# God commanding that which we cannot do...



## SolaScriptura (Mar 1, 2012)

From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to command something which the other is incapable of doing?


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## Philip (Mar 1, 2012)

Natural or moral ability?


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## SolaScriptura (Mar 1, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Natural or moral ability?



The fact that we've had to make the distinction seems to establish at a very fundamental level the premise that it is unjust to command that which we are unable to do. So we've come up with the natural/moral distinction so as to explain how it really isn't unjust for God to command something we are "unable" to do. 

But back to my first question: From where do we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong to command something that someone cannot do?


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## Philip (Mar 1, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> But back to my first question: From where do we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong to command something that someone cannot do?



It seems fairly evident that if you command something that someone is naturally incapable of doing, you are being unreasonable. For example, asking a two-year-old to write a five-page essay is considered an unreasonable request. Asking me to fly around the room, that is also an unreasonable request. Even if I have a moral obligation to do what you say, you would still be unreasonable to ask me to fly around the room.

Now, if you command me to walk around and I stubbornly refuse because I'm an obstinate moral wretch with no moral ability to obey authority, your request would not be unreasonable. 

As a parent, would you hold a child responsible for a task that he/she was physically incapable of? It does not seem unreasonable, though, to command something that you know they will disobey.


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## Peairtach (Mar 1, 2012)

By asking or commanding someone to do something it is impossible for them to _naturally_ do you are not being wise, good, loving, just or truthful. 

You are either mocking or disrespecting the person, or are not in touch with reality.


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## Constantlyreforming (Mar 1, 2012)

Does this have to do with the discrepancy of whether or not one can believe in Christ, without His giving the ability to believe?

I have heard some espouse the following:

We have the natural ability to choose (decide) to follow Christ; however, we will not choose to follow Christ because our ability to choose is bound by sin; the ability is maimed, unable. Many will choose (volition) to supposedly follow Christ; what shows later is that their decision was not backed up with ability (regeneration). Regeneration enables the heart to adhere to the gospel, rather than just having interest in it.


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## MississippiBaptist (Mar 1, 2012)

Living in the Arminian Armpit of America I get this question a good bit. I've been looking for a good way to explain how everyone is commanded to repent but only those who are regenerated are able. I lean on the federal position of Adam and the fact that his sin was imputed to us; thereby, enslaving us to sin. That's the best I could come up with...love to hear other approaches.


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## Curt (Mar 1, 2012)

We are commanded to be holy as He is holy. We cannot do it. But we can apprehend His holiness; IF He ordains it.


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## Peairtach (Mar 1, 2012)

In respect of our natural response to the Gospel, our "Can't" is a "Won't" and our "Won't" is a "Can't". 

The chill is in the will; and it's moral, not natural or metaphysical. So we're culpable for it.


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## KMK (Mar 1, 2012)

Would it be immoral if I, a potter, made my own coffee cup and commanded it to keep my coffee hot indefinitely and then threatened it with destruction if it fails? Of course not.

Even if it could be proven that man has some kind of right to be free from impossible commands, this right would not extend to his creator.


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## Philip (Mar 1, 2012)

KMK said:


> Would it be immoral if I, a potter, made my own coffee cup and commanded it to keep my coffee hot indefinitely and then threatened it with destruction if it fails? Of course not.



Not immoral, just irrational.


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## KMK (Mar 1, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> KMK said:
> 
> 
> > Would it be immoral if I, a potter, made my own coffee cup and commanded it to keep my coffee hot indefinitely and then threatened it with destruction if it fails? Of course not.
> ...



How so? Hath not the potter power over the clay?


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Mar 1, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> But back to my first question: From where do we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong to command something that someone cannot do?


We get the idea from our depravity refusing to give up on notions of autonomy that we have no Scriptural warrant to cling to. _Accountability_ does not presuppose freedom (only responsibility) nor has nothing to do with _ability_, as all officers in the military can attest to. 

AMR


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## SolaScriptura (Mar 1, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Now, if you command me to walk around and I stubbornly refuse because I'm an obstinate moral wretch with no moral ability to obey authority, your request would not be unreasonable.



ok, so let me push back a little...

You "stubbornly refuse" BECAUSE you have no moral ABILITY to obey. Call it "natural" call it "moral," but the bottom line is that you've granted they don't have the ABILITY to obey and thus their "stubborn refusal" is intrinsically connected to their inability. How is that not the same as God commanding what we cannot do?


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## MW (Mar 1, 2012)

WCF 4.2, "having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfil it." Original capability.

WCF 9.3, "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation." Spiritual incapability.

WCF 16.7, "Works done by unregenerate men, although, for the matter of them, they may be things which God commands, and of good use both to themselves and others..." Material capability.

Man is perfectly capable of willing what is good. His depravity lies in the enmity of his heart towards God even while he chooses to do "the good." He wills "good" for evil reasons.


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## Philip (Mar 1, 2012)

KMK said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> > Not immoral, just irrational.
> ...



Yes---but the clay is not a rational moral agent with natural ability to do that which is asked of it. Remember that when Paul is using this analogy, he is referring to ultimate destiny and God's determination: he is not talking about man's responsibility for his own sin before God.

In what way would casting moral blame on a coffee mug be rational?



SolaScriptura said:


> but the bottom line is that you've granted they don't have the ABILITY to obey



They don't have the moral ability---their hearts are hardened and therefore they will not obey God. They do have the natural ability/capacity.


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## SolaScriptura (Mar 1, 2012)

Ok, I'm not wanting to have rehashed the alleged moral/natural ability distinction. I get it. I'm wanting to know from where we get the idea that obligation to do something can only be attributed if there is ability.

It appears that the thinking here is that it is simply "self-evident" that it would be unjust to command what one cannot do.


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## Loopie (Mar 1, 2012)

Perhaps the concept is just something that God has written on our hearts. I mean, all men 'know' the truth (Romans ch 1), but suppress it willfully due to their enslavement to sin. People 'know' right from wrong, but suppress that knowledge to the point that they call evil, good, and good, evil. 

The distinction between ability and will is very important, and I recommend Jonathan Edward's work Freedom of the Will. 

In fact, it is important in understanding the concept of 'will' when we discuss God's attributes. Many atheists like to say that if God was 'omnipotent', then couldn't he do X (list some ridiculous, immoral, or illogical thing). I always point out to them that to be all-powerful is to be able to ALWAYS accomplish your will. God is omnipotent in the sense that he does whatever he wills, and nothing or no one thwarts him. This does not mean that God is all-willing (he wills everything). Clearly God does not 'will' everything. But he does accomplish whatever he wills, and therefore is omnipotent.


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## rbcbob (Mar 1, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to command something which the other is incapable of doing?



As Van Til used to say "autonomous man makes himself the final arbitrator in all predication." Each Fallen Man sees himself as having the final say as to what is right.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Natural or moral ability?



There may be neither and yet the Lord may sovereignly command both. Where He commands either or both, and has willed it, He will provide the ability.

10 And behold, there was *a man who had a withered hand*. And they asked Him, saying, "Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath?"-- that they might accuse Him.
11 Then He said to them, "What man is there among you who has one sheep, and if it falls into a pit on the Sabbath, will not lay hold of it and lift it out?
12 "Of how much more value then is a man than a sheep? Therefore it is lawful to do good on the Sabbath."
13 Then He said to the man, "*Stretch out your hand.*" *And he stretched it out*, and it was restored as whole as the other.
(Mat 12:10-13 NKJ)

Acts 16:14 Now a certain woman named Lydia heard us. She was a seller of purple from the city of Thyatira, who worshiped God. *The Lord opened her heart to heed the things spoken by Paul.* (Act 16:14 NKJ)


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## MW (Mar 1, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> It appears that the thinking here is that it is simply "self-evident" that it would be unjust to command what one cannot do.



Perhaps it might be helpful to use more descriptive words for "can." E.g., self-determination. Is it true that in the command is the supposition that the individual has the power to determine to do what he is told. If so, where does the idea come from? I would answer yes, and the idea comes from our understanding of man as created to aim at and achieve certain ends. As the Shorter Catechism suggests, "purpose" is inherent in man.


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## Philip (Mar 1, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> It appears that the thinking here is that it is simply "self-evident" that it would be unjust to command what one cannot do.



Can you think of a clear example where commanding a moral agent to do something that he was completely incapable of would be right? Again, think in terms of your role as a father.

Would it ever be right to tell your children to do something that you knew was outside their capacity entirely? Would it be moral for you to command your child "fly over to me"?


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## Loopie (Mar 1, 2012)

I would like to share a quote from Calvin on this topic:

"When the will is enchained as the slave of sin, it cannot make a movement toward goodness, far less steadily pursue it. Every such movement is the first step in that conversion to God, which in Scripture is entirely ascribed to divine grace. Thus Jeremiah prays, "Turn thou me, and I shall be turned" (Jer 31:18). Hence, too, in the same chapter, describing the spiritual redemption of believers, the prophet says, "The Lord has redeemed Jacob, and ransomed him from the hand of him that was stronger than he" (Jer 31:11); intimating how close the fetters are with which the sinner is bound, so long as he is abandoned by the Lord, and acts under the yoke of the devil. Nevertheless, there remains a will which both inclines and hastens on with the strongest affection toward sin; man, when placed under this bondage, being deprived not of will, but of soundness of will. Bernard says not improperly, that all of us have a will; but to will well is proficiency, to will ill is defect. Thus simply to will is the part of man, to will ill the part of corrupt nature, to will well the part of grace.

Moreover, when I say that the will, deprived of liberty, is led or dragged by necessity to evil, it is strange that any should deem the expression harsh, seeing there is no absurdity in it, and it is not at variance with pious use. It does, however, offend those who know not how to distinguish between necessity and compulsion. Were any one to ask them, Is not God necessarily good, is not the devil necessarily wicked, what answer would they give? The goodness of God is so connected with his Godhead, that it is not more necessary to be God than to be good; whereas the devil, by his fall, was so estranged from goodness, that he can do nothing but evil. Should any one give utterance to the profane jeer, that little praise is due to God for a goodness to which he is forced, is it not obvious to every man to reply, It is owing not to violent impulse, but to his boundless goodness, that he cannot do evil? Therefore, if the free will of God in doing good is not impeded, because he necessarily must do good; if the devil, who can do nothing but evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily; can it be said that man sins less voluntarily because he is under a necessity of sinning?

This necessity is uniformly proclaimed by Augustine, who, even when pressed by the invidious cavil of Celestius, hesitated not to assert it in the following terms: 'Man through liberty became a sinner, but corruption, ensuing as the penalty, has converted liberty into necessity'. Whenever mention is made of the subject, he hesitates not to speak in this way of the necessary bondage of sin. Let this, then, be regarded as the sum of the distinction. Man, since he was corrupted by the fall, sins not forced or unwilling, but voluntarily, by a most forward bias of the mind; not by violent compulsion, or external force, but by the movement of his own passion; and yet such is the depravity of his nature, that he cannot move and act except in the direction of evil. If this is true, the thing not obscurely expressed is, that he is under a necessity of sinning." (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book Second, Chapter 3).


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## moral necessity (Mar 2, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> It appears that the thinking here is that it is simply "self-evident" that it would be unjust to command what one cannot do.



I'm not sure of a scripture off-hand. It must also come from God's character being impressed upon us all at creation, that still lies within us as a remnant after being contaminated. I think it is just and proper to only be responsible for that which we can perform, and that it is unrighteous to hold one accountable for what they cannot do. What we tend to forget, however, is that we are held accountable according to the standard of what we used to be able to do prior to the fall. We are like a motor that used to run, but now we are broken, and yet still held accountable to be able to run. It is just to still demand something to perform how it was originally designed to perform.

Blessings!


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## KMK (Mar 2, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> In what way would casting moral blame on a coffee mug be rational?



Who said anything about 'casting moral blame'? The point I am trying to make is that the Creator has the right to do whatsoever he wills with His creatures without those creatures sitting in judgment over his morality or rationality. We have neither the ability or authority to fairly judge God even if He does command that which cannot be done.


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## KingofBashan (Mar 2, 2012)

The way I look at this issue is like this:

Consider a hypothetical dialog between a sinner and Jesus Christ on the day of judgment.

Sinner: You can't judge me. I'm totally depraved, morally and naturally unable to do any good. You are the one who has no sense of justice.
Jesus: Are you saying you were incapable of _not placing_ a piece of fruit in your mouth?
[awkward silence]
Sinner: Yes. I'm morally corrupt.
Jesus: Then why didn't you ask for help?
[another awkward silence]
Sinner: I didn't think you would help me, and even if I did, I didn't want _your_ help -
[gavel falls]

End of discussion. No matter how you slice it the sinner is responsible and God has done nothing wrong. 

The illustration is meant to show how absolutely absurd it is to even posit that God is unjust in his requirements. It is meant to answer the original question by illustrating that this way of thinking originates as sinful man's cleverly crafted arguments against the truth. It is 100% pure stubble.

[Holy Spirit works in the heart of a sinner.]
Sinner: You are just in everything you say - I have inherited death, and I _deserve_ death. I cannot will to do good. But I trust you.
Jesus: I say you may have my righteousness.
Sinner: That is just, and I accept your free gift. Help me to live worthy of your righteousness.
Jesus: I will.
[an eternal life begins]


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## Philip (Mar 2, 2012)

KMK said:


> Who said anything about 'casting moral blame'?



You did in your example. You told your coffee mug that you would hold it to account for not keeping your coffee warm. To command something rationally would entail that the thing commanded be somehow within the natural capacity of the one who has received the command. Your command to your coffee mug is fundamentally irrational and silly.



KMK said:


> The point I am trying to make is that the Creator has the right to do whatsoever he wills with His creatures without those creatures sitting in judgment over his morality or rationality.



I'm not questioning this: I am merely pointing out the conditions necessary for man's moral responsibility before Responsibility presupposes some measure of freedom.


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## KMK (Mar 2, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> You told your coffee mug that you would hold it to account for not keeping your coffee warm.



I didn't mean to hold the cup to account in a moral sense but in a practical sense. If you create something for a purpose and it fails to achieve that purpose you throw it out. As with all analogies it has its limitations but I think it sufficiently demonstrates the irrationality of those who cry, to Him, "What doest Thou?" 

If it weren't for those who sit in judgment over God for His sovereign election we wouldn't have to keep answering these kinds of objections. Instead of answering their objections maybe it would be better to point out the absurdity of the objection in the first place.


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## Philip (Mar 2, 2012)

KMK said:


> If you create something for a purpose and it fails to achieve that purpose you throw it out.



Yes, but if you create a coffee mug to keep your coffee hot and it doesn't, whose fault is it? That's what I'm concerned with here: not casting blame on God.

Paul, in fact, is arguing that the sinner is unjust in his accusation because he forgets that he is serving God's purpose---God's purposes never fail.


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## JimmyH (Mar 3, 2012)

Maybe I'm missing the point entirely ? What comes to my feeble mind, is that if man were capable of fulfilling God's requirements His Son wouldn't have had to come to this world of time and pour His life out, a ransom for many, and wash us of our sins in His own blood. 

And Jesus said to his disciples, “Truly, I say to you, only with difficulty will a rich person enter the kingdom of heaven. 24 Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God.” 25 When the disciples heard this, they were greatly astonished, saying, “Who then can be saved?” 26 But Jesus looked at them and said, “*With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.” *


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## sevenzedek (Mar 7, 2012)

God is not not justified in commanding us to do something that we are unable to do because his justice appeals to an ideal outside himself. When Paul makes an appeal for God's justice in Romans 9, he doesn't reason that God is just on the basis of anything other than the fact that "God said." If God said it, it is therefore just.

Romans 9:14-15
14 What shall we say then? Is there injustice on God's part? By no means! 15 For he says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.”

God is not just because he conforms to an ideal other than himself. He is just because he conforms to himself.

I think God would be just to command that we fly around the room even though we lack natural ability. Granted, I think it would be a strange request from God as it would be quite unlike him to command me to fly by using my natural ability; but it would not be unjust. The just-ness of God does not come from any other ideal than himself and himself alone.

Distinguishing natural abilities from moral abilities is only helpful as long as we understand that God is not required to measure up to an extrinsic ideal. He is only required to measure up to that which is intrinsically God.

From where do we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong to command something that someone cannot do? I think we get it from our faulty perceptions of authority. If God has absolute authority, then who or what is to say that God is just or unjust. The only appeal God must give for the just-ness of his authority is "Because I said so." What is righteous is righteous because it conforms to what God says is righteous. He, of course, has the authority to do that. He gets to make the rules. HE is God!

---------- Post added at 01:07 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:01 PM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> KMK said:
> 
> 
> > If you create something for a purpose and it fails to achieve that purpose you throw it out.
> ...



Romans 9:21
21 Has the potter no right over the clay, to make...[a vessel] for dishonorable use?

Those who are going to hell were not purposed for honorable use.


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## Philip (Mar 7, 2012)

sevenzedek said:


> Those who are going to hell were not purposed for honorable use.



Not questioning this. But are the damned responsible for their own damnation? Are they simply destroyed like a pot, or were they moral agents with real choices for which they were rightly judged?



sevenzedek said:


> I think God would be just to command that we fly around the room even though we lack natural ability.



My point is that God wouldn't. God cannot be inconsistent with His own nature and therefore does not command what we cannot naturally do.

Again, would it be rational for you to command someone to do something not in their capacity?


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## sevenzedek (Mar 7, 2012)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Are they simply destroyed like a pot, or were they moral agents with real choices for which they were rightly judged?



Both?

See Romans 9:19-20.
19 You will say to me then, Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will? 20 But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, Why have you made me like this?"

---------- Post added at 01:42 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:36 PM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, would it be rational for you to command someone to do something not in their capacity?



I do think it would be irrational for me to command someone to do something not in their capacity.


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## RobertPGH1981 (Mar 7, 2012)

I think that after the fall God recognized this issue and that is why he sent Jesus. Now for those who have faith they will be saved and those who do not have faith will perish. The reason they do not have faith is because they refuse to believe because they are bent towards sin. They still have the ability but because of being turned inward they would never act outside of the holy spirits assistance. 

Romans 5:17 - For if, by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man, how much more will those who receive God's abundant provision of grace and of the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man, Jesus Christ.

The Arminian view handles this very well but eliminates passages that allude to God's sovereign choice in the matter (Romans 9). Calvanists do not have a direct answer to how it's rational to be accountable and incapable at the same time. Paul didn't seem to think that matter based on Romans 9:21. I obviously hold to the reformed view but must admit I consider this a paradox. I just accept this as it is written in scripture considering that both can be true at the same time (i.e. Ability and Inability). 

The verse that I accepted is the fact that God can create whatever he wants (Romans 9:21).


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Mar 7, 2012)

RobertPGH1981 said:


> I think that after the fall God recognized this issue and that is why he sent Jesus.


Do you mean to imply that God did not know what was going to happen in the Garden?

AMR


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## RobertPGH1981 (Mar 7, 2012)

No, I am saying he knew this would happen, recognized this, and that is why he sent Jesus. It was in his plans.


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## sevenzedek (Mar 8, 2012)

RobertPGH1981 said:


> Calvanists do not have a direct answer to how it's rational to be accountable and incapable at the same time. Paul didn't seem to think that matter based on Romans 9:21. I obviously hold to the reformed view but must admit I consider this a paradox. I just accept this as it is written in scripture considering that both can be true at the same time (i.e. Ability and Inability).



As I said before, I think we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong for God to command us to do something that we cannot do from our faulty perception of his authority. Robert, the problem you bumping up against is that you seem to think that God's purposes and commands must make sense to you in order for you to see them as rational. To look for an extrinsic rational reason to which God must conform I think is the wrong approach. I have a different approach. I think that the mere fact that God does what he does and commands what he wills is what defines rationality. Granted, when we look at this dilemma we begin to wonder about his purposes. Why would he command us to do something that we cannot do on our own. The simple answer is that God does all things for his glory. Note that this is not an extrinsic answer. While it may appear that this answer points to an ideal outside of God, it is, in fact, in accordance with his good pleasure. Calvin, when he comments on Romans 9:15, says this:

With regard to the elect,, God cannot be charged with any unrighteousness; for according to his good pleasure he favors them with mercy: and yet even in this case the flesh finds reasons for murmuring, for it cannot concede to God the right of showing favor to one and not to another, except the cause be made evident. As then it seems unreasonable that some should without merit be preferred to others, the petulancy of men quarrels with God, as though he deferred to persons more than what is right. Let us now see how Paul defends the righteousness of God. In the first place, he does by no means conceal or hide what he saw would be disliked, but proceeds to maintain it with inflexible firmness. And in the second place, he labours not to seek out reasons to soften its asperity, but considers it enough to check vile barkings by the testimonies of Scripture.
It may indeed appear a frigid defence that God is not unjust, because he is merciful to whom he pleases; but as God regards his own authority alone as abundantly sufficient, so that he needs the defence of none, Paul thought it enough to appoint him the vindicator of his own right. Now Paul brings forward here the answer which Moses received from the Lord, when he prayed for the salvation of the whole people, "I will show mercy," was God's answer, "on whom I will show mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." By this oracle the Lord declared that he is a debtor to none of mankind, and that whatever he gives is a gratuitous benefit, and then that his kindness is free, so that he can confer it on whom he pleases; and lastly, that no cause higher than his own will can be thought of, why he does good and shows favor to some men but not to all. The words indeed mean as much as though he had said, "From him to whom I have once purposed to show mercy, I will never take it away; and with perpetual kindness will I follow him to whom I have determined to be kind." And thus he assigns the highest reason for imparting grace, even his own voluntary purpose, and also intimates that he has designed his mercy peculiarly :for some; for it is a way of speaking which excludes all outward causes, as when we claim to ourselves the free power of acting, we say, "I will do what I mean to do."

In short, I say the rational reason that Calvinists give for how it is rational that God should require of us what we cannot do on our own is this:

...because God said so...

---------- Post added at 08:23 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:14 AM ----------




> Robert, the problem you bumping up against is that you seem to think that God's purposes and commands must make sense to you in order for you to see them as rational.



Sorry, Robert. I should have said, "The problem you seem to be bumping up against..."

---------- Post added at 08:32 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:23 AM ----------

Perhaps I should add that our sinfulness IS the fact that we cannot do on our own what God commands. The reason this is sinful is because God IS worthy of our submission to his authority.


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## RobertPGH1981 (Mar 8, 2012)

sevenzedek said:


> As I said before, I think we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong for God to command us to do something that we cannot do from our faulty perception of his authority. Robert, the problem you bumping up against is that you seem to think that God's purposes and commands must make sense to you in order for you to see them as rational.



I would agree and that's why I accept this as truth. 

However, when Paul addresses this issue in Roman 9 he says, "[SUP]21 [/SUP] Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use? [SUP]22 [/SUP]*What if* God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, [SUP]23 [/SUP]in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory—"

When he says, "*What if*" doesn't that mean that Paul is even making a guess to the answer because he accepts that God is the creator and does what he wills, but at the same time couldn't wrap his head around this idea of being incapable and accountable?


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## Theogenes (Mar 8, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> Ok, I'm not wanting to have rehashed the alleged moral/natural ability distinction. I get it. I'm wanting to know from where we get the idea that obligation to do something can only be attributed if there is ability.
> 
> It appears that the thinking here is that it is simply "self-evident" that it would be unjust to command what one cannot do.



Ben,
Kant put this idea forward, that the "ought" implies the "can"....
Ought implies can - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I think that it is the natural reasoning of a person in spiritual darkness. 
Jim


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## MW (Mar 8, 2012)

I think the appeal to Romans 9 takes the discussion off its original course. The "will" of Romans 9 is decretive. Man cannot know what God has decreed until it has come to pass or unless God has specially revealed it beforehand. The original question related to God commanding men, which is usually designated His "preceptive" will, and something which man can and does know. Moving from one to the other is sure to create confusion.


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## sevenzedek (Mar 8, 2012)

armourbearer said:


> I think the appeal to Romans 9 takes the discussion off its original course. *The "will" of Romans 9 is decretive. *Man cannot know what God has decreed until it has come to pass or unless God has specially revealed it beforehand. *The original question related to God commanding men, which is usually designated His "preceptive" will, and something which man can and does know. *Moving from one to the other is sure to create confusion.



I disagree. I commend to you that my contribution concerning Romans 9 was warranted for reasons I will describe. For the question itself mixes the decretive and perceptive wills of God and warrants the use of Romans 9 that supports my point concerning God's absolute authority that is being challenged.

The original question asked, From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to command something which the other is incapable of doing?

First, we see, in the question, God's preceptive will in the words that say that one is commanding something.

Second, we see in the question God's decretive will in the words that say that one is incapable. For instance, the reason men are incapable of believing in Christ is precisely because of God's decretive will. God has not decreed for certain men to believe.

Finally, I have drawn attention to Romans 9 for the purpose of supporting my assertion that the idea that it is unjust for God to command something (God's preceptive will) which the other is incapable of doing (because of God's decretive will prevents and does not enable) is really man's problem with God's authority, for it is God's prerogative to do as he pleases. In the spirit of Romans 9:20, Who are you, O man who finds God's ways inherently unjust, to answer back to God?

That the "will" of Romans 9 refers to the decretive will of God does not exclude the text from a discussion concerning God's perceptive will. For it is the decretive will that enables obedience to preceptive will.


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## MW (Mar 8, 2012)

sevenzedek said:


> Second, we see in the question God's decretive will in the words that say that one is incapable. For instance, the reason men are incapable of believing in Christ is precisely because of God's decretive will. God has not decreed for certain men to believe.



This is where the discussion is confusing two different things. Men are not incapable of believing in Christ, all things being equal. They are incapable as a result of the bondage of the will in consequence of the fall into sin. They are to blame, not God, for their incapacity. As soon as one brings the decretive will into it, as if human failure does not admit of a reasonable explanation, the guilt of the sinner is alleviated; and that is a serious error.


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## sevenzedek (Mar 8, 2012)

This is going to go over my very quickly!

I recant the use of the word "precisely." That was a lame thing to say. Men ARE culpable for their sin.

While am at it, allow me to recant the use of Romans 9 as well for the sake of a less confusing conversation.

In the end, my answer to the original question is that man has a problem with God's absolute authority. Does anyone think this is on the right track?

Hey Winzer. Thanks for pointing out my serious error.


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## moral necessity (Mar 8, 2012)

Here's a thought from Calvin that seems fitting:

"Now what is to be learned from the law can be readily understood: that God, as he is our Creator, has toward us by right the place of Father and Lord; for this reason we owe to him glory, reverence, love, and fear; verily, that we have no right to follow the mind's caprice wherever it impels us, but, dependent upon his will, ought to stand firm in that alone which is pleasing to him; then, that righteousness and uprightness are pleasing to him, but he abominates wickedness; and that, for this reason, unless we would turn away from our Creator in impious ingratitude, we must cherish righteousness all our life. For if only when we prefer his will to our own do we render to him the reverence that is his due, it follows that the only lawful worship of him is the observance of righteousness, holiness, and purity. And we cannot pretend the excuse that we lack ability and, like impoverished debtors, are unable to pay. It is not fitting for us to measure God's glory according to our ability; for whatever we may be, he remains always like himself: the friend of righteousness, the foe of iniquity. Whatever he requires of us (because he can require only what is right), we must obey out of natural obligation. But what we cannot do is our own fault. If our lust in which sin reigns [cf. Rom.6:12] so holds us bound that we are not free to obey our Father, there is no reason why we should claim necessity as a defense, for the evil of that necessity is both within us and to be imputed to us." - _Institutes_, Book II, Ch.VIII.2

Blessings!


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## Bald_Brother (Mar 9, 2012)

SolaScriptura said:


> From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to command something which the other is incapable of doing?



If I may reword the question I may better be able to jump in.

"From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to hold someone morally culpable for failing to do that which they were at the same time commanded and incapable of doing?"

My best answer is that it is assumed, and justifiably so. Using an example from this thread, if I were to command my daughter to fly across the room to me, that command would not be unjust, it would be unreasonable - and silly. However, if I proceeded to tan my daughter's hide for not flying to me as I commanded, I would be unjust in holding her morally responsible for the very thing that she does not, nor can ever, have the ability to accomplish. 

Consider how authority works. Commander -> Respondant / Command -> Response. In this model, the respondant should have the reasonable expectation that the commander's commands will be reasonable and accomplishable. The commander, in turn, should have the reasonable expectation that the respondant's response will accomplish the reasonable command. But, it all starts with the commander commanding. If the commander's command is unreasonable and unaccomplishable then it cannot be reasonably expected that the respondants response will accomplish a reasonable command that does not exist.

Further, to hold the respondant morally responsible for the failing of the commander to give a reasonable command would be unjust. If any correction need be made in this situation, it is the commander that should be corrected.

In comes the distinction between moral and natural ability to the question of God commanding man.


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