# Determinism and Moral Responsibility



## cih1355 (Mar 1, 2009)

I have heard that if our choices are determined by our genes and our social conditioning, then we are not morally responsible for our actions. Can anyone explain why it is the case that if our choices are determined by our genes and our social conditioning, then we are not morally responsible for our actions, but if choices are determined by God, then we are morally responsible for our actions?


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## Solus Christus (Mar 1, 2009)

You've touched on a subject I've struggled with understanding, namely, where to draw that proverbial line. One thing I can say is just because God knows (decrees/allows) what will transpire it doesn't affect the choices we make. They are perfectly free and therefore we can be held responsible for those choices.

I'm pretty dubious whenever I hear people point to our genes. It seems like a genetic scapegoat, you know, "It's not my fault, I was just born that way." As to our social conditioning, this does make more of an impact. Just looking at how abusive parents can damage their children is just one example. But even then, we have seen people overcome those circumstances. We even applaud them for their courage, strength, or faith.

So really, it still boils down to how we choose to act. And God, rightly, holds us to our actions. He never made us sin. But apart from His grace we would still be bound to sinful natures, never being able to seek what is good.


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## Theogenes (Mar 2, 2009)

Check out this essay on the topic...
Trinity Foundation: Explaining God, man, Bible, salvation, philosophy, theology.


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## Craig (Mar 2, 2009)

If our choices are *simply* the product of our genes, and social conditioning...then there is no morality...even if there were, we couldn't know it since it can't penetrate our closed system.


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## cih1355 (Mar 2, 2009)

Craig said:


> If our choices are *simply* the product of our genes, and social conditioning...then there is no morality...even if there were, we couldn't know it since it can't penetrate our closed system.



Could you explain why if our choices are simply a result of our genes and social conditioning, then there would be no morality?


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## Craig (Mar 2, 2009)

cih1355 said:


> Craig said:
> 
> 
> > If our choices are *simply* the product of our genes, and social conditioning...then there is no morality...even if there were, we couldn't know it since it can't penetrate our closed system.
> ...



Morality, as in ethics, says what we "ought to do" or "ought not to do". If all of your choices are the necessary consequence of genetic and social determinism, then the very notion of "ought" is ridiculous. There's only "Did", "Didn't", "Will do", "Won't do". What you do is different than what you *should do*. Where does one get "should"? If someone says "genes", then what needs to be asked is "whose genes?". After they try to wiggle out of that, they may say "society"...then ask them what society they belong to...that term is tossed about and never defined by atheists. A favorite retort to those who affirm mob morality is citing the example of Dr. Martin Luther King, a veritable saint when it comes to most anyone you speak with. He opposed the societal standards of racism...was he wrong? If not, why not? If so, why do you hate Black people


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## A.J. (Mar 3, 2009)

Please check out this essay too: Man's Will - Free Yet Bound by Walter Chantry. I think it answers your question. Enjoy!


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## Christoffer (Mar 3, 2009)

cih1355 said:


> I have heard that if our choices are determined by our genes and our social conditioning, then we are not morally responsible for our actions. Can anyone explain why it is the case that if our choices are determined by our genes and our social conditioning, then we are not morally responsible for our actions, but if choices are determined by God, then we are morally responsible for our actions?



I would say that as long as there is a will that can give assent to certain deeds then there is moral responsibility.

God could realize His decrees by either physical causes (genes and social circumstances) or by giving us minds that are inclined to different things.

In both cases, as long as we have a will, we are morally responsible. For example, let's say that I get an impulse to steal. I give assent to my impulse and then commit the deed. 

I would have stolen no matter what (since God has so decreed since eternity) but it is my giving assent to the act that makes me morally responsible. Whether the impulse was caused by physics or mental factors then becomes irrelevant.

Of course, the presupposition behind all of this is that we always do what we want. Hence our will makes us responsible, since it always assents to what we do. This is my understanding of compatibilism.

So the question of moral responsibility is not one of causes, it is rather whether God exists or nor. Of course, a physicalist view of man is not the Biblical one.

my


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## Reformed Thomist (Apr 19, 2009)

Craig said:


> If our choices are *simply* the product of our genes, and social conditioning...then there is no morality...even if there were, we couldn't know it since it can't penetrate our closed system.



'Scientific' determinism and moral responsibility are not mutually exclusive. All that is required for the latter is that whatever we do is what we rationally _desire_ to do. Also, even this kind of determinism does entail that _we cannot do otherwise_. I could always have done otherwise insofar as anything I do ('Reformed Thomist walked to the store at 4pm') is not a necessary truth, but a contingent truth.


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## steven-nemes (Apr 19, 2009)

I suppose the definition is that while a person does not have free will, in that he cannot choose among two different options in any situation, he can be held morally responsible because he is physically capable of committing the act (so, if he is going to be held responsible for running a relay race, he is not in a wheel chair or anything of that sort, or chained down in a dungeon, or whatever) and is able to do whatever he desires. Now he might do what he does necessarily because his desires are of a certain kind, and he can't act contrary to his desires, but he was physically capable of fulfilling the commands had his desires been different, and so he can be held responsible.


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## Confessor (Apr 19, 2009)

Reformed Thomist said:


> I could always have done otherwise insofar as anything I do ('Reformed Thomist walked to the store at 4pm') is not a necessary truth, but a contingent truth.



Still though, this is a _counterfactual_ ability to do otherwise, rather than in some absolute sense. And free-willists demand that the latter be true.

And Steven is on the money in the post above.


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