# Terms: Predestination, Foreordination, etc.



## Romans922 (Mar 27, 2009)

Are there differences in these words in how we should use them when talking about various doctrines?

-Foreordination
-Predestination
-Ordained
-Plan
-Will
-Purpose
-Providence
-Decree
-Preterition

Example: Should you use the term predestination when talking about the reprobate? (I believe the confession uses foreordination to describe it, and uses predestination to refer to the elect)


----------



## Tripel (Mar 27, 2009)

Predestination (in reference to the elect) involves God intervening in the life of man to bring him unto salvation. Foreordination (in reference to the reprobate) is God's withholding of his intervention, allowing them to stay on course to damnation.


----------



## Romans922 (Mar 27, 2009)

Tripel said:


> Predestination (in reference to the elect) involves God intervening in the life of man to bring him unto salvation. Foreordination (in reference to the reprobate) is God's withholding of his intervention, allowing them to stay on course to damnation.



Is that last definition you gave more suitable to the term 'preterition'?

I am going to add that term, I forgot it until you put that definition.


----------



## Prufrock (Mar 27, 2009)

This has the potential to be a fairly tricky question, as the connotation of each word is capable of varying from author to author. What follows will be description of Vermigli's use of the terms: of the Reformers, I think his distinctions possessed the most clarity, and also, his teaching on Predestination (according to many historians) was the most influential of the Reformers for later orthodoxy. An interesting study to note, by the way, is Frank James' "A Late Medieval Parallel in Reformation Thought: _Gemina Praedestinatio_ in Gregory of Rimini and Peter Martyr Vermigli," which demonstrates the dependency of Vermigli on Rimini.

I. For Vermigli, Providence may be defined as "God's appointed, unmovable and perpetual administration of all things" (Commentary on Romans), though, in the same work, he often uses the term in a narrower sense to refer to God's provision for his people ("Thus, God's providence does not extend simply to Israel, but to the Gentiles, now, in Christ." (paraphrase). It is important to note that this providence works through secondary causation. 

II. _Foreknowledge_ differs from God's knowledge in that it is combined with his will: for _all_ things are present to God's knowledge -- both those things which shall come to pass, and those things which shall not. Thus, since nothing occurs apart from the will of God, his foreknowledge respects that which he has willed to happen.

III. Regarding the term Purpose, or the eternal _propositum Dei_, certain things need to be said before speaking of Predestination. This is the cause of the foreknowledge above. This, to Vermigli, is the cause of both Predestination and Reprobation. Here, he will differ slightly from Calvin. For while Calvin desires to include the Son as the author of the decree of Predestination, Vermigli shies away from this (making the Father the author of _Predestination_), but making the Godhead as a whole the cause of this Purpose (on account of which, the Father predestines the elect in Christ). This _propositum Dei_ has no other cause but the essence or Will of God. His reason for this distinction seems to be founded in his attempt to maintain the order in Romans 8:29-30 upon which his teaching is based.

IV. When he approaches the term _Predestination_ (which may be considered either respect to the mind of God, or to its execution) he gives the following definition:


> Predestination is that most wise purpose of God, whereby he hath before all eternity constantly decreed, to call those whom he hath loved in Christ to the adoption of children, to justification by faith and at length to glory through good works, that they may be made like unto the image of the Son of God, and that in them should be declared the glory and mercy of the creator.


He notes that the term, _absolutely_, may denote God's foreordaining of all things; however, in following what he considers the general usage of scripture (that is, leaving out when the crucifixion of Christ is said in Acts to be done according to God's predestination), he restricts the meaning to God's soteric ordination (including both the ends and the means). This is due to a distinction which he raises, which is the cause of him leaving reprobation out of the sphere of predestination: given that the sphere or realm of execution of the decree of Predestination is in Christ, Vermigli assigns nothing to Predestination which is attainable by the strength of nature. Thus, while sins are indeed governed by God's providence, he does not assign them to predestination since sinning is something we are capable of by nature.

V. Reprobation for Vermigli cannot be understood unless his emphasis on providence working through secondary causality is first realized. It is an eternal will or purpose of _Preterition_, or a decision _not_ to bestow mercy. First, Reprobation finds its foundation in the eternal _propositum Dei_, which is most just. It cannot be on account of foreseen sin, or else all would be considered reprobate. Secondly, reprobation is to separated from condemnation or damnation, which _is_ based upon sin. Thirdly, reprobation does not involve the infusing of any malice into the creature, which is already present through original sin. Fourthly, this original sin and our descent into further sin is considered as punishment for Adam's first sin (as well as for our own previous sins). He assigns God as the cause of the _actions_ which, when performed by us, are considered sins. Finally, Adam's first sin was caused by a removal of grace from him, whereupon he stumbled (hence the need for understanding God's providence not as a fatalistic force, but as God working through secondary causes and within our wills).

It is certainly difficult to give any meaningful description of his views in so short a space, but hopefully this begins to point in the right direction.


----------

