random motions, it hits against the windows and changes directions. The fly is free to buzz around and is only constrained by the limits of your car. However, to someone outside your car the fly is flying at 65 mph, pretty fast for a fly, and it's overall direction is the same as the car. The car is compelling the fly in a definite direction as the fly follows it's simple choices.

In the case of God's providence nothing is left to chance, everything happens within it including our 'free' choices. We can make a philosophical argument that providence and volition are in contrast but it's only a perceived contrast because of our being locked in space and time. Only eternity will allow us to finally turn around and look back and see that every one of our 'free' choices was determined and purposed for the glory of God.


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## Semper Fidelis (Oct 17, 2007)

Spear Dane said:


> Can the Human Will be both compelled and voluntary simultaneously? This objection was raised by the Thomist Peter Kreeft. To Kreeft's credit, it was done in a thoughtful and irenic spirit, which is often lacking today. He considers the "compulsion by God" aspect to be a fundamental premise to Calvinism. He then attempts a rebuttal:
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I think so. It seems to me that the debate is already re-cast by the discussion. It seems to be cast in autonomous human philosophical categories from the beginning. I simply don't ever see the Scriptures trying to "defend" that man is compelled or voluntary in his will. I do see a lot of men trying to justify to others what the Scriptures say about the nature of men. I think a more Biblical notion would be that man is fallen and volitional. That is that he is fallen in sin and makes decisions according to his fallen nature and is morally responsible to God for those decisions.



> 2. Does Calvinism really maintain that way of formulating the issue?


I don't believe so. I believe a Christian theology demands that we recognize that there is not a "dichotomy" - some sort of way in which the human will is really not responsible. Paul repudiates this so many times in Romans it ought to leave men without excuse who would deign to call themselves Christian. The Scriptures are unapologetic that man is fallen, responsible for his sin, and justly condemned for it.



> 3. Is the nature/grace dichotomy essential to this formulation? If so, then would a rebuttal of Thomism's nature/grace constitute a rebuttal of this critique?


On this I'll have to claim not a small amount of ignorance. As I understand Aquinas, however, he sees our fallenness in a defect of being itself. Grace, then, is to fix men ontologically. Our fall, though, is a moral one. Grace doesn't fix a metaphysical problem but an ethical problem. I think you can reject an Aquinian formulation without rejecting what Grace does to overcome the sinful human heart.



> 4. Given that many forms of Calvinism seek to preserve the genuine moral choice component of the will, does this really critique Calvinism at all? Isn't this more of a critique of behaviorism and hard determinism? In that case, the Calvinist agrees with the critique!



Maybe so. It seems like a dialectic presentation of the issue rather than a Biblical one. Human philosophy just can't adequately address the problem. It will always end up being reproved by Scripture for drawing a conclusion from the "facts" that are sinful to conclude: "You will say to me then, why does God still find fault for who has resisted His Will....."


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## KMK (Oct 17, 2007)

BobVigneault said:


> Have you ever noticed as you're driving down the freeway, a fly buzzing around inside your car. I moves and weaves in seemingly random motions, it hits against the windows and changes directions. The fly is free to buzz around and is only constrained by the limits of your car. However, to someone outside your car the fly is flying at 65 mph, pretty fast for a fly, and it's overall direction is the same as the car. The car is compelling the fly in a definite direction as the fly follows it's simple choices.



I will be stealing this illustration.

Boetner also uses the example of a mother tending to a crying baby. She is free to choose not to tend to the baby but it is predestined that she will because the baby's cries are compelling her to do so.


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## BobVigneault (Oct 17, 2007)

Steal away Pastor Ken. Hey, regarding your avatar. ARE YOU EVER GOING TO FINISH THAT BLASTED CUP OF COFFEE? You've been nursing that thing for well over a year now. Suck it up! Get a fresh cup!


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## KMK (Oct 17, 2007)

I will never give up this sweet nectar! After all the psalmist said, "God gave coffee," did he not?

PS When will you stop staring bullets at me through that silver mane and that cheeky smirk? I can't tell if I annoy you or you have a man-crush on me.)


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## Davidius (Oct 17, 2007)

I think of it as a Roman aqueduct. The water goes downhill because of gravity, but the exact direction and final destination are determined by the aqueduct. In the same way, our "free choice" allows us to make real decisions and "move" without being forced in the same way that the aqueduct doesn't force the water to move (gravity does). God's providence "directs" the choices we freely make.


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## BobVigneault (Oct 17, 2007)

I've got no problem with your coffee, only that you never finish it. As far as your PS, are you saying that IF i DID have a man-crush on you that it wouldn't be annoying. Man-crush indeed. That's it, you lost your TV privileges for a week young man. 




KMK said:


> I will never give up this sweet nectar! After all the psalmist said, "God gave coffee," did he not?
> 
> PS When will you stop staring bullets at me through that silver mane and that cheeky smirk? I can't tell if I annoy you or you have a man-crush on me.)


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## BrianLanier (Oct 17, 2007)

Spear Dane said:


> Can the Human Will be both compelled and voluntary simultaneously? This objection was raised by the Thomist Peter Kreeft. To Kreeft's credit, it was done in a thoughtful and irenic spirit, which is often lacking today. He considers the "compulsion by God" aspect to be a fundamental premise to Calvinism. He then attempts a rebuttal:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



You are correct, he misses the boat here. Why accept this disjuction?



> 2. Does Calvinism really maintain that way of formulating the issue?



No--at least *thoughtful* Calvinists don't.



> 3. Is the nature/grace dichotomy essential to this formulation? If so, then would a rebuttal of Thomism's nature/grace constitute a rebuttal of this critique?



What do you mean by "this formulation"? Do you mean: "He considers the "compulsion by God" aspect to be a fundamental premise to Calvinism"? If so, then there is no need of a rebuttal of Thomism--just a clear definition of Calvinism should be fine.



> 4. Given that many forms of Calvinism seek to preserve the genuine moral choice component of the will, does this really critique Calvinism at all? Isn't this more of a critique of behaviorism and hard determinism? In that case, the Calvinist agrees with the critique!



Doesn't critique Calvinism at all. It sound like a critique of a straw man, even of behaviorism or hard determinism--no one explicity hold to a contradiction.

(NOTE: I am only responding to what Jacob has written or quoted in *this* thread. I have not read the rest of the work by Kreeft, so I cannot say whether or not Kreefts "critique" is what he thinks Calvinists *actually* believe, or merely what he sees to be a *consequent* of Calvinsit beliefs. (I have a suspicion it is the latter, but I don't know).)


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## KMK (Oct 17, 2007)

BobVigneault said:


> I've got no problem with your coffee, only that you never finish it. As far as your PS, are you saying that IF i DID have a man-crush on you that it wouldn't be annoying. Man-crush indeed. That's it, you lost your TV privileges for a week young man.
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> 
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> ...



I am encouraged because the Bible teaches that your chastisement means you love me...


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 17, 2007)

We do not believe that we do things "involuntarily." That is, against our will. All our choices, though predetermined, were voluntary (where "voluntary" means that we wanted to do it). S _predetermining_ S* to do action A at time t1 does not entail that S _forced_ S* to A at t1.

Kreeft assumes the libertarian notion of PAP - principle of alternative possibility. That is, for an action A to be free, one must have been "able" to genuinely actualize ~A.

I assume Kreeft reasons thus:

If S predetermined S* to A at t1, then S* could not actualize ~A at t1.

If S* could not actualize ~A at t1, then S*'s decision to A was forced, or, involuntary.

Therefore, if S predetermined S* to A at t1, then S*'s decision to A was forced, or, involuntary.

But why define "freedom" that way? One reason is that libertarians will say that we cannot be held morally responsible. For an agent to be held morally responsible, to say that his actions were praiseworthy or blameworthy, the agent must have been able to do otherwise - where "able to do otherwise" means the real possibility to actualize an alternative possibility. This imports what some have taken to be the intuitive moral principle that to say that S _ought_ to do act A, is to say that S _can_ A. Thus ought-implies-can. (It should be noted that the meaning of "can" is hotly debated.) The intuitive notion can be spelled out, perhaps, by this illustration: Say you're a a citizen walking by a small water fountain when an infant falls in. To say that you ought to save him implies that you can. This is obvious because we wouldn't tell you that you ought to save him if you were 1 mile away, say, using mental telepathy. So, to say that S ought to A is to assume that S _can_ A. But, if S was determined to ~A, and given God's decree S could not ~A, that is, PAP is denied, then it would be ridiculous to hold S morally responsioble for not ~A-ing.

But, thanks to atheists like Harry Frankfurt(!), the Calvinist determinist (who is trying to put our theological tradition into terms that the philosopher likes, cause hey, philosophers need to be taught Calvinism too , and if it is more persuasive for them to get some of their conceptual knots straightened out via the language of philosophers, then why not? Sure, we can beat gthem over the head with the Bible, but (a) this might not be persuasive for them, and (b) they have a different exegesis which (c) might even, however wrongly, be guided by what they take to be a logical impossibility, i.e., genuine freedom given divine determinism; anyway, I digress....) can reject the principle of PAP and the ought-implies-can OIC that seems to propell it. Thus a classic counter to OIC goes like this:



> "Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones' plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waiver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened. " Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)



And so back to Kreeft. Since S _predetermining_ S* to do action A at time t1 does not entail that S _forced_ S* to A at t1, and since if one does something that he was not forced to do but, rather, he wanted to do it (given the reasons-response condition, see here: Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)), then it seems that the Calvinist can hold on to freedom by saying that we do what we want to do. That seems to satisfy pre-philosophical notions of freedom. Simply and unsophisticatedly: I did A freely so long as I wanted to do A. Indeed, even if God determined that we would want to A, then it seems to logically follow that "we wanted to A." Therefore, even God determining our wants doesn't make them something we didn't want to do. Kreeft needs to show that we do things that we did not, at the time, want to do. That is, that we wanted to do A, but God determined ~A, so we did ~A, but all the time we were mentally fighting it and our arm just reached and grabbed the knife to kill the man all the time we were trying to not do that, as if we were puppets (with minds) on a string.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 22, 2007)

Thanks Paul


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