# Bahnsen's "package deals"



## MW (Sep 7, 2006)

I didn't want to detract from the other thread on the impossibility of the contrary, so I will pose this question here.

Did Bahnsen's theory of "package deals" borrow from Clark's idea of "consistent systems?" How consistent is it with the VanTillian theory of analogy in contrast to Clark's theory of correspondence?


----------



## MW (Sep 8, 2006)

Thanks, Paul, for your suggestive response.

I still cannot figure out how a "consistent system" works via the VanTillian theory of analogy. I can see how God's thoughts require consistency; but I cannot see how man's thoughts can require the same consistency, when the human mind cannot know even one proposition in the minimal significance with the same depth of meaning with which God knows that proposition. If we deny man this minimal significance, aren't we also denying the quality of immutability in that truth which man knows? But it is the quality of immutability which makes truth consistent.

Blessings!

[Edited on 9-8-2006 by armourbearer]


----------



## VictorBravo (Sep 8, 2006)

Interesting, I first heard of the term while reading Ayn Rand. She used it similarly to Van Til in her book on epistemology.


----------



## MW (Sep 8, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> i. The anological "theory" is also called this: "Thinking God's thoughts after him."



That is the catch-phrase, but the word *after* is the key to understanding it.



> ii. You claimed that, "the human mind cannot know even one proposition in the minimal significance with the same depth of meaning with which God knows that proposition."
> 
> a) Can you quote Van Tillians saying this so I know where you're coming from?



Intro. Syst. Theo., 185, if I am reading my scribble correctly.



> b) This quote from you is ambiguous, at best. For example, resorting to a metaphor ("depth") doesn't seem very helpful.



That's the problem with Van Til's language.


----------



## MW (Sep 9, 2006)

Sorry, Paul, I must be missing something. I am asking how Bahnsen's belief in consistent system squares with VanTillian analogy. So far I seem to be getting a rebuttal for doing nothing more than quoting VanTil's words.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 1. Well, God is the *original* knower and interpreter of His creation, thus all our knowledge is *derivative,* hence, the "after" portion.



But we know VanTil said more than that. He said what we know propositionally, even with our minimal significance, is not the same as what God knows. Hence the *after* is not simply a derived knowledge, but a different knowledge.



> 2. And I broke down various meanings, but I don't know how you're understanding it.



I am understanding it according to what the man himself said. Propositionally we do not know anything as God knows it.



> 3. Romans 11:33 Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out!



"Finding out" is better. All this of course is after Paul by inspiration has made known the wisdom of God in hardening Israel that the Gentiles might come in, that He might ultimately have mercy on Israel. And let us not forget the conclusion of the doxology, that as all things are of Him and through Him, so they are unto Him also. But how does one give (ascribe) glory to God if what he is proclaiming does not correspond to God's glory?



> b. If you're going to try to show a problem with someone's system, resorting to metaphors to explain his system isn't helpful.



The metaphor of "depth" is VanTil's, not mine. And I am not explaining his system. It is fairly self-explanatory. I am simply asking how consistency squares with analogy?



> c. If you say that you were just using Van Til's language then he used God's langauge, where's the problem.



I don't see the quote from Van Til's Intro. anywhere in holy Scripture.



> 4. Unfortunately, it seems as if you don't have any serious critique of Van Til except for regurgitated cliches.



Paul, no need to think of this as an attack that needs a defence. A simple explanation will suffice as to how consistency can be maintained when the qualities of "immutability," "eternality," etc., do not attach to truth as known by man.



> I tried to get you to be precise, but, alas, you wanted to be Van Tillian!



My statement was a quote from Van Til, hence the imprecision with which he expressed himself according to VanTillian thought. Perhaps it is a case of Van Til against the VanTillians.



> I at least hope I've helped you understand VT a bit more. Thanks for the convo.



Actually, its becoming confusing. Granted I studied VanTil a decade ago. But I'm pretty sure he hasn't written anything new since then.

Blessings, brother!

[Edited on 9-9-2006 by armourbearer]


----------



## MW (Sep 9, 2006)

Paul, I am honestly not critiquing. You and I both agree that VanTil teaches a qualitative difference. I don't understand why you affirm it, but then repudiate my affirming it. The status quaestionis here is simply this: Whether the truth as man knows it is immutable? Van Tillians deny; Clarkians affirm. Yet immutability is necessary for consistency, as far as I can see. So how does a Van Tillian like Bahnsen maintain analogy AND consistency? Doesn't he require the Clarkian element of immutability in truth in order to do so? It is a fairly straightforward question; but there is nothing in any of your posts to date which have suggested an answer.

I will quote a few statements from your recent post, and offer a few remarks which will hopefully illustrate the problem.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 3) The act of knowledge is different (i.e., we know as creatures, God knows as Creator).



Immutability is an incommunicable attribute of the Creator. Van Tillianism obviously denies that truth claims by men are immutable, else they would know something as God knows it. However, the only way a system can be consistent is if the attribute of truth as known by man never changes. Bahnsen appears (to me at least) to depend upon this assumption.



> Again, depends on what you mean. We know the *same*object of knowledge. But, we don't know anything as God knows it in the sense of "the act(or) of knowledge." If you think our knowledghe is the *smae* in this sense then you're saying that when you know something you know as Creator.



While I know as a human, that which is known is divine. Thus my claim to know truth can be a claim to know what is immutable. Again, Bahnsen affirms this.



> If Van Til saying thnat God's knowledge was deeper than ours then how is that different than Paul saying that. or, do you think you can go "as deep" as God?



The apostle is speaking about a truth that is unknowable apart from divine revelation. The context bears this out. No doubt man cannot know it with the same infinitude as God knows it, but he should be allowed the "minimal significance" which an infallible revelation affords him.

Does Bahnsen contradict Van Til at this point by requiring a coherence in man's "minimal significance?" He does not appear to me to answer this in his writings, else I would not have brought it up.


----------



## MW (Sep 9, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Okay, but saying that Van Tillians cannot have a coherent system seems like a critique. But, I'll take your word for it.



I haven't said they can't. I have been asking for the basis upon which they can. But let's move to the substance.



> 3. Let me quote Van Til and Bahnsen:
> Excerpts from A Survey Of Christian Epistemology:
> "If there is to be true coherence in our knowledge there must be correspondence between our ideas of facts and God's ideas of these facts. Or rather we shjould say that our ideas must correspond to God's ideas." VT
> 
> ...



So what is this distinction telling us? That the difference in the verb "to know," is a difference between the subject and the object. What difference does this make? When we ask Van Til, does the fact that God and man can know the same thing, mean that the quality of truth is the same for God and man? we hear a resounding No. When we ask Van Til, Why? He says because God knows as Creator, man as creature. And because he reasons from the the manner of man's knowledge being qualitatively different to the matter of it being qualitatively different, it is impossible to create a distinction in Van Til's thought between subject and object, though Greg Bahnsen has tried so valiantly to do so.

So we are back where we started -- how can a Van Tillian speak of coherence in man's knowledge, which requires the essential quality necessary for truth, which is immutability? If he says what man knows is immutable, he says that man knows a proposition with the same quality that God knows it, which is the Clarkianism Van Til so desperately sought to avoid for the better part of his illustrious career.

But what the Bahnsen quotations teach us, is that Bahnsen was desperate to find Clarkian rationality in Van Til. This answers my original question with a definite "yes."

The Van Til quotation from his Survey merely shows us that Van Til could talk the talk, but anyone who knows anything about his methodology knows that he did not invest the same meaning in the terms he used as ordinary philosophers would. He speaks of correspondence and coherence. What does he mean by that? Nothing more than that God must be brought in at the start of the process, not as an after-thought, and that all knowledge is intrinsically related to God's coherent plan. Thus Van Til has not stated anything about truth as known by man when he utilises the terms correspondence and coherence. Where does Van Til find coherence? In God's knowledge.



> Therefore, upon analysis, your position proves too much! Since _no one_ can "know the same as God" in this sense, and since not "knowing the same as God" means that we can't have a "coherent system" then this logically implies that, according to you, _no one can have a coherent system!_ You see, only with the requisit analysis provided by Bahnsen and myself do we avoid an absurd conclsuion. Thus if you do not accepot my analysis then your position suffers from a serious _reductio ad absurdum_.



It seems to me that Greg Bahnsen and Paul Manata would have brought a smile to Van Til's face in much the same way Ronald Nash did. But heroes wouldn't be heroes if their faults weren't ignored with idealist bliss.

Many blessings!

[Edited on 9-9-2006 by armourbearer]


----------



## ChristianTrader (Sep 9, 2006)

As a side note, I believe that reading Bahnsen´s analysis of Van Til´s interaction with Nash can lead one to only one of two conclusions:

1)Van Til was unbelievably mean to Nash during their interaction. For if someone actually said exactly what Nash did and you believed that he was being equivocable then would you just smile and say that the question had no answer and then end the conversation or would you just point out your belief that there was an equivocation going on and then point it out, followed by agreeing to disagree?

2)Bahnsen missed the boat on his analysis

I am really leaning towards the second conclusion. First off, if the interaction is regarded as complete in Nash´s retelling, then Van Til gave no indication that he believed that there was anything equivocably in the question but instead that it was straight forward but had no answer that (at least) Van Til had access to. 

Second, it seems that Nash´s question was very well chosen. Since he chose 1+1=2 instead of the example of flowers then the qualitative distinction is done because unless one wants to embrace theistic activism (which I know very few people want any part of theistic activism), then there is no creator vs. creature distinction of which to talk. So all one has to lean on is the quantitative difference. This makes Van Til´s response even harder to swallow if you take Bahnsen´s view.

I think that this interaction as well as other comments by Van Til can reasonably lead one ot believe that he endorsed theistic activism. If he did, then his comments to Nash make perfect sense.

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader (Sep 10, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Can only lead to one of two conclusions?
> 
> 1) Unfortunately I can think of at least 10 other intperpretations, just off the top of my head.
> ...



This would go into the unbelievably mean category. He said it was an improper question and had no answer, not hey I have told you before X, Y and Z go away.



> b) Maybe Van Til was busy and Nash grabbed him on his way out. Van Til therefore gave the best answer for the amount of time he had.



If that is so then, shucks. In response to an equivocation, that is the best one can do. That would fall into category 1.



> c) We ddidn't ahve the entire conversation given to us. Maybe Van Til did point out the equivocation but Nash just wanted to quote the part which seemed devistating for Van Til's system.



As I point out later, if one assumes that the entire conversation is not complete, then at some point the analysis will break down. 



> I mean, c'mon CT, I can come up with these things all night.



You can and I see no reason to invent any new categories to put Bahnsen's analysis through for those new things.



> As far as what you say under (2), all i can say is: Have you been paying attention to the thread.
> 
> Let's take your example
> 
> ...



So 1+1=2 is created? Hence theistic activism?




> > I think that this interaction as well as other comments by Van Til can reasonably lead one ot believe that he endorsed theistic activism. If he did, then his comments to Nash make perfect sense.
> 
> 
> 
> Hardly, especially when we consider the fact that Van Til spoke of the divine ideas being in God's mind, logic being part of God's nature, and "coherence existing before there was any space-time fact to which God's knowledge could correspond to." That pretty much blows your theory out of the water.



I can affirm each of those proposition and still hold to theistic activism.

1)Do you think I affirm that divine ideas are somewhere else outside of God's mind?

2)Logic is a part of God's nature.

3)Do you think that I believe that God was incoherent before time/space? All I have is a limiting idea of God's coherency with respect to God before creation, but that is more than 0. 



> And so what I think is going on, which is the only explanation for the sloppy analysis given above, si that CT is enamored with his theistic activism and that is clouding his normally clear vision on things.



I am still trying to get over how you can be a non theistic activist but still believe that my knowledge of 1+1=2 is of the created.

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader (Sep 10, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 1. As far as (1) goes, we don't have the entire conversation. And who are you to sit back and judge something that you have partial information about? That's my point.



Here what is good for the goose is good for the gander. What exactly did Bahnsen do but bring a judgment about the conversation with only partial info.



> And, (1) suffers from just being your unjustified *opinion* on the matter.



I will accept that if you apply the same standard to Bahnsen.



> I mean, reading a few sentences and then saying that Van Til was "unbeleiveably mean?"



Bahnsen assumed that there was enough reported in the conversation to give an analysis, so why is it somehow no one else is afforded that right. And if you read my post you will see that I do not believe that Van Til was being unbelievably mean.



> That's called the stacking the deck fallacy. You're making (1) seem so wrong that we'd have to opt for (2). But, my response is that (1) is by no means the *only* other option besudes (2). With that in mind your "as a side" pretty much collapses.



Actually your whole "argument" rests on the assumption that something relevant to the conversation was left out. Bahnsen did not make that assumption so why do you?

Unless you want to argue that I can not make some assumption in my argument, I do not see where you are trying to go with this.



> (2) As far as two goes. You said there was no logic without space and time. But if God was thinking coherently then he was thinking logically, hence logic is not created.



Why do coherency imply the laws of logic? The only way to make that jump is to beg the question under discussion. A created being cannot be coherent without obeying the laws of logic. That implies the same for God. Therefore the laws of logic are not created.

You just skipped a few steps that I would like to see worked out explicitly.

I also never said that there was no logic without space and time. I hold the position that we cannot conceive of the laws of logic without something to apply them to. (See email "the Crash of Modal Metaphysics") So if one wants to make some sort of argument for God having logic without space and time, then one will make an argument for "God" logic. Which I have no opinion on either way.



> Furthermore, it doesn't have to be "incoherent" it can just be "non-coherent."



I would not say non-coherent because I have no reason to reject coherency for God if I reject that the laws of logic are uncreated.



> And, who can't imagine "coherency" without space and time.



I can imagine such, but you have to somehow equate coherency with the laws of logic to get somewhere. Once you demonstrate that God could not be coherent without the laws of logic, then you have gone somewhere.



> Also, we can't really think what it was like to have no coherence since we've always had coherence.



You mean like thinking of not having the laws of logic because we've always had them?



> So, I just used all your arguments for activism against you.



Not at all.



> Bottom line, what Van Til mean by this was, "thinking logically" since the law of contradiction was an *expression of his nature.*



I can hold to that. I would only have a problem saying that logic is a part of his essential nature. So what it comes down to is how you want to read "expression".



> Appropos your (1). Then you're a conceptual realist as well, for your (1) is Welty's and Plantinga's conceptual realism.



How much in defense of theistic activism have you read? Somehow I am not thinking very much. M&M are not the only theistic activists going.

Why do you believe that my agreement with 1) Necessitate my agreement with conceptual realism as opposed to theistic activism.



> Appropos your (2). So God created part of his nature? CT, you've been saying logic is *created* and, therefore, you now believe "part of God's nature" is *created!*



Yes. For example, God is a creator. Before time 0 (let out a yell if you wish), he was not. So God created one of his attributes.



> And, I addressed your (3) above.



And I responded.



> Lastly, I don't believe you knowledge of 1+1=2 is of the created. i'm afraid you misunderstood. I said that the *act* of knowing 1+1=2 is that *act* of a crerature knowing, whereas the *act* of knowing 1+1=2 on God's end is the *act* of a divine mind knowing. Thus there is a *metaphysical* difference. Therefore there still is a *qualitative* difference. Hence I've shown your assertion that there can be no *qualitiative* difference in God's and my knowledge if 1+1=2, to be false.



Yep I misunderstood.

However, I still dont see how your explanation differs from saying "it is a qualitative difference just because". 

If you want to say that "it is qualitative in a way that I do not know how", I would buy that, but as written I do not see anything but an assertion of a difference (beyond a quantitative one) 



> My knowledge of these abstracta, in the *propositional* sense (or, the *object* of knowledge) is a divine idea in God's mind.



okay.



> Thus we see that we have some qualitiative areas in agreement (i.e., the *object*) and we have some qualitiative areas in disagreement.



I still dont see the disagreements.



> Thus we see similarity and disimilarity. Therefore we have "analogy." My knowledge of 1+1=2 is "the same" as God's in the object sense and different than God in the act sense.
> 
> hope that helps,



I can handle analogy without admitting to qualitative differences. All I need to admit is that there are some similaritities and some differences.

CT


----------



## MW (Sep 10, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> It's obvious you have an axe to grind.



Paul,

The axe I am grinding is stated in the first post of this thread. I am not sure why you would expect me to simply accept your declaration that analogy and consistency are compatible without showing how. If you are not inclined to show how they are compatible, then simply say so, rather than accuse me of carrying on some secret agenda.

You seem disappointed that I haven't engaged in analysis and only made one quotation from my notebook. But I am only exploring a question, not analysing a position. If I wanted to really critique Van Til, you and I both know there are multitudes of debateable statements that would have served the turn. That's not what this thread is about.

Now I would have expected a simple response to my question -- something along the lines of showing that the Van Tillian "system of truth" is itself analogical, and then demonstrating where Bahnsen either (1) provides a consistent outworking of this principle in terms of divine coherence, or (2) modifies it slightly by introducing coherence into the human system. Instead we have been given the customary continuity/discontinuity package we often have delivered to us by CVT interpreters. We have not even been given an exposition of the classic two tiered approach to ontology, which is fundamental to Van Tillian analogy.

Now it would be no difficult task to show quite clearly that CVT taught,

1. The system that Christians seek to obtain is analogical (Christian Theory Knowledge, 16).

2. That the system is constantly subject to God's revelation (ibid.)

3. That this analogical system of truth is not a deductive system, but adapted to human understanding; and hence "one must not take one doctrine and deduce from it by means of syllogistic procedure what he thinks follows from it (ibid., 38).

4. That because man's knowledge is analogical it must be paradoxical (Defense of Faith, 44).

5. That the solution to the paradox or *seeming* contradiction of Christian truth is to be found in God, who alone has exhaustive knowledge (ibid., 44, 45).

This is fairly fundamental to Van Tillian thought, and so any exposition of Bahnsen's thought should be related to these points in some way, shape or form. I did not expect that these fundamentals would have been questioned, and an irrelevant discussion of continuities and discontinuities brought into the thread.



> No, I've listed at least 5 different disticntions here, not simply the two you mention. Are you reading my posts?



Yes I am reading your posts. None of your distinctions answer the problem. John Frame provides even more distinctions. If he had have answered my query, I would not have posed the question.

Notwithstanding all the distinctions, we are still left with a qualitative difference of propositional content. One example from p. 184 of the Intro. Syst. Theo., and a crass example at that: "œWhen man says that God is eternal he can, because of his own limitations, think of God only as being very old." This refers to propositional content, and examples could be multiplied if you please. They all point to the same reality "“ that the object of knowledge (what is known) is qualitatively different for God and man.



> With all the effort I've put in to this thread this is sad, and sloppy.



I am happy to acknowledge the effort you have put into this thread, Paul, but it´s a bit like a man laying foundations for his house in his neighbour´s backyard. The dichotomy between object and subject as expounded by Bahnsen is Bahnsen's interpretation of Van Til; but the first question of this thread explores the possibility that Bahnsen might have introduced something foreign to Van Tillianism in order to espouse a consistent system similar to Clark. To subsequently quote Bahnsen's interpretation of Van Til is simply to beg the initial question.

But let us ask, can such a dichotomy be found in Van Til? I think it is important to realise that for Van Til the WHAT determines the HOW. The object of man's knowledge (what is known) is incomprehensible, and hence the subject (the manner of knowing) is qualitatively different. It is therefore impossible to create a dichotomy between object and subject, because the one is determinative of the other. It is precisely because the content or matter of man's knowledge is qualitatively different that CVT argued the character or manner of knowing is qualitatively different.

Different schools interpret this differently. Jim Halsey allows for no shared beliefs. John Frame tries to squeeze out the idea that God and man think about the same things, but differently. Bahnsen appears to me to seek for more rationality, but the exploration of that question is the purpose of this thread.



> Furthermore, though you'd like to continue to use the critiques from Nash, Reymond, and Clark, you do so at the perril of shjowing yourself unaware of Van Til's meanings, but rather, you take the interpretation of hostile critics instead of by men who were taught by, hand picked to replace, and spent many hours discussing his ideas.



I haven´t utilised Nash, Reymond or Clark. I haven´t made or utilised one critique of Van Til. You keep interpreting my investigation as a critique. I am happy to take CVT at face value. This thread is about analogy and consistency, especially Bahnsen´s use of the consistent system. But for some reason you want to turn this thread into an attack on my part and a defence on your part of CVT.



> By "thought content" Van Til meant the _thinking activity_ in which the mind of God engages which is _metaphysically_ different from the operations of man's mind (cf. IST, 184).



On page 184, CVT writes: "œAn endless number of added propositions does not change the MATTER in the least." The Bahnsen supposition of a dichotomy between subject and object does not exist in CVT. Because the MATTER known is qualitatively different, the MANNER of knowing is also.



> 4. Greg Bahnsen is telling us how Van Til should be interpreted by using (a) Van Til's own writings and (b) based on his vast experience and connection with the man. Sorry if I don't take your "interpretation" with the same force as a man who walked for hours with Van Til and had Van Til playing with his kids at his house on Sunday's after church.



Take it or leave it as you please. There is no point replying to the rest of your post, as it carries on in the same vein. Many blessings!


----------



## MW (Sep 11, 2006)

Paul, personally I appreciate Bahnsen's contributions; and I see this as the result of allowing for a certain kind of rationality in the human system, which is not merely analogous to God's system of truth. But I will leave it there. The idea that Bahnsen could have added to Van Til in the slightest seems to be too difficult to contemplate. Blessings!


----------

