# How would you prove the God of the Bible exists?



## Romans922

If you were asked by a Christian to prove that the God of the Bible exists in a short manner, how would you go about it?


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## PuritanCovenanter

History. Prophecy seems to confer. 



> Joh 14:29 And now I have told you before it takes place, so that when it does take place you may believe.





> Joh 16:4 But I have said these things to you, that when their hour comes you may remember that I told them to you. "I did not say these things to you from the beginning, because I was with you.


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## Herald

Andrew,

I don't know if I would even try to prove that God exists. Instead, I would share with the skeptic or doubter what Paul wrote in Romans 1. 



> Romans 1:20 20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse.



The complexity of nature testifies that there was a creator. 

The author of Hebrews wrote:



> Hebrews 11:6 6 And without faith it is impossible to please Him, for he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek him.



I would challenge the skeptic or doubter to consider what the bible says about the nature of God and the nature of man. Allow the Word to convict of God's existence and the reader's sinfulness. A back and forth argument using philosophy, science or rational thought usually doesn't sway unbelievers. Perhaps it's just my simple mind, but I prefer to allow God to confront them through the scriptures.


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## Tripel

I'd say that there's no better explainer for the world around us. Nothing comes close to giving as sufficient an answer for man's questions about life, origins, and purpose.


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## JML

Romans922 said:


> If you were asked by a Christian to prove that the God of the Bible exists in a short manner, how would you go about it?


 
I wouldn't. The Bible never sets out to prove that God exists. It starts with the fact of His existence.

*Genesis 1:1*
"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."


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## Tripel

John Lanier said:


> I wouldn't. The Bible never sets out to prove that God exists. It starts with the fact of His existence.
> 
> *Genesis 1:1*
> "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."


 
Are you saying you would refuse to discuss the existence of God?


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## Grymir

Hi Romans922,

Since you said that the person is a Christian, it becomes easier that trying to prove God to a lost person. One of the things I do is to prove the historical reliability of the Scriptures. Hank Hanegraaff has a great acronym "MAPS" that I like to use. Although I change Statistics to Science, and debunk evolution.

Here's a link to his work - http://www.friedenschurch.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/01/MAPS.pdf

That the Bible is written by God is one of the things that "proved" the existence Of God to me. 

I wouldn't get bogged down with the modern philosophical rabbit trails of "you can't prove anything" or the certainty rationalizations. Since the person asked about proving the God of the Bible, start from there.

Enjoy!


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## KMK

Perhaps start by trying to prove the God of the Bible does NOT exist. This would necessarily lead to the study of the Bible itself which would be the most edifying possibility.


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## CharlieJ

I'm not sure that I would. Obviously, you wouldn't need to prove the God of the Bible to a Christian, right? But if you meant to a non-Christian, I wouldn't do that either. For Calvin, apologetics had two major purposes: to answer the foolishness of the unbeliever who attempts to disprove Christianity, and to protect the Christian from such assaults. I don't recall in the early Reformed traditions "proofs" of the existence of God by which unbelievers are forced to yield to the rational necessity of the truth of the Bible. 

The point is that there is no way to demonstrate rationally and unambiguously the truth of the Bible. If there were, there would be no need for the Holy Spirit. Also notice that never in the Bible is there any attempt "prove" the resurrection of Christ, for instance. The resurrection is declared and certain counter-arguments are discredited, but the reason to believe in the resurrection is that God calls us to do so. I did not become a Christian because I was convinced of the rational necessity of the resurrection. I believe in the resurrection because I have been called by the resurrected Christ.


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## Claudiu

I didn't read the OP correctly, and I thought it said a "non-Christian" instead of "Christian" so I had to erase my comments.

I'm kind of confused on someone being a Christian and not believing in God. How does that work out? Maybe I'm missing something.


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## Backwoods Presbyterian

The Ontological Argument is my personal favorite.


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## DMcFadden

*Presuppositionally:*
1. Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
2. If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
3. Therefore God exists.

We must point out to [our opponents] that [non-theistic] reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well... It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions. —(A Survey of Christian Epistemology [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969], p. 204).

*Classically:*
"If anything exists . . . God exists." (R.C. Sproul)


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## PuritanCovenanter

DMcFadden said:


> *Presuppositionally:*
> 1. Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
> 2. If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
> 3. Therefore God exists.
> 
> We must point out to [our opponents] that [non-theistic] reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well... It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions. —(A Survey of Christian Epistemology [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969], p. 204).
> 
> *Classically:*
> "If anything exists . . . God exists." (R.C. Sproul)


 
Amen.


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## Philip

Depends . . .

The ontological argument is a good one to use, but a bit difficult to explain (though most philosophers today would accept its validity, albeit grudgingly).

We have to remember that while an argument (like the OA) may be sound in theory, it will not convince one whose heart is hard. The apologist may argue and argue well, but in the end, the Holy Spirit must convince. I think that there are probably ways of rationally and unambiguously demonstrating the truth of the Gospel--and I do not think for a minute that these could be successful unless the Holy Spirit were working in the heart of the listener. Reason is just as fallen as our other cognitive equipment.


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## pesterjon

When the average Christian goes to great lengths to prove to a skeptic intellectually what the Bible assumes from square one as fact (Gen. 1:1 - in the beginning God...), it does not typically result in anything other than an intellectual conversation taking place.

As a pastor, I immediately turn the question back to the person asking. If you are able to somehow prove God, what is it you will prove? And once you have proved whatever that is, what will be the result? 

The goal of gospel has never been to prove God's existence, that is simply something that has taken place over time as Christians have pushed intellectual engagement. Interestingly there are not any examples in Scripture of someone who does not believe in God becoming a Christian. Even the Mars Hill pagans believed in gods.

I am not saying don't be renewing your mind. i am saying you will never prove God's existence, and many such conversations are nothing more than an intellectual exercise that leaves an even smugger person making excuses for what their conscience is telling them is true. We must clearly speak and live the gospel, and those who reject it may use the excuse of not believing in God's existence but I don't really see anywhere in Scripture that compels us to engage at that particular level.


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## larryjf

Since you want to specifically prove the God of the Bible, and not God in general, I would say to use the Bible.

Fulfilled prophecy is a great way to show that the bible is the Word of God, for only God is omniscient. Sine biblical prophecy has been fulfilled, the God of the Bible must be the true God. As an example...

Thus says the LORD to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have grasped, to subdue nations before him and to loose the belts of kings, to open doors before him that gates may not be closed: (Isa 45:1)


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## jwithnell

> 1. Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
> 2. If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
> 3. Therefore God exists.


This is Ontological, not presuppositional. The latter (and arguably the reformed approach) would be to presuppose that God exists and that he has spoken the truth in the scriptures.

Turn the question around: if God doesn't exist, what do you believe? Then lead them with your questions to their logical conclusion.


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## Philip

All presuppositional arguments can be turned into direct ones: each one is the reverse of the other. In theory, it can work both ways.


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## JML

Tripel said:


> John Lanier said:
> 
> 
> 
> I wouldn't. The Bible never sets out to prove that God exists. It starts with the fact of His existence.
> 
> *Genesis 1:1*
> "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Are you saying you would refuse to discuss the existence of God?
Click to expand...


No. I don't have a problem discussing the existence of God. What I am saying is that the Bible does not even attempt to "prove" the existence of God. It is taken as fact. I am not going to get into an argument with someone trying to "prove" that God exists. It is clear that God exists. We believe in God by faith plus there is something in human nature that makes us realize when we look out on creation that there is a God. Setting out trying to "prove" He exists is silly in my opinion. There is a lot of ink wasted (see Lee Strobel) trying to "prove" things that we are never asked to prove but are to believe by faith. I believe God exists because He has told me that He exists through the Scriptures. I don't need human arguments or someone's idea of evidence. We either believe the Scriptures or we do not.


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## Philip

John Lanier said:


> Tripel said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> John Lanier said:
> 
> 
> 
> I wouldn't. The Bible never sets out to prove that God exists. It starts with the fact of His existence.
> 
> *Genesis 1:1*
> "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Are you saying you would refuse to discuss the existence of God?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> No. I don't have a problem discussing the existence of God. What I am saying is that the Bible does not even attempt to "prove" the existence of God. It is taken as fact. I am not going to get into an argument with someone trying to "prove" that God exists. It is clear that God exists. We believe in God by faith plus there is something in human nature that makes us realize when we look out on creation that there is a God. Setting out trying to "prove" He exists is silly in my opinion. There is a lot of ink wasted (see Lee Strobel) trying to "prove" things that we are never asked to prove but are to believe by faith. I believe God exists because He has told me that He exists through the Scriptures. I don't need human arguments or someone's idea of evidence. We either believe the Scriptures or we do not.
Click to expand...

 
Could we say, then, that an argument is not needed because we see clearly the existence of God in much the same way as we see that 2+2=4 or that there is a tree outside? We know that God is there because of the _Sensus divinitatus_ (which the unbeliever suppresses in unrighteousness) and because of the work of the Holy Spirit regenerating us and pointing us to the Scriptures.

I don't think that it is necessarily a negation of any of this to argue for the existence of God. Arguments for the existence of God are, in the words of Anselm, "faith in search of understanding." Anselm's ontological argument, for instance, appears in the midst of a prayer--the whole _proslogion_ is a long prayer. So while, like you, I believe in God for reasons other than argument, I do not think it necessary to say that all arguments are futile or wasted.


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## jwright82

I agree with P. F. Pugh, great post brother. I would employ Bahnsen and Van Til types of arguments to hopefully show the futility of not beleiving in God, I would evidences if the job called for it and also versions of the classical arguments if necessary. My only scruple about the question is this I am not so sure we can prove the exsistance of the God of the bible without also proving the whole christian worldview. It is not a god we are talking about it is the God of scripture and it is not some nuetral view of theism we are proving either. It is the whole christian worldview on the docks not a piece of it.


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## JennyG

I heard of someone who was asked for a one-word proof of*the truth of the Bible (not quite what you were asking, but still)
...his answer was, "Israel".
It's a good one - their continued existence through all the ages defies explanation in human terms


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## Claudiu

JennyG said:


> I heard of someone who was asked for a one-word proof of*the truth of the Bible (not quite what you were asking, but still)
> ...his answer was, "Israel".
> It's a good one - their continued existence through all the ages defies explanation in human terms


 
I hear dispensationalists use this one.


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## JennyG

Claudiu said:


> JennyG said:
> 
> 
> 
> I heard of someone who was asked for a one-word proof of*the truth of the Bible (not quite what you were asking, but still)
> ...his answer was, "Israel".
> It's a good one - their continued existence through all the ages defies explanation in human terms
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I hear dispensationalists use this one.
Click to expand...

 I'm hazy on all those isms......is that bad?


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## ColdSilverMoon

I don't think it is possible to "prove" God exists.

That said, I think asking a skeptic if they believe the Resurrection took place is a good way to start. If they say no, then point out the almost incontrovertible historical evidence that it did. If someone believes the Resurrection then they must believe the existence of God, and really the whole of the Bible for that matter. If they still refuse to believe in the Resurrection, I'm not sure what else one can do to persuade them at that point in time.


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## Skyler

Romans922 said:


> If you were asked by a Christian to prove that the God of the Bible exists in a short manner, how would you go about it?


 
The internal witness of the Holy Spirit usually suffices for Christians.

If the Christian was asking how he could prove to an unbeliever that the God of the Bible exists, that's a little different question. There really is no "short" answer, but the shortest and best one I have found is that the Christian worldview, unlike any others, provides a logically, morally, and philosophically consistent worldview.


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## MW

John Lanier said:


> What I am saying is that the Bible does not even attempt to "prove" the existence of God. It is taken as fact.


 
There are various places where "demonstration" is provided even where "proof" in the empirical sense has not been offered. For example, we have the polemic against idolatry in the second section of Isaiah. God undertakes to prove Himself as true and trustworthy in comparison to the gods of the nations. One fact in particular, fulfilled prophecy, is given as an argument for believing He is God and there is none other.


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## MW

Joshua said:


> I wouldn't try to "prove" that He exists. I would just affirm what the WLC says
> 
> "The very light of nature in man and the works of God declare plainly that there is a God, but His Word and Spirit only do sufficiently and effectually reveal Him unto men for their salvation."


 
The light of nature is knowledge which reason provides. If the knowledge which reason provides declares plainly that God exists, then the belief in "reasons" for God's existence is presupposed in the statement of the Larger Catechism.


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## DMcFadden

jwithnell said:


> 1. Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
> 2. If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
> 3. Therefore God exists.
> 
> 
> 
> This is Ontological, not presuppositional. The latter (and arguably the reformed approach) would be to presuppose that God exists and that he has spoken the truth in the scriptures.
> 
> Turn the question around: if God doesn't exist, what do you believe? Then lead them with your questions to their logical conclusion.
Click to expand...

 
Really? I thought that the transcendental argument (of which this was a simplified form) tries to prove that God is the "precondition off all human knowledge and experience," hence the quote from Van Til. Not being much of a philosopher, it was my opinion that such arguments were pretty common in Reformed apologetics of a presuppositional variety. Am I missing something? Doesn't the demonstration of the impossibility of the contrary function pretty commonly in presuppositional apologetics?


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## MW

Romans922 said:


> If you were asked by a Christian to prove that the God of the Bible exists in a short manner, how would you go about it?


 
I would maintain that the very request for proof presupposes the God of the Bible. Why? Proof requires the existence of absolute fact made known. The existence of absolute fact made known requires the existence of absolute intellect making known absolute fact.


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## JML

armourbearer said:


> John Lanier said:
> 
> 
> 
> What I am saying is that the Bible does not even attempt to "prove" the existence of God. It is taken as fact.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There are various places where "demonstration" is provided even where "proof" in the empirical sense has not been offered. For example, we have the polemic against idolatry in the second section of Isaiah. God undertakes to prove Himself as true and trustworthy in comparison to the gods of the nations. One fact in particular, fulfilled prophecy, is given as an argument for believing He is God and there is none other.
Click to expand...


True. I guess I see your point. I think my statement is still true. The Bible does not attempt to prove the existence of God. However, there were men in Scripture who set out to prove that the one true God was the God of the Bible. For example, Elijah on Mount Carmel. As I read the OP, that seems to be what he is asking: not to prove the existence of God but the God of the Bible. There is no need to prove that there is a God, it is clear from nature and from the Scriptures.

*1 Kings 18:24*
"And call ye on the name of your gods, and I will call on the name of the LORD: and the God that answereth by fire, let him be God. And all the people answered and said, It is well spoken."


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## Philip

Skyler said:


> The internal witness of the Holy Spirit usually suffices for Christians.
> 
> If the Christian was asking how he could prove to an unbeliever that the God of the Bible exists, that's a little different question. There really is no "short" answer, but the shortest and best one I have found is that the Christian worldview, unlike any others, provides a logically, morally, and philosophically consistent worldview.



First, coming up with a proof for the existence of God doesn't mean that we don't know, just as my looking into the proof for a given mathematical formula means that I don't know (or that I doubt) the formula.

Second, the argument you have given presupposes a coherence view of knowledge where there are no possible external criteria. Consistency is no proof of truth---it simply proves that you have a nice theory. To say that the Christian worldview is consistent is not to say that it is true.


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## larryjf

If he would want you to prove God using logic, then ask him to first prove that logic exists.
It's an improper assumption to believe that something must be proven in order to exist.


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## Wannabee

Ps 19 The heavens declare the glory of God.
Romans 1

Proof of God's existence is self-evident in creation. It's not a matter of proof, it's a matter of convincing someone of that proof's validity. If they deny the evidence of His existence then they fulfill what God said man would do by futilely suppressing the self-evident truth in unrighteousness. I recently witnessed to a man who said their was no God and informed him that his response was exactly what God said he'd say. He just laughed it off... for the time being.

This reminds me of a discussion I had with my brother-in-law. After getting a little heated in our exchange he asked, "What does the Bible prove?" I stammered out something about creation and he cut me off, "No, what does it prove?" I was stumped. After pondering it for a bit I realized I had let hm form an errant line of reasoning in my mind. The Bible proves nothing. The Bible states truth. It is that by which truth is measured. It is the rule. The rule's authority is self evident and all else proves it's validity. Every true science is a study of the work of the Creator. All creation proves that God exists and that Scripture is true.


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## jwright82

DMcFadden said:


> jwithnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
> 2. If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
> 3. Therefore God exists.
> 
> 
> 
> This is Ontological, not presuppositional. The latter (and arguably the reformed approach) would be to presuppose that God exists and that he has spoken the truth in the scriptures.
> 
> Turn the question around: if God doesn't exist, what do you believe? Then lead them with your questions to their logical conclusion.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Really? I thought that the transcendental argument (of which this was a simplified form) tries to prove that God is the "precondition off all human knowledge and experience," hence the quote from Van Til. Not being much of a philosopher, it was my opinion that such arguments were pretty common in Reformed apologetics of a presuppositional variety. Am I missing something? Doesn't the demonstration of the impossibility of the contrary function pretty commonly in presuppositional apologetics?
Click to expand...

 
That simplyfied version of the argument really isn't an argument at all and is rightly criticized as being near impossible to prove in that form. It is because each premise must be proven independantly because it is a direct argument. Van Til spoke of using an indirect argument, if I show that the only way that morality can be justified is to assume the God of the bible than I havn't directly proven that God exsists only that we must assume His exsistance in order for morality to be justified. The atheist has no buissnesss invoking all their moral outrages against christianity if they cannot even justify morality to begin with (the impossibility of the contrary, atheism in this case). 

The argument mentioned above is better at showing the method one would use in argumentation. Also the argument is transcendental in nature, it originated in its modern form with Kant. When Kant was "awakened from his dogmatic slumber" by David Hume's destructivly critical philosophy he sought a new way to gain certainty in knowledge. He argued for what he wrongly thought were the preconditions for knowledge, his "Critique of Pure Reason". For instance in order for like say a movie projector to work certian elements must be there in order for it to work (lenses, light, film, etc..). In the same way he analyzed knowledge like this to come up with what must be present for us to even have knowledge. 

After him German philosophy used this same method of argumentation and then the anglo-saxon wolrd adopted it mainly through Hegel, this school is known as the Idealists. When Van Til learned philosophy it was in this Idealist school that he did. At the same time he was learning this the Pragmatists and the American Realists were reacting against Idealism in America and the Analytical movement was reacting against it in England. They kind of threw the baby out with the bath water and this method of argumentation was somewhat forgotten, this is why it seems so strange to modern ears to hear Van Tillians use it. Recent work Analytical philosophy has "rediscovered" it, so there is much work to be done on the logic of it so to speak. I hope this minor history lesson helps anyone grasp what Van Til was doing.


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## Philip

> The atheist has no buissnesss invoking all their moral outrages against christianity if they cannot even justify morality to begin with (the impossibility of the contrary, atheism in this case).



Why does morality need justification? Why the deontologism? What exactly is illegitimate about morality being properly basic?

And even if there is a problem, why can't the moral critique be an internal critique?


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## jwright82

> Why does morality need justification?



Because we cannot take anything for granted in the philosophical world. On a civil level we can take things for granted, an atheist and I can agree that some public policy is wrong without debating our individual justification for it. We must come up with a metaphysical theory that can justify ethics or anything else before we can legitamatly use it.



> Why the deontologism? What exactly is illegitimate about morality being properly basic?



Foundationalism has been criticized for its lack of criteria of what is properly basic. Methodologically speaking if you let the unbeleiver take these things as properly basic than that is just your methodological choice.



> And even if there is a problem, why can't the moral critique be an internal critique?



Sometimes it is an internal critique, whether or not a worldview can hold two contradictory moral beleifs.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Why does morality need justification?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Because we cannot take anything for granted in the philosophical world. On a civil level we can take things for granted, an atheist and I can agree that some public policy is wrong without debating our individual justification for it. We must come up with a metaphysical theory that can justify ethics or anything else before we can legitamatly use it.
Click to expand...


No we don't. I don't have to come up with an argument for everything, so I'm not going to force that on the atheist. Remember, I'm an anti-skeptic. You say we have to justify everything, you end up with skepticism.



> Why the deontologism? What exactly is illegitimate about morality being properly basic?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Foundationalism has been criticized for its lack of criteria of what is properly basic. Methodologically speaking if you let the unbeleiver take these things as properly basic than that is just your methodological choice.
Click to expand...


Properly basic beliefs are produced by properly-functioning belief-forming faculties. Your list of these faculties with depend on which model of our cognitive equipment you are using.



> And even if there is a problem, why can't the moral critique be an internal critique?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sometimes it is an internal critique, whether or not a worldview can hold two contradictory moral beleifs.
Click to expand...

 
That's my point--regardless of the atheist's presuppositions, we do need to answer his objections, even if it is to point out a flaw in them.


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## jwright82

> No we don't. I don't have to come up with an argument for everything, so I'm not going to force that on the atheist. Remember, I'm an anti-skeptic. You say we have to justify everything, you end up with skepticism.



Not argument, explination. I tell you what name one worldview that has no metaphysical assumptions attached to it. These assumptions have consequences, these consequences determine the nature of things within that worldview.



> Properly basic beliefs are produced by properly-functioning belief-forming faculties. Your list of these faculties with depend on which model of our cognitive equipment you are using.



How do you know your faculties are "properly-functioning"? The problem with foundationalism is how a beleif is prperly basic? What attribute does it posses over and against other beleifs (other than being properly basic) ? How would one prove that it is properly basic? If morality is properly basic than why do people disagree over what is moral or not? Pro-life people and pro-choice people both make moral arguments in their favor.



> That's my point--regardless of the atheist's presuppositions, we do need to answer his objections, even if it is to point out a flaw in them.



The method that I prefer is to show how futile their presupositions are and how they cannot explain reality as we experience it. Both are legitimate methods, I feel that Van Til's method is the most thouroughly critical.


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## Philip

> Not argument, explination. I tell you what name one worldview that has no metaphysical assumptions attached to it. These assumptions have consequences, these consequences determine the nature of things within that worldview.



Why do I have to explain everything? If there are no givens, there is no philosophy.



> How do you know your faculties are "properly-functioning"?



What exactly do you mean by "know" here?



> The problem with foundationalism is how a beleif is prperly basic? What attribute does it posses over and against other beleifs (other than being properly basic) ? How would one prove that it is properly basic?



Proper basicality may vary from person to person. As a Christian, my belief in God is properly basic, being produced by the _Sensus divinitatus_ (guided by the Holy Spirit). However, for an atheist, this belief is not properly basic.

My belief that there is a tree outside is also properly basic--it is produced by a properly-functioning noetic faculty which I have no reason to doubt at the moment.



> If morality is properly basic than why do people disagree over what is moral or not?



Some of this can be attributed to cultural norms as well as cultural emphases on which parts of morality are more important.



> The method that I prefer is to show how futile their presupositions are and how they cannot explain reality as we experience it.



Why not do that _after_ answering the objections themselves?


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## Claudiu

JennyG said:


> Claudiu said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> JennyG said:
> 
> 
> 
> I heard of someone who was asked for a one-word proof of*the truth of the Bible (not quite what you were asking, but still)
> ...his answer was, "Israel".
> It's a good one - their continued existence through all the ages defies explanation in human terms
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I hear dispensationalists use this one.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I'm hazy on all those isms......is that bad?
Click to expand...

 
From where they are coming, yeah (with the premil view). They hold Jews higher than Christians, most I've talked to say it in a John Hagee way where it sounds like all Jews well end up getting saved. I think its wrong. 

If you aren't saying it from a Disp. perspective then Israel's continued existence is somewhat meaningless, since they are just following tradition and not believing in Christ as Savior when he came the first time.


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## Claudiu

Claudiu said:


> I didn't read the OP correctly, and I thought it said a "non-Christian" instead of "Christian" so I had to erase my comments.
> 
> I'm kind of confused on someone being a Christian and not believing in God. How does that work out? Maybe I'm missing something.





I don't know if we're allowed to bump, but I'm still wondering about this: how someone can be a Christian but not believe in the God of the Bible? Again, I'm probably reading the OP wrong or not getting something. Just wondering if someone could help me out.


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## O'GodHowGreatThouArt

larryjf said:


> If he would want you to prove God using logic, then ask him to first prove that logic exists.
> It's an improper assumption to believe that something must be proven in order to exist.



If someone wants to go after the non-existence of God via logic, it could get interesting depending on how deep the person goes and if they're doing it from a neutral perspective.

I posted a note regarding such a topic on Facebook a while back, and will quote it here.



> People do not believe God exists because it's not logical. Who said anything about God being logical? He's outside the boundaries of any form of logic that ever has or ever will be created. Because if He's God, he can't be confined to human logic (which is inferior to Him).
> 
> To prove something doesn't exist, it must be bound by some form of reasoning (In this attempt: logic), and then this bounded “truth” must be disproved using known facts. If you can’t do both, disproving it is considered illogical, because one requisite is bound to another. To fail attempting to bind it would render you incapable of disproving it. How can you bind something to logic when it is outside of it?
> 
> Assume God exists. Look up god in any dictionary, and almost every definition would carry one of two terms: Supreme creator or deity. Both terms place God over everything that ever was created. This means that He is placed outside of us: unable to reach Him unless He chooses for us to reach Him. This also places Him above us in every regard, including intelligence. If He is placed above us in any way, no amount of human intelligence can ever bind God to the knowledge we obtain. In order to truly bind God, we have to BE God. But if you try to do that, you will be in essence blinding yourself, because you will be God.
> 
> And here in lies the catch-22.
> 
> Thus, assuming you are God based on the end of the previous paragraph, this all means that you are attempting to prove YOU do not exist.
> 
> Notice a problem here?



Lesson to be learned: If you like people to be able to prove you exist, don't try to prove God doesn't exist.


----------



## Philip

Claudiu said:


> I don't know if we're allowed to bump, but I'm still wondering about this: how someone can be a Christian but not believe in the God of the Bible? Again, I'm probably reading the OP wrong or not getting something. Just wondering if someone could help me out.


 
I think we're more dealing with a Christian who knows but doubts or is struggling. This is part of the reason why theologians like Anselm wrote arguments: the primary target was not the unbeliever, but the struggling believer.


----------



## jwright82

> Why do I have to explain everything? If there are no givens, there is no philosophy.



I am not ussually critical of the classic view of apologetics but this is one area in which I am. It seems to me that the classicist must assume modernity and its views on everything just to survive. Unless there are givens and completly nuetral spaces between beleivers and unbeleivers then there is skepticism. This is the lie that the modernist wants us to think. I also think this dichotomy is a false one. There is a general formless sense of right and wrong that all people have, we know and act as if there are moral absolutes. But since it is formless and lacking any concrete dimension to it it is of no use. Just because we know that there is a right and wrong doesn't mean that anything is given. The particular theories of ethics all agree that there is a right and wrong but they all disagree on why things are that way and what acts are right and wrong.

Remember the pro-lifers and the pro-choicers both believe they are the moral ones in the dicussion. Hence I can attack the theory of ethics presented by the unbeleiver and that has no bearing on morality itself. You know as well as I do that any assumption or proposition in an argument can be called into question in a philosophical debate.



> What exactly do you mean by "know" here?



Or to say it another way how do you know you can trust your falcuties?



> Proper basicality may vary from person to person. As a Christian, my belief in God is properly basic, being produced by the Sensus divinitatus (guided by the Holy Spirit). However, for an atheist, this belief is not properly basic.
> 
> My belief that there is a tree outside is also properly basic--it is produced by a properly-functioning noetic faculty which I have no reason to doubt at the moment.



This makes "proper-basicality" purely subjective than and of no use, this is one reason why foundationalism is in trouble. Unless there is an objective standered for all people than it is not proper at all.



> Some of this can be attributed to cultural norms as well as cultural emphases on which parts of morality are more important.



Not only here but in their very conception of what is right and wrong and why. Or over the nature of ethics itself. A utilitarainist disagrees with a kantian at the most basic level.



> Why not do that after answering the objections themselves?



In a sense I would seek to do both at the same time. If someone stated that the God of the OT was cruel and unethical in His commandments to wipe the various tribes and stuff I would answer their objections by pointing out that their assumptions when reading the text were wrong and futile. God being God can do whatever He likes with His creation and especially right if we take the christian notion of sin into account, both assumptions he or she rejects. The creature has no right to judge the Creator unless they can come up with a non-problamatic theory of ethics that even God Himself must be subject to, things that are right and wrong outside of God. This assumption is futile and wrong, also it is not one that the christian can believe.


----------



## Philip

> I am not ussually critical of the classic view of apologetics but this is one area in which I am. It seems to me that the classicist must assume modernity and its views on everything just to survive.



I don't assume modernity at all---that's why I assume anti-skepticism. If there are no givens, we are left with skepticism. I take it as a given that my senses are working according to their design plan and that the _sensus Divinitatus_ is just such a module.

I'm not a modern foundationalist: just a pre-modern foundationalist.



> Or to say it another way how do you know you can trust your falcuties?



Because they are properly-functioning modules of the design plan.



> This makes "proper-basicality" purely subjective than and of no use, this is one reason why foundationalism is in trouble. Unless there is an objective standered for all people than it is not proper at all.



"Proper" here means that I cannot place epistemic blame upon you for the belief, given your position.



> Some of this can be attributed to cultural norms as well as cultural emphases on which parts of morality are more important.
> 
> 
> 
> Not only here but in their very conception of what is right and wrong and why. Or over the nature of ethics itself. A utilitarainist disagrees with a kantian at the most basic level.
Click to expand...


Why think this? If the Kantian and the Utilitarian disagree at the most basic level, there can be no communication between them, since they are playing completely separate language-games.



> In a sense I would seek to do both at the same time. If someone stated that the God of the OT was cruel and unethical in His commandments to wipe the various tribes and stuff I would answer their objections by pointing out that their assumptions when reading the text were wrong and futile.



Or you could answer the question more simply: the lives were God's to take.



> The creature has no right to judge the Creator unless they can come up with a non-problamatic theory of ethics that even God Himself must be subject to, things that are right and wrong outside of God.



I can think of one--and it isn't external to God: it's essential to God. God's own nature is a law to which He is subject.

Again, you are assuming a coherence view of knowledge which the skeptic has no reason to grant, which is why you shouldn't concede him his skepticism and be an anti-skeptic. If you say that there are no givens, you have accepted the Cartesian burden: you are beginning with doubt, not faith (Lesslie Newbigin's _Proper Confidence_ is an excellent refutation of Cartesian modernism).


----------



## jwright82

> I don't assume modernity at all---that's why I assume anti-skepticism. If there are no givens, we are left with skepticism. I take it as a given that my senses are working according to their design plan and that the sensus Divinitatus is just such a module.



I think a better word for given in this context would be assume. You assume your senses are reliable and you assume the sensus Divinitatus as well, these are both assumptions I have as well. Dare I say yet another word we could use is presupossition, we pre-suposse these things when we analyze and interpret reality itself. 



> I'm not a modern foundationalist: just a pre-modern foundationalist.



Since Descarte was the father of modern foundationalism than who before him do you take your point of view from?



> Because they are properly-functioning modules of the design plan.



Design sounds an awful lot like it refers to God, or am I mistaken here. If it does refer to God than I take that mean that the proper functioning of a module depends on God and who he is in order to function properly. This is pretty much in line with Van Til and Bahnsen.



> "Proper" here means that I cannot place epistemic blame upon you for the belief, given your position.



So than, if I understand you, the person holding the beleif could be dead wrong but not to blame if they held the belief on what to them was a proper functioning of there modules. This seems to lead to skepticism in my opinion. 



> Why think this? If the Kantian and the Utilitarian disagree at the most basic level, there can be no communication between them, since they are playing completely separate language-games.



They agree that there is such a thing as right and wrong but such a beleif is so abstract that it provides no direction for concrete ethics. So the next step is to determine why things are right or wrong (kantians disagree with utilitarianits at this most basic level) and how to determine what acts/thoughts are right or wrong (they both disagree at least on the method here which is a most basic level). There is communication because they agree in the abstract concepts of right and wrong, they are both humans so that presents a bridge of communication itself but they disagree at those two most basic levels of doing ethics which means that you cannot over emphasize the point of contact. 



> Or you could answer the question more simply: the lives were God's to take.



Which is also a fine example of the Van Tillian apologetic method.



> I can think of one--and it isn't external to God: it's essential to God. God's own nature is a law to which He is subject.



Yes but as you say it is not outside Himself. This only proves that ethics are based on His will and what he says is right and wrong. 



> Again, you are assuming a coherence view of knowledge which the skeptic has no reason to grant, which is why you shouldn't concede him his skepticism and be an anti-skeptic. If you say that there are no givens, you have accepted the Cartesian burden: you are beginning with doubt, not faith (Lesslie Newbigin's Proper Confidence is an excellent refutation of Cartesian modernism).



I start with faith not doubt. I am also unsure as to how I am a coherentist. My assumptions are true if and only if they corespond to creation and special revealation. This is to say that natural revealation is still revealation so my interpretation of creation is correct if it coresponds to God's revealation. Thus I am a revealationalist in epistomology. Yes if a thing is true than it will corespond to other true beleifs in my web of beleifs. Also it will be pragmatic because it will help me get along better in creation.


----------



## Philip

> I'm not a modern foundationalist: just a pre-modern foundationalist.
> 
> 
> 
> Since Descarte was the father of modern foundationalism than who before him do you take your point of view from?
Click to expand...


I draw largely on the assumptions of the medieval synthesis (Anselm, Thomas, Scotus, Occam, Calvin) which took a largely common-sense view of the world which would be reiterated as a response to David Hume by Thomas Reid. It's a bit hard to define simply because it defines itself largely in opposition to challenges and skeptics. This kind of philosophy was the grounding assumption of Old Princeton and most English-speaking reformed theologians (with the notable exception of Jonathan Edwards--an idealist similar to Berkeley in many respects) until the 1930s.

There have been notable atheists who have said similar things (G. E. Moore, for example) but their atheism usually strikes a discordant note in their philosophy (Moore, rather unknowingly, was a key figure in the awakening of the ontological argument from its Kantian slumber).



> Design sounds an awful lot like it refers to God, or am I mistaken here. If it does refer to God than I take that mean that the proper functioning of a module depends on God and who he is in order to function properly. This is pretty much in line with Van Til and Bahnsen.



You are inserting God here, and I would agree, but a deist or even atheist could agree to the terminology of design without too much inconsistency.



> So than, if I understand you, the person holding the beleif could be dead wrong but not to blame if they held the belief on what to them was a proper functioning of there modules. This seems to lead to skepticism in my opinion.



Coherentism has the same problem: given the atheist's atheism, I cannot blame him (epistemically) for not believing in God, given his web of beliefs. He is internally justified.

On the other hand, given a model such as I am suggesting, we can say that yes, he is internally justified only because one of the modules of the design plan (the SD) is not functioning properly or at all.



> They agree that there is such a thing as right and wrong but such a beleif is so abstract that it provides no direction for concrete ethics. So the next step is to determine why things are right or wrong (kantians disagree with utilitarianits at this most basic level) and how to determine what acts/thoughts are right or wrong (they both disagree at least on the method here which is a most basic level).



What you are forgetting is that you are thinking about Kantianism and Utilitarianism in the abstract. In reality, what you would do would be to keep bringing up examples which both would agree are clear cases until an example comes up that is clearly out of place in a particular system.

Example: you are hiding Jews and the Gestapo comes knocking at your door. The Kantian has several choices: a) bite the bullet and tell the Gestapo b) rephrase their categorical imperative so that there is a higher claim to protect life c) recognize that endless rephrasing will ensue and that Kant is simply wrong and that a new ethic is needed which will allow them to lie to the Gestapo to save lives.

This is common sense.



> Yes but as you say it is not outside Himself. This only proves that ethics are based on His will and what he says is right and wrong.



Can God change His nature? His will is based on His nature and character, which is unchanging. Ethics is based in the character of God, which is _revealed_ in His commands, but is not _based_ in His commands.



> I start with faith not doubt. I am also unsure as to how I am a coherentist. My assumptions are true if and only if they corespond to creation and special revealation.



I mean coherence as opposed to foundationalism.


----------



## he beholds

I have asked this question so many times! What I have finally decided to say with my atheists friends is that we both have the same evidences available to us. I don't have some secret evidence that he is not privy to. I read the Bible and think that it accurately depicts the world, mankind, mankind's problem, and the solution to that problem, etc. He reads the Bible and sees the world, yet does not think that they relate. I cannot prove God's existence. If it were able to be proven, this discussion would be over, because proof is not a suggestion. Just like if science really proved evolution, that discussion would be over. Proof is irrefutable. 

I think there are evidences that suggest that God exists, but not proof. (Though I have no question that God exists, so perhaps those evidences are proof enough for me--is that allowable?)


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## jwright82

> I draw largely on the assumptions of the medieval synthesis (Anselm, Thomas, Scotus, Occam, Calvin) which took a largely common-sense view of the world which would be reiterated as a response to David Hume by Thomas Reid. It's a bit hard to define simply because it defines itself largely in opposition to challenges and skeptics. This kind of philosophy was the grounding assumption of Old Princeton and most English-speaking reformed theologians (with the notable exception of Jonathan Edwards--an idealist similar to Berkeley in many respects) until the 1930s.
> 
> There have been notable atheists who have said similar things (G. E. Moore, for example) but their atheism usually strikes a discordant note in their philosophy (Moore, rather unknowingly, was a key figure in the awakening of the ontological argument from its Kantian slumber).



Good to know, I have a better idea of where you are coming from. So thanks.



> You are inserting God here, and I would agree, but a deist or even atheist could agree to the terminology of design without too much inconsistency.



Only if this idea like anyother idea can be taken out of the context of the entire worldview being espoused. This is one of Van Til's greatest insights that although we can speak of these particular ideas we can never seperate them entirely from the general point of view being espoused. 



> Coherentism has the same problem: given the atheist's atheism, I cannot blame him (epistemically) for not believing in God, given his web of beliefs. He is internally justified.



But to what does his ideas correspond to? An atheist cannot completly and correctly interpret the world around them and maintain their atheism. His worldview is also not internally justified at all, atheism has no morality, no objective basis for human value. All of those are the logical consequences of the simple definition of atheism as the denial of the existance of God. But such a simple definition can never exaust a person's worldview. Atheists like to say that atheism just means that one is not convinced that God exists. To that I say OK but you still have a whole worldview that you espouse, so is this worldview based on the assumption that God exists or not? Because that has serious logical difficulties attached to it.



> On the other hand, given a model such as I am suggesting, we can say that yes, he is internally justified only because one of the modules of the design plan (the SD) is not functioning properly or at all.



If it is not functioning properly than the atheist has an excuse for not beleiving, contra the Reformed tradition.



> What you are forgetting is that you are thinking about Kantianism and Utilitarianism in the abstract. In reality, what you would do would be to keep bringing up examples which both would agree are clear cases until an example comes up that is clearly out of place in a particular system.



This is true if and only if they both arrived at the same result from the same point of view, since both would arrive at the same conclusion from different points of views than this is just coincedence and nothing more. This means that I can critique both of them at the two basic levels I refered to in my previous posts. They can believe all day long that murder is wrong and we can both agree to that but I can ask for a justification as to why it is wrong from their point of view. 



> Can God change His nature? His will is based on His nature and character, which is unchanging. Ethics is based in the character of God, which is revealed in His commands, but is not based in His commands.



His commands are based on His nature, but still they are not based on some moral code that exists seperatly from His eternal charector. 



> I mean coherence as opposed to foundationalism.



You seem to hold to a view of foundationalism that has as its foundational properties like these modules or parts of our brain or mind that function correctly. So I take it that you don't mean an axiomatic form of foundationalism. In order for foundationalism to work than the foundation must be the foundation and not one more level in a bigger picture, or worldview. An atheist and a christian may agree on the modules here but that is not a foundation it is an agreement. If you argue that these modules are necessary for knowledge to take place than that is in essence a transcendental argument a la Kant. Also one's metaphysical theory affects the nature of these modules and why they are here, this makes your foundation just one more level or perspective in a larger worldview.


----------



## Philip

> You are inserting God here, and I would agree, but a deist or even atheist could agree to the terminology of design without too much inconsistency.
> 
> 
> 
> Only if this idea like any other idea can be taken out of the context of the entire worldview being espoused. This is one of Van Til's greatest insights that although we can speak of these particular ideas we can never seperate them entirely from the general point of view being espoused.
Click to expand...


This is where I think Van Til gets it wrong: the whole modern problem is the attempt to _find_ a unifying principle. You can't critique a metaphysical unifying principle that isn't there. There is no general point of view being espoused. Postmodernism is simply the surrender to the idea that there might not be a unifying principle. We cannot speak of an "entire worldview" because, too often, there isn't one, just a bundle of ideas that may or may not have any connection to one another.



> If it is not functioning properly than the atheist has an excuse for not beleiving, contra the Reformed tradition.



Epistemic excuse, yes. Moral excuse, no. The atheist is morally culpable for the suppression of the SD.



> This is true if and only if they both arrived at the same result from the same point of view, since both would arrive at the same conclusion from different points of views than this is just coincedence and nothing more.



I would say it's proof of implicit shared assumptions, or at least common humanity.



> Also one's metaphysical theory affects the nature of these modules and why they are here, this makes your foundation just one more level or perspective in a larger worldview.



Metaphysical theories, though, are the product of these modules and therefore are a superstructure. It's a kind of spherical kind of foundationalism where there is a core beyond which there can be no speculation. Metaphysics is not more basic, but built on top of the modules. The epistemic theory is itself a product of these modules.


----------



## jwright82

> This is where I think Van Til gets it wrong: the whole modern problem is the attempt to find a unifying principle. You can't critique a metaphysical unifying principle that isn't there. There is no general point of view being espoused. Postmodernism is simply the surrender to the idea that there might not be a unifying principle. We cannot speak of an "entire worldview" because, too often, there isn't one, just a bundle of ideas that may or may not have any connection to one another.



So you honestly believe that there are people out there that have no worldview at all? 
I think that you believe a person cannot be said to hold an opinion of any kind unless they flat out lay it out there, often times this is not so but they hold views about reality in general and those ideas have consequences. Your argument has a serious problem with it if logical consequences exist, it is a logical consequence of atheism that they have a problem with objective morality. They can disagree with me but that is not enough to solve the problem.



> We cannot speak of an "entire worldview" because, too often, there isn't one, just a bundle of ideas that may or may not have any connection to one another.



Than as a Van Tillian I would point out that their bundle of ideas contradict eachother and that invalidates their viewpoint.



> Epistemic excuse, yes. Moral excuse, no. The atheist is morally culpable for the suppression of the SD.



First off what is "SD"? How can know they right yet morally be wrong? Or how can they morally be wrong yet have every epitemic right to believe they are morally right? Also the reformed tradition following Paul has stated that people know that there is a God but they "supress that truth in unritoussness".



> I would say it's proof of implicit shared assumptions, or at least common humanity.



What shared assumptions do the two people in our discussion have? A common humanity is a metaphysical point of contact, which Van Till affirmed was apoint of contact himself.



> Metaphysical theories, though, are the product of these modules and therefore are a superstructure.



Metaphysics determines what the nature of a thing is, so the modules depend on their nature to determine what they are. Epistemically speaking you can start with the modules and then work your way out, but this only underminds the very nature of foundationalism because it is only a foundation from a certian perspective. If I start from the perspective of the metaphysical than that to becomes a foundation for the modules, ontologically speaking. 



> It's a kind of spherical kind of foundationalism where there is a core beyond which there can be no speculation. Metaphysics is not more basic, but built on top of the modules. The epistemic theory is itself a product of these modules



If they are the foundation of everything else than that undermines God's place as alpha and omega, since these modules are more basic than He is. Also they raise the metaphysical question of where do they come from? If they come from God than He is the foundation upon which there can be no more speculation. If we are not alowed to speculate about them than that is seriously taking things for granted. Even modules posses a metaphysics so that metaphysics is logically prior to these modules but if we can't speculate about that than we have no reason to trust them at all. Since I cannot look outside them to see if they are reliable or not. This is not excepting skepticism on my part only calling into question the claims made by the foundationalist.


----------



## Philip

> So you honestly believe that there are people out there that have no worldview at all?



Not in the sense you are speaking of. If by "worldview" you mean "set of beliefs", then naturally everyone does.

But if by worldview you mean "Relatively unified set of more or less coherent beliefs" in other words a system, you are going to find yourself frustrated. The worldviews of people today are more and more fragmented to the point where you could point out the inconsistency in a person's set and the person wouldn't care. People have become fine with the fact that there is no unifying principle to their set--it works for them.



> it is a logical consequence of atheism that they have a problem with objective morality.



Please show me how we logically get from "there is no god" to "there are no moral absolutes." Not being able to account for something is not a logical inconsistency. Disconnects are only problematic if you are a coherentist.



> Than as a Van Tillian I would point out that their bundle of ideas contradict eachother and that invalidates their viewpoint.



Why should they care? Why is logical validity any reason to accept or reject a set of ideas? You're missing the point of the postmodern spirit: it doesn't matter whether your viewpoint is _logically_ valid, as long as it suits you.



> First off what is "SD"? How can know they right yet morally be wrong? Or how can they morally be wrong yet have every epitemic right to believe they are morally right? Also the reformed tradition following Paul has stated that people know that there is a God but they "supress that truth in unritoussness".



SD is _sensus Divinitatus_.

Epistemic culpability refers to whether you are internally justified in believing something--that is, whether there is a _de jure_ objection to S's believing P, given P's epistemic position.

Example: if I look at the clock and see that it says "7:45" I am justified in thinking that it is, in fact, 7:45. Even if the clock (apart from my knowing) had stopped at the 7:45 mark, I would still be justified, epistemically.

Epistemic justification, though, doesn't necessarily mean that one is not morally culpable. The atheist is morally culpable for his atheism even though, on his autonomous assumptions, he is epistemically justified. The "knowledge" that Paul talks of, due to suppression, is unconscious.



> What shared assumptions do the two people in our discussion have?



I would say that the particulars of morality are more basic than the theories of morality.



> Epistemically speaking you can start with the modules and then work your way out, but this only underminds the very nature of foundationalism because it is only a foundation from a certian perspective.



To try and make the order of being into the order of knowing is to attempt that which only God could possibly do. In reality, naturally, metaphysics precedes epistemology, but from the human perspective (which is the given), we have to begin with epistemology. Foundationalism describes the order of knowing, not the order of being.

I'm not displacing God as the actual center of being, just pointing out that from a human perspective (which is what we have) we have to start from what we are given. When we speak of epistemology we are always speaking on the order of knowing, not the order of being. God is only a given for the regenerate because they have had their SD repaired by the Holy Spirit, and even then we need His help to see Him.



> Since I cannot look outside them to see if they are reliable or not



Why not? All I have to do to confirm what I see is to hold up my hand and say "here is a hand." Why should I think my senses are unreliable?


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## Peairtach

The world without God, the hypothetical "atheist world", is unintelligible,unaffirmable, and the atheist world and life view is a form of scepticism that is self-refuting.

Only the God of the Bible provides the preconditions of intelligibility.

Remember the basic principle of transcendental arguments which Van Til got from Kant, and then proceed from there:
"A transcendental argument starts from a premise like "I think", "I believe myself to be free", or "I have an idea of myself" [or "I believe there is (no) God/the God of the Bible" and/or "I believe there are laws of logic" and/or "I believe there are laws of nature"] ; it then asks "What must be true if there is to be such a thought? What else must I think, and what must the world be like in which I exist, thinking such a thought? " ( "An Intelligent Person's Guide to Philosophy" by Roger Scruton, Duckworth,1996)


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## Philip

> What else must I think, and what must the world be like in which I exist, thinking such a thought?



More fundamentally, how would you know, once you had found an answer to this question, whether it was the right answer? How would you even go about finding an answer?


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## jwright82

> Not in the sense you are speaking of. If by "worldview" you mean "set of beliefs", then naturally everyone does.
> 
> But if by worldview you mean "Relatively unified set of more or less coherent beliefs" in other words a system, you are going to find yourself frustrated. The worldviews of people today are more and more fragmented to the point where you could point out the inconsistency in a person's set and the person wouldn't care. People have become fine with the fact that there is no unifying principle to their set--it works for them.



Well than we are definantly on the same page here. This is why Van Til said that we had poke and prod the epistomological "loafer" out of their lazyness in the apologetical endeavor. 



> SD is sensus Divinitatus.
> 
> Epistemic culpability refers to whether you are internally justified in believing something--that is, whether there is a de jure objection to S's believing P, given P's epistemic position.
> 
> Example: if I look at the clock and see that it says "7:45" I am justified in thinking that it is, in fact, 7:45. Even if the clock (apart from my knowing) had stopped at the 7:45 mark, I would still be justified, epistemically.
> 
> Epistemic justification, though, doesn't necessarily mean that one is not morally culpable. The atheist is morally culpable for his atheism even though, on his autonomous assumptions, he is epistemically justified. The "knowledge" that Paul talks of, due to suppression, is unconscious



OK I understand you better here and I agree with you here.



> To try and make the order of being into the order of knowing is to attempt that which only God could possibly do. In reality, naturally, metaphysics precedes epistemology, but from the human perspective (which is the given), we have to begin with epistemology. Foundationalism describes the order of knowing, not the order of being.
> 
> I'm not displacing God as the actual center of being, just pointing out that from a human perspective (which is what we have) we have to start from what we are given. When we speak of epistemology we are always speaking on the order of knowing, not the order of being. God is only a given for the regenerate because they have had their SD repaired by the Holy Spirit, and even then we need His help to see Him.



I agree but keep in mind that even you if you start with epistomolgy and these "givens" a metaphysical theory must be assumed in some way shape or form. I could be wrong here so please correct me if I am accusing you of anything you don't believe, it seems to me that you think it is wrong to press the unbeleiver for a metaphysical explination for one of these givens, which would be the ultimate epistomological justification. They may be shared assumptions but the metaphysical aspect here is not. If you and the unbeleiver have different metaphysics than you both disagree at a fundemental level. You may use the same words have the same "givens" but the practical shape these givens take in the differing metaphysics is not the same.



> Please show me how we logically get from "there is no god" to "there are no moral absolutes." Not being able to account for something is not a logical inconsistency. Disconnects are only problematic if you are a coherentist.



There is no direct logical connection between those two statments but there is an indirect one. I often get the impression from talking to and reading atheists that they feel they are off the logical hook so to speak by virtue of being an atheist. That they can make moral denouncment after moral denouncment without ever producing a theory of ethics. They can have all these "givens" without ever backing them up. But the one problem is is that they are still human so they form beleifs on things just like everybody else does. That is the indirect connection, they must still back up their moral denouncments like everybody else.



> Why should they care? Why is logical validity any reason to accept or reject a set of ideas? You're missing the point of the postmodern spirit: it doesn't matter whether your viewpoint is logically valid, as long as it suits you.



I do understand what the postmodern spirit is, I also don't feel like contemporary cultural philosophy can be classified as postmodern, I'll have to tell you my theory on that one day, but we live in an age of normal postmodernism, that philosophy is the point of departure for everyone. They don't have to care in fact they can walk away anytime they wish, but if they wish to engage in absolute philosophical debate than their inconsistancies are fair game. The burden of proof is not on me in that situation but on the person who is being nonsensecal.



> I would say that the particulars of morality are more basic than the theories of morality.



True but metaphysically the theories of morality are ontologically more basic than the particuliers.



> Why not? All I have to do to confirm what I see is to hold up my hand and say "here is a hand." Why should I think my senses are unreliable?



Well Moore's argument that you refer to is circuler in nature so it begs the question.


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## Philip

> I agree but keep in mind that even you if you start with epistomolgy and these "givens" a metaphysical theory must be assumed in some way shape or form.



Sort of--the theory entailed (not assumed) by such a common-sense epistemology is rather vague and open for debate. I happen to think that Christian theism best fits, but that's because of the SD. Without the action of the Holy Spirit repairing the SD the best I could do would be a vague theism, deism, or even certain forms of atheism (Buddhism, Jung, etc).

What I am proposing, BTW, is a model. The only skeptical objections to it are ones that would also be _de facto_ objections to theism.



> I often get the impression from talking to and reading atheists that they feel they are off the logical hook so to speak by virtue of being an atheist. That they can make moral denouncment after moral denouncment without ever producing a theory of ethics.



What exactly obligates them to produce a systematic theory of ethics?

Again, I'm assuming a fairly particularist account of things: I don't have to have a theory to be justified in using x. A child with Down Syndrome can be justified in believing in God even though she is incapable of producing an epistemology to account for it. Only a skeptic thinks that you have to account for everything.



> True but metaphysically the theories of morality are ontologically more basic than the particuliers.



Metaphysics is not an epistemic justifier unless there are givens.



> Well Moore's argument that you refer to is circuler in nature so it begs the question.



And skepticism doesn't? If I assume the skeptic's burden of proof, I've saddled myself with an impossible task, less Herculean than Sisyphian. The skeptic asks whether I have any reason to trust my senses: I ask whether I have any reason to doubt them, and the fact is that I don't.

Descartes posits a demon deceiving me, but is there any good reason for me to think that such is the case? No. Both skepticism and externalism are circular and skepticism leads to a void, so rather than getting sucked into a black hole, I'll take externalism.

Here's the question: why should I have to satisfy the skeptic? Why give him that power?


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## jwright82

> Sort of--the theory entailed (not assumed) by such a common-sense epistemology is rather vague and open for debate. I happen to think that Christian theism best fits, but that's because of the SD. Without the action of the Holy Spirit repairing the SD the best I could do would be a vague theism, deism, or even certain forms of atheism (Buddhism, Jung, etc).
> 
> What I am proposing, BTW, is a model. The only skeptical objections to it are ones that would also be de facto objections to theism.



I can agree with this, it is roughly within reformed epistomology right? It sounds alright to me I'm anxious to see how it plays out in practice.



> What exactly obligates them to produce a systematic theory of ethics?
> 
> Again, I'm assuming a fairly particularist account of things: I don't have to have a theory to be justified in using x. A child with Down Syndrome can be justified in believing in God even though she is incapable of producing an epistemology to account for it. Only a skeptic thinks that you have to account for everything.



Not necessaraly, Van Til felt like the unbeleiver, especially the atheist, takes for granted things like morality reason etc. Atheists are prone to make moral denouncements against christianity. So unless ethics exists out there as a self-existant, independent from God, basically god-like status, than we all have to have reasons for why we think something is right or wrong. If I debate a utilitarianist on ethics the reasons he/she gives me will be different than a kantian, even if it is over a particuler issue we all agree with. 



> Metaphysics is not an epistemic justifier unless there are givens.



Particulers are just examples of the general, one vs. many debate. The general theory of ethics determines what the particuler examples of right and wrong are. Thus the general is ontologically prior to the particulers. Unless there is no such thing as ethics possible in any worldview without exception. 



> And skepticism doesn't? If I assume the skeptic's burden of proof, I've saddled myself with an impossible task, less Herculean than Sisyphian. The skeptic asks whether I have any reason to trust my senses: I ask whether I have any reason to doubt them, and the fact is that I don't.
> 
> Descartes posits a demon deceiving me, but is there any good reason for me to think that such is the case? No. Both skepticism and externalism are circular and skepticism leads to a void, so rather than getting sucked into a black hole, I'll take externalism.



Skepticism is just as circuler in nature as Moore's argument, I too if given the choice would choose where you went. But the world is not divided up into foundationalists and skeptics. A skeptic has to have justification for everything, you are right, and I believe that there are beleifs out there that many people hold to that can not be deductivly proven and that is OK. They every right to hold these beleifs if we examine their reasons for holding them. But our most basic beleifs about ethics, metaphysics, epistomology, theology, science are more general sort of beleifs. If somebody doesn't trust science at all and I ask them why, their answer is there general beleif about science. If an atheist says to me that by teaching my child chritianity than I am engaging in child abuse, than I have every right to ask for reasons why doing this equals child abuse. 

They will then give me reasons why they believe this and these reasons as you know will involve their beleifs about science, reality, epistomology, God, and so it is these beleifs that form their worldview. Then I can say OK you believe that my action X is child abuse well how do you differentiate between what is good and what is evil, this is the heart of ethics. They will then give me their method of doing ethics, theory of ethics (kantian, aristotillian, utilitarianist, platonic, emotovist, etc.). This method either meets the ethical standered of "ought" or it fails to drive me logically to the conclusion that I ought not to do X, that analysis is the philosophical endeavor. 



> Here's the question: why should I have to satisfy the skeptic? Why give him that power?



I would only answer him/her if they had a legitemate complaint, not something like "I'm not convinced" and they don't have any reasons for doing so.


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## Philip

> I can agree with this, it is roughly within reformed epistomology right? It sounds alright to me I'm anxious to see how it plays out in practice.



I would say it _is_ the original reformed epistemology. For a fuller sketch of something close to what I'm talking about, Plantinga's _Warranted Christian Belief_ is an excellent one (though I have to differ with his account on certain issues where he is less than orthodox).



> Not necessaraly, Van Til felt like the unbeleiver, especially the atheist, takes for granted things like morality reason etc.



This is because he was dealing with modernism, which is now passe. While we have ethicists and epistemologists working in this paradigm, the fact is that many would now argue that you don't need a unifying principle for ethics, reason, etc. You don't need a theory--or, at least, the theory you create should be synthesized from the particulars to create something like a family resemblance relationship (think Wittgenstein: how would Wittgenstein do ethics).



> So unless ethics exists out there as a self-existant, independent from God, basically god-like status, than we all have to have reasons for why we think something is right or wrong.



I could always claim that it's part of the language-game our culture plays.



> The general theory of ethics determines what the particuler examples of right and wrong are.



Only if you assume a methodist (not the denomination, the philosophic approach) approach to ethics rather than a particularist one. Van Til is methodistic.



> But our most basic beleifs about ethics, metaphysics, epistomology, theology, science are more general sort of beleifs.



Your basic beliefs are beliefs like, "There is a tree outside," "I have hands," "I am not a brain in a vat," "murder is wrong." These have ethical, theological, epistemological, metaphysical, and scientific implications, but those are synthesized from the particulars, depending on various factors, some genetic, some environmental, some cultural.

Now, once that is done, then you have the total worldview, but it's generally messy, unsystematic, human. Systematic philosophies are the exception rather than the rule: most people are simply walking bundles of contradictions--including you and I.



> I would only answer him/her if they had a legitemate complaint, not something like "I'm not convinced" and they don't have any reasons for doing so.



Actually, "I don't find your reasons compelling" is a perfectly legitimate answer, if there is really no common assumption.


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## jwright82

> I would say it is the original reformed epistemology. For a fuller sketch of something close to what I'm talking about, Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief is an excellent one (though I have to differ with his account on certain issues where he is less than orthodox).



Good, I will have to pick that up (I definantly need a job first).



> This is because he was dealing with modernism, which is now passe. While we have ethicists and epistemologists working in this paradigm, the fact is that many would now argue that you don't need a unifying principle for ethics, reason, etc. You don't need a theory--or, at least, the theory you create should be synthesized from the particulars to create something like a family resemblance relationship (think Wittgenstein: how would Wittgenstein do ethics).



This is true but no one wants to accept the consequences of this nihilistic view of things, postmodernism is dead and it killed itself.



> I could always claim that it's part of the language-game our culture plays.



This is essentially Rorty's view, but he makes absolute moral condemnations himself (he has been criticized by unbeleivers for this as well). The best and most horrible thing he can come up with is that someone like stalin isn't elightened like he is or they would be liberal too, which assumes that liberalism is a metanarrative in postmodernism which is a no no as you know.



> Only if you assume a methodist (not the denomination, the philosophic approach) approach to ethics rather than a particularist one. Van Til is methodistic.



Yes but the particulers are still decided based on a general theory, this theory may be decided after enough particulers are gathered I will grant you that but all aldults have gathered enough particulers to come up with a general theory of sorts. Also I wouldn't be so cold hearted with a lay person on having a theory of ethics but I would ask for reasons why they held such beleifs. 



> Your basic beliefs are beliefs like, "There is a tree outside," "I have hands," "I am not a brain in a vat," "murder is wrong." These have ethical, theological, epistemological, metaphysical, and scientific implications, but those are synthesized from the particulars, depending on various factors, some genetic, some environmental, some cultural.



This sounds a little empiricist in regards to beleif formation to me but I don't at all that you are not an empiricist. 



> Now, once that is done, then you have the total worldview, but it's generally messy, unsystematic, human. Systematic philosophies are the exception rather than the rule: most people are simply walking bundles of contradictions--including you and I.



I agree and so would Bahnsen and Van Till remember they both painted with broad brushes and unfortunantly left it to people like me and others to work this stuff out.



> Actually, "I don't find your reasons compelling" is a perfectly legitimate answer, if there is really no common assumption.



I would just ask them why? If they refused to give me particuler examples of things that were not compelling than I would say that the conversation was over and they should think about it and get back to me and then we could continue.


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## Philip

> This is true but no one wants to accept the consequences of this nihilistic view of things, postmodernism is dead and it killed itself.



I wouldn't say that this is nihilistic, merely despairing (in a Schaefferian sense).

As for the language-game, you can, in fact, judge others on the basis of a language-game. What you cannot do is judge another language-game. Thus, the liberal language-game could denounce Hitler, but it could not judge Nazism. It's an odd position, but not technically inconsistent.



> Also I wouldn't be so cold hearted with a lay person on having a theory of ethics but I would ask for reasons why they held such beleifs.



But what you are finding there is the synthetic thread that they think binds the particulars together. The particulars are more basic than the theory--the purpose of the theory is to explain the particulars. If the person happens not to need a theory, there is nothing that compels him or her to do so.



> This sounds a little empiricist in regards to beleif formation to me but I don't at all that you are not an empiricist.



Is it so wrong to say that certain basic beliefs are empirical? I also count as basic my beliefs that 2+2=4, or that God is there.



> I would just ask them why?



Because they don't share your assumptions. You have to admit the premises, or the conclusion is uncompelling.


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## jwright82

> I wouldn't say that this is nihilistic, merely despairing (in a Schaefferian sense).
> 
> As for the language-game, you can, in fact, judge others on the basis of a language-game. What you cannot do is judge another language-game. Thus, the liberal language-game could denounce Hitler, but it could not judge Nazism. It's an odd position, but not technically inconsistent.



True but not in an absolute sense. Hey I found this website about after postmodernism you might be interested in I will try to find it.
After Postmodernism. There it is, if the link works. They have papers and everything.



> But what you are finding there is the synthetic thread that they think binds the particulars together. The particulars are more basic than the theory--the purpose of the theory is to explain the particulars. If the person happens not to need a theory, there is nothing that compels him or her to do so.



I wouldn't go so far as to say that that is the only way beleifs are formed, it sounds too empiricist to me. Also they do a need a theory if they are going to pronounce anything as right or wrong. You claim that the sentnce "murder is wrong" is basic but if it is basic than it must be analytically true, which it is not.



> Is it so wrong to say that certain basic beliefs are empirical? I also count as basic my beliefs that 2+2=4, or that God is there.



Only if all beleifs are epiricist, but as I already said I know you don't believe that. 



> Because they don't share your assumptions. You have to admit the premises, or the conclusion is uncompelling.



What premises they gave no argument, also in a philosophical debate I can challenge any premise that I want, provided I can produce good reasons to doubt it.


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## Der Pilger

Wannabee said:


> This reminds me of a discussion I had with my brother-in-law. After getting a little heated in our exchange he asked, "What does the Bible prove?" I stammered out something about creation and he cut me off, "No, what does it prove?" I was stumped. After pondering it for a bit I realized I had let hm form an errant line of reasoning in my mind. The Bible proves nothing. The Bible states truth. It is that by which truth is measured. It is the rule. The rule's authority is self evident and all else proves it's validity. Every true science is a study of the work of the Creator. All creation proves that God exists and that Scripture is true.


 
Herman Bavinck wrote this interesting point about the freedom of Scripture from the judgments of human reason: "If Christian revelation, which presupposes the darkness and error of unspiritual humanity, submitted in advance to the judgments of reason, it would by that token contradict itself. It would thereby place itself before a tribunal whose jurisdiction it had first denied."


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## Peairtach

The world the atheist posits, where the foundation stone of the God of the Bible is removed, is untenable and unlivable.

Take away God, and the atheist takes away "so much more" than God.

Basically they've got/would have a ruin of a world, without God. They'll deny this of course, while showing by their words and behaviour that they presuppose the God of the Bible, as they need to, to live and be atheists.


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## Philip

> You claim that the sentnce "murder is wrong" is basic but if it is basic than it must be analytically true, which it is not.



Why does it have to be analytically true to be basic? I simply find myself believing that murder is wrong---that's as basic as it gets.



> Only if all beleifs are epiricist, but as I already said I know you don't believe that.



True, not all beliefs are empirical, but _some_ beliefs certainly are. Some of my basic beliefs---my belief that there is a lamp on my desk---are empirical. Exactly why does it follow from "some basic beliefs are empirical" that "all basic beliefs are empirical"? I see no connection between the two. Certainly the latter entails the former, but the former does not entail or imply the latter.



> What premises they gave no argument, also in a philosophical debate I can challenge any premise that I want, provided I can produce good reasons to doubt it.



But what if they find your reasons for doubt uncompelling? Descartes' reasons for doubting my senses are uncompelling to me because I don't share his skeptical assumptions. His skepticism is just as question-begging as my common sense.


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## jwright82

> Why does it have to be analytically true to be basic? I simply find myself believing that murder is wrong---that's as basic as it gets.



You are collapsing is with ought. To say that murder is wrong begs the question of why it is wrong. If you say that it is a basic beleif therefore murder is wrong than that is a little bit of circuler reasoning. You can only go in circles with that kind of logic. Claiming that I am a skeptic for asking such questions is a little to close to the fallacy of special pleading, that is your claim that your beleif is beyond questioning puts it in a special class of beleifs that cannot be questioned. 



> True, not all beliefs are empirical, but some beliefs certainly are. Some of my basic beliefs---my belief that there is a lamp on my desk---are empirical.



We completly agree here. 



> Exactly why does it follow from "some basic beliefs are empirical" that "all basic beliefs are empirical"? I see no connection between the two. Certainly the latter entails the former, but the former does not entail or imply the latter.



I wasn't making a logical argument, sorry it seemed that way. We agree on the place of epirical knowledge in our belief formation. 



> But what if they find your reasons for doubt uncompelling?



Your going to have to elaborate on what you mean by compelling. If you mean that they produce solid reasons why my doubts are uncompelling than that is fine. But if you mean that they don't even adresss my reasons for doubt and simply assert that they are not compelled than that isn't a valid argument at all, it is the fallacy of special pleading all over again. Their is so special that it is beyond reasonable debate or they are God and they know everything, that is what I would ask them. 



> His skepticism is just as question-begging as my common sense.



I still don't see why the world must be divided into common-sense-realists and straight skeptics. It seems that that is a false dichotomy either your one of us or one of them. Although I think that that is an essential beleif for the foundationalist because without it their whole argument goes away.


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## Philip

> To say that murder is wrong begs the question of why it is wrong.



"Why" is less basic (epistemically) than "what."



> Your going to have to elaborate on what you mean by compelling. If you mean that they produce solid reasons why my doubts are uncompelling than that is fine.



They don't have to if they can point out that your criticism depends on your worldview. Unless you can find a direct _inconsistency_ (not a disconnect) in their thinking, there is nothing compelling about the argument and even if such is proved, there is no rational reason for them to accept your account.



> I still don't see why the world must be divided into common-sense-realists and straight skeptics.



I see your point, but I happen to think that all of the alternatives to common-sense realism (whichever variation: Moorean, Reidian, Plantingian, etc.) ultimately lead to some sort of skepticism. Empiricism, rationalism, idealism, Kantianism, solipsism, Platonism, are all reductionist, elevating one part of our cognitive equipment over the others. The result is that all of these, though antagonistic, are united in being skeptical of most of our God-given faculties.


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## MarieP

Romans922 said:


> If you were asked by a Christian to prove that the God of the Bible exists in a short manner, how would you go about it?


 
Romans 1


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## jwright82

> "Why" is less basic (epistemically) than "what."



Do you mean less as in more important than what or less important? The difference, it seems to me, is that if it is more important than what than it establishes the what, murder is only wrong if you can show why it is wrong. If you mean less important than that makes the idea "murder is wrong" an eternal selfexistant truth that would be true even if God didn't exist kind of true, but atheism has never produced a why for this idea so that rules this option out.



> They don't have to if they can point out that your criticism depends on your worldview. Unless you can find a direct inconsistency (not a disconnect) in their thinking, there is nothing compelling about the argument and even if such is proved, there is no rational reason for them to accept your account.



That is true if and only if the criticism is dependent on my worldview. For instance many of the positive arguments against materialism fail at this point, they make assumptions about reality (worldview) and then criticize another worldview on those assumption. That is why I stick to negative arguments about their theories and such. But they still have to come up with these reasons or their out of the game so to speak. 



> I see your point, but I happen to think that all of the alternatives to common-sense realism (whichever variation: Moorean, Reidian, Plantingian, etc.) ultimately lead to some sort of skepticism. Empiricism, rationalism, idealism, Kantianism, solipsism, Platonism, are all reductionist, elevating one part of our cognitive equipment over the others. The result is that all of these, though antagonistic, are united in being skeptical of most of our God-given faculties.



I actually agree with you here, but I'm not in favor of common-sense-realism, on the various philosophies. I believe that Van Til offers an alternitave to this debate, I know you would disagree with me here, that iswhy I go with him. But there is much in common-sense-realism that I like and can agree with.


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## Philip

> Do you mean less as in more important than what or less important?



No. I mean that it is more basic---the what precedes the why chronologically and epistemically. For example, I am aware of divergent species before I am aware of theories of species diversification. I cannot have a theory (evolutionary, creationist, or otherwise) of species diversification unless I know of at least some of the divergent species.



> That is why I stick to negative arguments about their theories and such. But they still have to come up with these reasons or their out of the game so to speak.



Unless they think that your reasons are dependent on your worldview---you want to have it both ways. You want to make it so that no materialist can criticize Christianity and yet you can criticize theirs. You can't do this: if you don't have to answer the materialist's objection, you cannot expect him or her to answer yours.



> But there is much in common-sense-realism that I like and can agree with.



I think (if I may) that what you don't like is the idea that unbelievers can be rational. Part of my goal here is to show that Christian belief is rational (I also happen to believe that it is true) as a viable alternative among the philosophies of the world. My goal is to silence the Greeks who say "foolishness."


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## jwright82

> No. I mean that it is more basic---the what precedes the why chronologically and epistemically. For example, I am aware of divergent species before I am aware of theories of species diversification. I cannot have a theory (evolutionary, creationist, or otherwise) of species diversification unless I know of at least some of the divergent species.



This may work fine in science but not in ethics. Ethics by its very nature demands a why to acompany the what. Also most people don't completly agree on what particular acts are considered murder. We all agree that going into someone's house and shooting them in cold blood is murder but not everyone agrees on abortion, euthanasia, infanticide, etc. The disagreements over these issues are nothing less than a disagreement in opposing theories. That is why worldview analysis is essential in these type of discussions. 



> Unless they think that your reasons are dependent on your worldview---you want to have it both ways. You want to make it so that no materialist can criticize Christianity and yet you can criticize theirs. You can't do this: if you don't have to answer the materialist's objection, you cannot expect him or her to answer yours.



I never just asserted that the materialist cannot criticize christianity because of their worldview, I always provided an argument as to why their theory of metaphysics could not justify the use of reason it destroyed reason, Lewis' argument from reason. So I don't want it both ways I will never simply assert something, I will always provide an argument for my assertion. I also never ruled out answering the materialist's objections either. But a transcendental critique of their worldview is an answer to their objection. Case in point is th e treatment of the story of Jonah. 

The atheist materialist loves to ridicule christians for beleiving that a man was swallowed by a fish and survived, so than what is their objection? Their objection stems from their worldview because in their worldview scientific materialism rules the day and this story is just a little to hoky to believe. So I will ask them if what they are saying is this could the God of the bible preform such a miracle? This diffuses their objection because their objection is that this story is irrational but since it is purely rational to believe that an all powerful God could preform such a miracle than their objection stems from their worldview, it only makes sense in their worldview. 



> I think (if I may) that what you don't like is the idea that unbelievers can be rational. Part of my goal here is to show that Christian belief is rational (I also happen to believe that it is true) as a viable alternative among the philosophies of the world. My goal is to silence the Greeks who say "foolishness."



But why do they say foolishness? This was Van Til's point because upon closer analysis, like my example above, they say foolishness because their worldview demands it. Also I don't object to their being rational it is just that they use their God given tool to "supress the truth in unrightoussness". The effects of their contrary use of reason is worldview hostile to christianity. But the fact that they are made in the image of God is a point of contact, and the fact they must live in the same creation as us is another point of contact.


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## Philip

> Also most people don't completly agree on what particular acts are considered murder.



That doesn't necessarily constitute a basic difference in theory, it could be merely a difference of definition.



> I never just asserted that the materialist cannot criticize christianity because of their worldview, I always provided an argument as to why their theory of metaphysics could not justify the use of reason it destroyed reason



And you still haven't established a need for said theory. Where exactly does the obligation lie? Do we have some moral obligation to do metaphysics? You beg the question by setting up a straw man: a fully-formed metaphysical theory.

Let's take this a step further: let us suppose that the worldview in question is not materialism but a worldview which (like so much of 20th Century philosophy) maintains that metaphysics is essentially meaningless and consists entirely of category mistakes.



> But why do they say foolishness?



Because they know how to make it sound foolish. Our job is to show that belief in God is no less warranted or more foolish than belief that the sun will come up tomorrow or that there is a lamp on my desk.



> But the fact that they are made in the image of God is a point of contact, and the fact they must live in the same creation as us is another point of contact.



I'd go a lot further than that. Not only do we live in the same creation, but that creation is revelatory in its essence. The idea that natural theology is autonomous only makes sense if you deny the reality of God's general revelation.


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## jwright82

> That doesn't necessarily constitute a basic difference in theory, it could be merely a difference of definition.



Since one's over arching theory determines for the most part how one defines things I would say that there is not much difference in saying this or that.



> And you still haven't established a need for said theory. Where exactly does the obligation lie?



Well I'll try to then, 
1. Ideas and assumptions have logical consequences to them.
2. A worldview or theory of things makes assumptions about the nature of things, metaphysics (even implicitly).
3. A beleif of anykind has logical assumptions that it rests on that must also be true in order for it to be true.
4. If a theory about the nature of things (fill in the blank ______) cannot logically support a beleif in something (morality, reason, science, whatever) than the person cannot hold to both their metaphysical theory and their said beleif.
5. If a person posits a beleif about something than there are neccessary logical assumptions that must also be true in order for the beleif to be reasonable and true, wheither or not the person agrees with these assumptions or not. 
6. If these assumptions have logical consequences that invalidate the original beleif than the person holding the beleif cannot consistantly hold to that beleif for the reasons they do.
7. Beleifs that are mutually exclusive cannot be held to be true by the person at the same time.



> Let's take this a step further: let us suppose that the worldview in question is not materialism but a worldview which (like so much of 20th Century philosophy) maintains that metaphysics is essentially meaningless and consists entirely of category mistakes.



I like to point out to them that they do metaphysics anyway. All postmodernists have made theories of the natures of things, mostly language, than they de facto do metaphysics. 



> Because they know how to make it sound foolish. Our job is to show that belief in God is no less warranted or more foolish than belief that the sun will come up tomorrow or that there is a lamp on my desk.



I agree with this, but our point of departure might be different.



> I'd go a lot further than that. Not only do we live in the same creation, but that creation is revelatory in its essence. The idea that natural theology is autonomous only makes sense if you deny the reality of God's general revelation.



I agree with this.


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## Philip

> Since one's over arching theory determines for the most part how one defines things I would say that there is not much difference in saying this or that.



I would argue that ground motives determine our definitions---ground motives also determine our theories. If theory were all the trouble we had with unbelievers, there would be little need for argument. The trouble is that the fall has penetrated to our ground motives so that even if you could disprove the theory, the worldview would remain.



> 1. Ideas and assumptions have logical consequences to them.



Agreed.



> 2. A worldview or theory of things makes assumptions about the nature of things, metaphysics (even implicitly).



A worldview is more than just a "theory of things." It's a set of attitudes (cultural, intellectual, genetic, personal) that have theoretical manifestations.



> 3. A beleif of anykind has logical assumptions that it rests on that must also be true in order for it to be true.



Wrong. One may wrongly arrive at right conclusions.



> 4. If a theory about the nature of things (fill in the blank ______) cannot logically support a beleif in something (morality, reason, science, whatever) than the person cannot hold to both their metaphysical theory and their said beleif.



What exactly do you mean by "logically support"?



> 5. If a person posits a beleif about something than there are neccessary logical assumptions that must also be true in order for the beleif to be reasonable and true, wheither or not the person agrees with these assumptions or not.



Unprovable. I have no reason to accept this.



> 7. Beleifs that are mutually exclusive cannot be held to be true by the person at the same time.



Yet we do it.



> I like to point out to them that they do metaphysics anyway. All postmodernists have made theories of the natures of things, mostly language, than they de facto do metaphysics.



Not necessarily: talking about how something works is not the same as talking about what something is. Are car mechanics talking physics?


----------



## jwright82

> I would argue that ground motives determine our definitions---ground motives also determine our theories. If theory were all the trouble we had with unbelievers, there would be little need for argument. The trouble is that the fall has penetrated to our ground motives so that even if you could disprove the theory, the worldview would remain.



I completly agree in fact Dooyweerd said that the disagreement was based on the religous ground-motive.



> A worldview is more than just a "theory of things." It's a set of attitudes (cultural, intellectual, genetic, personal) that have theoretical manifestations.



Agreed I wasn't trying to give an absolute definition of worldview just relating that aspect of it to my argument.



> Wrong. One may wrongly arrive at right conclusions.



Agreed but what I had in mind here was not the premises of an argument but other beleifs that must be true in order for the other beleif to be treu, euthanasia rests on the assumption that sometimes it is ok to murder someone.



> Wrong. One may wrongly arrive at right conclusions.



A good example would be the dalla lama. His metaphysical theory involves the beleif that desire leads to suffering yet he desires for the liberation of tibet, his one beleif cannot be supported by his over arching theory of reality and everything in it.



> Not necessarily: talking about how something works is not the same as talking about what something is. Are car mechanics talking physics?



Your point would be correct if and only if postmodernists did not give a theory of language to back up their claims, but they all do even implicitly (we can go thrugh the list of them if you want).



> Yet we do it.



Yes but theoretically they cannot support a rational argument on two excusive beleifs. 



> Unprovable. I have no reason to accept this.



I cannot believe that what hitler did was right and maintain that any and all genocide is wrong because in order for my beleif that what hitler did was right rests, logically, on the beleif that some genocide is ok. If I deny that some genocide is ok and side with my second beleif than I have given up the rational basis for my first beleif. That is what I am talking about. If atheism cannot produce an adequite theory of ethics than it has no rational basis withen their worldview to support their beleif that murder is wrong.


----------



## Philip

> I completly agree in fact Dooyweerd said that the disagreement was based on the religous ground-motive.



And here's the point: the ground motive influences our interpretation of the facts and causes us to synthesize a theory from them.



> Agreed but what I had in mind here was not the premises of an argument but other beleifs that must be true in order for the other beleif to be treu, euthanasia rests on the assumption that sometimes it is ok to murder someone.



No it doesn't. The question is whether it's murder or mercy-killing. The conflict is over what we mean by "murder."



> A good example would be the dalla lama. His metaphysical theory involves the beleif that desire leads to suffering yet he desires for the liberation of tibet, his one beleif cannot be supported by his over arching theory of reality and everything in it.



Personal inconsistencies are not theoretical inconsistencies. Whether the Dalai Lama is able to overcome his personal desires is irrelevant to the question of whether or no Buddhism is true.



> Your point would be correct if and only if postmodernists did not give a theory of language to back up their claims, but they all do even implicitly (we can go thrugh the list of them if you want).



I guess I'm making the assumption that you could have a consistent postmodern language analyst coming in with no metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of language.



> I cannot believe that what hitler did was right and maintain that any and all genocide is wrong because in order for my beleif that what hitler did was right rests, logically, on the beleif that some genocide is ok.



It logically _entails_ the belief that some genocide is right---you'd have to do a lot more arguing to get me to admit that "some genocide is right" is a theoretical precondition for saying that Hitler was right. What if I came to the conclusion that some genocide was right from the premise that Hitler was right?



> If atheism cannot produce an adequite theory of ethics than it has no rational basis withen their worldview to support their beleif that murder is wrong.



No---just no logical connection between "there is no God" and "murder is wrong." It's a disconnect, not a contradiction. Disconnects are not inconsistencies.


----------



## jwright82

> And here's the point: the ground motive influences our interpretation of the facts and causes us to synthesize a theory from them.



Agreed. I would go further and say that one's relation to God spiritually, regenerate or unregenerate, influences this motive at a deep level.



> No it doesn't. The question is whether it's murder or mercy-killing. The conflict is over what we mean by "murder."



Actually in making their arguments they do attempt to justify that the state can take someone's life for some reason besides capital punishment, although they seem to be against this as well. They call it a mercy killing but that is just sophistry by itself. It logically rests upon the assumption that the state can take people's life in cases traditionaly defined as at least homicide. 



> Personal inconsistencies are not theoretical inconsistencies. Whether the Dalai Lama is able to overcome his personal desires is irrelevant to the question of whether or no Buddhism is true.



Your right that doesn't diprove Buddhism, I only argued that he was contradicting his own metaphysical beleifs by his lets say political beleifs. His metaphysical beleifs cannot support his political beleifs.



> I guess I'm making the assumption that you could have a consistent postmodern language analyst coming in with no metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of language.



Well to be fair to you I think they would agree that they are not making metaphysical assumptions but they are, wheither or not they like it or not. 



> It logically entails the belief that some genocide is right---you'd have to do a lot more arguing to get me to admit that "some genocide is right" is a theoretical precondition for saying that Hitler was right. What if I came to the conclusion that some genocide was right from the premise that Hitler was right?



Well I don't know exactlly what entails means, if you could explain, if it means something close to pressupose than we agree there. Let me lay out the argument.

1. Either it is ok to commit some genocide or no genocide.
2. Hitler commited genocide
3. It is not ok to commit any genocide whatsoever.
4. Therefore what Hitler did was not ok.

Notice that that the ethical standing of what Hitler did rests upon whether or not it is ok to commit some genocide.



> What if I came to the conclusion that some genocide was right from the premise that Hitler was right?



You would only be going circles. The premise that "Hitler was right" is not true on its own so it requires other propositions that must be true first in order for it to be true it self, my argument above.



> "there is no God"



I think we can both agree that this does not exaust the worldview of Atheism. My argument was not over a simple definition of Atheism but over the logical consequences of their worldview.



> No---just no logical connection between "there is no God" and "murder is wrong." It's a disconnect, not a contradiction. Disconnects are not inconsistencies.



Of course there is no direct logical connection between those two statments. What foundation could an atheist appeal to to justify an ethical statment?


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## Philip

> Actually in making their arguments they do attempt to justify that the state can take someone's life for some reason besides capital punishment, although they seem to be against this as well. They call it a mercy killing but that is just sophistry by itself. It logically rests upon the assumption that the state can take people's life in cases traditionaly defined as at least homicide.



The traditional definition is what is under attack, that's the heart of the issue.



> Your right that doesn't diprove Buddhism, I only argued that he was contradicting his own metaphysical beleifs by his lets say political beleifs. His metaphysical beleifs cannot support his political beleifs.



I see a disconnect, but no logical contradiction. Perhaps a moral one, but not a logical one. On a theoretical level he can hold both.



> Well to be fair to you I think they would agree that they are not making metaphysical assumptions but they are, wheither or not they like it or not.



Such as?



> Well I don't know exactlly what entails means, if you could explain, if it means something close to pressupose than we agree there. Let me lay out the argument.



The form looks logically the same, yes. However presuppose means that there is an assumption, whereas entailing means that there is a deduction.

Here's the form:

If A then B.

The question is whether B is assumed by A or whether it is a logical consequence of A. A methodistic approach would say the former, while a particularist would say the latter.



> 1. Either it is ok to commit some genocide or no genocide.
> 2. Hitler commited genocide
> 3. It is not ok to commit any genocide whatsoever.
> 4. Therefore what Hitler did was not ok.
> 
> Notice that that the ethical standing of what Hitler did rests upon whether or not it is ok to commit some genocide.



Or I do it this way:

1. What Hitler did was wrong.
2. What Hitler did was to commit genocide.
3. Therefore committing genocide is wrong.

I have synthesized a principle from the particular.



> You would only be going circles. The premise that "Hitler was right" is not true on its own so it requires other propositions that must be true first in order for it to be true it self, my argument above.



Yet we use the form of this to say this:

1. God is always right.
2. God told us that murder is wrong.
3. Therefore murder is wrong.



> I think we can both agree that this does not exaust the worldview of Atheism.



Actually, it does. What it does not exhaust is the worldview of particular atheists. Atheism is a tenet of many worldviews including materialism, some forms of existentialism, non-materialism, and Buddhism, as well as logical positivism, scientism, and modern humanism. 

Which form of atheism were you referring to?



> What foundation could an atheist appeal to to justify an ethical statment?



A transcendent system of values. I believe you could find some basis for this in Jung.


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## jwright82

> I see a disconnect, but no logical contradiction. Perhaps a moral one, but not a logical one. On a theoretical level he can hold both.



How? As the dalla lama he has reached enlightenment and therefore has no desires but he desires the liberation of tibet, that is a cntradiction.



> Such as?



Rorty: that language is selfcontained, it does not really tell us anything about reality there is no correspondance theory here. 

Foucalt: all language is power. All language is is an attempt to excercize power over people, this is his view of truth as well.

Derrida: There is in language a false metaphysics of presence, as he called it. In fact all differences in langusge, he worked off of the linguist Sasaure here, are a hidden ontology of violence. In fact language is so slippery that an author can be "deconstructed" to mean nearly anything the critic wants them to.



> The form looks logically the same, yes. However presuppose means that there is an assumption, whereas entailing means that there is a deduction.
> 
> Here's the form:
> 
> If A then B.
> 
> The question is whether B is assumed by A or whether it is a logical consequence of A. A methodistic approach would say the former, while a particularist would say the latter



Thank you very much!



> Or I do it this way:
> 
> 1. What Hitler did was wrong.
> 2. What Hitler did was to commit genocide.
> 3. Therefore committing genocide is wrong.
> 
> I have synthesized a principle from the particular.



Yes but how would you prove the first premise? It requires a whole theory of ethics to do so.



> Yet we use the form of this to say this:
> 
> 1. God is always right.
> 2. God told us that murder is wrong.
> 3. Therefore murder is wrong.



I must say that as a Van Tillian I am not comfortable with this argument because premise one appears to assume that right is a concept that can exist on its own apart from God. I would rather say that what is right or wrong is defined by God. So rightness only makes sense when it is defined by God.



> Actually, it does. What it does not exhaust is the worldview of particular atheists. Atheism is a tenet of many worldviews including materialism, some forms of existentialism, non-materialism, and Buddhism, as well as logical positivism, scientism, and modern humanism.
> 
> Which form of atheism were you referring to?



Quite true you are right that I would have to tailor my argument for each different form of atheism but the denial of God in any form has certian logical consequences that cannot be escaped by any form of atheism.



> A transcendent system of values. I believe you could find some basis for this in Jung.



I don't know if Jung could be called an atheist or not, was he? This would essentially be a platonic view of ethics and therefore have all those problems that he did. Plus an atheist would have to reconcile there non-beleif in a trancsendant being with a beleif in a trancsendant morality.


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## Philip

> How? As the dalla lama he has reached enlightenment and therefore has no desires but he desires the liberation of tibet, that is a cntradiction.



He claims to have reached enlightenment?



> Rorty: that language is selfcontained, it does not really tell us anything about reality there is no correspondance theory here.



And exactly how is this metaphysics? Theories of truth are theories of how truth works, not what truth is.



> Foucalt: all language is power. All language is is an attempt to excercize power over people, this is his view of truth as well.



Again, this is a theory of how it works, not what it is.



> Yes but how would you prove the first premise?



It's a given.



> I must say that as a Van Tillian I am not comfortable with this argument because premise one appears to assume that right is a concept that can exist on its own apart from God. I would rather say that what is right or wrong is defined by God. So rightness only makes sense when it is defined by God.



All you really say here is that premise 1 is tautologous.



> Quite true you are right that I would have to tailor my argument for each different form of atheism but the denial of God in any form has certian logical consequences that cannot be escaped by any form of atheism.



In other words, you could deduce from "There is no God" other statements. I am curious as to how from this premise, one could reach the conclusion that there is no basis for ethics. I am of the opinion that all you need for ethics is a halfway decent epistemology.

Again, transcendental argumentation works only if the other party assumes your burden of proof, and you still have not shown why he or she must do so. Do I have to have a theory of physics to build a car? No, just a working knowledge of mechanics. Do I have to have a metaphysical theory to be justified in ethical claims? No, just a functioning moral sense.



> I don't know if Jung could be called an atheist or not, was he?



From the best I can gather, he was a non-theistic non-materialist.



> This would essentially be a platonic view of ethics and therefore have all those problems that he did.



Such as?



> Plus an atheist would have to reconcile there non-beleif in a trancsendant being with a beleif in a trancsendant morality.



A non-theist may well believe in a transcendent being (the term "being" is quite vague). And even if he doesn't, where exactly does the contradiction lie?


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## jwright82

> He claims to have reached enlightenment?



Yes I heard Ravi Zacharias discussing this very issue.



> And exactly how is this metaphysics? Theories of truth are theories of how truth works, not what truth is.



The fact that he is describing what language is makes it metaphysics. If I say that words do not correspond to reality than that is a statement about the nature of language.



> Again, this is a theory of how it works, not what it is.



Actually it is a theory on the nature of language that it is nothing other than power plays. A theory of metaphysics will usually have something to say on how a thing functions as well. In fact Dooyweerd used the idea of function over and against essence as a primary metaphysical principle of what a thing is, he said that a thing is how it is meant to function in creation.



> It's a given



Nothing is completly given. Plus to say that it is given is only to reason in a circle. Hey I am taking care of my grandmother today and I have to take her to a doctor's apointment so I will reply to the rest when I get back.


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## jwright82

> In other words, you could deduce from "There is no God" other statements. I am curious as to how from this premise, one could reach the conclusion that there is no basis for ethics.



It would not be so simple but yes it is possible and long.



> I am of the opinion that all you need for ethics is a halfway decent epistemology.
> 
> Again, transcendental argumentation works only if the other party assumes your burden of proof, and you still have not shown why he or she must do so. Do I have to have a theory of physics to build a car? No, just a working knowledge of mechanics. Do I have to have a metaphysical theory to be justified in ethical claims? No, just a functioning moral sense.



How do you know that your moral sense is functioning right? Also once a person makes a moral statement than I may legitmatly ask why, their answer will be their theory of ethics.



> Such as?



The realm of ideas is problamatic because it ultimatly begs the question. If our world exists beacause of the realm of ideas than why does the realm of ideas exist? It pushes the question back one step without answering it. Also how do we know about the realm of ideas?



> A non-theist may well believe in a transcendent being (the term "being" is quite vague). And even if he doesn't, where exactly does the contradiction lie?



Just like in the Bahnsen debate his opponant contradicted his argument by trying to place God in an epistomologically awkaurd class with the soul and other immaterial things only to turn around and claim that the laws of logic were immaterial. His method rested on trying to argue over how one knows these immaterial things and have him just point out that we can't know immaterial things. To turn around and base your theory of reason on its being immaterial is selfdefeating in this case.


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## Philip

> The fact that he is describing what language is makes it metaphysics. If I say that words do not correspond to reality than that is a statement about the nature of language.



Just as a statement that gasoline is used in a car is a statement about the nature of a car engine. It is not, however, a theory about internal combustion.



> Actually it is a theory on the nature of language that it is nothing other than power plays. A theory of metaphysics will usually have something to say on how a thing functions as well. In fact Dooyweerd used the idea of function over and against essence as a primary metaphysical principle of what a thing is, he said that a thing is how it is meant to function in creation.



The trouble is that Dooyeweerd gives no reason why I should accept that function equals being or essence.



> It would not be so simple but yes it is possible and long.



I would be curious to see the argument.



> How do you know that your moral sense is functioning right?



How does a mechanic know that his knowledge of cars is functioning right? How does the lawyer know that his knowledge of law is functioning right? I can't say how, but the fact is that they do.



> Also once a person makes a moral statement than I may legitmatly ask why, their answer will be their theory of ethics.



Again, if this is your approach, you are bound to be disappointed.



> The realm of ideas is problamatic because it ultimatly begs the question. If our world exists beacause of the realm of ideas than why does the realm of ideas exist? It pushes the question back one step without answering it. Also how do we know about the realm of ideas?



What if it was said that the realm of ideas is self-existent? How do we know about anything? This kind of philosophy actually has a fair shot at coming up with a counter-philosophy that can answer all your questions---it'll be wrong, but it'll be sufficient.



> Just like in the Bahnsen debate his opponant contradicted his argument by trying to place God in an epistomologically awkaurd class with the soul and other immaterial things only to turn around and claim that the laws of logic were immaterial. His method rested on trying to argue over how one knows these immaterial things and have him just point out that we can't know immaterial things. To turn around and base your theory of reason on its being immaterial is selfdefeating in this case.



But we aren't talking about a materialist, but instead a non-materialist.


----------



## jwright82

> Just as a statement that gasoline is used in a car is a statement about the nature of a car engine. It is not, however, a theory about internal combustion.



How does this prove that Rorty wasn't making statements about the nature of language?



> The trouble is that Dooyeweerd gives no reason why I should accept that function equals being or essence



I can't say what reasons he would give, I suspect that he would claim that it is a consequence of a truly christian philosophy. 



> I would be curious to see the argument.



I don't have the space here to do it justice but I will start a thread laying it out, give me a couple of days.



> How does a mechanic know that his knowledge of cars is functioning right? How does the lawyer know that his knowledge of law is functioning right? I can't say how, but the fact is that they do.



Your examples are misleading because in both cases it is the senses that are in view, morality is not some physical thing out there. So the two examples you gave are irrelavent to our discussion. How do you know that a serial killer's moral sense is not acting right and everyone elses' is off? Also in your view what place does sin play in this moral sense and its rightness or wrongness?



> Again, if this is your approach, you are bound to be disappointed.



Why? I have never been disapointed in using this tactic, in fact it has worked quite well. The most popular response I get is the question what? Most people have never even been asked this question and so they try to come up with reasons for their beleif or say that it is so obvious that it is beyond dispute, I lay out the problems with their answers and they ussually resort to acusing me of saying that such act is right to do. At least serious atheists get the gravity of this question and their problem. I have heard, I cannot verify, that Richard Dawkins has gone so far as to say that we must give up the beleif in evil. Many of the most famous atheists have admitted that this is a serious problem for them. 



> What if it was said that the realm of ideas is self-existent?



How would you know that it was self-existent? Plus what proof is there that such a place actually exists? 



> How do we know about anything?



That depends on what the thing is that you are talking about.



> This kind of philosophy actually has a fair shot at coming up with a counter-philosophy that can answer all your questions---it'll be wrong, but it'll be sufficient.



I don't know, the history of philosophy has produced plenty of criticism of Plato after all. 



> But we aren't talking about a materialist, but instead a non-materialist.



The non-materialist atheist has bigger problems than a materialist does because their stratagy must be different. The non-materialist still can be questioned about basic metaphysical issues as well. I must say that most atheists are materialists, although I know of one who does ask why atheists can't believe in immaterial things? He seems to believe that they can but gives no explination as to what these objects are or where they exist? He leaves all those questions for someone else to deal with I guess, which makes him not even worthy to respond to because there is nothing to respond to.


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## Philip

> Just as a statement that gasoline is used in a car is a statement about the nature of a car engine. It is not, however, a theory about internal combustion.
> 
> 
> 
> How does this prove that Rorty wasn't making statements about the nature of language?
Click to expand...


He's doing an internal review of how language functions because he thinks that this is all that can be said. Metaphysics is the attempt to see things from the outside.



> Your examples are misleading because in both cases it is the senses that are in view, morality is not some physical thing out there. So the two examples you gave are irrelavent to our discussion. How do you know that a serial killer's moral sense is not acting right and everyone elses' is off? Also in your view what place does sin play in this moral sense and its rightness or wrongness?



Just because it isn't physical, doesn't mean I can't have a functioning sense of it. Humor isn't physical, yet I have a functioning sense of humor (yes, I think that a sense of the absurd is part of our cognitive equipment).

I can judge other moral senses by my moral sense.

Sin has indeed impaired the moral sense, but we can't expect, say, G. E. Moore to acknowledge this. Internally he is justified in his non-naturalistic non-divine view of ethics.



> Why? I have never been disapointed in using this tactic, in fact it has worked quite well. The most popular response I get is the question what? Most people have never even been asked this question and so they try to come up with reasons for their beleif or say that it is so obvious that it is beyond dispute, I lay out the problems with their answers and they ussually resort to acusing me of saying that such act is right to do.



Because hitherto you have dealt primarily with deontological (duty-based) views of reason where if you can't give a clear reason, you are somehow deficient in doing your epistemic duty. The problem comes when you have a non-deontological view of knowledge, such as I am suggesting. In my view, a person who could give no reasons at all would be justified in believing in God. Justification depends on what model you are operating under.



> How would you know that it was self-existent? Plus what proof is there that such a place actually exists?



Well it's obvious that your sensus immaterialis is deficient. Under such a model, no "proof" would be needed.



> I don't know, the history of philosophy has produced plenty of criticism of Plato after all.



Yes, and yet Platonism is still with us . . .



> The non-materialist atheist has bigger problems than a materialist does because their stratagy must be different.



Yes and no---it's a much more serious challenge because it's less defined and more fluid.


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## jwright82

> He's doing an internal review of how language functions because he thinks that this is all that can be said. Metaphysics is the attempt to see things from the outside.



If he thinks that that is all that can be said than that is a metaphysical statement. You have to be able to see outside to make a statement like that and others.



> Internally he is justified in his non-naturalistic non-divine view of ethics.



What are you getting at here?



> Because hitherto you have dealt primarily with deontological (duty-based) views of reason where if you can't give a clear reason, you are somehow deficient in doing your epistemic duty. The problem comes when you have a non-deontological view of knowledge, such as I am suggesting. In my view, a person who could give no reasons at all would be justified in believing in God. Justification depends on what model you are operating under.



It seems to me that, if I understand you, what is most important to ethics (standered for determining what is right or wrong, theory of ethics) is impossible because each person has their own theories or givens and that entitles them to believe these moral givens and never have to defend them because they are given. Now I know that you probally do not believe this and I don't want to misinterpret you here, so could you elaborate on the sensus thing you keep mentioning and the relation to epistemic justification?



> Well it's obvious that your sensus immaterialis is deficient. Under such a model, no "proof" would be needed.



Why not? I don't believe I can place a beleif in a special catagory of unquestionable because I claim my sensus model is working fine. 

I guess I just don't understand the model you are proposing and all its implications.


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## Romans922

Butting in and I can since I started this whole question. It is of my opinion, that at the current time in this whole thread, that the best answer is given to us courtesy of Joshua (although I can't find the post, although Rev. Winzer quotes him) when he said, 

"I wouldn't try to "prove" that He exists. I would just affirm what the WLC says

"The very light of nature in man and the works of God declare plainly that there is a God, but His Word and Spirit only do sufficiently and effectually reveal Him unto men for their salvation.""


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## jwright82

Romans922 said:


> Butting in and I can since I started this whole question. It is of my opinion, that at the current time in this whole thread, that the best answer is given to us courtesy of Joshua (although I can't find the post, although Rev. Winzer quotes him) when he said,
> 
> "I wouldn't try to "prove" that He exists. I would just affirm what the WLC says
> 
> "The very light of nature in man and the works of God declare plainly that there is a God, but His Word and Spirit only do sufficiently and effectually reveal Him unto men for their salvation.""



Sorry to have hijacked your thread. P. F. Pugh and I have been wrestling with our philosophical differences since I joined. I can't speak for him but I enjoy it because he has some fascinating things to say and he is very good at critical philosophy as well, our little ongoing discussions have only helped me to reasses my point of view where needed and strenghthen arguments when needed as well.


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## Romans922

No problem, continue on!


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## Philip

> If he thinks that that is all that can be said than that is a metaphysical statement. You have to be able to see outside to make a statement like that and others.



Yes and no. I would like to think of the statement the way Wittgenstein (I) thought of the _Tractatus_: it's a ladder to get one somewhere and then to be discarded.



> What are you getting at here?



All that is needed for internal justification is a) consistency with other propositions (non-contradiction) b) connection with some other premise in the set. External justification is, of course, properly basic.



> It seems to me that, if I understand you, what is most important to ethics (standered for determining what is right or wrong, theory of ethics) is impossible because each person has their own theories or givens and that entitles them to believe these moral givens and never have to defend them because they are given. Now I know that you probally do not believe this and I don't want to misinterpret you here, so could you elaborate on the sensus thing you keep mentioning and the relation to epistemic justification?



The _sensus_ here is our moral sense---conscience. Because of it, moral judgements are justified whether or not there is a clear theory to support them. There may be some implicit standard, but standards and theories are not necessarily the same. All theories are standards, but not all standards are theories. If there is no higher standard which can be appealed to reasonably, even an internal critique is impossible.



> Why not? I don't believe I can place a beleif in a special catagory of unquestionable because I claim my sensus model is working fine.



I didn't say unquestionable---what the sensus model does is to turn the question from one of a _de jure_ objection of justification into a _de facto_ objection of actuality.

In Christian terms, the _sensus Divinitatus_ (as per Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model) makes it so that the only objection to Christian belief could be arguments for why Christian belief is false. The only cogent objection to this model (I believe) would be to argue against theism directly. The only way to prove the model false would be to prove that there is no God.

On the immaterialist non-theist model, we have to answer it by attacking the existence of a non-personal realm of transcendent . . . stuff (such a great metaphysical word, "stuff").


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## jwright82

> Yes and no. I would like to think of the statement the way Wittgenstein (I) thought of the Tractatus: it's a ladder to get one somewhere and then to be discarded.



Yeah but one cannot metaphorically abandon metaphysics like that, he still did metaphysics and tried to deny it when he realized he had egg on his face. 



> All that is needed for internal justification is a) consistency with other propositions (non-contradiction) b) connection with some other premise in the set. External justification is, of course, properly basic.



Well this definantly has the seeds of Van Tillianism in it.



> The sensus here is our moral sense---conscience. Because of it, moral judgements are justified whether or not there is a clear theory to support them. There may be some implicit standard, but standards and theories are not necessarily the same. All theories are standards, but not all standards are theories. If there is no higher standard which can be appealed to reasonably, even an internal critique is impossible.



I think I am starting to get you. Yes you are correct to assume that if you have a moral sense and it tells you something is right or wrong than yes that would technically justify the moral statment but a theory of ethics must be determined to decide if the moral sense is functioning properly. Plus how do you square total depravity with this?



> I didn't say unquestionable---what the sensus model does is to turn the question from one of a de jure objection of justification into a de facto objection of actuality.
> 
> In Christian terms, the sensus Divinitatus (as per Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model) makes it so that the only objection to Christian belief could be arguments for why Christian belief is false. The only cogent objection to this model (I believe) would be to argue against theism directly. The only way to prove the model false would be to prove that there is no God.



I get you now, I misunderstood you, I don't know enough about Plantinga's project to rightly criticize it but I would still wonder how he would square up with the reformed conffessions on total depravity, maybe that is one of those corrections you alluded to making if so than I would be curious to hear. K. Scott Oliphant criticizes Plantinga at this point by saying that the fall stopped our sensus from functioning properly. 



> On the immaterialist non-theist model, we have to answer it by attacking the existence of a non-personal realm of transcendent . . . stuff (such a great metaphysical word, "stuff").



Yes that would be my method as well and yes "stuff" is a great metaphysical word.


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## Philip

> Yeah but one cannot metaphorically abandon metaphysics like that, he still did metaphysics and tried to deny it when he realized he had egg on his face.



But in the final analysis, he actually avoids internal inconsistency. It's a bizarre system, but not incoherent.



> I think I am starting to get you. Yes you are correct to assume that if you have a moral sense and it tells you something is right or wrong than yes that would technically justify the moral statment but a theory of ethics must be determined to decide if the moral sense is functioning properly. Plus how do you square total depravity with this?



But how would one know that the moral theory being used is the correct one?

As for total depravity, I would say that it is a case of malfunctioning moral sense, but then I'm operating on a Christian model. The non-Christian is still internally justified.



> I get you now, I misunderstood you, I don't know enough about Plantinga's project to rightly criticize it but I would still wonder how he would square up with the reformed conffessions on total depravity, maybe that is one of those corrections you alluded to making if so than I would be curious to hear. K. Scott Oliphant criticizes Plantinga at this point by saying that the fall stopped our sensus from functioning properly.



First, Plantinga agrees with Oliphant. The _sensus_ has been severely damaged by the fall and so in regeneration, the Spirit reactivates and repairs the _sensus_ (a model that makes much more sense in a Calvinist framework than in Plantinga's Molinist one).

Second, Plantinga is quite careful on this point, drawing most of his model from Calvin. Its language also draws heavily from Thomas Reid, the Scottish school of common sense, and its theological offspring, Old Princeton.


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## jwright82

> But in the final analysis, he actually avoids internal inconsistency. It's a bizarre system, but not incoherent.



That is why I prefer the later Wittgenstien. I suppose it is internally consistant, except he is talking about things he claims cannot be talked about.



> But how would one know that the moral theory being used is the correct one?



Without a moral theory how would you be able to tell if your moral sense is working right? Without some outside standered to test your moral sense you are left with the purely autonomous person and no objective morality at all.



> As for total depravity, I would say that it is a case of malfunctioning moral sense, but then I'm operating on a Christian model. The non-Christian is still internally justified.



But once you ask for that standered they appeal to than their consistancy will brake down unless they affirm God's morality as their standered. 



> First, Plantinga agrees with Oliphant. The sensus has been severely damaged by the fall and so in regeneration, the Spirit reactivates and repairs the sensus (a model that makes much more sense in a Calvinist framework than in Plantinga's Molinist one).



Oliphant sees the sensus as more than severly damaged but I will have to re-read his essay on this.



> Second, Plantinga is quite careful on this point, drawing most of his model from Calvin. Its language also draws heavily from Thomas Reid, the Scottish school of common sense, and its theological offspring, Old Princeton.



I've read some essays that claim that he is outside the reformed tradition on this point.


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## Elimelek

Hi, 
I shall not try to prove God's existence at all. For me, the most effective way would be God showing himself to the person. Thus, I shall spend hours and hours on my knees.

Regards


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