# John Frame Sent me this



## T.A.G. (Mar 30, 2010)

This was on the topic of being impossible from personableness to come from impersonal

Yes, I agree with Schaeffer on that. He had a lot of influence on the moral argument that I use in Apologetics to the Glory of God. Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc. On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).

what does he mean that if there is no morality, there can be no thought and if no thought then no causation? What does morality have to do with these, is he speaking of morality in a different term?

Thanks

also feel free to give me your thoughts!!!!!


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## Covenant Joel (Mar 30, 2010)

I took Apologetics with him recently, and what I believe he is getting at is that thinking is inherently a moral activity. In other words, by even saying that certain ways of thinking are right/wrong (even using the language of logical/illogical), we are making a moral judgment. Accordingly, without morality, thinking has no basis and can't be done. If thinking can't be done, how can one discuss causation?


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## jwright82 (Mar 30, 2010)

> what does he mean that if there is no morality, there can be no thought and if no thought then no causation?


Based on what he said I think he kind of answered you in saying this:


> With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc


Although I have not read that particular work and I am unfamiler with Schaeffer's exact argument, so I cannot comment on those. Did Schaeffer lay this out The God Who Is There? If so than where?


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## VictorBravo (Mar 30, 2010)

Covenant Joel said:


> I took Apologetics with him recently, and what I believe he is getting at is that thinking is inherently a moral activity. In other words, by even saying that certain ways of thinking are right/wrong (even using the language of logical/illogical), we are making a moral judgment. Accordingly, without morality, thinking has no basis and can't be done. If thinking can't be done, how can one discuss causation?


 
That's how I understand it too. Sometimes these concepts are so simple that we miss them.

Basically, when you are actually thinking, you are discerning a right conclusion from a wrong one. If there is no right and wrong, that is, if you reject such a standard, then you cannot actually think.


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## T.A.G. (Mar 30, 2010)

ok so let me ask a obvious question, how does this affect causation by not having a morality?


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## Skyler (Mar 30, 2010)

T.A.G. said:


> ok so let me ask a obvious question, how does this affect causation by not having a morality?


 
It doesn't; it affects _assertions about_ causality.


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## Covenant Joel (Mar 30, 2010)

T.A.G. said:


> ok so let me ask a obvious question, how does this affect causation by not having a morality?


 
Skyler makes the point well. I don't know that he's saying causation itself is directly affected by not having morality. Rather, he's saying that if there is no morality, there are no laws for thought. If there are no laws for thought, then there is no way to rightly assert any causative relationship between thing.


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## tommyb (Mar 30, 2010)

I'm not convinced. He seems to be equating a logical inference with a moral judgment. Declaring something logically correct or incorrect is not the same a declaring it morally right or wrong.


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## Philip (Mar 30, 2010)

The law of causality is a tautology: an effect, by definition, must have a cause.



> Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.



Why? What is it about thought that makes it normative?


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## T.A.G. (Mar 30, 2010)

Yeah I do not know if I can buy it, I want to buy it but I am not sure if i can.
Any other takers?


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## Covenant Joel (Mar 30, 2010)

tommyb said:


> I'm not convinced. He seems to be equating a logical inference with a moral judgment. Declaring something logically correct or incorrect is not the same a declaring it morally right or wrong.


 
Are we not required to make correct judgments? If I were to argue like this: "The Bible is true. The Bible says Jesus is God. Therefore, Jesus is *not* God," wouldn't that be more than just a logical problem? If one is obligated to reason in certain ways, then that is a moral issue.


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## VictorBravo (Mar 31, 2010)

tommyb said:


> I'm not convinced. He seems to be equating a logical inference with a moral judgment. Declaring something logically correct or incorrect is not the same a declaring it morally right or wrong.


 
How can you declare something correct or incorrect without appealing to the concept of right and wrong?

When you say "morally right or wrong", is that really any different from saying "right or wrong?"

In other words, I think Frame is saying the act of discernment of correct or incorrect is fundamentally moral, because, quite simply, moral means deciding what is right or wrong.


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## Covenant Joel (Mar 31, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> The law of causality is a tautology: an effect, by definition, must have a cause.



I don't think Frame would deny that. But if I am not obligated to reason in certain ways, I could simply claim that an effect didn't have a cause, and who would be able to challenge me? The point is, we are obligated to reason in certain ways, and therefore I can't make assertions about causality if no such obligation exists.



P. F. Pugh said:


> > Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> Why? What is it about thought that makes it normative?


 
Well, I think we would agree that one must reason in certain ways. I can't just say, "A is B and not B" about a given topic. If I am obligated to reason in accordance with the laws of thought, then there is a moral dimension. Where Frame goes with this is that we are to reason in accord with God's revelation. Accordingly, if we don't reason in accord with that, then we can't meaningfully claim a basis for our thinking, and thus can't make assertions about causality (or anything else).


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## Philip (Mar 31, 2010)

> I don't think Frame would deny that. But if I am not obligated to reason in certain ways, I could simply claim that an effect didn't have a cause, and who would be able to challenge me? The point is, we are obligated to reason in certain ways, and therefore I can't make assertions about causality if no such obligation exists.



What type of obligation are we talking here? Moral or practical?

You are equivocating between two different kinds of normativity: that which you must not do and that which you cannot do.


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## T.A.G. (Mar 31, 2010)

good point, I am looking forward to a response.


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## Covenant Joel (Mar 31, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> What type of obligation are we talking here? Moral or practical?
> 
> You are equivocating between two different kinds of normativity: that which you must not do and that which you cannot do.


 
I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "practical obligation." 

I don't think I'm equivocating the two. I'm not talking about what you _cannot_ do, but rather what you _should_ not do. If you say, "A is B and not B," and I say, "No, that's wrong," I'm not talking about what you cannot do (you are able to argue however you want to), but rather what is wrong, that is, what you should/must not do. And that is Frame's point: if you _*ought*_ to reason in a certain way, then that introduces a moral dimension to it. Without that moral "ought," you have no basis for the laws of thought. Without the laws of thought, you have no basis for meaningful assertions. Sure, you _can_ still think and make assertions. But if one denies that there is morality, that there is an "ought," then there is no basis for thinking or assertions.


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## jwright82 (Mar 31, 2010)

I think one way to clear the metaphysical cobwebs here is to remember that value statements (right vs. wrong, correct vs. incorrect, good vs. bad, right conclusions vs. wrong conclusions) all occuppy to a greater or lesser degree a common language game. All this means is that they are used in roughly the same way. Since the use of a word determines its meaning than these value statements are all used for basically the same purpose, although this does not imply that the are all interchangeble with eachother. This, in my opinion, clears the whole distinction between value judgements in logic, right conlusion vs. wrong conclusion, and the distinction in morality, morally right vs. morally wrong. The point is they are all value judgements. This is how I would proceed to develop this argument because as far as I know Frame does not use the later Wittgenstien's philosophy like I just did.

This is not to say that I completly agree with his argument only that the point I made might clearup some of the unecessary metaphysical cobwebs that this argument brings up. After going to Schaeffer and going to Frame's book on Van Til I think I might understand the whole personal from impersonal argument a little better than I did. According to both these men the Christian faith is unique because it assumes that our personality was created by an absolute personal being vs. some kind of impersonal explination. Even Islam doesn't have this kind of personality because, as I understand them, allah is practically wholly other. No part of human language can concieve of him in any way shape or form. So this means he cannot reveal anything about himself to us, and selfrevealation is essential to the very notion of personality. How do you what another *person* is thinking unless they reveal it to you?

In the Christian WV God condescends to us in His selfrevealation to analogically reveal things about Himself to us. This personal interaction is wholly unique. As far as impersonal explinations go Schaeffer put it this way, on one side you have the personal giving rise to the personal and on the on the other you have some form of the impersonal giving rise to the personal. The basic problem, that I see, for anyone interested in an impersonal explination for the personal is that they seem to get themselves into the heap paradox.

The heap paradox is basically this, I take a plate and a grain of sand and I drop the grain of sand onto the plate and I ask you if this is a heap of sand? You say no, so I repeat until you decide that X number of grains of sand equals a heap. The paradox is lets say hypothetically that 239 grains of sand doesn't equal a heap but 240 does? This is the whole quantitative vs. qualitative distinction. At what point does a difference in quantity, grains of sand, equal a difference in quality or kind, not-heap vs. heap?

I would apply this to any version of an impersonal explination of the personal this way, take any impersonal force and ask if by itself this force, material or immaterial, equals personality? They either explain why or say no. Repeat until they can prove that this many impersonal things in relation to eachother equal what we experiance as personality. This puts them on the defensive vs. us on the defensive. At what point does a difference in quantity, number of impersonal things in relation to eachother, equal a difference in quality or kind, personal vs. impersonal?


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## SRoper (Mar 31, 2010)

Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.


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## VictorBravo (Mar 31, 2010)

SRoper said:


> Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.


 
I think that is a succinct way of describing the confusion. But I think Frame is talking about one level higher: what is driving us to evaluate true/false?

In other words, why is this distinction important? At the very simplest, it seems it is important because it ought to be important. I think the various attacks on objective truth often have the goal of making us forget that the desire itself to discern truth is because we intuitively or innately think it is a good thing to do. An empirical or practical argument for the desire doesn't easily explain it. The notion that "we use logic because it works--if it doesn't work, we will try something else" is itself an acknowledgment of the "goodness" of having something that works.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Mar 31, 2010)

T.A.G. said:


> This was on the topic of being impossible from personableness to come from impersonal
> 
> Yes, I agree with Schaeffer on that. He had a lot of influence on the moral argument that I use in Apologetics to the Glory of God. Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc. On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).
> 
> ...


 
Frame is a master of conclusions--premises, not so much. 
In other words, he makes a lot of arguments, but he doesn't do much work substantiating their premises or replying to counter-arguments. I say this as long-time student of Frame's work. This massive argument is one such example in my opinion


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## T.A.G. (Mar 31, 2010)

VictorBravo said:


> SRoper said:
> 
> 
> > Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.
> ...


 
When you said "what is driving us to evaluate true or false" this really hit me. I think maybe this argument does hold some weight, will continue to reflect and read others.

---------- Post added at 04:09 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:08 PM ----------




CatechumenPatrick said:


> T.A.G. said:
> 
> 
> > This was on the topic of being impossible from personableness to come from impersonal
> ...


 
So do you think the argument holds any weight?


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## Philip (Mar 31, 2010)

> I think that is a succinct way of describing the confusion. But I think Frame is talking about one level higher: what is driving us to evaluate true/false?



The motivation for why we do what we do might be said to be the realm of psychology, not philosophy. I'm not arguing that the answer you would give is inadequate, just that the question may be perceived as irrelevant.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Mar 31, 2010)

> So do you think the argument holds any weight?



I take it that the arguments are:



> Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.
> On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).



One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.


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## Covenant Joel (Mar 31, 2010)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.


 
I'm not sure that this is a fair characterization of Frame's work. Have you read _The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_? He does offer arguments to support these things. He's an incredibly busy man, so he didn't respond with full details to the original inquiry. I don't have the time to go searching through his books, but he has indeed made the arguments. He didn't just state these conclusions in his books. You may disagree with him. But he has argued these points in his books and lectures.


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## T.A.G. (Apr 1, 2010)

Covenant Joel said:


> CatechumenPatrick said:
> 
> 
> > One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.
> ...


 
yes this is true.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Apr 1, 2010)

Covenant Joel said:


> CatechumenPatrick said:
> 
> 
> > One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.
> ...


 
I didn't mean Frame offers no arguments, but that no arguments (above) were given, at least not in the original description. I also don't mean to knock Frame's work. But books like DKG are general and extremely wide-ranging. Each discussion is as succinct as it can be (see, e.g., his augments against traditional theories of knowledge and justification wrapped-up into 109-122). So he just doesn't have time or space for extended arguments. You might agree with every assertion in "without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.," but it begs for supporting premises.


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## chbrooking (Apr 1, 2010)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> I also don't mean to knock Frame's work.





CatechumenPatrick said:


> And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.


 
The problem is in your use of the word 'typically'. This statement is, by nature, a generalization -- and I'm not sure it's a fair one.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Apr 1, 2010)

chbrooking said:


> CatechumenPatrick said:
> 
> 
> > I also don't mean to knock Frame's work.
> ...


 
You might be right. But in the conclusion(s) the OP cited, what are the arguments? Or what are Frame's arguments?


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## jwright82 (Apr 1, 2010)

SRoper said:


> Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.


 You are right. But I did clarify by saying that these words were not always interchangeble, this implies distinctions. Sorry I guess I should have elaborated more on that. In that part of my post I was simply trying to point out that exact absolute static division between these words only leads to metaphysical confusion. If you look through the posts above mine you will see people using true/false right/wrong in interchangeble ways. The distinction between is and ought is an important one but I would say that it is a distinction within the language-game of value judgements, and therefore you must take this into consideration when trying to absolutly seperate truth/false from the value judgment language game.


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## chbrooking (Apr 1, 2010)

Oh I wasn't disputing that. I agree that the argument needs a bit of elucidation to be persuasive. I was just trying to help you see where your comment might have benefited by particularity and restraint.



CatechumenPatrick said:


> You might be right. But in the conclusion(s) the OP cited, what are the arguments? Or what are Frame's arguments?


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## Covenant Joel (Apr 1, 2010)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> You might be right. But in the conclusion(s) the OP cited, what are the arguments? Or what are Frame's arguments?


 
As I mentioned above, Frame's words above seem to have been a simple response to a question by email. He doesn't have the time to fully elaborate the argument behind all of those conclusions. I think he has made the arguments for this particular issue both in DKG and in _Apologetics to the Glory of God._

And I don't mean to say that Frame has fully backed up all of his conclusions. Sure, there are some things in DKG and in his newer _Doctrine of the Christian Life_ that could be more expanded. But to generally characterize him as making assertions without backing them up is an unfair characterization of the time he has put into many of these issues.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Apr 1, 2010)

Covenant Joel said:


> CatechumenPatrick said:
> 
> 
> > You might be right. But in the conclusion(s) the OP cited, what are the arguments? Or what are Frame's arguments?
> ...


 
Do you know where in DKG or Apologetics he elaborates? I've heard him make similar claims as the ones he said in the e-mail in his lectures on the history of philosophy and pastoral and social ethics at RTS, but I haven't encountered them in his books. Or I don't remember where they are. 
In any case, how might the arguments for his claims go?


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## VictorBravo (Apr 1, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> > I think that is a succinct way of describing the confusion. But I think Frame is talking about one level higher: what is driving us to evaluate true/false?
> 
> 
> 
> The motivation for why we do what we do might be said to be the realm of psychology, not philosophy. I'm not arguing that the answer you would give is inadequate, just that the question may be perceived as irrelevant.




Sure, someone can say the question is irrelevant. But in doing so I’d hope such a person would acknowledge that he has nothing to say about why choosing to apply reason is better than unreason. If that is the case, he has no ground for saying someone is wrong in their evaluatation of true/false distinctions and ought to acknowledge that his opinions on morality, or even causation, are arbitrary.

If he has no reason for using reason, then, at that point at least, he is irrational because his choice to be reasonable is based on a whim.


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## Covenant Joel (Apr 1, 2010)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> Do you know where in DKG or Apologetics he elaborates? I've heard him make similar claims as the ones he said in the e-mail in his lectures on the history of philosophy and pastoral and social ethics at RTS, but I haven't encountered them in his books. Or I don't remember where they are.
> In any case, how might the arguments for his claims go?


 
I don't have the books with me right now. I can check on it later when I get home.

I think the argument (in a nutshell) is what I've said above and what Victor Bravo has just said above as well. And really, I think it just goes back to Van Til. If we can say that we _*ought*_ to reason in a certain way, then that introduces a moral distinction. If we say that one _*ought*_ to use reason rather than irrationality, then one introduces a moral distinction. Accordingly, thought is dependent on the existence of morality. Assertions about causality then have no basis without thought's validity and therefore morality. (I am fully aware that this could/should be elaborated more, but I think that is the basic argument.)


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## CatechumenPatrick (Apr 1, 2010)

Covenant Joel said:


> CatechumenPatrick said:
> 
> 
> > Do you know where in DKG or Apologetics he elaborates? I've heard him make similar claims as the ones he said in the e-mail in his lectures on the history of philosophy and pastoral and social ethics at RTS, but I haven't encountered them in his books. Or I don't remember where they are.
> ...


 
Not all uses of "ought" are strictly moral, but all are normative. As a moral concept, if S ought not X, then S would be blameworthy, subject to moral condemnation, if S performed X, and feelings of guilt would be warranted on S's part. But there are non-moral uses of "ought," uses having to do with broad normativity (reasons for action). Say S has some epistemic goals, such as minimizing false beliefs and maximizing true ones. Then we might say S ought (has reason) to, say, investigate matters thoughtfully, not believe anything on insufficient evidence, familiarize him- or herself with basic logic, or the like. So merely saying "one ought to reason in a certain way" need not be a moral command. But even if it was, it wouldn't follow that "Accordingly, thought is dependent on the existence of morality." First of all, again, the concepts need unpacking. What does "thought" refer to? Thought as a cognitive processes in sentient beings? How does, then, thought as a cognitive function of a brain require morality? Why couldn't a being have amoral thought-processes, perhaps only thinking about numbers and counting objects? (And what does it mean to say thought is dependent on morality's existence? Does that mean that, so long as one conscious being has moral thoughts, other beings can think but lack a moral sense, or not think about morality?)


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## ChristianTrader (Apr 1, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> > I don't think Frame would deny that. But if I am not obligated to reason in certain ways, I could simply claim that an effect didn't have a cause, and who would be able to challenge me? The point is, we are obligated to reason in certain ways, and therefore I can't make assertions about causality if no such obligation exists.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 
I do not think there is an equivocation here. One cannot argue that an effect does not have an cause because that statement is nonsense/meaningless. So even if you attempt to make such an argument all you would be doing is making funny noises.


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## T.A.G. (Apr 1, 2010)

As a brother from this website has pointed out to me
So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God. (1Co 10:31)
Thus every decision we know as Christians is a moral one.


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## Covenant Joel (Apr 2, 2010)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> Not all uses of "ought" are strictly moral, but all are normative. As a moral concept, if S ought not X, then S would be blameworthy, subject to moral condemnation, if S performed X, and feelings of guilt would be warranted on S's part. But there are non-moral uses of "ought," uses having to do with broad normativity (reasons for action). Say S has some epistemic goals, such as minimizing false beliefs and maximizing true ones. Then we might say S ought (has reason) to, say, investigate matters thoughtfully, not believe anything on insufficient evidence, familiarize him- or herself with basic logic, or the like. So merely saying "one ought to reason in a certain way" need not be a moral command. But even if it was, it wouldn't follow that "Accordingly, thought is dependent on the existence of morality." First of all, again, the concepts need unpacking. What does "thought" refer to? Thought as a cognitive processes in sentient beings? How does, then, thought as a cognitive function of a brain require morality? Why couldn't a being have amoral thought-processes, perhaps only thinking about numbers and counting objects? (And what does it mean to say thought is dependent on morality's existence? Does that mean that, so long as one conscious being has moral thoughts, other beings can think but lack a moral sense, or not think about morality?)


 
But what we're talking about is ultimate, binding standards of thought. If one ought always to reason in a certain way (cause to effect; a=b, b=c, therefore a=c), then that is a moral matter. I cannot say, "A = B, B = C, therefore, A does not equal C." That would not be right reasoning. The point is, why is there any right way of reasoning (or doing anything else)? If there isn't a right way, I can reason however I want to, no matter how preposterous it is.

I think we're speaking past each about thought, and about thought _requiring_ morality. I'm not saying that if someone denies absolute standards that they can't think. Only that they have no basis for doing so. This the same point that Van Til made, just pointed in a little bit different direction: the unbeliever may deny all of these things (morality, God's standards, etc), but that doesn't mean that he doesn't still operate on their basis. Clearly people who deny God's standards of morality do think, do make assertions about causation, perhaps even live according to some moral standards that seem biblical. But the point is that they have no basis for doing so. If they deny that there is any right and wrong, then they are denying that there is a right and a wrong way to think. But if they then appeal to use standards of thought in their attempts to disprove God's existence, for example, it is the Van Tillian image of a child sitting on his father's lap, beating his chest and saying that he doesn't exist, while it was only the Father's presence that keeps him from falling to the floor.

Frame addresses these issues briefly on page 63 of DKG (part of a larger section on God's law). I'll quote a relevant portion:



> Therefore it is possible and useful to regard epistemology as a branch of ethics, though this is not the only way to classify epistemology. (Different classifications have value for difference purposes; there is no one "right" classification.) Ethics, we may say, deals with the norms, or laws, for human life in general. Epistemology deals with the norms that govern thought. By seeing epistemology as a branch of ethics, we remind ourselves in the most vivid way that knowing is not autonomous; it is subject to God's authority, as is all of human life. This procedure also reminds us that knowing, thinking, theorizing, and so forth are indeed parts of human life as a whole. Although that point seems obvious, often we fail to consider that theory is part of practice, that thinking is one kind of doing, that knowing is one kind of achievement. Often we are inclined to put "epistemological" activities into some special kind of category, wherein they furnish the norms for all the rest of life and are themselves subject to no norm at all. No! Thought is not an activity that lifts us above the normal level of our humanity. It is an ordinary part of human life, subject to the same law as the rest of life, and no more autonomous than any other human activity. Indeed, I will show that far from determining the whole course of human life, thought is as dependent on our other activities as they are on it.
> Epistemology, then, analyzes the norms for belief. It tells us what we ought to believe, how we ought to think, what justifications ought to be accepted. Those "oughts" are ethical thoughts. [_The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_ (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1987), 63-64.]



This section is followed by Frame working out some of the specifics of the arguments he made in the quoted section above. You may disagree with his arguments, and that's fine. But he has made arguments for these things.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Apr 2, 2010)

> If one ought always to reason in a certain way (cause to effect; a=b, b=c, therefore a=c), then that is a moral matter.



That depends. If one ought to reason that way because God commands it, or because that form of reasoning characterizes God's spoken and written revelation that we ought to imitate, then sure, that's a moral ought applied to epistemic practices. But if I ought to reason that way (e.g., by following the basic laws of logic) because that maximizes true belief, and that's something I want (it sure seems like it's in my interests to want it in any case), then I have reason to (ought to) follow those laws. Or, if given my cognitive composition the only way I can intelligibly understand the external world is through causal inferences, then either I reason that way, or I don't understand events in the world--presumably, then, I have reason to think in that fashion as understanding the world is something most people want. The latter two cases are not necessarily matters of morality, but broad normativity.

Regarding Frame's discussion, no philosopher disagrees that epistemology has a normative aspect, or even that it can have an ethical aspect. But why think epistemology is just the ethics of thought, such that every epistemic rule is a moral one? He says, 


> Epistemology, then, analyzes the norms for belief. It tells us what we ought to believe, how we ought to think, what justifications ought to be accepted. Those "oughts" are ethical thoughts.


First, he is not quite correct in his description of epistemology. Epistemology does not tell us what we ought to believe--that is, it doesn't give the content of beliefs we ought to hold, but the type of beliefs (rational, justified). Epistemology is about how we in fact form beliefs and how we should form beliefs, what methods we use to justify them, and what it means to say any given belief is rational, justified, known, etc. And formal epistemology (as opposed to mainstream) likewise uses probability theory/decision theory to analyze things like belief revision and belief paradoxes.
Second, it is not clear what he is saying in the last sentence. If he merely means the "ought" involved in epistemology is normative, not descriptive, he's obviously right as has been shown (here, though, is an example of a purely descriptive use of "ought": John, seeing the rain clouds, says, "It ought to rain today." This is a statement of empirical probability--he is not saying the sky has a normative or moral reason to rain). But if he means all epistemic oughts are ethical, he is incorrect. Am I sinning every time I do not follow modus ponens? Am I morally blameworthy every single time I fail to proportion my belief to the evidence? Is the probability calculus part of God's law? I don't think even a radical evidentialist like Clifford would go that far.


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## Philip (Apr 3, 2010)

Joel

In making this move, Frame is assuming a deontological view of epistemology where reasonability entails doing your epistemic duty. This is the Lockian view of epistemology that Plantinga demolishes in _Warranted Christian Belief_. Epistemology is normative only insofar as it establishes criteria for what constitutes knowledge and reasonability. It is not normative in that its job apart from these criteria is primarily descriptive. 

Are all kinds of normativity ethical? Not necessarily--some norms are practical. Speed limits are often practical norms not ethical ones. The tax code is a set of practical norms, not ethical norms. Passport law is a set of practical, not ethical, norms. Now, this is not to say that practical norms cannot become ethical--but it would be necessary to show exactly how and why a practical norm is ethical in a particular situation.

In epistemology, for example, one would have to show how exactly the madman's belief that he is a poached egg is a moral infraction. A huge part of the case against evidentialism rests on the fact that epistemology is not ethical in its roots.


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## jwright82 (Apr 3, 2010)

Frame, and anyone else who agrees with him, is within their Christian right to believe that reason, like all other spheres of human life, is inherently ethical. Everything we are or have can be used in only two different ways: in obediance to God or in disobediance to God. I remeber hearing Sproul, who as we all know is no friend of pressupossitionalism, say that to reason incorectly was a sin.
I think the argument in this case could be laid out in this fashion:
1. Reason is part of the image of God
2. Human beings are the image of God
3. To misuse reason is to badly reflect that image
4. To badly reflect that image is a sin, or morally wrong
5. Therefore epistomology, which estblishes the rules of reasoning correct, is inherently ethical

If we look at it this way than there is definantly an ethical dimension or perspective or whatever you want to call it at root in epistomology. If we are disobediant in the use of reason than we can never adequitly use the canons of reason, without Divine assistance of course. 
Of course anyone could obgect that I must prove that we are in fact made in the image of God and that this God actually exsists and so on and so forth.
The interesting thing though is that at the end of the day every person, regardless of whether or not I have proven my premises, is still obediant to God or disobediant to God making everything we do right or wrong.


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## Philip (Apr 3, 2010)

> 1. Reason is part of the image of God
> 2. Human beings are the image of God
> 3. To misuse reason is to badly reflect that image
> 4. To badly reflect that image is a sin, or morally wrong
> 5. Therefore epistomology, which estblishes the rules of reasoning correct, is inherently ethical



Misusing reason is not the same as making an error. Misusing reason refers to using it for a purpose which God did not intend. God did intend it to be used for epistemology, ergo its use in epistemology is inherently good.

If I unintentionally commit a formal fallacy, is that sin? No, it's human error--it's a result of an oversight, my finitude, not necessarily sin. Because of the fall, all of our reasoning is inherently imperfect, not simply because we are finite, but because we are fallible.

Also, epistemology does not provide the rules of reasoning: it assumes the rules of reasoning. It is only skeptics who think that it has to provide them. The rules of reasoning are matters of observation with a view toward normativity, so they are not strictly normative or ethical.


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## jwright82 (Apr 3, 2010)

> Also, epistemology does not provide the rules of reasoning: it assumes the rules of reasoning. It is only skeptics who think that it has to provide them. The rules of reasoning are matters of observation with a view toward normativity, so they are not strictly normative or ethical.





> Epistemology is normative only insofar as it establishes criteria for what constitutes knowledge and reasonability.


What is the difference between what you are saying here and summerizing this statement, which I whole heartedly agree with, as saying that epistemology establishes the "the rules of reason"? The difference, it seems to me, is only semantical? I was just trying to summerize what you said, so if we mean 2 different things by this phrase than for future reference when I use this phrase I am merely trying summerize your well put definition. Sometimes my Wittgenstienian beliefs get the best of me and I forget that sometimes you need exactness in definition and not addequite substitute for words. I can't just assume that people see things like I do.


> Misusing reason is not the same as making an error.


How so? It seems simple to me that if I correctly use reason all the time I will never make a mistake. How could I?


> Misusing reason refers to using it for a purpose which God did not intend. God did intend it to be used for epistemology, ergo its use in epistemology is inherently good.


I can definantly agree that epistemology is inherently good but I would definantly make a distinction between Epistemology as an independent field of inquiry and various epistemological P.O.V.'s over the years, I think we can agree here. Also if epistemology is inherently good than how can it's use lead to error? 


> If I unintentionally commit a formal fallacy, is that sin?


Why did you unintentionally commit it? If you had used epistemology correctly all the time than you would not have made the mistake. But if you didn't use it properlly than you are right back in the middle of my argument.


> No, it's human error--it's a result of an oversight, my finitude, not necessarily sin. Because of the fall, all of our reasoning is inherently imperfect, not simply because we are finite, but because we are fallible.


Every single action that every single human being makes is either right or wrong. Either it is done in obediance to God or disobediance to God. You seem to be assuming some neutral space here where this rule doesn't apply.


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## Covenant Joel (Apr 3, 2010)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> That depends. If one ought to reason that way because God commands it, or because that form of reasoning characterizes God's spoken and written revelation that we ought to imitate, then sure, that's a moral ought applied to epistemic practices. But if I ought to reason that way (e.g., by following the basic laws of logic) because that maximizes true belief, and that's something I want (it sure seems like it's in my interests to want it in any case), then I have reason to (ought to) follow those laws. Or, if given my cognitive composition the only way I can intelligibly understand the external world is through causal inferences, then either I reason that way, or I don't understand events in the world--presumably, then, I have reason to think in that fashion as understanding the world is something most people want. The latter two cases are not necessarily matters of morality, but broad normativity.



Well I think Frame's point is that you ought to reason that way because it does flow from God's revelation. You may not agree with him on that point, but I think that's where he is saying what Van Til said. I'm also unsure how "maximizing true belief" could be a neutral activity. I can reason in way that doesn't maximize true belief, but that's fine as long as I don't want to? That ought seems like a moral ought to me. So to reason in a way in which you can't make sense of the world is fine? There's no moral dimension to me saying, "The president landed on Air Force One in Washington. A bomb went off in Turkey. The president should quit flying in airplanes because it's causing bombs in Turkey"? My cause-and-effect reasoning would be wildly inaccurate, but that's fine because I don't really care if I properly understand the world?



CatechumenPatrick said:


> Regarding Frame's discussion, no philosopher disagrees that epistemology has a normative aspect, or even that it can have an ethical aspect. But why think epistemology is just the ethics of thought, such that every epistemic rule is a moral one? He says,
> 
> 
> > Epistemology, then, analyzes the norms for belief. It tells us what we ought to believe, how we ought to think, what justifications ought to be accepted. Those "oughts" are ethical thoughts.
> ...



I can see your point in what's in bold, and I'm not entirely sure how Frame would reply to that. What I've put in italics is what I think Frame was getting at: how can we determine what methods are acceptable? 



CatechumenPatrick said:


> Second, it is not clear what he is saying in the last sentence. If he merely means the "ought" involved in epistemology is normative, not descriptive, he's obviously right as has been shown (here, though, is an example of a purely descriptive use of "ought": John, seeing the rain clouds, says, "It ought to rain today." This is a statement of empirical probability--he is not saying the sky has a normative or moral reason to rain). But if he means all epistemic oughts are ethical, he is incorrect. Am I sinning every time I do not follow modus ponens? Am I morally blameworthy every single time I fail to proportion my belief to the evidence? Is the probability calculus part of God's law? I don't think even a radical evidentialist like Clifford would go that far.


 
Sure, the word "ought" can have other meanings. If I say to a friend, "You ought to go to the gym with me," clearly I'm not making a moral claim on his life. But I don't think Frame would dispute that either. I don't think he's saying either that every time you do not follow modus ponens you're sinning. But I think he's saying that by reasoning incorrectly, you are admitting that true/false and right/wrong exist in the world. We don't always have all the information, sometimes our vision is clouded, and we make a faulty decision. But his basic point (if you disagree, that's fine, the original question was just asking what Frame meant) is that by admitting right and wrong ways of reasoning, we are admitting that there is morality (right/wrong) in the universe.

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P. F. Pugh said:


> Joel
> 
> In making this move, Frame is assuming a deontological view of epistemology where reasonability entails doing your epistemic duty. This is the Lockian view of epistemology that Plantinga demolishes in _Warranted Christian Belief_. Epistemology is normative only insofar as it establishes criteria for what constitutes knowledge and reasonability. It is not normative in that its job apart from these criteria is primarily descriptive.



The original post was asking what Frame meant, so I tried to explain it. Having not read _Warranted Christian Belief_ yet, I don't feel I am capable of commenting on your thoughts here. Frame has interacted with Plantinga in his writings, but I don't know about this specific point. 



> Are all kinds of normativity ethical? Not necessarily--some norms are practical. Speed limits are often practical norms not ethical ones. The tax code is a set of practical norms, not ethical norms. Passport law is a set of practical, not ethical, norms. Now, this is not to say that practical norms cannot become ethical--but it would be necessary to show exactly how and why a practical norm is ethical in a particular situation.



It seems that each of the norms you've mentioned is ethical in the sense that I'm required to abide by them. But certainly, passport law is not the same as other norms. I doubt that Frame would dispute that. I think his basic point is simply this: If you say, "I am a man. Rufus is a dog. Therefore, I am a man," you have reasoned in error. By claiming that you have reasoned in error, I am presupposing that are right and wrong ways of reasoning (thus morality). That, I believe, is what Frame is saying. You may disagree. It makes sense to me, but having not had the time to read extensively in epistemology, I probably can't comment further.



P. F. Pugh said:


> In epistemology, for example, one would have to show how exactly the madman's belief that he is a poached egg is a moral infraction. A huge part of the case against evidentialism rests on the fact that epistemology is not ethical in its roots.


 
I'm not sure that Frame is exactly saying that every time one makes an error in reasoning, he is morally culpable. But I think he is saying that we are presupposing that right versus wrong (morality) exists when we make such a claim.


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## Philip (Apr 3, 2010)

> What is the difference between what you are saying here and summerizing this statement, which I whole heartedly agree with, as saying that epistemology establishes the "the rules of reason"?



Reasonability is distinct from reason. Reason refers to using the laws of logic and evidential standards, where reasonability simply means sanity. One can be reasonable without using reason.



> How so? It seems simple to me that if I correctly use reason all the time I will never make a mistake. How could I?



Correct usage refers to usage with right intent, not to absence of error. Making mistakes is not indicative of sin, but of our finitude and fallenness--sometimes error is unavoidable (ask any scientist).



> I can definantly agree that epistemology is inherently good but I would definantly make a distinction between Epistemology as an independent field of inquiry and various epistemological P.O.V.'s over the years, I think we can agree here. Also if epistemology is inherently good than how can it's use lead to error?



Through using it in an attitude of independence from God rather than an attitude of faithful dependence on God. The difference between autonomy and faithful dependence is this: when you reason autonomously, you will never reach God, even if you begin from Scripture, whereas if you reason in an attitude of faithful dependence upon God, then you will inevitably find Him, no matter where you begin.



> Why did you unintentionally commit it?



Maybe it was simply an oversight, a lack of sleep, or simple necessity (in fact, you commit all kinds of formal fallacies every time you look out the window and conclude that there are trees outside).



> Every single action that every single human being makes is either right or wrong. Either it is done in obediance to God or disobediance to God. You seem to be assuming some neutral space here where this rule doesn't apply.



But the sin or right action, for much of what we do, consists in the motivation, the heart, not in the act itself. Is my decision to get my hair cut at one barber and not another inherently ethical? Is my decision to drink coffee and not tea this morning inherently ethical? Is my decision to hang a Rembrandt print over a Slaughter an inherently ethical decision? I don't think so.


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## jwright82 (Apr 3, 2010)

> Reasonability is distinct from reason. Reason refers to using the laws of logic and evidential standards, where reasonability simply means sanity. One can be reasonable without using reason.


Your difference here is merely semantical. Many ordinary people use these two words interchangebley. You have simply stamped them down with exact definitions. The last part I can't agree with because every single thought we have incorperates reason. There is a united function of faculties happening in every thought, we abstract them into different things to help us understand better.



> Correct usage refers to usage with right intent, not to absence of error. Making mistakes is not indicative of sin, but of our finitude and fallenness--sometimes error is unavoidable (ask any scientist).


Why should one except this? How could Adam and Eve had made mistakes when they had direct divine revealation from God? Error is indicative of autonomy not finitude, incompletness of knowledge is indicative of finitude. 



> Through using it in an attitude of independence from God rather than an attitude of faithful dependence on God. The difference between autonomy and faithful dependence is this: when you reason autonomously, you will never reach God, even if you begin from Scripture, whereas if you reason in an attitude of faithful dependence upon God, then you will inevitably find Him, no matter where you begin.


No disagreement here.



> Maybe it was simply an oversight, a lack of sleep, or simple necessity (in fact, you commit all kinds of formal fallacies every time you look out the window and conclude that there are trees outside).


But if I apply the the right use of reason than I would only conclude such things if I chose to be lazy about applying the rules completly and consistantly.



> But the sin or right action, for much of what we do, consists in the motivation, the heart, not in the act itself. Is my decision to get my hair cut at one barber and not another inherently ethical? Is my decision to drink coffee and not tea this morning inherently ethical? Is my decision to hang a Rembrandt print over a Slaughter an inherently ethical decision? I don't think so.


You seem again to be assuming this whole area of human life in which sin has not corrupted. You also simplify human action to a level that is inconsistant with experience.


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## VictorBravo (Apr 4, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> But the sin or right action, for much of what we do, consists in the motivation, the heart, not in the act itself. Is my decision to get my hair cut at one barber and not another inherently ethical? Is my decision to drink coffee and not tea this morning inherently ethical? Is my decision to hang a Rembrandt print over a Slaughter an inherently ethical decision? I don't think so.



Actually, I think deciding which acts are adiaphoria is inherently ethical.


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## Philip (Apr 4, 2010)

> Why should one except this? How could Adam and Eve had made mistakes when they had direct divine revealation from God? Error is indicative of autonomy not finitude, incompletness of knowledge is indicative of finitude.



Quite easily, it seems:

Suppose that I look at the clock and it says 2:30, but what I don't know is that the clock has stopped, and therefore I conclude wrongly that it is 2:30, even though I am reasoning in a perfectly right manner. I would suggest reading Edmund Gettier's _Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?_ (it really isn't that long) for more examples of how right reasoning can go wrong.



> But if I apply the the right use of reason than I would only conclude such things if I chose to be lazy about applying the rules completly and consistantly.



You forget that half the time it's involuntary--unless you happen to be a disembodied spirit (which I highly doubt). Many times our mistakes are not through laziness, but through simple error and fallibility. Inductive reasoning, for example, while useful is not infallible. Is a weatherman sinning when his prediction, based on state-of-the-art techniques, is wrong? Honestly, have you really considered how many times a day you are wrong and it's not your fault?



> You seem again to be assuming this whole area of human life in which sin has not corrupted. You also simplify human action to a level that is inconsistant with experience.



No, just removing motivation from the picture for a minute. In essence, I am scrutinizing particular actions to see whether, all things being equal, these actions are in essence ethical. There are many actions which derive their ethical nature from the motivations of the actor, not from anything inherent in the actions themselves.


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## jwright82 (Apr 4, 2010)

> Quite easily, it seems:
> 
> Suppose that I look at the clock and it says 2:30, but what I don't know is that the clock has stopped, and therefore I conclude wrongly that it is 2:30, even though I am reasoning in a perfectly right manner. I would suggest reading Edmund Gettier's Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (it really isn't that long) for more examples of how right reasoning can go wrong.


Thank you for the book suggestion I will look into to it, any author you deem worthy to read means I ought to read them or I will miss out. My ony question for this statment is this, how do you know the inference you are drawing from experience around you isn't tainted? I mean If creation was and is cursed from sin than how do you know that the mistakes we make are not sinful? Do we really know what an unfallen world would be like?



> Honestly, have you really considered how many times a day you are wrong and it's not your fault?


Ask anyone who knows me and they will tell a lot!



> You forget that half the time it's involuntary--unless you happen to be a disembodied spirit (which I highly doubt). Many times our mistakes are not through laziness, but through simple error and fallibility. Inductive reasoning, for example, while useful is not infallible. Is a weatherman sinning when his prediction, based on state-of-the-art techniques, is wrong?


Well like I said above how do we know these mistakes are not indicative of the fall? 



> No, just removing motivation from the picture for a minute. In essence, I am scrutinizing particular actions to see whether, all things being equal, these actions are in essence ethical. There are many actions which derive their ethical nature from the motivations of the actor, not from anything inherent in the actions themselves.


Well it seems this is the crux of our disagreement. You are correct if you abstract the action in question to see if it is inherently ethical or not you are absolutly correct they are not. But since nothing happens in a pure vacuum than the motivation in question is a complex one to look at. Since every motivation is created in a web of beleifs than it will itself be weblike. This also means that every action has a corresponding complex motivation behind it. This motivation in the unbeleiver is either in its most basic form willful obediance to God or willful disobediance to God.


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## Philip (Apr 4, 2010)

> Thank you for the book suggestion I will look into to it, any author you deem worthy to read means I ought to read them or I will miss out.



It's actually just a two page article--but it has nearly shattered the traditional definition of knowledge. Here it is.



> My ony question for this statment is this, how do you know the inference you are drawing from experience around you isn't tainted? I mean If creation was and is cursed from sin than how do you know that the mistakes we make are not sinful? Do we really know what an unfallen world would be like?



Because it's the only inference that I can possibly make. An unfallen world would still contain finite creatures who can only reason from what they are given--finite knowledge means that truth is not guaranteed, since there is now the category of inductive reasoning.



> Well like I said above how do we know these mistakes are not indicative of the fall?



So, in other words, Adam was omniscient? Even if this is indicative of the fall, that may not indicate sin. The fact that I'll die without food is indicative of the fall, but we don't call that sin. Jesus Himself suffered under the effects of the fall, yet He didn't sin--ergo, not all effects of the fall are sinful necessarily.



> Since every motivation is created in a web of beleifs than it will itself be weblike. This also means that every action has a corresponding complex motivation behind it. This motivation in the unbeleiver is either in its most basic form willful obediance to God or willful disobediance to God.



The difference between us is that I am a foundationalist and you are a coherentist, like Van Til (still trying to figure out Clark). Motivations determine our actions, but is my desire to go and get a drink of water right now ethical? I would prefer to see things as done in a certain spirit or attitude rather than simply saying that all motivations are necessarily ethical.


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## jwright82 (Apr 5, 2010)

> Because it's the only inference that I can possibly make. An unfallen world would still contain finite creatures who can only reason from what they are given--finite knowledge means that truth is not guaranteed, since there is now the category of inductive reasoning.





> So, in other words, Adam was omniscient? Even if this is indicative of the fall, that may not indicate sin. The fact that I'll die without food is indicative of the fall, but we don't call that sin. Jesus Himself suffered under the effects of the fall, yet He didn't sin--ergo, not all effects of the fall are sinful necessarily.


Well the example of Adam and Eve actually goes to one of the most important things in Van Til's system, at least in my opinion. They still had special revealation to guide them, God directly told them what He wanted them to do. As far as the problem of induction in the garden, I would say that it was not that much of a problem after all. They had direct revealation of the Creator and so they had faith in the regularity of nature, this was of a primal nature though. Who knows how philosophical they were. As far as making mistakes goes I don't know that we can answer that in a post-fallen world. 

I agree that not all effects of the fall are sinful, necessaraly, but I thought the issue in question was human action of all types and how far our corruption went into these areas? Total depravity means total, my choice to go to a certian barber over another may not seem at first glance to be an ethical decision but that abstracts that one decision out of of context. Human beings are very complex creatures, why should the ethicicst rip an action or motive out of its WV context to see if it is intrinciscly right or wrong? I don't agree with this statement for 2 reasons:

1. It seems to assume that there is this standered of right and wrong out there that has the quality of aseity, which only God has. Aseity means self-exsistant, among other things, it literally means "from or by oneself". Right and wrong are treated as though they are independent metaphysical qualities that need nothing but themselves to exsist. This gives divine attributes to created things, the essence of idolatry. Right and wrong are dependent on God's will for their meaning, not themselves.

2. It overly simplifies human beings. As if we are these simply constructed creatures who can be adequitly diced up and analiyzed. No Every action and motive are made in a context, ussually a complex one. This context involves a complex web of beliefs, both concious and unconcious, that all must be taken into account to determine the rightness or wrongness of an action. 



> The difference between us is that I am a foundationalist and you are a coherentist, like Van Til (still trying to figure out Clark).


It depends on how you use thes terms. I prefer to consider myself a revealational epitemologest, I will try to find a good article to explain this or start a thread. 



> Motivations determine our actions, but is my desire to go and get a drink of water right now ethical? I would prefer to see things as done in a certain spirit or attitude rather than simply saying that all motivations are necessarily ethical.


So it is motivation alone that determines whether an act is right or wrong? Do unbeleivers do good things from a Divine P.O.V.? 

Also the great thinkers and manipulators of power in history have recognized that every human action is selfish in some way. I may give to the poor but I only give because it makes me feel good or I like the way people think about me when I do it. Or even I feel bad about something else I did. 

Since you don't appear to believe that getting a drink of water is inherently ethical, than what determines what is ethical and what is not? How do you divide human actions into ethical ones and non-ethical ones?


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