# It appears Cheung has replied



## tellville

I thought some people might like this given the recent surge 
in his popularity (whether positive or negative). 

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by tellville]


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## Don

> _Originally posted by tellville_
> I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
> in his popularity (whether positive or negative).
> 
> http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/




Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this. Not only is it irrelevant by not answering the critiques of Aquascum and others, Cheung takes too much for granted by assuming that in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it, which is nothing more than an internalist constraint on justification that he'll need to prove. 

by the way, you may want to check the signature requirements!


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by tellville_
> I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
> in his popularity (whether positive or negative).
> 
> http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this. Not only is it irrelevant by not answering the critiques of Aquascum and others, Cheung takes too much for granted by assuming that in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it, which is nothing more than an internalist constraint on justification that he'll need to prove.
> 
> by the way, you may want to check the signature requirements!
Click to expand...


I don't consider it irrelevant since the "you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable" is still the most common objection to Cheung's epistemology. And that is only one of the points he made. 

As for "in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it" - isn't that one of the objectives of philosophy? That Cheung actually can answer the question "how he knows" where most fail, seems to be a an argument in Cheung's favor. If an epistemology can not answer the basic question "how do you know?" then what good is it? Only God can get away with answers like "I know what I know".

Would you mind explaining the "internalist constraint"? I've seen that phrase tossed about without any explanation - I'm beginning to wonder if anyone knows what it means.


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## Don

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]


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## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Don_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by tellville_
> I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
> in his popularity (whether positive or negative).
> 
> http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this. Not only is it irrelevant by not answering the critiques of Aquascum and others, Cheung takes too much for granted by assuming that in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it, which is nothing more than an internalist constraint on justification that he'll need to prove.
> 
> by the way, you may want to check the signature requirements!
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I don't consider it irrelevant since the "you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable" is still the most common objection to Cheung's epistemology. And that is only one of the points he made.
> 
> As for "in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it" - isn't that one of the objectives of philosophy?
Click to expand...


Actually perhaps you could say that it is one objective, but you are making the claim that you have to give a (1-2-3 step) type of explaination in order to claim knowledge. Here you are confusing sufficient with necessary.



> That Cheung actually can answer the question "how he knows" where most fail, seems to be a an argument in Cheung's favor.



He can give an answer, the issue is if its good answer or not.



> If an epistemology can not answer the basic question "how do you know?" then what good is it? Only God can get away with answers like "I know what I know".



Actually no one just says "I know what I know", it usually is, "I know X because if I do not know X, then knowledge basically evaporates. It is usually embedded into a Reductio.



> Would you mind explaining the "internalist constraint"? I've seen that phrase tossed about without any explanation - I'm beginning to wonder if anyone knows what it means.



Basically it is that you must be able to give a step by step argument for how you know something in order to know it.

CT


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## Magma2

> Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this.



You´re wrong Don. To this day I get this very same objection constantly from Clark´s detractors. Just because Cheung isn´t writing for your benefit, doesn´t mean that someone might not so benefit. I know you´re so very impressed with Pondscum´s regurgitation of Sudduth, but some of us think him irrelevant. Then again some people are enamored by the irrational and obtuse meandering of C. Van Til too. 

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Magma2]

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Magma2]


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## Don

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]


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## turmeric

Who's Pondscum? Did you know Sudduth is on this board? I saw his name the other day, if it's the same one. Some of you are making apologetics look like a most unpleasant and unedifying topic, but I hope no one is put off of it by that.


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## Robin

I'm with you, Meg! Apologetics is quite meaningful....

However, let's notice things like the hubris displayed by guys like Cheung, that are very telltale, bad signs.

He comes off as so very full of himself in his writings. (Anyone here see that?)

After a few e mails from him, I learned that he's definitely invested in promoting himself and what amounts to his own "denomination" type thing.

How unfortunate, indeed.....

Robin


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## turmeric

Yes, but where did Sudduth go? I'm quite certain I saw his name here the other day. Maybe he wants to be anonymous? I'm not crazy, really, I'm not...

I don't know much about this stuff, just saw the rules that say if you don't want to debate don't go here, exiting now.


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## RamistThomist

Sudduth said he was busy and probably wouldn't be able to contribute to every discussion.


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by turmeric_
> Who's Pondscum? Did you know Sudduth is on this board? I saw his name the other day, if it's the same one. Some of you are making apologetics look like a most unpleasant and unedifying topic, but I hope no one is put off of it by that.



Granted it can be irriatating at time with all the nitpicking, but we should consider this (which both clarkians and van tillians will agree):
Bad arguments do not glorify God and best, and are dishonest at worst. We dare not insult the intelligence of those created imago dei.


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## tellville

Sorry, I don't know why my signature didn't appear. It's there now!

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by tellville]


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## Bryan

Paul has responded to Cheung

I'm not convinced either way on this debate yet.

Bryan
SDG


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## ChristianTrader

*Dracula Rises From Grave*

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/03/dracula-rises-from-grave.html

This is a good article that really takes Cheung to task (again)

CT


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## Magma2

> I´m not aware of any Van Tilians who admit that induction is fallacious. Indeed, it´s fallacious to say induction is fallacious. That commits a category mistake.
> 
> . . .To compare and contrast induction with deduction does not, of itself, show that one mode of reasoning is superior to another. That requires a supporting argument.



If p then q

q Therefore p


I guess for Van Tilians asserting the consequent is not a fallacy. After all if truth is analogous and all Scripture is apparently contradictory pretty much anything goes. Nonsense has come. If the above article is a good example of taking Cheung to task, I can see he needn´t be too concern.


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## Ron

Cheung allows for it to be true that I see a red car. For Cheung, it is true that we actually see a red car that _might_ or _might not_ physically exist, yet we cannot know what we see, a real car or an illusion. His point is that we cannot know that our mind is actually corresponding to an actual material car, so we cannot _know_ - that although it is true we see a red car - that a red car physically exists. If we stand firmly within Cheung's worldview we should find that he cannot know that red cars actually exist anymore than he can know that unicorns actually existing. Accordingly, for Cheung, the irreducible truth is that we can know that we see a red car but cannot know that one physically exists when we see one. Presumably he believes he can also know that he sees himself pay money to fill up his red car with gas. He feels he can also know that he sees that he drives the red car to the store for groceries. Cheung believes that he knows that he sees a lot of things but feels that he cannot know that those things that he experiences are actually occurring _in what, a physical way?_ Well then what is he predicating when he grants that he knows (which presupposes it is true) that we see a red car? Does he not know that the car that he sees is physical? If Cheung does not know that his mind corresponds to the physical world (if it is even true that there is a physical world within Cheung's worldview), then what does it actually mean that it is true that he sees a red car? 

*Here's the rub:*

1. If it is actually true that the red car is indeed physical, then it is philosophically false that Cheung sees a red car _if what Cheung means by this is that it is true that he sees a red car that is not physical._ That much is obvious.

2. If the red car is _not_ physical, then it is philosophically false that Cheung sees a red car if what Cheung means by this is that it is true that he sees a red car that _is_ physical. This too is obvious.

3. Cheung believes that we are not able to assign a known truth value to the physicality of the red car, yet a truth value must exist for it is either true that the red car physically exists or it is false. So, what can it possibly mean that Cheung "œsees a red car?" Cheung cannot know what that proposition means! It´s a meaningless predication in other words. 

Should we suppose that Cheung means that he "œmight" see a physical red car? It can´t mean this for it is philosophically false that Cheung "œmight" see a red car, because "œmight" is philosophically antithetical to the ontological truth value of what Cheung actually sees, whether what he sees is physical or illusory. If it is true that either the car is physical or not physical, then it is philosophically false that the car he sees _might_ be physical or not physical. This is akin to the objection to the Molinist's use of might-counterfactuals. (E.g., if it is true that I will choose X, then it is false that I might or might not choose X.) All this to say, Cheung can't have it both ways. If it is true that the car _might not_ actually exist, then it is philosophically _false_ that he _might_ see a non-physical red car or a physical red car. Cheung either sees one or the other, either an illusion or a physical car, which makes it false that he _might_ see one or the other. Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t _know_ that we are sinning. Nor may we put men to death for murder if we can't know the ontological truth value of what can be seen. 

Ron

---------

With respect to induction, I´ve posted on this site: 

Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A _has more veracity..._" is of course"¦ sound. To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequent has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery. As GHK noted, science has great value but it´s always wrong! The value of science is due to the fact that asserting the consequent allows for rational inference because the antecedent is shown to have more veracity whenever the consequent is asserted.

The above quote is an excerpt from another thread that might have relevance here:



> _Originally posted by Ron_
> In light of Civbert and Puritanhead's discussion from page one:
> 
> Does one know that the President of the United States in the 1980´s had the initials R.R. if he thinks that Roy Rogers was President then?
> 
> Let´s talk about time.
> 
> 1. Justification: Inductive inference that the clock is working based upon history
> 2. Belief: Believe as true the time the clock indicates, which is 12:00
> 3. Truth: It is 12:00
> 
> Someone might say that since all the criteria have been met, one can know it is 12:00 given inductive-knowledge. However, the 3 criteria allow one to say that he knows it is 12:00 even when relying upon a broken clock! Shouldn't this intuitively bother us? Can we "know" things based upon false information? The problem with induction is that inferences that are rational to maintain can always be false.
> 
> Let me try to make this even more glaring. Let´s say there is another man in the room who has strong reason to believe that the clock is broken. Accordingly, this man will not rely upon the clock. In fact, this man believes that any justification of the time based upon the clock will be unwarranted. The point should be obvious. The man who is most informed about the clock is not able to know the time, whereas the man with less information about the clock can "œknow" the time if inductive inference allows for such knowledge! *If anyone is looking for a reductio, then here it is. Given and inductive-knowledge, having less information can be a necessary condition for more knowledge, and having more information can cause one to rationally lose the knowledge he once had!* Ignorance truly can be bliss. It´s one thing to have a rational inference about a truth value and quite another thing to have knowledge of a truth value.
> 
> Now let me sum this up. The first man´s inference about the clock was rational because based upon history the clock had an extremely high probability of working; say 99.9%. The second man had an entirely different rational inference based upon his history with broken clocks. He believed that there was less than 1% chance of the clock working the day after he observed it not working. Both men were making rational inferences based upon their finite perspectives and information. At the very least, given inductive-knowledge, deductive or revelatory knowledge becomes something of a different order and not merely a difference in degree. We need to distinguish the two. I prefer reserving the term knowledge to more than inductive inferences, allowing for rational inferences that yield to the maximal degree what John Frame might call "œpsychological certainty" as opposed to epistemic certainty, or knowledge rightly called.
> 
> Can anyone be certain of the time?
> 
> Let´s say that there is one clock in the world that is the standard of time. In other words, let´s assume that it indicates the "œtrue time." Now let´s say we were to hook up a digital transmitter to the clock that would output the time to a series of data acquisition systems all running in parallel. Would all of the systems record the same time at any exact instance? No. How can we arrive at the true time then? Some might take the median time of all the times recorded as call it the true time. Someone else might take the arithmetic mean and someone else the mode. Let´s say we were to conclude that at a particular instance the true time was 12:00 noon +/.000000000000000000000000001 milliseconds. How many points of time can fit between that very variance? Well an infinite number of course. Accordingly, what is the probability of one knowing the true time? Well 1/infinity of course. Well, what is 1/infinity? Well zero of course. Consequently, no matter what the time is, nobody knows the true time!
> 
> Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A _has more veracity..._" is of course the basis for science and sound. To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequence has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery.
> 
> Ron


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## Civbert

As far as red cars go, or anything else one perceive, one can never know if there is a physical object the corresponds to the mental image or not. For it is the mental image that we have in our minds, and not the object itself. I'm here, the physical object is over there (as far as I can tell), and is not in my mind. All Cheung does, along with Gordon Clark, is say that knowledge that comes only from perceptions is unreliable. Unlike reading, or hearing language (which conveys information by symbols), perceptions of physical attributes like color, movement, texture, are not "knowable" but are really opinions (weak or strong) we have based on our interpretations about the immediate physicality of what we perceive. 

I've noticed that all the Gettier examples (that questions the definition of knowledge as"justified true belief") are always based on perceptions (empirical knowledge). A man driving along sees a series of barns (except with one exception they are facades". Or a man see a friend across a room that is really a manikin (while his friend hides behind a partition). Gettier's examples really show that we can not justify the truth of empirical knowledge. He never gives and example - a man reads the phrase "red car is a VW" on a paper poster, but really it's a image of the words projected on a screen. The man still sees the same phrase, and it still has the same meaning.

My point is the Scripturalism makes the Scripture the axiom of knowledge. The knowledge from Scripture is propositional. The difficulties of epistemology are usually found in trying to justify what we perceive in the physical world. By Scriptural knowledge is spiritual, intellectual, rational, and really does not care if we can know if we are seeing "red cars" that are physical realities or optical illusions. The issues of Scripture are our relationship to God, Christ, sin, justification, atonement, good works, obedience. These are the issues that we need to know the truth about - and truth is goal of epistemology. 



> _posted by Ron_
> 
> Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning. Nor may we put men to death for murder if we can't know the ontological truth value of what can be seen.



That's an interesting statement. I don't know if one needs to "know" epistemologically that one has sinned to be punished for sinning. First I'm unsure that God requires us to be "aware" of our sin. We are born into sin, guilty from conception. We may not become "aware of our nature, but we still may "know" our sin nature. I believe we have innate knowledge of "God" and our "sin nature" that we suppress. I don't think we need to be conscience of this knowledge - we "know" even though we are "unaware" because we suppress some truths we hold. But this does not apply to Chueng's epistemology - which is about how one may "justify" the truth of ones beliefs. 

Scripturalism is a means of logically justifying the truth of propositions believed. One can still know truths without being "aware" of how one justifies that knowledge. Epistemology aims to differentiate between things we can justify knowing and things we can believe but must say are opinions because we can not justify them as true. Some things we believe may be true, but we can not account for them from a reliable foundation. 

So even if one can not know "epistemologically" if one has stolen a "red car", that does not mean one is innocent of stealing. One can know one has stolen, and that stealing is a sin. The Bible does not say we can not know our own actions, even if it is doubtful one can judge ones own heart. So self awareness of ones intents is not a prerequisite of being guilty of committing a particular sin. No one can judge a mans heart.


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## Magma2

> Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A has more veracity..." is of course"¦ sound.



Hi Ron. I will say up front I´m not at all interested in defending or debating Cheung, since I haven´t read anything more than a couple of his blogs, most of which I have agreed with, however your above observation is a bit confusing. Soundness means that the argument is valid and all of the premises are true. I don´t think "œhas more veracity" qualifies but rather hedges. The question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "has more veractiy," but is it true. Also, doesn´t one have to first know the truth to be able to judge if something better conforms to it or not? 



> To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequent has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery. As GHK noted, science has great value but it´s always wrong! The value of science is due to the fact that asserting the consequent allows for rational inference because the antecedent is shown to have more veracity whenever the consequent is asserted.



Now if you mean GHC above then I am willing to debate him. I don´t recall anywhere Clark arguing that the value of science is because it "œallows for rational inference because the antecedent is shown to have more veracity whenever the consequent is asserted"? Do you have a citation? OTOH Clark did give this example of the usefulness of science and nothing in it suggests that one false example has any more veracity than any other false example. 



> How science can be useful though false is illustrated in a delightful textbook on inductive logic. Milk fever, the illustration goes, until late in the nineteenth century, was a disease frequently fatal to cows. A veterinarian proposed the theory that it was caused by bacteria in the cows´ udders. The cure therefore was to disinfect the cow, which the veterinarian proceeded to do by injecting Lugol solution into each teat. The mortality under this treatment fell from a previous ninety percent to thirty. Does not this success full treatment prove that the bacteria were killed and that Lugol cured the disease? Unfortunately another veterinarian was caught without the Lugol solution one day, and he injected plain boiled water. The cow recovered. Had water killed the bacteria? What is worse, it was found later that air could be pumped into the cows´ udders with equally beneficial results. The original science was wrong, but it cured the cows nonetheless.
> 
> A closer examination of the logic of verification should be made. In the example above, the first veterinarian probably argued: If bacteria cause milk fever, Lugol solution will cure; the disinfectant does cure it; therefore I have verified the hypothesis that bacteria cause milk fever. This argument, as would be explained in a course of deductive logic, is a fallacy. Its invalidity may perhaps be more clearly seen in an artificial example: If a student doggedly works through Plato´s Republic in Greek, he will know the Greek language; this student knows Greek; therefore he has read Plato´s Republic. This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, and it is invalid whenever used. But it is precisely this fallacy that is used in every case of scientific verification. If the law of gravitation is true, a freely falling body will have a constant acceleration, and the eclipse will begin at 2:58:03p.m.; but freely falling bodies do have a constant acceleration and the eclipse did begin at 2:58:03 p.m.; therefore the law of gravitation is true. Or, if the periodic table of atomic weights is true, a new element of such and such a weight must exist; this new element has now been discovered; therefore the period table is verified. And, if I eat roast turkey and plum pudding, I lose my appetite; I have lost my appetite; therefore, we had roast turkey for dinner. All these arguments are equally invalid. But sometimes there is an adverse reaction if it is claimed that verification never proves the truth of a scientific law. Is it worse to "attack" science, or to "murder" logic?



The value of science is not that it arrives at something closer to the truth or that one scientific argument has more veracity than another, but rather does it works. Biblically speaking science is a tool so that man may have dominion over his environment and subdue it. The idiolatry Clark exposed is the idea that science is a means by which truth can be discovered "“ even something just closer to the truth.


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## Ron

> As far as red cars go, or anything else one perceive, one can never know if there is a physical object [that] corresponds to the mental image or not. For it is the mental image that we have in our minds, and not the object itself.



Civbert,

That the object is not in our mind simply confuses the issue. If you cannot distinguish between objects and images, then what you would be distinguishing between are images that appear to correspond with objects and images that do not appear to correspond with objects. In other words, it´s not merely an image in your mind but an image that has a truth value that corresponds with an object, whether that truth value is true or false. If you cannot know the truth value of the object, then you cannot know whether you stole an object, yet sin presupposes we can know these things. 



> That's an interesting statement. I don't know if one needs to "know" epistemologically that one has sinned to be punished for sinning.



The Bible distinguishes between sins such as actual steeling and sins of conscience. For one to try to steel an illusory red car would not be an actual sin of steeling. Moreover, the Bible speaks of actual restitution, which presupposes actual knowledge of steeling, which presupposes knowledge of objects. 



> So even if one can not know "epistemologically" if one has stolen a "red car", that does not mean one is innocent of stealing.



Innocence is an ontological status that we can know for it presupposes knowledge of guilt as opposed to ontological guilt without knowledge; this presupposes that one can have certainty (i.e. know) whether he stole, which presupposes knowledge of objects. 

What kills me in all of this is that I get the impression that many believe that knowledge of objects involves induction! 



> One can know one has stolen, and that stealing is a sin.



Knowing truth values of physical objects is a necessary condition for one to know he has stolen. So to concede the latter as you have, you concede the former. 



> Hi Ron.



Hi Sean.



> Soundness means that the argument is valid and all of the premises are true. I don´t think "œhas more veracity" qualifies but rather hedges. The question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "has more veractiy," but is it true.



This is simply a semantic difference in one sense since "œsound" typically refers to deductive arguments. Nonetheless, you believe in rational inference. You base such rational inference on asserting the consequent. The more consequents that can be asserted that support the inference, the more rational the inference. Consequently, I don´t think that the following is dealing with my issue: "œthe question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "˜has more veracity,´ but is it true." The question we are trying to answer is whether this deductive fallacy enables us to determine by rational inference what should be _believed_, which is not an endeavor to find out what is actually true and, therefore, knowable. I´m concerned with whether it is true that it is more rational to maintain X. The truth value has to do with the rationality of a belief, not the truth of that which cannot be known. 



> Also, doesn´t one have to first know the truth to be able to judge if something better conforms to it or not?



By rational inference, I am not trying to determine what is true or knowable. I am trying to determine what is rational to maintain, but not by comparing it to some ideal or truth for none is knowable. If something is rational, then it might come close to what might be true. Notwithstanding, in no way can one compare the inference to the truth, for as you well noted the truth cannot be known. 



> Clark did give this example of the usefulness of science and nothing in it suggests that one false example has any more veracity than any other false example.



Science is useful, as you agree. Again though, nobody is comparing something "œfalse" with something "œfalse." Induction allows us to infer what is rational to believe, though if our beliefs are without mathematical tolerance, for instance, they will always be false. However, through induction it is _true_ that it is _rational_ that the light go on when I flip the switch. The truth value has to do with what is rational to believe. 

BTW, Clark´s Lugol solution story has no bearing on what _I_ am saying. I concur with his point.



> The value of science is not that it arrives at something closer to the truth or that one scientific argument has more veracity than another, but rather does it works. Biblically speaking science is a tool so that man may have dominion over his environment and subdue it.



If induction aids in dominion, then induction shows what has more _veracity_, i.e., what should be *believed* in the effort to gain dominion. If you understand me, you will have no issue. I believe what the truth might be, but I am not comparing inductive inference with what I know to be true since I don't know what is true. If science is useful, then it must give us conclusions that are rational to hold, no more no less.

Ron


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## Magma2

> Quote:
> Soundness means that the argument is valid and all of the premises are true. I don´t think "œhas more veracity" qualifies but rather hedges. The question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "has more veractiy," but is it true.
> 
> 
> This is simply a semantic difference in one sense since "œsound" typically refers to deductive arguments. Nonetheless, you believe in rational inference. You base such rational inference on asserting the consequent. The more consequents that can be asserted that support the inference, the more rational the inference. Consequently, I don´t think that the following is dealing with my issue: "œthe question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "˜has more veracity,´ but is it true." The question we are trying to answer is whether this deductive fallacy enables us to determine by rational inference what should be believed, which is not an endeavor to find out what is actually true and, therefore, knowable. I´m concerned with whether it is true that it is more rational to maintain X. The truth value has to do with the rationality of a belief, not the truth of that which cannot be known.




I would think some level of semantic precision is warranted and without it I think there is a tendency to confuse. As you know Clark was not very interested in what people believe since people believe a myriad of false propositions. His concern was how truth can be known and it is not true that asserting the consequent can ever provide a rational basis of what should be believed. I would refer you to his Phil of Science. I don´t have the book in front of me, but I think you´ll find that Clark very much agreed with Karl Popper when he said; "It can even be shown that all [scientific] theories, including the best, have the same probability, namely zero." You might recall Clark´s discussion of the number of possible lines through any point on a graph, etc. 




> Quote:
> Also, doesn´t one have to first know the truth to be able to judge if something better conforms to it or not?
> 
> 
> By rational inference, I am not trying to determine what is true or knowable. I am trying to determine what is rational to maintain, but not by comparing it to some ideal or truth for none is knowable. If something is rational, then it might come close to what might be true. Notwithstanding, in no way can one compare the inference to the truth, for as you well noted the truth cannot be known.



Again, some of the confusion, at least for me, has to do with your use of terms, therefore I´m more than willing to say my problem with your post has to do with semantics. When I think of what is rational I tend to think of soundness in the usual sense and validity in the formal sense. I see now that's not how you were using these terms. 




> Quote:
> The value of science is not that it arrives at something closer to the truth or that one scientific argument has more veracity than another, but rather does it works. Biblically speaking science is a tool so that man may have dominion over his environment and subdue it.
> 
> 
> If induction aids in dominion, then induction shows what has more veracity, i.e., what should be believed in the effort to gain dominion.



Again, maybe it's just semantics again. My dictionaries defines veracity as: 
1 : devotion to the truth : TRUTHFULNESS
2 : power of conveying or perceiving truth
3 : conformity with truth or fact : ACCURACY
4 : something true <makes lies sound like veracities>

I don´t see how an induction which aids in dominion has more _veracity_? For example, I spent a number of years working framing houses but I wouldn´t say that my Estwing curved handle framing hammer has more veracity since it allowed me to drive a nail faster than my straight handle Vaughn. I think it would be more accurate to say that it is perhaps more rational to use what works and what works better than a straight handled Vaughn  

Thanks for clarifying.


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> As far as red cars go, or anything else one perceive, one can never know if there is a physical object [that] corresponds to the mental image or not. For it is the mental image that we have in our minds, and not the object itself.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Civbert,
> 
> That the object is not in our mind simply confuses the issue. If you cannot distinguish between objects and images, then what you would be distinguishing between are images that appear to correspond with objects and images that do not appear to correspond with objects. In other words, it´s not merely an image in your mind but an image that has a truth value that corresponds with an object, whether that truth value is true or false.
Click to expand...

But what you have in mind is an image of something, and one can not always tell the difference between the images based on objects and images based on illusions. We do not need to either. We can know what we intended, or attempted to do with the object we might perceive. 



> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> If you cannot know the truth value of the object, then you cannot know whether you stole an object, yet sin presupposes we can know these things.
> 
> Ron


Sin is committed the moment we determined we were going to steal the object. Before one commits any sin, one determines to act, and sets oneself to carry out the action. So even if the image of the object is based on an illusion, or on an object, the sin is committed before the physical action take places. The mental action is the sin.

To sin, you don't need to "know" anything about the object. All you need to have is "believe" that the object belongs to your neighbor. If you "believe" the object is your neighbors, and you determine to steal it, you do not need to "know" what the object is, or even "know" the object belongs to your neighbor. What you do "know" is that you stole (or determined to steal) something you "believed" was not yours. You know you have sinned, in deed or thought, regardless of your ability to have "empirical knowledge" or knowledge of objects from perceptions.

It's important to differentiate between empirical "knowledge", and "belief". Knowledge is justified true belief, and belief is what one believes true even without justification. While Chueng's Scripturalism does not justify empirical knowledge (based solely on perceptions), it does allow that one can "believe" what one sees. And that's all that is necessary for one to commit sins with respect to objects one believes they perceive. If you believe you have stolen a red car, you have sinned - you don't get a pass if you stole a green car, or a red bike, or even if it was your own car you took. You believe you stole the car because that was what you had determined to do, and it is what you believe you did, and in so choosing to steal, you sin.

[Edited on 3-8-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Ron

> To sin, you don't need to "know" anything about the object. All you need to have is "believe" that the object belongs to your neighbor. If you "believe" the object is your neighbors, and you determine to steal it, you do not need to "know" what the object is, or even "know" the object belongs to your neighbor. What you do "know" is that you stole (or determined to steal) something you "believed" was not yours. You know you have sinned, in deed or thought, regardless of your ability to have "empirical knowledge" or knowledge of objects from perceptions.



Civbert,

You skirted the issue for some reason. To commit a sin of *actual* steeling as opposed to *illusory* steeling, an *actual* object must exist. To *actually* fornicate out of wedlock requires *actual* impropriety of the actual *flesh*. 

You're a skeptic Civbert.

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> To sin, you don't need to "know" anything about the object. All you need to have is "believe" that the object belongs to your neighbor. If you "believe" the object is your neighbors, and you determine to steal it, you do not need to "know" what the object is, or even "know" the object belongs to your neighbor. What you do "know" is that you stole (or determined to steal) something you "believed" was not yours. You know you have sinned, in deed or thought, regardless of your ability to have "empirical knowledge" or knowledge of objects from perceptions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Civbert,
> 
> You skirted the issue for some reason. To commit a sin of *actual* steeling as opposed to *illusory* steeling, an *actual* object must exist. To *actually* fornicate out of wedlock requires *actual* impropriety of the actual *flesh*.
> 
> You're a skeptic Civbert.
> 
> Ron
Click to expand...



"Mat 5:28 "But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. "

No "actual flesh" here, only the thought - yet the actual sin of adultery has been committed. Sin is committed in the mind before it is acted on by the body. You don't even need to "know" you looking at an "actual" woman to lust for her - you can sin with a virtual woman. You wouldn't excuse using p0rnography because it used images and text and claim only prostitution is sinful because it uses "actual" women would you?

Sin does not require "knowledge" of the existence of objects. So an epistemology the denies that we can have "knowledge of objects" does not effect our knowledge of sin. 

If I am skeptical, it is that I am skeptical that we can know things empirically. But I believe we can know things by the revelation of Scripture. And this true knowledge is much more beneficial than anything we might try to induce from our sensory perceptions. We can not induce the doctrine of the Trinity or Limited Atonement from physical sensations. We can know truth only by God's revelation and Spirit to read/hear and understand Scripture and it's implications. 



[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Civbert

To return to your original post on red cars and stealing, you said:


> Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning.



The you argued that "actually steeling" presumes an "actual object" is stolen for it to be a sin of "actual steeling" - and therefore if we can not know there is an actual object to steel, we can't know if we have sinned (according to Chueng's epistemology).

My response is:

A: We don't need to "know"if we have acted out particular instances of sins to "know" we have "all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God". The fact that we Scripture tells us we have sinned is enough to prove to us that we have sinned and are guilty and accountable. (See Rom 3:23)

B: We don't need to commit the physical act of steeling a physical object to commit the actual _sin_ of steeling. The sin is first committed in the mind - and once that is done, no physical action needs follow for it to be accounted to us as sin. (See Mat 5:28)

Do you disagree with A and B? If you agree with both, them maybe I have not understood you argument and you might want to rephrase your objection to Chueng's epistemology.

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Ron

> *Ron Stated:* You skirted the issue for some reason. To commit a sin of *actual* steeling as opposed to *illusory* steeling, an *actual* object must exist. To *actually* fornicate out of wedlock requires *actual* impropriety of the actual *flesh*.
> 
> *Civbert Replies:* "Mat 5:28 "But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. "



Wow, this is truly an amazing reply. I argue that the Bible speaks of actual *physical* actions of adultery and actual *physical* actions of theft, which demonstrate the precondition of knowing that *actual* objects exist, and in your massive equivocation you address sins of the heart that do not presuppose actual *physical* actions! Don´t just ignore what I have said; try hard to internalize your equivocation of thought, which is obvious to Nate and Ct. 



> If I am skeptical, it is that I am skeptical that we can know things empirically.



You´re not a skeptic in your heart of hearts, Civbert. You´re a skeptic in your hardness of heart "“ in your creed "“ denying what you know to be true, which is that you _know_ that objects exist as you see them. 



> But I believe we can know things by the revelation of Scripture.



Yes, you know things by revelation but such knowledge does not comport with your presuppositions since given your presuppositions you cannot know that the Bible you are reading is God´s word! 

Ron


----------



## Ron

Sean,

I believe we might agree. I would be more confident we do if you could help Civbert!

Ron


----------



## Ron

One of the problems Civbert might be having is that he might believe that the knowledge of objects presupposes inductive inference.

Ron


----------



## Ron

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> To return to your original post on red cars and stealing, you said:
> 
> 
> 
> Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The you argued that "actually steeling" presumes an "actual object" is stolen for it to be a sin of "actual steeling" - and therefore if we can not know there is an actual object to steel, we can't know if we have sinned (according to Chueng's epistemology).
> 
> My response is:
> 
> A: We don't need to "know"if we have acted out particular instances of sins to "know" we have "all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God". The fact that we Scripture tells us we have sinned is enough to prove to us that we have sinned and are guilty and accountable. (See Rom 3:23)
> 
> B: We don't need to commit the physical act of steeling a physical object to commit the actual _sin_ of steeling. The sin is first committed in the mind - and once that is done, no physical action needs follow for it to be accounted to us as sin. (See Mat 5:28)
> 
> Do you disagree with A and B? If you agree with both, them maybe I have not understood you argument and you might want to rephrase your objection to Chueng's epistemology.
> 
> [Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]
> 
> [Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]
Click to expand...


I'll make an unpopular sort of remark. Civbert, maybe you're just not smart enough to know that your arguments are fallacious. As I pointed out above, although the Bible speaks of sins of the heart that deal with known non-physical objects, it also speaks of sins in which people can know pertain to objects. In fact, Jesus taught that we should not be deluded into thinking that a known sin of the heart does not entail judgment as a known sin that entails known physical objects! Again, I suspect the problem you are having is that you think that knowing objects exist is inferential. 

Ron


----------



## Semper Fidelis

Thanks to all on this thread. One question:

I noticed in another thread that Dr. R. Scott Clark affirms man, as an analogue, in God's image in his entire nature. Dr. Gordon Clark in the God and Logic article posted by Civbert only affirms that man is God's image only in his rational faculties. Is this difference why folks like Cheung and others consider things like eyeballs and ears and synapses to be inherently unable to process the word of God requiring "reason" to have revelation beamed into it apart from our senses?

I read both articles and believe Paul Manata nails the issue. I don't really find Cheung's argument convincing that one must prove infallibility of the senses. I just don't see a Biblical warrant that our knowledge must be perfect. I didn't see a single Scripture quoted in his entire blog article. If we are only left with direct revelation from God, unsure whether He is revealing Truth to us, how can we be sure of anything?

I also notice tremendous hubris in Cheung, as others have. Someone confident of this would have to be awfully proud to believe they have discovered the "killer" apologetic. In other words, in the history of Christendom, it would seem that Cheung believes that God has revealed Truth directly to his mind on this subject that He has withheld from all theological minds in history. He is, it would seem, after Christ and the Apostles, most blessed of all men that has ever walked the Earth. 

I think if I were to accept Cheung's apologetic I would only be left with tremendous doubt as to whether God was deceiving me every time I read the Bible knowing how much I am in need of Grace from sinning in so many other areas. I suppose if I were so deceived and lazy, I might also conclude that all this learning is pointless - why even read books on apologetics, theology, etc if God will reveal Truth as He ordains? Does preparation impel God to be more gracious as to what He reveals?

Sorry, I said I had only one question but this whole thing leads me down so many rabbit trails...

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by SemperFideles]


----------



## Magma2

> _Originally posted by SemperFideles_
> Thanks to all on this thread. One question:
> 
> I noticed in another thread that Dr. R. Scott Clark affirms man in God's image in his entire nature. Dr. Gordon Clark in the God and Logic article posted by Civbert only affirms that man is God's image only in his rational faculties.




Nature without some sort of definition is a meaningless word. Clark argued that logic in man is the image of God since even to understand one command or proposition presupposes reason. 



> I just don't see a Biblical warrant that our knowledge must be perfect.



Neither do I, but since no empiricist, Christian or otherwise, can seem to provide an explanation of how their theory might work, nor do they ever feel the need to even define sensation much less demonstrate that men actually have them, it seems to me that Clark's rejection of empiricism in its various forms is spot on. 



> I didn't see a single Scripture quoted in his entire blog article. If we are only left with direct revelation from God, unsure whether He is revealing Truth to us, how can we be sure of anything.



Quick question for you; how did Abraham know it was God telling him to sacrifice Isaac and not Satan?


----------



## Ron

[/quote]Quick question for you; how did Abraham know it was God telling him to sacrifice Isaac and not Satan?[/quote]

Sean, 

The same way the reprobate will know on the last day that it is God casting him into hell and not Satan. God's self-attesting revelation of himself is clearly understood through the confirming work of the Third Person of the Trinity. 

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> To return to your original post on red cars and stealing, you said:
> 
> 
> 
> Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The you argued that "actually steeling" presumes an "actual object" is stolen for it to be a sin of "actual steeling" - and therefore if we can not know there is an actual object to steel, we can't know if we have sinned (according to Chueng's epistemology).
> 
> My response is:
> 
> A: We don't need to "know"if we have acted out particular instances of sins to "know" we have "all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God". The fact that we Scripture tells us we have sinned is enough to prove to us that we have sinned and are guilty and accountable. (See Rom 3:23)
> 
> B: We don't need to commit the physical act of steeling a physical object to commit the actual _sin_ of steeling. The sin is first committed in the mind - and once that is done, no physical action needs follow for it to be accounted to us as sin. (See Mat 5:28)
> 
> Do you disagree with A and B? If you agree with both, them maybe I have not understood you argument and you might want to rephrase your objection to Chueng's epistemology.
> 
> [Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]
> 
> [Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I'll make an unpopular sort of remark. Civbert, maybe you're just not smart enough to know that your arguments are fallacious. As I pointed out above, although the Bible speaks of sins of the heart that deal with known non-physical objects, it also speaks of sins in which people can know pertain to objects. In fact, Jesus taught that we should not be deluded into thinking that a known sin of the heart does not entail judgment as a known sin that entails known physical objects! Again, I suspect the problem you are having is that you think that knowing objects exist is inferential.
> 
> Ron
Click to expand...


Maybe Ron. But how I'm I suppose to see what you have not shown me? What exactly is the fallacy I have made?  

I think you have not addressed my question to you - "do you disagree with A and B?" 

Or perhaps you will show where Jesus "taught that we should not be deluded into thinking that a known sin of the heart does not entail judgment as a known sin that entails known physical objects!" or what that actually means.


----------



## Ron

Civbert,

I appreciate your ambition but truth be told, you're in way over your head. I'm sorry. 

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> Civbert,
> 
> I appreciate your ambition but truth be told, you're in way over your head. I'm sorry.
> 
> Ron



I don't think so Ron. However, it's disappointing that you feel that way and do not want to discuss my points. I understand you gave it your best shot. It very frustrating when someone finds a fatal flaws in your views - and you don't see it. But I'm not giving up on you. We agree on too many things to let this minor disagreement stop our discussions. No doubt I have failed to be clear enough for you to understand my objections and I will try to be clearer. 

I appreciate it when someone can show me where my views can be improved, (especially if I am going against Scripture). Certainly this can be frustrating too, but the fire that burns also purifies. And as an elder, you have a special duty to teach the truth to the sheep. So if I am too ignorant to understand your arguments - then you can not give up on me either.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert,

Response to A: It is a true statement, but doesnt encompass all the Biblical data on the issue. The Bible pressumes that we can know the particular instances as well as the "total score". For example, God has given the civil magistrate the right to punish and condemn criminals for their crimes. If no one could know anything about the particulars, then that would make no sense. Next, God has given the church government the right to excommunicate those who are unrepentant in their sins. If we cannot know who did what "in particular" then that is just nonesense.

Response to B: Jesus makes the distinction between the sin of adultery in the heart and the crime of actual adultery. This presupposes that we can know the difference, or the story doesnt make any sense.

So I would say that I agree with what you said in both statements, but the problems is what you leave out.

CT


----------



## Semper Fidelis

> _Originally posted by Ron_


Quick question for you; how did Abraham know it was God telling him to sacrifice Isaac and not Satan?[/quote]

Sean, 

The same way the reprobate will know on the last day that it is God casting him into hell and not Satan. God's self-attesting revelation of himself is clearly understood through the confirming work of the Third Person of the Trinity. 

Ron [/quote]
That answer is satisfactory for me. 

I don't really find the question relevant, magma2, as a specific refutation of an epistimology different than Cheung's. Cheung offers no answer for surety himself. Seriously, how would you answer the same question? How does Abraham know his mind is not being deceived by God?

I agree with Ron to say that Cheung's epistimology just leads to complete skepticism, if one is humble. I would add it leads to hubris if one is proud. If one is humble one would conclude that, since God _may_ be deceiving me, I can be certain of nothing I believe about God. If one is proud, I would conclude that, surely, God would never deceive _me_.

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by SemperFideles]


----------



## Ron

> So if I am too ignorant to understand your arguments - then you can not give up on me either.



Civbert, 


Sure I can and, also, I may. Nothing requires me before God to continue to put for sound arguments to one who either will not or cannot grasp them, no matter how eager the one thinks or says he is to learn. Your problem is that you have a pre-commitment to premises that reduce your worldview to skepticism. Several threads bear witness to this truth, which of course you deny. 

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> Civbert,
> 
> Response to A: It is a true statement, but doesnt encompass all the Biblical data on the issue. The Bible pressumes that we can know the particular instances as well as the "total score". For example, God has given the civil magistrate the right to punish and condemn criminals for their crimes. If no one could know anything about the particulars, then that would make no sense. Next, God has given the church government the right to excommunicate those who are unrepentant in their sins. If we cannot know who did what "in particular" then that is just nonsense.
> 
> Response to B: Jesus makes the distinction between the sin of adultery in the heart and the crime of actual adultery. This presupposes that we can know the difference, or the story doesnt make any sense.
> 
> So I would say that I agree with what you said in both statements, but the problems is what you leave out.
> 
> CT



Thanks CT,

I was I was thinking about the responsibilities we have to judge the sin of other - e.g. "the civil magistrate the right to punish and condemn criminals for their crimes" and how that fits in, so I'm glad you mentioned it. And we are not to ignore the sins we see our brothers commit. But I don't think this entails "knowing" they have sinned in an epistemological sense. We are to be certain, and weight the evidence, hear the witnesses, etc, and make a judgment as appropriate, but this does not mean we "know" that our brother as sinned in the sense that we can know his heart which is the source of and seat of sin. We must do the best we can to get at the truth so that we can correct our brothers. 

I don't think we can rightly account that as knowledge. But this is only because I have a very strict standard for what can is justified as knowledge, and what is a justifiable belief. We can not know the witness have not erred.  We can not know from the evidence the sin has occurred - we can not "know" we saw what we "believe" we saw - but we can be justified and _believing_ that a sin has occurred when the evidence supports that conclusion - and so we have a duty to correct it. It is reasonable to believe many things based on evidence - as long as it does not contradict what we "know" from Scripture. Scripture is my standard for knowledge - and if I can not justify a proposition is true from Scripture, I do not consider it knowledge. 

And any proposition I believe contradicts what I know from Scripture, I consider false.

So, the methods for determining reasonable beliefs are evidence, testimony, observations, induction. And so it is only a matter of how I categorize the propositions I believe are reasonable and the ones I "know" are true. I can not know the person is guilty of murder, but I can believe it beyond a reasonable doubt - and that is what is required for me to judge.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Magma2

> The same way the reprobate will know on the last day that it is God casting him into hell and not Satan. God's self-attesting revelation of himself is clearly understood through the confirming work of the Third Person of the Trinity.
> 
> Ron
> 
> That answer is satisfactory for me.
> 
> I don't really find the question relevant, magma2, as a specific refutation of an epistimology different than Cheung's. Cheung offers no answer for surety himself. Seriously, how would you answer the same question? How does Abraham know his mind is not being deceived by God?



I would answer the question the same way. As to relevance the answer speaks to your objection; "œIf we are only left with direct revelation from God, unsure whether He is revealing Truth to us, how can we be sure of anything?" 




> I agree with Ron to say that Cheung's epistimology just leads to complete skepticism, if one is humble. I would add it leads to hubris if one is proud. If one is humble one would conclude that, since God may be deceiving me, I can be certain of nothing I believe about God. If one is proud, I would conclude that, surely, God would never deceive me.



I can´t really speak to Cheung´s epistemology because I´m not that familiar with him, but I don´t agree at all that his view, at least what I´ve read, leads to complete skepticism. He does seem skeptical about a lot of things that perhaps too many unthinkingly take for granted, but I don´t fault him for that. Also, Scripture does teach that God does send deluding spirits so that people will believe what is false (see 2Th 2:11 for example). Nothing earth shaking there either. As for certainty, it´s irrelevant. People are certain about any number things which are demonstrably false.


----------



## Ron

> Also, Scripture does teach that God does send deluding spirits so that people will believe what is false (see 2Th 2:11 for example).



Sean,

One can _believe_ that which is false while knowing a contradictory proposition that is true. If one of those contradictory beliefs have warrant, then knowledge obtains, even when the one possessing the knowledge believes a contradictory proposition. Contradictory beliefs are held all the time. 



> People are certain about any number things which are demonstrably false.



One cannot know (be certain about) something false.

Ron


----------



## Magma2

> One cannot know (be certain about) something false.



Which is why certainty should not be equated with knowledge. Knowledge, epistemically speaking, is justified true belief -- even if JTB has fallen on hard times among some so-called "Reformed" epistemologists. Certainty is a psychological state of mind.


----------



## Ron

I couldn't disagree more, Sean, with how you define certainty. In any case, the main issue is that you just argued that because God can send a lying spirit so that men would "believe" a lie, that we cannot know that we know. This is wrong, if for no other reason, one can believe a lie while _knowing_ a contrary proposition because contradictory beliefs are possible to hold; again, knowledge obtains when there is warrant, even when an inconsistency is being embraced.

Ron


----------



## Magma2

> I couldn't disagree more, Sean, with how you define certainty.



What do you disagree with? That certainty isn´t knowledge? I thought that was obvious. To be certain of something is to be free from doubt. It´s a conviction which frankly has no bearing on the truth or falsity of any proposition. Now, I realize that you have defined words in ways contrary to what they usually mean, so perhaps you are defining certainty in some sense that you haven´t yet explained? However, equating certainty with knowledge or even as a component of knowledge just seems confused if not just plain wrong. You said; "One cannot know (be certain about) something false." While one cannot know something false, since knowledge is JTB, true being the operative word here, people are certain about things that are false all the time. I don't know about you but I meet them every day.




> In any case, the main issue is that you just argued that because God can send a lying spirit so that men would "believe" a lie, that we cannot know that we know.



Actually, I haven´t argued any such thing, but I think the idea that one must know that he knows in order to know anything is, well, an unnecessary and perhaps insurmountable constraint.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Magma2]


----------



## Ron

Sean,

A proposition is epistemically certain if it has maximal warrant. "_Epistemically_ certain" is redundant. Therefore, _certainty_ presupposes warrant and true warrant is arrived at through deduction or revelation. 



> Actually, I haven´t argued any such thing, but I think the idea that one must know that he knows in order to know anything is, well, an unnecessary and perhaps insurmountable constraint.



This is just getting more confused with every post. What relevance was there in your pointing to the fact that God can send a deluding spirit? It was said in the context of whether Abraham could _know_ "it was God telling him to sacrifice Isaac and not Satan." To which I noted that God can cause us to _believe_ a lie while ordaining that we _know_ a contary truth to the lie. Your point regarding the deluding spirit, if it is to have any relevance to this discussion, would seem to fail for reasons just noted.

Ron


----------



## ChristianTrader

Here is an article on certainty by John Frame: http://snipurl.com/ne7r

It seems that he believes that certainty contains degrees and can be misplaced. One key aspect is that there are different definitions of the term.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by ChristianTrader]


----------



## Ron

quote]_Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
Here is an article on certainty by John Frame: http://snipurl.com/ne7r

It seems that he believes that certainty contains degrees and can be misplaced. One key aspect is that there are different definitions of the term.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by ChristianTrader] [/quote]

Yea, I have it on my pc. 

Here's the rub:

If you (Sean) believe that JTB is knowledge, then you must believe that justification must entail maximal justification, as opposed to some sort of lesser justification, such as one might gain through induction, since knowledge cannot come through a lesser justification. Accordingly, if JTB must entail maximal justification by definition, then the "œjustification" for one´s epistemic certainty must entail maximal justification as well, lest we equivocate over the term "œjustification." Added to this, whenever there is maximal justification for a belief, the belief must be a true belief - otherwise the justification could not have been maximal! Consequently, if there is true "œjustification" for the epistemic certainty, which of course there must be if there is epistemic certainty, then there must be maximal justification, lest again we equivocate over what it is to have "œjustification." If the justification for the certainty is maximal, which it must be if it's "justification," then knowledge obtains. As for "œpsychological" certainty, such talk is utter nonsense. What is subjective certainty after all and what type of justification would it have?! 

Ron


----------



## Semper Fidelis

> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> Here is an article on certainty by John Frame: http://snipurl.com/ne7r
> 
> It seems that he believes that certainty contains degrees and can be misplaced. One key aspect is that there are different definitions of the term.
> 
> [Edited on 3-10-2006 by ChristianTrader]


Thanks for the article. Good stuff.


----------



## Magma2

> A proposition is epistemically certain if it has maximal warrant. "Epistemically certain" is redundant. Therefore, certainty presupposes warrant and true warrant is arrived at through deduction or revelation.



I would say "œepistemically certain" isn´t so much a redundancy as it is nonsensical as is "œmaximal warrant." Either a proposition has warrant or it doesn´t. That´s like saying that a syllogism has "œmaximal validity." It just confuses rather than clarifies Ron. 




> Quote:
> Actually, I haven´t argued any such thing, but I think the idea that one must know that he knows in order to know anything is, well, an unnecessary and perhaps insurmountable constraint.
> 
> 
> This is just getting more confused with every post. What relevance was there in your pointing to the fact that God can send a deluding spirit? It was said in the context of whether Abraham could know "it was God telling him to sacrifice Isaac and not Satan." To which I noted that God can cause us to believe a lie while ordaining that we know a contary truth to the lie. Your point regarding the deluding spirit, if it is to have any relevance to this discussion, would seem to fail for reasons just noted.



Well, perhaps as in your discussion with Anthony you are the one missing the point (btw, questioning Anthony´s intelligence was uncalled for). The relevance of the question how did Abraham know bears directly on Rich´s objection to Cheung concerning the direct work of the HS immediately on the minds of men causing them to believe that which is true, or, by secondary means (i.e., sending deluding spirits), that which is false. As it turns out you both seem to be in agreement with Cheung after all. Without the immediate work of the HS illumining the minds of men no man could ever come to believe, much less, know the truth. For what it's worth Clark was right and epistemology is logically related to soteriology in that if man is going to know anything at all it is God alone who must provide.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Magma2]

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Magma2]


----------



## Magma2

> One can believe that which is false while knowing a contradictory proposition that is true. If one of those contradictory beliefs have warrant, then knowledge obtains, even when the one possessing the knowledge believes a contradictory proposition. Contradictory beliefs are held all the time.



While am at it, and after further thought, this too appears to be nonsensical. Care to provide an example? Since it happens "œall the time" it should be easy. I would think if a person believes proposition A then he cannot also know the contradiction of A since knowledge entails belief. For examlpe, if someone believes a man is jusified by his faithful obedience, can he really also believe that a man is justified by belief alone?


----------



## Ron

> I would say "œepistemically certain" isn´t so much a redundancy as it is nonsensical as is "œmaximal warrant." Either a proposition has warrant or it doesn´t. That´s like saying that a syllogism has "œmaximal validity." It just confuses rather than clarifies Ron.



Sean,

Warrant is justification. I'm afraid you don't know what you are arguing against. The rest of your post simply dodged the issues.

Ron


----------



## Ron

> While am at it, and after further thought, this too appears to be nonsensical. Care to provide an example? Since it happens "œall the time" it should be easy. I would think if a person believes proposition A then he cannot also know the contradiction of A since knowledge entails belief.



Sean,

Atheists don´t believe that God exists, yet Romans one tells us that they know God, which presupposes belief in God. What is occurring is self-deception. They suppress their knowledge of the truth and believe a lie about what is true. They work hard at holding to contradictory beliefs.



> For examlpe, if someone believes a man is jusified by his faithful obedience, can he really also believe that a man is justified by belief alone?



Yup, people hold to inconsistent beliefs all of the time. Men are saved through the means of imperfect faith. In weakness, a converted soul can believe that he must work in order to be forgiven but even given such doubt he doesn´t stop believing that Christ alone saves him apart from works, for saving faith cannot be lost. So, again, the same man can hold to contrary beliefs.

Ron


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> quote]_Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> Here is an article on certainty by John Frame: http://snipurl.com/ne7r
> 
> It seems that he believes that certainty contains degrees and can be misplaced. One key aspect is that there are different definitions of the term.
> 
> [Edited on 3-10-2006 by ChristianTrader]



Yea, I have it on my pc. 

Here's the rub:

If you (Sean) believe that JTB is knowledge, then you must believe that justification must entail maximal justification, as opposed to some sort of lesser justification, such as one might gain through induction, since knowledge cannot come through a lesser justification. Accordingly, if JTB must entail maximal justification by definition, then the "œjustification" for one´s epistemic certainty must entail maximal justification as well, lest we equivocate over the term "œjustification." Added to this, whenever there is maximal justification for a belief, the belief must be a true belief - otherwise the justification could not have been maximal! Consequently, if there is true "œjustification" for the epistemic certainty, which of course there must be if there is epistemic certainty, then there must be maximal justification, lest again we equivocate over what it is to have "œjustification." If the justification for the certainty is maximal, which it must be if it's "justification," then knowledge obtains. As for "œpsychological" certainty, such talk is utter nonsense. What is subjective certainty after all and what type of justification would it have?! 

Ron [/quote]

Ron,

Is this an attempt to refute Sean et. al or do you actually buy what you wrote here?

CT


----------



## Ron

Of course I believe what I wrote.


----------



## Don

> _Originally posted by Magma2_
> 
> 
> 
> One can believe that which is false while knowing a contradictory proposition that is true. If one of those contradictory beliefs have warrant, then knowledge obtains, even when the one possessing the knowledge believes a contradictory proposition. Contradictory beliefs are held all the time.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> While am at it, and after further thought, this too appears to be nonsensical. Care to provide an example? Since it happens "œall the time" it should be easy. I would think if a person believes proposition A then he cannot also know the contradiction of A since knowledge entails belief. For examlpe, if someone believes a man is jusified by his faithful obedience, can he really also believe that a man is justified by belief alone?
Click to expand...


Sean, 

It may be helpful here to remember the dichotomy between epistemological vs psychological belief as described by Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, et al. The unbeliever is autonomous (atheistic, et al) with respect to his ultimate epistemological authority, but psychologically, he believes in God. No contradiction is entailed by this distinction when holding opposing beliefs. There are other ways of explaining the self-deception of the unbeliever that Frame and others touch on. 

Don

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Don]


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> Of course I believe what I wrote.



Okay, I was giving you the benefit of the doubt, for I have serious issues that will be addressed a little later today.

CT


----------



## Magma2

> Atheists don´t believe that God exists, yet Romans one tells us that they know God, which presupposes belief in God. What is occurring is self-deception. They suppress their knowledge of the truth and believe a lie about what is true. They work hard at holding to contradictory beliefs.



The bible also tells us that Adam knew his wife and the ox knows its owner. It appears to me that you are equivocating on the word to know. Atheists disbelieve what they ought to believe for the truth of God is evident within them, but because of their disbelief they never come to the knowledge of the truth. Paul said professing to be wise they´re minds are darkened. In 2 Tim he said such men are "œalways learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." Clearly, if some never come to the knowledge of the truth then it would suggest that when Paul says the unbeliever "œknew God" in Rom. 1:21 he is using the word in a different sense and I would suggest he is doing exactly that. 




> Quote:
> For examlpe, if someone believes a man is jusified by his faithful obedience, can he really also believe that a man is justified by belief alone?
> 
> 
> Yup, people hold to inconsistent beliefs all of the time. Men are saved through the means of imperfect faith.



We´re not talking about salvation by inconsistent beliefs, but if it is possible to believe mutually exclusive and contradictory _propositions_ . 




> In weakness, a converted soul can believe that he must work in order to be forgiven but even given such doubt he doesn´t stop believing that Christ alone saves him apart from works, for saving faith cannot be lost. So, again, the same man can hold to contrary beliefs.



We´re not talking about a momentary lapse into sin either, but whether or not, and per the example, if a person´s belief in salvation by works vitiates his claim that salvation is by belief alone. I say it does. In my experience, so take it for what it´s worth, those who claim to believe both generally end up redefining salvation by faith alone so that it means something quite different then how the the phrase commonly understood. A good example is Doug Wilson who, like any number of modern Romanists I´ve encountered, will openly claim he believes in justification by belief alone, but then redefines his terms and openly rejects and even mocks the idea of salvation by "œmere" belief alone. Clearly such a man has more in mind.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Magma2]

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Magma2]


----------



## Magma2

> It may be helpful here to remember the dichotomy between epistemological vs psychological belief as described by Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, et al. The unbeliever is autonomous (atheistic, et al) with respect to his ultimate epistemological authority, but psychologically, he believes in God. No contradiction is entailed by this distinction when holding opposing beliefs. There are other ways of explaining the self-deception of the unbeliever that Frame and others touch on.




Hi Don. You´re right, there is no contradiction as long as the word to know is understood in one sense in Rom 1 (which I assume per the above would be the psychological as opposed to the epistemological sense) and another in 2 Tim or even 1 Th 4:5 for that matter where Paul makes mention of "œGentiles which know not God." However, in all fairness, it doesn´t seem to me that Ron is making that kind of distinction. Or, if he is, I wish he would be clearer in explaing exactly what he means.


----------



## Magma2

> Ron,
> 
> Is this an attempt to refute Sean et. al or do you actually buy what you wrote here?
> 
> CT





> Of course I believe what I wrote.




Then again he may believe the contrary of what he wrote as well.


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> quote]_Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> Here is an article on certainty by John Frame: http://snipurl.com/ne7r
> 
> It seems that he believes that certainty contains degrees and can be misplaced. One key aspect is that there are different definitions of the term.
> 
> [Edited on 3-10-2006 by ChristianTrader]



Yea, I have it on my pc. 

Here's the rub:

If you (Sean) believe that JTB is knowledge
[/quote]

I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.



> , then you must believe that justification must entail maximal justification, as opposed to some sort of lesser justification, such as one might gain through induction



Maximal warrant is used by Frame et. al instead of maximal justification due to the wish not to beg internalism.

Next, as Frame pointed out, maximal warranted means different things to different people, so to speak as if there is some uniform tradition that contradicts on pain of "nonsense" is not productive at all.

It depends on the context what maximal warrant means. In some cases, it means one proposition has all the warrant and nothing else has any or it may mean that one proposition just has more warrant than any other but others have some as well.

There also seems to be a wish for an infallibilist constraint on knowledge. Is this what you wish to convey.



> as opposed to some sort of lesser justification, such as one might gain through induction, since knowledge cannot come through a lesser justification.



Here it seems that you want to say that one cannot gain knowledge from induction. Which is just "scary". That is all I want to say until I can confirm that is what you are attempting to say.



> Accordingly, if JTB must entail maximal justification by definition, then the "œjustification" for one´s epistemic certainty must entail maximal justification as well, lest we equivocate over the term "œjustification."



Since we either are not using the same terms (warrant vs. justification) or we disagree over the meaning of the terms, not much can be done here.



> Added to this, whenever there is maximal justification for a belief, the belief must be a true belief - otherwise the justification could not have been maximal!



All that has happened here is that you have defined induction out of the picture and then scold anyone who bring it back into the picture. There is also the issue of wanting to take out the issue of degrees of certainty.



> Consequently, if there is true "œjustification" for the epistemic certainty, which of course there must be if there is epistemic certainty, then there must be maximal justification, lest again we equivocate over what it is to have "œjustification." If the justification for the certainty is maximal, which it must be if it's "justification," then knowledge obtains. As for "œpsychological" certainty, such talk is utter nonsense. What is subjective certainty after all and what type of justification would it have?!
> 
> Ron



We disagree at a basic level so its kinda hard to critique individual statements.

One last thing. Psychological certainty is nonsense to you because it seems that you do not want to understand what it means. Epistemic certainty is the level of certainty based on the evidence (A sort of reasonable man idea) vs. Psychological certainty is the level of certainty that an individual has based on the evidence. If they are in conflict then one needs to be changed in order to make them both match.

CT

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by ChristianTrader]


----------



## Ron

> Ron Stated: Atheists don´t believe that God exists, yet Romans one tells us that they know God, which presupposes belief in God. What is occurring is self-deception. They suppress their knowledge of the truth and believe a lie about what is true. They work hard at holding to contradictory beliefs.
> 
> Sean Stated: The bible also tells us that Adam knew his wife and the ox knows its owner. It appears to me that you are equivocating on the word to know. Atheists disbelieve what they ought to believe for the truth of God is evident within them, but because of their disbelief they never come to the knowledge of the truth. Paul said professing to be wise they´re minds are darkened. In 2 Tim he said such men are "œalways learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." Clearly, if some never come to the knowledge of the truth then it would suggest that when Paul says the unbeliever "œknew God" in Rom. 1:21 he is using the word in a different sense and I would suggest he is doing exactly that.


 
Sean,

Your reasoning is rather erratic and tangential. You simply refuse to deal with the premises head on, that Romans one states that all men know God, yet atheists do not believe in God. Accordingly, one can believe with warrant and not believe without warrant, which is to say that contradictory truths can be believed by the same person. These are obviously things you have never considered, hence your bunny trail. 



> We´re not talking about a momentary lapse into sin either"¦.



If you wish to deal with the argument before you, I´ll be happy to engage you. One who believes unto salvation cannot stop believing the truth, lest he lose his salvation, which is impossible. However, it is possible through sin to disbelieve what is yet still believed; hence we can believe yet need the Lord to help our unbelief. 

Ron


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## Ron

> I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.



CT, please give an example how one can have knowledge without having a justified belief.



> Here it seems that you want to say that one cannot gain knowledge from induction. Which is just "scary". That is all I want to say until I can confirm that is what you are attempting to say.



Give me a concrete example of what you know through induction. 

Ron


----------



## Ron

Can we "know" through inference? Let me try to use a non-deductive, non-revelatory inductive inference to make my point.

1. "Justification": Inductive inference that the clock is working based upon history
2. Belief: Believe as true the time the clock indicates, which is 12:00
3. Truth: It is 12:00

Someone might say that since all the criteria have been met, one can know it is 12:00 given inductive-knowledge. However, the 3 criteria allow one to say that he knows it is 12:00 even when relying upon a broken clock! Shouldn't this intuitively bother us? Can we "know" things based upon false information? The problem with induction is that inferences that are rational to maintain can always be false. 

Let me try to make this even more glaring. Let´s say there is another man in the room who has strong reason to believe that the clock is broken. Accordingly, this man will not rely upon the clock. In fact, this man believes that any justification of the time based upon the clock will be unwarranted. The point should be obvious. The man who is most informed about the clock is not able to know the time, whereas the man with less information about the clock can "œknow" the time if inductive inference allows for such knowledge! *If anyone is looking for a reductio, then here it is. Given and inductive-knowledge, having less information can be a necessary condition for more knowledge, and having more information can cause one to rationally lose the knowledge he once had!* Ignorance truly can be bliss. It´s one thing to have a rational inference about a truth value and quite another thing to have knowledge of a truth value.

Now let me sum this up. The first man´s inference about the clock was rational because based upon history the clock had an extremely high probability of working; say 99.9%. The second man had an entirely different rational inference based upon his history with broken clocks. He believed that there was less than 1% chance of the clock working the day after he observed it not working. Both men were making rational inferences based upon their finite perspectives and information. At the very least, given inductive-knowledge, deductive or revelatory knowledge becomes something of a different order and not merely a difference in degree. We need to distinguish the two. I prefer reserving the term knowledge to more than inductive inferences, allowing for rational inferences that yield to the maximal degree what John Frame might call "œpsychological certainty" as opposed to epistemic certainty, or knowledge rightly called. 

*Can anyone know the time?*

Let´s say that there is one clock in the world that is the standard of time. In other words, let´s assume that it indicates the "œtrue time." Now let´s say we were to hook up a digital transmitter to the clock that would output the time to a series of data acquisition systems all running in parallel. Would all of the systems record the same time at any exact instance? No. How can we arrive at the true time then? Some might take the median time of all the times recorded as call it the true time. Someone else might take the arithmetic mean and someone else the mode. Let´s say we were to conclude that at a particular instance the true time was 12:00 noon +/.000000000000000000000000001 milliseconds. How many points of time can fit between that very variance? Well an infinite number of course. Accordingly, what is the probability of one knowing the true time? Well 1/infinity of course. Well, what is 1/infinity? Well zero of course. Consequently, no matter what the time is, nobody knows the true time!

Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A _has more veracity..._" is of course the basis for science and sound. To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequence has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery. 

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> 
> Sean,
> 
> It may be helpful here to remember the dichotomy between epistemological vs psychological belief as described by Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame, et al. The unbeliever is autonomous (atheistic, et al) with respect to his ultimate epistemological authority, but psychologically, he believes in God. No contradiction is entailed by this distinction. There are other ways of explaining the self-deception of the unbeliever that Frame and others touch on.
> 
> Don



I'd think it would be the other way around. Non-believers lack any psychological belief in God - but they do have knowledge of God. And it's not merely a belief in God, it's knowledge - justified true belief. 

But then how could one know something and not be aware of that knowledge? Yet I think this is the situation regarding the knowledge of God. Unbelievers suppress this knowledge.

Imagine all the times you can't recall a particular name, or there's a word you want to use, you know the word, but you can't bring it to mind. It's still knowledge, that name, or that word, but you can't access it. I don't think the answer is "psychological", it has to do with the nature of knowledge itself - and what "justified" means when one says knowledge is "justified" true belief.

I don't think knowledge entails awareness of what one knows. We can know things that we have "forgotten" like an old phone number, or childhood teachers name. I don't think we need know how we know some things. I think the question of epistemology is what beliefs we hold can we justify as knowledge. 

Some things we happen to believe are truths, knowledge in a universal sense, but there is no way to justify the truth of those beliefs. It is knowledge in the sense that it is a truth as God knows all truth - but if the truth of it can not be accounted for (epistemically justified) then it is a belief. This is merely to acknowledge that this particular belief is not "justifiably" true. 

There are truths, truths believed, and justifiable truths believed. This latter is call knowledge. 

This is a model of knowledge:






The overlap of justified and beliefs is knowledge. Notice that not all beliefs are truths, and not all truths believed are knowledge. So the question is, how to tell a belief from a justified true belief. That's the purpose of epistemology.

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Magma2

> Your reasoning is rather erratic and tangential. You simply refuse to deal with the premises head on, that Romans one states that all men know God, yet atheists do not believe in God.



I beg to differ. You simply see the word know and attach to it an epistemic value and you wonder why I consider some of your statement confusing. I´ve already cited 2 verses where Paul says explicitly that some men do not *know* God and do not *know* the truth. Why don´t you deal with those? Is Paul some sort of Neo-Orthodox Van Tilian dialectician where men both know and do not know God at the same time and in the same sense. It would seem so. But, of course, I´m the one being erratic and tangential. 

You can have the last word in this thread. We're getting nowhere.


----------



## Ron

> Non-believers... do have knowledge of God. And it's not merely a belief in God, it's knowledge - justified true belief.



True



> But then how could one know something and not be aware of that knowledge? Yet I think this is the situation regarding the knowledge of God. Unbelievers suppress this knowledge.



Civbert,

They wouldn't be supressing the knowledge of God if they weren't aware of what they know about God. The reason they supress this knowledge is so that they might avoid being confronted with Whom they know by Whom they know. Having said that, *YES*, we are not always aware of many things we know. However, God is not one of those things. God always makes men aware of his Person. God consistently through conscience convicts men of sin, righteousness and the wrath to come; he is not always convicting men of phone numbers. 

Ron


----------



## Ron

> _Originally posted by Magma2_
> 
> 
> 
> Your reasoning is rather erratic and tangential. You simply refuse to deal with the premises head on, that Romans one states that all men know God, yet atheists do not believe in God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I beg to differ. You simply see the word know and attach to it an epistemic value and you wonder why I consider some of your statement confusing. I´ve already cited 2 verses where Paul says explicitly that some men do not *know* God and do not *know* the truth. Why don´t you deal with those? Is Paul some sort of Neo-Orthodox Van Tilian dialectician where men both know and do not know God at the same time and in the same sense. It would seem so. But, of course, I´m the one being erratic and tangential.
> 
> You can have the last word in this thread. We're getting nowhere.
Click to expand...


Brother Sean,

The verses you brought into play I could deal with but they are so far removed from the issue that it would be derail in my estimation. I'm happy to let this matter go with you. Some are profiting from this thread, which is all I can hope for.

Blessings in Christ my brother.

Maybe you might join me in explaining why induction cannot bring forth knowledge. 

Ron


----------



## Ron

> Paul some sort of Neo-Orthodox Van Tilian dialectician where men both know and do not know God at the same time and in the same sense.



*sigh* no reprobate knows this proposition: Jesus died for me

Reprobates do know that God has real wrath, while also believing that God does not have real wrath. 

What you've confused is the gospel of Christ with God's general revelation to all men everywhere. 

Ron


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> CT, please give an example how one can have knowledge without having a justified belief.
Click to expand...


It will be helpful for futher discussion for you to state what you mean by the term "justification".

An example, is of the people who have the unique ability to add, multiply large numbers in their head, very quickly. No one knows how exactly they are able to do it. But the answers are always (we can say usually because infalliblity is not a part of my criteria for knowledge). Do you withold the term knowledge if you cannot explain it?



> Here it seems that you want to say that one cannot gain knowledge from induction. Which is just "scary". That is all I want to say until I can confirm that is what you are attempting to say.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Give me a concrete example of what you know through induction.
> 
> Ron
Click to expand...


A functioning stove will burn your hand if you touch it, while on.

CT


----------



## Ron

> Clearly, if some never come to the knowledge of the truth then it would suggest that when Paul says the unbeliever "œknew God" in Rom. 1:21 he is using the word in a different sense and I would suggest he is doing exactly that.



Again, *sigh*, Paul is not using the idea of knowledge in two different respects, rather he simply showing that there are certain truths about God that reprobates cannot know, like Jesus died for them! *I'm not equivocating over knowledge. Rather, Sean is equivocating over the truth propositions regarding what men can know about God.*


----------



## Ron

> A functioning stove will burn your hand if you touch it, while on.



So you are saying that the following formal argument is valid:

If A, then B
B
Therefore, A _is true_


----------



## Don

Hi Civbert, 

Dr. Bahnsen spends an entire chapter on this in his VTA: Readings & Analysis. You may want to look that up, especially since I gave an extremely general overview of it, and I don't care to debate it right now. It's psychological ground that is the common ground between the believer and the unbeliever. 

Cf. VTA: R&A, Chapter 6, page 405.


Don

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Don]


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## Magma2

> I'd think it would be the other way around. Non-believers lack any psychological belief in God - but they do have knowledge of God. And it's not merely a belief in God, it's knowledge - justified true belief.
> 
> But then how could one know something and not be aware of that knowledge? Yet I think this is the situation regarding the knowledge of God. Unbelievers suppress this knowledge.
> 
> I don't think the answer is "psychological", it has to do with the nature of knowledge itself - and what "justified" means when one says knowledge is "justified" true belief.



I disagree Anthony and I don´t think unbelievers know God in any justified sense of the word. If they knew God in this sense they would believe the Scriptures. Instead, they hold the truth of God within themselves in "œunrighteousness." They suppress and do not assent to the truth. They don´t believe the truth, that´s why, after all, they´re called unbelievers. They know God in the sense that the a_priori truths concerning God, His law, and themselves continually convicts them. This is why I wouldn´t object to the idea that men are said to know God per Rom. 1 in a psychological or even a colloquial sense.


----------



## Ron

I rest my case, Sean. Anyone with ears to hear will hear.


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> Can we "know" through inference? Let me try to use a non-deductive, non-revelatory inductive inference to make my point.
> 
> 1. "Justification": Inductive inference that the clock is working based upon history
> 2. Belief: Believe as true the time the clock indicates, which is 12:00
> 3. Truth: It is 12:00
> 
> Someone might say that since all the criteria have been met, one can know it is 12:00 given inductive-knowledge. However, the 3 criteria allow one to say that he knows it is 12:00 even when relying upon a broken clock! Shouldn't this intuitively bother us? Can we "know" things based upon false information? The problem with induction is that inferences that are rational to maintain can always be false.



I would not call it a problem of induction, more like a fact of induction. We cannot know things based on false criteria. When we find out that it is false, then we move the proposition into the category "thought to be knowledge but was not".



> Let me try to make this even more glaring.



You can try but Ive seen the line of argumentation before, nothing will shock or awe me.



> Let´s say there is another man in the room who has strong reason to believe that the clock is broken. Accordingly, this man will not rely upon the clock. In fact, this man believes that any justification of the time based upon the clock will be unwarranted.



Alright.



> The point should be obvious. The man who is most informed about the clock is not able to know the time, whereas the man with less information about the clock can "œknow" the time if inductive inference allows for such knowledge! *If anyone is looking for a reductio, then here it is. Given and inductive-knowledge, having less information can be a necessary condition for more knowledge, and having more information can cause one to rationally lose the knowledge he once had!* Ignorance truly can be bliss. It´s one thing to have a rational inference about a truth value and quite another thing to have knowledge of a truth value.



Your argument only works if someone is working within the infallibilist tradition. If one works in the fallibilitist tradition, then nothing you have said will phase or surprise them.



> Now let me sum this up. The first man´s inference about the clock was rational because based upon history the clock had an extremely high probability of working; say 99.9%. The second man had an entirely different rational inference based upon his history with broken clocks. He believed that there was less than 1% chance of the clock working the day after he observed it not working. Both men were making rational inferences based upon their finite perspectives and information. At the very least, given inductive-knowledge, deductive or revelatory knowledge becomes something of a different order and not merely a difference in degree. We need to distinguish the two. I prefer reserving the term knowledge to more than inductive inferences,



You can prefer to do as you wish, but it seems that you fail to understand how induction effects almost everything that we do and know.

Also unless you want to become a scripturalist, you are going to be hard pressed to do deduction without first doing induction.



> allowing for rational inferences that yield to the maximal degree what John Frame might call "œpsychological certainty" as opposed to epistemic certainty, or knowledge rightly called.



Frame doesnt really make psychological oppose epistemic, he argues that they should be the same.



> *Can anyone know the time?*
> 
> Let´s say that there is one clock in the world that is the standard of time. In other words, let´s assume that it indicates the "œtrue time." Now let´s say we were to hook up a digital transmitter to the clock that would output the time to a series of data acquisition systems all running in parallel. Would all of the systems record the same time at any exact instance? No. How can we arrive at the true time then? Some might take the median time of all the times recorded as call it the true time. Someone else might take the arithmetic mean and someone else the mode. Let´s say we were to conclude that at a particular instance the true time was 12:00 noon +/.000000000000000000000000001 milliseconds. How many points of time can fit between that very variance? Well an infinite number of course. Accordingly, what is the probability of one knowing the true time? Well 1/infinity of course. Well, what is 1/infinity? Well zero of course. Consequently, no matter what the time is, nobody knows the true time!



Well know to what precision? I can know, it is 12:00 noon +/- whatever.



> Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A _has more veracity..._" is of course the basis for science and sound. To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequence has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery.
> 
> Ron



So what you are saying is that something cannot be called knowledge if it is possible to be wrong in what you call knowledge?

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> A functioning stove will burn your hand if you touch it, while on.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So you are saying that the following formal argument is valid:
> 
> If A, then B
> B
> Therefore, A _is true_
Click to expand...


Did I accidentally use or imply the term "formal" somewhere? Or are you trying to trick me? 

CT


----------



## Ron

> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> A functioning stove will burn your hand if you touch it, while on.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So you are saying that the following formal argument is valid:
> 
> If A, then B
> B
> Therefore, A _is true_
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Did I accidentally use or imply the term "formal" somewhere? Or are you trying to trick me?
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


Here's your position, CT:

If touching a functioning stove when it is on causes pain, then if I touch a functioning stove when it is on I´ll experience pain

I touched a functioning stove when it was on and I experienced pain

Therefore, it is *true* that touching a functioning stove when it is on causes pain

--------

Obviously the argument has a fallacious form, yet it is rational to believe that pain will be experienced by touching stoves when they're on. What you are willing to call knowledge includes very rational beliefs. However, the form by which you must defend these beliefs _as being TRUE_, as opposed to being probable, is fallacious. If you were to modify the conclusion to "probable" as opposed to "true" you'd be o.k. However, such a modification would undermine your definition of "knowledge" - for one cannot "know" X is true, if X is merely probably true! 

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...
> I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.
> ...
> Maximal warrant is used by Frame et. al instead of maximal justification due to the wish not to beg internalism.



What makes JTB beg internalism?


----------



## Magma2

> Dr. Bahnsen spends an entire chapter on this in his VTA: Readings & Analysis. You may want to look that up, especially since I gave an extremely general overview of it, and I don't care to debate it right now. It's psychological ground that is the common ground between the believer and the unbeliever.
> 
> Cf. VTA: R&A, Chapter 6, page 405.



"œPsychologically there are no atheistic men; epistemologically every sinner is atheistic." 

"œ. . .the natural man has epistemologically nothing in common with the Christian." - CVT


"œAs Van Til Liked to quip: "˜unbelievers can very well count, but they cannot account for counting.´ When it comes to knowing things, then the unbeliever is an "˜epistemological´ failure; he has no adequate theory, or philosophy, or worldview that makes his knowing intelligible." - GB


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> A functioning stove will burn your hand if you touch it, while on.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So you are saying that the following formal argument is valid:
> 
> If A, then B
> B
> Therefore, A _is true_
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Did I accidentally use or imply the term "formal" somewhere? Or are you trying to trick me?
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Here's your position, CT:
> 
> If touching a functioning stove when it is on causes pain, then if I touch a functioning stove when it is on I´ll experience pain
> 
> I touched a functioning stove when it was on and I experienced pain
> 
> Therefore, it is *true* that touching a functioning stove when it is on causes pain
> 
> --------
> 
> Obviously the argument has a fallacious form, yet it is rational to believe that pain will be experienced by touching stoves when they're on. What you are willing to call knowledge includes very rational beliefs. However, the form by which you must defend these beliefs _as being TRUE_, as opposed to being probable, is fallacious. If you were to modify the conclusion to "probable" as opposed to "true" you'd be o.k. However, such a modification would undermine your definition of "knowledge" - for one cannot "know" X is true, if X is merely probably true!
> 
> Ron
Click to expand...


I have no problem calling something knowledge that could in fact end up not being the case. Unless you have some argument beyond, "I do not like you doing that", then there really aint much more to say. I (as well as many others) do not need an infallibilitistic constraint on knowledge.

As an aside, you still have said nothing about the people who can do awesome math in their head. Can they know the answer is correct or not?

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...
> I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.
> ...
> Maximal warrant is used by Frame et. al instead of maximal justification due to the wish not to beg internalism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What makes JTB beg internalism?
Click to expand...


Its the term justification. Justification implies internal or special access to the reasons for something to be the case. I used the math example with Ron. Most would call that knowledge and to say otherwise, one has to just say, "I just dont want to call it knowledge because I dont".

CT


----------



## Ron

> I have no problem calling something knowledge that could in fact end up not being the case.



Well then you have no problem with contradiction, CT. You are content with verbal contradictions such as: "I know that X is true, although I don't know that X is true." You have no problem asserting the consequent - deductively! - in order to arrive at an alleged _true_ conclusion that is fallaciously derived. Moreover, you have no way of distinguishing probablity from epistemic certainty of the truth. Finally, you're left to assign an arbitrary statistical confidence to some arbitrary threshold at which point, in your subjective opinion, inference transitions to "knowledge." 



> As an aside, you still have said nothing about the people who can do awesome math in their head. Can they know the answer is correct or not?



Of course one can know he has the true answer.

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...
> I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.
> ...
> Maximal warrant is used by Frame et. al instead of maximal justification due to the wish not to beg internalism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What makes JTB beg internalism?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Its the term justification. Justification implies internal or special access to the reasons for something to be the case. I used the math example with Ron. Most would call that knowledge and to say otherwise, one has to just say, "I just dont want to call it knowledge because I dont".
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


Yes but the person who can do math in his head can have access the the basis for that knowledge. Internalism does not require a person the be able to work out how he does it at that moment, but that he _can_, given time, at least figure out how or on what basis he can do the math. For that to be an externalist example of knowledge - then it would be impossible for him to give a basis for being able to do the math. 

See Internalist vs. Externalist  by George Pappas (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)



> ...the actual view internalists have in mind, is accessibility knowledge internalism. It requires only that one can become aware of the knowledge basis, either by easy and quick reflection in some cases, or by more difficult and lengthy reflection in others. What matters, however, is not the temporal length of the reflection, but rather that this is an awareness one can achieve merely by reflection.
> 
> ...Knowledge externalism, however, wants to incorporate the idea that in some cases one cannot access any of one's knowledge basis.



So I don't think your example is extenalistict. It only shows that some knowledge is not easy to justify - _not_ impossible justify. The externalist would say that some knowledge is not justifiable at all. OK, but why call that knowledge? It's indistinguishable from opinion. Any opinion can be knowledge from an externalist, just on his say-so.

Further, justification does not need imply internalism because it doesn't say that that an individual must or can justify the proposition, only that the proposition is justified. 

Scripturalism says that one way to check if a proposition is justified is to deduce it from the basis of Scripture. But the proposition was justified true knowledge prior to the act of determining what that justification is. 

A retarded person can know the Gospel without knowing it's scriptural justification. It's knowledge because it is justified true and because he believes it. 

So neither JTB nor Scripturalism is internalist, although it can be understood either way. The internalist view has advantages of making it *possible* for a person to have access to what is justifiable so that he can tell try to tell opinion from knowledge.



[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> I have no problem calling something knowledge that could in fact end up not being the case.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well then you have no problem with contradiction, CT.
Click to expand...


It will be interesting to see how you show that such follows from my above statement. Let us look.



> You are content with verbal contradictions such as: "I know that X is true, although I don't know that X is true."



Well to have a contradiction implies that you are not using the word know in various ways in the two different cases. If you are using the word the same way in both, then no I could not affirm both simultaneously. I could affirm one at some point and the other at a later or different point. I can say that I know one that has the greater amount of warrant (X) in this case, but not know the one with lesser warrant (Not-X)



> You have no problem asserting the consequent - deductively! - in order to arrive at an alleged _true_ conclusion that is fallaciously derived.



If we are not dealing deductively then we have no reason to use the term fallacious. Remember that I do not claim that all claims of knowledge will end up being true. We just say that futher info showed a knowledge claim to be false or incomplete.



> Moreover, you have no way of distinguishing probablity from epistemic certainty of the truth.



Remember all you have done is assert that epistemic certainty implies infallible certainty. There are levels of certainty. Certainty can be misplaced or placed correctly.

Next, since I have a heirachy of knowledge, I can easily distinguish between infallible knowledge and other lower types.



> Finally, you're left to assign an arbitrary statistical confidence to some arbitrary threshold at which point, in your subjective opinion, inference transitions to "knowledge."



Um fallible, finite creatures can only reach a certain level of objectivity. If you wish to complain that I acknowledge this, then so be it. This is not to say that one cannot reach infallible knowledge with the help of the Holy Spirit, but that it actually take the Holy Spirit to reach that level. And that only occurs in a few scarce occasions.



> As an aside, you still have said nothing about the people who can do awesome math in their head. Can they know the answer is correct or not?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course one can know he has the true answer.
> 
> Ron
Click to expand...


If you agree with my stated situation then you have just given up justification as necessary for knowledge. For to be justified one has to have access to the reason for truth. No one knows what the process of coming to the answer is in the heads of these select few people.

Your out is to say that you (or the special person in question) cannot know the answer to be correct until it is justified using an another source. At this point, you have just begged internalism.

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...
> I see JTB (or something close to it is sufficient for knowledge) but justification is not necessary. To say otherwise is to beg internalism.
> ...
> Maximal warrant is used by Frame et. al instead of maximal justification due to the wish not to beg internalism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What makes JTB beg internalism?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Its the term justification. Justification implies internal or special access to the reasons for something to be the case. I used the math example with Ron. Most would call that knowledge and to say otherwise, one has to just say, "I just dont want to call it knowledge because I dont".
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Yes but the person who can do math in his head can have access the the basis for that knowledge. Internalism does not require a person the be able to work out how he does it at that moment, but that he _can_, given time, at least figure out how or on what basis he can do the math. For that to be an externalist example of knowledge - then it would be impossible for him to give a basis for being able to do the math.
Click to expand...


As of right now, no one knows how they do the calculations (them or others). For it to be internalistic, they have to have the reason, which they dont. Perhaps sometime down the line, we will come to some learn about some process. (But even then we cant be certain that the hypothetical process is correct). So it is an example of externalistic (at least until an internalistic account can be given at some point in the future)



> See Internalist vs. Externalist  by George Pappas (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...the actual view internalists have in mind, is accessibility knowledge internalism. It requires only that one can become aware of the knowledge basis, either by easy and quick reflection in some cases, or by more difficult and lengthy reflection in others. What matters, however, is not the temporal length of the reflection, but rather that this is an awareness one can achieve merely by reflection.
> 
> ...Knowledge externalism, however, wants to incorporate the idea that in some cases one cannot access any of one's knowledge basis.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So I don't think your example is extenalistict. It only shows that some knowledge is not easy to justify - _not_ impossible justify.
Click to expand...


The problem is that you assume that they know how they did it. But the point is not the actual example, it is if this is an example of externalism, is it to be called knowledge.



> The externalist would say that some knowledge is not justifiable at all. OK, but why call that knowledge? It's indistinguishable from opinion. Any opinion can be knowledge from an externalist, just on his say-so.



Nope not any opinion can be knowledge. Now there is a subjective aspect but that does not imply that any opinion can be knowledge. In this case, the warrant would come from getting the right answer 100 times in a row, for example. Now 100 vs. 150 is pretty arbitrary but that doesnt imply that anything can be rightfully called knowledge.



> Further, justification does not need imply internalism because it doesn't say that that an individual must or can justify the proposition, only that the proposition is justified.



He must know the reasons why it is justified. Not simply that it is justified.



> Scripturalism says that one way to check if a proposition is justified is to deduce it from the basis of Scripture. But the proposition was justified true knowledge prior to the act of determining what that justification is.



Things are true before we learn them but that doesnt imply anything about us knowing or believing or being justified in believing the proposition.



> A retarded person can know the Gospel without knowing it's scriptural justification. It's knowledge because it is justified true and because he believes it.



In your statement justification does nothing on top of the statement being true. If it is not justified to you, then can you call it knowledge (if you take justification as necessary for knowledge). You can say someone knows it, but you can't say that you know it.l



> So neither JTB nor Scripturalism is internalist, although it can be understood either way. The internalist view has advantages of making it *possible* for a person to have access to what is justifiable so that he can tell try to tell opinion from knowledge.
> 
> 
> 
> [Edited on 3-10-2006 by Civbert]



All you have done here is define externalism as internalism before you find out the reason that it works. You may never find out the reason that it works (and like a true scripturalist, you would have to say even if you did find out, it is just mere opinion). Internalism says that until you find out the reason why something works (however long it takes), then it is mere opinion. This is consistent with the def from the plato site.

CT


----------



## Robin

> _Originally posted by Magma2_
> 
> 
> 
> I'd think it would be the other way around. Non-believers lack any psychological belief in God - but they do have knowledge of God. And it's not merely a belief in God, it's knowledge - justified true belief.
> 
> But then how could one know something and not be aware of that knowledge? Yet I think this is the situation regarding the knowledge of God. Unbelievers suppress this knowledge.
> 
> I don't think the answer is "psychological", it has to do with the nature of knowledge itself - and what "justified" means when one says knowledge is "justified" true belief.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I disagree Anthony and I don´t think unbelievers know God in any justified sense of the word. If they knew God in this sense they would believe the Scriptures. Instead, they hold the truth of God within themselves in "œunrighteousness." They suppress and do not assent to the truth. They don´t believe the truth, that´s why, after all, they´re called unbelievers. They know God in the sense that the a_priori truths concerning God, His law, and themselves continually convicts them. This is why I wouldn´t object to the idea that men are said to know God per Rom. 1 in a psychological or even a colloquial sense.
Click to expand...


Reviewing this thread...I noticed that the most important element is being left out: "general" revelation and "special" revelation. The TWO revelations God uses. 

General has to do with God's self disclosure in creation or nature. All men have knowledge of God, the Creator; his power and supremacy; his Laws. This knowledge is either distorted or supressed. Hence, all the world's religions are evidence that man MUST express an awareness of God - though it's idolatrous. All men express ethical traits (some form of the 10 C.) In this sense, all men "know" God and are therefore "without excuse...."

Special revelation has to do with the Gospel - which is utterly (alien) outside man's knowledge. It must be given by God, directly and must be "preached" so it can reach the ears/mind since it is located only in the Word of God. The Gospel is the "word of Christ" or information about the Jesus of Holy Scripture. It is precisely this information that is toxic to unbelief. However, faith (trust) in this information must be applied/given via the Holy Spirit (who is IN the word.) 

J. G. Machen helpfully decribes faith in 3 parts: knowledge; assent; trust. The first two parts, any man can have. They are information; and agreement with the information. However, the last part (trust in the information) is given by the Holy Spirit upon hearing the Gospel.



Robin

[Edited on 3-10-2006 by Robin]


----------



## Ron

> I can say that I know one that has the greater amount of warrant (X) in this case, but not know the one with lesser warrant (Not-X)



CT

Ah, but the proposition you KNOW is alleged to be not a proposition of warrant but that X is *true*: X being that touching "hot" stoves causes pain! You said earlier that you "œknow" that touching functioning stoves while on causes pain. Accordingly, it is true that touching functioning stoves while on causes pain. If you wish to maintain that it is only probably true, then 100% confidence through deduction or revelation is not a necessary condition for knowledge as you define it. Accordingly, when you say that "œknow" that your Savior lives, all you are communicating, given your diluted definition of knowledge, is that your Savior probably lives, which is to communicate that he might not live! At this juncture you might wish to argue that knowledge ranges from rational inference all the way up to justified true belief, in which case to say you know something is equivocal or uninformative. If "œto know something" does not denote the kind of warrant by which the knowledge is obtained, whether maximal through revelation or deduction, or minimal through induction, then _minimal warrant_ becomes your necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge (since minimal warrant is the common denominator and it is certainly rational to believe things that are deduced or revealed in Scripture). In other words, if you must further define whether knowledge is deductive or inductive, then either it is (a) vacuous to say "œI know X" or (b) it must only communicate minimal warrant until the term is modified. Accordingly, to say that you know your Savior lives is either meaningless or it _communicates_ that he might not live! 



> If we are not dealing deductively then we have no reason to use the term fallacious.



Ah, but the basis of all scientific inference is based on a syllogistic formulation, which happens to be fallacious if the conclusion that is asserted is that which has an absolute truth value. If the truth value is only probable, then you´re left with knowing things that can be false. 



> Remember that I do not claim that all claims of knowledge will end up being true. We just say that futher info showed a knowledge claim to be false or incomplete.



See above



> For to be justified one has to have access to the reason for truth. No one knows what the process of coming to the answer is in the heads of these select few people.



I thought you asked whether person A can know that he-himself added something in his head? Of course I couldn´t know that someone didn´t make a mistake.

Ron


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Ron_
> 
> 
> 
> I can say that I know one that has the greater amount of warrant (X) in this case, but not know the one with lesser warrant (Not-X)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> CT
> 
> Ah, but the proposition you KNOW is alleged to be not a proposition of warrant but that X is *true*: X being that touching "hot" stoves causes pain! You said earlier that you "œknow" that touching functioning stoves while on causes pain. Accordingly, it is true that touching functioning stoves while on causes pain. If you wish to maintain that it is only probably true, then 100% confidence through deduction or revelation is not a necessary condition for knowledge as you define it.
Click to expand...


This is true. It is not a necessary condition.



> Accordingly, when you say that "œknow" that your Savior lives, all you are communicating, given your diluted definition of knowledge, is that your Savior probably lives, which is to communicate that he might not live! At this juncture you might wish to argue that knowledge ranges from rational inference all the way up to justified true belief, in which case to say you know something is equivocal or uninformative.



That is like saying some object is the color red is uniformative or equivocal because there is a great range of the color and I can't tell you exactly where the color red becomes a different color. Now you may want to get more info than just red, and then I can go into more detail what kind of red. Fire engine red etc. If someone asked if my Savior lives then I would say that the knowledge is at the top of the range.



> If "œto know something" does not denote the kind of warrant by which the knowledge is obtained, whether maximal through revelation or deduction, or minimal through induction, then _minimal warrant_ becomes your necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge (since minimal warrant is the common denominator and it is certainly rational to believe things that are deduced or revealed in Scripture). In other words, if you must further define whether knowledge is deductive or inductive, then either it is (a) vacuous to say "œI know X" or (b) it must only communicate minimal warrant until the term is modified. Accordingly, to say that you know your Savior lives is either meaningless or it _communicates_ that he might not live!



If by the term "vacuous" means that it is not as precise as you would prefer, then okay. To say that implies no meaning is to go too far.



> If we are not dealing deductively then we have no reason to use the term fallacious.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ah, but the basis of all scientific inference is based on a syllogistic formulation, which happens to be fallacious if the conclusion that is asserted is that which has an absolute truth value.
Click to expand...


In science, what is done is that various observations are gathered. Then one uses induction to say "If my finite sample of observations hold over all time", then what is the case. If my finite sample does not hold (there are conditions under which I did not sample) then my syllogism says nothing because the premises arent true. There is no fallacy here.




> If the truth value is only probable, then you´re left with knowing things that can be false.



Which I have no problem then taking the prosition that I said I knew and putting it into the category of things that I do not know.



> Remember that I do not claim that all claims of knowledge will end up being true. We just say that futher info showed a knowledge claim to be false or incomplete.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> See above
> 
> 
> 
> 
> For to be justified one has to have access to the reason for truth. No one knows what the process of coming to the answer is in the heads of these select few people.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I thought you asked whether person A can know that he-himself added something in his head? Of course I couldn´t know that someone didn´t make a mistake.
> 
> Ron
Click to expand...


The case in point, the person did not go throw a process of adding. He just "sees" the answer. Something had to happen, but the subject doesnt know what it was. All he has is the answer. The issue is can one know something without knowing or understanding the process that led to the answer?

CT


----------



## Ron

> *Ron Stated:* In other words, if you must further define whether knowledge is deductive or inductive, then either it is (a) vacuous to say "œI know X" or (b) it must only communicate minimal warrant until the term is modified. Accordingly, to say that you know your Savior lives is either meaningless or it _communicates_ that he might not live!
> 
> *CT Replied:* If by the term "vacuous" means that it is not as precise as you would prefer, then okay. To say that implies no meaning is to go too far.



CT,

Fine, then if your definition of knowledge is not vacuous, then when you communicate that you "œknow" your Savior lives, it translates to "œhe might not live," which means that knowledge might not intersect the mind of God! That´s even hard to grasp even allowing for the absurdity of analogical knowledge! 



> *Ron Stated:* Ah, but the basis of all scientific inference is based on a syllogistic formulation, which happens to be fallacious if the conclusion that is asserted is that which has an absolute truth value.
> 
> *CT Replied*In science, what is done is that various observations are gathered. Then one uses induction to say "If my finite sample of observations hold over all time", then what is the case. If my finite sample does not hold (there are conditions under which I did not sample) then my syllogism says nothing because the premises arent true. There is no fallacy here.



You say that "œone uses induction to say"¦" CT, "œone uses induction" by way of deductive reasoning, which asserts the consequent. Whether or not you know this to be the case, it is the case just the same, as I´ve shown. Moreover, you vaguely stated "œif my finite sample does not hold"¦" Well, CT, what if your finite sample does hold?! If your finite sample does hold, it does so in a fallacious deductive formulation _whenever the conclusion asserts a truth value_, *as you did* with your assertion regarding pain and hot stoves! Again, in order to avoid a formal fallacy you must weaken your conclusion to an uncertain conclusion, which leaves you with the semantic relationship of something like, "œI know, but I´m not sure." 



> *Ron Stated:*If the truth value is only probable, then you´re left with knowing things that can be false.
> 
> *CT Replied:*Which I have no problem then taking the prosition that I said I knew and putting it into the category of things that I do not know.



*Well, then I can rest my case. Your position reduces to absurdity since it allows for statements such as "œI know X is true though it may very well be false." * 

I might be done with Mr. Trader, unless he posts something new or interesting for me to interact with. Actually, if I use CT's reasoning, I may say that I "know" that I am done with CT but still reserve the right to respond anyway since I am allowed to know something that might be false! 

If anyone would like an elaboration on these matters, please post or U2 me.

Ron


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> Internalism says that until you find out the reason why something works (however long it takes), then it is mere opinion. This is consistent with the def from the plato site.
> 
> CT



No, no, no.

Internalism says that a proposition (P) is know by a subject (S) if that person can, on reflection, give a reason for P.

Roughly speaking, it says: S knows P if and only if S, upon reflection, can give a reason for P.

It doesn't say that S must give a reason _prior_ to knowing P - only that S _can_ give a reason for P given enough time and effort.

So your "internalist constraint" on _knowledge_ is an unjust constraint on _internalism_. I think you should reconsider, and if you still disagree, then give relevant quotes to support "your" definition of "internalism".


----------



## Don

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> No, no, no.
> 
> Internalism says that a proposition (P) is know by a subject (S) if that person can, on reflection, give a reason for P.
> 
> Roughly speaking, it says: S knows P if and only if S, upon reflection, can give a reason for P.
> 
> It doesn't say that S must give a reason _prior_ to knowing P - only that S _can_ give a reason for P given enough time and effort.
> 
> So your "internalist constraint" on _knowledge_ is an unjust constraint on _internalism_. I think you should reconsider, and if you still disagree, then give relevant quotes to support "your" definition of "internalism".



Anthony, 

You are aware that he (Pappas - the article you linked) is contrasting different forms of internalism, right? 

I don't think that 'given enough time and effort' would do much good since the internalist constraint is still there. A person still has to give reasons for his belief in order to be justified to have knowledge. I'm not sure how postponing justification for an indefinite amount of time helps. To rid yourself of it, it would seem that one would need some form of externalism, but I digress on this point. 

Nevertheless, Cheung's internalism does not seem to be the same as the 'accessibility knowledge internalism' (AKI)spoken of in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article and can be seen from the rhetoric in most of his books. It also appears that AKI would run headlong into the same problem. As relates to your apologetic methodology, you would need to allow the unbeliever this same luxury, that he can have *knowledge* and that he can also, like the Scripturalist, put justification off indefinitely. 


Don


[Edited on 3-13-2006 by Don]


----------



## Don

Hi Robin,



> Reviewing this thread...I noticed that the most important element is being left out: "general" revelation and "special" revelation. The TWO revelations God uses.
> 
> General has to do with God's self disclosure in creation or nature. All men have knowledge of God, the Creator; his power and supremacy; his Laws. This knowledge is either distorted or supressed. Hence, all the world's religions are evidence that man MUST express an awareness of God - though it's idolatrous. All men express ethical traits (some form of the 10 C.) In this sense, all men "know" God and are therefore "without excuse...."
> 
> Special revelation has to do with the Gospel - which is utterly (alien) outside man's knowledge. It must be given by God, directly and must be "preached" so it can reach the ears/mind since it is located only in the Word of God. The Gospel is the "word of Christ" or information about the Jesus of Holy Scripture. It is precisely this information that is toxic to unbelief. However, faith (trust) in this information must be applied/given via the Holy Spirit (who is IN the word.)
> 
> J. G. Machen helpfully decribes faith in 3 parts: knowledge; assent; trust. The first two parts, any man can have. They are information; and agreement with the information. However, the last part (trust in the information) is given by the Holy Spirit upon hearing the Gospel.
> 
> 
> 
> Robin
> 
> [Edited on 3-10-2006 by Robin]



I don't think that Sean or anyone here would disagree with you on the distinction between general and special revelation. However, we were looking into the problem of holding opposing beliefs and attempting to resolve this without landing in contradiction. In other words, how can one be said to believe that a) God doesn't exist (per his own testimony) and 2) God does exist (per revelation). That's where the epistemological vs psychological distinction comes into play. 

Don


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> No, no, no.
> 
> Internalism says that a proposition (P) is know by a subject (S) if that person can, on reflection, give a reason for P.
> 
> Roughly speaking, it says: S knows P if and only if S, upon reflection, can give a reason for P.
> 
> It doesn't say that S must give a reason _prior_ to knowing P - only that S _can_ give a reason for P given enough time and effort.
> 
> So your "internalist constraint" on _knowledge_ is an unjust constraint on _internalism_. I think you should reconsider, and if you still disagree, then give relevant quotes to support "your" definition of "internalism".
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Anthony,
> 
> You are aware that he (Pappas - the article you linked) is contrasting different forms of internalism, right?
> 
> I don't think that 'given enough time and effort' would do much good since the internalist constraint is still there. A person still has to give reasons for his belief in order to be justified to have knowledge. I'm not sure how postponing justification for an indefinite amount of time helps. To rid yourself of it, it would seem that one would need some form of externalism, but I digress on this point.
> 
> Nevertheless, Cheung's internalism does not seem to be the same as the 'accessibility knowledge internalism' (AKI)spoken of in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article and can be seen from the rhetoric in most of his books. It also appears that AKI would run headlong into the same problem. As relates to your apologetic methodology, you would need to allow the unbeliever this same luxury, that he can have *knowledge* and that he can also, like the Scripturalist, put justification off indefinitely.
> 
> 
> Don
> 
> 
> [Edited on 3-13-2006 by Don]
Click to expand...


Yes, it's an interesting article. And what is most interesting, is that it does not says that the internalist does demands S give an account for P in order to know P. The internalist issue has to do with access to an account for P, the other forms of internalism seem to make Chueng and externalist. 

Access internalism says _can_ S access a reason for P, not that he _must_ access the reason for P. S does not have to "give a reason" for P in order to "know" P. But he must have the ability to give a reason. As long as a reason is available for S to know P, then S knows P. 

CT said that the internalist constraint is the P is an opinion until S gives a reason for P. This is not correct. P is known by S, even if S never gives an account for P. 

I have not problem with unbelievers having knowledge. In fact I know he has knowledge. He has knowledge of the existence and character of God. 

There were three forms of internalism given by the article, and none of them seems to be a problem as presented by Chueng's detractors. 


> Internalism in the first instance is a thesis about the basis of either knowledge or justified belief. This first form of internalism holds that a person either does or can have a form of access to the basis for knowledge or justified belief. The key idea is that the person either is or can be aware of this basis. Externalist, by contrast, deny that one always can have this sort of access to the basis for one's knowledge and justified belief.
> A second form of internalism, connected just to justified belief but probably extendable to knowledge as well, concerns not access but rather what the basis for a justified belief really is. Mentalism is the thesis that what ultimately justifies any belief is some mental state of the epistemic agent holding that belief. Externalism on this dimension, then, would be the view that something other than mental states operate as justifiers.
> A third form of internalism concerns the very concept of justification, rather than access to or the nature of justifiers. This third form of internalism is the deontological concept of justification, whose main idea is that the concept of epistemic justification is to be analyzed in terms of fulfilling one's intellectual duties or responsibilities. Externalism with respect to the concept of epistemic justification would be the thesis that this concept is to be analyzed in terms other than special duties or responsibilities.
> [/list=1]





The first seem to be the one that is being called a problem for Cheung. Since it does not say that the person has to first give an account prior to knowing - so the objections stated by many are not the internalist view. Cheung may be an internalist, but that is not a problem - it's is merely a way of describing Chueng's epistemology. 

The second form of internalism seems to make Chueng an externalist - since Chueng makes the Holy Spirit the basis for knowledge in the mind. The Spirit places the knowledge in a persons mind, and it does not have to do with the mental abilities or reasoning of the person.

The third form does not seem to apply to Cheung's epistemology either way.

Aquascum makes the following statement which is out-of-line with internalism: 


> "The idea that someone can happily know p even though he has no idea how he knows p, is rejected by those who put an internalist constraint upon knowledge."



The access knowledge internalism only says that a person must be able to access his basis for P, not that he must be immediately aware of how he knows P. Men know of God, but few have any idea how they know this. Chueng "occasionalism" gives and answer that is ironical externalist. So how does is Chueng an internalist - will Aquascum says it's implicit, since Chueng doesn't say he is.

Chueng seems to argue from an internalist perspective by asking on what basis does a person know something. This implies that a person who can not give a basis does not have a way of showing that something he claims to know, is really knowledge. All this does is undermine typical assaults on Christianity - by saying since may un-believers can not account for the things they believe, they can not use them to defeat Christianity. It's a defeater defeater. And it's not bad at that. The only problem is Chueng should not say that unbelievers don't know things, only that they don't have a reliable justification for knowing things. That's not infalliblism - it's simply an argument against alternatives to non-biblical knowledge that would contradict Christianity because they are unreliable. 

Aquascum has many problems with Chueng, basically because Aquascum's particular epistemology includes induction as a justifier, and empiricism, and other non-Scriptural justifications for knowledge. It's not so much that Chueng is right or wrong, but his epistemology is different than Aquascum. So Aquaboy has never defeated Chueng.

His infallibilsim and internalism descriptions are strawmen. We can tell this because Aquascum never gives a description of Chueng's epistemology that Chueng would agree with. Aqm gives strawmen versions and question begging premises that are well constructed for he's knocking down. At best, he might show some inconsistent statements on Chueng's part - but he has failed to defeat Scripturalism.

[Edited on 3-13-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Don

Anthony, 

Tell you what, since you have 'refuted' Aquascum, why not email this to him so he'll shut up! Just last week, he posted another critique of Cheung's latest post. There's an email address on his page. 


Don


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Anthony,
> 
> Tell you what, since you have 'refuted' Aquascum, why not email this to him so he'll shut up! Just last week, he posted another critique of Cheung's latest post. There's an email address on his page.
> 
> 
> Don



Do you have the link to his latest post? I didn't notice it when I looked at his site, what's it titled?


----------



## Don

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> Do you have the link to his latest post? I didn't notice it when I looked at his site, what's it titled?




It's the next to last link on his homepage. Here it is. I have yet to read it, but noted it so you'd know he's still around and I am sure he would love to read your critique.

His email is aquascumSPAMMENOT at gmail dot com.


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> Do you have the link to his latest post? I didn't notice it when I looked at his site, what's it titled?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It's the next to last link on his homepage. Here it is. I have yet to read it, but noted it so you'd know he's still around and I am sure he would love to read your critique.
> 
> His email is aquascumSPAMMENOT at gmail dot com.
Click to expand...


I'll give you the short refutation. Chueng says God controls all beliefs we have, true or false. Aquascum says this makes it "a fallible process". 

Here is Aquascum's argument in a nutshell: since Chueng rejects "sense-experience" as a justification of knowledge on the grounds it is fallible, then he should reject occasionalism since it is fallible because God's "divine illumination" also makes people believe false propositions. 

Chueng argues that empiricism is uncertain and should not be a justifying process for knowledge - and that is true. The process of empiricism is to take sense-experiences and induction to test for the truth of propositions. "Divine illumination" is not fallible in the same sense because it is not a justifying "process". The comparison should be made to the Scripturalist justifying process for knowledge by deduction from Scripture. Certainly deduction from Scripture is much more reliable then induction from sense-experiences. But both are fallible in that both call for normal reasoning functions that suffer from the noetic effects of sin.

The "divine illumination" process is a different matter altogether. It is an infallibly metaphysical means that God makes us believe truths and falsehoods - not the "justifying" process of epistemology. And it never fails to do what it purports to do - no matter what epistemological process one employs to justify a proposition (empiricism or Scripturalism or rationalism) as knowledge. 

Aquascum has compared apples to oranges in his argument - an epistemological process (empiricism) for justifying knowledge, to a metaphysical process (divine illumination) for believing any proposition is true or false. 

Empiricism is an unreliable process for justifying knowledge. Scripturalism is not infallible, but far more reliable as a process. "Divine illumination" is infallible because it does exactly what it says - and is justified as a proposition from the Scripturalism epistemology.

Aquascum is refuted again! 

:bigsmile: 

[Edited on 3-13-2006 by Civbert]
Don't ya hate it when you notice your typos and spelling mistakes _after_ you're post is quoted! :} What a maroon I am! 

[Edited on 3-13-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Magma2

> Certainly deduction from Scripture is much more reliable then induction from sense-experiences. But both are fallible in that both call for normal reasoning functions that suffer from the noetic effects of sin.



Good point! As Clark used to say, people make mistakes in balancing their checkbooks too. 



> The "divine illumination" process a different matter altogether. It is a infallibly metaphysical means that God makes us believe truths and falsehoods - not the justifying process of epistemology. And it never fails to do what it reports to do - no matter what epistemological process one emplys to justify a proposition (empiricism or Scripturalism or rationalism) as knowledge.
> 
> Aquascum has compared apples to oranges in his argument - an epistemological processes (empiricism) for justifying knowledge, to a metaphysical process (divine illumination) for believing any proposition is true or false.



Excellent point # 2!



> Epiricism is an unreliable process for justifying knowledge. Scripturalism is not infallible, but far more reliable as a process. "Devine illumination" is infallible because it does exactly what it says - and is justified as a proposition from the Scripturalism epistemology.
> 
> Aquascum is refuted again!





[Edited on 3-14-2006 by Magma2]


----------



## Don

Since you have corrected your spelling now, are you ready to send this to Aquaboy? I probably wouldn't if I were you as there are so many problems with it, but I'm tired of rehashing stuff over and over. 

I think it's time to 'man' up, send it to Aquaboy, and show this PHD how he's wrong!



Don


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Since you have corrected your spelling now, are you ready to send this to Aquaboy? I probably wouldn't if I were you as there are so many problems with it, but I'm tired of rehashing stuff over and over.
> 
> I think it's time to 'man' up, send it to Aquaboy, and show this PHD how he's wrong!
> 
> 
> 
> Don



Signed and delivered. I also copied Vincent Cheung to be fair. Maybe I'll get something interesting back. Who knows?


----------



## Civbert

I got lengthy replies from Vincent Chueng and Aqu Scum. Both gave made some good points, clarified some things for me, and were quite gracious. I'll post them according to their wishes.

... including their corrections - I certainly can't throw stones on that account. 

[Edited on 3-17-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Civbert

My thanks to Aqua Scums for his following response to my e-mail. He wrote:



> _ originally by Aqua Scum in an e-mailed to Anthony Coletti dated 3/16/2006. Re: Coletti's response to Aquascum's "On Cheungian Occasionalism_
> 
> Hi Anthony,
> 
> Thanks for your feedback on the following link:
> 
> <http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/occasionalism.htm>
> 
> ...which was recently added over at:
> 
> <http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/>
> 
> Here are my thoughts:
> 
> > "Divine illumination" is not fallible in the same sense
> > because it is not a justifying "process".
> 
> I'm not sure why you import the notion of a *justifying* process into
> my discussion. If you want to do this, you're going to have to make
> clear whether we're talking about internalist justification,
> externalist justification, or some combination of the two (such as
> that delineated by Alston in "An Internalist Externalism").
> 
> Here I would simply encourage you to read section 4 of my "A Response
> to Vincent Cheung," where I lay out Cheung's own position on divine
> illumination and occasionalism, using citations from his own works. In
> the citation which begins section 4.1 ("What does Cheung mean by
> 'occasionalism'?"), Cheung explicitly contrasts empirical
> investigations with the divine illumination of the logos, which occurs
> on the occasion of our empirical observations. So if you think (as you
> say below) that comparing empiricism with occasionalism is "comparing
> apples to oranges," then it appears your problem is with Cheung, not
> with me. On pp. 16-17 of "Ultimate Questions," Cheung sketches out two
> contrasting ways of obtaining knowledge -- empirical investigations
> and occasionalism -- and says that it is only by the latter that we
> can gain any knowledge.
> 
> > The comparison should be made to the Scripturalist justifying
> > process for knowledge by deduction from Scripture. Certainly
> > deduction from Scripture is much more reliable then induction
> > from sense-experiences. But both are fallible in that both call
> > for normal reasoning functions that suffer from the noetic
> > effects of sin.
> 
> Err, what? Here you say that "deduction from Scripture" is "fallible,"
> even as "induction from sense-experiences" is "fallible". Once again,
> your problem appears to be with Cheung, not with me. Why, exactly, is
> the fallibility of sense-experience a problem then, if deduction from
> Scripture is likewise fallible?
> 
> > The "divine illumination" process is a different
> > matter altogether. It is an infallibly metaphysical means
> > that God makes us believe truths and falsehoods - not the
> > "justifying" process of epistemology. And it never fails to
> > do what it purports to do - no matter what epistemological
> > process one employs to justify a proposition (empiricism or
> > Scripturalism or rationalism) as knowledge.
> 
> The problem here is a simple equivocation on the notion of
> "infallible". No doubt if an omnipotent God seeks to cause in us
> belief X, then he cannot fail of his purpose. Such a belief *will* be
> produced. In that sense, the process is infallible (though the better
> terminology here is to say that the process is deterministic rather
> than probabilistic). But, of course, the fact that God cannot fail to
> attain his goal of producing in us a particular belief on any occasion
> he chooses, does not give us any reason at all to think that the
> belief will be either true or false. On many, many occasions, God
> produces false beliefs in human beings, rather than true beliefs.
> Thus, the process of occasionalist divine illumination is fallible
> *from the epistemic point of view*.
> 
> In this latter sense, then, the parallel with sense-experience is
> exact, and relevant. When epistemologists comment upon the fallibility
> of sense-experience, they wouldn't be moved by the suggestion that, if
> all the physical causes of a belief are in place on a particular
> occasion, then the belief *will* be produced, and thus the process of
> sense-experience is 'infallible'. For this leaves entirely out of the
> analysis what is important from an epistemic point of view: whether or
> not the process produces only true beliefs. Clearly it doesn't, and so
> the process is fallible. Ditto for occasionalist divine illumination.
> 
> My comparison between sense-experience and occasionalist divine
> illumination, as to their fallibility, was intended to be from the
> epistemic point of view, and no other. Presumably, this is also the
> comparison intended by Cheung in the passages I cite. Here are two
> examples.
> 
> First, Cheung does not take occasionalist divine illumination to be a
> merely 'metaphysical' process, such that it carries no epistemological
> weight. On the contrary, in section 4.2 of my Response I cite Cheung's
> claim that occasionalist divine illumination is an *epistemological*
> thesis:
> 
> <<<
> "Christian epistemology affirms that all knowledge must be immediately
> "“ that is, without mediation "“ granted and conveyed to the human mind
> by God. Thus on the occasion that you look at the words of the Bible,
> God directly communicates what is written to your mind, *without*
> going through the senses themselves. That is, your sensations provide
> the occasions upon which God directly conveys information to your mind
> *apart from* the sensations themselves. Therefore, although we do read
> the Bible, knowledge never comes from sensation" ("Ultimate
> Questions," p. 38).
> >>>
> 
> Cheung says that the above view is "consistent with Christian
> metaphysics," but clearly he takes it to be an affirmation of
> "Christian epistemology". It is Christian *epistemology* which
> "affirms that all knowledge must be immediately "“ that is, without
> mediation "“ granted and conveyed to the human mind by God." It is
> Christian *epistemology* which affirms that "on the occasion that you
> look at the words of the Bible, God directly communicates what is
> written to your mind, *without* going through the senses themselves.
> That is, your sensations provide the occasions upon which God directly
> conveys information to your mind *apart from* the sensations
> themselves."
> 
> Second, take Cheung's treatment of the matter in
> <http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/04/29/occasionalism-and-empiricism/>,
> which I cite in section 4.3 of my Response. There he says:
> 
> <<<
> And if I know that 'Vincent is a man,' I certainly do not know this on
> an empirical basis (what precisely do I sense to know that 'Vincent is
> a man'?) or by common sense, but by illumination from the Logos, in
> accordance with my explanation on occasionalism.
> >>>
> 
> Clearly, Cheung is contrasting two *epistemological* processes. There
> are two candidates for how Cheung *knows* that "Vincent is a man": he
> either "knows this on an empirical basis," or he knows it "by
> illumination from the Logos, in accordance with my explanation on
> occasionalism."
> 
> In addition, in the citation above you misapply the distinction
> between "metaphysical means" and "epistemological process". No doubt
> there is a distinction here, but it does you no good in this context.
> Both sense-experience and occasionalist divine illumination can be
> characterized as "metaphysical means". Advocates of sense-experience
> say that there is a genuinely metaphysical process, a *causal*
> process, that obtains in virtue of sensory stimuli causing effects in
> us, namely, beliefs. That is why discussions of causation loom large
> in treatises on metaphysics; it is in general a metaphysical matter as
> to what causes what. Similarly, as you rightly bring out,
> occasionalist divine illumination is a metaphysical means. Divine
> illumination is a *causal* process that obtains in virtue of God
> directly causing beliefs in us on the occasion of empirical
> observation.
> 
> By the same token, both sense-experience and occasionalist divine
> illumination can be characterized as an "epistemological process".
> Once you bring in the question of the *truth* of the beliefs produced,
> and bring in the question of the reliability of the process in
> bringing about true beliefs, you are comparing the processes from the
> epistemic point of view, where increasing our stock of true beliefs is
> the chief (although not only) epistemological desideratum. Notice that
> we can do this because in each case one of the causal relata is
> *beliefs*, which are things that can be either true or false. (By way
> of contrast, it's difficult to analyze the causal process of
> photosynthesis from an epistemic point of view, because there's
> nothing produced by the process that can conceivably be characterized
> as true or false.)
> 
> So no, the divine illumination process *isn't* "a different matter
> altogether." No matter how you slice it, the comparison is apt. You
> are either comparing metaphysical to metaphysical, or epistemological
> to epistemological, in noting aspects of these two processes. I took
> the intended comparison as epistemological because that's how *Cheung*
> takes it, in the material cited in section 4 of my Response.
> 
> > Aquascum has compared apples to oranges in his argument -
> > an epistemological process (empiricism) for justifying
> > knowledge, to a metaphysical process (divine illumination)
> > for believing any proposition is true or false.
> 
> Hopefully you are now in a position to see why this charge won't fly.
> They are both 'metaphysical' processes, being causal processes, and
> they can both be evaluated from an epistemic point of view, being
> causal processes which issue in beliefs. And when done so, it is
> easily seen that they are both fallible. Thus, it seems clear to me
> that my original critique stands.
> 
> > Empiricism is an unreliable process for justifying
> > knowledge. Scripturalism is not infallible, but far
> > more reliable as a process.
> 
> Do you really think this will satisfy Cheung's standards for
> knowledge?! Scripturalism is "more reliable" than sense-experience,
> rather than being infallible? Surely Cheung will reject this
> abandonment of the infallibilist constraint on knowledge, as evidenced
> by my citations of him in section 3.1 of my Response.
> 
> > "Divine illumination" is infallible because it does
> > exactly what it says - and is justified as a proposition
> > from the Scripturalism epistemology.
> 
> One might as well say that "sense experience" is infallible because it
> does exactly what *it* says. After all, any time sensory stimuli are
> in a position to cause our beliefs, they do so, or so says the
> advocate of sense-experience. Cheung of course demurs, and says that
> this causal process doesn't obtain. But in its place he puts in
> another causal process: empirical "observation stimulates the mind to
> intuit what the logos immediately conveys to it on the occasion of the
> observation, often about what the person is observing" ("Ultimate
> Questions," p. 17).
> 
> But once we examine either causal process from an epistemic point of
> view -- as to whether it produces *true* beliefs -- it is easily seen
> that they are equally fallible.
> 
> You can publish this reply in any public forum you'd like, as long as
> you do so in its entirety.
> 
> -- Aquascum



[Edited on 3-17-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Civbert

A follow up form Aqua Scum came the later that day.



> _originally by Aqua Scum in an e-mailed to Anthony Coletti dated 3/16/2006 11:03 PM. Re: Coletti's response to Aquascum's "On Cheungian Occasionalism_
> 
> 
> Hi Anthony,
> 
> Just a quick follow-up. From what I can by perusing the main
> 'Aquascum' threads over at the Puritanboard, your main response to my
> critiques is that I fail to recognize that Scripturalism is an
> axiomatic system. On your view, I should have recognized that one must
> simply assume the axioms, and that we can never know them. The
> following comment of yours is, I think, emblematic of this kind of
> response:
> 
> > Does Scripturalism say that we can justify the truth of "the
> > Scripture is true"? Nope. We can believe it. We can not "know" it.
> 
> I'm not sure if this is the case, but you might have missed the
> following document over at the Aquascum page:
> 
> "Second Reply: Some Comments" (07 July 05)
> <http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/secondreply.htm>
> 
> I think the entire document is relevant to your concerns, but of
> particular interest is the section entitled "On 'begging the
> question'". There, I argue that "the Scripturalist is in the fairly
> ludicrous position of having to hold that no one can know that
> Scripturalism is true. Indeed, no one knows the truth of
> Scripturalism. Indeed, it follows that *Scripturalism is unjustified
> opinion*."
> 
> This seems to be in accordance with your opinion above. This goes
> back, of course, to the alethic Scripturalism / epistemic
> Scripturalism distinction which Sudduth draws, as well as the vanilla
> Scripturalism / Rocky Road Scripturalism distinction which he draws.
> Cheung's view is Rocky Road epistemic Scripturalism, and I do think
> it's subject to my critique.
> 
> You might argue, however, that although Scripturalism isn't knowable,
> nevertheless it is *justified* opinion, rather than being unjustified
> opinion. That's fine. But in my view, that's simply an abandonment of
> Scripturalism (at least as Cheung conceives it), since now you've got
> to come up with an account of positive epistemic status in which there
> can be a "justification" which falls short of knowledge. In other
> words, you'd have to actually do epistemology, which I think is in
> short supply in Cheungian circles. If my critiques lead Scripturalists
> to abandon Scripturalism and actually do some epistemology, that would
> be a good thing in my view.
> 
> Again, feel free to post this on the Puritanboard, as long as you do
> so in its entirety.
> 
> -- Aquascum



P.S. I can't even copy/paste without need to correct my errors.

[Edited on 3-17-2006 by Civbert]


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## Civbert

> _originally by Aqua Scum in an e-mailed to Anthony Coletti dated 3/16/2006 11:16 PM. Re: Coletti's response to Aquascum's "On Cheungian Occasionalism_
> 
> On 3/16/06, Aqua Scum <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > This seems to be in accordance with your opinion above. This goes
> > back, of course, to the alethic Scripturalism / epistemic
> > Scripturalism distinction which Sudduth draws, as well as the vanilla
> > Scripturalism / Rocky Road Scripturalism distinction which he draws.
> > Cheung's view is Rocky Road epistemic Scripturalism, and I do think
> > it's subject to my critique.
> 
> Oops. To be clear, my view is that Rocky Road epistemic Scripturalism
> *is* self-referentially incoherent, whereas vanilla Scripturalism
> reduces to unjustified opinion, unless one wants to supplement it with
> some actual epistemology about "justification".
> 
> -- Aquascum






> _originally by Aqua Scum in an e-mailed to Anthony Coletti dated 3/17/2006 10:24 AM. Re: Coletti's response to Aquascum's "On Cheungian Occasionalism_
> 
> Argh! You know, I really should proofread every line before sending. A
> slight revision to the below.
> 
> On 3/16/06, Aqua Scum <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > Oops. To be clear, my view is that Rocky Road epistemic Scripturalism
> > *is* self-referentially incoherent, whereas vanilla Scripturalism
> > reduces to unjustified opinion, unless one wants to supplement it with
> > some actual epistemology about "justification".
> 
> By "vanilla Scripturalism" I meant, of course, vanilla *epistemic*
> Scripturalism.
> 
> These distinctions are taken from:
> <http://www.puritanboard.com/forum/viewthread.php?tid=16689&page=1#pid232007>
> 
> This should be my last email on this particular topic
> 
> -- Aquascum


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## Civbert

I'll get to add Chueng's response to my e-mail latter today or early next week. His will require even more work since it includes more formating to separate quotes from snippets from other conversations.

I'm impressed by the detail and effort that both of them took in replying to me. I didn't expect so much and I'm grateful to them both. As far as my comments to what they wrote.... eventually I'll get a chance to digest it all, but so far I've only skimmed then.

Thanks for the suggest Don - it was very fruitful advice - even if it was almost a dare.  And it shows that it's okay to play with the big-boys, they don't bite as much as you little guys!


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## Don

Civbert,

Well, since you were critiquing Aquascum and not anyone here, I thought it'd be appropriate to send him your critique. 



> Thanks for the suggest Don - it was very fruitful advice - even if it was almost a dare. And it shows that it's okay to play with the big-boys, they don't bite as much as you little guys!



So is this a bite at the little guys?! 


Don


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Civbert,
> 
> Well, since you were critiquing Aquascum and not anyone here, I thought it'd be appropriate to send him your critique.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Thanks for the suggest Don - it was very fruitful advice - even if it was almost a dare. And it shows that it's okay to play with the big-boys, they don't bite as much as you little guys!
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So is this a bite at the little guys?!
> 
> 
> Don
Click to expand...


Arf!


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