# Molinism



## Notthemama1984 (Jan 26, 2010)

I heard this term for the first time tonight. The guy who advocates it wasn't making any sense. So what exactly is molinism and is it orthodox, heterodox, or heretical?

Thanks


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## Philip (Jan 26, 2010)

Molinism is a Roman Catholic attempt to reconcile Libertarian Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge. It does this by saying that even though free will is undetermined, God can still know what the result will be because he knows the counterfactuals (ie: all the possible outcomes) and determines which one will be actualized.

The position is not so much heretical as inconsistent and unstable. Historically, it was the Jesuit counter-position to Calvinism. It makes much more sense to accept the classic Augustinian-Calvinist view of compatibilist or conditioned free will.


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## A.J. (Jan 26, 2010)

Wikipedia has an article on this. 

Molinism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The opposing view is Thomism. 

Thomism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

If I remember correctly, both views are allowed within Roman Catholicism.

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The Catholic Encyclopedia has better and more detailed explanations of the two views.

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Molinism 

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA: Thomism


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## MW (Jan 26, 2010)

Molinism is heretical as well as inconsistent. It is heretical because it ascribes uncertain knowledge to God and robs Him of His sovereignty over the freedom of the will. It is inconsistent because it attempts to turn foreknown possibilities into contingent realities and thereby create realities which are contingent upon conditions which God has not decreed.


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## Notthemama1984 (Jan 26, 2010)

So is it fair to say that they believe that God knows all possible outcomes and in order to bring about his sovereign will, God does not manipulate the will of man but rather manipulates the circumstances in order that man will make a free will decision that corresponds to the sovereign will of God?


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## MW (Jan 26, 2010)

Chaplainintraining said:


> So is it fair to say that they believe that God knows all possible outcomes and in order to bring about his sovereign will, God does not manipulate the will of man but rather manipulates the circumstances in order that man will make a free will decision that corresponds to the sovereign will of God?


 
This definition defeats the idea of middle knowledge because it still makes the knowledge of future events depend upon the sovereign will of God. 

Traditionally God's knowledge as conceived by man is distinguished as a knowledge of possibilities (a natural knowledge of intelligence) and of certainties (a free knowledge of vision). All knowledge falls into one of these two categories. The middle knowledge exponent suggests a third kind of knowledge. It is not merely of things possible, but of things actually future yet contingent on specific conditions. God is said to know that they could actually come to pass when the conditions which bring them to pass are present. The criticism from a traditional perspective is that this makes God's knowledge of the future dependent upon the free actions of men, which is contrary to the free and absolute nature of God.


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## Notthemama1984 (Jan 27, 2010)

wow, that sounds similiar to open theism. God doesn't know exactly what will happen. He merely knows what could happen if certain circumstances occur.

So I think the guy was blowing smoke when he said Calvinism is evolving into a molinistic calvinism.


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## Philip (Jan 27, 2010)

Some of this will depend on the Molinist. Most Molinists (William Lane Craig, Alvin Plantinga, etc) would admit that God has complete knowledge of the future. Molinism is not openness theism--they claim, though, that God can have such knowledge because of His middle knowledge and His choosing which of the possibilities to actualize.

Why it's unstable: if you start with their (incompatibilist) idea of free will, you get openness theism. If you start with middle knowledge, you get compatibilism and a Jansenist/Calvinist view.

Molinistic Calvinism is possible if you were to substitute compatibilist free will from incompatibilist/libertarian free will.


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## Notthemama1984 (Jan 27, 2010)

I was under the impression that a libertarian free will would lead to the denial of original sin (because the idea of original sin means that with Adam's sin imputed our nature is now such that we only follow after the way of the flesh. If we have a libertarian free will, then we are not bound after the ways of the flesh which would mean we do not have original sin corrupting our nature). If this is true, then I see Molinistic calvinism as an oxymoron.

PS thanks to everyone for helping me through all of this.


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## Philip (Jan 27, 2010)

Molinistic Calvinism would not be classically Molinist in that it would deny libertarian free will and recognize compatibilist (Calvinist) free will. The part of Molinism that it would affirm would be middle knowledge preceding actualization of the possibilities.


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## Notthemama1984 (Jan 27, 2010)

gotcha


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jan 28, 2010)

Molinism sees God's knowledge as comprising logical moments, placing God’s decision to create after the moment of God’s hypothetical knowledge:

In the Molinism schematic below, worlds that could be created are shown as ‘O’

Moment 1: .... OzOzOzzzzzzzzzOzzOzzzzOzzzzzzOzzzz*O*zzzzzzO...
*Natural Knowledg*e: God knows the range of possible worlds (what could be). The content of this knowledge is essential to God.

Moment 2: ... zzzzzzzzzzOzOzzzzzzzzzOzOzzzzzzzzzzz*O*...
*Middle Knowledge*: God knows the range of feasible worlds (what would be). God’s [hypothetical] knowledge of what every possible free creature would do under any possible set of circumstances and, thus, knowledge of those possible worlds which God can make actual. The content of this knowledge is not essential to God.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Divine Creative Decree – God’s Free Decision to Create a World Here
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moment 3:… zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz*O*
*Free Knowledge*: God knows the actual world (what will be). The content of this knowledge is not essential to God.


Craig and others refer to the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CFs): Knowing what any possible agent would do in any possible circumstances, God can have complete providential control over the events that occur by knowing how the history of the world would go given any creative decision He might make about which circumstances to cause to be actual, and by then making that initial creative decision. Yet human libertarian freedom is obviously also maintained.

But, foreknowledge is grounded in something that actually happens, and it is the occurrence of that future event that sanctions the foreknowledge of it. On the other hand, whatever grounds the truth of counterfactuals of freedom is something other than an actually occurring event. The indeterminateness of counterfactual states of affairs in virtue of which counterfactuals of freedom are true is therefore of a wholly different order from the indeterminateness of future states of affairs in virtue of which future factuals of freedom are true. Though the latter are not yet determinate, they nevertheless will be.

Even granting that there are some CF’s with actual (true) antecedents whose truth might in principle be determined by actual agents it seems to be such that God could not know them pre-volitionally, if He must directly perceive their grounds. For until God decides which agents and which circumstances to cause to be actual, there aren’t any actual decisions that God could in principle know as the grounds of these CF’s. Since middle knowledge is meant to be the aid by which God determines the actual world, and yet it seems as if He could not have this knowledge logically prior to determining the actuality of a particular possible world, “middle knowledge” seems both incorrectly described and unhelpful for providential creation decisions.

I believe that the Molinist view of providence should be rejected because there are good reasons to think that there are not any (and certainly not enough) true counterfactuals of freedom. According to Molinism, foreknowledge is nothing more than the causally impotent byproduct of God’s creative act of will.

[Source: Adapted from Craig’s, _The Only Wise God and What Does God Know_?]

AMR


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## cih1355 (Jan 29, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Molinistic Calvinism would not be classically Molinist in that it would deny libertarian free will and recognize compatibilist (Calvinist) free will. The part of Molinism that it would affirm would be middle knowledge preceding actualization of the possibilities.


 

I thought that the idea of middle knowledge assumed that man has libertarian free will. If God knows what we would do in all possible circumstances because He decides what we would do in those circumstances, then why would there have to be a separate category of knowledge called "middle knowledge"? God knowing what we would do in all possible circumstances would be natural knowledge.


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## MW (Jan 29, 2010)

cih1355 said:


> I thought that the idea of middle knowledge assumed that man has libertarian free will. If God knows what we would do in all possible circumstances because He decides what we would do in those circumstances, then why would there have to be a separate category of knowledge called "middle knowledge"? God knowing what we would do in all possible circumstances would be natural knowledge.


 
It's not dependent on libertarian freewill. In fact, a case could be made that it depends on a conditioned will because the counterfactual can only be known on stable conditions.

Patrick's distinction between "could" and "would" shows the difference between natural knowledge and middle knowledge. The proponent of MK is specifically claiming that this contingent state of affiars "would" in fact take place where specific conditions were present. This is what is said to reconcile God's exhaustive knowledge with freedom of choice, that is, to choose what is not determined.


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