# Atheism and ethics.



## jwright82 (Jun 1, 2010)

As promised I will put foward the argument that atheism cannot provide a theory of ethics. First I will define what I mean by ethics.

Ethics tells us two things: what are the right and wrong things to do and why they are right or wrong. For instance the Bible tells us that murder is wrong, the what, because human beings are made in the image of God and God said that murder is wrong, the why. 

Now atheism is the beleif in the nonexistance of God. Since the vast majority of atheists are seculer humanists it is this form that I will have in mind not every abhorent view possible. So basically they do not believe in any higher power. This leaves open a number of possible foundations for ethics.
1. A naturalistic ethics, or based on nature somehow (evolutionary ethics).
2. A socialistic ethics.
3. Some practical ethical theory, utilitarianism for example.
4. Emotive ethical theories.
5. Or some form of foundationalism or intrinsic ethics, Kant's theories.

Now I will critique each possibility to show that they do not produce an *objective foundation for ethics*, this is a very important point to grasp. In order for ethics to be the same for everyone it must be objective. If it is not objective than it is not normative. Now for the critique.
1. This possibility commits the naturalistic fallacy, you cannot move from is to ought.
2. This theory says that communities or societies decide what is right or wrong but the problem is that social opinions change. Also societies don't agree on what is right and wrong thus making ethics subjective to each society not objective across the board. 
3. Practical theories work on practical grounds but they do not furnish objective standereds of ethics. What works today might not work tommorow.
4. Emotive theories describe only why people feel a certian way not why we should act a certian way.
5. The problem with this option is that it makes the ethical endeavor circuler at the end of the day. A certian ethical beleif is declared to be a basic beleif, once I ask why it is so the person defending the beleif must give reasons for this to be so but are these reasons more foundational than the beleif or are they more basic? If so than the original beleif is not basic or foundational at all. In order for it to be basic it must be basic which is the only reason I can give for it to be basic, which is circuler reasoning. Also it makes ethics subjective because we may not agree on what is basic beleifs or not.

Now this is not a direct logical argument from the denial of God to no ethics but it is an indirect one. Also I could not give each different theory full justice but only a broad critique, how the critique fits each possible example of these theories would change from theory to theory.


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## Confessor (Jun 7, 2010)

Good post.

I think you erred regarding the fifth, though, and that's because basic beliefs are beliefs which _require_ no justification but can still receive justification from other beliefs. For instance, take Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology. He argues that belief in God can be properly basic, yet he also offers many theistic proofs.

In fact, it seems your argument against holding ethical beliefs to be basic would work against _any_ basic belief, which is problematic. Your argument is that if the atheist offered a response after you asked him why he held an ethical belief as basic, then he would be denying its basicality. But you can ask anyone why they hold a belief as basic. The atheist could simply respond that the belief is basic and therefore needs no other reasoning.

I think, further, that this argument for the existence of God actually _requires_ (some) ethical beliefs to be basic. If they weren't, then why would the atheist be under obligation to provide an objective ethical philosophy? The apologetics aspect comes into play, then, by showing the requirement of a transcendent lawgiver to supply moral laws, as well by showing how secularistic accounts fail.


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## Philip (Jun 7, 2010)

Another option:

6. Non-materialistic non-theistic ethics (Buddhism, Jung, Joseph Campbell).

On 5: Your definition of ethics begs the question against ethics being a properly basic endeavor, in which case I have to decide whether I want to say that ethics is properly basic or whether I want to accept your definition.


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## jwright82 (Jun 7, 2010)

I appreciate your criticisms. Since you both seem to be employing a basic beleif style criticism I will criticize that. 
What criteria exists to decide whether or not a beleif is basic or not? Who decided, subjectively, what counts as basic or not? Also foundationalism has always begged the question about there basic or foundational beleifs always resting on other beleifs thus forfeiting their status as basic or foundational. 

Simply responding that without this scheme we would fall into pure skepticism is to create a false dilema. Also responding that a beleif being basic requires no justiffication is true in theory only, whether or not such beleifs exists is doubtful. To use this line of defense is the fallacy of special pleading, that what you beleve is basic is beyond doubt. 

Buddhism does not represent a viewpoint inside my scheme hear since I was dealing with the most common form of atheism. But Buddhism is an irrationalistic worldview at best, especially when it comes to ethics (they have an ethical code of conduct but enlightenment is to rise above good and evil which contradicts their original beleif). If I had to classify Jung and Joseph Campbell they probally would fall into an intuitionalistic viewpoint, if I am wrong here than please correct me. This viewpoint has the same inherent problems as any ethical theory I mentioned, people have different intuitions of what is ethical so who is correct?


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## Philip (Jun 7, 2010)

> Buddhism does not represent a viewpoint inside my scheme hear since I was dealing with the most common form of atheism.



Actually, Buddhism is the most common form of atheism.



> What criteria exists to decide whether or not a beleif is basic or not?



The criterion is whether the belief arises from a properly-functioning module of the design plan working in the context for which it was designed. The atheist argues for non-intelligent design, whereas the theist argues for intelligent design. 



> Who decided, subjectively, what counts as basic or not?



It depends to some degree on what model you are operating on: internal justification depends on your model. To attack it, you must attack the model, not the justification. Your critiques do not apply because they attack specific beliefs, not the models that justify them.

In addition, you also assume that ethics is necessarily absolute---this assumption is not shared by these other models.


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## jwright82 (Jun 8, 2010)

> Actually, Buddhism is the most common form of atheism.



Yes but not the seculer humanistic atheism I was refering too. Buddhism is a religion and seculer humanistic atheism tries to claim it is not. 



> The criterion is whether the belief arises from a properly-functioning module of the design plan working in the context for which it was designed. The atheist argues for non-intelligent design, whereas the theist argues for intelligent design.



How would you prove that your module is functioning properly and avoid the criticisms I gave above? I still don't understand 100% what your proposing here but it seems to me that it leads to skepticism all by it self because you can't get outside this model to test it so you fall right back into the skeptick's criticism and going the Reidian route of common sense is just the fallacy of mass appeal, I would recomend you read the first part of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 

Also it seems to me that at best you have no actual knowledge at all of the module's only beleifs about the modules that require seperate modules to create them which creates new beleifs about these new modules and so on and so forth ad infinetum. I guess if you explained more what it is you are proposing with attention to how you would avoid my criticism might help me understand you better. 




> this assumption is not shared by these other models.



What other models? I thought we all used the same models?



> In addition, you also assume that ethics is necessarily absolute



This is a fair crticism but the irony is that people cannot help but make moral statements.



> It depends to some degree on what model you are operating on: internal justification depends on your model. To attack it, you must attack the model, not the justification. Your critiques do not apply because they attack specific beliefs, not the models that justify them.



What models? If I understand you correctly a person could be justified in beleiving what ever they wanted by proposing that their model is always right in forming beleifs no matter what and therefore whatever particuler beleif is in question is right as well. If you criticize their model than they say they believe you are wrong and since their model is the way it is you must be wrong because the are always right.


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## Philip (Jun 8, 2010)

> Yes but not the seculer humanistic atheism I was refering too. Buddhism is a religion and seculer humanistic atheism tries to claim it is not.



It needed clarification as "secular humanist atheism" then. Atheism proper is simply the proposition "There is no god."



> but it seems to me that it leads to skepticism all by it self because you can't get outside this model to test it so you fall right back into the skeptick's criticism



Why do I have to do so? Why do I have to satisfy the skeptic? You assume that I have some sort of duty to somehow satisfy this hypothetical skeptic (who would not be satisfied by the most convincing proof in the world, by the way).

Why do I have the burden of proof here? I would say that the skeptic has to show me a good reason to doubt my senses, etc.



> Reidian route of common sense is just the fallacy of mass appeal



And you are committing the fallacy of appeal to the few.

Here is my contention: any philosophy that says that I do not know the following things is false:

1. 2+2=4
2. I am a student at Covenant College.
3. George Washington was the first President of the United States.
4. Jesus rose from the dead.

All of these are properly basic beliefs: ie, I did not go through a chain of reasoning, but instead I found myself believing them as the result of one of my cognitive faculties.



> What other models? I thought we all used the same models?



You are critiquing epistemological models, trying to say that under these non-theistic models, one is not justified (warranted is a better term, in my opinion) in holding ethical beliefs.



> If you criticize their model than they say they believe you are wrong and since their model is the way it is you must be wrong because the are always right.



You can prove a model wrong by doing a _de facto_ attack upon its premises: so to defeat these models, the best way is to prove that God does exist. Proof, though, in no way guarantees persuasion.


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## Semper Fidelis (Jun 8, 2010)

I found this "informal debate" very entertaining: Triablogue: If Evil, Then God


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## jwright82 (Jun 8, 2010)

> Why do I have to do so? Why do I have to satisfy the skeptic? You assume that I have some sort of duty to somehow satisfy this hypothetical skeptic (who would not be satisfied by the most convincing proof in the world, by the way).
> 
> Why do I have the burden of proof here? I would say that the skeptic has to show me a good reason to doubt my senses, etc.



Because than you are still commiting the fallacy of special pleading, you must have some way to prove or disprove a module, whatever that is.



> And you are committing the fallacy of appeal to the few.
> 
> Here is my contention: any philosophy that says that I do not know the following things is false:
> 
> ...



I agree that these beleifs are true but not that they are properly basic because they assume other premises to be true that they rest on thus making them not basic.



> You are critiquing epistemological models, trying to say that under these non-theistic models, one is not justified (warranted is a better term, in my opinion) in holding ethical beliefs.



Yes that is what I am saying and you have not proven otherwise, but here again I just don't understand what you are proposing. I don't quite get what a module is or any of the other essential elements in your epistomology, please explain them better to me and I think then I might be able to better see where you are coming from.


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## Philip (Jun 8, 2010)

> Because than you are still commiting the fallacy of special pleading, you must have some way to prove or disprove a module, whatever that is.



Still not sure why this means I have to answer the skeptic---who made him judge? Standards involve a lordship commitment---why should I submit to the skeptic?



> I agree that these beleifs are true but not that they are properly basic because they assume other premises to be true that they rest on thus making them not basic.



A properly basic belief is any belief that is not believed upon the basis of an argument, but which arises naturally from one's faculties. I do not believe that Jesus Christ rose from the dead because of an argument: I read the biblical account and find myself believing it (credulity is a faculty)---that's as basic as it gets.



> Yes that is what I am saying and you have not proven otherwise, but here again I just don't understand what you are proposing. I don't quite get what a module is or any of the other essential elements in your epistomology, please explain them better to me and I think then I might be able to better see where you are coming from.



Modules in this epistemology are belief-forming components of our cognitive makeup. For example, the physical senses give rise to beliefs about our physical surroundings and the spacial relationships associated with them. Other modules include reason, credulity (ie: the capacity to believe a proposition on authority), the aesthetic sense, conscience, the sense of humor, and (for the Christian) the _Sensus Divinitatus_ by which we know God.

This is not to say that these modules always work perfectly---but we can be reasonably certain of them (certainty being a fairly subjective threshold concept).


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## jwright82 (Jun 8, 2010)

Ok I think I get a better idea of what you believe. I would still say that the atheist has no grounds for many things to believe in because these modules still have to take into acount metaphysical problems. Also I don't see why ethics must be a set of basic beleifs. Your account, though much I can agree with, still seems incomplete. The metaphysical problems here are that ethics requires an external justification not an in ternal one. For instance whatever theory of ethics you put up you still face the question of why, in a nonskeptical sense. I agree that the skeptic who asks for proof of their existance or something like that is simply wasting your time but ethics is different it derives its justification from outside itself regardless of how well our conscience is functioning. Atheists like everyone else has the law of God imprinted on their heart but a phylosophy of ethics must seek a theory that justifies its own moral precepts. You may be interested in mythread on natural law since it seems to fall in this category.


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## Philip (Jun 8, 2010)

> The metaphysical problems here are that ethics requires an external justification not an in ternal one.



My point here is that even if one cannot come up with an external theory of ethics, one would still be warranted in making ethical claims. Otherwise, there would be no need for the ethical theory---the purpose of the theory is to explain the claims, not to "justify" them.



> I agree that the skeptic who asks for proof of their existance or something like that is simply wasting your time but ethics is different it derives its justification from outside itself regardless of how well our conscience is functioning.



May I ask for a definition of what exactly you mean by "justification"? Is there some sort of blame attached to a state of making an ethical claim without a grand meta-ethical theory to explain it? Or do you simply mean something akin to "warrant"?


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## jwright82 (Jun 9, 2010)

> My point here is that even if one cannot come up with an external theory of ethics, one would still be warranted in making ethical claims. Otherwise, there would be no need for the ethical theory---the purpose of the theory is to explain the claims, not to "justify" them.



If there is no external basis for an ethical claim, one that is objective, than you are making the claim in a vacuum and it has no value. Ethical theories tell us how to determine if something is right or wrong and why it is so.



> May I ask for a definition of what exactly you mean by "justification"? Is there some sort of blame attached to a state of making an ethical claim without a grand meta-ethical theory to explain it? Or do you simply mean something akin to "warrant"?



In this sense I guess warrant might also be what I mean but more like a basis for saying something. It is a legitemate answer to the question of why, why is murder wrong? The answer one gives to that question will be their warrant, ethical basis, justification for asserting that murder is wrong. You can then critique their reason to see if their claim is legitemate or not.


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## Philip (Jun 9, 2010)

> If there is no external basis for an ethical claim, one that is objective



First, you need to establish that objectivity is possible.



> Ethical theories tell us how to determine if something is right or wrong and why it is so.



Actually, all you need for the first is a standard or set of criteria. The standard may or may not tell you why. The unbeliever has conscience.



> It is a legitemate answer to the question of why, why is murder wrong? The answer one gives to that question will be their warrant, ethical basis, justification for asserting that murder is wrong.



I don't think that you need an ethical theory to assert that murder is wrong, just an ethical standard---and even that is the product of finding multiple "wrong" actions and finding the common denominator.

Also, you misunderstand warrant: I am warranted in a claim if it is a) properly basic (ie: there is a lamp in front of me, 2+2=4, Jesus rose from the dead) and/or b) reasoned from properly basic beliefs. I maintain that my warrant for believing that murder is wrong is very similar to that of the unbeliever: I hear about a murder and find myself believing that murder is wrong---just as I see a lamp and find myself believing that there is a lamp.


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## jwright82 (Jun 10, 2010)

> First, you need to establish that objectivity is possible.



That my friend is where a good old transcendental argument comes in, unless objectivity in ethics is actual than there is no ethics at all.



> Actually, all you need for the first is a standard or set of criteria. The standard may or may not tell you why. The unbeliever has conscience.



But to posit a standered without answering the why is to beg the question. Also no one can agree on what this standered is, murder may be wrong but is abortion murder?



> I don't think that you need an ethical theory to assert that murder is wrong, just an ethical standard---and even that is the product of finding multiple "wrong" actions and finding the common denominator.



That argument for producing the general ethical law, murder is wrong, doesn't get over the problem of induction so it is self-defeating.



> Also, you misunderstand warrant: I am warranted in a claim if it is a) properly basic (ie: there is a lamp in front of me, 2+2=4, Jesus rose from the dead) and/or b) reasoned from properly basic beliefs. I maintain that my warrant for believing that murder is wrong is very similar to that of the unbeliever: I hear about a murder and find myself believing that murder is wrong---just as I see a lamp and find myself believing that there is a lamp.



This is to argue by assertion, anyone can throw any beleif out there and say properly basic and they are just as warrented in that asseartion as you are. It seems that a lot of what you accussed VanTil of arguing you are now arguing yourself.


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## Philip (Jun 10, 2010)

> This is to argue by assertion, anyone can throw any beleif out there and say properly basic and they are just as warrented in that asseartion as you are. It seems that a lot of what you accussed VanTil of arguing you are now arguing yourself.



My whole project with warrant is this:

An atheist challenges my warrant for believing that Jesus rose from the dead---the only way he can do this under my model, would be to try and assert that Jesus did not _in fact_ rise from the dead. The argument is not over whether by belief is warranted, but over whether the content of my belief is true.

A non-believer using a similar model would have warrant for saying "murder is wrong," so the only way to challenge his assertion would be to challenge the belief---don't do it. If you can show that the statements "murder is wrong" and "there is no God" are in direct contradiction, that's one thing, but it's pointless to try and challenge the unbeliever's assertion.



> That my friend is where a good old transcendental argument comes in, unless objectivity in ethics is actual than there is no ethics at all.



Is it possible for a human to transcend his or her subjectivity?



> But to posit a standered without answering the why is to beg the question.



Unless of course "good" is indefinable.



> That argument for producing the general ethical law, murder is wrong, doesn't get over the problem of induction so it is self-defeating.



I don't see a problem with induction---it's only a problem if you have an unnecessarily narrow view of our cognitive faculties.


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## jwright82 (Jun 10, 2010)

> My whole project with warrant is this:
> 
> An atheist challenges my warrant for believing that Jesus rose from the dead---the only way he can do this under my model, would be to try and assert that Jesus did not in fact rise from the dead. The argument is not over whether by belief is warranted, but over whether the content of my belief is true.



I can agree with this.



> A non-believer using a similar model would have warrant for saying "murder is wrong," so the only way to challenge his assertion would be to challenge the belief---don't do it. If you can show that the statements "murder is wrong" and "there is no God" are in direct contradiction, that's one thing, but it's pointless to try and challenge the unbeliever's assertion.



Not if I challenge his metaphysics of ethics you could say. Notice that we havn't been debating whether or not utilitarianism can successfully make moral statements because as an objective theory of ethics it cannot. It is that direction that I challenge the atheist on, produce a theory of ethics or stop making ethical judgements.



> Is it possible for a human to transcend his or her subjectivity?



Reason as a tool alows us to do this yes, if I understand your question right (I may not).



> Unless of course "good" is indefinable



This would be Moore's ethical theory right, his intuitionalism I critiqued above, somewhere I believe.



> I don't see a problem with induction---it's only a problem if you have an unnecessarily narrow view of our cognitive faculties.



In everyday life it is fine to ignore but when making an absolute objective statment, murder is wrong, it is a legitamate logical problem, unless of course you have a logical solution to it (I have a VanTillian solution to it, atleast I think so).


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## Philip (Jun 10, 2010)

> Not if I challenge his metaphysics of ethics you could say.



Again, I don't think it works that way. He would be warranted in his belief regardless of whether he can come up with a metaphysical justification just as I am warranted in my belief in God regardless of whether I can come up with a metaphysical argument.



> In everyday life it is fine to ignore but when making an absolute objective statment, murder is wrong, it is a legitamate logical problem, unless of course you have a logical solution to it



I make an absolute objective statement that no dogs have horns. I have warrant for my belief, given my data set---I don't see the problem, unless you want to define knowledge narrowly.


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## jwright82 (Jun 11, 2010)

P. F. Pugh said:


> > Not if I challenge his metaphysics of ethics you could say.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 
Well first off it seems that philosophy itself goes away in your model because every problem can be sidestepped by so-called common-sense appeals, which by the way the atheist is warranted in not beleiving in God just as much as you are in beleiving in Him. It seems that your model is a catch all for any6 beleif so long as I label it properly basic. Since what is properly basic is ultimatly a subjective decision and so what counts as criticism is also subjective and so on and so forth.

Don't get me wrong I like how your model places the burden of proof on the skeptic, which would apply to the atheist as well. I also like what seems to me to be a functional view of beleif formation, that is that my modules are functioning to produce beleifs. But I don't see your model avoids the fallacies of mass appeal and special pleading. 

Also although it may seem to be properly basic for the atheist to believe that murder is wrong, I can legitamatly challange that view on negative grounds like asking him or her to provide a moral framework to base that beleif on.


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## Philip (Jun 11, 2010)

> Well first off it seems that philosophy itself goes away in your model because every problem can be sidestepped by so-called common-sense appeals,



Which problems were you referring to? I think that common sense actually provides a lot of the problems of philosophy, particularly in metaphysics.



> which by the way the atheist is warranted in not beleiving in God just as much as you are in beleiving in Him. It seems that your model is a catch all for any6 beleif so long as I label it properly basic. Since what is properly basic is ultimatly a subjective decision and so what counts as criticism is also subjective and so on and so forth.



Correct, he is warranted in his belief that there is no God, though he is still morally blameworthy for this belief. Again, the way to counteract is the challenge the belief itself: show that there is a God---the evidence is there. Since his _Sensus Divinitatus_ is not working, you have to work through other channels.



> Also although it may seem to be properly basic for the atheist to believe that murder is wrong, I can legitamatly challange that view on negative grounds like asking him or her to provide a moral framework to base that beleif on.



Again, what obligates the unbeliever to provide one, given that he has warrant without it? You are assuming that there is some normative obligation to provide one---that there would be some sort of blame attached to not doing so. If so, what kind?



> But I don't see your model avoids the fallacies of mass appeal and special pleading.



I'm still not seeing how it commits them any more than the alternatives do. Remember to that all inductive reasoning commits formal fallacy: all appeals to authority commit formal fallacies, yet both are quite reasonable. Even appeal _ad Scripturam_ is a formal fallacy. Unless, of course, these things are properly basic.


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## jwright82 (Jun 11, 2010)

> Again, what obligates the unbeliever to provide one, given that he has warrant without it? You are assuming that there is some normative obligation to provide one---that there would be some sort of blame attached to not doing so. If so, what kind?



There is a logical obligation to provide one, the whole entire history of ethics is proof of this. Every single ethicist, practically, has recognized this as a legitamate problem.



> Which problems were you referring to? I think that common sense actually provides a lot of the problems of philosophy, particularly in metaphysics.



Ethics, epistomology, the problem of induction, fallacies apparently. Any can be denyed by simply throwing out te word properly basic, which destroys all normativity in everything. 



> Correct, he is warranted in his belief that there is no God, though he is still morally blameworthy for this belief.



How is he blameworthy? In VanTillian apologetics he is blameworthy because he knows from the begining that there is a God and is not warrented in capicity whatsoever to not believe in God.



> I'm still not seeing how it commits them any more than the alternatives do. Remember to that all inductive reasoning commits formal fallacy: all appeals to authority commit formal fallacies, yet both are quite reasonable. Even appeal ad Scripturam is a formal fallacy. Unless, of course, these things are properly basic.



Well your model does commit these fallacies and the major problem with it is that it is purely subjective and although you don't mean to it seems that the very reason for apologetics is destroyed in the process. Just out of curiousity this is what Plantinga is propossing too? I must say that if the whole model could be proven it would be very powerful indeed and you could elimanate those problems I mentioned, I am very impressed with what your proposing and I don't see any sunstantial disagreement with my own VanTillian view, but obviously there are differences.

---------- Post added at 02:22 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:16 PM ----------

I just about this how do you test properly basic beleifs? Do you test them against reality so that they must correspond to actual states of affairs? If so than your notion of properly basic beleifs arn't that much different from what VanTil meant by presuppossitions, and we are in more agreement than it might seem.


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## Philip (Jun 11, 2010)

> There is a logical obligation to provide one, the whole entire history of ethics is proof of this. Every single ethicist, practically, has recognized this as a legitamate problem.



Exactly what kind of obligation is a "logical obligation"? What kind of blame is attached to not fulfilling one's "logical obligations"? What other logical obligations do I have to fulfill to escape blame?



> Ethics, epistomology, the problem of induction, fallacies apparently. Any can be denyed by simply throwing out te word properly basic, which destroys all normativity in everything.



First of all, proper basicality simply means that one can make a knowledge claim without having to provide a logical argument for it. How do I know that 2+2=4? It's a properly basic claim: I came to know it on authority (credulity being the operative faculty). Proper basicality means that you cannot assign epistemic blame to me for holding the belief but instead (if you are to persuade me to give it up) must attack the content of the belief.

So, someone claims that their belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic? Prove that there is no Great Pumpkin.

The problem of induction is only a problem if you have a narrow view of the way in which we know stuff. Ethics and epistemology are perfectly fine disciplines as long as they are practical and in touch with reality and real-world situations.



> How is he blameworthy? In VanTillian apologetics he is blameworthy because he knows from the begining that there is a God and is not warrented in capicity whatsoever to not believe in God.



What kind of knowledge is it that one has no access to? For all practical purposes, given the malfunction of the SD, I would say that the unbeliever is very warranted in his unbelief and so our obligation is to give reasons for belief.



> Well your model does commit these fallacies and the major problem with it is that it is purely subjective



This model is no more fallacious than courtroom argumentation. I am more concerned with being reasonable than with being logical.

Is it purely subjective though? No. True, warrant is subjective, but is not infallible---the way to challenge warrant is with fact, argument, not with attempts at epistemic blame. Warrant is only sufficient for a knowledge claim, not for knowledge itself, which requires truth.



> I just about this how do you test properly basic beleifs?



You assume them unless they are falsified. So, I read in my history book that "George Washington was the first President of the United States", I find myself believing it (credulity) and will continue to believe it unless someone more authoritative presents me with evidence to the contrary.


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## jwright82 (Jun 11, 2010)

> Exactly what kind of obligation is a "logical obligation"? What kind of blame is attached to not fulfilling one's "logical obligations"? What other logical obligations do I have to fulfill to escape blame?



Claiming that murder is wrong begs the question of why which is a logical obligation. Calling a special untouchable class of beleifs entitled properly basic is just an attempt at special pleading which is a fallacy. If the best defense an atheist can come up with is to commit a logical fallacy than he or she has no defense at all. Notice I said atheist and not you, you are a christian theist which gives you the right foundation for ethics or even a beleif in properly basic beleifs themselves.



> The problem of induction is only a problem if you have a narrow view of the way in which we know stuff. Ethics and epistemology are perfectly fine disciplines as long as they are practical and in touch with reality and real-world situations.



Its a logical problem for anyone trying to base on argument for a general statement of somekind on particuler instances. Now a transcendental justification is required for my beleif in the uniformity of nature, we christians have this in the idea of God (the atheist does not). 



> First of all, proper basicality simply means that one can make a knowledge claim without having to provide a logical argument for it. How do I know that 2+2=4? It's a properly basic claim: I came to know it on authority (credulity being the operative faculty). Proper basicality means that you cannot assign epistemic blame to me for holding the belief but instead (if you are to persuade me to give it up) must attack the content of the belief.



All this does is take knowledge for granted. Without a metaphysical theory to explain why they have knowledge to begin with they have no defence or the fallacy defence I already mentioned.



> What kind of knowledge is it that one has no access to?



Immediate knowledge as a creature of God.



> For all practical purposes, given the malfunction of the SD, I would say that the unbeliever is very warranted in his unbelief and so our obligation is to give reasons for belief.



I would follow the apostle Paul and say that they do have knowledge of God and that they suppress hat knowledge.



> This model is no more fallacious than courtroom argumentation. I am more concerned with being reasonable than with being logical.



I don't think you really be reasonable without being logical, my concern is that your defence of your model rests solely on logical fallacies which makes it no defence at all, unless I misunderstand you.



> Is it purely subjective though? No. True, warrant is subjective, but is not infallible---the way to challenge warrant is with fact, argument, not with attempts at epistemic blame. Warrant is only sufficient for a knowledge claim, not for knowledge itself, which requires truth.



What is truth in your model? Why I feel that your model is subjective is that the standered of what is properly basic is purely subjective, what is properly basic purely subjective, it seems that from begining to end all that it amounts to is subjectivity, if it is not than please show me what part isn't.



> You assume them unless they are falsified. So, I read in my history book that "George Washington was the first President of the United States", I find myself believing it (credulity) and will continue to believe it unless someone more authoritative presents me with evidence to the contrary.



That is pretty standerd for all beleifs, so I can't disagree with that one.


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## Philip (Jun 13, 2010)

> Claiming that murder is wrong begs the question of why which is a logical obligation.



But "why" has no bearing on warrant. If you were to ask me why there is a tree, my answer would have no bearing on my warrant for knowing that there is a tree. The truth or falsehood of the story you tell about A does not affect your warrant for believing A.



> Calling a special untouchable class of beleifs entitled properly basic is just an attempt at special pleading which is a fallacy.



I'm not saying they cannot be challenged, just that the challenge must be on a _de facto_ basis. If you want to question basic belief A you must do so not by challenging my basis for believing A (it's a basic belief), but instead you come up with an argument for ~A.



> Now a transcendental justification is required for my beleif in the uniformity of nature



Not so---my basis for believing in the uniformity of nature is that it's a basic assumption of my reason. The transcendental part is merely the story I tell to explain it in my larger framework.



> All this does is take knowledge for granted.



As I must. The only alternative is to commit the Cartesian heresy of starting with doubt.



> Without a metaphysical theory to explain why they have knowledge to begin with they have no defence or the fallacy defence I already mentioned.



Metaphysical theories are nice and useful, but not necessary for knowledge. A downs syndrome child has just as good warrant as I have for believing that there is a tree---no metaphysical account necessary for warrant.



> Immediate knowledge as a creature of God.



Like sight or hearing? I have access to these sources of knowledge.



> they do have knowledge of God and that they suppress hat knowledge.



I take the verse to be referring to warrant and evidence which would produce belief in a creature whose SD was functioning properly instead of being suppressed.



> I don't think you really be reasonable without being logical



Is my belief that there is a tree reasonable? According to you, it isn't, since I didn't follow a train of logic to get there. According to you, my knowledge that God is there is not reasonable---immediate knowledge, according to you, is never reasonable. Isn't this a bit ridiculous?



> Why I feel that your model is subjective is that the standered of what is properly basic is purely subjective, what is properly basic purely subjective, it seems that from begining to end all that it amounts to is subjectivity



How so? First of all, of course truth is objective, but people are subjects and therefore it is their nature to be subjective. If by "objective" you mean "Seeing things as they really are" then I would agree that maybe we can, to some extent, but if you mean "non-subjective", then it is absurd to think that a subject could become non-subjective.



> That is pretty standerd for all beleifs, so I can't disagree with that one.



But it's the same for my belief that I am more than five minutes old: I think and remember past experiences and find myself believing that they happened.


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## jwright82 (Jun 14, 2010)

> But "why" has no bearing on warrant. If you were to ask me why there is a tree, my answer would have no bearing on my warrant for knowing that there is a tree. The truth or falsehood of the story you tell about A does not affect your warrant for believing A.



Well than it seems the word warrant has little to no use in a philosophical debate. Anyone can claim warrant for any beleif whatsoever but that doesn't justify their beleif in a rational objective sense. I don't care that the atheist beleives that murder is wrong I care how athiesm can objectivly condemn what communist Russia, which was an atheistic regime, did in its mass genocide. Once you pose the problem in this way all the subjective warrant in the world goes out the window because the atheist must now come up with an objective theory of ethics to prove that what they did was wrong and they cannot do that. So warrant has little value in the problem I am discussing.



> I'm not saying they cannot be challenged, just that the challenge must be on a de facto basis. If you want to question basic belief A you must do so not by challenging my basis for believing A (it's a basic belief), but instead you come up with an argument for ~A



I can challenge it on the basis of your whole scheme, unless of course you want to make a false dichotomy between foundationalism and skepticism, or your claims that whatever beleif is in question is prperly basic. You cannot avoid criticism by mere assertion it doesn't work that way. Also it seems to me that your model only allows for classical apologetics to be legitmate, which rules out Van Til and TA. I don't disagree that de facto arguments are good and useful I just also believe that transcendental critiques are legetimate as well, but your model doesn't allow for them at all and produces no reason why it is illegetimate.



> Not so---my basis for believing in the uniformity of nature is that it's a basic assumption of my reason. The transcendental part is merely the story I tell to explain it in my larger framework.



Again all your model seems to be doing here is avoiding the tough questions, which is special pleading. Why do you not have to justify that assumption in a larger metaphysical context?



> As I must. The only alternative is to commit the Cartesian heresy of starting with doubt.



This is a false dillema or dichotomy, there could be a third option.



> Metaphysical theories are nice and useful, but not necessary for knowledge. A downs syndrome child has just as good warrant as I have for believing that there is a tree---no metaphysical account necessary for warrant.



True but they are necessary for justification of a beleif. The materialist has metaphysical problems inherent in their beleif system they cannot avoid answering these problems by claiming they have warrant for heir beleif, again I don't care about their warrant but how they reconcile that beleif with their overall theory of reality.



> Like sight or hearing? I have access to these sources of knowledge.
> 
> they do have knowledge of God and that they suppress hat knowledge. I take the verse to be referring to warrant and evidence which would produce belief in a creature whose SD was functioning properly instead of being suppressed.
> 
> I don't think you really be reasonable without being logical Is my belief that there is a tree reasonable? According to you, it isn't, since I didn't follow a train of logic to get there. According to you, my knowledge that God is there is not reasonable---immediate knowledge, according to you, is never reasonable. Isn't this a bit ridiculous?



This issue is a little larger than this current discussion and we have a lot on our plates as it is, I will answer your questions later I promise.



> How so? First of all, of course truth is objective, but people are subjects and therefore it is their nature to be subjective. If by "objective" you mean "Seeing things as they really are" then I would agree that maybe we can, to some extent, but if you mean "non-subjective", then it is absurd to think that a subject could become non-subjective.



What I mean is that warrant in your model seems subjective from beggining to end. If it is objective than it is a transcendental standered for humans at all times but this destroys your very idea of warrant because within your model the atheist has warrant for beleifs that he might not have ultimate justification for, that is subjectivity in a bad sense. 



> But it's the same for my belief that I am more than five minutes old: I think and remember past experiences and find myself believing that they happened.



It certainly is. For me the beleifs and beleif formation is a little more complex than your model is.


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## Philip (Jun 14, 2010)

> Well than it seems the word warrant has little to no use in a philosophical debate. Anyone can claim warrant for any beleif whatsoever but that doesn't justify their beleif in a rational objective sense.



I'm not following this. If I can't tell you why the tree exists, I have no grounds for believing that there is a tree? That's just absurd. Having warrant means that it is rational for me to believe A---that A cannot be challenged on grounds of justification, but must be challenged in a _de facto_ sense.

For the atheist who claims that murder is wrong, this means that rather than saying that they have no grounds for believing that murder is wrong, you must challenge the belief itself. Just because one came to the belief rationally does not mean that the belief is true---people were quite rational in believing that the earth was flat: they just happened to be wrong.



> I don't care that the atheist beleives that murder is wrong I care how athiesm can objectivly condemn what communist Russia, which was an atheistic regime, did in its mass genocide.



Atheism cannot condemn anything because atheism is not a system but a proposition: "There is no god." It is individual atheists who condemn Soviet Russia.



> Once you pose the problem in this way all the subjective warrant in the world goes out the window because the atheist must now come up with an objective theory of ethics to prove that what they did was wrong and they cannot do that.



a) Murder is wrong
b) Soviet Russia committed murder
c) Soviet Russia was wrong

Where's the problem?



> You cannot avoid criticism by mere assertion it doesn't work that way.



Unless the criticism stems from your not understanding how it works.



> Also it seems to me that your model only allows for classical apologetics to be legitmate, which rules out Van Til and TA. I don't disagree that de facto arguments are good and useful I just also believe that transcendental critiques are legetimate as well, but your model doesn't allow for them at all and produces no reason why it is illegetimate.



Here's why the TA doesn't work: what the TA is asking for is a justification of A. Under my system, all that is needed for justification is warrant. The metaphysical "why" is simply how you explain A, but it is not necessary because A is a given.

Let me illustrate:

I and an evolutionist have a disagreement: I maintain that man was a direct creation by God, whereas he maintains that man evolved from an ape. These are two different ways of accounting for the man (the "why" question) but the fact is, that we are both warranted in believing that the man is there---the man is a fact regardless of how we interpret him.

Without the given, there could be no transcendental account. We may critique the transcendental account, but it will not add up to an argument that our account is necessarily correct. It's an interesting method of critique, but that's all.



> Again all your model seems to be doing here is avoiding the tough questions, which is special pleading. Why do you not have to justify that assumption in a larger metaphysical context?



Because unless that assumption were a given, there would be no need for a "why" question at all. Metaphysical justification is only necessary in metaphysics.



> This is a false dillema or dichotomy, there could be a third option.



You can begin with knowledge (faith) or you can not begin with it (doubt). Unless you want to challenge the law of the excluded middle, there is no alternative.



> The materialist has metaphysical problems inherent in their beleif system



Then challenge materialism, not their warrant for believing that murder is wrong.



> they cannot avoid answering these problems by claiming they have warrant for heir beleif



Then challenge the content of the belief: the argument should be over whether materialism is true or not rather than whether it provides "adequate justification" for morality.



> I don't care about their warrant but how they reconcile that beleif with their overall theory of reality.



This only works if you can prove a direct contradiction.



> If it is objective than it is a transcendental standered for humans at all times but this destroys your very idea of warrant because within your model the atheist has warrant for beleifs that he might not have ultimate justification for, that is subjectivity in a bad sense.



It is objective in the sense that there is a clearly-defined criterion. It is subjective in the sense that different people work differently. What is so important about "ultimate justification"? Why does not having an adequate metaphysical story about why we have ethics mean that one cannot make ethical claims? Without the ethical claims, there would be no need for the theory.

The fact is, that there is an absolute standard for warrant: proper function. According to this, we cannot assign blame to the non-theist who says that murder is wrong because his conscience is properly functioning in that case.


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## jwright82 (Jun 15, 2010)

> I'm not following this. If I can't tell you why the tree exists, I have no grounds for believing that there is a tree? That's just absurd. Having warrant means that it is rational for me to believe A---that A cannot be challenged on grounds of justification, but must be challenged in a de facto sense.
> 
> For the atheist who claims that murder is wrong, this means that rather than saying that they have no grounds for believing that murder is wrong, you must challenge the belief itself. Just because one came to the belief rationally does not mean that the belief is true---people were quite rational in believing that the earth was flat: they just happened to be wrong.



Than why is murder wrong? I am challenging you that it is a basic beleif, I don't think it is so why is it wrong? Or prove in a objective sense, objective in that way that I defined (true for all people at all times) that it is wrong. If you claim that it is a basic beleif than why is your beleif that it is a basic beleif objective to anyone but your self, which is only subjectivity in a bad way, you feel that it is wrong or whatever. 



> Atheism cannot condemn anything because atheism is not a system but a proposition: "There is no god." It is individual atheists who condemn Soviet Russia.



This is true if and only if they do not have a worldview, or system of beleifs about things.



> a) Murder is wrong
> b) Soviet Russia committed murder
> c) Soviet Russia was wrong
> 
> Where's the problem?



Prove a than show that what Russia did actually can classified as murder and there you go. The problem is that without some ethical theory, which is what ethicists have been doing since the beggining of philosophy and still do, you cannot prove a. 



> Unless the criticism stems from your not understanding how it works.



Well I just realized this your whole model is one big TA. You are giving the pressupossitions that you think provide an adequite basis for knowledge, but you cannot prove your model in the traditional sense just anyother TA. So how can you be critical of me doing it when you are doing it as well?



> Here's why the TA doesn't work: what the TA is asking for is a justification of A. Under my system, all that is needed for justification is warrant. The metaphysical "why" is simply how you explain A, but it is not necessary because A is a given.
> 
> Let me illustrate:
> 
> ...



There are givens in a sense but they don't stand on there own. We may agree that murder is wrong, a given, but why it is wrong and what counts as murder differs between me and an atheist. It is that disagreement that I am interested in fleshing out. The proposition murder is wrong cannot stand on its own, it is not analytically true. 



> Then challenge materialism, not their warrant for believing that murder is wrong.



I am challanging whether or not materilaism can provide warrant for beleiving that murder is wrong, which it cannot. 



> Then challenge the content of the belief: the argument should be over whether materialism is true or not rather than whether it provides "adequate justification" for morality.



This is only a disagreement over method not substance.



> This only works if you can prove a direct contradiction.



Than show me a materialist theory of ethics that doesn't commit the naturalistic fallacy or contradict their most basic metaphysical assumption.



> It is objective in the sense that there is a clearly-defined criterion. It is subjective in the sense that different people work differently. What is so important about "ultimate justification"? Why does not having an adequate metaphysical story about why we have ethics mean that one cannot make ethical claims? Without the ethical claims, there would be no need for the theory.
> 
> The fact is, that there is an absolute standard for warrant: proper function. According to this, we cannot assign blame to the non-theist who says that murder is wrong because his conscience is properly functioning in that case



Your offering a TA for your theory here. If one has no warrant for making a certian statement than they shouldn't make it right? If one cannot say why something is right or wrong than they shouldn't say anything about it at all or risk the objection that they have no warrant for saying it right? If atheism or materialism or any other ism has no basis for ethics than the particuler person has no warrant to make ethical claims. They can go about making such claims all the want but they will be forced to choose between their metaphysics and their ethics, or admit to being inconsistant.


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## Philip (Jun 15, 2010)

> Than why is murder wrong?



Because I know that it is. You believe differently because your conscience is defective, so you can't be blamed for your belief---you just need education.

I could very well see someone giving an answer like that.



> I am challenging you that it is a basic beleif



Whether or not a belief is basic depends on how you came to hold it. If one did not follow a chain of reasoning, but instead found himself believing it upon being presented with information, it is basic until someone can prove the belief to be false.



> This is true if and only if they do not have a worldview, or system of beleifs about things.



But atheism is not that system: it is a proposition within several systems including secular humanism, logical positivism, Buddhism, non-materialistic non-theism, etc. You have to clarify which one you mean. You cannot make blanket statements about "atheism" because atheism is a proposition.



> Prove a than show that what Russia did actually can classified as murder and there you go.



But A is a basic belief---just because I can't prove it to you doesn't mean that I am somehow irrational in believing it. I also cannot prove that you exist, yet I am fully rational in believing that you do. Proof is only necessary if I want to persuade you, it isn't necessary for my being rational in believing.



> We may agree that murder is wrong, a given, but why it is wrong and what counts as murder differs between me and an atheist. It is that disagreement that I am interested in fleshing out. The proposition murder is wrong cannot stand on its own, it is not analytically true.



In what sense do you mean "stand on its own"? I would say that, as a basic assumption apart from how one accounts for it, it does stand on its own: I would probably believe that murder is wrong whether I was an atheist or a Christian.



> I am challanging whether or not materilaism can provide warrant for beleiving that murder is wrong, which it cannot.



Warrant is often external to the belief system. My warrant for believing that there is a lamp in front of me is that there is a lamp in front of me: that's as objective as it gets and it is external to my belief system. You have a top-down view of epistemology whereas I have a bottom-up view.

Again, the question of whether materialism can provide an adequate theory as to why murder is wrong does not affect either the belief or materialism. A disconnect is not a contradiction. Theories are only there to explain facts---this is why I am leery of transcendental arguments for God: it turns God into a theory rather than a living reality. I know that God exists not because He is a convenient explanation for morality and reason (Kant) but because He has revealed Himself to me by His Spirit.



> If one has no warrant for making a certian statement than they shouldn't make it right?



Correct, if you remember that warrant consists in a belief produced by a properly-functioning cognitive faculty.



> If one cannot say why something is right or wrong than they shouldn't say anything about it at all or risk the objection that they have no warrant for saying it right?



You have misunderstood warrant: no metaphysical justification is necessary for warrant. A downs syndrome person is perfectly warranted in making moral judgments.



> They can go about making such claims all the want but they will be forced to choose between their metaphysics and their ethics, or admit to being inconsistant.



Inconsistency is merely contradiction, not disconnect. Disconnects are only problematic if you assume that there has to be an overarching theory of _everything_.


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## jwright82 (Jun 15, 2010)

> Because I know that it is



How do you know that it is? If this is the only answer that you can give than it is circuler reasoning, unless of course you are providing a TA for your model than that would be different.



> But A is a basic belief



Prove that.



> Whether or not a belief is basic depends on how you came to hold it. If one did not follow a chain of reasoning, but instead found himself believing it upon being presented with information, it is basic until someone can prove the belief to be false.



You have explained what your definition of a basic beleif is not proven that the beleif in question is basic or not. If basic beleifs are only basic for the person holding them than you end up in subjective skepticism because there is no objectivity there, meaning that it is basic for all people at all times. Unless this is somekind of moderate foundationalism, which equally provides no sure footing.



> You have misunderstood warrant: no metaphysical justification is necessary for warrant.



Than warrant is absolutly useless as a concept. Unless of course he can be warranted in a very limited sense, very limeted sense but not in a larger sense when we incorperate his other beleifs about reality itself.



> But atheism is not that system: it is a proposition within several systems including secular humanism, logical positivism, Buddhism, non-materialistic non-theism, etc. You have to clarify which one you mean. You cannot make blanket statements about "atheism" because atheism is a proposition.



I assume you own/have read books by atheists. Do they present beleifs on other topics other than God? Worldview. Do they try to justify their ethical claims, everyone I have does. They recognize this problem as well that is why they posit a theory of ethics. If they hold contradictory beleifs that are of a most fundemental nature, pressupossitions, than their whole worldview is built upon divided foundations. Whether or not there is a tree outside my window or not is a relatevly unimportant beleif in the grand scheme of things but why something is right or wrong is very important because it affects many of my other beleifs.



> In what sense do you mean "stand on its own"? I would say that, as a basic assumption apart from how one accounts for it, it does stand on its own: I would probably believe that murder is wrong whether I was an atheist or a Christian.



Analytically true. Meaning that it is true all by itself. 



> Again, the question of whether materialism can provide an adequate theory as to why murder is wrong does not affect either the belief or materialism. A disconnect is not a contradiction. Theories are only there to explain facts---this is why I am leery of transcendental arguments for God: it turns God into a theory rather than a living reality. I know that God exists not because He is a convenient explanation for morality and reason (Kant) but because He has revealed Himself to me by His Spirit.



So your alternative to TA is a theory that you admit is based on logical fallacies? Also the purpose of the TA, which your model is by the way, is to show the inescabability of the living God. All the classical arguments commit logical fallacies so what do they prove?



> Correct, if you remember that warrant consists in a belief produced by a properly-functioning cognitive faculty.



You have posited your model but you havn't proven it directly, unless of course it is transcendental in nature.



> You have misunderstood warrant: no metaphysical justification is necessary for warrant. A downs syndrome person is perfectly warranted in making moral judgments.



We're not talking about people with down syndrom we are talking about the average person.



> Inconsistency is merely contradiction, not disconnect. Disconnects are only problematic if you assume that there has to be an overarching theory of everything.



Were is this theory of ethics that the materialist can use to justify his claims? If you claim that no justification is required than I believe this logically destroys what you have been trying to do, avoid skepticism.


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## Philip (Jun 15, 2010)

> Prove that.



I find myself believing A through my conscience just as I find myself believing there is a lamp though my senses.



> You have explained what your definition of a basic beleif is not proven that the beleif in question is basic or not. If basic beleifs are only basic for the person holding them than you end up in subjective skepticism because there is no objectivity there, meaning that it is basic for all people at all times.



There is an objective criterion: if you can falsify the believe then I am obligated not to believe. Otherwise it is basic. It is the skeptic who is irrational.

If objective simply means "true for all people in all times" it still does not entail "rationally known or believed by all people at all times." In fact, I would argue that many objective facts are not true for all people at all times. It is objectively true that Barack Obama is president of the United States, but it is not true for all people at all times.

Again, basicality has to do with rational belief formation: ie "How did I come to believe A? Am I rational in believing A despite lack of reasoning?"

Again, is a downs syndrome person rational in believing A? Yes.



> Than warrant is absolutly useless as a concept. Unless of course he can be warranted in a very limited sense, very limeted sense but not in a larger sense when we incorperate his other beleifs about reality itself.



Again, warrant has to do with how one came to have a belief: if a person is warranted by a means other than their system of beliefs (ie: externally), then a disconnect is fine. The warrant is external to the system. The system may fall and the belief remain---the only catch is if there is a _direct_ contradiction.



> I assume you own/have read books by atheists. Do they present beleifs on other topics other than God? Worldview. Do they try to justify their ethical claims, everyone I have does.



Because they are trying to create a system to explain the phenomena: they want what Christianity has without having a pesky God to judge them. However, if one is content to remain a metaphysical agnostic, I see no reason why an atheist has to create such a system. It's a non-rational motivation.



> Whether or not there is a tree outside my window or not is a relatevly unimportant beleif in the grand scheme of things but why something is right or wrong is very important because it affects many of my other beleifs.



So what you need is a criterion, not a metaphysical theory. Metaphysical theories are nice, but not strictly necessary.



> Analytically true. Meaning that it is true all by itself.



Can you come up with an example? I don't think that something has to be analytically true in order to be a given---you are separating the intellect from our other faculties (another Cartesian mistake).



> So your alternative to TA is a theory that you admit is based on logical fallacies?



Again, which ones? Special pleading is out because properly basic beliefs are indeed challengeable and falsifiable on a _de facto_ level.



> Also the purpose of the TA, which your model is by the way, is to show the inescabability of the living God.



And it fails---there's still a leap of faith, unless you admit of proper basicality, in which case a TA is not necessary.



> All the classical arguments commit logical fallacies so what do they prove?



Have you studied the ontological argument? Even most atheists admit that it is valid---they escape by attempting to deny premises.



> You have posited your model but you havn't proven it directly



That is because it is primarily descriptive---the challenges to it are challenges to the things that it claims: ie, the only way to challenge the theory is to challenge the beliefs directly.



> We're not talking about people with down syndrom we are talking about the average person.



We have to include all people who know stuff---that includes down syndrome people, five-year-olds, etc.



> Were is this theory of ethics that the materialist can use to justify his claims? If you claim that no justification is required than I believe this logically destroys what you have been trying to do, avoid skepticism.



Here we need to draw a distinction: you are equivocating on "justification" here.

Justification A: within your system, being able to account for A on a metaphysical level.

Justification B: Doing your epistemic (not necessarily moral) duty as a rational being with regard to your beliefs.

All that is required for justification B is warrant.


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## jwright82 (Jun 16, 2010)

> I find myself believing A through my conscience just as I find myself believing there is a lamp though my senses.



This is a category mistake howyoui come to believe in a lamp on the desk has no bearing on how you believe something is right or wrong. Since not everyone agrees on what is right or wrong you have no way of knowing if a) your conscience actually exists in the way you view it b) even if it does exist how do you know it is functioning properly?



> There is an objective criterion: if you can falsify the believe then I am obligated not to believe. Otherwise it is basic. It is the skeptic who is irrational.
> 
> If objective simply means "true for all people in all times" it still does not entail "rationally known or believed by all people at all times." In fact, I would argue that many objective facts are not true for all people at all times. It is objectively true that Barack Obama is president of the United States, but it is not true for all people at all times.
> 
> ...



All right lets take a different aproech here so I can hopefully demonstrate why a theory of ethics is necessary to prove a beleif of an ethical kind. You meet an atheist who says that it is a basic beleif of his that murder of any kind is morally right to do. How do show this beleif to be false? You rule out my method at the beggining of challenging his theory of ethics so how would you disprove this idea?



> Again, warrant has to do with how one came to have a belief: if a person is warranted by a means other than their system of beliefs (ie: externally), then a disconnect is fine. The warrant is external to the system. The system may fall and the belief remain---the only catch is if there is a direct contradiction.



Warrant is fine and dandy in everyday life. But someone can have all the warrant that their finite perception allows and still believe in something that is false. You seem to be blowing warrant out of proportion, no offence intended. It is whether or not the person has coherence with their more important or general beleifs and that any and all their beleifs corespond to reality that is important to me. In your model you cannot get out of the loop of subjectivity. Many empirical beleifs can be challanged on a de facto basis but moral beleifs are not empirical so a de facto argument may be out of the question.



> Because they are trying to create a system to explain the phenomena: they want what Christianity has without having a pesky God to judge them. However, if one is content to remain a metaphysical agnostic, I see no reason why an atheist has to create such a system. It's a non-rational motivation



A system to explain phenomonon is a worldview. If the atheist refuses to produce a worldview than that is fine too, that assumes of course that people do not form beleifs about what they experience and that they do not try to reconcile these beleifs toghether, which every average person does. If they refuse to form this worldview by appealing to what they define as atheism not being a worldview than I would critique on two fronts.
1. They are still people and all people produce a system of beleifs to explain the world around them and that is a worldview.
2. Atheism still has logical consequences to it as an idea. Many thinkers have worked out these consequences in history. If we imagine a world without God and this world is how the materialist tells us it is than how do you have ethics in such a universe? That is the logicaL problem withen atheism. Imagining an atheist world and trying to answer these questions.
My computer is going to die give me a couple of hours to respond to the rest.


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## jwright82 (Jun 16, 2010)

> So what you need is a criterion, not a metaphysical theory. Metaphysical theories are nice, but not strictly necessary.



But even a criterion needs or is affected by metaphysics as well. Materialism as a theory cannot produce or account for ethics if it is true. 



> Can you come up with an example? I don't think that something has to be analytically true in order to be a given---you are separating the intellect from our other faculties (another Cartesian mistake).



I don't believe there are any. But if you claim that something is given, in the realm of ethics for instance, than it is either analyticaly true or it is not given. Given is given it is like obviously true but although common-sense is very useful for philosophy it still stands that certian beleifs like ethics cannot be given without being analytically true. 



> Again, which ones? Special pleading is out because properly basic beliefs are indeed challengeable and falsifiable on a de facto level



Well if you rule out a certian kind of of criticism that is or has been applied to theories since the begining of philosophy you either prove why it can't apply or it seems to me that that is special pleading of a certian kind. Also if you claim that a beleif is given enough to need no proof, other than empirical ones, than the most you can come up with is mass appeal which is a fallacy. 



> Have you studied the ontological argument? Even most atheists admit that it is valid---they escape by attempting to deny premises.



I have studied it but I think criticizing it is beyond this post. I will PM you my criticism if you like.



> That is because it is primarily descriptive---the challenges to it are challenges to the things that it claims: ie, the only way to challenge the theory is to challenge the beliefs directly.



The only way it is descriptive is if it describes your metaphysics of epistemology. These modules you keep mentioning I mean how do you even prove that they exist?



> That is because it is primarily descriptive---the challenges to it are challenges to the things that it claims: ie, the only way to challenge the theory is to challenge the beliefs directly.



Your right but they only prove that justifying ones beleifs change according to age or mental ability. A child accepts things on authority which is just fine.



> Justification B: Doing your epistemic (not necessarily moral) duty as a rational being with regard to your beliefs.
> 
> All that is required for justification B is warrant.



It all depends upon what you mean by warrant. If materialism cannot produce an adequite theory of ethics than a materialist has no warrant to believe in any of their ethical beleifs.



> Justification A: within your system, being able to account for A on a metaphysical level.



I would make differing levels here.
If an atheist and I are sitting there watching the news and a story about genocide somwhere we could agree that that was wrong no problem and I wouldn't ask for any jutification because we are both warranted according to being made in the image of God and they would be using that innate knowledge of God's law to make this pronouncement.

If they then went into a scathing criticism of Christianity on the grounds that they felt that it was immoral for whatever reason tan one of the possible criticisms that I could level against them would be to askhow in an atheistic universe ethics was even objectivly possible. Again the argument is placed withen imagining what a Godless universe is like logically speaking and then matching that with reality as we experience it, that is the TA in a nutshell.


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## Philip (Jun 16, 2010)

> But even a criterion needs or is affected by metaphysics as well. Materialism as a theory cannot produce or account for ethics if it is true.



Again, I don't think your metaphysics has to provide a justification. It's nice if it does, but only necessary if you are a coherentist or internalist in epistemology.



> I don't believe there are any. But if you claim that something is given, in the realm of ethics for instance, than it is either analyticaly true or it is not given.



Why? Why must a proposition be analytically true in order to be a given? I would say that "2+2=4" is a given---it's necessarily true, after all.

If there are no givens, then there's nothing to be explained by your theories.



> Given is given it is like obviously true but although common-sense is very useful for philosophy it still stands that certian beleifs like ethics cannot be given without being analytically true.



Why not? Why can't we take the dictates of conscience as givens? Every discipline must have givens or else there is no discipline---that, my friend, is relativism.



> Well if you rule out a certian kind of of criticism that is or has been applied to theories since the begining of philosophy you either prove why it can't apply or it seems to me that that is special pleading of a certian kind.



And I keep showing why it is that basic beliefs do not amount to special pleading: they are central to our belief system and therefore can be challenged on a _de facto_ basis alone, not on the basis of warrant/justification. The justification for my belief that murder is wrong is qualitatively no different from my belief that there is a lamp--- therefore I am quite rational in believing it regardless of my metaphysical theory regarding it.

What if I can't know why A is true? What if the answer is beyond human comprehension?



> The only way it is descriptive is if it describes your metaphysics of epistemology. These modules you keep mentioning I mean how do you even prove that they exist?



We certainly speak of them a lot in philosophy. Skepticism is the doubting of things like sense perception, reason, memory, conscience, etc---even skepticism admits that these are part of our makeup, it just refuses to believe that they are rational because it has a bad definition of rationality. The best epistemologists are educators.



> Your right but they only prove that justifying ones beleifs change according to age or mental ability. A child accepts things on authority which is just fine.



And so do adults: how do you know that Barack Obama is the president of the United States? I would hazard a guess that it's on some sort of authority. As credulity develops, it certainly learns to discern between authorities, but that's part of the mechanism.



> It all depends upon what you mean by warrant.



Warrant is the property of having been produced by a properly-functioning cognitive faculty within the context for which it was designed.



> If they then went into a scathing criticism of Christianity on the grounds that they felt that it was immoral for whatever reason tan one of the possible criticisms that I could level against them would be to askhow in an atheistic universe ethics was even objectivly possible.



But this begs the question. The atheist already assumes that the moral universe we live in is godless. You assume that the atheist has the same top-down approach that you have rather than a bottom-up or composite approach.



> Again the argument is placed withen imagining what a Godless universe is like



Except that all that the atheist has to say is, "But the universe we live in _is_ godless and at the same time moral, ergo your question is meaningless."


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## jwright82 (Jun 17, 2010)

> Again, I don't think your metaphysics has to provide a justification. It's nice if it does, but only necessary if you are a coherentist or internalist in epistemology.



The reason it provides justification is because it has priority over the other areas of philosophy. Take a materialistic universe, this theory describes what can and cannot exist withen this universe, for instance only phyisical material things may exist withen this universe. That sets the rules for any further discussion that the materialist has for the other areas of philosophy. Epistemology, they seek a material explination for reason and other mental phenomonon. Ethics they seek a purely material ethics, which is by nature the naturalistic fallacy. If they claim that some immaterial ethical norms exist outside the universe than their metaphysics and their ethics contradict oneanother. It is like the person who claims that God exists and that He doesn't exist at the same time and in the same realationship, that is no disconnect but a bold faced contradiction. You see my metaphysical views are not disconnected from my ethical views but have logical consequences for them and vice versa.



> Why? Why must a proposition be analytically true in order to be a given? I would say that "2+2=4" is a given---it's necessarily true, after all.
> 
> If there are no givens, then there's nothing to be explained by your theories.



It is necessarily true if and only if you first assume the laws of mathmatics exist. So your given, your basic beleif, rests on something that must be more given or basic. But since Godel and Turing proved that mathmatics or even logic cannot provide an adequete basis for itself your claim of absolute giveness is on unstable foundations, in an ultimate sense. It is given in a common-sense everyday experience kind of way but once you take common-sense too far than it becomes problamatic.



> Why not? Why can't we take the dictates of conscience as givens? Every discipline must have givens or else there is no discipline---that, my friend, is relativism.



It is only relativism in the old foundationalist scheme of the universe, it is all or nothing. For me all authority rests outside the universe in the being of God thus providing a third option to your scheme.
Every discipline does have givens in a limited common-sense view but you cannot take this truth and blow it out of proportion into its own metaphysical foundation upon which all other truths can rest, this is a form of autonomy. 



> And I keep showing why it is that basic beliefs do not amount to special pleading: they are central to our belief system and therefore can be challenged on a de facto basis alone, not on the basis of warrant/justification. The justification for my belief that murder is wrong is qualitatively no different from my belief that there is a lamp--- therefore I am quite rational in believing it regardless of my metaphysical theory regarding it.



Those two beleifs are qualitativly different because one is developed through the senses and the other one is not. The claim that murder is right can be just as basic as our beleif that murder is wrong. 

It is special pleading when you rule out transcendental critiques by asserting that basic beleifs can challenged on a _de facto_ basis alone. Why is this? Well only if your scheme is true, but even if it was how would rule out the beleif that murder is right is a basic beleif. What facts would you go to to disprove this as a basic beleif? That most people disagree with it, fallacy of mass appeal. That it would breed a chaotic world if it were to be adopted by people, this only begs the ethical question of ought and is therefore circiluler reasoning. That it violates some absolute ethical standered, this would only make ethics not as given as you claim and therefore disprove your scheme (also it would again be begging the ethical question of ought). So which other facts are there that would disprove it? The only fact you could come up with would be that you disagree that it is basic but that only proves that you disagree with it not that it isn't basic.



> We certainly speak of them a lot in philosophy. Skepticism is the doubting of things like sense perception, reason, memory, conscience, etc---even skepticism admits that these are part of our makeup, it just refuses to believe that they are rational because it has a bad definition of rationality. The best epistemologists are educators.



I don't doubt that there are these modules I just doubt the authority you are claiming they have. I for one love this element of your model, I find it to very insightful and have been thinking about how to incorperate it in my own thinking. Latley I have been melding VanTil/Bahnsen/Frame scheme with a Dooyeweerd/Vollenhaven/Bavink/Smith scheme and what I will call a Pugh/Plantinga/Wolterstorff scheme. One weakness in VanTil's thought is that we are only concerned with the actual beleifs a person has, but he never really explained how those beleifs were aquired, your scheme in my own modified sense can account nicley for the aquisition of beleifs but does not have the ultimate authority you seem to be placing on it.



> And so do adults: how do you know that Barack Obama is the president of the United States? I would hazard a guess that it's on some sort of authority. As credulity develops, it certainly learns to discern between authorities, but that's part of the mechanism.



This is another area were we are in agreement, authority has an essential role in both of our schemes. Reason itself rests on the authority of God as creator. So there is no disagreement here.



> Warrant is the property of having been produced by a properly-functioning cognitive faculty within the context for which it was designed.



I can certianly agree with this definition but I think proper warrant is a little more complex than you seem to be saying. I have warrant in a limited sense for beleiving that "2+2=4" is given on a practical basis, but I may not have ultimate warrant once the totality of my beleifs about reality come into the conversation, my metaphysics may contradict my beleifs about mathmatics.



> The atheist already assumes that the moral universe we live in is godless. You assume that the atheist has the same top-down approach that you have rather than a bottom-up or composite approach



Just because someone assumes something doesn't mean they ultimate warrant for that assumption, the best answer they can come up with it seems for their beleif in morality is that "it just is", which the absolute height of absurdity.



> Except that all that the atheist has to say is, "But the universe we live in is godless and at the same time moral, ergo your question is meaningless."



If my question is meaningless than ethics as a discipline is meaningless as well, for you need no theory of ethics which means that philosophy has been wasting its time since its beggining. Also they are pleading that their beleif is special and that it cannot be doubted on a logical basis, why they cannot give. For whatever reason the atheist has found a beleif that logic can't touch, I'm not allowed to logically analyze their beleif and their warrant for such a beleif on practical or ultimate grounds. Because if I was allowed than their beleif would not be as warranted as they thought, so it seems that they must yet again commit logical fallacies just to hold up their various beleifs on different matters.


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## Philip (Jun 17, 2010)

> It is only relativism in the old foundationalist scheme of the universe, it is all or nothing. For me all authority rests outside the universe in the being of God thus providing a third option to your scheme.



So is God your given then? Can you show that God's existence is a tautology?



> Every discipline does have givens in a limited common-sense view but you cannot take this truth and blow it out of proportion into its own metaphysical foundation upon which all other truths can rest, this is a form of autonomy.



Which definition of autonomy are you using here? I would maintain that my position is how everyone actually gains knowledge, regardless of the metaphysical system they use to try and make sense of it.



> If they claim that some immaterial ethical norms exist outside the universe than their metaphysics and their ethics contradict oneanother.



So let's revise the metaphysics to include some non-material entities and we're good.



> It is necessarily true if and only if you first assume the laws of mathmatics exist.



Or we could say it the other way round: we know that the laws of mathematics are true because 2+2 does in fact equal 4.



> It is given in a common-sense everyday experience kind of way but once you take common-sense too far than it becomes problamatic.



Why can't we assume things? Can you show that I don't know that 2+2=4?



> Those two beleifs are qualitativly different because one is developed through the senses and the other one is not.



No, both are developed through the senses: one is developed through physical sense, and the other through moral sense (conscience).



> It is special pleading when you rule out transcendental critiques by asserting that basic beleifs can challenged on a de facto basis alone.



This is because of the nature of warrant in the case of a basic belief: a basic belief comes on the basis of a cognitive faculty that is generally assumed to be reliable. Therefore, in order to prove that the sense is not working correctly (warrant, TA) you must prove that the belief is, in fact, false.



> So which other facts are there that would disprove it?



The fact that murder is, in fact, wrong. The fact that I cannot prove something to person x's satisfaction doesn't entail that a) I don't know it b) that I am forced to be a relativist. I may not be able to assign epistemic blame, but I can know that his conscience isn't working right.



> I don't doubt that there are these modules I just doubt the authority you are claiming they have.



In a Christian system, they can have this kind of authority because, though partly broken by the fall, they are God-given. That's the argument that Reid makes in the first chapter of _Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man_.

If you know that God exists, the system makes a lot more sense (making sense, though, is not the same thing as being logically coherent: making sense is intuitive, not strictly logical).



> but I may not have ultimate warrant once the totality of my beleifs about reality come into the conversation



I think what you are saying is that it may be in contradiction to other beliefs: so what you do is weigh the warrant and decide which you have more warrant for (assuming, of course, that the two are actually in conflict).



> If my question is meaningless than ethics as a discipline is meaningless as well, for you need no theory of ethics which means that philosophy has been wasting its time since its beggining.



Here, I think, is the disagreement. You would challenge the atheist to imagine a world without God and see whether it had ethics or not. This question, though, is loaded against the atheist: all he has to do is say:

1) God does not exist
2) We live in a moral universe
3) Ergo there is some explanation, even if I can't provide it right now.

The other problem is that there may well be a way in which an atheist could come up with a consistent way to account for ethics and it just hasn't been thought of yet.

The problem is that you, as a Christian, see the argument run like this:

a) If ethics then God
b) Ethics
c) Therefore God.

Whereas the atheist will dispute the first part. I agree that materialism is untenable, which is why non-materialism is what needs answering---that's the monster we face.



> Also they are pleading that their beleif is special and that it cannot be doubted on a logical basis



Can you find a purely logical basis for any belief? All that logic can do is show relations between beliefs: logic alone can yield no truth.



> For whatever reason the atheist has found a beleif that logic can't touch



_Tu quoque_: logic can't touch my belief in God either.

You assume too much: you are (I think) equating "making sense" with logicality. I agree that it makes a lot more sense for us to believe in God than not, but we cannot, with mere logic, destroy the opposite proposition. In many ways, reason is the slave of the passions---it is guided either by a spirit of dependence on God or by a spirit of autonomy. It's not where you start, it's how you start. As someone once said, the heart of the matter is a matter of the heart.


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## jwright82 (Jun 18, 2010)

> So is God your given then? Can you show that God's existence is a tautology?



He is my most important presupossition. The difference between a given or basic beleif and presupossition is that a presupossition takes on a somewhat religious charector in that it has ultimacy and authority over all other beleifs, it is foundational to my worldview but it takes on a slightly different charector than your basic beleifs do.



> Which definition of autonomy are you using here? I would maintain that my position is how everyone actually gains knowledge, regardless of the metaphysical system they use to try and make sense of it.



By autonomy here I mean that the discipline itself needs no outside support from anyother source. Much like Russell and Whiteheads attempt to provide a ground for mathmatics, which Godel disproved later. In fact You could say that Godel disproved the autonomy of mathmatics. I like how your model accounts for the acquisition of beleifs, so yes your right you are looking at how people gain knowledge but knowledge by itself does justify itself in an ultimate sense. 

As you point out later in your post all the materialist has to do is to allow for some immaterial things but they are no longer a strict materialist. This new theory has its pros and cons but it only proves that the person cannot hold both set sof beleifs at the same time. But again this isn't as simple as two beleifs contradicting eachother these are two sets of the most important beleifs. I mean what kind of coffee someone likes is not that important in the grand scheme of things but what the nature of reality is well that determines so many other beleifs and sets so many questions that it is of the most important in fact you could eaisily say it is a presupossition.



> So let's revise the metaphysics to include some non-material entities and we're good.



Yes this gets them out of the inherent problems of strict materialism. Have you ever studied the atheists of the french revolution? They might fit into this scheme. I have only personally read one atheist who argued this so the vast majority want to stick to a strict materialism. I wouldn't say they were good because I can still question them on their metaphysics of ethics you could say. What are these non-material entities and where do they exist and all that. And I bet I would get 10 different answers for 10 different people because as I said the vast majority of atheist are strict materialsit. There is a more thought out worldview there that is more in line with historical atheism as well. 



> Or we could say it the other way round: we know that the laws of mathematics are true because 2+2 does in fact equal 4.



This is only circuler reasoning.



> Why can't we assume things? Can you show that I don't know that 2+2=4?



You know it to be true in what sense? Do you have warrant to use it in everyday experience, yes.

---------- Post added at 09:18 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:01 AM ----------

Sorry my computer weirded out on me. You may be warranted in this narrow sense but ultimatly you may not be depending on your view of the foundation of mathmatics.



> No, both are developed through the senses: one is developed through physical sense, and the other through moral sense (conscience).



You are equivecating on the word sense here.



> This is because of the nature of warrant in the case of a basic belief: a basic belief comes on the basis of a cognitive faculty that is generally assumed to be reliable. Therefore, in order to prove that the sense is not working correctly (warrant, TA) you must prove that the belief is, in fact, false.



Granted this is one way to disprove the beleif but I can also expand the discussion out to include your whole web of beleifs and then the individual faculties play almost no role in warranting a beleif in an ultimate sense. The faculties are good at aquiring beleifs but they cannot provide absolute warrant for a beleif, this is what I mean by justification.



> The fact that murder is, in fact, wrong. The fact that I cannot prove something to person x's satisfaction doesn't entail that a) I don't know it b) that I am forced to be a relativist. I may not be able to assign epistemic blame, but I can know that his conscience isn't working right.



You see on your own limited sense of warrant you couldn't factually challenge it at all but I could challange it in an ultimate sense and employ a TA. On the more everyday beleifs sure all that is needed is your method to prove or disprove the beleif but on these more important matters my method might be more useful.



> In a Christian system, they can have this kind of authority because, though partly broken by the fall, they are God-given. That's the argument that Reid makes in the first chapter of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.
> 
> If you know that God exists, the system makes a lot more sense (making sense, though, is not the same thing as being logically coherent: making sense is intuitive, not strictly logical).



Agreed.



> I think what you are saying is that it may be in contradiction to other beliefs: so what you do is weigh the warrant and decide which you have more warrant for (assuming, of course, that the two are actually in conflict).



Agreed but they may not have warrant for either beleif as well.



> Here, I think, is the disagreement. You would challenge the atheist to imagine a world without God and see whether it had ethics or not. This question, though, is loaded against the atheist: all he has to do is say:
> 
> 1) God does not exist
> 2) We live in a moral universe
> ...



Strict materialism will commit the naturalsitic fallacy anytime they attempt to provide a objective moral theory it is inescapable. They may provide a practical ethics but that will not prove that you ought to behave the way they want you to.



> Can you find a purely logical basis for any belief? All that logic can do is show relations between beliefs: logic alone can yield no truth.



I mean more along the lines of logical analysis and criticism.



> Tu quoque: logic can't touch my belief in God either.
> 
> You assume too much: you are (I think) equating "making sense" with logicality. I agree that it makes a lot more sense for us to believe in God than not, but we cannot, with mere logic, destroy the opposite proposition. In many ways, reason is the slave of the passions---it is guided either by a spirit of dependence on God or by a spirit of autonomy. It's not where you start, it's how you start. As someone once said, the heart of the matter is a matter of the heart.



I like the last part. I can destroy the the atheist worldview because it contradicts itself and leaves many very important logical problems withen its own system unanswered. Some atheists, like Adam Savage on mythbusters, apparently won't even answer the question of ethics. They just assume good without God and go from there. They commit the fallacy of absurdity by trying to pretend like the question is so stupid that it requires no answer. I can say this without trying to pat myself on the back but this line of argumentation is so weak and irational that even I can embarrass any atheist I have debated who spouted it.


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