# Any Reidians out there?



## RamistThomist (Oct 2, 2007)

I just purchased N. Wolterstorff's Thomas Reid and the Ethics of Belief (or something like that). I like Wolterstorrf's other works so this looks good.


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## Semper Fidelis (Oct 3, 2007)

It's funny you should bring that up. I've been thinking about starting a thread on this at some point. I wouldn't want to say for sure but I think Rev. Winzer might be a Common Sense Realist. I noted recently that when I read Dabney's _The Sensualistic Philosophy_ that he sounded like a Van Tillian in the way he internally critiqued naturalistic philosophy.

I started wondering why Bahnsen thought the philosophy was all gooned up and then I was listening to Frame recently and he stated that Van Til was convinced that this philosophy ended up nearly destroying Reformed Theology at Princeton and that Hodge was a big time Common Sense Realist as well as many who came after him.

I sometimes wonder if the "simple-minded", intuitive philosophy isn't relaly a good philosophy after all. I know Frame and Bahnsen don't like it but, it seems to me that the reason they don't like it is because it violates the "rules" of what good philosophy is. Yet, at the same time, if you listen to them review the history of human philosophy there are no good comprehensive human philosophies out there. It seems that Van Tillians, in the end, can demonstrate that every human philosophy fails but then cannot replace a systematic philosophy in its place except a fairly intuitive variety that seems very Common Sense Realism to me.

I wonder, then, why do we constantly want to construct what human philosophers would consider a "sound philosophy" when their rules on what constitutes truth all lead to incoherence? In other words, they have no metaphysic, ethic, or epistemology to offer but the rules they establish are then turned around to judge the validity of an intutitive system based on what man knows being a thinking, created being.

I don't know if what I said makes sense but I'd love to interact more on it.


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## MW (Oct 3, 2007)

Yes, I'm a common sense realist; they call us foundationalists these days. Whether that makes me a Reidian, I don't know. Reid was a bit of a moderate, if I remember correctly. I'd certainly distance myself from that. I think the problem with Hodge and Princeton was not the realism but the inductivist approach to science and theology. Van Til corrected this with the Kuyperian emphasis on antithesis. The benefit of realism is its insistence that the a priori ability to know is itself knowledge. This is presuppositionalism.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 3, 2007)

The title of the book was John Locke and the Ethics of Belief; Wolterstorff wrote another book by the same title with Thoma Reid. 

I had to study intensely for my apologetics final with Frame and we dealt with this. I found it interesting, if frustrating at times. A lot of good things but...


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

The below isn't necessarily an endorsement of Bahnsen (and Frame's to a lesser extent) position, but an explanation of his position. Wether they are/were right or wrong isn't my motive. I'll also make some comments of my own that have nothing to do with Bahnsen or Frame and the debate.



> I started wondering why Bahnsen thought the philosophy was all gooned up and then I was listening to Frame recently and he stated that Van Til was convinced that this philosophy ended up nearly destroying Reformed Theology at Princeton and that Hodge was a big time Common Sense Realist as well as many who came after him.



It wasn't the philosophy _per se_, but rather the autonomous employment of it. I don't think Bahnsen or Frame have a big problem appealing to CS _within a Christian framework_. Afterall, Bahnsen says, "If you're not God, how do you know what is 'common' to all men, or creation, etc?"

Perhaps CSR got a bad rap because it was once used to argue for God via design in nature vis a viz Paley, and then CSR was appealed to in order to argue for "design" by natural mselection and descent with modification. Indeed, Warfield was a theistic evolutionist and Hodge, even though he wrote the book "What is darwinism," concluding, "It is Atheism," had leanings in the macro-evolution direction.



> I sometimes wonder if the "simple-minded", intuitive philosophy isn't relaly a good philosophy after all.



a) I wouldn't call it "simple minded." Have you read Reid, or his modern day defenders?

b) Intuitions are falen too. It's fine to appeal to them as far as it goes, but not as a standard. And, many things that do seem "intuitive" are flat out false. So, I have no problem appealing to intuition, but then, neither does the physicalist who says that it's just intuitively obvious that non-physical entities can't cause thing to happen in the physical world. Where does the energy come from, after all?



> I know Frame and Bahnsen don't like it but, it seems to me that the reason they don't like it is because it violates the "rules" of what good philosophy is.



I wouldn't say that. Charitably, they don't like an autonomous appeal to CSR outside the Christian worldview. Seems to me that Bahnsen and Frame break the "rules" of what constitutes "good philosophy," all the time. Secular philosophers have said of them, "They're doing theology, not philosophy."



> Yet, at the same time, if you listen to them review the history of human philosophy there are no good comprehensive human philosophies out there. It seems that Van Tillians, in the end, can demonstrate that every human philosophy fails but then cannot replace a systematic philosophy in its place except a fairly intuitive variety that seems very Common Sense Realism to me.



a) Every autonomous philosophical system.

b) they "replace" them with "the Christian worldview." Now, this latter phrase may have its problems, but my point is that they have at least attemtped to "put something out there." So, they have, according to them, a distinctively Christian metaphysic, epistemology, and ethic. This is not "fairly intuitive."

Having said all this, I am a fan of CSR and find it a valuable weapon to include in an overall worldview.

I would agree with Rev. Winzer that we can "just know" some things without having to be able to "give an account" for that knowledge, i.e., have "access to" the justifying reasons for our beliefs. I'd also agree with the particularist approach to epistemology CSRs take.


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

Spear Dane said:


> The title of the book was John Locke and the Ethics of Belief; Wolterstorff wrote another book by the same title with Thoma Reid.



The title of the book on Reid was "_Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology_."


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## RamistThomist (Oct 3, 2007)

And I can't wait to read Wolterstorff. He is a very competent thinker and no doubt will make a good case. I also don't ahve problems with using both Bahnsen/Frame on one level, and the CSR on another.


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## CatechumenPatrick (Oct 3, 2007)

On this topic, does anyone know of some good Reformed critiques on CSR, Reid, or its contemporary defenders? Perhaps specific works or essays by Frame, Bahsen, or Van Til? Thanks


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## RamistThomist (Oct 3, 2007)

CatechumenPatrick said:


> On this topic, does anyone know of some good Reformed critiques on CSR, Reid, or its contemporary defenders? Perhaps specific works or essays by Frame, Bahsen, or Van Til? Thanks



Scott Oliphant, in Reasons for Faith, makes the argument that Common-sense couldn't tell us what common sense is. I have to read more on that before I make an argument.


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## MW (Oct 3, 2007)

Spear Dane said:


> Scott Oliphant, in Reasons for Faith, makes the argument that Common-sense couldn't tell us what common sense is. I have to read more on that before I make an argument.



That's actually a good criticism. But the fact is, I can't tell you alot of things with respect to how you and I communicate over the internet, and yet we do it nonetheless -- common sense! Someone might try to create an idealist gap between what we both experience, like Hume did; and yet our very discussion of this gap would still require a common experience. As far as I can see, CSR reflects our creaturehood.


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## Semper Fidelis (Oct 3, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


> The below isn't necessarily an endorsement of Bahnsen (and Frame's to a lesser extent) position, but an explanation of his position. Wether they are/were right or wrong isn't my motive. I'll also make some comments of my own that have nothing to do with Bahnsen or Frame and the debate.
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Thanks Paul. I'm particularly glad you noted the last part. I was pretty sloppy in some of my terms. I completly agree that fallen intuition can be a bad thing. Believe it or not, I usually criticize most people that say they rely on "common sense" because they're usually the people that don't like to study. I still remember a girl in high school who was a year older than me at my first job in 1984 (age 16). She was boasting that she had dropped out of school and that everything she learned, she learned on the street. I thought: "Well, I want more than a job at Burger King so I think I'll go the book learning route."

My point about Van Til was not to criticize his approach because I do find that what it seems to do is rigorously approach Philosophy but, in the end, it does seem to come down to a simple sense that we are created in God's Image and that the sheep hear His voice. I had heard that Reid was actually big time into free will and not much of a Presbyterian so I wasn't advocating an intuitive common sense. I assume you've read Dabney but his version of CSR seems very solid.

Anyway, I just feel a tension in the philosophical discussions to pull the train into philosophical rules. Not that all philosophical rules are bad but it does strike me that philosophy's goodness or badness is judged on the same principles that could not be worked into a systematic presentation that stood on their own unless God be presumed.

So I wonder, then, about whether a grand system of all thought could be constructed like Aquinas attempted but on Reformed presups. I've heard it criticized here that Van Til never had a full systematic philosophy that encompassed all knowledge. I sometimes think: "So what?" but maybe there is something more to that.

All I know is that the moment that philosophers start to go in directions of the idealist or the empericist that denies the very things that are as obvious to me as the nose on my face, there is enough CSR in me to say: "Go sell crazy somewhere else" even if I'm not equipped to argue the point in a philosophicallly capable manner.

Does that make any sense at all?


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## RamistThomist (Oct 3, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


> So I wonder, then, about whether a grand system of all thought could be constructed like Aquinas attempted but on Reformed presups. I've heard it criticized here that Van Til never had a full systematic philosophy that encompassed all knowledge. I sometimes think: "So what?" but maybe there is something more to that.



I tried that once. It was a lot of fun but it was harder than I thought. Time and money ran out. I might try to develop a system later on. Like writing a book entitled Epistemology and the War on the Dragon god. I would combine 2 Corinthians 10:5 with Revelation 15:3-5. Epistemology was the weapon used to kill the dragon god.


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


> Tom Bombadil said:
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> > The below isn't necessarily an endorsement of Bahnsen (and Frame's to a lesser extent) position, but an explanation of his position. Wether they are/were right or wrong isn't my motive. I'll also make some comments of my own that have nothing to do with Bahnsen or Frame and the debate.
> ...




Everyone does philosophy, not everyone does it well.

Van Til was breaking ground, can't do everything. Other people need to step up too. And, in one sense, it didn't begin with Van Til. He said he was standing on the shoulders of giants.

I'd say that we have many of the pieces of w worked wout worldview. The problem is, it's all over the place. Problem is, some people are just looking at a Bahnsen, or a Frame, and not looking at a Helm, or a Plantinga, or a Alston, or even a Moreland, or a Craig, or a x, y, z.

But, if you chose to live under a rock, your worked out philosophy will be about as sharp as a rock. if you're a right wing presuppositinalist "homer," well then you'll never let go of that old pitcher, or the tired quaterback, and you'll keep losing games while ignoring the pain because you are still living in the glory days of that big win (or, perhaps, of that Bahnsen/Stein debate...which, may not even be able to be classified as a big win. Doesn't take much for a philosopher to make some dude who wrote his dissertation on the maturation of ovaries in Japanese quail to look stupid!).


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## RamistThomist (Oct 3, 2007)

Kind of what Paul said. I owe Bahnsen and Van Til so much. But I also started reading Craig, Moreland, and Wolterstorrf. I had a number of questions about some of their positions, but I found their stuff too good to just write off. 

On one hand I don't want to just mix and match all systems, but I also don't think I need to live and die in terms of one system. And that was one of Frame's points in his apologetics class. These guys (Bahnsen, Clark, Plantiga, Pratt) all say good things, but they all make mistakes. Part of the excitement in doing philosophy is to find out pros and cons in these thinkers and seeing how you would incorporate that into your apologetics. 

my two cents. Deo Volente, next time I am at RTS Jackson I plan to buy out all the Plantinga and Wolterstorff stuff there.


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## Semper Fidelis (Oct 3, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


> Everyone does philosophy, not everyone does it well.


Yes, I know, Dr. Bahn...er...Dr. Frame...er...Paul. I agree. 


> Van Til was breaking ground, can't do everything. Other people need to step up too. And, in one sense, it didn't begin with Van Til. He said he was standing on the shoulders of giants.
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> I'd say that we have many of the pieces of w worked wout worldview. The problem is, it's all over the place. Problem is, some people are just looking at a Bahnsen, or a Frame, and not looking at a Helm, or a Plantinga, or a Alston, or even a Moreland, or a Craig, or a x, y, z.


I want it to be a Manata that does it Baby!



> But, if you chose to live under a rock, your worked out philosophy will be about as sharp as a rock.


I agree. I wasn't trying to be a rock. I'm trying to figure out where the wheat and chaff are. There's a lot of chaff in philosophy. It's not that I don't enjoy pushing my brain hard. Part of me thinks, though, that as much as I like Frame, I wonder if some of his tendency to go off the reservation at times is linked to his desire to be a good philosopher based on the wrong standards of philosophy. I'd rather not have something driving me into corners of thought that seem "responsible" to my mind if, in fact, they end up being dark corners in the end. I say that with respect for Dr. Frame because I've read his major works and benefitted greatly from him. I just think he tends to speculate a bit much.



> if you're a right wing presuppositinalist "homer," well then you'll never let go of that old pitcher, or the tired quaterback, and you'll keep losing games while ignoring the pain because you are still living in the glory days of that big win (or, perhaps, of that Bahnsen/Stein debate...which, may not even be able to be classified as a big win. Doesn't take much for a philosopher to make some dude who wrote his dissertation on the maturation of ovaries in Japanese quail to look stupid!).



Gordon Stein anyone? 

You know, I still chuckle to myself about that interaction every now and again. Stein was dumb enough to respond: "Well, Bahnsen's thesis was on the epistemology of self-deception (or something like that) and I don't see what that has to do with this debate...." I was thinking: "Are you kidding?!" Quail ovaries vs. a guy that studies why people deceive themselves in a discussion about God!


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

> I want it to be a Manata that does it Baby!



Maybe one of my perfect, sinless, saved and regenerate from the womb covenant children that can do no wrong and come out of the womb with the catechism memorized, baby!  (I thought my baptist brothers would find that funny.)

Anyway, I know that you're not advocating anti-intelelctualism. I'm just using "you" in an editorial sense.

I wouldn't attribute any of the perceived problems with Frame as due to trying to live up to some impersonal standard of philosophy. And, if we're going to be charitable, what drives him is his commitment to scripture. If he thinks scripture says something he'll take his stand there, all night long. If he doesn't think scriputre is clear, he'll try to call off the dogs from hunting "heretics" down and bloodying them for all to see. Right or wrong, that's where I see Frame's heart at, and his driving motive - presuppositional commitment to the triune God of scripture.


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## Semper Fidelis (Oct 3, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


> > I want it to be a Manata that does it Baby!
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Fair enough. I don't question his desire or place him in the category of the arrogant but it's hard to figure out where he is on some things.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 3, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


> Tom Bombadil said:
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I must be the oddball out. My pastor was a student of Frame (and a good friend of his) and made the same observation. I have yet to see Frame, however, make weird statements (but this is coming from someone who wanted to write a book dealing with epistemology and dragon gods,  )


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


> Tom Bombadil said:
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that's because it's hard to figure out what (or if) the Bible says about things. Should we be Cartesian, Thomistic, or property dualists? Chapter and verse, please!


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> Spear Dane said:
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A good criticism unless you are a particularist. In this case, you start with some paradigm cases, i.e., my senses are basically reliable, we know there is a past, etc., and then work out your theory from there. If you deny basic things like that their common sensical status well, as Reid liked to say, "You don't need an argument, you need ridicule."!


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## Semper Fidelis (Oct 3, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


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No, I'm referring to where he is as a Reformed theologian. It's kind of like that Sesame Street song: "One of these kids is not like the other...." His view of the RPW is pretty novel. Also, he hasn't quite been clear in whether or not he condemns the FV.


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## MW (Oct 3, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


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That's well observed. In other words, the criticism which applies to CSR, applies as equally to every assumption of a mind-world relationship.


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


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He doesn't think scripture supports the RPW side.

He's condemned FV in some places, not in others. He notes that it is not a monolithic movement. Heck, some guys in the FV uphold the active obedience, some don't. That's one reason why it's hard to offer a one-for-all critique against the "FV." Now, I do believe he should come down stronger on the FV. So, your critique is not totally without merit.


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 3, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> Tom Bombadil said:
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I'd say it applies to "methodologists." Peopel who need a "method" or a "criteria" for discerning "knowledge" from "non-knowledge." Like the apple sorting machine which sorts out good and bad apples. Don't you _already have to know_ what a good and bad apple are? So, Oliphint's (and others) critique assumes a methodologists approach to doing epistemology. The particularist isn't hamstrung by this "problem." We can "start with" some paradigm cases of knowledge (or common sense) and see what features it exhibits, obtaining our analysis from that.


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## sotzo (Oct 4, 2007)

Pardon my interruption long into this conversation, but I'm wondering what sort of knowledge is being discussed in the thread? Are you talking about knowledge inductively obtained, deductively obtained, assumed starting points, etc?


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 4, 2007)

mainly knowledge of beliefs we all take for granted in almost everything (reliability of memory, existence of other minds, existence of a past, reliability of cognitive faculties, reliability of testimony from others, induction, etc., etc., etc.,).

Classical foundationalism had a small base: necessary truths, perceptual beliefs, incorrigable beliefs (there's debate here, I added most) and then they had other beliefs (non-basic) that they could know if they were inferred (in some way) from basic beliefs. Problem, besides being self-referentially incoherent (i.e., classical foundationalism isn't basic and it's not inferred from basic beliefs), it leaves us with a small stock of knowledge. Take the belief that other people have minds, or that the earth has existed for more than 5 minutes. These would not be basic beliefs, nor are they inferrable. So, it seems like we cannot 'know' that other people have minds, etc.

Reidian foundationalism has a broad base: other minds, memonic beliefs, testimony of others, the world having a past, reliability of senses, induction, etc. 

Think of the former as an inverted pyramid, the latter a pyramid - big, flat base.

Seems that there are no "good" or "demonstrable" arguments for many of the things we take for granted.

So, does the skeptic win?

Do we not know that the "people" we see actually have minds and are not robots, aliens, or delusions sent by God?

If we do know it, how so?

Common sense realism would say that we know it because it is a basic belief. It does not need to be derived from other beliefs in order for someone to be rational in holding the belief, and claiming knowledge of it.

That was the brief sketch of thousands of pages of episetmological literature....


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## sotzo (Oct 4, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


> mainly knowledge of basic beliefs.
> 
> Classical foundationalism had a small base: necessary truths, perceptual beliefs, incorrigable beliefs (there's debate here, I added most) and then they had other beliefs (non-basic) that they could know if they were inferred (in some way) from basic beliefs. Problem, besides being self-referentially incoherent (i.e., classical foundationalism isn't basic and it's not inferred from basic beliefs), it leaves us with a small stock of knowledge. Take the belief that other people have minds, or that the earth has existed for more than 5 minutes. These would not be basic beliefs, nor are they inferrable. So, it seems like we cannot 'know' that other people have minds, etc.
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Thanks...very helpful....sounds like the classical foundationalist is stuck having to live quite inconsistently with his beliefs. To use your examples, he will almost certainly treat others as if they have minds and talk about last week with full confidence that the earth has been around for longer than 5 minutes.

But didn't Hume fully admit that though such things could not be proven inferentially, he could not live consistently without assuming them? And isn't this really the same thing as saying one believes them, for if one did not believe them he would not act upon them unless:

1) he was not purposely acting upon such assumptions, but only accidentally following what we _perceived_ to be his assumptions
2) he does not permit the definition of belief to include things that can only be assumed, not proven


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 4, 2007)

Hume *believes* them, but is he *justified* or *warranted* in believing them? He would have to say no, Reid would say yes. Hume would have to drop those beliefs, if he were internally rational. Rational people don't believe things they are not justified are warranted in believing (I'm using justfied and warranted interchangebly). Thus his believings were a function of what Plantinga would call the "optiomistic overridder." That is, beliefs we hold, even in a basic way, but not a properly basic way. One can have a disease where 1 in 1,000,000,000 victims survive. He may form a strong belief that he will "beat the odds." This belief would be produced by the function of our cognitive faculties responsible for producing beliefs with survival (though not alethic) value. or, take a man caught in a snow storm atop a mountain. He will see another ledge where if he were to jump to it, he would be able to get down the mountain. Normally, this perceptual belief would reveal the ledge to far to be traversed. But, in his particular epistemic environment, he forms the belief, based on perception, that he can "make the jump." This is basic, as it is based on perception. it is not a warranted belief, though. His epistemic environment was not conducive to producing true beliefs. His belief was the outcome of his optimistic overridder. This is valuable. Say he jumps and makes it. He lives. Thus, this may be part of the design plan for our cognitive faculties, and it has a purpose, but not he purpose of producing true beliefs, and thus getting warrant conferred to this belief.

Hume's skepticism precluded this kind of knowledge (knowledge of other minds, induction, the past, enduring self, etc), and even his skepticism, so he was free to drop his skepticism (and then hold those beliefs his skepticism decapitated) because that's what his skepticism demanded, but when that happens, his reasoning (extreme empiricism) would lead him back to his skepticism, and then back to dropping those every day, common sense, beliefs. This is called the "Humean loop." That's when someone, S, holds a skeptical belief B that they believe 'reason' invairably leads to, that forces S to drop various beliefs, x, y, and z, and eventually B itself, when B is dropped, x, y, and z are allowed to return, but then so is B, in turn x, y, and z are dropped again, then eventually B must be so also, .... 'round and 'round we go.

Well, you can see why after all this Hume just said he would take off his philosopher's hat, put on his average Joe hat, and go play backgammon with the boys, drink some ale, smoke a cigar, get some sleep, and go back to the office the next day and begin the madness all over again.

Thanks be to God for the regeneration of our minds, and the solid ground found in Christ.


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## ChristianTrader (Oct 4, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


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I am currently really leaning towards accepting William Dennison's critique of Frame in the Spring 95 issue of WTJ. Frame is too much Analytic Philosopher, too little Reformed Theologian.

CT


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 4, 2007)

ChristianTrader said:


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Well I wish more "reformed theologians" would write doctrine of God books, systematic theology books, and doctrine of the knowledge of God books.

Btw, I'd also say, the majority of other guys in the formed camp are too much theologian, too little analytic philosopher. Dennison's about a 2 on the scale of the latter.

Frame's not perfect by far (neither are any of us, btw), but I think he and Paul Helm (and some other younger guys, Welty, Crisp, etc.,) are the best assets we have in the above mentioned areas 9and maybe throw a Oliphint in there....maybe!).

The best is a guy who has both areas mastered. Frame comes closer to that, by far, than Dennison does.


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## ChristianTrader (Oct 4, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


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Basically every Reformed Theologian who has written a systematic has done so. (Most prolegema's work out to be something akin to Frame's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God book.)



> Btw, I'd also say, the majority of other guys in the formed camp are too much theologian, too little analytic philosopher. Dennison's about a 2 on the scale of the latter.



I do not think you can be too much of a theologian, that is somewhat saying that one has too much Jesus. Remember Theology is the Queen while Philosophy is the handmaiden. No one would ever say, one needs more handmaiden and less Queen.



> Frame's not perfect by far (neither are any of us, btw), but I think he and Paul Helm (and some other younger guys, Welty, Crisp, etc.,) are the best assets we have in the above mentioned areas 9and maybe throw a Oliphint in there....maybe!).



I'll take Anderson and Oliphint but keep an eye on Helm and others.



> The best is a guy who has both areas mastered. Frame comes closer to that, by far, than Dennison does.



I would say that a person who has mastered Theology and Philosophy would be dangerous, but I would need to see more about how mastering Analytic Philosophy implies mastering good philosophy in general.

CT


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 4, 2007)

Frame hasn't "mastered" analytic philosophy. I wouldn't even classify him that way. There's HUGE differences between reading him, and a true analytic philosopher. So, I guess one could ask what Dennison's critique has to do with Frame. And, I guess you'd note that Frame is "dangerous."

Anyway, I know where you're coming from and you know where I am. Hopefully my side will win and reformed theology won't slip away into obscurity!


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 4, 2007)

Btw, the Bible doesn't endorse an "internalist" or an "externalist" approach to warrant. it doesn't endorse a Cartesian dualism over a Thomistic or personalist dualism. The Bible doesn't give us a theory of universals. Doesn't tell us about moderate or extreme realism. It doesn't give us a theory of sense perception, e.g., indirect vs. direct realism. Much of these things are *assumed* in your doing theology, or in addressing theological questions. We need our theologians to be good philosophers as well. Being "too much theologian" and "too little philosopher" gets one shoddy work usually. Sounds good to ignorant laymen, but is that really what you want?


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## ChristianTrader (Oct 4, 2007)

Tom Bombadil said:


> Frame hasn't "mastered" analytic philosophy. I wouldn't even classify him that way. There's HUGE differences between reading him, and a true analytic philosopher. So, I guess one could ask what Dennison's critique has to do with Frame. And, I guess you'd note that Frame is "dangerous."
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> Anyway, I know where you're coming from and you know where I am. Hopefully my side will win and reformed theology won't slip away into obscurity!



Reformed Theology has been around a lot longer and will continue a lot longer than any particular school of philosophy.

I really didn't make any comment on Frame's mastering of anything. My only issue with him is that he seems to be more philosopher less Theologian.

My dangerous comment was meant in a good way, not a bad way.

CT


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## Jim Johnston (Oct 4, 2007)

"Reformed" theology is a will-o-the-wisp, in one sense. Is "reformed theology" infra or supra? Is the RPW part of it? How about days of creation? Traducianism, creationism? At one level, I understand you, but when we analyze what you said , we run into problems.

If you mean, the theology of the Bible has been around longer than particular shcools of philosophy, fine. But, do we know for certain every one of our interpretations? In the same way, then, Christian philosophy has been around just as long as a Christian theology. Do we know that our philosophical positions are certainly correct? No, not all of them.

I know you emant "dangerous" in a good way. And, since Frame isn't technically an "analytic philosopher" (though he grew up in that tradition, and does employ some of its methods), but is still a good philosopher, then he's a "dangeruous guy," which is a good thing! Dennison meant his statement as a "bad thing." You therefore disagree with Dennison.


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## ChristianTrader (Oct 5, 2007)

Tom,
How are you differentiating between Theology and Philosophy? When does one stop doing Theology and start doing Philosophy? I think at some level we are talking past each other.

CT


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