# Truth as the "in itself"



## Cheshire Cat (Feb 25, 2008)

It seems that if one holds to a correspondence theory of truth, then one should also hold that a proposition (or whatever truth bearer you choose) is true iff it conforms with facts/the way things really are (or whatever truth maker you choose), i.e. the "in itself" of what that proposition intends to conform to. 

My question is, is the "in itself" of an object truly in itself only in the mind of God. It seems obvious to me that human beings cannot know the 'in itself' of an object or idea. We are fallible beings who cannot simultaneously look at something from every perspective. 

Now, if to be a true proposition, it must conform to the 'in itself', and we can't know the in itself as God does, how do we know the proposition is true? 

Perhaps a coherence theory of justification? I don't know, as I have studied very little epistemology. But my point is that it seems God's knowledge of an object or idea is different than ours. We can still know things, but only in a way similar to God's knowledge, as we are made in God's image. But our knowledge is not exactly the same as God's. 

What say ye?


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## Vytautas (Feb 29, 2008)

Why should we think that there is some intersection between the knowledge of God and man?

Usually the answer is given that since God knows everything, then we can only know something because God knows it. If there is no intersection between the knowledge of the Creator and the creature, then we know nothing. But we as creatures know at least something. So there is some intersection between the knowledge of God and the knowledge we have as humans.

However, the above argument assumes that there is an intersection between the knowledge of God and man. Notice that the above reducto uses the term knowledge as the same for both the Creator and the creature. Thus, the above argument is not a good argument for the intersection between the knowledge of God and of man.


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## Davidius (Mar 1, 2008)

Vytautas said:


> Why should we think that there is some intersection between the knowledge of God and man?
> 
> Usually the answer is given that since God knows everything, then we can only know something because God knows it. If there is no intersection between the knowledge of the Creator and the creature, then we know nothing. But we as creatures know at least something. So there is some intersection between the knowledge of God and the knowledge we have as humans.
> 
> However, the above argument assumes that there is an intersection between the knowledge of God and man. Notice that the above reducto uses the term knowledge as the same for both the Creator and the creature. Thus, the above argument is not a good argument for the intersection between the knowledge of God and of man.



Right back atcha: why shouldn't there be any intersection between the knowledge of God and man?

Per the OP, it is obvious that our knowledge is not the same as God's in every respect. God knows everything, and He knows it exhaustively. We know in part. But do we have reason to believe that God understands the proposition "All men are mortal" (qualitatively) differently from us?


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## Cheshire Cat (Mar 1, 2008)

David, perhaps it would be better to phrase what I’m thinking about it terms of justification. In order for God to know a proposition, does his knowing require a greater degree of justification than it does for humans? 

Perhaps if God’s degree of justification is the same as humans, than an open theist could argue God *knows* he will be the victor in the end, even though he doesn’t have certainty of knowledge (or "see" how the future is with certainty), because knowledge does not require certainty. Or something like that…


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