# Article sparked my thoughts on Infralapsarianism



## panta dokimazete (Dec 1, 2007)

Infralapsarianism, Molinism - guess which I am for! *Supra* seems to clearly make more sense.

Started at the Founders blog which lead me to start reading about the Building Bridges conference and this blog post from the Baptist Press:



> The primary weakness of both supralapsarian Calvinism (God decreed to save some men before the fall) and infralapsarian Calvinism (God decreed to save some men after the fall) lies in their inability to explain sin and evil without stipulating God as the cause of them, Keathley said. Molinism better reconciles God and the so-called "problem of evil," he said, and eliminates the charge of God having caused evil.
> 
> "God controls all things but He does not cause all things," Keathley said. "We must embrace God's permission to avoid having God causing evil."



I guess I don't really understand the issue...is seems like the proposition is that unless God somehow did not know that Man was going to sin, He is the author of sin - that is - if He knew Man would sin and did nothing to stop it, He was the cause of sin.

I think it goes something like this.

P1 God knew Man would sin
P2 Man sinned
C1 God caused sin

This, to me, is a false dilemma - God created Man (and Angel) to have free will - it is obvious (or strongly evidential) that free will not bound/regulated by the will of God is corrupting... and that makes sense. God is God and has the capability to exist with the potential of absolute libertarian free will, yet freely chooses goodness and freely chooses to humble Himself to save some of Mankind. Man (and Angel), when given libertarian free will, chose to exalt themselves and grasp equality with God. Now, since we are not God and God is not a puppet master, we fail and are responsible - not God. The fact is that God is glorified through our inability without being culpable for causing it.

Now, I do not know the circumstances of Angelic free will, except to know that they have apparently been through a first judgment with no redeeming mercy as a result of some of their freewill rebellion (led by Satan) against God, since they were immediately judged and cast out (although one might propose that they are currently experiencing some mercy until the final judgment). I believe the Angels that did not rebel are now glorified and are incapable of rebelling (non posse peccare), just as we will be, post-judgment. In other words, I think the Angelic beings were judged under works-righteousness criteria, since they do not have a Savior, yet are in the presence of God.

Now clearly Satan is the ultimate author of sin, both in the Angelic and Mankind realms, since we know he is the prince of the Fallen, but we (and they!) were willing (free willing!) accomplices - the primary difference is that our (Man's) sin ultimately worked to the good, since through Man's sin, Christ was glorified as Savior. Some of the guilty are saved! None of the rebelling Angels were given mercy - on purpose, I am sure and to the glory of God and the fulfillment of His purpose.

So...God's foreknowledge - and I really think that the concept of foreknowledge is a limitation of the language, not a limitation of God - is perfect and complete because He is not required to be bound by time or the rules of time, since, well, I hate to point out the obvious here, but He created time. He is also not bound by this "middle knowledge" scenario, since creation (including Time) from the initial BANG to the final judgment is a tapestry he has woven and ordained/decreed to be. And just as I have exhaustive knowledge of a tapestry I have woven does not detract from the pleasure I receive by putting it to its decreed purpose; in this instance - God glorifying Himself, saving some of His creatures, thus displaying his loving Mercy as well as glorifying Himself through the exercise of His divine Justice. Justice without Mercy is not true Justice. Love without Justice is worthless.

That is the current state of my  on this matter. Sorry if it seems rambling - I shoulda been in bed an hour ago! 

-JD


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## cih1355 (Dec 1, 2007)

Can God permit something to come to pass and at the same time guarantee that it will take place?



> "God controls all things but He does not cause all things," Keathley said. "We must embrace God's permission to avoid having God causing evil."



Isn't God's permission of an event still a cause- an indirect one? Didn't God guarantee that it would come to pass whether by direct causation or indirect causation?


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## Iconoclast (Dec 1, 2007)

jdlongmire said:


> Infralapsarianism and Molinism - guess which I am for!
> 
> Started at the Founders blog which lead me to start reading about the Building Bridges conference and this blog post from the Baptist Press:
> 
> ...



JD 
What in scripture suggests to you that this is so?



> God created Man (and Angel) to have free will - it is obvious (or strongly evidential) that free will not bound/regulated by the will of God is corrupting... and that makes sense.



Although we make choices who says our will is "free". I believe free-will is a false philosophical concept.
Our will is bound by our nature Romans 6:14-23. 
God cannot lie, sin, or change as His Holy nature will not allow it. He is not free to do these things. 
In heaven we will not sin. We will not be free to. We will not be able to. Because people use these terms or philosophical concepts does not make them exist.

How do you see this? 



> God is God and has the capability to exist with the potential of absolute libertarian free will, yet freely chooses goodness and freely chooses to humble Himself to save some of Mankind. Man (and Angel), when given libertarian free will,



I know that the bible answer man uses this idea,or concept he calls libertarian freewill. I believe it is completely subjective and unbiblical. Even if someone would try to say it is so with Adam before the fall, nevertheless the fall has taken place and we have a dead Adam, not just a slighty wounded Adam.
I believe this philosophical idea is fallen man trying to resist revealed truth


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 1, 2007)

cih1355 said:


> Can God permit something to come to pass and at the same time guarantee that it will take place?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



yup - God created the plan, then created the circumstance. The trick here is the "free will" part (I've a mind to call it "open or neutral will"). That is like a known piece of the equation. 

*(free will) - (regulation of the Holy Spirit) = sin*

or
*
(free will) + (influence of Satan) = sin*


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 1, 2007)

Iconoclast said:


> What in scripture suggests to you that this is so?



It seems like a "good and necessary consequence" of the overall teaching of Scripture.



JD said:


> God created Man (and Angel) to have free will - it is obvious (or strongly evidential) that free will not bound/regulated by the will of God is corrupting... and that makes sense.





> Although we make choices who says our will is "free". I believe free-will is a false philosophical concept.
> (Our will is bound by our nature Romans 6:14-23.



hmm - I would have a problem saying we had a fallen nature before the fall - I would be ok with an "open" or "neutral" nature that fell under the influence of a fallen creature.



> God cannot lie, sin, or change as His Holy nature will not allow it. He is not free to do these things.



I disagree somewhat - saying God *can* not is different than saying God *will* not. We cannot limit the scope of God's power nor the puissance of His *will*.

(Weak analogy - I *can* murder - that is - I have the *power* to do so, but I *will* not. So there is *no potential* that murder occurs.)



> In heaven we will not sin. We will not be free to. We will not be able to. Because people use these terms or philosophical concepts does not make them exist.



In heaven we will not sin because we will be under the constant, overwhelming, ever-present influence of God.



JD said:


> God is God and has the capability to exist with the potential of absolute libertarian free will, yet freely chooses goodness and freely chooses to humble Himself to save some of Mankind. Man (and Angel), when given libertarian free will,





> I know that the bible answer man uses this idea,or concept he calls libertarian freewill. I believe it is completely subjective and unbiblical. Even if someone would try to say it is so with Adam before the fall, nevertheless the fall has taken place and we have a dead Adam, not just a slighty wounded Adam.
> I believe this philosophical idea is fallen man trying to resist revealed truth



Oh, I agree that "libertarian free will" is not currently extant and that it is an abhorrent construct for post-Fall Man.


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## Cheshire Cat (Dec 1, 2007)

I think this quote came from Gene Bridges on Triablogue: "MK also has an ethical aim, to get God "off the hook" in terms of responsibility - but if (a) He instantiates this universe and no other to ensure a particular result, and (b) He then interferes in it from time to time to make sure that those results happen, then Molinism has done nothing at all to get God off the hook. The same objections to the Augustinian view will thereby fall back on him with equal force."


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## KMK (Dec 1, 2007)

I withold water from my house plant and it dies.

Did I kill the plant? Did God kill the plant? Did the laws of nature kill the plant?

What would a supra say?
What would an infra say?
What would a molinist say?


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## Ron (Dec 1, 2007)

I'm a high-Calvinist, which is to say supra. 

It's a somewhat complex metaphysical question to ask whether God can decree an action without that action being caused. Don't get me wrong, Molinism is a philosophical surd. Notwithstanding, we must be precise when attacking this "sophisticated" articulation of rank-Arminianism. 

Non-Calvinists and Calvinists agree that it is necessary that if God foreknows that Jones will choose X, then Jones will choose X. Only Calvinists believe that foreknown choices will occur by necessity as opposed to freely, which is to say purely contingently. Furthermore, non-Calvinists are quick to point out that it can be fallacious to argue from the premise of God’s foreknowledge of outcomes to the necessity of those outcomes. The fallacy in view is that of transferring the necessity of the inference to the conclusion. That Jones will necessarily choose X is not implied by the premise that necessarily if God foreknows that Jones will choose X, then Jones will choose X. Although it is fallacious to transfer the necessity of the inference to the conclusion, it would be equally fallacious to conclude that it can be established on a lack of deterministic argumentation that God can foreknow purely contingent choices or even that there are any. In other words, the fallacious argument no sooner establishes the validity of the Arminian notion of undetermined contingent choices than it affirms that all choices are necessary. The fallacy only suggests that a relationship of foreknowledge to necessity of choice has not been established by the argument in view. Indeed, when the form of an argument is invalid the conclusion is unreliable but it still may be true. Accordingly, the Calvinist must establish that purely contingent choices are not possible and that necessary choices do not destroy human accountability but are in fact the grounds for it. It is quite valid to argue: Necessarily, if God foreknows that Jones will choose X, then Jones will necessarily choose X; God foreknows that Jones will choose X; therefore, Jones will necessarily choose X. In other words, we may validly argue to the conclusion that Jones’ choices are necessary and not free, if the necessity of Jones’ choices is a necessary condition for God’s foreknowledge of them!

The above paragraph is a portion of a larger piece that I wrote, which can be found here. Reformed Apologist: Arminianism in Light of Future Tense Truth Propositions and God's Sole Eternality

Blessings,

Ron


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## Pilgrim (Dec 1, 2007)

I have to admit to not having studied these issues thorougly. But isn't this similar to the so called problem of evil? An example would be whether God caused 9/11 or if he just "permitted" it to happen. If God knew beforehand and had the power to stop it, what is the difference from the p.o.v. of those who are essentially trying to protect the character of God? Some like Clark Pinnock have seen this and have sought an alternative in open theism.

"Shall there be evil in a city, and the LORD hath not done it?" Amos 3:6


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## Ron (Dec 1, 2007)

Pilgrim said:


> I have to admit to not having studied these issues thorougly. But isn't this similar to the so called problem of evil? An example would be whether God caused 9/11 or if he just "permitted" it to happen. If God knew beforehand and had the power to stop it, what is the difference from the p.o.v. of those who are essentially trying to protect the character of God. The alternative is open theism.



There is no problem of evil. God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he determines to bring to pass. 

God merely permits nothing. He determines everything. God knows what will occur because he determines what will occur. In a word, God's knowledge of the future is predicated upon his will for the future. The only question is whether God's will for the future was constrained in eternity by something other than His own perfection. Obviously not lest some other entity is ontologically necessary. 

Ron


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 2, 2007)

> God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he determines to bring to pass.



Maybe it's splitting hairs, but I'd say:

1) For natural "evil" - determines to *cause* - decretive will
2) For moral evil - determines to *allow* - preceptive will

Both to accomplish His decretive will.


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## Ron (Dec 2, 2007)

jdlongmire said:


> > God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he determines to bring to pass.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I'm not sure that you are saying what you would like to say. Preceptive will usually refers to what is required of man in light of God's precepts. Evil is not required of man so I'm a bit confused why you would index moral evil to God's will of precept. In any case, what I think you might be trying to say is that God acts positively, causing natural disasters for instance; whereas regarding moral choices that are contrary to His precepts, God permits such actions but doesn't cause them. I'm not sure I would say that but it is a popular sentiment among Reformed Christians. I don't like the construct simply because all things are held together by God's sovereign, sustaining power. I can't imagine anything that God doesn't cause in an ultimate sense. 

Blessings,

Ron


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## Cheshire Cat (Dec 2, 2007)

Seems to me God is the first cause of both.


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 2, 2007)

Preceptive in the sense that it is not decreed - man's moral evil is *allowed* to exist within the boundaries of God's preceptive will - if God *decreed* that man would not sin - man would not sin.



> I can't imagine anything that God doesn't cause in an ultimate sense.



He is the prime mover, but allowing is not causing. Passive vs. active. See the book of Job.

Unless you believe God decreed evil?


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## Ron (Dec 2, 2007)

> He is the prime mover. Allowing is not causing.



You are right. Allowing is not causing. How is man's will inclined toward this sin over that sin, by libertarian free will or the sovereign orchestration of God's determined providence. In other words, what causes the intentions by which man acts? Isn't it true that through divine providence, God orders circumstances that present themselves to the soul of man, which in turn form the intentions by which man acts necessarily? And if that is true, then isn't God doing more than merely allowing? In other words, is God allowing men to act according to libertarian freedom or is God _causing _the relevant state of affairs which incline the mind to choose what God decrees? Reformed Apologist: A Word or Two About "Free Will"

Blessings,

Ron


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## cih1355 (Dec 2, 2007)

If God ordains that a person will not choose X, does that mean that he does not have the ability to do X or does that mean that God is preventing him from doing what he is capable of doing?


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## Ron (Dec 2, 2007)

cih1355 said:


> If God ordains that a person will not choose X, does that mean that he does not have the ability to do X or does that mean that God is preventing him from doing what he is capable of doing?



Good questions. Man does not have the _ability_ to choose contrary to how he chooses. If man could choose contrary to how he chooses at the moment of choice, then we'd have to say that man's choices are not caused; yet if man's choices are not caused, then why do they occur and how could man be held accountable? Notwithstanding, when men choose they have _liberty _- which is not the power of contrary choice. Man has liberty when he is free to choose as he wants. Yet man never has the power of contrary choice, which is to say man does not have the ability to choose contrary to how he will. Yet in all choices, men have the ability to choose as they want. 

Given liberty, it is necessary that man always choose according to his intentions and never contrary to them; for to act contrary to an intention is not to choose but to act irrationally, without intention. Accordingly, man is morally accountable when he has liberty yet no free will to act contrary to how he will. So: A man crippled in his legs from birth cannot be held responsible for not running around the back yard with his children. The reason being, he could not do so if he wanted. He has no liberty in other words, which is again the ability to choose as one wants. With respect to coming to Christ, *God’s election of reprobates unto damnation does not prohibit them from acting according their desires and intentions*. A reprobate does not lack liberty, the ability to act according to his desire or lack of desire for Christ. Consequently, the reprobate is not at all like the crippled man who is prevented from running even given a desire to do so; for the crippled man cannot act according to a desire to run, whereas the reprobate can and does act according his intention toward Christ. *A reprobate chooses to reject God, yet could embrace God if he so desired*; whereas a crippled man cannot run with his children given a desire to do so. The difference is obvious. The reprobate has liberty, whereas the crippled man has none.

I’ve addressed the matter of the reprobate coming to Christ only because it is the most important choice one makes in his life. However, one should not become confused and think that some real choices are not determined and not according to one’s intentions and, therefore, "free." Some Calvinists wrongly think that reprobates are "free" except with respect to coming to Christ. That is false. No person is free to choose contrary to how he will, whether in the area of the gospel or in common life.

Blessings,

Ron


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## Ron (Dec 2, 2007)

> God cannot lie, sin, or change as His Holy nature will not allow it. He is not free to do these things



Anthony,

You are correct. 

Could Jesus have sinned? Nineteenth century, Princeton Theologian Charles Hodge argued that He could since for Hodge temptation always presupposes the possibility of sin. Naturally, therefore, Hodge reasoned that since Jesus was tempted, He must have been able to sin. In one sense, Hodge can be refuted quite readily since an action cannot be contrary to the decree of God; which would imply that since Jesus did not sin then he could not have sinned. 

To get to the heart of what Hodge and others have asked, we might rephrase the question to “Could God have decreed that Jesus sin?” Even that, however, is an unsatisfactory question since God’s decree, being eternal, was necessary. 

The question Hodge and others have tried to ask is indeed a hypothetical one that grants the Arminian notion of the non-necessity of choices that defy both the decree of God and the metaphysical axiom that responsible choices being caused are, therefore, necessary and not purely contingent. Such concessions as these do not, in my estimation, take away from the legitimacy of the question at hand. Whether the incarnate Christ could have sinned speaks to the question of His person, which deals with a most reasonable Christian inquiry. 

*Here's the issue:*

The question we must concern ourselves with is whether an action (in this case the action of sin) defies an essential property of the person committing that action. For instance, if I were to have chosen to dine at a Chinese food restaurant last evening instead of a Mexican food restaurant, my choice would not have been contrary to my personhood, which is human, let alone destroyed it. However, had the incarnate Son of God sinned, he would no longer have been a divine person, which is a contradiction since divinity is an immutable property. The reason Christ could not have sinned is simply because were He to have sinned, He would have stopped being God incarnate. We might argue that if one state of affairs necessitates another state of affairs that is contradictory to the first, then it is impossible that the first state of affairs obtain. If P, then Q; ~Q, therefore, ~P is a valid form of argumentation. Conseqently, it would seem to follow that if Jesus could have sinned, then Jesus could have stopped being God; but it’s not true that Jesus could have stopped being God; therefore, it is not true that Jesus could have sinned. 

Ron


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 3, 2007)

> He is the prime mover. Allowing is not causing.





Ron said:


> You are right. Allowing is not causing. How is man's will inclined toward this sin over that sin, by libertarian free will or the sovereign orchestration of God's determined providence. *In other words, what causes the intentions by which man acts?*



That is a complicated question - Man's moral agency is influenced:

Pre-Fall - directly by unencumbered internal logic ("free will"), God (first) and Satan (later).

Post-Fall, Pre-Pentecost - by God's direct external presence, the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ, the Law and the prophets, Satan and Man's own internal sin-slavery.

Post-Fall, Post-Pentecost - by all of the above minus Christ's direct presence, but add the continuous indwelling of the Holy Spirit post-conversion. This allows liberty from sin-slavery, but only to the degree Man becomes slave to righteousness.



> Isn't it true that through divine providence, God orders circumstances that present themselves to the soul of man, which in turn form the intentions by which man acts necessarily? And if that is true, then isn't God doing more than merely allowing?



Necessarily? What is the nature of temptation, then? If we are lead into it, we necessarily succumb? If He leads us into temptation and we succumb because of unencumbered logic, is that God's responsibility?

Did He lead Eve and Adam into temptation and not deliver them from evil?



> In other words, is God allowing men to act according to libertarian freedom or is God _causing _the relevant state of affairs which incline the mind to choose what God decrees? Reformed Apologist: A Word or Two About "Free Will"



Let's make sure we are on the same page... Post-Fall, there is no libertarian free-will.

God has decreed that *all* evil intent be turned to ultimate good; glorifying Him either by demonstrating His perfect Justice or His perfect Love.

(BTW: thanks for the interaction! )


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## Ron (Dec 3, 2007)

JD,

You are promoting LFW in the truest sense of the term. I don't think you are going to accept that though. 

Blessings,

Ron


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 3, 2007)

Ron said:


> JD,
> 
> You are promoting LFW in the truest sense of the term. I don't think you are going to accept that though.
> 
> ...



You better believe that is not my intent! And certainly not for Post-Fall Man. Please help point out where, so I can revise my thinking.

I am actually moving toward the concept of unencumbered logic vs LFW...that is - God's logic is perfect and unencumbered, while Man's logic was never perfect (good, though) and initially unencumbered.


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 3, 2007)

Logic motivates the will, yes?


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## Ron (Dec 3, 2007)

Logic doesn't necessarily motivate the will. We sin and sin is very irrational! 

Let's pick this up tomorrow if possible. I'm pooped!  Also, are you aware that I get your emails? My blog is also on your site... 

Before we continue, maybe you might consider whether you always act according to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice. If so, then aren't your actions of choice _caused _by your strongest inclination? And aren't all things that are _caused_ also necessary by the nature of the case; and if necessary they cannot be contrary to how they end up being - yes? 

Sleep tight my brother.

Unworthy but His,

Ron


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## Ravens (Dec 3, 2007)

God's relationship to evil is hard to discuss and think through, in my oft-errant opinion, simply because it touches on so many different topics and loci of theology, e.g. God's decrees, His providence in effecting those decrees, philosophical issues like 1st and 2nd causes and _concursus_, the nature of the human will, the nature of true "freedom", freedom and responsibility, the nature of God's justice, etc.

And in that respect, sometimes I think that the debate between supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism doesn't really touch the heart of the issue. It sometimes seems that proponents of infralapsarianism don't realize that even infralapsarians teach that all things have been foreordained by God, including the fall and particular human sins. As I understand it (and maybe I am wrong), the infra-supra thing is really one of logical order in the decree to save, relative to the fall and human sin.

But infralapsarians have to deal with the problem of God and the Fall as much as supralapsarians do.

In short, for what its worth, I find Dabney's discussion of this very helpful; and even though some members of the board that I highly respect lean towards Turretin's view of _concursus_, I would probably side more with Dabney, and for all intents and purposes, as I read Dabney, he pretty much has a "Reformed" view of _scientia media_ that allows for the creature to freely perform God's plan without any actuating cause or energy from God impelling it to sin.

Then again, I am not nearly as well-read as others, and am probably mistaken on many points.

Regardless, at the end of the day, two things need to be kept in mind.

God's foreordination is all-expansive, all-extensive, and exhaustive. It comprehends, orders, preordains all things, good or bad, tiny or great, simple or complex, from the fall, to the movement of molecules, to thoughts.

Somehow all of this works out, and yet, to speak anthropomorphically, the heart of God is still Love, and Light, and Life, and not so much as a drop of injustice, darkness, corruption, or ill can be found in Him.

And in the past, I have too often emphasized the first point to the detriment of the second. 

And as of now, I am content on seeing that as mystery. I used to think that was an irrational cop-out, but now I see it as more irrational for a finite, sinful creature to think it can fully plumb the depths of God, when it can't even plump the depths of its own psyche, or the depths of the earth's oceans. We don't even know ourselves perfectly, and yet we want to dissect and parse the Uncreated Light.

Just my thoughts, for what they are worth. I've thought about these issues quite a bit. I would welcome smarter-people-than-I's thoughts on the differences between Turretin and Dabney.


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 3, 2007)

Ron said:


> Logic doesn't necessarily motivate the will. We sin and sin is very irrational!



Only to the elect! 



> Let's pick this up tomorrow if possible. I'm pooped!  Also, are you aware that I get your emails? My blog is also on your site...



I did not know you got my emails and I added your site as a result of this dialog and the content! 



> Before we continue, maybe you might consider whether you always act according to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice. If so, then aren't your actions of choice _caused _by your strongest inclination? And aren't all things that are _caused_ also necessary by the nature of the case; and if necessary they cannot be contrary to how they end up being - yes?



good idea - let's take this up tomorrow! 



> Sleep tight my brother.
> 
> Unworthy but His,
> 
> Ron



you, too, brother! 

Striving to see His face and seek His glory,

JD


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## cih1355 (Dec 3, 2007)

> *Here's the issue:*
> 
> The question we must concern ourselves with is whether an action (in this case the action of sin) defies an essential property of the person committing that action. For instance, if I were to have chosen to dine at a Chinese food restaurant last evening instead of a Mexican food restaurant, my choice would not have been contrary to my personhood, which is human, let alone destroyed it. However, had the incarnate Son of God sinned, he would no longer have been a divine person, which is a contradiction since divinity is an immutable property. The reason Christ could not have sinned is simply because were He to have sinned, He would have stopped being God incarnate. We might argue that if one state of affairs necessitates another state of affairs that is contradictory to the first, then it is impossible that the first state of affairs obtain. If P, then Q; ~Q, therefore, ~P is a valid form of argumentation. Conseqently, it would seem to follow that if Jesus could have sinned, then Jesus could have stopped being God; but it’s not true that Jesus could have stopped being God; therefore, it is not true that Jesus could have sinned.
> 
> Ron



Could omnipotence be defined as being able to do anything as long as it does not violate the laws of logic?


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## cih1355 (Dec 3, 2007)

Ron said:


> cih1355 said:
> 
> 
> > If God ordains that a person will not choose X, does that mean that he does not have the ability to do X or does that mean that God is preventing him from doing what he is capable of doing?
> ...




Do you think people confuse the ability to choose the contrary with liberty? Choosing to buy a car this year, but not next year would be liberty, not the ability to choose the contrary. Is this correct?


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## cih1355 (Dec 3, 2007)

> > Isn't it true that through divine providence, God orders circumstances that present themselves to the soul of man, which in turn form the intentions by which man acts necessarily? And if that is true, then isn't God doing more than merely allowing?
> 
> 
> 
> ...




If it is God's plan that someone will not succumb to temptation, then he will resist temptation. If it is God's plan that he will succumb to temptation, then he will fall into sin. A person will not act contrary to what God ordained that he would do.


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## Ron (Dec 3, 2007)

Ron said: Logic doesn't necessarily motivate the will. We sin and sin is very irrational! 

JD said: Only to the elect! 

Ron says: Aren't the regnerate often motivated by non-logical reasoning? We _always_ choose according to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice, which makes are _necessary_. 

Ron Stated: Before we continue, maybe you might consider whether you always act according to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice. If so, then aren't your actions of choice _caused _by your strongest inclination? And aren't all things that are _caused_ also necessary by the nature of the case; and if necessary they cannot be contrary to how they end up being - yes? 

Blessings,

Ron


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## Ron (Dec 3, 2007)

> Could omnipotence be defined as being able to do anything as long as it does not violate the laws of logic?



God can do all his holy will. There are some things that are not in God's holy will that are logically tenable. Can God act contrary to His holy will? I would say NO. Yet it is not a want of power but a matter of His wise determination that keeps him from acting in certain ways. At this point, we are are a semantic impasse. Your definition is fine as long as if we assume that it is not illogical for God to act contrary to how he will and, therefore, must. 

Ron


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## Ron (Dec 3, 2007)

> Do you think people confuse the ability to choose the contrary with liberty? Choosing to buy a car this year, but not next year would be liberty, not the ability to choose the contrary. Is this correct?



I think so. I have the liberty to turn off my computer right now - because I could if I wanted - but I don't have the ability to do so if I don't do so simply because I cannot act contrary to how I do if my choices are indeed caused because something caused is necessary. Now if our actions were not caused, then they would not rational - they'd be chaotic. 

Ron


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## Ron (Dec 3, 2007)

> If it is God's plan that someone will not succumb to temptation, then he will resist temptation. If it is God's plan that he will succumb to temptation, then he will fall into sin. A person will not act contrary to what God ordained that he would do.



Sounds real good to me! 

Ron


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## Matthias (Dec 3, 2007)

Did it ever occur to you that nothing ever occured to God?


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