# Legitimate use of Classical and Evidential apologetics within Van Tillian presuppositionalism?



## Me Died Blue

I've been thinking about apologetics as of late, and have typically viewed Classical and Evidential apologetics as unbiblical and erroneous, due to their divorced nature from one's theology, versus presuppositionalism's consistency with the rest of Reformed systematic theology, including man's depravity, the Creator-creature distinction, special knowledge of God and regeneration, universal knowledge of God as set forth in Romans 1, the fear of the Lord as the _beginning_ (not the end result) of wisdom and knowledge (Proverbs 1:7), all hidden in Christ (Colossians 2:3), and other issues.

And I am still an ardent presuppositionalist, and believe the Classical and Evidential _approaches as a whole_ as employed by men like Aquinas and Lee Strobel are unbiblical. But what do other presuppositionalists - who are committed to standing against neutrality, and not standing on the foolishness of unbelief on the so-called "neutral" level of the unbeliever - think of the possibility of legitimate use of certain Classical and Evidential arguments as particular parts to Proverbs 26:5, answering a fool according to his folly, by taking his perspective for the sake of argument?

In other words, after making our ultimate commitment to Christ as the beginning and source of all true knowledge, and stating that we will not surrender that in our apologetical discussion with the unbeliever, and presenting the Christian worldview and how it explains life around and within us, once we also begin to answer a fool according to his folly, could we not in that part say something to the effect of, "OK, and for the sake of argument, taking your assumptions that reason and science can be neutral or objective with regard to the question of the Christian worldview, here's how even that perspective of yours (employing "neutral" philosophy in the Classical arguments, and "neutral" science in the Evidential arguments) only points toward the reasonableness of Christianity, rather than the doubtfulness."

Of course we also still have to answer the fool according to his folly by showing him that his view logically leads to utter absurdity and chaos in _all_ spheres of reason, experience and life (e.g. showing the impossibility of laws of logic and uniformity of nature without the Christian worldview), but could not these arguments also serve as additional points in the "reason" and "experience" categories in that regard? Some presuppositionalists may say that doing so would render the most basic demonstrations of Christianity's necessity as "insufficient," but that is hardly the case any more than the fact that we use arguments about logic _and_ science being impossible with autonomy, for as Dr. Bahnsen well noted in his "Challenge to Unbelief" lectures, we are in effect _done_ once we have shown even one of those as being impossible - yet showing several of them as such on many levels is part of answering a fool according to his folly, as he always raises many objections of many types.


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## Saiph

Frame talks about the legitimate uses in "Apologetics To The GLory Of God".



What a pity if philosophers, who are expected to be the chief seekers and lovers of the truth and to see as much of it as can be seen by man, should decide after all that truth cannot be discovered. How they should then grieve that their studies have been all in vain.

-St. Thomas Aquinas


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## RamistThomist

I have my thoughts, but I am about to go to class.

I will use evidence, provided the following conditions are agreed on by both sides:

1) I get to determine what counts as valid evidence.
2) My worldview, not yours, determines what counts as valid standards for evaluating evidence.


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## Saiph

Is not presuppositionalism really a christian response to Kant ?


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Is not presuppositionalism really a christian response to Kant ?



Only to the degree when it reflects upon Kant's claims. We abhor the autonomy which Kant claimed, but find his transcendental method to be very useful.


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## Arch2k

Chris,

I hope that I am not overstepping my bounds in this thread, being that I am more Clarkian than VanTillian. But that being said, i agree with VanTil on many things, and it is ever interesting to me how the reasoning between the two is the same...to a point.

I cannot pretend to tell you what VT would say on the subject, but what I can tell you is what I believe (although I am interested to hear more presupps on this thread).

To answer a fool according to his folly does not mean that we can give _positive_ proof for the existence of God. When you ask the question if we can use evidential arguments to "point to the reasonableness of Christianity rather than doubtfulness" frankly, I think that this is precisely what VT/GHC are trying to prevent. Even if one tries to approach this tactic from a Christian worldview, in essence, they have to deny God in order to use it. To try to prove the existence of God, is to deny him first. 

Secondly, even ignoring the fact that all "proofs" are fallacious, one could theoretically only "point to the reasonableness of Christianity" by probablity, not absolutely (inductive vs. deductive reasoning). Remember, we are not trying to reason people's way into the kingdom, but we are "casting down arguments and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5).

It is also interesting to note that the examples of apologetic encounters are ones that either argue to absurdity, or ones that use scripture. If one can find an example cases other than these, I would be interested to know them.

Lastly, it is also interesting to note that the only offensive weapon given us by God is the most important, the Word of God. If we believe that everything necessary for faith and life (including apologetics) is either expressly set down in scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from it, then it only makes sense that God would give us everything necessary to combat antichristian worldviews.

Eph 6:11 Put on the whole armor of God, that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. 
Eph 6:12 For we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this age, against spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places. 
Eph 6:13 Therefore take up the whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand. 
Eph 6:14 Stand therefore, having girded your waist with truth, having put on the breastplate of righteousness, 
Eph 6:15 and having shod your feet with the preparation of the gospel of peace; 
Eph 6:16 above all, taking the shield of faith with which you will be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked one. 
Eph 6:17 And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God; 

My long


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> Chris,
> 
> I hope that I am not overstepping my bounds in this thread, being that I am more Clarkian than VanTillian. But that being said, i agree with VanTil on many things, and it is ever interesting to me how the reasoning between the two is the same...to a point.
> 
> I cannot pretend to tell you what VT would say on the subject, but what I can tell you is what I believe (although I am interested to hear more presupps on this thread).
> 
> To answer a fool according to his folly does not mean that we can give _positive_ proof for the existence of God. When you ask the question if we can use evidential arguments to "point to the reasonableness of Christianity rather than doubtfulness" frankly, I think that this is precisely what VT/GHC are trying to prevent. Even if one tries to approach this tactic from a Christian worldview, in essence, they have to deny God in order to use it. To try to prove the existence of God, is to deny him first.
> 
> Secondly, even ignoring the fact that all "proofs" are fallacious, one could theoretically only "point to the reasonableness of Christianity" by probablity, not absolutely (inductive vs. deductive reasoning). Remember, we are not trying to reason people's way into the kingdom, but we are "casting down arguments and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5).
> 
> It is also interesting to note that the examples of apologetic encounters are ones that either argue to absurdity, or ones that use scripture. If one can find an example cases other than these, I would be interested to know them.
> 
> Lastly, it is also interesting to note that the only offensive weapon given us by God is the most important, the Word of God. If we believe that everything necessary for faith and life (including apologetics) is either expressly set down in scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from it, then it only makes sense that God would give us everything necessary to combat antichristian worldviews.
> 
> Eph 6:11 Put on the whole armor of God, that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil.
> Eph 6:12 For we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this age, against spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places.
> Eph 6:13 Therefore take up the whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand.
> Eph 6:14 Stand therefore, having girded your waist with truth, having put on the breastplate of righteousness,
> Eph 6:15 and having shod your feet with the preparation of the gospel of peace;
> Eph 6:16 above all, taking the shield of faith with which you will be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked one.
> Eph 6:17 And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God;
> 
> My long



Evenutally I will want to spar with you on giving a positive "proof" for God, but this was a good summary on the insufficiency of evidentiary approaches. To borrow a phrase from Bahnsen, we can't just say we will use "evidence" (whatever that is) for or against the faith, we must ask what *kinds* of evidence are to be allowed. 

Also, the nature of proof itself is problematic. If there is "some" evidence for God's existence, then there must be "some" evidence *against* God's existence.


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## Saiph

> Also, the nature of proof itself is problematic. If there is "some" evidence for God's existence, then there must be "some" evidence *against* God's existence.



??

What evidence against God's existence would there be ?

The minute you offer anything seemingly rationally viable, you admit to being a fool.

Psa 14:1 The fool says in his heart, "There is no God."


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## Saiph

Rom 1:19 * For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. *
Rom 1:20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been *clearly perceived*, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. 
Rom 1:21 For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became* futile in their thinking,* and their foolish hearts were darkened. 
Rom 1:22 *Claiming to be wise, they became fools, *

[Edited on 1-17-2006 by Saiph]


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> 
> 
> 
> Also, the nature of proof itself is problematic. If there is "some" evidence for God's existence, then there must be "some" evidence *against* God's existence.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ??
> 
> What evidence against God's existence would there be ?
> 
> The minute you offer anything seemingly rationally viable, you admit to being a fool.
> 
> Psa 14:1 The fool says in his heart, "There is no God."
Click to expand...


That's only a problem if one engages in inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning can only render _probable_ conclusions. Thus, if it renders some evidence for God, to be logically consistent, one must admit that given the standards of reasoning employed, there must be some, albeit small, evidence against God's existence.

Of course, I repudiate any such reasoning in apologetics. Rather, I would assume a transcendental approach and render inescapable evidence for God's existence.


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## Saiph




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## PuritanCovenanter

Sounds like a famaliar struggle I have been having. 

Paul, Chris, and Jacob did help me out significantly.

They don't deny evidence but put it in it's place.

Why not Both?

[Edited on 1-17-2006 by puritancovenanter]


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by puritancovenanter_
> Sounds like a famaliar struggle I have been having.
> 
> Paul, Chris, and Jacob did help me out significantly.
> 
> They don't deny evidence but put it in it's place.
> 
> Why not Both?
> 
> [Edited on 1-17-2006 by puritancovenanter]



Right. I will try to kill two birds with one stone. There is no such thing as an "uninterpreted fact." Everything has a context (I can go deeper later). This means we must engage in "worldview" thinking. 

Why is it that almost all evangelicals get excited about the arguments for the resurrection right at first? They sound pretty good. According to us, what's not to deny? The problem is they work because they are already true. We have the proper worldview in which they make sense. We already have the proper context.

Secondly, a corpse resuccitating doesn't prove Christianity. An atheist can accept the fact that Christ rose from the dead and not be a Christian. In a chance universe, strange things happen. The Christian must challenge not only his *facts* but his *philosophy* of facts.


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## WrittenFromUtopia

An empiricist would never find presuppositionalism to be worth a hill of beans, just as they would not find the Ontological arguments of Anselm to be "arguments" per se. However, a rationalist would be forced to concede many points of presuppositionalism (just as they would with Anselm) if the argument was logically sound.


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia_
> An empiricist would never find presuppositionalism to be worth a hill of beans, just as they would not find the Ontological arguments of Anselm to be "arguments" per se. However, a rationalist would be forced to concede many points of presuppositionalism (just as they would with Anselm) if the argument was logically sound.



empiricism is a naive philosophy. JW Montgomery has long tried to silence presupps. Still forthcoming...


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## Arch2k

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> Why is it that almost all evangelicals get excited about the arguments for the resurrection right at first? They sound pretty good. According to us, what's not to deny? The problem is they work because they are already true. We have the proper worldview in which they make sense. We already have the proper context.



Not only that (which I agree with your line of reasoning here), but the arguments themselves are fallacious. Just because one agrees (and wants to defend) the conclusion of an argument, doesn´t mean he should accept the method of argumentation.



> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> Secondly, a corpse resuccitating doesn't prove Christianity. An atheist can accept the fact that Christ rose from the dead and not be a Christian. In a chance universe, strange things happen. The Christian must challenge not only his *facts* but his *philosophy* of facts.



This is true. In fact, the resurrection doesn´t *prove* anything. There were many people resurrected in the gospel accounts, not to mention we ALL will eventually be resurrected on that great day. 

_C.H. Spurgeon_


> The bible is like a Lion. It needs no defense. Let it out of it´s cage, and it will defend itself.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia_
> An empiricist would never find presuppositionalism to be worth a hill of beans, just as they would not find the Ontological arguments of Anselm to be "arguments" per se. However, a rationalist would be forced to concede many points of presuppositionalism (just as they would with Anselm) if the argument was logically sound.



Unless you can convince the empiricist that he is a presuppositionalist in a sense - that is, he can not prove his empiricism presupposition - that knowledge comes from sensation.


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## Saiph

Classical arguments are fine for most people not sufficiently educated in philosophy. No one is converted by any apologetic other than the Spirit and the word.

So, What is evidence according to the Bible ? Is the TA evidence ?
Must a rational person have evidence or reasons for all his beliefs ? Or does their worldview rather need to provide a foundation for their beliefs being viable ? Is a person justified in believing a proposition only if it can be inferred inductively or deductively from the assumed incorrigible sensory data ? And what about propositions considered to be common sense and accepted by everyone.

I believe Jacob owns at least one firearm. Other people on this discussion board do as well. Because we have seen pictures of him holding one. Do we need to prove that by visiting his house and seeing the said weapon and resgistration form in his name ? Maybe he did not register it, and paid cash for it. Is his word enough ? These are difficult epistemological dilemmas. However, scripture is clear, that all men know God. So if classical arguments work on those who supress that knowledge to point out how inconsistently they are living as atheists, then use them. If they do not, bring out the TA.


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Classical arguments are fine for most people not sufficiently educated in philosophy. No one is converted by any apologetic other than the Spirit and the word.
> 
> So, What is evidence according to the Bible ? Is the TA evidence ?
> Must a rational person have evidence or reasons for all his beliefs ? Or does their worldview rather need to provide a foundation for their beliefs being viable ? Is a person justified in believing a proposition only if it can be inferred inductively or deductively from the assumed incorrigible sensory data ? And what about propositions considered to be common sense and accepted by everyone.
> 
> I believe Jacob owns at least one firearm. Other people on this discussion board do as well. Because we have seen pictures of him holding one. Do we need to prove that by visiting his house and seeing the said weapon and resgistration form in his name ? Maybe he did not register it, and paid cash for it. Is his word enough ? .



I don't have to answer these do I? I plead the fifth.


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## Saiph

That answers it for us Jacob. :bigsmile: 


Evidence that will not hold up in court however.


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## Civbert

Is the TA a valid proof?


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## Saiph

Yes.

So is their own conscience condemning them.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Yes.
> 
> So is their own conscience condemning them.



If TA is a valid proof, then wouldn't we have the power to believe the Gospel by our own reason?


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## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> That answers it for us Jacob. :bigsmile:
> 
> 
> Evidence that will not hold up in court however.



And speaking of court, this sure explains a lot for me.


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## Saiph

> If TA is a valid proof, then wouldn't we have the power to believe the Gospel by our own reason?



Proof of His existence and attributes, not His plan for salvation. The faith that leads to repentance is a gift.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> 
> 
> 
> If TA is a valid proof, then wouldn't we have the power to believe the Gospel by our own reason?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Proof of His existence and attributes, not His plan for salvation. The faith that leads to repentance is a gift.
Click to expand...


Could you point me to a good article that presents and defends TA? I've heard it presented before, but I've always found it to be circular. Not only did it fail to prove the God of Scripture, but it did not prove any kind of supreme being. But maybe it was poorly given.


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## Saiph

Well Kant came up with it. And Jacob may know a good Bahnsen or Van Til link.

Here is a site with Frame's articles: http://www.frame-poythress.org/

[Edited on 1-17-2006 by Saiph]


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Well Kant came up with it. And Jacob may know a good Bahnsen or Van Til link.
> 
> Here is a site with Frame's articles: http://www.frame-poythress.org/
> 
> [Edited on 1-17-2006 by Saiph]



hmmmm...Here are some old Paul Manata quotes on it.

The finest summary of the transcendental argument is by Michael Bultler in The Standard Bearer: A Festrchrift to Greg Bahnsen. Here is the summary of it



> In the nature of the case, no two transcendentals can be equally valid. Even non-Christian philosophers grant this point.
> For example, it cannot be logically true that the Christian worldview and X worldview both provide the preconditions of intelligibility. Before we even point out and say, "Of course, law of non-contradiction," I want to press the question, "Why is it the law of non-contradiction is even valid?" For that to be the case, what must first happen? See where I am going?
> Let me sum up the objections for the moment, for you raise a good point. Page numbers are referenced to Butler's essay in The Standard Bearer.
> Objection 1: The Nature of Tag: It basically reduces to some traditional form of argumentation. This is Frame's objection. However, TAG's seek what the precondition of intelligibility is. Traditional argumentation does not. The cosmological argument seeks to show God as the first Cause. It assumes causality outright. It does not ask the crucial questions (77-79)
> Objection 2: The Uniqueness Proof for the Conclusion of TAG: Does the conclusion that God exists necessarily follow from the argument (Montgomery)? If the unbeliever says that Christianity can account for human experience, true, but possibly an another worldview will as well, so what? This does him little good. People live and die in terms of REAL worldviews, not hypothetical ones. If someone makes this claim, ask him to show the worldview in specific terms. If he does not, ballgame. If he does, proceed to demolish the worldview (9 times out of 10 he cannot). Let's move on with this objection: The TAG says that the non-Christian worldview cannot give an account of human experiences, NOT that an infinite number of possible worldviews cannot do this. See it as A (Christianity) or ~A. I can develop this point in another email, gladly, if you would like. There are a few other things I would like to mention, though.
> Objection 3: The Mere Sufficiency of the Christian Worldview: Does demonstrating the sufficiency of the Christian worldview neccesitate the Christian worldview? In doing this we need to see the difference between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions. More on this later.
> There are more objections, quite arcane in nature, that Butler deals with.



-------------------------------------------------------

here are some old email correspondences I've done on it;



> "That A or ~A = A or B." This is not true, at least as the Presupps (should) define their terms.
> A = Christian Theism
> B = a non-Christian worldview
> ~A = all non-Christian worldviews.
> 
> See the difference? If I refute B, so what? All I do is show that Islam, for example, is wrong. If I refute, ~A, then I show--theoretically--that all non-Christian religions are wrong.
> 
> But can I make the claim for ~A being false? If I am going to do this--and this is where a knowledge of the history of philosophy (which I don't have) becomes valuable--I must show that non-Christian worldviews (~A) is internally schizophrenic. I sent out an email where Van Til showed that non-Christian religions suffer greatly from internal critiques.



By definition, and ULTIMATE authority is just that, ultimate. If you ahve two transcendentals then you have an irresolvable dualism, and no unity/coherence in your worldview. There can only be one unifying transcendental. 

---------------------------------------

this is what manata wrote a long time ago



> TA's are broad in scope covering *every* aspect of uman experience. Also the *pre-condition* is *always* an a priori. The scientific evidence was a posteriori. The transcendental aregument deals with what must be necessarily presupposed in order to make sense of *anything* whatsoever. Put differently: The proof of Christian theism is that without it you couldn't prove anything.
> 
> 
> The form of a TA generally takes this stucture
> 
> X-;Y (because Y is the precondition for X)
> X
> :.Y
> 
> A transcendental argument is simply a form of deduction, with the typical pattern: Only if p then q; q is true; therefore, p is true. As this form of argument appears in philosophy, the interest, and the difficulty, reside not in the movement from premises to conclusions, which is routine, but in the setting up of the major premises-that is, in the kinds of things that are taken as starting points. For example, Immanuel Kant tried to prove the principle of causality by showing that it is a necessary condition of the possibility of making empirically verifiable statements in natural science. (philosophical encyclopedia)
> 
> 
> Michael Butler wries: TA's generally take this form X-->Y (because Y is a precondition for X). X. Thereofre, Y. (That is in his chapter on TA's in "The standard bearer. He writes it out, I just shortend it.


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## RamistThomist

Greg Bahnsen wrote,



> The
> Christian, perhaps thinking that his argument with the non-Christian
> is simply over a fact such as Christ's resurrection from the dead, may
> set out to prove from history that this event occurred, but he soon realizes
> (if he is at all thoughtful) that the two of them also disagree over
> the proper character of historical research, reasoning, and evaluation.



Bahnsen, Cornelius Van Til: Readings and Analysis, 101.


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## Civbert

> X-;Y (because Y is the precondition for X)
> X
> :.Y



This is Modus Ponens:

X -> Y
X
:. Y

But unless "X -> Y" is an immediate inference such as A(xy) -> I(xy), then it needs to be proven. And if it is asserted, the argument begs the question.

I have not seen the argument that can prove that _only_ Christianity provides the preconditions for rationality: first, what _are_ the preconditions of rationality?; second, even a hypothetical worldview that can provide the "preconditions of rationality" would invalidate "X -> Y". For if a _hypothetical_ worldview works, then to assert X -> (Y and ~Z ) is really the fallacy of asserting the consequence.

Rationality (X) implies Christianity (Y) {"because Y is a precondition for X"}, but then it is also true that X -> ( Y or Z). Rationality implies that either Christianity is true, or some other worldview is true.

X -> ( Y or Z)
(X -> Y) or (X -> Z) this statement is true if either part is true.

so to assert 

(X -> Y) and ~(X->Z) without making it explicate that both implications are necessary is begging the question.


For B to be a precondition of A, B must be logically prior to A. Now what are the preconditions of "intelligibility"? What is logically prior to reason? The question is hard to contemplate because the answer must be reasonable before we can be reasonable.

I found this article by Frame: Transcendental Arguments. It appears the question begging began with Kant: 


> All of us, he argued, must concede that knowledge is possible.


and then Van Til:


> But how can we defend the logical move from "œintelligible universe" to "œtheistic universe?" Van Til rarely articulated his reason for that move; he seemed to think it was self-evident. But in effect, he reverted at this point to apologetics of a more traditional type.


and includes also:


> Only if a person had designed the world to be known, and the human mind to know it, could knowledge be possible. So Van Til at this point reverted to a traditional teleological argument. He never admitted doing this, and he could not have admitted it, because he thought the traditional teleological (like the other traditional arguments) were autonomous and neutral.


This is nothing more than Intelligent Design. It may be persuasive, but it does not prove God exists or that he created the universe. The only proof we have that God created the universe is that He revealed this in his Word, and only if we assume that truth of Scripture axiomatically.

All through the transcendental argument in this article, assumptions are made that are nothing less than the conclusion that it is attempting to prove. It assumes "knowledge" and "order" exists then that only if some sort of supreme being caused it, and no other possible answer accounts for it. While a supreme being is one possible answer to the order of the universe we "observe", this answer is inductive - it does not follow necessarily and can only be assumed or opined true. It assumes both the necessity of the supreme being, and that our observation of order is infallible correct. It also assumes that there is such a thing as the "preconditions of reason". 

And Van Til's TAG argument was supposed to show more than a supreme being exists, but that only the supreme being of the Bible exists. And nothing in this argument makes that connection. In fact, it resorts to the traditional arguments that Van Til found invalid.

First:


> Like Kant, Van Til was unhappy with empiricism and rationalism, and with traditional ways of combining reason and sense experience such as that of Aquinas. Kant found these approaches to knowledge logically invalid. But for Van Til they were also wrong in a distinctively theological way.


 then second:


> If Van Til´s transcendental approach is to succeed, however, it must abandon the assumption that traditional arguments are necessarily autonomous and welcome the assistance of such arguments to complete the transcendental argument. The traditional arguments are in fact necessary to establish the existence of God as a transcendental conclusion.



The traditional arguments are based on rationalism and/or empiricism. These were rejected by Van Til as false. He developed TAG, and then found he needed to include the things he said were false, which things prompted him to develop TAG, which can not be "completed"without them, but they are false, and ... so the circle remains. 

It looks like Frame has made the same error here:


> The Bible does make this kind of radical claim, that creation not only implies, but presupposes God. For God is the creator of all, and therefore the source of all meaning, order, and intelligibility.



This implies that when God created the universe, he created "meaning, order, and intelligibility". Which means that before creation, there was no knowledge. Without meaning, order, and intelligibility, there can be no knowledge. I do not think Frame meant to make this implication - but there it is. Or it means that God is the source of reason and order, but that would not implied that God is the precondition of reason and order. In fact, I think our observation of meaning, order, and intelligibility in the universe are _evidence_ that, _if_ God exists, then these are characteristics of God.

The TAG is not a valid proof of God. It may be a strong argument for a supreme being, but it is not proof that one necessarily exists. It begs the question by assuming the unity and existence of "transcendentals" which in effect are the God it attempts to prove. And the TAG in itself does not support the God of the Bible, but it does evidence the God that even demons believe exists, and tremble. 

The best evidence for the God of the Bible is God's revelation. Again, it is not a proof - but a strong argument. We should admit that we can not prove God or Christianity - but we can give a solid defense. In the end, only God makes one believe the Gospel.


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## RamistThomist

Anthony,
I know what you are getting at but I won't enter the debate at this time, since it would rehash old Clark/Van til debates. I was merely answering Saiph's question.


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## JohnV

Anthony:

We can't take someone by the hand, intrude into God's presence, and make introductions. In that way we cannot "prove" to the satisfaction of the inquirer, or doubter, or skeptic, that God exists. But the fact still remains as clear as ever for those who rejoice in God's presence that to not see the evidences of God's existence is nothing more than obstinacy and stubbornness in sin. What does not proclaim God's handiwork? 

Why fault the proofs when it is man that is at fault?


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Anthony:
> 
> We can't take someone by the hand, intrude into God's presence, and make introductions. In that way we cannot "prove" to the satisfaction of the inquirer, or doubter, or skeptic, that God exists. But the fact still remains as clear as ever for those who rejoice in God's presence that to not see the evidences of God's existence is nothing more than obstinacy and stubbornness in sin. What does not proclaim God's handiwork?
> 
> Why fault the proofs when it is man that is at fault?



We're using two different definitions of proof. I agree and stated that TAG can be a strong argument, as well as the more traditional arguments. But to say these arguments are proof is to say the conclusion is without doubt. Since they all contain fallacies, either by asserting the consequence (induction fallacy) or by begging the question, then they are not true proofs. 

The fault is in the proof. They do not prove what they claim to prove. I certainly see the clear evidence of God in the complexity and grandeur of creation - but I am a believer - and this is an inductive conclusion - not a proof of the reality of the God of scripture. When we as Christians start claiming we can prove the existence of the God of Scripture - and we make such blatant errors in reasoning - it only hurts our cause.


----------



## JohnV

Well, I can't agree with that, Anthony. I do agree that different definitions of the idea of proof are concerned here. But I see no fault in the proofs. Perhaps they do not prove what you want them to prove, but they cannot deny God's existence, neither can they testify to anything else by God's existence, and they themselves cannot exist unless God exists. The fact that the man, whoever he may be, remains unconvinced is no fault of the proofs. Men kick against the goads all their life. It is only when God reveals Himself to men that they realize how obstinate they have been. 

I won't argue against the fact that we use induction in our conclusions of God's existence. I will dissent from the notion that this makes it any less certain. 

If men do not acknowledge God, it is not the fault of the proofs. Men have believed on a lot less evidence. It is, in fact, rather audacious to assume such comprehensive knowledge of truth as to blame the facts rather than man's limited understandings. If we are going to pin-point the induction fallacy then here is where our focus should be, making inductive statements about the whole of knowledge based on our limited understanding, not on the ample evidences for God's existence to which God Himself testifies.


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## Saiph

I agree with JohnV Anthony.

Your statement here is a bit too rigid:


> But to say these arguments are proof is to say the conclusion is without doubt.



Only God can know something exhaustively and without doubt.



Must a rational person have proof or reasons for all his beliefs ? 
Is a person justified in believing a proposition only if it can be inferred inductively or deductively from the assumed incorrigible sensory data ? 

If I hear a bird singing outside my window, but do not see it, is that enough proof to believe a bird is actually there ?


----------



## Saiph

Faith, is required to believe the gospel, but I do not think it is necessary for the existence of God. The fool has said in his heart there is no God, because he denies the obvious. What difference does it make if I cannot know a thing in itself (Ding an sich). Who cares ? ? ? 

The bible teaches that we not only can arrive at conclusions about reality beyond the phenomenal world by means of empyrical and rational categories, but that they are written on our being because we are made in God's image.

_Ex nihilo nihil fit._

[Edited on 1-18-2006 by Saiph]


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> I agree with JohnV Anthony.
> 
> Your statement here is a bit too rigid:
> 
> 
> 
> But to say these arguments are proof is to say the conclusion is without doubt.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Only God can know something exhaustively and without doubt
Click to expand...


We too can know some things without doubt if we can demonstrate the conclusion is deductivly true. The conclusion of a valid deductive argument is necessarily true if the premises are true. 


All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
therefore Socrates is a mortal.

The nature of deductive argumentations is that when correctly done, the conclusion follow because it is impossible for them not too follow. Proofs are only proofs if they are constructed as valid deductive arguments, not from induction or circular reasoning. They must be based on a priori knowledge, premises known to be true. 

Inductive arguments like those of ID and the Theory of Evolution, never prove a truth. But that does not make them false. It only makes them uncertain - maybe true, maybe false.



> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Must a rational person have proof or reasons for all his beliefs ?
> Is a person justified in believing a proposition only if it can be inferred inductively or deductively from the assumed incorrigible sensory data ?



No. It is reasonable to believe something on the basises of inductive or evidential arguments. We would can say we believe them, but we don't _know_ them. And we do that all the time. This is also the form of argument that science uses to support ID and the Theory of Evolution, that psychologist use to support their view of homosexuality, that engineers use to build bridges. But I would never say I can prove this bridge will never fail. I know that under excessive loading it can fail. I also know that due to the properties of materials, even under normal circumstances there is a small probability that it will fail. We design to make that probability as very small, but never 0. So based on: my educated opinion that this bridge is correctly designed; and my trust in the builders to do the job; I firmly _believe_ that the bridge is safe. 

But the "proofs" for the existence of God, claim that we can "know" God exists based on the arguments. And the arguments fail because they make errors in logic. To know requires the thing known is true. And to prove something is true, it can not be just close to true, or probably true, but it must be neccessarily true. And if we know the premises are true, then we will know the conclusions it true. This is distinct from just belief. A belief does not need to be proven to be believed. But anything proven from what we know, is also knowledge. A proof of God claims that man can _know_ that God exists apart from God revealing it to him, but rather through mans observations and reason alone. 



> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> If I hear a bird singing outside my window, but do not see it, is that enough proof to believe a bird is actually there ?



No it's not. It's not a proof. To be a proof, you'd have to accept the following valid deductive argument:

I am hearing the sounds a bird makes.
The sounds a bird makes can only come from a bird.
Therefore, I am hearing the sounds that are coming from a bird.
The argument is valid, it follows the correct form and rules of a logical inference. But it is unsound; "the sounds a bird makes can only come from a bird" is a false assertion. Something else (no matter how unlikely) could be making the sounds, some cats, a cell phone (this is a new thing in ring-tones), a radio on your shelf near the window.

Now, do you have good reason to believe that there is a bird outside your window? Sure! Who wouldn't. Based on the information give, although you can not prove a bird is there, the evidence is convincing enough for any person to believe the bird is there. Even if you don't know a bird is there, you can not be faulted for believing it.

I also believe I can safely drive home and I can swallow a bite from a ham sandwich. I do not "know" that I won't crash, or choke on my sandwich. I know that I am a sinner - because I can deduce that from Scripture. I know math is a valid form of logic because God is logical, and Scripture demonstrates valid mathematical principles. 

It is not unreasonable to believe the conclusions of evidential arguments when they are strong. But we would not know they are true.

The conclusions of a deductive proof will be known if you know the premises are true, and the argument is formally valid. The only alternative is to reject one or more of the premises as being false. It is deductive reasoning that tells us that Paul and James did not mean the exact same thing when they talked about "faith" - for if they did, it would be a logical contradiction in Scripture. Since God does not lie to us in His Word, and He is a God of wisdom and truth, we use logic to test the implications of what we think the Bible is saying to us.

The danger of saying the TAG and other arguments are "proof" of the existence of God, is that a thinking man will see that the argument is fallacious by it's very form. This is not due to his being unregenerate, he is correct. If it is an inductive argument, it proves nothing but a possiblilty, and if it claims to be a deductive argument, it is circular or begging the question. Van Til said all worldviews a necessarily circular. Amen to that. But the implication is no proof of God is valid unless one adopts or presumes a worldview in which God exists. One must assume God, to prove God, and that is circular reasoning. 

In the end, we believe the Gospel because God gives us faith, and we can not believe the Gospel otherwise. And every man knows God exists because God has written that truth on man's heart. Not because of the evidence. A blind deaf and mute person knows there is a God. A person born with brain damage knows. They know because God makes himself known. We all know there is a God from the day we are conceived. 

The proof. An infants, even the unborn child, is in need of the blood of Christ. In order to be saved, the child must believe in Jesus. In order to believe, the child must have knowledge. To have knowledge, before one has had any experience, the child must have that knowledge imparted to him. He must know there is a God, or he has an excuse. He must know Jesus is his savior, or he can not be saved.
And some infants will know the truth of Jesus, because God can (and does) impart this knowledge to them directly - even into a mother's womb. 



> Luk 1:15 "For he will be great in the sight of the Lord, and shall drink neither wine nor strong drink. He will also be filled with the Holy Spirit, even from his mother's womb.
> 
> Luk 1:41 And it happened, when Elizabeth heard the greeting of Mary, that the babe leaped in her womb; and Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit.
> 
> Luk 1:44 "For indeed, as soon as the voice of your greeting sounded in my ears, the babe leaped in my womb for joy.
> 
> Psa 22:9 But You are He who took Me out of the womb; You made Me trust while on My mother's breasts.
> 
> Psa 22:10 I was cast upon You from birth. From My mother's womb You have been My God.
> 
> Jer 1:5 "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you; Before you were born I sanctified you; I ordained you a prophet to the nations."




I guess I went off on a tangent there, but it was relevant. God is the only source of knowledge. Experience only serves to bring innate knowledge to light - the evidence does not prove God exists, we already knew - it merely makes us aware of the knowledge. We know God exists from our mother's womb, we are sometimes given faith in Jesus before we are born. We can not know God exists simply by means of observation of the "evidence", nor are there any valid proofs that God exists. God is not "one with nature" - but nature (the _natural_ man) knows God exists - and he is therefore without any excuse. The _spiritual_ man knows Jesus as Lord and Savior.

We need to be clear that we can not argue our way into having the saving knowledge that is the Gospel, and God has made his existence known to all men so they are without excuse. Arguments can strengthen our faith, or soften the hearts (minds) of non-believers. But the line between belief in Jesus, and unbelief, can only be crossed by God's grace and free gift of saving faith. It can not be crossed by arguments. We can take a man up to the line, but only God takes him over the line.


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Faith, is required to believe the gospel, but I do not think it is necessary for the existence of God. The fool has said in his heart there is no God, because he denies the obvious. What difference does it make if I cannot know a thing in itself (Ding an sich). Who cares ? ? ?
> 
> The bible teaches that we not only can arrive at conclusions about reality beyond the phenomenal world by means of empyrical and rational categories, but that they are written on our being because we are made in God's image.
> 
> _Ex nihilo nihil fit._
> 
> [Edited on 1-18-2006 by Saiph]



I agree.


----------



## Saiph

> God is the only source of knowledge. Experience only serves to bring innate knowledge to light - the evidence does not prove God exists, we already knew - it merely makes us aware of the knowledge. We know God exists from our mother's womb, we are sometimes given faith in Jesus before we are born. We can not know God exists simply by means of observation of the "evidence", nor are there any valid proofs that God exists. God is not "one with nature" - but nature (the natural man) knows God exists - and he is therefore without any excuse. The spiritual man knows Jesus as Lord and Savior.



That God is the source of knowledge we both agree.

It is not pantheistic to assert that God has given empyrical evidence within the created order.



> Rom 1:19-20
> For what *can be known* about God *is plain to them*, because God has *shown it to them. *
> For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been *clearly perceived*, ever since the creation of the world, *in the things that have been made.* So they are without excuse.



God has given man empyrical and rational proof of His existence so that man is inexcusable.


Paul is referring to the concept of the teleological argument, which even Kant could not unravel, and Hume made feeble attempts at.



> Immanuel Kant on the teleological argument for God's existence:
> 
> This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is
> the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the
> common reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it
> itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that
> source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our
> observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends
> our knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the
> principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature
> again reacts upon this idea- its cause; and thus our belief in a
> divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible
> conviction.
> 
> For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob
> this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind,
> unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which, although
> empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their
> force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts
> suggested by subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state
> of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms
> of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to
> height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to
> the supreme and unconditioned author of all.
> 
> THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
> by Immanuel Kant
> translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn p.270



[Edited on 1-18-2006 by Saiph]


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Well, I can't agree with that, Anthony. I do agree that different definitions of the idea of proof are concerned here. But I see no fault in the proofs. Perhaps they do not prove what you want them to prove, but they cannot deny God's existence, neither can they testify to anything else by God's existence, and they themselves cannot exist unless God exists. The fact that the man, whoever he may be, remains unconvinced is no fault of the proofs. Men kick against the goads all their life. It is only when God reveals Himself to men that they realize how obstinate they have been.
> 
> I won't argue against the fact that we use induction in our conclusions of God's existence. I will dissent from the notion that this makes it any less certain.
> 
> If men do not acknowledge God, it is not the fault of the proofs. Men have believed on a lot less evidence. It is, in fact, rather audacious to assume such comprehensive knowledge of truth as to blame the facts rather than man's limited understandings. If we are going to pin-point the induction fallacy then here is where our focus should be, making inductive statements about the whole of knowledge based on our limited understanding, not on the ample evidences for God's existence to which God Himself testifies.



If you use the term "proof" to mean an argument which is convincing, then you are making it possible for man to know God apart from God's revelation. But the evidence points in different directions, depending on your presuppositions. This gives the atheist a good excuse for denying God. By the atheists worldview, the "facts" point to there being no God. Their worldview dictates this conclusion. However, it is fallacious in the same way "proofs" of God are always fallacious. The evidence is not neutral. Observable facts are our "interpretation" of our sensory experiences. They are subject to the principle presuppositions (the axioms) we have about metaphysics and epistemology. If one holds a empiricist+atheist world view - the evidence can not point to God.

If you talk to a true believer in the Theory of Evolution, they will always point to the overwhelming evidence. And they are right. But only because they have already presumed the presuppositions of "natural" science - that says that only observable things are real, and that only a "natural" answer can explain our observations. Given those presuppositions, they have no choice but to believe in the TOE. The evidence points to TOE! Even though TOE is bad science, by it's own standards, it's still the only reasonable conclusion, because a supernatural answer is rejected out-of-hand. Until you show them that their presuppositions dictate their view of the facts, no evidential arguments will even begin to convince them. 

If you talk to a rationalist who presumes there is no God, he will see the logical fallacy of the TAG and other so-called proofs of God. It is immediately evident to the rationalist that the conclusion follows only by presuming God exists. This is circular. The fault is in the form of the argument, not in the man. 

The nature of God makes it impossible to prove His existence is necessarily true. A neutral position on God's existence, can not lead to a proof of God. All the proofs that deduce God, have the assumption that there must be a "first mover" or a "first reasoner" or a "transcendental cause of intelligibility". 

Here is the picture of a neutral man: he has no experience; he has no knowledge. Now how does he get started? He can not deduce anything from nothing. Let's assume he can gain "experiential" knowledge (it's absurd but let's assume it anyhow). Observations of the natural world can not lead necessarily to the conclusion of a supernatural being, because this is a logical fallacy. You can only deduce in terms of prior knowledge. But if he knows innately that God exists, and he acknowledges this truth, all the evidence will point to God. If he suppresses this knowledge, none of the evidence will convince him. For he assumes no God exists, and the evidence (observations of the natural world) can only prove the existence of the natural world (if even that).


----------



## Civbert

> Rom 1:19-20
> For what *can be known* about God *is plain to them*, because God has *shown it to them. *
> For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been *clearly perceived*, ever since the creation of the world, *in the things that have been made.* So they are without excuse.



For God showed it to them. This does not indicate he gave us clues, or that he drew a picture to see with our eyes. When God "shows" us things, it means he is given us knowledge. Let him who has eyes see the truth. The truth is the Word of God revealed to man by God. 

"They who are without excuse" refers to "the things that have been made". And "in" can be translated "by". 



> because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. (Rom 1:19-20 NKJV)



How can we say this is empirical evidence of the "invisible attributes". It only makes sense of man already has innate knowledge of God. To clearly perceive means to understand, not necessarily "see with the eyes". We understand the truth that God has shown us, his creation.

I don't think this supports empirical knowledge - rather it supports innate knowledge. I think innate and revealed spiritual knowledge is better supported by scripture.

And this would also excuse our children and others who are too feeble minded to "perceive" this evidence of God's invisible attributes. 

[Edited on 1-18-2006 by Civbert]

[Edited on 1-18-2006 by Civbert]

[Edited on 1-18-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Saiph

> How can we say this is empirical evidence of the "invisible attributes". It only makes sense of man already has innate knowledge of God. To clearly perceive means to understand, not necessarily "see with the eyes". We understand the truth that God has shown us, his creation.



Because God is invisible and His attributes are abstract. I could just as well say that by your actions and works of art I can see your invisible attributes.

Can you see, touch, or hear emotions love, fear, anger, etc . . . Can you see attributes like omnipotence, immutability, goodness ? ? No, but when we look at the sheer imensity of the universe and the unfathomable complexity of the world, we are right to conclude that it did not happen by chance, and out of nothing. If someone put it all here, they preceded the time space continuum, and are therefore eternal. You can work most everything out from there.

I said that the knowledge is innate as well and deductive from the phenomenological. The TA and the classical arguments are good.

One needs faith to believe the gospel. God must grant faith to someone for them to realize that the limited atonement of Christ applies to them.


----------



## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Well, I can't agree with that, Anthony. I do agree that different definitions of the idea of proof are concerned here. But I see no fault in the proofs. Perhaps they do not prove what you want them to prove, but they cannot deny God's existence, neither can they testify to anything else by God's existence, and they themselves cannot exist unless God exists. The fact that the man, whoever he may be, remains unconvinced is no fault of the proofs. Men kick against the goads all their life. It is only when God reveals Himself to men that they realize how obstinate they have been.
> 
> I won't argue against the fact that we use induction in our conclusions of God's existence. I will dissent from the notion that this makes it any less certain.
> 
> If men do not acknowledge God, it is not the fault of the proofs. Men have believed on a lot less evidence. It is, in fact, rather audacious to assume such comprehensive knowledge of truth as to blame the facts rather than man's limited understandings. If we are going to pin-point the induction fallacy then here is where our focus should be, making inductive statements about the whole of knowledge based on our limited understanding, not on the ample evidences for God's existence to which God Himself testifies.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If you use the term "proof" to mean an argument which is convincing, then you are making it possible for man to know God apart from God's revelation. But the evidence points in different directions, depending on your presuppositions. This gives the atheist a good excuse for denying God. By the atheists worldview, the "facts" point to there being no God. Their worldview dictates this conclusion. However, it is fallacious in the same way "proofs" of God are always fallacious. The evidence is not neutral. Observable facts are our "interpretation" of our sensory experiences. They are subject to the principle presuppositions (the axioms) we have about metaphysics and epistemology. If one holds a empiricist+atheist world view - the evidence can not point to God.
> 
> If you talk to a true believer in the Theory of Evolution, they will always point to the overwhelming evidence. And they are right. But only because they have already presumed the presuppositions of "natural" science - that says that only observable things are real, and that only a "natural" answer can explain our observations. Given those presuppositions, they have no choice but to believe in the TOE. The evidence points to TOE! Even though TOE is bad science, by it's own standards, it's still the only reasonable conclusion, because a supernatural answer is rejected out-of-hand. Until you show them that their presuppositions dictate their view of the facts, no evidential arguments will even begin to convince them.
> 
> If you talk to a rationalist who presumes there is no God, he will see the logical fallacy of the TAG and other so-called proofs of God. It is immediately evident to the rationalist that the conclusion follows only by presuming God exists. This is circular. The fault is in the form of the argument, not in the man.
> 
> The nature of God makes it impossible to prove His existence is necessarily true. A neutral position on God's existence, can not lead to a proof of God. All the proofs that deduce God, have the assumption that there must be a "first mover" or a "first reasoner" or a "transcendental cause of intelligibility".
> 
> Here is the picture of a neutral man: he has no experience; he has no knowledge. Now how does he get started? He can not deduce anything from nothing. Let's assume he can gain "experiential" knowledge (it's absurd but let's assume it anyhow). Observations of the natural world can not lead necessarily to the conclusion of a supernatural being, because this is a logical fallacy. You can only deduce in terms of prior knowledge. But if he knows innately that God exists, and he acknowledges this truth, all the evidence will point to God. If he suppresses this knowledge, none of the evidence will convince him. For he assumes no God exists, and the evidence (observations of the natural world) can only prove the existence of the natural world (if even that).
Click to expand...


All very good reasons why I am not a Presuppositionalist, why I reject it, Anthony. I'm not saying that I won't agree with it; I'm saying that I can't agree with it.


----------



## Saiph

Really, we need to adress the initial question set forth by Chris.

Are the classic evidential arguments unbiblical ?

I say, it depends on how far you take them.
I believe Van Til is correct in saying the knowledge God imparts to us of Himself through natural and special revelation is integral to understanding anything else.



> The only way then for man to have any knowledge of either temporal or
> eternal things is for a God to think for us in eternal categories and reveal to us the Measure of truth we can fathom. Thus we hold that Christian theism is the only alternative to skepticism.
> 
> Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1969), 38.






> We must not argue as though we can already know a great deal about nature by itself but that, inasmuch as we cannot know all that ought to be known about it, there must be one who knows infinitely more than we do. We must rather reason that unless God exists as ultimate, as self-subsistent, we could not even know anything; we could not even reason that God must exist, nor could we even ask a question about God.
> 
> Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1974), 102.





> The Calvinist, therefore, using his point of contact, observes to the non-
> Christian that if the world were not what Scripture says it is, if the natural
> man´s knowledge were not actually rooted in the creation and providence of God, then there could be no knowledge whatsoever.
> 
> Van Til, My Credo, 17.



However, should we conclude from that, as Anthony and John Frame seem to do that unregenerate man cannot discern this knowledge by reason and the senses ? And that it is by intuition only ?



> Rom. 1 tells us that this knowledge is gained from God´s revelation "˜in the things that are made,´ that is, the entire created world, including human beings themselves. But how do people obtain this knowledge from creation? Some apologists have thought that this knowledge comes about through rational activity, particularly through theistic proofs and evidences. But this understanding would limit the knowledge of Romans 1 only to those competent to understand and be persuaded by those arguments and evidences. Paul, however, sees this knowledge as universal. Romans 1 begins the argument that leads in Rom. 3:10-20, 23, to the conclusion that all have sinned and stand in need of God´s grace. . So the knowledge of Rom. 1 renders all human beings inexcusable (verse 20). If that knowledge were less than universal, the conclusion of Rom. 3 would not follow from it. So the knowledge of God by creation evidently reaches all, even those who are not competent to formulate or evaluate proofs and evidences. Evidently we discern the general revelation of God by some form of intuition, an intuition that some are able to articulate and defend by proofs and evidences, but which does not depend on them.
> 
> 
> John M. Frame
> ["œUnregenerate Knowledge of God," for IVP Dictionary of Apologetics.]



My question is, without language, or understanding, what form does that intuition take ? And does it really diminish God's sovereignty to say rather that God created man's mind, and senses, in a generally capable capacity to understand His eternal attributes from nature ?
After all, man is the single component of the same created order that God displays His attributes through, that alone reveals those in a very unique way, because we bear His image.


----------



## JohnV

Mark:

All men are liars, and they lie to themselves also about what they know, or what they think they know. It is called "dissembling". The facts to not lie, but men do. 

The facts are what they are, not what men make of them, whether they are unbelievers or Christians. I take my own presuppositions as needing to be brought into conformity with God's revelations, both general and special, a lifelong process that is never finished. These revelations cannot fail us, but our own thoughts can fail us. Thus conformity to truth is always the watchword for the man wanting to gain in understanding. 

It is not that the unregenerate man does not or cannot see the same things as the Christian. Anselm showed conclusively that the man who intelligently denies God's existence is merely lying to himself and to others. Not only is the image of God in him, but it is evident all around him. The Presuppositionalist has this right: the "intelligent" unregenerate man, who disbelieves because of "the evidences" is being dishonest to his most basic preconsiderations. But he is also dishonest about those evidences. It is impossible that there be evidence that God does not exist. Any person, regenerate or not, can come to that conclusion, if he is willing to submit to truth. 

And that is the crux of it: willingness to submit to truth. The evidences are not to blame; the classical categories are not to blame; and the creation is not to blame. What gives men the boldness to make public spectacles of themselves, proudly proclaiming their pretenses, is that they find a willing audience in the masses, people hungry for the emptiness and nothingness, the foolishness that is foisted as knowledge. There is a ready market for it. And where there is a ready market, there are many who are more than willing to provide for that market. 

But men themselves are vain. They prefer the lie. And if God approaches them, they run the other way to avoid Him. How could they run the other way if they could not see Him coming? And surely they do that. So they are liars if they tell me that they do not see Him, that they intelligently deny His existence. 

It's like denying that cars exist, but yet always looking both ways before crossing the road.


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## Saiph

Well said John.


----------



## Civbert

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Mark:
> 
> All men are liars, and they lie to themselves also about what they know, or what they think they know. It is called "dissembling". The facts to not lie, but men do. ....



I don't necessarily disagree with you. But it there are two issues that I think distort the facts: the noetic effect of sin on mens minds, and the worldview they hold. I don't think the unregenerate atheist will even agree on what the facts are. The facts we determine, are themselves an interpretation of our senses (when they are empirical) and are therefor subjective. A person with an anti-Christian worldview will not agree with the Christian in what he thinks the facts are, much less what they infer.

One can see this by simply adopting our opponents axioms (presuppositions) and see that the facts they believe are completely different. And the conclusions they point to is not the existence of God, or his attributes. We see God's attributes in the creation because we are aware of his attributes and this makes sense of the world. But the only thing that empirical observations will tell the atheist is that the only thing that is real is what he can sense.

So whether you want to say this is due to their suppressing the truth that is written in their hearts (minds), or it is due to their worldview axioms, it comes to the same thing. Men will not believe the Gospel based on "evidence" that they don't see, or "proofs" which are necessarily circular.

People come to Christ because they hear the Gospel, and if Spirit makes them believe the truth, and their need for Christ. And with this regeneration of their minds, we can see how it explains the world around us.

I think the only use for evidential arguments is gained if we get our opponents to admit that they hold epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. And then, we try to get them to adopt our presuppositions for the sake of argument, to show how it make sense of the world and morality and our relationship to God. Even if this does not convince them (it will not), they will (if they want to be rational about it) admit that the Christian worldview is good. Then perhaps we can adopt their presuppositions (for the sake of argument) and show how their worldview leads to skepticism or or irrational mysticism. This won't convince them either, they may just admit they are skeptics or mystics and say that's the way things are. 

We can hold our own with apologetics, showing the rationality and cohesiveness and comprehensiveness of Christianity. We can demonstrate the flaws of other worldviews. *But we can not prove the truth of Christianity without abandoning the logic we defend it with. 

If we could prove the truth of Christianity, they would have no choice but to believe it, and they would do so _without_ receiving it as a gift from God! So a proof of Christianity is a violation of what we say is the source of saving faith. Only the regenerating of the Spirit can give one saving faith.

--------------

*I am using proof in the sense of the classical proofs being deductive and formally valid and sound arguments.

P.S. Anselm was wrong. 

[Edited on 1-19-2006 by Civbert]


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## Arch2k

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> We can hold our own with apologetics, showing the rationality and cohesiveness and comprehensiveness of Christianity. We can demonstrate the flaws of other worldviews. *But we can not prove the truth of Christianity without abandoning the logic we defend it with.



 and 

I would also clarify that certain arguments like TAG do not fit under this category of "proof." TAG is certainly sound, but it _assumes_ that scripture is true in both of it's premises, and therefore assumes what it is trying to prove, and therefore circular. In language, this is not what people want when they ask for "proof".

Sadly, when people ask for "proof", what they really want is empirical or rational evidence.

1Co 1:22 For Jews request a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom; 
1Co 1:23 but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness, 
1Co 1:24 but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. 
1Co 1:25 Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men.


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## Saiph

Anthony, I am not talking about a proof of Christianity, I am talking about a proof for the existence of God.

Big difference.


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## Arch2k

Why do people try to *prove* the existence of God?


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Anthony, I am not talking about a proof of Christianity, I am talking about a proof for the existence of God.
> 
> Big difference.



_I'm_ talking about both. Teleological, Transcendental, Evidential, they all fail to prove God exists due to errors in reasoning.



[Edited on 1-19-2006 by Civbert]


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## Saiph

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Anthony, I am not talking about a proof of Christianity, I am talking about a proof for the existence of God.
> 
> Big difference.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _I'm_ talking about both. Teleological, Transcendental, Evidential, they all fail to prove God exists due to errors in reasoning.
> 
> 
> 
> [Edited on 1-19-2006 by Civbert]
Click to expand...


Yeah, its cool, it seems to be a bit hyper-vantillian. I have a broader definition of proof.

Proof n. 
The evidence or argument that compels the mind to accept an assertion as true. 

Nothing can be known with absolute certainty, because it requires exhaustive knowledge, which God alone posesses.

But we certainly do have enough proof dislayed in nature to our senses, and enough proof within our own consciences to comdemn us for eternity. We need grace to receive salvation.


----------



## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Anthony, I am not talking about a proof of Christianity, I am talking about a proof for the existence of God.
> 
> Big difference.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _I'm_ talking about both. Teleological, Transcendental, Evidential, they all fail to prove God exists due to errors in reasoning.
Click to expand...

So the errors are in men, not in the evidences? Or is it that even if God were to part the sea right in front of us, that would tell us nothing because all evidences fail due to men's errors in reasoning? 


[Edited on 1-19-2006 by JohnV]


----------



## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Anthony, I am not talking about a proof of Christianity, I am talking about a proof for the existence of God.
> 
> Big difference.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _I'm_ talking about both. Teleological, Transcendental, Evidential, they all fail to prove God exists due to errors in reasoning.
> 
> 
> 
> [Edited on 1-19-2006 by Civbert]
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Yeah, its cool, it seems to be a bit hyper-vantillian. I have a broader definition of proof.
> 
> Proof n.
> The evidence or argument that compels the mind to accept an assertion as true.
> 
> Nothing can be known with absolute certainty, because it requires exhaustive knowledge, which God alone posesses.
> 
> But we certainly do have enough proof dislayed in nature to our senses, and enough proof within our own consciences to comdemn us for eternity. We need grace to receive salvation.
Click to expand...

Proof doesn't have to be exhaustive, just sufficient. I don't know God exhaustively, but I know Him. And He didn't show me all of Himself, but He showed me enough to convince me. If I am not satisfied until He has shown me everthing about Him then that is stubborness on my part, remaining unconvinced even when more than enough proof has been given me, simply for the reason that He has not given me all of it.


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## Saiph

Exactly John, no one will be able to say, "But God, there simply was not enough proof."


----------



## JohnV

What I need from a Presuppositionalist to convince me is integrity. Internal and external integrity. No offence, Anthony, but your defence of it is laden with contradictions. It is quite suprising to me that people believe this kind of thing, and that it is so openly defended as such. 

But the integrity that I'm looking for is for a Presuppositionalist to stand up, finally, and say "Enough of this!" Did you know that men are standing on pulpits proclaiming Presuppositionalism as necessary according to Scripture? Did you know that Sola Scriptura is equated with Presuppositionalism on pulpits? Did you know that some proclaim that to disagree with Presuppositionalism is a sin? 

The RPW, as it stands in our day, is now of two different and mutually exclusive parts, but hold together because they relate to two different kinds of people. The RPW that we all know goes like this "Whatever is not commanded is forbidden." But that is for the non-ordained. The RPW for the ordained is "What is not forbidden may be commanded." If GA says that a certain opinion does not violate the WCF, then it may be preached by an ordained man, on the grounds that the preacher believes it to be Biblical. So in the case of Presuppositionalism, it may be preached. It has not been ruled as what the Bible teaches or imposes, because the same "not forbidden" ruling has been granted to Evidentialism and Classicalism; so they don't really say what the Bible teaches in that regard. As an opinion it does not violate the WCF. So men who are ordained may preach it because for them the RPW is that "what is not forbidden may be commanded." As proof of this, look how many are preaching the Framework Hypothesis, Postmillennialism, and even heretical views such as Federal Vision, simply on the grounds that they believe it to be Biblical themselves, not because of any denominational decision that these are what the Bible imposes. If it is not forbidden then it may be commanded by ordained men; this is now the rule by convention. ( That is, it is the going rule because everyone is doing it, unchecked and unabated. )

That is what using the pulpit for it is doing; it identifies the minister's opinion with God's commands. In spite of all the church documentation that prohibits this, that only the Word of God be preached, yet these very churches allow the pulpit to be used to expound and propagate men's opinions from the pulpits, and therefore as equal to the Word of God.

But it does not stop there. Did you know that Presuppositionalism is now prerequisite to theology? It is a fundamental doctrine for certain ideologies. Reconstructionism comes to mind. It is vehemently defended as the true form of Reformational interpretation, but Presuppostionalism is a necessary prerequisite. That is, then, that Presuppositionalism is necessary to interpret the Bible properly. So it is even more fundamental than the Bible. And this is how it is preached from pulpits: it is expounded, defended, porpagated, and imposed because the pulpit is liberally used to this end. 

Within my lifetime the case has been that if a minister preached his opinion, because he thought it was Biblical, but on the pretense of his own ordained authority, then it resulted in a scandal. It was considered the most audacious act a minister could do, to preach his opinions as Biblical based on the fact that he was ordained to preach what he believed rather than what he was commanded to preach. If he saw the two as the same thing then there was a big problem. To say, "It is his opinion" was an indictment, not an excusing. 

In our day, if it is found that a minister is convinced that his opinion is Biblical, and it is not forbidden, then that is reason enough for him to preach it. The consciences of the unordained mean nothing; they, the unordained, have to abide by the other RPW, which forbids what is not commanded. So a minister may command his opinion, and therefore the unordained may not oppose it because it is commanded. This man is ordained and he may lord his opinions over the unordained. He lives by a different rule.

So you have the possiblitity that God commands this apologetic in one church, another apologetic in another church, and perhaps no particular apologetic in a third church. All this being sanctioned by the same Spirit. Presuppositionalism makes these different views mutually exclusive. So in one church you may have the Spirit-sanctioned teaching that is mutually exclusive of what is Spirit-sanctioned in another church. 

And this we present to the world as the gospel?

It is true that this states the case almost too blatantly, though not untruly. But my point is that there is no single Presuppositionalist that stands up and says, "This is enough; it is forbidden." Not one is found who cares enough for his point of view to protect it from this kind of abuse. Who of the Presuppositionalists protested when Mark Rushdoony delivered his speach at the Chalcedon convention? Who of them said that this is going far too far, making Presuppositionalism, a man's precept, into a fundamental ground for new ideologies, and calling it superior Christianity? Are there any? If there is, then I'd like to know, because perhaps he may be able to convince me. At least he may have some integrity for his reasonings to seem credible. But while this remains as going on, unabated and unchecked by Presuppositionalists, no Presuppositionalist has credibility. Even if there are credible Presuppositionalists, they are of such a minority that they have no say in things. When it finally finds its proper place in theology it may have some, we'll have to see. But until then, while it imposes itself even over God's Word with reckless abandon, and no Presuppositionalist is found to give it integrity, it has no credibility.


----------



## Arch2k

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> What I need from a Presuppositionalist to convince me is integrity. Internal and external integrity. No offence, Anthony, but your defence of it is laden with contradictions. It is quite suprising to me that people believe this kind of thing, and that it is so openly defended as such.



I would like to know these contradictions of which you speak. If one must rid all contradictions in their theology (which should be done) one must rid themselves of all logical fallacies, as the presupps are trying to do. 



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> But the integrity that I'm looking for is for a Presuppositionalist to stand up, finally, and say "Enough of this!" Did you know that men are standing on pulpits proclaiming Presuppositionalism as necessary according to Scripture?



As they should.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Did you know that Sola Scriptura is equated with Presuppositionalism on pulpits?



I don´t know of any specific cases, but I can definitely see the STRONG relationship between presuppositionalism and sola scriptura. Let me ask you, do you believe that "œAll Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work"? 

The Bible furnishes man with all of the apologetic necessary for Christians. Pressup is the apologetic of Jesus and Paul. If you can provide me one apologetic that is different, I would love to see it. We are commanded to defend the hope that is in us for sure, but will throwing tomatoes do? Will a rocket launcher help? No. God has given us a specific weapon and told us to use it, the Bible.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Did you know that some proclaim that to disagree with Presuppositionalism is a sin?



Yes. In order to use empirical or rational arguments, one must DENY GOD in order to PROVE GOD. This is sin. The empirical or rationalist must completely abandon the scripture for just a moment when he argues with nonbelievers. "œLet me pretend for just a moment that God does not exist, so I can prove him to you." Does this sound like Christ is King, even over our apologetic? Christ must be central to ALL of our apologetic endeavors. 



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> The RPW, as it stands in our day, is now of two different and mutually exclusive parts, but hold together because they relate to two different kinds of people. The RPW that we all know goes like this "Whatever is not commanded is forbidden." But that is for the non-ordained. The RPW for the ordained is "What is not forbidden may be commanded." If GA says that a certain opinion does not violate the WCF, then it may be preached by an ordained man, on the grounds that the preacher believes it to be Biblical. So in the case of Presuppositionalism, it may be preached. It has not been ruled as what the Bible teaches or imposes, because the same "not forbidden" ruling has been granted to Evidentialism and Classicalism; so they don't really say what the Bible teaches in that regard. As an opinion it does not violate the WCF. So men who are ordained may preach it because for them the RPW is that "what is not forbidden may be commanded." As proof of this, look how many are preaching the Framework Hypothesis, Postmillennialism, and even heretical views such as Federal Vision, simply on the grounds that they believe it to be Biblical themselves, not because of any denominational decision that these are what the Bible imposes. If it is not forbidden then it may be commanded by ordained men; this is now the rule by convention. ( That is, it is the going rule because everyone is doing it, unchecked and unabated. )



No comment.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> That is what using the pulpit for it is doing; it identifies the minister's opinion with God's commands. In spite of all the church documentation that prohibits this, that only the Word of God be preached, yet these very churches allow the pulpit to be used to expound and propagate men's opinions from the pulpits, and therefore as equal to the Word of God.



Pressup is NOT man´s opinion, it is the Bible´s. Just because you disagree with pressup does not make it non-scriptural. I have heard pressup from the pulpit, and give it a hearty AMEN! 



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> But it does not stop there. Did you know that Presuppositionalism is now prerequisite to theology? It is a fundamental doctrine for certain ideologies. Reconstructionism comes to mind. It is vehemently defended as the true form of Reformational interpretation, but Presuppostionalism is a necessary prerequisite. That is, then, that Presuppositionalism is necessary to interpret the Bible properly. So it is even more fundamental than the Bible. And this is how it is preached from pulpits: it is expounded, defended, porpagated, and imposed because the pulpit is liberally used to this end.



I have no idea what you are talking about, can you cite examples?



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Within my lifetime the case has been that if a minister preached his opinion, because he thought it was Biblical, but on the pretense of his own ordained authority, then it resulted in a scandal. It was considered the most audacious act a minister could do, to preach his opinions as Biblical based on the fact that he was ordained to preach what he believed rather than what he was commanded to preach. If he saw the two as the same thing then there was a big problem. To say, "It is his opinion" was an indictment, not an excusing.



No comment.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> In our day, if it is found that a minister is convinced that his opinion is Biblical, and it is not forbidden, then that is reason enough for him to preach it. The consciences of the unordained mean nothing; they, the unordained, have to abide by the other RPW, which forbids what is not commanded. So a minister may command his opinion, and therefore the unordained may not oppose it because it is commanded. This man is ordained and he may lord his opinions over the unordained. He lives by a different rule.
> 
> So you have the possiblitity that God commands this apologetic in one church, another apologetic in another church, and perhaps no particular apologetic in a third church. All this being sanctioned by the same Spirit. Presuppositionalism makes these different views mutually exclusive. So in one church you may have the Spirit-sanctioned teaching that is mutually exclusive of what is Spirit-sanctioned in another church.



This is true, but the question is, which one is right? 



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> And this we present to the world as the gospel?



John"¦.that is why we are to STUDY and to find out exactly what the Bible does say about pressup, RPW, traducianism, supralapsarianism, birth control etc. etc.

The church will not be harmonious on these doctrines until that great day (and a GREAT day it will be!).



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> It is true that this states the case almost too blatantly, though not untruly. But my point is that there is no single Presuppositionalist that stands up and says, "This is enough; it is forbidden." Not one is found who cares enough for his point of view to protect it from this kind of abuse. Who of the Presuppositionalists protested when Mark Rushdoony delivered his speach at the Chalcedon convention? Who of them said that this is going far too far, making Presuppositionalism, a man's precept, into a fundamental ground for new ideologies, and calling it superior Christianity? Are there any? If there is, then I'd like to know, because perhaps he may be able to convince me. At least he may have some integrity for his reasonings to seem credible. But while this remains as going on, unabated and unchecked by Presuppositionalists, no Presuppositionalist has credibility. Even if there are credible Presuppositionalists, they are of such a minority that they have no say in things. When it finally finds its proper place in theology it may have some, we'll have to see. But until then, while it imposes itself even over God's Word with reckless abandon, and no Presuppositionalist is found to give it integrity, it has no credibility.



I don´t know what presupps you have been reading, but the pastor of which I speak is willing to call it sin, and say ENOUGH. To my knowledge, so do the greats of pressup in this centure, GHC and CVT. It is not a matter of "œgetting a little better" in our apologetic, it is a matter of a right apologetic, and a wrong one. One that is logically found in the WCF and the scriptures, and one that is not found in either.

WCF
Chapter I Of the Holy Scripture
IV. The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed, and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man, or church; but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God.[9]

9. II Peter 1:19-20; II Tim. 3:16; I John 5:9; I Thess. 2:13; Rev. 1:1-2

V. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture.[10] And the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God: yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.  [11]

10. I Tim 3:15
11. I Cor. 2:4-5, 9-10; Heb. 4:12; John 10:35; Isa. 55:11, 59:21; Rom. 11:36: Psa. 19:7-11; II Tim. 3:15; I Thess. 1:5; I John 2:20, 27


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## RamistThomist

Jeff

John, with all due respect you are drifting from the purpose of the thread. While I will not say, "He is a sinner because he is non-presup," if presup is biblical, then (___________________; draw the conclusion). 

How or would I preach presup? Well, for one I wouldn't preach presup. But I will say this from the pulpit: The scriptures judge us, not we the Scriptures. I wouldn't give evidential arguments from the pulpit for that matter. But even granting your points, so? This doesn't apply to me or any presups I know and is a moot point on this thread.


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## JohnV

> I would like to know these contradictions of which you speak. If one must rid all contradictions in their theology (which should be done) one must rid themselves of all logical fallacies, as the presupps are trying to do.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Originally posted by JohnV
> But the integrity that I'm looking for is for a Presuppositionalist to stand up, finally, and say "Enough of this!" Did you know that men are standing on pulpits proclaiming Presuppositionalism as necessary according to Scripture?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> As they should.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Originally posted by JohnV
> Did you know that Sola Scriptura is equated with Presuppositionalism on pulpits?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don´t know of any specific cases, but I can definitely see the STRONG relationship between presuppositionalism and sola scriptura. Let me ask you, do you believe that "œAll Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work"?
> 
> The Bible furnishes man with all of the apologetic necessary for Christians. Pressup is the apologetic of Jesus and Paul.
Click to expand...

This is not the ruling of the church, for the church has ruled that three different apologetics do not transgress the WCF, and therefore do not transgress Biblical teaching. If the authority of Christ on earth, namely the church ruling only by the Word and necessary consequence, has not ruled that Presuppositionalism was the apologetic of Jesus and Paul, then men may not do so on their own. If it is not a church ruling, it is not authoritative. 

Men insist on it, not churches. It is men who say it should be preached, not the churches' Confession. It is men who claim it to be Jesus' and Paul's apologetic, not the Bible. It is men who usurp the authority of the pulpit to proclaim it, just as you say they should. So far no reputable church has mandated it as exclusively Biblical, no accepted Confession, and no Biblical necessity has done so either. It is only in your own mind that this has taken place. 

Presuppositionalism will finally just fade away. What I am concerned about is the church. The pulpit is the central focus of the church: the preaching of the Word. When that is polluted by men, then where is the church? Surely there are still faithful people in the church, but if the pulpits are not kept, then how long will that be so? On the arbitrary ruling of men things are propounded from the pulpit, not just as being equal to the Word, but as being necessary prior to the Word. 

I actually have to provide no examples, though I am quite able to. For you yourself have not only suggested but insisted that Presuppositionalism ought to be preached from the pulpit, and that Presuppositionalism was the apologetic of Jesus and Paul. This is quite audacious enough. I need prove no more to you, for you prove it to yourself. You say these things as if they are obviously true, and yet without any sanction from any real authority. No one has ruled that these things are so, but only men have.

[Edited on 1-20-2006 by JohnV]


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## RamistThomist

John, help me out:
Given your standards, it would seem that all the church could preach on is what's specifically stated in the Confessions. But this would rule against making good and necessary deductions from the Confession. No, the Confession doesn't state presuppositionalism, but a pastor in the pulpit, applying the word to current situations, may indeed discover, alongside the teachings of sound men, that this indeed is in harmony (More so?) than the others.


----------



## Arch2k

John, I don't know what church you are talking about. 

I think without any further true discussion on the actual subject at hand, I will bow out. I am interested in discussing the "legitimate use of classical and evidential apologetics within Van Tillian presuppositionalism."


----------



## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> John, help me out:
> Given your standards, it would seem that all the church could preach on is what's specifically stated in the Confessions. But this would rule against making good and necessary deductions from the Confession. No, the Confession doesn't state presuppositionalism, but a pastor in the pulpit, applying the word to current situations, may indeed discover, alongside the teachings of sound men, that this indeed is in harmony (More so?) than the others.


Who are sound men? Not even the Westminster Assembly dared to rule anything based on "the teachings of sound men". Sure, they cited them in other works, such as _Jus Divinum_, but only so as to lend support in that godly men throughout history are in agreement, not so as to make it authoritative. If the men of WA relied on their own reasoning for any of the Confession, then it is suspect; but it is accepted in the churches because they relied on Scripture alone, and not on their reasonings. 

But more to your question. Yes, that which is specifically taught in the Confessions is the limit of what may be preached. There is enough in there for any preacher's lifetime of preaching. And yes, it indeed does rule against preachers making their own "good and necessary inferences" on their own. The church is not governed by any one man, but by a plurality of rulers all governed by the Word. So it is even less so that Biblical doctrine is determined by one man, but must be recognized by a plurality of elders, again governed by the Word. Nothing more may be added. 

But no, this does not curtail the preachers mandate. He has many ways to express the teachings of the Bible to specific circumstances, according to the needs of his ministry among people. It is not wrong, for example, to stress the need for missions, even to a particular place. This is in line with, as direct application of, what the Bible teaches, and of what the Confessions recognize. And yes, an apologetic necessity is sometimes in place. And this is not in contravention of the limits of office. 

There are indeed times when a good Presuppositional presentation is required. This is in complete accordance with the Bible's teaching. There are times as well when the classic arguments could avail, or the Biblical understanding of the evidences be presented. This too is not prohibited. 

What I am talking about is that men, without Biblical, necessary, or ecclesiastical sanction have ruled that Presuppositionalism and Presuppositionalism alone is prerequisite to understanding anything at all, most of all Scripture, but nor excluding creation. I agree that one must have his ducks in a row to think straight, but I don't agree that Presuppositionalists alone have a corner on the market. That is plain enough, since they have no compunction at all about using the pulpit to propagate their opinons without first appealing to the church and to Scripture, and being subject to them. They do this on their own authority, but not on any real authority. Such things used to be scandalous, outrageous, but now are everyday. 

So much so, in fact, that it is possible to define a new RPW for ordained men, namely that what is not forbidden may be commanded. For men such as I who dissent from having Presuppositionalism imposed there is the old RPW, that what is not commanded is forbidden. Therefore if a minister believes that Presuppositionalism is Biblical, I have no choice. I have to tell my children that he is preaching the Word, and therefore must be respected and believed. If I don't then he may drive my children from me, and it will be all my fault for failing as a father. In fact, I may be excommunicated for dissenting, for believing that he ought only to preach the Word and not his opinions. This is because the old RPW applies to me: I may not reject the minister's commands, which include his opinions imposed upon me; while a new RPW applies to him, that he may commend and command what is not forbidden, what he on his own authority deems good and necessary. 

If you're asking me if ministers may freely expand on the Confessions on their own reasoning, then I say: No, they may not. That undermines what the Confessions stand for. What is the use of systemizing the teachings of Scripture if every man is free to add to it his own surmisings and opinions? His office is an office of agency of the Spirit, not a direct authority. Thus there are limits to his authority. He may only wield authority on behalf of Christ, not on his own. Supreme and magisterial authority belong to God through Christ alone, not to men. What is delegated to men is to rule according to Christ's authority. It is what is called "improperly ecclesiastical and spiritual" because it is only objectively ecclesiastical and spiritual. That is, that which is surely known through the Word is its rule, nothing more. Therefore men adding their surmisings, that is, their opinions in addition to the Word, is repugnant to that office.


----------



## RamistThomist

> This is in complete accordance with the Bible's teaching. There are times as well when the classic arguments could avail, or the Biblical understanding of the evidences be presented. This too is not prohibited.



That's all you had to say, for this is what the thread is about.


----------



## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> John, I don't know what church you are talking about.
> 
> I think without any further true discussion on the actual subject at hand, I will bow out. I am interested in discussing the "legitimate use of classical and evidential apologetics within Van Tillian presuppositionalism."



This presumes that Presuppositionalism is the _de facto_ orthodoxy, calling into question the legitimacy, if any, of classical or evidential apologetic arguments. What I am saying is that Presuppositionalism is in no place to make such a request. The question must first be if Presuppositionalism is legitimate enough for any legitimate use of classical or evidential arguments to be added to it. If you are really interested in this topic then this should be your prime concern. 

No, Jacob, this is not off topic. I am not a Presuppositionalist, so it is fair to call the question, the one that is begged by the propositions. Presuppositionalism must first show its legitimacy before it can call into question the legitimacy of other aplogetic views. That means, of necessity, that it must divorce itself from the abuses perpetrated in its name. It must stop judging and accusing men on no other grounds than its own opinions. 

It is not authoritative until God says so. And God did not say so. So don't pretend that it is authoritative.


----------



## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> 
> 
> No, Jacob, this is not off topic. I am not a Presuppositionalist, so it is fair to call the question, the one that is begged by the propositions. Presuppositionalism must first show its legitimacy before it can call into question the legitimacy of other aplogetic views. That means, of necessity, that it must divorce itself from the abuses perpetrated in its name. It must stop judging and accusing men on no other grounds than its own opinions.



Then, pray tell, how may one divorce oneself from the abuses, whatever they are?


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> John, I don't know what church you are talking about.
> 
> I think without any further true discussion on the actual subject at hand, I will bow out. I am interested in discussing the "legitimate use of classical and evidential apologetics within Van Tillian presuppositionalism."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This presumes that Presuppositionalism is the _de facto_ orthodoxy, calling into question the legitimacy, if any, of classical or evidential apologetic arguments. What I am saying is that Presuppositionalism is in no place to make such a request. The question must first be if Presuppositionalism is legitimate enough for any legitimate use of classical or evidential arguments to be added to it. If you are really interested in this topic then this should be your prime concern.
> 
> No, Jacob, this is not off topic. I am not a Presuppositionalist, so it is fair to call the question, the one that is begged by the propositions. Presuppositionalism must first show its legitimacy before it can call into question the legitimacy of other aplogetic views. That means, of necessity, that it must divorce itself from the abuses perpetrated in its name. It must stop judging and accusing men on no other grounds than its own opinions.
> 
> It is not authoritative until God says so. And God did not say so. So don't pretend that it is authoritative.
Click to expand...


You may have said before, but how exactly is this different than the baptism debate. Either Paedo is correct or Credo is correct. One who holds to the wrong one is in sin and unorthodox. The wrong side is putting their opinion into the mouth of God.

Next, calling a group's integrity into question is far beyond what one should be doing here. If you wish to call someone's position wrong and therefore they are in sin, then go right ahead, but going further is completely uncalled for.


----------



## JohnV

I mentioned Mark Rushdoony's speach which Chris posted a while ago. This speach espouses a Reconstructionism ( unlike your own ) which names as its fundamental bases both Presuppositionalism and Postmillennialism. This is not only an ideology but one that purports itself as more fundamentally Christian in perspective than the Reformedness of the the Reformed churches. It even imposes itself upon theology by proclaiming its hybrid result, namely Dominion Theology. That is, texts in the Bible are to be interpreted according to their dominion-oriented thrust. 
But the point is that both Postmillennialism and Presuppositionalism were raised to a level of being normative for interpreting Scripture, a man-made grid to put overtop of Scripture which results in a new theology. 
This ideology has never been the ideology of the church. Never. It has been, as the Westminster Presbyters put so well, "superadded". This is clearly an abuse. 

Another abuse is the fact of some churches within the federations of Reformed churches defining themselves as Reconstructionist churches. They have more than just Reformed theology, they also have Reconstructionism. And if they believe this to be the truer expression of Reformed theology, they have done so on their own authority, not the churches' rule under Christ's authority. This, as Ligon Duncan proves, _depends_ on adoption of Presuppositionalism. This is clearly an abuse. 

How often has it been that the insinuation, if not direct accusation, from the Presuppositionalist that classical arguments and evidential arguments are unfaithful to Scripture? Again, on whose authority? This is an abuse. Men lording it over men; men claiming superiority over others; men accusing others on spurious grounds. 

There are others. But why do we need to go beyond what Jeff said. He believes that Presuppositionalism was the apologetic of Jesus and Paul. Where did he get that notion from? Someone is teaching this stuff. Is this not an abuse? Have you ever heard of anything like this before? If you have, you can be sure is came from churches that were later judged as having left the straight an narrow. 

Jacob, it disturbs me more and more, as I delve into these things concerning my appeal before GA this coming summer, how far we have wandered from the ecclesiology of the Westminster Assembly. Questions such as the one this thread poses only add to the concern. Do we really believe that Presuppositionalism has gained to the level of being a mark of orthodoxy, as the question implies? If so, then I will surely welcome being told that I have no part in the church anymore. I will certainly be looking for a real orthodox church, one which does not add men's doctrines to the Word. 

For if Presuppositionalism were really the apologetic of Jesus and Paul, then clearly the churches would not have approved the Classical and Evidential approaches. According to Presuppositionalism they are mutually exclusive to Presuppositionalism. Therefore to rule Presuppositionalism as Christ's and Paul's apologetic is to rule the others as unacceptable at the same time. No church has done that. So that leaves that this has been determined by men, not by God; men working on their own authority; or worse, usurping authority that does not belong to them.


----------



## Saiph

Hermonta,


> You may have said before, but how exactly is this different than the baptism debate. Either Paedo is correct or Credo is correct. One who holds to the wrong one is in sin and unorthodox. The wrong side is putting their opinion into the mouth of God.



I have to disagree with you there. Baptism is a sacrament, sign and seal of the COG. Apologetics is philosophy applied to the knowledge of God. Big difference.

And Plantinga does a great job of being presuppositional while still giving value to the classical arguments as far as they can go. esp the ontological.

[Edited on 1-20-2006 by Saiph]


----------



## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Hermonta,
> 
> 
> 
> You may have said before, but how exactly is this different than the baptism debate. Either Paedo is correct or Credo is correct. One who holds to the wrong one is in sin and unorthodox. The wrong side is putting their opinion into the mouth of God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have to disagree with ypu there. Baptism is a sacrament, sign and seal of the COG. Apologetics is philosophy applied to the knowledge of God. Big difference.
Click to expand...


What he meant was that Baptism, either way, isn't stated as clearly as both sides would like. Apologetics the same way: we don't see the words presup, but like baptism, we should not shy away from the subject. Of course, I have strong opinions on this subject.


----------



## JohnV

Hermonta:



> You may have said before, but how exactly is this different than the baptism debate. Either Paedo is correct or Credo is correct. One who holds to the wrong one is in sin and unorthodox. The wrong side is putting their opinion into the mouth of God.
> 
> Next, calling a group's integrity into question is far beyond what one should be doing here. If you wish to call someone's position wrong and therefore they are in sin, then go right ahead, but going further is completely uncalled for.


The last paragraph is my point: calling the integrity of classicalists and evidentialists into question goes beyond the scope. That is what the original question implies, though. 

I have stated what is fact; and I have stated the position of the Reformed ecclesiology truly, according to the Westminster's own rulings and documents. _Jus Divinum_ is considered the authoritative argumentation of the Assembly, though they did not put all their arguements into the Confessional framework. So I have it right from the horse's mouth, so to speak. And I personally know that such audacious things are being done in the name of Christ. I am in the very middle of it. There is no question about it. And if it is done here, then certainly it is done elsewhere. For surely there are other churches proclaiming the same doctrines, reputing themselves as Reconstructionist churches, where Presuppositionalism plays a prerequisite part. 

And it is not the Classicalist or the Evidentialist that is making waves on the discussion boards, proclaiming themselves to be the only authoritative answer to the calumnies thrown at the church and her members. They only claim to have answers, not as having the only answers. Nor do you see these other apologetic methodologies resulting in new ideologies that depend on them, forcing them to be imbibed before one can understand Scripture. They have always been held in submission and subservience to revealed truth in creation and Scripture. Where men have transgressed these bounds their faults have been found, and will continue to be found by sincere, godly, and pious men. 

In relation to the baptism debate, yes I agree that the two are mutually exclusive. And I agree that one view must be faulty. Someone is wrong. The fact that we have not been able to convince each other, though there are godly men on both sides who duly respect the sole authority of the Word, displays the weakness of men, not of the Word. I believe that the credo's are wrong here, and demonstrably so. However, as plain as it is to me, it is not plain to others. It may be that God has not allowed them to see; but it may also yet be that God has not allowed me to see. This is a sore to the unity of the church. 

But it is also true that we as paedo's have many faults in our view of baptism that would go unchecked were it not for God's providential hand in providing for us godly men who differ with us on a Scriptural level. This may add more to the true unity, if not organizational, than the disunity it imparts. 

These separate churches must preach these doctrines from the pulpit. Though one is surely wrong, it is yet about a fundamental aspect of the church, namely the administration of the Word through sacrament. This must be preached so as to maintain the unity of the means of grace. 

This is wholly different than apologetic methodologies. It is not even necessary to hold to any one particular methodology to be a faithful member of the church, much less be expert at any one of them. It is not essential. To be a defender of the faith, a particular calling of the offices of the church, one must be proficient with the teachings of Scripture, the relationship of the two revelations in unity, and the meanings of the offences against the faith. But there is no demand for any particular methodology. None whatsoever, except that it be faithful to God's truth. On this point no church has ever ruled that one methodology, to the exclusion of all others, is the authoritative methodology, save that one must not claim to know what he does not know. 

As you can see, this is far different than the differences on baptism. Men are not usurping authority that does not belong to them in order to proclaim their church's rulings on baptism. The churches have ruled, and not the elders whom the churches send preach it. On the other hand, no churches have ruled, no churches have sent, and yet men are using their office and the pulpit to proclaim their particular apologetic methodolgy. In the former case they may be wrong, but it is still on the churches' authority; while in the latter case the churches cannot be blamed for men doing so, but only that they did not protect the offices from it, according to what they did rule by adopting the Westminster rulings on ecclesiology. 

No one has sent them, but they sent themselves. This is no small obstacle to them. It is a serious thing for them to consider. Especially if they are Theonomists, the kind that believe that they must re-establish the OT judicial code. For there it clearly states that men who usurp the offices, saying what God did not tell them to say, claiming to be sent when God did not send them, are to be stoned. It is not necessary to be a Theonomist to be a Presuppositionalist, but it is necessary to be a Presuppositionalist to be a Theonomist; it is their platform, what they stand on, as Ligon Duncan has shown. So this is a serious problem. 

All I am saying is that a Presuppositionalist has to stand up and put a limit on it. It has gone too far, and for it to regain integrity it must recognize the limits and abide by them. Proclaiming it on men's authority does nothing to convince me. Follow proper procedure, follow the church's ruling, be scrupulous, and be above reproach, and then we may talk about whether the classical or evidential arguments avail anything.


----------



## RamistThomist

> For if Presuppositionalism were really the apologetic of Jesus and Paul, then clearly the churches would not have approved the Classical and Evidential approaches



I can answer this, but not now. You won't like it, though.

I will soften my position: Other branches of apologeitcs are not sinful, but they are also compromised in effeciency.

Functionally, you come down to the position of "You can't even talk about presuppositionalism positively until you prove it is the biblical positon." Then someone will argue for the value of presuppsitional apologetics. Then you backtrack, with all due respect, and say that the Confession doesn't speak on it, so you shan't either.

So it looks like this: You have to prove to me presuppositonalism is valid before you can pontificate it.

(proceeds to argue for presuppositionalism)

Well, you can't argue for it because the Confession doesn't speak on it. 

Ultimately, you shift standards in teh debate and make it a "darned if you do, darned if you don't" approach. I am bowing out, since we are no longer addressing Chris's claim.


----------



## JohnV

Mark:



> And Plantinga does a great job of being presuppositional while still giving value to the classical arguments as far as they can go. esp the ontological.


I haven't been up on Plantinga for a while, but it is a good point that the different approaches do not have to be mutually exclusive, especially when they deal in different areas. I have said one time that Presuppositionalism is Classicalism applied to the predispositions of men's minds, their own. Classicalism deals with predispositions beyond that, not of men's own. And Evidentialism deals with the facts in spite of men's predispositions. So they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.


----------



## JohnV

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> 
> 
> 
> For if Presuppositionalism were really the apologetic of Jesus and Paul, then clearly the churches would not have approved the Classical and Evidential approaches
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I can answer this, but not now. You won't like it, though.
> 
> I will soften my position: Other branches of apologeitcs are not sinful, but they are also compromised in effeciency.
> 
> Functionally, you come down to the position of "You can't even talk about presuppositionalism positively until you prove it is the biblical positon." Then someone will argue for the value of presuppsitional apologetics. Then you backtrack, with all due respect, and say that the Confession doesn't speak on it, so you shan't either.
> 
> So it looks like this: You have to prove to me presuppositonalism is valid before you can pontificate it.
> 
> (proceeds to argue for presuppositionalism)
> 
> Well, you can't argue for it because the Confession doesn't speak on it.
> 
> Ultimately, you shift standards in the debate and make it a "darned if you do, darned if you don't" approach. I am bowing out, since we are no longer addressing Chris's claim.
Click to expand...


I think you misunderstand, Jacob. What I am saying is that things such as what Anthony and Jeff were saying is far too bold, as is the original question. This seriously calls Presuppositionalism into question, simply because no Presuppositionalist sees it, though it is clear enough. I am not saying that you cannot talk about or defend your position. It would be dumb not to, if you really believe it, as I'm sure you do. Just do so with understanding, that's all. Know the limits, and abide with them. 

I am not saying you can't argue it because the Confessions don't speak on it. I am saying that men may not use their God-given offices for it, because they have no leave, no permission to do so. You are not an office-bearer, and it is your opinion. It may even be that it is your opinion that it is exclusive. That's fine. Put it out for discussion as such. Nothing wrong with that. But first disentangle yourself from those who have brought your views into disrepute by claiming to be sent by God to proclaim it, which is what using the pulpit and the offices is saying. They have to keep the office pure, and the pulpit pure, free from men's infiltration and influence. And you must keep your view free from it as well. Therefore, if you truly believe in it, then distance yourself from these pretenders. For no church has sent them to proclaim Presuppositionalism as Jesus' and Paul's apologetic; no authority has sent them to proclaim it as orthodoxy.


----------



## Saiph

John, I agree with you, and so does John Frame. I just finished Plantinga's book "God And Other Minds". It is a very good read, and goes through all of the classical arguments and reveals where they need better definitions at certain levels. He also deals with the problem of evil and the analogy of other minds. The last half was a bit more obtuse for my amateur mind, but it brings up very interesting questions. I plan on working through all of his writings. This one was first published in 1967, so his thoughts might have changed by now.

[Edited on 1-20-2006 by Saiph]


----------



## JohnV

Mark: 

"amateur"? Interesting. I need to read that book.


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> Hermonta,
> 
> 
> 
> You may have said before, but how exactly is this different than the baptism debate. Either Paedo is correct or Credo is correct. One who holds to the wrong one is in sin and unorthodox. The wrong side is putting their opinion into the mouth of God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have to disagree with you there. Baptism is a sacrament, sign and seal of the COG. Apologetics is philosophy applied to the knowledge of God. Big difference.
> 
> And Plantinga does a great job of being presuppositional while still giving value to the classical arguments as far as they can go. esp the ontological.
> 
> [Edited on 1-20-2006 by Saiph]
Click to expand...


I am not saying the stakes are as high. I am only comparing the "someone has it wrong" aspect.

Plantinga is a great philosopher, eventhough I disagree vehemently with him on certain issues. If he would be more presuppositional, he would be much better.

CT


----------



## Civbert

Have I been too bold? - I hope so. But have I contradicted myself - I don't think I have. If you can show me a clear contradiction, I'd really appreciate it, because one of my goals in life is to remove all contradictory beliefs.

The issue of who's pushing Presuppositionalism, and if the have the authority, is interesting, but a bit of a straw man, and maybe an unintended red-herring. So I'd like to get back to the different kinds of apologetics.

There are different ways of looking at proof. And again it seems that many here are satisfied with calling it proof when there is an abundance of evidence to make the case. If that is all that is required, then the Theory of Evolution has been proven. There is certainly plenty of evidence for ToE, one might say it's overwhelming evidence. And that being the case, then we can not say ToE is unproven.

But if we consider proof only in the deductive sense, as a necessary inference, a conclusion that is true because it can not possible be false, then ToE is unproven, but is a matter of scientific opinion. It's bad science, but that is the standard of natural science today - convincing (subjective) evidence.

But I will always use proof to be deductive. This is the sense being used by the classical arguments for the existence of God. This is the kind of proof used for the Teleological, Ontological, and Transcendental arguments. It is Aquinas's "first mover" argument, and Anslem's "the being than whom nothing greater can be conceived". And let me add that in these arguments, we do not need exhaustive knowledge to prove them. All that is needed to prove deductively is true premises, and valid forms of of inference. You can prove a deductive conclusion is true with only one true premise - and no exhaustive knowledge is needed.

What I think is folly and fallacy, is any deductive argument for the existence of anything - especially an undefined "God". I think that any argument for the existence of something, must presuppose the thing exists for it to work, and it is thereby a circular argument and a logical fallacy. 

The most basic form of a propositions includes two terms (a logical subject, and a logical predicate) joined by the copula "is" or "are". And this copula means "exists as". Existence is assumed whenever you state any true proposition. So arguing for the existence of anything is circular because the premise assumes that it exists. X is Y assumes X exists in some manner or form, and that is the predicate we need to state.

The question then is not "does God exist" but rather "what God exists". That is, we should be asking if the statement "God is X" is true (where X is some predicate phrase that defines "God"). The statement "God exists" is nonsensical. It means nothing more than "God is" and it is an incomplete thought, a sentence fragment, not a complete proposition. We can not prove God exists because the question is incomplete and unanswerable as stated. 

What does this have to do with presuppositionalism? Well the Christian presupposition is "the Bible is the Word of God", and from this presuppositions, we have our definition of God. The Bible defines for us who God is.


----------



## ChristianTrader

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Have I been too bold? - I hope so. But have I contradicted myself - I don't think I have. If you can show me a clear contradiction, I'd really appreciate it, because one of my goals in life is to remove all contradictory beliefs.



Since we do not have/ nor will ever have exhaustive knowledge, the best you will be able to do is to call some of your "contradictions" only apparent contradictions or antimonies.



> The issue of who's pushing Presuppositionalism, and if the have the authority, is interesting, but a bit of a straw man, and maybe an unintended red-herring. So I'd like to get back to the different kinds of apologetics.



Let us do just that.



> There are different ways of looking at proof. And again it seems that many here are satisfied with calling it proof when there is an abundance of evidence to make the case.



Well it is not quite that simple. 

It seems that your argument reduces to, "I and many others have defined proof X, and if you do not do the same, I will yell and scream and have a fit." Alrighty.

There is a not an abundance of evidence, there is no evidence for the other side. But on top of that there is no way of gaining any evidence.



> If that is all that is required, then the Theory of Evolution has been proven.



The theory of evolution destroys the possibility of knowledge, therefore to engage in conversation or debate, assumes the falsity of the proposition of evolution.



> There is certainly plenty of evidence for ToE, one might say it's overwhelming evidence. And that being the case, then we can not say ToE is unproven.



There is zero evidence for evolution. So I do not understand your point.



> But if we consider proof only in the deductive sense, as a necessary inference, a conclusion that is true because it can not possible be false, then ToE is unproven, but is a matter of scientific opinion. It's bad science, but that is the standard of natural science today - convincing (subjective) evidence.



You are not trying to make an argument that you can deal with evolution and those with other definitions of proof cannot, therefore you are correct, are you?

Who said evolution was convincing at any level?

You do understand that (according to your own terms) all you have done is shift the uncertainty from the process of going from premises to the the conclusion, to the premises themselves. Unless you can "convince" that your premises have to be true, what exactly have you gained?



> But I will always use proof to be deductive. This is the sense being used by the classical arguments for the existence of God. This is the kind of proof used for the Teleological, Ontological, and Transcendental arguments. It is Aquinas's "first mover" argument, and Anslem's "the being than whom nothing greater can be conceived". And let me add that in these arguments, we do not need exhaustive knowledge to prove them. All that is needed to prove deductively is true premises, and valid forms of of inference. You can prove a deductive conclusion is true with only one true premise - and no exhaustive knowledge is needed.



You have to have exhaustive knowledge in order for them to be useful.

Next, true premises are the thing in question. So unless you can prove that, what the reason to be so confident?



> What I think is folly and fallacy, is any deductive argument for the existence of anything - especially an undefined "God". I think that any argument for the existence of something, must presuppose the thing exists for it to work, and it is thereby a circular argument and a logical fallacy.



You must know that there are different degrees of circularity and that Van Tillians have no problem with certain degrees but do with others. So all you are doing now is dogmatically asserting that you don't agree with them. So I can just dogmatically assert that I do not agree with you and we are even?



> The most basic form of a propositions includes two terms (a logical subject, and a logical predicate) joined by the copula "is" or "are". And this copula means "exists as". Existence is assumed whenever you state any true proposition. So arguing for the existence of anything is circular because the premise assumes that it exists. X is Y assumes X exists in some manner or form, and that is the predicate we need to state.



No disagreement there. Hence we spend the time arguing for our worldview being the only one to make knowledge possible. You just seem to not like the argument, which is fine.



> The question then is not "does God exist" but rather "what God exists". That is, we should be asking if the statement "God is X" is true (where X is some predicate phrase that defines "God"). The statement "God exists" is nonsensical. It means nothing more than "God is" and it is an incomplete thought, a sentence fragment, not a complete proposition. We can not prove God exists because the question is incomplete and unanswerable as stated.



There is more to God (of the Bible), than can be proven transcendentally. For some things, we just need the Bible to tell us and we could not know them any other way. I do not see this as a problem, perhaps you could explain your objection more?



> What does this have to do with presuppositionalism? Well the Christian presupposition is "the Bible is the Word of God", and from this presuppositions, we have our definition of God. The Bible defines for us who God is.



No, the Christian presupp is that the Bible and Natural Revelation are the Words of God. Clarkians tend to short change that. Not denying that Special revelation is critically important for saving and other knowledge, to deny natural revelation is foolhardy.


----------



## JohnV

Anthony:
There is a huge difference in how we are using the terms. And this is leading us into different ways of understanding. But more importantly, there is a great gulf between how we understand the limits of men's opinions. 

In my way of understanding, Presuppositionalism is _adiaphora_, indifferent. The Church agrees, for she has not ruled it as _necessary_. And she has ruled the other two as of equal standing, as not heretical, as permissible views, and as not transgressing the Confessional covenant of Biblical teaching. The three are of equal standing, and only as permissible views, opinions. If it were plainly a Scriptural truth then surely the church would have seen it by now, and would have ruled it as necessary doctrine because the Bible clearly teaches it. But she has not done so. It is _adiaphora_, indifferent. 

Now, the difference between a permissible opinion and a clear teaching is that the latter must be imposed, the former may not be imposed. The fact that it does not transgress Biblical teaching means that you may hold to that opinion without fear of contradicting the Bible's teaching. But that does not mean that this opinion is what the Bible teaches. 

Even the most militant Presuppositionalist that I know of has agreed with me, when I cornered him. He admitted that it is _adiaphora_. The problem is, he also said that is was a platform, a prerequisite, to his views which he believed he had a right to preach, because he believed them to be Biblical. That is, then, he also held Presuppositionalism as _necessary_. That's what "prerequisite" entails, necessity. And preaching it entails God's sanction. But whether it is God's opinion has not been established, because the Church has ruled, and the Presuppositionalist has agreed, that it is _adiaphora_.

Do you see the contradiction? No, it is not your contradiction. It is his. Yet he sees no contradiction. This sets up the situation that I described above, where one thing is God's message in one church, and its mutually exclusive opposite is God's message in another church. In one church Presuppositionalism is God's _necessary_ gospel because a man believes it, though not on church authority, but on his own; and in another church Presuppositionalism is _adiaphora_, because the church does not mandate it. They cannot both be true. Do you see that only that which God commands may be taught as God's commands? Nothing more? Men cannot add to is just because they believe it to be so. Men do not have that authority. They may only impose as true what God has commanded. This is a strict rule in the churches and always has been. 

Now here is your contradiction. You have made Presuppositionalism superior to all others. Exclusive even. But no church has ever ruled that this is what the Bible demands. That has never been done. You are doing this on your own authority. Bear with me, I'm getting to it. If you may do that, then what actual respect do you have for true authority? If you willingly by-pass the Bible-ordained means by which the Spirit rules, namely the Church, and make doctrine on your own or on men's say-so, but not the church's, then you really have no ground at all to say anything is true. Here is the contradiction: you say Presuppositionalism is true, and yet undermine any contact with certifying it. You're going around the way to prove it, not through it. You think all you need is to convince yourself that this is what the Bible says, and that's enough. Not even Calvin dared to do that, and yet you think it is enough. 

Do you see where I'm coming from? I'm no expert on apologetics or philosophy. But when you step on the church, that's another matter. And I am told, authoritatively so, that Presuppositionalism is _adiaphora_, indifferent. It is not necessary. And as long as the church holds to that, no man may shake that. No one may. No one may come to me and make it a necessity for anything for me. When they do, then they have by-passed the very Spirit they claim to cite for proof. For the Spirit does not and will not tell you to circumvent His ordained means of ruling the church. 

The church may be wrong. That has happened in the past. But only the true church may correct that, not men. Men may dissent from a church that has gone wrong, but just forming groups on their own and calling that church is not the right way to go about it. Church does not rest on men's authority. So how much less doctrine. All authority is Christ's, no one else's. He delegates it to men ordained for His purpose. They are not ordained to preach whatever they want to, but only what they are commanded, for it is Christ's gospel, not men's. 

Take this as an axiom, Anthony, and remember it well:



> The preacher must believe everything he is called to preach, but he is not called to preach everything he believes.



The preacher is commanded what he may preach, by Christ, through the church. He is not free to preach whatever he himself reasons to come out of Scripture. That is not his office. This has never been given him to do. He must submit his notions to the ruling body of the church so that they may test it to see if it is of God, necessitated by Scripture and sound reason. He shouldn't trust himself. Let him submit it to the Church, and then let the Church sustain him, and then send him. 

I'm saying this so that you know the limits of holding to speculative points of view, ideas that do not have the sanction of the Church as doctrine. So when you make claims for Presuppositionalism that go beyond the Church's authority, then I know that you do not really know what you are claiming. If you by-pass the historic Church, saying something to be true that has never been established as true, making it more than speculation, more than opinion when that has never been ruled to be so, then you are showing that you do not know the limits of theology sufficiently to know the claims you are making that bear on theology. You may believe it yourself, but also respect those who are convinced otherwise. Know your own fallibility, and reap what you can from those that God has gifted with other convictions, convictions which the Church also allows. 

This is why we rejected the teachings of the Romanist church. They too were making things doctrinal precepts that could not be unquestionably sustained by Scripture. They did so on their own authority, as men. When finally the Romanist church adopted them, at the Council of Trent, then it became that church's sin as well, for they cited tradition and the rulings of men as their authority, not Scripture. Therefore they ruled themselves as apostate, and the break was made solid, necessary, and permanent. 

There are a number of contradictions in your previous post which you asked me to address. But I wanted to make this clear first. For it seems to me that you have a mistaken impression of what may and may not be imposed from Scripture. It is one thing to hold to that opinion, that Presuppositionalism is superior to the other methodologies, but it is quite another to suppose that it is anything more than your opinion or the opinion of men. And it is also quite another to cast aspersions on other people who do not agree with you, as if you had some authority backing you up. All the kings horses and all the kings men ( in other words, all the best Christian minds put together ) is not authority. Only the Word is authority. And the churches have ruled according to that Word: Presuppositionalism is, at best, _adiaphora_. Don't try to trump the historic Church. 


How is this on topic? If Presuppositionalism does not boast itself to be more than it rightfully is, then there are a number of key areas where the other two methodologies can compliment it. And vice versa as well: the others may also not boast too much, and may be of great assistance to Presuppositionalism. They are all three helpful to us to make understood that what the Bible teaches is true, true even for the unbeliever.

How so? Once Presuppositionalism has established by its method that some things are necessarily true, such as that God must needs exist, and that the world is understood through the knowledge He gives us, then suddenly all the proofs are of great weight, and all the categories are most fitting to the understanding. Suddenly all the proofs have a greater impact, for they go right to the core of the person's predispositions of the mind, whether voluntary and involuntary. We can address the skeptical, the doubter, or the questioner, because we too are weak as he is, and we too had need of our minds being redeemed; so we can identify with him and help him.


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## Saiph

> What does this have to do with presuppositionalism? Well the Christian presupposition is "the Bible is the Word of God", and from this presuppositions, we have our definition of God. The Bible defines for us who God is.



I think that is a misrepresentation of presuppositionalism. Do we learn language _a priori_ ? How do we learn to read the bible ? First empyrically and rationally, then by supernatural enlightenment by the Spirit.

Hermonta is correct, to deny natural revelation is foolhardy.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> 
> 
> 
> What does this have to do with presuppositionalism? Well the Christian presupposition is "the Bible is the Word of God", and from this presuppositions, we have our definition of God. The Bible defines for us who God is.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think that is a misrepresentation of presuppositionalism. Do we learn language _a priori_ ? How do we learn to read the bible ? First empyrically and rationally, then by supernatural enlightenment by the Spirit.
> 
> Hermonta is correct, to deny natural revelation is foolhardy.
Click to expand...


The temporal order of learning, and the logical justification of knowledge are not the same. What is your theory of language? Did it evolve, or was it given to us by God. Do you think speaking is necessary before knowledge? 

If we "learn language" before we can know the Bible, and thereby the Gospel, then what is the state of the feeble minded and infants?

But when I say the the presupposition is Scripture, I mean that only by taking Scripture (God propositional verbal revelation) as the axiom of our worldview can we have justified true belief. Empirical based knowledge is, at best, opinion. It is subjective and unverifiable. 

I suppose I need to add a disclaimer to my posts. I am not an elder, nor an representative of the PCA. These are my opinions, and I am expressing them on this forum because believe it is a good way to examine my beliefs. I do believe I am allowed to say what I believe is biblical in this forum even if it does not agree in detail with the specific doctrines of the PCA or the WCF. 

But I also believe the elders should teach what they believe is most biblical - and as long as it agrees with the WCF - and as long as it is not a question of the Gospel and the salvation of the elect- even if it is not "official" church doctrine. If an elder believes his beliefs contradict the WCF, then he should resign his office and consider finding a church that he agrees with. But this is my opinion, is subject to change without prior notice to the reader.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Anthony:
> There is a huge difference in how we are using the terms. And this is leading us into different ways of understanding. But more importantly, there is a great gulf between how we understand the limits of men's opinions.
> 
> In my way of understanding, Presuppositionalism is _adiaphora_, indifferent. The Church agrees, for she has not ruled it as _necessary_. ....
> 
> ... But whether it is God's opinion has not been established, because the Church has ruled, and the Presuppositionalist has agreed, that it is _adiaphora_.
> 
> ....
> 
> Now here is your contradiction. You have made Presuppositionalism superior to all others. Exclusive even....
> 
> ...
> Take this as an axiom, Anthony, and remember it well:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The preacher must believe everything he is called to preach, but he is not called to preach everything he believes.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...
> 
> There are a number of contradictions in your previous post which you asked me to address. But I wanted to make this clear first. For it seems to me that you have a mistaken impression of what may and may not be imposed from Scripture. It is one thing to hold to that opinion, that Presuppositionalism is superior to the other methodologies, but it is quite another to suppose that it is anything more than your opinion or the opinion of men. And it is also quite another to cast aspersions on other people who do not agree with you, as if you had some authority backing you up. All the kings horses and all the kings men ( in other words, all the best Christian minds put together ) is not authority. Only the Word is authority. And the churches have ruled according to that Word: Presuppositionalism is, at best, _adiaphora_. Don't try to trump the historic Church.
> ...
Click to expand...


John,

I'm not sure where all this is coming from, but I think you are reading more into my posts then I intended. I am not a pastor, I'm not questioning anyone's faith, I'm just giving my arguments for the presuppositional position - my opinion. 

I worry that you have so stressed the "historical church" to the point of making it the sole authority of what is truth. I might error in similar ways regarding the WCF. But it should always be stressed (and I'm sure you agree) that Scripture is the only authority of truth for man - not the WCF, not Calvin, not "the church". 

But since I am not a pastor, nor am I presenting myself as any kind of authority, but am merely debating and discussion apologetical methods, I think your comments were a bit overboard.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_ I think that is a misrepresentation of presuppositionalism. Do we learn language _a priori_ ?



A presupposition _is_ the logical a priori justification for knowledge. I think both Clark and Van Til would agree.


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## Saiph

> If we "learn language" before we can know the Bible, and thereby the Gospel, then what is the state of the feeble minded and infants?



Anthony, I am not sure how you view knowledge at this point.
An infant or feeble minded person cannot know the bible without learning to read and being able to articulate thoughts into language. And the only path to that is through empyrical and rational excercise. We all "know" God innately, but but we do not know innately what He granted only by special revelation. I am arguing that natural revelation is knowledge enough to condemn all men. Special revelation is necessary for salvation.

And as far as the salvific state of the infant or feeble minded, I do not presume to understand. But I am not willing to change my philosophy of knowledge so that I can rationally include them. If they are elect, God can certainly elect them in spite of their ignorance.

[Edited on 1-20-2006 by Saiph]


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> 
> 
> 
> If we "learn language" before we can know the Bible, and thereby the Gospel, then what is the state of the feeble minded and infants?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Anthony, I am not sure how you view knowledge at this point.
> An infant or feeble minded person cannot know the bible without learning to read and being able to articulate thoughts into language. And the only path to that is through empyrical and rational excercise. We all "know" God innately, but but we do not know innately what He granted only by special revelation. I am arguing that natural revelation is knowledge enough to condemn all men. Special revelation is necessary for salvation.
> 
> And as far as the salvific state of the infant or feeble minded, I do not presume to understand. But I am not willing to change my philosophy of knowledge so that I can rationally include them. If they are elect, God can certainly elect them in spite of their ignorance.
> 
> [Edited on 1-20-2006 by Saiph]
Click to expand...


It might help if you consider that the physical brain is not where knowledge is found. Our souls have knowledge. When we die, our bodies return to dust, but we still have knowledge, and we will still join Christ.

So I think the brain just gets in the way of our souls. Infants can and do have knowledge, they can have saving faith (knowledge of the truth of Christ) even if they are not aware or conscious of this. And so too does unregenerate man know that God exists, even if he swears he does not. 

I do not think everything we know comes via sound and sight, that really what we know is innate, and we come aware of it as were read or hear the Word, and as it is made manifest within our minds (not brains) by the Spirit. When Scripture says we have the mind of Christ, this is not a metaphor. It is that God has enlightened our minds to the truth, given us both knowledge and understanding according to his will. We justify the things we believe, to be knowledge, by Scripture.

I'm not being as clear as I'd like, but I hope I am not being completely confusing. 

Also consider that empirical and rational are not concepts we can draw readily from Scripture. So we should not assume they are valid off hand. Consider that either might be false - and try to justify how either can work. Empiricism will fail if you examine it carefully. And rationalism lacks any foundation to build on.

[Edited on 1-20-2006 by Civbert]


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## Saiph

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> It might help if you consider that the physical brain is not where knowledge is found. Our souls have knowledge. When we die, our bodies return to dust, but we still have knowledge, and we will still join Christ.
> 
> So I think the brain just gets in the way of our souls. Infants can and do have knowledge, they can have saving faith (knowledge of the truth of Christ) even if they are not aware or conscious of this. And so too does unregenerate man know that God exists, even if he swears he does not.
> 
> I do not think everything we know comes via sound and sight, that really what we know is innate, and we come aware of it as were read or hear the Word, and as it is made manifest within our minds (not brains) by the Spirit. When Scripture says we have the mind of Christ, this is not a metaphor. It is that God has enlightened our minds to the truth, given us both knowledge and understanding according to his will. We justify the things we believe, to be knowledge, by Scripture.
> 
> I'm not being as clear as I'd like, but I hope I am not being completely confusing.
> 
> Also consider that empirical and rational are not concepts we can draw readily from Scripture. So we should not assume they are valid off hand. Consider that either might be false - and try to justify how either can work. Empiricism will fail if you examine it carefully. And rationalism lacks any foundation to build on.
> 
> [Edited on 1-20-2006 by Civbert]



That sounds almost like Descartes mental substance idea. Have you read Bahnsen's essay on Substantive monism ?

I disagree with you. The brain and the soul cannot be seperated the way you imply they can.


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## JohnV

Correction, Anthony: empiricism may fail you because you do not apply it correctly, but the empirical evidences do not fail. How can they fail if God created them, and they do give glory to His name, and they do proclaim His handiwork, His providential hand in upholding all things? No it is man that fails, it is his mind that has fallen into depravity. So empiricism fails you because you do not understand it. But empiricism does not fail. You actually have no way to conclude that, because you cannot rely on empirical proofs within your system to verify that. You have no empiricism. 

So of course it fails you. But do not judge other men's abilities or gifts. Some men are redeemed, and are given the mind of Christ, and are not totally depraved in their thinking, and are therefore able to make sense of the empirical evidences. That is what Mark is saying. And that is what this thread is about. Without this the Church could not rule objectively on what the Bible necessarily teaches. Not what men may think follows from Scripture, but what Scripture imposes and only that. Necessity is not capricious, contingent upon men; it is imposition of absolute truth.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> That sounds almost like Descartes mental substance idea. Have you read Bahnsen's essay on Substantive monism ?



No, but I'd like to. How was it published? I'll give it a google.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Correction, Anthony: empiricism may fail you because you do not apply it correctly, but the empirical evidences do not fail.


Empiricism fails because it does not work. Empiricism is the theory of knowledge that says knowledge comes from sensory experience alone, without any a priori knowledge. But knowledge is propositional, and senses are a different category, neither true nor false nor universal nor objective. So there are no empirical facts. There is our interpretation of sensation. And the only time that is objective is when it involves language or text. In which case, it is not empirical because you can not read without a priori knowledge.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> How can they fail if God created them, and they do give glory to His name, and they do proclaim His handiwork, His providential hand in upholding all things? No it is man that fails, it is his mind that has fallen into depravity. So empiricism fails you because you do not understand it.


God did not create empirical evidence (or facts) because knowledge is really not empirical, in that you do not obtain knowledge through sensory experience. You gain knowledge through language and reason. When you see a mountain or a tree or a bacterium, they don't say anything to you - they do not speak or write or communicate in any way. What you might learn from them is a product of your reasoning from a priori knowledge - and with the enlightenment of the Spirit if you are regenerate. 



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> But empiricism does not fail. You actually have no way to conclude that, because you cannot rely on empirical proofs within your system to verify that. You have no empiricism.


There is no such beast as an empirical proof. There are empirical formulas (which have nothing to do with empirical epistemology), and empirical theories which depend on a priori knowledge and rational thought to be formulated - so they are not of empiricism. Empirical proof is a fallacy.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> So of course it fails you. But do not judge other men's abilities or gifts.


I am not judging anyone's abilities or gifts. I am trying to explain that empiricism is itself absurd. One can not lean anything from sensory experience alone. Empiricism fails you and me both.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Some men are redeemed, and are given the mind of Christ, and are not totally depraved in their thinking, and are therefore able to make sense of the empirical evidences.


Indeed, we can make sense of our senses and experiences - _because_ we have the mind of Christ. But that is not empiricism, and it is not rationalism. It is the Spirit that enlightens our minds to the truth which is contrary to the theory of empiricism and rationalism.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> That is what Mark is saying. And that is what this thread is about. Without this the Church could not rule objectively on what the Bible necessarily teaches.


I do not see the connection here. Are you saying reading is empirical? Nope, you must know before you read, the meaning of the words and ideas you will be working with.



> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Not what men may think follows from Scripture, but what Scripture imposes and only that. Necessity is not capricious, contingent upon men; it is imposition of absolute truth.


Necessity can not be determined by empiricism, and rationalism has no content to work with. Therefore we have the Scriptures, that give us a foundation, a justification of truth, by which we can know absolute truth.

Clearly you and I are not using empiricism in the same manner. But when you start adding the enlightenment of the Spirit, or the truth we can learn from the Scriptures, then we are no longer taking about empiricism or rationalism. In effect, you are agreeing with the presuppositionalist who says that man can not make sense of reality without God. I say that man can know God exists because God has instilled knowledge of himself into the minds of all men at conception, and you seem to be saying the man can somehow reasonably infer the existence and nature of God through observation and by his own power of reason.

As is often the case, the disagreements hinge on definitions - and arguing without understanding each other's definitions is rather pointless. We don't have to agree on definitions, but we should try to understand how we are using the terms differently. Because I think we are substantially in agreement on the effects of sin and the correcting effect of the Spirit on our knowledge and understanding. We differ on the means of gaining knowledge, and maybe on the definition of knowledge. But we are speaking are cross purpose regarding "empiricism" and "proof".

[Edited on 1-21-2006 by Civbert]


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## JohnV

Anthony:


> Clearly you and I are not using empiricism in the same manner.


I agree. The question is, then, who is using the term properly? I believe I have shown ample reason to show that the Presuppositionalists' views are suspect. I began also to show that I don't have to accept your view of things. I can believe the Bible and the revelation of God in creation without adopting your views.


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## JohnV

> I've been thinking about apologetics as of late, and have typically viewed Classical and Evidential apologetics as unbiblical and erroneous, due to their divorced nature from one's theology, versus presuppositionalism's consistency with the rest of Reformed systematic theology, including man's depravity, the Creator-creature distinction, special knowledge of God and regeneration, universal knowledge of God as set forth in Romans 1, the fear of the Lord as the beginning (not the end result) of wisdom and knowledge (Proverbs 1:7), all hidden in Christ (Colossians 2:3), and other issues.
> 
> And I am still an ardent presuppositionalist, and believe the Classical and Evidential approaches as a whole as employed by men like Aquinas and Lee Strobel are unbiblical. But what do other presuppositionalists - who are committed to standing against neutrality, and not standing on the foolishness of unbelief on the so-called "neutral" level of the unbeliever - think of the possibility of legitimate use of certain Classical and Evidential arguments as particular parts to Proverbs 26:5, answering a fool according to his folly, by taking his perspective for the sake of argument?
> 
> In other words, after making our ultimate commitment to Christ as the beginning and source of all true knowledge, and stating that we will not surrender that in our apologetical discussion with the unbeliever, and presenting the Christian worldview and how it explains life around and within us, once we also begin to answer a fool according to his folly, could we not in that part say something to the effect of, "OK, and for the sake of argument, taking your assumptions that reason and science can be neutral or objective with regard to the question of the Christian worldview, here's how even that perspective of yours (employing "neutral" philosophy in the Classical arguments, and "neutral" science in the Evidential arguments) only points toward the reasonableness of Christianity, rather than the doubtfulness."
> 
> Of course we also still have to answer the fool according to his folly by showing him that his view logically leads to utter absurdity and chaos in all spheres of reason, experience and life (e.g. showing the impossibility of laws of logic and uniformity of nature without the Christian worldview), but could not these arguments also serve as additional points in the "reason" and "experience" categories in that regard? Some presuppositionalists may say that doing so would render the most basic demonstrations of Christianity's necessity as "insufficient," but that is hardly the case any more than the fact that we use arguments about logic and science being impossible with autonomy, for as Dr. Bahnsen well noted in his "Challenge to Unbelief" lectures, we are in effect done once we have shown even one of those as being impossible - yet showing several of them as such on many levels is part of answering a fool according to his folly, as he always raises many objections of many types.


As you can see, I think I've answered at least some of the questions. In addition to these things I would add that it is not evidentialism or classicalism that is divorced from theology, for Christ has chosen to select men for a major assembly of His Church in a time of classical and evidential views of apologetics to respond to the crucial issues of the Church in history; and their work is handed down to us as the rule of faith for the Church to this day as a standard of faith, namely the Westminster and Dordt Church Assemblies. They were not necessarily classicalists or evidentialists to the degree that they were adamant to defend them. They did not make any certainty in doctrine rest on the speculations of man. But they used these liberally to defend the truths of the Bible, to show that these doctrines were evident. Nor do they use the offices or the pulpit to insist upon these methodologies. They are of use, and they used them. But the truths were already true before these methods were used to convince men of the doctrines; they used them in subjection to truth. And so, if they were of use to them, it cannot be that they be folly for us to use.

In respect to the Westminster Standards and the Three Forms of Unity, as well as the LBCF for the Baptists, these are not the rulings of men, but the rulings of duly authorized credentialed men of the Church deciding these matters in holy convocation, from the Scripture by the Spirit, not on their own authority. So they are not the doctrines of men. Neither ought we to add anything to them without the authority of the Church in the same manner and of like authority. These are Church standards, through the Spirit. 

Let us not make men like Calvin great because they were such great minds. Let us remember that the great wrongs of the time did as much and more to reveal these truths to us, and that God gifted men like Calvin so He could teach us the lessons of history in the Church. It was not Calvin, but Christ using the agency of a man. In the same way He is leading His church through the agency of ordained men, so that we may be taught truly. It is not ours to add to these rulings according to our whim, or our own authority. This is how the Bible says the Church will be ruled, and so we need to acknowledge that. Not bowing down any longer to men who add their own doctrines by their own understandings, but bowing to those doctrines already established by the Spirit through these men, according to the Word.


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## default3

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> John, I agree with you, and so does John Frame. I just finished Plantinga's book "God And Other Minds". It is a very good read, and goes through all of the classical arguments and reveals where they need better definitions at certain levels. He also deals with the problem of evil and the analogy of other minds. The last half was a bit more obtuse for my amateur mind, but it brings up very interesting questions. I plan on working through all of his writings. This one was first published in 1967, so his thoughts might have changed by now.
> 
> [Edited on 1-20-2006 by Saiph]



Saiph,

*God and Other Minds* prepared the way for Plantinga's defense of properly basic theistic belief. You might want to read *Warranted Christian Belief* (pp. 69-71) and the preface to the 1990 edition of *God and Other Minds* to get Plantinga's gloss on his project in *God and Other Minds* from the vantage point of his more mature epistemology of belief in God.

One particularly important point is that Plantinga later admitted that he took an overly narrow view of natural theology in *God and Other Minds.* He assumed that such arguments are supposed to satisfy rigorous criteria of proof.

"In evaluating the theistic arguments, furthermore, I employed a traditional but improperly stringent standard; there may be plenty of good arguments for theism even if there anre't any that start from propositions that compel assent from every honest and intelligent person and proceed majestically to their conclusion by way of forms of argument that can be rejected only on pain of irrationality." (Plantinga, "Preface to the 1990 Edition," *God and Other Minds*).

Plantinga's position here illuminates the short coming of a fairly standard 20th century Reformed criticism of natural theology: the failure of theistic arguments to constitute logical demonstrations of the existence of God. As I argue in my book, this criticism simply assumes an indefensibly narrow conception of proof and argument.

Plantinga's subsequent lecture *Two Dozen (or So) Theistic Arguments*) places his position in clearer relief.

"I've been arguing that theistic belief does not (in general) need argument either for deontological justification, or for positive epistemic status, (or for Foley rationality or Alstonian justification)); belief in God is properly basic. But doesn't follow, of course that there aren't any good arguments. Are there some? At least a couple of dozen or so. . . .What are these arguments like, and what role do they play? They are probabilistic, either with respect to the premises, or with respect to the connection between the premises and conclusion, or both. They can serve to bolster and confirm ('helps' a la John Calvin); perhaps to convince."

So Plantinga's positive assessment of theistic arguments has been refined considerably since the original publication of *God and Other Minds.* There are good theistic arguments, but these arguments are probabilistic and not logically demonstrative. (For a clarification and defense of the goodness of probabilistic theistic arguments, see chapters 12 and 13 of my book).

Michael


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## default3

[/quote] Also, the nature of proof itself is problematic. If there is "some" evidence for God's existence, then there must be "some" evidence *against* God's existence. [/quote]

Jacob,

This doesn't strike me as obviously true, at least not if we unpack evidential claims in terms of conditional epistemic probability.

[A] The conditional epistemic probability of theism T on evidence E is less than 1.

* There is some evidence E* such that the conditional epistemic probability of ~T on E* is greater than 0.

It may be that  is true, but it wouldn't follow simply from [A], at least not in any obvious way. 

Perhaps you were thinking that the probability of T can only be lowered (and hence prevented from being 1) by there being some evidence against T, but this is false. The proposition "my nextdoor neighbor just bought a new Cadillac" will have a conditional epistemic probability based on the evidence that my neighbor told me so and I see a new Cadillac parked in his driveway, but this probability will be lowered, if only slightly, if we add to our evidence the fact that my neighbor is a practical joker about the acquisition of expensive items. This added piece of evidence isn't evidence against my neighbor's having bought a cadillac, but it still lowers the probability of the proposition that he did. In the language of *defeaters,* it constitutes an undercutting defeater, as opposed to a rebutting defeater.

Now since the epistemic probability of some proposition can be assessed relative to correct and incorrect inductive criteria, there is a sense in which  will be true with reference to certain assessments of the epistemic probability of theism. Whether  is true given correct inductive standards is another matter though. But still,  would not follow from [A] alone.

However, one might also ask what precisely is wrong with there being *some* evidence against the existence of God. This wouldn't necessarily justify unbelief. Surely there is some evidence against my being alive next week, but this wouldn't justify my believing that I won't live another week. Anyhow, in the case of theism it seems plausible to suppose that if all people know that God exists, they know this even if there is some evidence against God's existence. 
So I don't see what exactly is wrong with there being evidence against the existence of God; but again, I surely don't see that this follows from simply holding that there is evidence for the existence of God.

Michael*


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## default3

[/quote] _I'm_ talking about both. Teleological, Transcendental, Evidential, they all fail to prove God exists due to errors in reasoning.

[/quote] So the errors are in men, not in the evidences? Or is it that even if God were to part the sea right in front of us, that would tell us nothing because all evidences fail due to men's errors in reasoning? [/quote]

John,

Anthony seems to think that a person commits an "error in reasoning" simply because the person presents an argument that fails to be deductively valid. This is overly simplistic and misleading, and *this* error in reasoning appears to vitiate a majority of his posts in this thread as far as I can see.

A deductive argument is an argument that has an implicit or explicit inferential claim to the effect that the conclusion follows by necessity from the premises. If a person presents a deductive argument but the argument is formally invalid, then this person has made a mistake in reasoning, for he supposes that he offers a necessary inference but he is mistaken *about the actual force of the inference.* 

An inductive argument is an argument that has an implicit or explicit inferential claim to the effect that the conclusion is probable given the evidence cited in the premises. If a person presents an inductive argument but the argument is inductively weaker than the inferential claim, then this person has made a mistake in reasoning, for he supposes that he offers a probable inference, but he is mistaken *about the actual force of the inference.*

By contrast, if a person presents an argument for the conclusion Q, and the person claims only that Q is probable to degree N given the evidence cited in the premises, what *error in reasoning* has the person committed if *in fact* Q is probable to degree N given the evidence cited in the premises. An error in reasoning implies an error in the inference, but if the person is correct about the inference, what inferential error has been made?

Moral of the story. . . .In each case, a *mistake* in reasoning is an *evaluative* judgment that must take into consideration the purported force of the alleged inference. Otherwise there is no basis for asserting an *error* or *mistake* in the reasoning. One can always say of an inductive argument, it is formally invalid. But this is a description of inductive arguments, not an evaluative judgment. It is only an evaluative judgment in the case of deductive arguments. In other terms, inductive arguments must be evaluated *qua* inductive arguments in terms of evidential criteria. Deductive arguments must be evaluated *qua* deductive arguments in terms of criteria of necessary inference.

The claim that inductive arguments are formally invalid is trivially true, but this observation does nothing to inform us about whether any particular inductive argument is a good inductive argument. And whether a good inductive argument is a good argument simpliciter really depends on whether such arguments can ground reasonable or warranted beliefs. I've yet to see a good argument, deductive or inductive, for supposing this isn't the case. At all events, the logic of arguments can't be separated from a range of epistemological considerations.

I develop these points at length in chapter 12 of my book.

Michael


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## JohnV

Michael:

Thank you very much. I am very appreciative of any help. You can be sure that I will try to sort this out for myself. 

If I may, I would like to outline my general approach to these topics. 

My approach has been of a very practical nature, trying hard to be as plain in terminology as possible. I want to reach the ordinary person in the pew. I see many arguments raised to substantiate a point of view which are quite simple errors in reasoning. Yet they are unashamedly raised and defended as if the result of scholarly study. I am not interested so much in trying to correct the scholar, though I have sat and discussed with them as well. My concern has been the ordinary church member, and how he is flim-flammed into believing ideas based upon plausible-sounding arguments. 

I cannot forget the overwhelming experience back in the 1980's when the redefinition of the word "man" was introduced into the church's doctrinal statements, and then these _redefiners_ charged the church doctrines with that redefinition. And there was not one voice to speak up to say that the these new definitions were not the definitions used by the doctrinal statements. Not one. The result was a change in doctrine on the place of man, via the introduction and acceptance of egalitarian notions. 

Everyone was tricked into believing, for example, that a "mailman" can only refer to a man, or that a "policeman" can only mean a male constable. So they changed the term "man" to "person", so that it could be inclusive; e.g., a "mailperson". So also, everytime the Bible spoke of "man" or "men" some were impugned by the use of that term because they felt exluded, being female. It was not inclusive enough for them. Thus the error they made in feeling excluded, when that was clearly not the meaning, was fousted upon the church instead of confessed for themselves. But it carried such momentum in the church that the offices had to be opened to women as well as men. There was no stopping it. A very simple equivocation took an entire denomination by storm. 

I see that done again today. For example, the redefinition of the term "neutrality", just as one example, is entirely strange to the evidentialist; when he calls upon a neutrality in an unbeliever it never enters his mind that he could mean by that term the redefinion given it. An intellectual autonomy apart from God's existence is an impossible notion to him. All men must live and relate to the necessity of God's existence as evidenced in the creation; it is impossible not to. The kind of neutrality suggested simply does not exist in his mind. So how can he be calling unbelievers to the kind of "neutral" position, as he is accused of, if the thought never even occurs to him? The evidentialist is calling the unbeliever to drop his dissembling, his self-deception, not so some nebulous no-man's-land of intellectual autonomy. 

Certain aspects of Presuppositionalism fall into this apologetic without a problem. It is as naturally evidentialist as evidentialism is naturally Presuppositional ( formally speaking ). Rather than being mutually exclusive, they in their formal and proper sense are mutually dependent. I have been trying to strip the errors and excesses from both of them. But not as a formal theoretic, or as an approach all on its own with its own name. It is just plain common sense, and that is name enough. 

As you can see, this falls quite well into the topic heading of this thread. 

I only want to call ordinary people back to common sense. I may have stated my arguments rather clumsily, but I am still only learning how to "handle" people and their suasions.

[Edited on 2-3-2006 by JohnV]


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## default3

> _Originally posted by JohnV_ I see that done again today. For example, the redefinition of the term "neutrality", just as one example, is entirely strange to the evidentialist; when he calls upon a neutrality in an unbeliever it never enters his mind that he could mean by that term the redefinion given it. An intellectual autonomy apart from God's existence is an impossible notion to him. All men must live and relate to the necessity of God's existence as evidenced in the creation; it is impossible not to. The kind of neutrality suggested simply does not exist in his mind. So how can he be calling unbelievers to the kind of "neutral" position, as he is accused of, if the thought never even occurs to him? The evidentialist is calling the unbeliever to drop his dissembling, his self-deception, not so some nebulous no-man's-land of intellectual autonomy.



John,

I also have problems with the way the appeal to neutrality is used by many presuppositionalists in their critique of evidentialist apologetics. To give another shameless plug for the book, I take this up in my chapter on apologetics. 



> Certain aspects of Presuppositionalism fall into this apologetic without a problem. It is as naturally evidentialist as evidentialism is naturally Presuppositional ( formally speaking ). Rather than being mutually exclusive, they in their formal and proper sense are mutually dependent. I have been trying to strip the errors and excesses from both of them. But not as a formal theoretic, or as an approach all on its own with its own name. It is just plain common sense, and that is name enough.



I agree that the dichotomy between evidentialism and presuppositionalism is overdone. Awhile back David Byron drew some good distinctions between the
(1) Evidentially-informed presuppositionalist
(2) Presuppositionally-informed evidentialist
(3) Presuppositional anti-evidentialist
(4) Evidential anti-presuppositionalist
&
(5) Naive evidentialist.

See Van Til Archives:
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/vantil-list/archive-Jul-1999/msg00042.html

I believe Byron was on the right track here. There are more positions here than some Van Tilians would like to allow.



> I only want to call ordinary people back to common sense. I may have stated my arguments rather clumsily, but I am still only learning how to "handle" people and their suasions.



I'll just call you the "Thomas Reid" of the Reformed faith. 

Michael


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## JohnV

> I'll just call you the "Thomas Reid" of the Reformed faith.
> 
> Michael


That's me!


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## Saiph

> There are good theistic arguments, but these arguments are probabilistic and not logically demonstrative.



Thank you Michael. I will dig deeper into Plantinga.


Would you consider the following probabilistic or logical ?

Every book has an author, yet we are told to assume that the incomprehensible complexity, and the vast immensity of the universe, which is God's natural revelation of Himself, exists without an architect, and without a playwright.


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## default3

> Would you consider the following probabilistic or logical ? Every book has an author, yet we are told to assume that the incomprehensible complexity, and the vast immensity of the universe, which is God's natural revelation of Himself, exists without an architect, and without a playwright.



Saiph,

This doesn't appear to be an argument. What's the conclusion supposed to be?

Maybe you were thinking of something like:

(1) Every book has an author.
(2) The universe is like a book.
therefore
(3) The universe has an author.

This would be an inductive argument by analogy. The strength of the inference would depend on the degree of similarity between books and the universe. Of coruse, we would still have to reason from (3) to the conclusion that God exists.

Michael


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## Vytautas

> _Originally posted by Saiph_
> 
> Would you consider the following probabilistic or logical ?
> 
> Every book has an author, yet we are told to assume that the incomprehensible complexity, and the vast immensity of the universe, which is God's natural revelation of Himself, exists without an architect, and without a playwright.



It is a statement that does not use anything that is probable such as every book has an author 90% of the time but asserts that it is true all the time. Not only is that section not probable, but all of the parts are either true or false. But is it logical? Perhaps if we look at it from a different angle then we will know if it is logical. It basically says that people say that God´s complex universe has no creator. There is a contradiction because on the one hand this is God´s universe and on the other people say that there is no God. The people that say that there is no God would have to say that it is not God´s universe. To conclude, all declarative sentences are either true or false and hence they are logical in that respect.


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## default3

[/quote] It is a statement that does not use anything that is probable such as every book has an author 90% of the time but asserts that it is true all the time. [/quote]

A universal or general statement can be the conclusion of inductive argument. It's called inductive generalization. In that case it would be probable to some degree, depending on the strength of the inductive inference. 

Probability and logical demonstration (in the original context in which this has been raised) indicate evidential relations between statements, not assessments of individual statements. So you have to ask what kind of *argument* is being made, not what kind of *statement* is being made. 

Michael


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## Scott Bushey

Michael,
Please click on the signature requirement link at the bottom of my post for board protocol.

Thanks.

Welcome aboard by the way!


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## Saiph

I was thinking it might be probabilistic. Because it is somewhat common sense. If you know of a book that does not have any author/s let me know. And the universe is much more complex than a book. The language of it, much more intricate. It is a general analogy of the teleological argument.


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## Civbert

Hello Dr. Sudduth, 

Glad you are on the forum - and I'm looking forward to reading your book.



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_


 _I'm_ talking about both. Teleological, Transcendental, Evidential, they all fail to prove God exists due to errors in reasoning.

[/quote] So the errors are in men, not in the evidences? Or is it that even if God were to part the sea right in front of us, that would tell us nothing because all evidences fail due to men's errors in reasoning? [/quote]

John,

Anthony seems to think that a person commits an "error in reasoning" simply because the person presents an argument that fails to be deductively valid. This is overly simplistic and misleading, and *this* error in reasoning appears to vitiate a majority of his posts in this thread as far as I can see.[/quote]

In error in reasoning is an error in reasoning. Some things are simple - and some complications are misleading. What seems to be the case, may not be the case in fact. Hopefully, I will correct your impression of what you think I "seem to think" so to correct you of this strawman. 



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> A deductive argument is an argument that has an implicit or explicit inferential claim to the effect that the conclusion follows by necessity from the premises. If a person presents a deductive argument but the argument is formally invalid, then this person has made a mistake in reasoning, for he supposes that he offers a necessary inference but he is mistaken *about the actual force of the inference.*



This is interesting. I mostly agree with the first part (the conclusion follows by necessity) but the following sentence does not seem correct. The error in reasoning is not simply that the person _supposes _the inference is correct," rather it is that the inference itself _is _ in fact false. And this is not due the "force of the inference" as if this was an issue of magnitude (force has magnitude, degrees of pressure). The error is in the structure of the inference which makes it false. And to be clear, I mean by "inference" not the conclusion but the formal translation from premise to conclusion. The "conclusion" may be true or false. If the inference is false, the true/false state of the conclusion is indetermined. 

Also, a valid deductive argument can always be expressed so that it is explicit (clearly stated and definitive). An implicit deductive argument would have to be an enthymeme if it is still valid. That is, there are unstated but assumable premises that prove the conclusion follows formally.



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> An inductive argument is an argument that has an implicit or explicit inferential claim to the effect that the conclusion is probable given the evidence cited in the premises. If a person presents an inductive argument but the argument is inductively weaker than the inferential claim, then this person has made a mistake in reasoning, for he supposes that he offers a probable inference, but he is mistaken *about the actual force of the inference.*



In this the term "force" makes more sense. Inductive arguments are never definitive or "necessarily" true, but merely "possibly" true. I do not say "probably" because rarely can one determine the numerical probability to a inductive argument (unless one is using raw statistical data). And weaker and stronger arguments are given which can not prove the conclusion follows, but seems to indicate the conclusion by subjective degrees of force.



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> By contrast, if a person presents an argument for the conclusion Q, and the person claims only that Q is probable to degree N given the evidence cited in the premises, what *error in reasoning* has the person committed if *in fact* Q is probable to degree N given the evidence cited in the premises....



None at all if that is the case.



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> ... An error in reasoning implies an error in the inference, but if the person is correct about the inference, what inferential error has been made?



Certainly if one has done the math and has shown that conclusion Q is probable to degree N then the inference is correct. The inference is made to the probability N that Q is correct. But the conclusion is not "Q", rather it is "the probability of Q is N". And in fact, this is a _deductive_ argument. If one says that the arguments P infer the conclusion Q, then an error of reasoning has been committed - because P only infers the _possibly_ of Q.

When inductive arguments are said to be proofs of the conclusions Q - this implies that the conclusion Q is 100% true (i.e. necessarily true). And whenever one says that inductive arguments are proofs, then that is a mistake in reasoning. A proof must be formally valid - and inductive arguments always fail due to an errors in forms of inference.



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> Moral of the story. . . .In each case, a *mistake* in reasoning is an *evaluative* judgment that must take into consideration the purported force of the alleged inference. Otherwise there is no basis for asserting an *error* or *mistake* in the reasoning. ...



Here you have defined "mistake in reason" an evaluative judgment. This seems to make it subjective. But correct reasoning as I think of it is objectively correct. Only by correct reasoning will you evaluate 5+6 and determine it equals 11. This is not just a question of "force" but one of truth. Truth is the goal of reason. 

Deductive and inductive arguments are not simply different kinds of "reason". Inductive arguments are deductively invalid. But the reverse is never the case.



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> One can always say of an inductive argument, it is formally invalid. But this is a description of inductive arguments, not an evaluative judgment. It is only an evaluative judgment in the case of deductive arguments. In other terms, inductive arguments must be evaluated *qua* inductive arguments in terms of evidential criteria. Deductive arguments must be evaluated *qua* deductive arguments in terms of criteria of necessary inference. ...






> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> The claim that inductive arguments are formally invalid is trivially true, but this observation does nothing to inform us about whether any particular inductive argument is a good inductive argument. And whether a good inductive argument is a good argument simpliciter really depends on whether such arguments can ground reasonable or warranted beliefs. I've yet to see a good argument, deductive or inductive, for supposing this isn't the case. At all events, the logic of arguments can't be separated from a range of epistemological considerations.



_Logically_ this ("the claim that inductive arguments are formally invalid") is trivial. But it is important non-the-less. In fact, it makes a great deal of difference regarding what is considered a valid proof. The problem is when we start presenting inductive arguments as valid proofs. But inductive arguments are subject to subjective interpretations of the "force of the arguments". But the conclusion of a valid deductive arguments is "necessarily" true - and that is proof. 

Inductive and deductive arguments are completely different beasts. One can not set them side by side as if they were equally valid for making or evaluating conclusions.

I would also like to point out that the arguments I was calling invalid were both deductive and inductive. The inductive evidential argument is invalid due to the "trivial" induction fallacy. Arguments like the Teleological and Transcendental are invalid due to "begging the question". 



> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> 
> I develop these points at length in chapter 12 of my book.
> 
> Michael



I do look forward to reading your book. It's always a pleasure to study your writings, even though it takes my slow mind more time and effort digest them - and I often feel a bit intimidated by your superior scholarship. I hope you will give me the benefit of the doubt when you read my pedestrian comments. (And yes, I know I am obviously pushing the limits of my vocabulary to appear smarter than I am.  )


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by sudduthofantioch_
> ...
> One particularly important point is that Plantinga later admitted that he took an overly narrow view of natural theology in *God and Other Minds.* He assumed that such arguments are supposed to satisfy rigorous criteria of proof.
> 
> "In evaluating the theistic arguments, furthermore, I employed a traditional but improperly stringent standard; there may be plenty of good arguments for theism even if there anre't any that start from propositions that compel assent from every honest and intelligent person and proceed majestically to their conclusion by way of forms of argument that can be rejected only on pain of irrationality." (Plantinga, "Preface to the 1990 Edition," *God and Other Minds*).
> 
> ...
> Michael



What a interesting quote. I suppose he was correct since his argument is not for "knowing" God exists but "believing" God exists. That is, warranted belief is not the same justified true belief (knowledge).

Not that this is bad. Most propositions we believe, we do so without any real justification or proof. I would say this is 90% the case. 

The problem is that the traditional "stringent standard" is quite proper for evaluating the traditional arguments for the existence of God because these arguments are presented as logical proofs who's "_forms_ of argument that can be rejected only on pain of irrationality." That is, we should hold these arguments to the same "stringent" standards of proof that that they claim to satisfy. 

But if you want to lower the standards of justification - then the same standards will apply to many arguments for different worldviews - counter belief systems are just as "warranted" as Christianity. But I suppose that was Plantinga's point: Christianity meets the same standards of rationality as any other rational belief system. 

Ironically, I think Van Til would object Plantinga's "warranted" Christian belief. Clark on the other hand might not - yet he still maintained a rigorous criteria of proof. And Clark's "axiom" of Scripture justified epistemological knowledge (not just belief).

[Edited on 2-4-2006 by Civbert]


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## default3

Since the format went queer on the last attempt, let's try this again....



> Anthony wrote:
> "What a interesting quote. I suppose he was correct since his argument is not for "knowing" God exists but "believing" God exists. That is, warranted belief is not the same justified true belief (knowledge). Not that this is bad. Most propositions we believe, we do so without any real justification or proof. I would say this is 90% the case."



On Plantinga's view warranted belief is not the same as justified belief, but Plantinga's arguments in defense of properly basic belief have been developed with reference to both epistemic desiderata, though I suspect Plantinga would have a very different account of the conceptual terrain here. The connections between warrant, justification, and knowledge is a fairly complex set of topics. I really don't have time to get into a lot of this. Suffice it to say, on Plantinga's view justified true belief is not knowledge, that is, as long as justification remains true to its internalist pedigree.




> "The problem is that the traditional "stringent standard" is quite proper for evaluating the traditional arguments for the existence of God because these arguments are presented as logical proofs who's "forms of argument that can be rejected only on pain of irrationality." That is, we should hold these arguments to the same "stringent" standards of proof that that they claim to satisfy."



If someone *purports* to offer a logical demonstration of God's existence, then in this circumstance it is *dialectically* proper to evaluate their arguments by the standards of logical demonstration. Historically of course these arguments have not *always* been presented as logical demonstrations. In these contexts it would be *dialectically* improper to evaluate the arguments as logical demonstrations. But more importantly, Plantinga's point is really a conceptual or philosophical one. It is an improper standard *philosophically* since (a) very few arguments in philosophy satisfy such stringent standards and (b) an argument can have dialectical and epistemic value without satisfying such standards.




> "But if you want to lower the standards of justification - then the same standards will apply to many arguments for different worldviews - counter belief systems are just as "warranted" as Christianity. But I suppose that was Plantinga's point: Christianity meets the same standards of rationality as any other rational belief system."



The same *standards* will apply to be sure (unless one advocates double standards), but it doesn't follow (nor is it Plantinga's point) that all viewpoints equally *satisfy* these standards.



> "Ironically, I think Van Til would object Plantinga's "warranted" Christian belief. Clark on the other hand might not - yet he still maintained a rigorous criteria of proof. And Clark's "axiom" of Scripture justified epistemological knowledge (not just belief)."



Well, I think one needs to distinguish between logical rigor and wishful thinking. 

As for your last statement, while I certainly think we can do better than "just belief," I have no idea what you mean by "epistemological knowledge," much less how it is that Scripture *justifies* such a thing. 

Michael

{Edited to fix formatting - FTG}

[Edited on 2/4/2006 by fredtgreco]


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## default3

Hi Anthony,

I don't have too much to say about your post on inductive reasoning. The crucial issue is really your claim that no inductive argument can have a conclusion that is more than possible. I don't find this plausible, and I don't think you've adopted the right sort of argumentative strategy to show otherwise.

Criteria of inductive logic *do* have as a consequence that some propositions will enjoy a greater degree of likelihood on certain evidence than other statements and that alterations in evidence will change the degree of likelihood for a proposition. Just as deductive criteria determine when inferences are necessary; inductive criteria determine when inferences are likely, more likely than alternative propositions, more likely than their negations, very likely, and so on. (Incidentally, unlike statistical and physical probability, epistemic probability does not involve nor require exact numerical values, so that point of yours was a red herring).

What you need to argue is that proposed criteria of inductive reasoning are not correct criteria. In fact, you also have to argue the stronger claim that in fact there are *no* correct criteria of inductive reasoning at all, for in that case *whatever* probabilities one assigns will be based on incorrect criteria. In that case, evidential probabilities will be closed under subjective conditions of inductive criteria. At all events, you'll have to critically engage criteria of inductive logic, in much the same way that a person claiming that there are no necessary inferences must critically engage deductive criteria. Given your own criteria of cogent reasoning, you'll need to logically demonstrate your claim. In the words of your mentor: "I think it cannot be done."

Peace,
Michael


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## Magma2

> I don't have too much to say about your post on inductive reasoning. The crucial issue is really your claim that no inductive argument can have a conclusion that is more than possible. I don't find this plausible, and I don't think you've adopted the right sort of argumentative strategy to show otherwise.



Dr. Crampton quoting Popper:

"œKarl Popper wrote: "We know that our scientific theories always remain hypotheses . . .. In science there is no knowledge, in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle understood the word, in the sense which implies finality; in science we never have sufficient reason for the belief that we have attained the truth." Popper went on to say: "It can even be shown that all [scientific] theories, including the best, have the same probability, namely zero." 

Now, if it can be shown the probability of even the *best* scientific theory is zero and that the inductive arguments on which all scientific theories provide no knowledge, I fail to see how probabilistic arguments for God´s existence can somehow rise to higher level where the conclusion is "œmore than possible." Also, what does "œmore than possible" mean? Really, really possible? Clearly, following Popper you don´t mean knowledge in the sense of Plato and Ari, so what do you mean? Or is this where you take off and wax into obscurant double talk that will dazzle your friends and confuse your critics 

Anyway, nice work Anthony. Very insightful and clear. 



[Edited on 2-7-2006 by Magma2]


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## JohnV

The problem of knowledge is not solved through equivocation. That only has the appearance of a solution. You are confusing theory with knowledge; scientists do know some things, from which they theorize. They often treat their theories as attained knowledge, but are really only fooling themselves; much the same way Arminians fool themselves with their meaning of free will as a solution to man's responsibilities to sin. 

However, I don't think we need to get too far into to pros and cons of inductive reasoning to see that there are deeper problems involved. Definition of terms, especially technical ones, is one of them, as has already been said. This would, in turn, effect views on the limits and extent of the contributions of induction to reason. 

I am not arguing for anything in particular here; I merely stating that some arguments are not at all persuasive, no matter how firmly some people believe in them.


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## Civbert

> _Originally posted by default3_
> Hi Anthony,
> 
> I don't have too much to say about your post on inductive reasoning. The crucial issue is really your claim that no inductive argument can have a conclusion that is more than possible. I don't find this plausible, and I don't think you've adopted the right sort of argumentative strategy to show otherwise.
> 
> Criteria of inductive logic *do* have as a consequence that some propositions will enjoy a greater degree of likelihood on certain evidence than other statements and that alterations in evidence will change the degree of likelihood for a proposition. Just as deductive criteria determine when inferences are necessary; inductive criteria determine when inferences are likely, more likely than alternative propositions, more likely than their negations, very likely, and so on. (Incidentally, unlike statistical and physical probability, epistemic probability does not involve nor require exact numerical values, so that point of yours was a red herring).



It was an aside, and not a part of the main argument. I'm sorry if I did not make that clear. I don't like the term probable because it seems to imply that you can put a number to it, although that is not necessarily true. But a probability that does not have a number, is merely saying that what is probable is more likely than not. That's all. It's an estimate that something is more likely than not.

As for the consequences of the criteria, I never said otherwise.



> _Originally posted by default3_
> What you need to argue is that proposed criteria of inductive reasoning are not correct criteria. In fact, you also have to argue the stronger claim that in fact there are *no* correct criteria of inductive reasoning at all, for in that case *whatever* probabilities one assigns will be based on incorrect criteria. In that case, evidential probabilities will be closed under subjective conditions of inductive criteria. At all events, you'll have to critically engage criteria of inductive logic, in much the same way that a person claiming that there are no necessary inferences must critically engage deductive criteria. Given your own criteria of cogent reasoning, you'll need to logically demonstrate your claim. In the words of your mentor: "I think it cannot be done."
> 
> Peace,
> Michael



I don't think I need to argue about the criteria, I think I'd rather look at the claims. If one wants to claim that inductive arguments have probable conclusions, and one clearly states the conclusion as a probable truth, then I have no problem, and I say this is really a deductive argument. That is if the conclusion is in the form 'x is probably y', then this is really a deduction that is necessarily true by definition of what probable means.

If one gives arguments where the conclusion does not necessarily follows, but gives the conclusion in the form 'x is y' then this is a fallacy, and an invalid argument, and the inference if false.

One must be careful. I did not say 'x is y' is false. I said the inference itself (from premise to conclusion) is false. 

Interestingly, both forms are given as examples of inductive reason. Usually the inductive argument fores from particulars to a general conclusion. So the two forms are p1, p2, p3, -> c4, and p1, p2, p3, -> probably c4. The first one says that the particular premises (p) infer general (or universal) conclusion c4. And the next says the premises infer that c4 is probable (more likely than not). 

The first form is fallacious - it does not follow, it is formally invalid, the inference is false. The latter is deductive since the definition of 'probable' is really an unstated premise, it it makes the conclusion necessarily true. In fact, the latter may be a valid deductive argument. Ironic huh?

P.S. "default3"? What happened to Dr. Sudduth ("sudduthofantioch")?



[Edited on 2-14-2006 by Civbert]


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