# Introduction to Philosophy (Geisler and Feinberg)



## RamistThomist (Jul 20, 2022)

Geisler, Norman, and Feinberg, Paul D. _Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective. _Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2003.

This is a systematic philosophy text. Like a systematic theology, it explains and evaluates the loci of philosophy. It is probably the best intro text on the market, at least from a Christian perspective.

A good philosophical system will achieve three things: (1) internal consistency, (2) external comprehensiveness, and (3) correspondence (Geisler and Feinberg, 72).

The authors do a fine job rebutting the pietistic charge that studying philosophy violates Colossians 2:8. For one, Paul is warning against false knowledge, not all knowledge. Moreover, the definite article could actually indicate a specific teaching at Colosse (i.e., most likely gnostic angel-worship). Even more, one cannot beware of false philosophy unless he is first aware of it (73). And though Geisler does not mention it, these same pietists themselves give a logos about theos and have no problem with using Aristotelian concepts like being, quality, quantity, and motion.

The first locus the authors cover is knowledge and the various options with justifying belief. My only concern is that I wish they had spent more time on foundationalism.

What is Knowledge?

Problems with skepticism:
1) Skepticism is rationally inconsistent. Assertions that we cannot know anything are themselves claims of knowledge (94ff).
2) Skepticism is practically inconsistent: skeptics trust their sense perceptions when they cross the road.

Foundationalism

Foundationalism is the view that there is a structure of knowledge “whose foundations, though they support all the rest, are themselves in need of no support” (152). We have directly justified beliefs “and they are topped with indirectly justified beliefs.”

In response to criticisms, the foundationalist maintains his position does not end in an infinite regress. It is possible that there are immediately grounded propositions.

Coherentism

Coherentism is one alternative to foundationalism. Geisler notes a distinction between coherentist theories of truth and coherentist justification for truth (161). The coherentist justification asserts that there are no basic beliefs, only webs of belief. The problem with both coherentist justifications and coherentist models is that both are disconnected from reality. A coherentist can give a perfectly coherent model that does not correspond to reality. All that matters is that it is internally consistent.

What is Reality?

Is reality One or Many? Geisler does a fine job explaining the power of Parmenides’ argument for monism (168). It looks like this:
1) Reality is either one or many.
2) If reality is many, then then many things must differ from each other.
3) But there are only two ways things can differ: either by being (something) or by non-being (nothing).
4) However, two (or more) things cannot differ by nothing, for to differ by nothing means not to differ at all.
5) Neither can things differ by being (or something), because being is the only thing that everything has in common, and things cannot differ in the very respect in which they are all the same.
6) Therefore, things cannot differ at all; everything is one.

It’s clear that the problem is his univocal use of the term “being.” The solution can’t be an equivocal use of the word “being,” for then our knowledge of reality is now suspect. The only solution, and one Aristotle and Aquinas would later formulate, is an analogical use of being.

The pluralist options are as follows:
Atomism: “Things Differ by Absolute Non-Being” (170ff).
Platonism: Things differ by relative non-being
Aristotle: Things Differ in their Being (Which is Simple)
Aquinas: Things Differ in their Being (which is composed of Form and Matter)

Trinity, One, and Many

Can the Trinity solve the problem of the One and Many? Short answer: No. The Trinity does not address Parmenides’ concern. Parmenides wants to know how things can differ in their being. The Trinity, however, only seeks to posit plurality in the persons, precisely not in the being.

God and the Ultimate

We must not confuse “belief in” with “belief that” (269). I do not need a reason for faith in God. It is entirely legitimate, though, to stress reasons for belief that God exist.

Some Thoughts on Deism

The Deists’ line that miracles are a violation of natural law no longer works. Science today is as likely to speak of “models” and “maps” than laws (277). Moreover, natural physical law does not actually “cause” anything. It merely explains it.

Problems with Panentheism and Finite Godism

Panentheism cannot claim an infinite god with “finite poles.” It does not make sense to speak of a contingent and necessary God. Even more problematic, “can God actualize his own potential?” This problem is even more damaging for finite godism. As Geisler notes, “A finite god needs a cause.” That new cause is now God (or at least has a better claim to be God).

Paul Tillich’s Symbolic Language

It does not do to say that God is the ground of ultimate Being and that language about God is symbolic. Such a person believes there is at least non-symbolic entity, being.

Analogical God-Talk

1) There is only a basis for “analogy when there is an intrinsic causal relation” (314). For example, as Geisler notes, hot water has an extrinsic relation to the hardness in the boiled egg, but it has an intrinsic relation to the heat in the egg.
2) The effect does not need to resemble the instrumental cause, only the principal efficient cause (315).
3) Likewise, the effect need not resemble the material cause, only the efficient one.
4) Terms like “being” are univocally defined, but analogically applied (317).

What is Good or Right?

Kantianism: will it to be a universalizable law. Existentialists have asked why should we prioritize the universal over the particular?

Utilitarianism: greatest good for the greatest number. There are numerous problems with this claim. Only God can be utilitarian, since only he has the foresight to know which actions will be the best for the greatest number (393). There is another problem: the utilitarian subtly analyzes results in terms of ‘the Good,” which means results cannot be the deciding factor. Perhaps the greatest practical problem: how long-range must the results be in order for them to be good? If it is only short-range, then this justifies a number of evils. Too long a range, on the other hand, makes it worthless.

Classical theistic ethics: the Good is self-evident. The main difficulty with the classical view is whether it can overcome the “is-ought” fallacy. There are several lines of response. “If ‘ought’ is a basic category that cannot be reduced to ‘is’ or anything else, then one must understand it intuitionally, since there is no way to break it down further” (383). We still haven’t justified natural law ethics. We have, however, provided a source about what we believe. We should point out, though, that concepts like “The Good” cannot be analyzed in terms of a higher concept.

Conclusion

This book was a joy to read. Geisler provided us with an accessible, yet rigorous text for the introductory to mid-level college student.

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## Taylor (Jul 20, 2022)

RamistThomist said:


> Foundationalism
> 
> Foundationalism is the view that there is a structure of knowledge “whose foundations, though they support all the rest, are themselves in need of no support” (152). We have directly justified beliefs “and they are topped with indirectly justified beliefs.”
> 
> In response to criticisms, the foundationalist maintains his position does not end in an infinite regress. It is possible that there are immediately grounded propositions.


Interestingly enough, when I was taking apologetics with Tom McCall, he had us read Alvin Plantinga, whose discussion of properly basic beliefs led me to presuppositionalism. But I have yet to understand the fundamental difference, if any, between properly basic beliefs and presuppositions. Can you help me out here?

Thanks for the review. I will probably buy this work now.


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## RamistThomist (Jul 20, 2022)

Taylor said:


> Interestingly enough, when I was taking apologetics with Tom McCall, he had us read Alvin Plantinga, whose discussion of properly basic beliefs led me to presuppositionalism. But I have yet to understand the fundamental difference, if any, between properly basic beliefs and presuppositions. Can you help me out here?
> 
> Thanks for the review. I will probably buy this work now.



PBBs still function as foundations or supports for other beliefs. Presuppositions do not. Sometimes they can but that isn't their role.

Plantinga thinks foundationalism has to have a infinite regress. Geisler responded to him here.








Geisler on Plantinga Transcendental Arguments and Charles Hodge - WordMp3.com


Lectures from Norman Geisler on apologetics.




www.wordmp3.com

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## RamistThomist (Jul 20, 2022)

Some more thoughts, and this is where it gets messy, first-generation presups (Van Til, Rushdoony, probably Gregg Singer) held to a coherentist view of truth. I know CVT said his position was neither coherentist nor correspondence, but for all practical purposes it was coherentist. Rushdoony more so. That kind of changed with Bahnsen and Frame. Bahnsen was explicitly correspondence. He defined knowledge as justified, true belief (and I probably would agree).

I doubt Bahnsen was a foundationalist, though. I'm certain Frame wasn't/

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## jwright82 (Jul 21, 2022)

Taylor said:


> Interestingly enough, when I was taking apologetics with Tom McCall, he had us read Alvin Plantinga, whose discussion of properly basic beliefs led me to presuppositionalism. But I have yet to understand the fundamental difference, if any, between properly basic beliefs and presuppositions. Can you help me out here?
> 
> Thanks for the review. I will probably buy this work now.


In essence a presupposition is a belief that must be true in order for another another belief to be either true or false. If I tell you I'm divorced that presupposes I was once married. Now if I'm still married to my first and only wife that statement is false, if I'm divorced than true. If I've never been married than its a meaningless question. It can't be true or false. Thats a strict logical analysis of presupposition but in reality they function in a more organic way as we walk around and engage life.
A Christian and an atheist probably will walk together with many of the same moral beliefs and agree on much ethically but when you analyze their presuppositions you find that in the Christian worldview an action can be either right or wrong (true or false) but in an atheistic worldview it is neither right or wrong (no basis for morality). Hence the ethical question is meaningless. Thats the Transcendental Argument or analysis against that aspect of their worldview.
Plantinga, as I understand him, is more concerned with the warrant of individual beliefs in isolation of other beliefs. My belief that my car is parked in my driveway has warrant (meaning I'm not being unreasonable in believing it) until I get up and notice its been stolen. Even though I was in my room ten minutes after it was stolen believing it was there, I still had warrant for my belief. So that belief has nothing to do with any other belief I hold, strictly speaking. I don't need to defend some philosophical position for the reliability of my senses to have warrant. Now obviously this assumes a properly functioning belief generating system, its a different animal than Van Til. 
So a TA can show that an Atheist's moral belief is meaningless even though they have warrant for that belief. The problem arises when we compare Plantinga and Van Til as if they're both operating within the same perspective on the same problems. Its true they're both concerned about epistemology and apologetics but from different angles. Asking if Plantinga is a foundationalist or not makes sense because that's the branch of epistemology he's engaged in, not so much with Van Til. 
Now that's not everything involved here, for a theological and philosophical critique of Plantinga see Oliphant's work on this, but I hope its a positive spin on both thinkers. There is interesting overlap between the two and areas to weigh out who's better but at least I hope that describes the logical and practical differences in how presuppositions and PBB'S function. If I'm not clear or confusing anywhere I'll be happy to try to clear anything up.


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## jwright82 (Jul 21, 2022)

RamistThomist said:


> Some more thoughts, and this is where it gets messy, first-generation presups (Van Til, Rushdoony, probably Gregg Singer) held to a coherentist view of truth. I know CVT said his position was neither coherentist nor correspondence, but for all practical purposes it was coherentist. Rushdoony more so. That kind of changed with Bahnsen and Frame. Bahnsen was explicitly correspondence. He defined knowledge as justified, true belief (and I probably would agree).
> 
> I doubt Bahnsen was a foundationalist, though. I'm certain Frame wasn't/


I do have to point out you're right, on one level, about Bahnsen and you're correct Van Til denied being a coherentist. You also qualified your statement by saying "practically speaking" (fair enough) but what do you make of Bahnsen and Horton challenging that statement on Van Til's view of truth? Both denied his view falling into any of the classical views of truth. Now practically speaking he may but since he seems to be operating outside that question it would be much harder to prove. I think impossible but thats my opinion. 
It's like evangelicals saying Richard Rorty is a relativist, he thinks the whole truth question is pointless so its much harder to prove. To prove that Van Til is anyone of the classical theories you'd have to show that he's (whether he likes it or not) operating in the same room as everybody else. I think both Bahnsen and Horton make a strong case he's not. 
Otherwise great review as always and the book looks interesting. I especially liked the part on Paul Tillich. I'm reading Robert Knudsen's four part series on Tillich right now, I believe he was a teaching assistant to him. I don't know about you but I always love reading critiques from someone who directly studied under the person being critiqued. The critique may be wrong but you can't say they don't know what the person thought (they knew them personally). 
Off the point, you may be interested in the book "Roots and Branches: The Quest For Meaning And Truth In Modern Thought", I'd love to read your review of that (if you haven't already read it). I know continental philosophy is not your interest, despite being well read about it, but Knudsen's lectures on Existentialism and Dooyeweerd at WTS media archives is fascinating. He also studied under Dooyeweerd in case you didn't know. 
Keep these reviews coming, I always enjoy them. They're a great blessing to everyone whether they've read it or not, or may get interested in the book because of them.

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## Knight (Jul 21, 2022)

RamistThomist said:


> Coherentism
> 
> Coherentism is one alternative to foundationalism. Geisler notes a distinction between coherentist theories of truth and coherentist justification for truth (161). The coherentist justification asserts that there are no basic beliefs, only webs of belief. The problem with both coherentist justifications and coherentist models is that both are disconnected from reality. A coherentist can give a perfectly coherent model that does not correspond to reality. All that matters is that it is internally consistent.


Interestingly, among others, Ernest Sosa (“The Raft and the Pyramid,” 1980) and Peter Klein (“Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem?” 2005; “Reasons, Reasoning, and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinitism and Foundationalism,” 2014) have each argued that “emergent” coherentism, on which the justification for a proposition or belief emerges in virtue of its being a member of a coherent set, is a form of meta-justificatory foundationalism. 

"The function of the type of reasoning we are considering is to enhance the epistemic status of our belief-states with their propositional contents, and circular reasoning cannot do that. It might appear that some progress has been made when a reason for y, namely x, is offered, but when it turns out that the reason for x is nothing other than y, it is pyrrhic progress.

The second, more plausible form of coherentism - emergent of holistic coherentism - holds that when our reasons have a reciprocal structure they are all at least prima facie justified. The epistemic status of all members of the coherent set is determined by the degree to which the propositions in the set are R-related plus, perhaps, some other properties obtaining. If x and y are members of the coherent set {x, y, ...} and xRy and yRx, it is not x that makes y justified and it is not y that makes x justified, rather what contributes to making each of them justified is that they are members of a coherent set. Being a member of such a set makes them prima facie justified, or, at least contributes significantly to each being prima facie justified (see BonJour 1989). I will not contest that in this paper. What is important to see here is that* emergent coherentism, as Ernest Sosa has shown, is a form of foundationalism* (Sosa, 1980). *The foundational property is being a member of a coherent set of propositions. *This form of coherentism is just as much a foundationalist account as, say, an account that takes all believed propositions which represent my conscious mental states as (at least) prima facie justified. Thus, and rapprochement with foundationalism is applicable to emergent coherentism as well." (Klein, 110-111 in _Ad Infinitum_)

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## Knight (Jul 21, 2022)

Taylor said:


> Interestingly enough, when I was taking apologetics with Tom McCall, he had us read Alvin Plantinga, whose discussion of properly basic beliefs led me to presuppositionalism. But I have yet to understand the fundamental difference, if any, between properly basic beliefs and presuppositions. Can you help me out here?
> 
> Thanks for the review. I will probably buy this work now.



I know a few answers have been given, but if you are asking about the difference between Plantinga's views and presuppositional_ism_, I think the heart of the difference is that, for Plantinga, properly basic beliefs are _defeatable_. For example:

"The fact, if it is a fact, *that belief in God is properly basic* *doesn't for a moment imply that it is immune to argument, objection, or defeat*; it is surely no consequence of my foundationalism or of the A/C model (_simpliciter_ or extended) that basic beliefs are beyond rational appraisal. I wouldn't so much as mention this, except that there seems to be a fairly widespread impression to the contrary." (_Warranted Christian Belief_, pg. 344)

Plantinga is a foundationalist, then, but for him, properly basic beliefs could be false. I think that most self-identifying presuppositionalists who also accept foundationalism (like myself or Gordon Clark) would deny that one's foundational belief could be false. 

One further relevant difference between the two views would be that I think most presuppositionalists are not externalists with respect to epistemic justification, whereas Plantinga is.

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