# Horton on Divine Impassibility



## CharlieJ (Mar 17, 2011)

I really like Horton's _The Christian Faith_, but I came across a paragraph that doesn't make any sense to me. Horton is explaining divine impassibility:



> _Second, it is crucial to bear in mind that impassibility refers to God's essence rather than to the particular persons who share it._ It is the _persons_ of the Trinity who are affected by creatures, not the divine _essence_ itself. This is true even of human beings. Even in life-altering experiences of delight or despair, one's humanity is not altered; rather, the person is changed. Essences (or natures) cannot feel, will, or act. Only _persons_ can love, be disappointed or delighted, angry or pleased, disturbed or satisfied. God's essence is not a person. It is only the persons who share this essence who can be affected. The Father, not the divine essence, so loved the world that he gave his Son and turned away from the sin-bearing Savior of sinners in wrath and judgment. Love is an attribute of the divine essence ("God is love" [1Jn 4:8, 16]), but only the divine _persons_ love (verb).



There are a number of items in there that concern me. 

First, if we assign impassibility only to the essence, not to the persons, then the attribution of impassibility becomes meaningless. If Horton is right that even human nature is impassible, then we aren't really saying anything by saying that God's essence is impassible.

Second, don't the trinitarian and christological controversies _assume_the impassibility, not only of the essence, but of the persons. Isn't that what caused the controversies in the first place? My understanding of Chalcedon is that the eternal Word is impassible, but the humanity assumed by it is passible. Thus, Jesus, who is God, suffered and died, but only according to his humanity. Horton's articulation seems to contradict the metaphysical assumptions behind Chalcedon.

Third, I'm uncomfortable ascribing statements such as "God is love" to the divine essence _rather than_ the persons. Such a view seems dangerously close to a "quaternity" in which the divine essence is a substratum underlying the persons. That tilts more toward "the Trinity which shares God" than Augustine's "the Trinity which is God" (Trinitas quae Deus est).

Do other Reformed theologians articulate the Trinity the way Horton does here?

---------- Post added at 04:08 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:39 PM ----------

Googling a bit, I see I'm not the only person to have similar thoughts:

The Christian Faith 2:6-7 » Think Theologically - Applying God's word to God's world


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## PuritanCovenanter (Mar 17, 2011)

If the quote is being understood correctly and contextually by Charlie and myself it sure sounds strange to me. Maybe I am incorrect but it seems to imply that the Persons of the Trinity all have some other nature (natures?) combined with their essence. It sure sounds different to me.  

I hope someone more intelligent than me can figure this out or shed some light.


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## Notthemama1984 (Mar 17, 2011)

What page is the quote on?


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## Semper Fidelis (Mar 17, 2011)

CharlieJ said:


> Second, don't the trinitarian and christological controversies assumethe impassibility, not only of the essence, but of the persons. Isn't that what caused the controversies in the first place? My understanding of Chalcedon is that the eternal Word is impassible, but the humanity assumed by it is passible. Thus, Jesus, who is God, suffered and died, but only according to his humanity. Horton's articulation seems to contradict the metaphysical assumptions behind Chalcedon



I haven't fully studied this issue but the Son is one person with two natures. 

WCF VIII


> II. The Son of God, the second Person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance, and equal with the Father, did, when the fullness of time was come, *take upon him man's nature, with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof*; yet without sin: being conceived by he power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in *one person*, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man.


Properly speaking, being one Person, the Son of God suffered in His humanity though not in His divine nature, which is of one substance with the Father.


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## Jack K (Mar 17, 2011)

That quote sounds different from what I've heard before, too. I have the same questions you do. But I say that without having read Horton's book yet and with only a novice's understanding of the doctrine of impassibility.


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## cih1355 (Mar 17, 2011)

It sounds like he is saying that a person can be affected by something without his essence being affected.


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## Semper Fidelis (Mar 17, 2011)

Berkhof:



> 1. NO ESSENTIAL CHANGE IN THE DIVINE NATURE. The doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the incarnation always constituted a problem in connection with the immutability of God. This was already pointed out in the discussion of that attribute. However this problem may be solved, it should be maintained that the divine nature did not undergo any essential change in the incarnation. This also means that it remained impassible, that is, incapable of suffering and death, free from ignorance, and insusceptible to weakness and temptation. *It is well to stress the fact that the incarnation was a personal act. It is better to say that the person of the Son of God became incarnate than to say that the divine nature assumed human flesh.* If Reformed theologians do occasionally speak of the divine nature as incarnate, they speak of it “not immediately but mediately,” to use the language of scholastic theology; they consider this nature not absolutely and in itself, but in the person of the Son of God. The result of the incarnation was that the divine Saviour could be ignorant and weak, could be tempted, and could suffer and die, not in His divine nature, but derivatively, by virtue of His possession of a human nature.
> 
> Berkhof, L. (1938). Systematic theology (323–324). Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans publishing co.


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## Semper Fidelis (Mar 17, 2011)

Hodge:


> Such being the Scriptural doctrine concerning the person of Christ, it follows that although the divine nature is immutable and impassible, and therefore neither the obedience nor the suffering of Christ was the obedience or suffering of the divine nature, yet they were none the less the obedience and suffering of a divine person.
> 
> Hodge, C. (1997). Vol. 2: Systematic theology (395). Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc.


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## PuritanCovenanter (Mar 17, 2011)

I understand that about the Son. My question is what about the other two persons of the Trinity.


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## baron (Mar 17, 2011)

Chaplainintraining said:


> What page is the quote on?



Page 249 second paragraph.


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## Notthemama1984 (Mar 17, 2011)

Thanks


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## MW (Mar 17, 2011)

I am concerned about raising questions about this particular theologian on this board given previous threads. It can sometimes be that because someone is so close to us we become exposed to more of their thought and therefore they are prone to be criticised more, when in reality there is more to criticise in those who are farther away from us. Be that as it may, this teaching is a matter of concern. First, the statement reflects a part of a theological movement in recent years which has questioned traditional categories of thought like impassibility, personhood, etc. Previously theologians simply had to rest content with the limitations of human thought and settled on "person" by limiting its connotations. 20th century theology wanted to move beyond those limits. There arose a movement advocating Trinitarian personalism, in which the divine unity is conceived in relational terms. In reformed circles it probably begins with C. Van Til's doctrine of Absolute Person. The strain of thought can border on the edges of Tritheism. Ironically, the Clarkians have made their own challenges to the doctrine of Person, but in a slightly different direction, which results in three perspectives. Anyway, in reformed circles Peter Leithart has developed what he calls Trinitarian Anthropology. He is honest in calling it a Re-casting of Reformed Theology. Smith (first name escapes me) develops this in terms of covenant unity. I have raised an objection on this board to this kind of development because it makes the sameness and oneness of the three persons something less than "consubstantial." Leaving to the side my objections to this whole strain of thought, the basic problems which are posed to traditional theology are these:

(1.) It requires speculation on the essence of God, which was outlawed the moment Calvin become marshall of reformed theology. Questions as to what is "being" leads to an open field for dogmatic hypothesis.

(2.) It depends on a continued conflation of the old distinction between ontology and economy.

(3.) It often involves an outright denial of "ad extra indivisa," which maintains that the external works of the Trinity are "in essence" indivisible.


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## MW (Mar 18, 2011)

CharlieJ said:


> Googling a bit, I see I'm not the only person to have similar thoughts:
> 
> The Christian Faith 2:6-7 » Think Theologically - Applying God's word to God's world


 
I just had an opportunity to read the blog. More troubling, now, would be the claims of this strain of analogical reasoning on the divine attributes. I leave Dr. Horton out of the picture and focus here on Dr. Frame's views, which I have already considered. To his way of thinking the viae negationis et eminentiae are mere teaching tools and not technically correct. But the truth is, in traditional theology, they are the very means of understanding the divine attributes in ectypal theology (there is no claim to being able to divine archetypal theology). When one starts saying that any kind of theological discourse is merely a teaching tool he ends up advocating a form of nominalism. If, as these theologians insist, analogical reasoning means theological discourse is a tool of human learning we end up having no genuine theology, just ways and means of speaking about God. On that basis we would be left with nothing that is technically correct except social conventions. Whatever else one might call this, it is not reformed.


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## MW (Mar 18, 2011)

Following up on my previous post, it might be in order to quote from Richard Muller's historiographical analysis of reformed scholasticism. His various statements on the subject of the viae in vol. 3 of PRRD demonstrate that this method of reasoning is essential to the very fabric of theology from the patristic period through the medieval theologians and into reformed theology itself. For the patristics see p. 34; for the medieval, p. 47, where the method is seen to be basic to both voluntarists and necessitarians, though understood as applying in different ways. For the systematisation in reformed theology, our author states, "as the Reformed orthodox learned from the older tradition, potentially from Durandus, there are three ways of approach to the problem of knowledge of and language concerning God, the _via causationis_ or _causalitatis_, the _via eminentiae_, and the _via negationis_... To the scholastic mind, therefore, the doctrine of the divine attributes is clearly not a matter of abstract speculation but rather *a basic way of knowing God*... Nor is it the case that these three ways of approach to God are purely philosophical... Indeed, *the orthodox recognize an intimate relationship between the various approaches to the knowledge of God and true religion or piety*: despite the difficulty of knowing God, *these doctrines are necessary* 'because man was made for that end, that he might rightly acknowledge and worship God, love and honor him' [Leigh]." (PRRD 3:166, 167, emboldened portions are emphasised added.)


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## CharlieJ (Mar 18, 2011)

Just to bring this back around a bit,

1) Horton fully affirms the classical viae, though he tends to express that by the idea of "analogical" language; I think his "analogical" speaking is equivalent to the via eminentiae.

2) Horton critiques Van Til's articulation and does not, as far as I can see, exhibit any of the other strains you mentioned. 

That's why I focused on that single paragraph. I've really enjoyed Horton's work, but that line of reasoning just strikes me as bizarre. Considering his statement that the divine essence, rather than the persons, is impassible, I'd like to propose a counter-statement. Anything attributed to the divine essence must be attributed to the persons (except perhaps unity), but certain peculiar properties (propria or idiomata) attributed to a person cannot be attributed to the other persons or the essence. So, the fact that God's essence is love means that each person loves, but the fact that the son is generated does not mean that the Father, Spirit, or essence is generated. 

If I'm correct, then Horton's statement is backwards. It tries to assign something to the essence while restricting it from the persons.


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## MW (Mar 18, 2011)

CharlieJ said:


> 1) Horton fully affirms the classical viae, though he tends to express that by the idea of "analogical" language; I think his "analogical" speaking is equivalent to the via eminentiae.



I left Dr. Horton out of view because I haven't read his work as yet; the reviewer in the linked post compared Dr. Horton with Dr. Frame; I have read Dr. Frame and therefore I commented on his presentation. The reviewer did say that for Dr. Horton "the distinction is merely a heuristic device." I leave that representation to be affirmed or denied by those who have read Dr. Horton, but I would stress it is much more than that in traditional reformed theology, and necessarily so. Any weakening of the viae must be considered a weakening of catholic theological discourse.



CharlieJ said:


> Anything attributed to the divine essence must be attributed to the persons (except perhaps unity), but certain peculiar properties (propria or idiomata) attributed to a person cannot be attributed to the other persons or the essence.


 
Again, not having read the work, it is difficult to comment. I can only say that the quoted portion reflects modern explorations into areas which traditional theology had declared out of bounds. The limitations of approaching God which we find richly symbolised in Exodus 19 (and fulfilled in Christ) do not seem to strike modern theologians with the kind of reverence which was typical of the past.

Concerning your counter-statement, you might find Turretin helpful in his explanation of the generation of the Son (Institutes 1:292ff.). Essence is communicated but personal properties terminate on the person (p. 293).


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