# Pushing the Euthyphro dilemma further



## cih1355 (Jun 9, 2007)

If you respond to the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that something is immoral because it does not reflect God's character, then the unbeliever can push the Euthyphro dilemma further by asking, "Why doesn't it reflect God's character?" or "Is God's character good because it is good or is it good because of God's character?". How would you respond to these questions?


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## Dieter Schneider (Jun 9, 2007)

cih1355 said:


> If you respond to the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that something is immoral because it does not reflect God's character, then the unbeliever can push the Euthyphro dilemma further by asking, "Why doesn't it reflect God's character?" or "Is God's character good because it is good or is it good because of God's character?". How would you respond to these questions?



2. Timothy 2:16


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## panta dokimazete (Jun 9, 2007)

> "Is God's character good because it is good or is it good because of God's character?"



Both.

You can't separate the quality of goodness that is an inseparable part of God from His character. Good *is* good, just like God *is* love.

Don't let them lead you into what I think is the fallacy of false dilemma.

Basically:

Moral acts are good, so they are from God, who *is* good and thus reflect His character.

Immoral acts are not good, so they are not from God who *is* good and thus do not reflect His character.

God's common grace allows even the non-elect to experience and do good\moral acts - for now.

my


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## Cheshire Cat (Jun 9, 2007)

cih1355 said:


> If you respond to the Euthyphro dilemma by saying that something is immoral because it does not reflect God's character, then the unbeliever can push the Euthyphro dilemma further by asking, "Why doesn't it reflect God's character?" or "Is God's character good because it is good or is it good because of God's character?". How would you respond to these questions?


The point is that God's character/nature *defines* what is good. Edit: Another way of putting this is to say that Goodness is an essential property that God has/"owns". Thus goodness is not identical to God (as in exact identity), so saying God is Good is not tautological. As Greg Koukl puts it, "God is not the very same thing as goodness (identical to it). It's an essential characteristic of God, so there is no tautology." (http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5236)


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## JohnV (Jun 9, 2007)

Perhaps the dilemma is not in God but rather in man. Is it possible to separate morality (goodness) from truth and beauty? These are self-evident axioms, but not independant of each other. It is not as though God could be good (moral) but not righteous; it is not at though God could be righteous but not beautiful; and it is not as though God could be beautiful and not morally good. It is rather that these all find perfection in God because God Himself is perfect, wise, and immutable. 

Placing one against the other, or any of these in opposition to God, demonstrates the impiety in man, not in God. It would seem preferable to men that they find limitations in God's infinity rather than find limitations and lackings in man's finitude. Is it possible that man can think of these contrapositions and God cannot? Is it possible that man can think up these dilemmas and God cannot solve them? Surely the answer to this dilemma is simple! The answer, it seems to me, is not in the nature of piety, but rather in the nature of impious thoughts on the nature of God's goodness, and of man's proper response to Him who alone is good and whose goodness alone is perfect.

Words cannot express the extent of God's unlimited goodness; but men desire to capture the nature of goodness in his own wrangling with words.


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