# Argument for God's Existence from Goodness



## Afterthought (Jun 15, 2016)

God is Goodness by divine simplicity, even as God is Truth itself. One argument for God's existence is from the nature of truth. The argument goes that truth is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable and is not matter. Ergo, truth is God. Likewise, I wonder whether the same argument could be made for goodness (or even justice or wisdom or knowledge)? I don't have the details worked out yet (i.e., I don't know have it worked out yet how I would argue that existence of moral standard implies goodness must be infinite, eternal, unchangeable, and not matter but mind), so there might be a hitch somewhere here.

However, I wonder whether the argument from truth (or goodness) suffers from another problem: could the existence of absolute falsehood (or absolute evil) likewise be argued to imply a Spirit that is falsehood (or evil) itself? A way out of this would be to argue that evil and falsehood are not entities themselves: they are the corruption or exaggeration of the good or truth. Hence, an absolute evil or falsehood would not imply an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable spirit that is them.

But how would one argue that falsehood or evil are non-entities? This would seem to be true theologically: if they were entities, God would have to create them (indeed, this seems to lead to the conclusion that whatsoever is false does not exist in the same manner that evil does not; and so it would seem falsehood is meaningless?). Or maybe there is another way to get around this difficulty?


I don't have time for a detailed post (you can find the argument from truth somewhere in Gordon Clark's writings and in Ronald Nash's _Life's Ultimate Questions_), so hopefully, this compact post will do. Otherwise, I'll just have to come back and re-write some things in more detail when I get time.


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## MW (Jun 15, 2016)

I think that argument is made by Clark at the end of Christian View of Men and Things in answer to scepticism.

This argument would classify as a foundationalist argument, which accomplishes a similar object to the ontological argument. The main objection to the ontological argument is that it jumps from thought to reality. Of course, the denial of the existence of God does the same thing, which is what the ontological argument exposes as the basic weakness of the unbeliever's reasoning. At any rate, such a charge cannot stand against the foundationalist argument, because in foundationalism there are certain beliefs which are assumed to be true, and any belief assumed to be true affirms the existence of truth. In a foundational belief, there is a claim being made for the existence of something which has not been demonstrated to exist; and yet, if its existence is denied, the claim for its existence cannot be made. The foundational argument for the existence of God regards the existence of God as a foundational belief; i.e., without belief in the existence of God, no claim either for or against His existence could be made. So that the unbeliever, in attempting to deny the existence of God, must, in making that attempt, affirm the existence of God.

The argument basically is that truth presupposes a mind that knows it; eternal, unchangeable truth presupposes an eternal, unchangeable mind that knows it; and apart from this eternal unchangeable mind there could be no truth in the proper sense of the term.

Can this be applied to the attribute of goodness in relation to morality? I believe so. Goodness presupposes a will to do good; eternal unchangeable goodness presupposes an eternal unchangeable will to do good; and apart from this eternal unchangeable will there could be no goodness in the proper sense of the term.


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## Afterthought (Jun 16, 2016)

There are a number of interesting things we could discuss. For now, why does goodness presuppose a will to do good? I see the analogy with truth presupposing a mind to know it, but why does "will" come in place of "mind"? Better asked, I would think that goodness would just presuppose a mind that knows it?

However, changing "mind" to "will" in the argument might rescue the argument from the following problem: What about positive law? And what about the fact that even the moral law is not eternal, since it sprang into being with the creation. For that matter, truths of the world and the conceptualized theology for the creature sprang into being with the creation too, so it would seem that truth also is not eternal. So where is this eternal goodness and eternal truth? Even the law of noncontradiction is nothing but a conceptualization of God's truth for the creature? It would seem the only requirement is that goodness and truth are the same at all times, places, and conditions; but this is satisfied by springing into existence with the creation; hence, they are not, strictly speaking, eternal or unchangeable or infinite.

And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?


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## MW (Jun 16, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> For now, why does goodness presuppose a will to do good? I see the analogy with truth presupposing a mind to know it, but why does "will" come in place of "mind"? Better asked, I would think that goodness would just presuppose a mind that knows it?



I suppose it is the difference between rationality and morality. Rationality is intelligence embracing the truth. Morality is will inclining to the good. In a discussion of morality the will is the primary object. It is will that grounds moral agency.



Afterthought said:


> And what about the fact that even the moral law is not eternal, since it sprang into being with the creation.



We are looking at foundations of morality, not the morality itself. Where is the foundation for moral law if there is not a will to do good? And the very act of "creation" decides the point because it establishes a Creator-creature relation which obliges the lesser to the greater. A different doctrine of beginnings establishes a different relationship with its own set of ethical implications.

Positive law is based in the moral, and supposes there are specific acts and circumstances within the moral imperative which require positive determination. E.g., the second command lays down the moral rule that God institutes His own worship; positive law institutes what the specific acts of worship will be.



Afterthought said:


> For that matter, truths of the world and the conceptualized theology for the creature sprang into being with the creation too, so it would seem that truth also is not eternal.



There is an equivocation here. The truth as the thing known is eternal; the truth as known by the subject is not eternal. It is the first we are looking at. The second would not be possible without the first. The qualities of it are external to us; hence we seek to know it and do not assume it as identical with ourselves. The same would apply in the case of goodness.



Afterthought said:


> Even the law of noncontradiction is nothing but a conceptualization of God's truth for the creature?



Whose conceptualisation? If every human mind is bound to it, and there is no "collective" human mind, it is obvious that another mind has conceptualised it, and such a mind as can affirm it applies at all times and all places without change. This could only be the mind of an Infinite, Eternal, and Unchangeable Being. Point established.



Afterthought said:


> And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?



Yes.


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## Afterthought (Jun 17, 2016)

Well, this has certainly taken an interesting and unexpected (to me) twist!

Firstly, (perhaps this has been answered, but I have not understood yet) besides the fact that no one (that I can think of) holds the belief I am about to outline (perhaps some cult in the future will), why does the mind/will need to be eternal/unchangeable? If the qualities of truth/goodness are simply that they are the same at all times, places, conditions, then doesn't it suffice for the will/mind to spring into being with the universe and/or exist as long as the universe and be the same in all times, places, and conditions (which is not necessarily the same as infinite, eternal, and unchangeable; it just contingently does not change for the history of the universe) to affirm that truth/goodness applies in all times, places, conditions?

Secondly, it would seem that the argument from goodness/truth accomplishes only one thing: to show that the infinite, eternal, unchangeable is part of our foundational beliefs. Hence, those who deny such suppress the truth. But in accomplishing this, if these arguments are valid, then our reason (a part of natural revelation; I know there is more to natural revelation but we would not expect a part of it to contradict other parts) is also forced to conclude that dualism is the reality. An unbeliever might even say that the Christian is suppressing the truth, since our foundational beliefs require the existence of an eternal, unchangeable mind and will for falsehood and evil. Special revelation would not help, since we could not be sure if the evil mind and will gave it to us; and the arguments do not help against skepticism, since the evil mind and will could be deceiving us. But regardless, it is usually acknowledged that a monotheistic Deity is the object of natural revelation? So if our reason is concluding dualism, it seems something is funny here. What do you make of this/how would you resolve this problem?


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## MW (Jun 17, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> then doesn't it suffice for the will/mind to spring into being with the universe



The truth of an "universe" requires epistemic validation. How can you speak of it as "one?" According to whose mind is it "one?" Is the universe infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? That would be impossible if it "sprang into being." It exhibits the qualities of space, time, and change. It demonstrates multiplicity and diversity. What gives unity to these? It must be a mind which is independent of and greater than this "universe." Besides, the universe is not a personal entity. "Truth" is a personal quality. It is known by persons. The mind that knows must be a person who can reveal his mind to others.



Afterthought said:


> Special revelation would not help, since we could not be sure if the evil mind and will gave it to us



At that point you could say, first, that a good and powerful God who made all things, and made men to know the truth and walk in it, could reasonably be thought to exercise His goodness and power to overcome evil and deceit in order to manifest His glory; and special revelation would be the effective way of accomplishing this. Then, secondly, one would reasonably suppose that this revelation would give self-authenticating marks of being the revelation of a great and good Creator. Then, thirdly, holy Scripture exhibits these marks both in its matter, as a revelation of invincible grace and inexorable justice, and in its manner, as speaking with majesty, purity, and unity, to the glory of God.


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## Afterthought (Jun 17, 2016)

MW said:


> The truth of an "universe" requires epistemic validation. How can you speak of it as "one?" According to whose mind is it "one?" Is the universe infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? That would be impossible if it "sprang into being." It exhibits the qualities of space, time, and change. It demonstrates multiplicity and diversity. What gives unity to these? It must be a mind which is independent of and greater than this "universe." Besides, the universe is not a personal entity. "Truth" is a personal quality. It is known by persons. The mind that knows must be a person who can reveal his mind to others.


Hm, I'm going to need to give this a think on how this shows the mind/will must be eternal/unchangeable and not merely the same at all times, places, conditions. I might have to get back to it on (my geographical location's) Monday.



MW said:


> At that point you could say, first, that a good and powerful God who made all things, and made men to know the truth and walk in it, could reasonably be thought to exercise His goodness and power to overcome evil and deceit in order to manifest His glory; and special revelation would be the effective way of accomplishing this. Then, secondly, one would reasonably suppose that this revelation would give self-authenticating marks of being the revelation of a great and good Creator. Then, thirdly, holy Scripture exhibits these marks both in its matter, as a revelation of invincible grace and inexorable justice, and in its manner, as speaking with majesty, purity, and unity, to the glory of God.


If our reason concludes dualism, then the evil will and good will have to be at war, so how do we know the good will can succeed in producing a special revelation? I suppose from the fact that the universe is not chaotic, we might suppose one of these wills is indeed more powerful, although I'm not sure how we would determine which will is more powerful (maybe the fact that things exist; an evil will necessarily wants to destroy?). But we argued for dualism from our foundational beliefs; how have our foundational beliefs led us astray?

Moreover, special revelation helps us escape concluding dualism by providing premises (an originally good Creation) that annuls our reasoning from our foundational beliefs. But again, these are our foundational beliefs; how could special revelation contradict them, anymore than it could contradict the law of non-contradiction? Or put another way, how is special revelation contradicting natural revelation, if natural revelation suffices to reveal God is? I have an inkling of a thought that this might be similar to how special revelation shows "ex nihilo nihil fit" is shown to not be an absolute conclusion but limited to nature, but I don't have this thought worked out yet. Or maybe that our conclusion about an evil will is not strictly required by the foundation, but rather, we have snuck in a foreign premise somewhere....in which case our foundational beliefs should not lead us to conclude dualism in the first place. Hm.


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## Afterthought (Jun 21, 2016)

MW said:


> The truth of an "universe" requires epistemic validation. How can you speak of it as "one?" According to whose mind is it "one?" Is the universe infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? That would be impossible if it "sprang into being." It exhibits the qualities of space, time, and change. It demonstrates multiplicity and diversity. What gives unity to these? It must be a mind which is independent of and greater than this "universe." Besides, the universe is not a personal entity. "Truth" is a personal quality. It is known by persons. The mind that knows must be a person who can reveal his mind to others.


Perhaps I am still not understanding, or I did not write what I intended to say. When I talked about a mind springing into being with the universe, I meant a personal mind that--independent of the world, universe, time, space (whatever we want to call it) springing into being--sprang into being coincidently with the universe; which mind happens to know all things concerning the world and itself, and for the history of the universe, this mind just so happens to be the same in all times, places, and conditions. Such is all that is necessary as a precondition for truth (or goodness, if we substitute will for mind). Writing this out more explicitly, this seems ridiculous, but the problem with this is still on the tip of my tongue (so to speak), rather than something that I can see clearly.


Edit: Actually, I may have figured it out. The problem with this is: how does this mind know all things? It cannot be by process, else the mind would not be the same at all times. So it must know all things by intuition. (Insert missing premise that I cannot think of right now) Ergo, this mind must have necessary existence and be eternal, unchangeable.

Edit 2: Okay, I understand now. If the mind sprang into being at the same time as the universe, the mind could not know (unless it knew by process, which requires a change) how long the universe had been around. While the mind theoretically would know all things, practically, the mind would itself require another mind to validate the fact that it sprang into existence with the universe--a fact that this lesser mind could not possibly know, since it came into being coincidentally with the universe.


Okay, that leaves the problem with our foundational reasoning to think about still!


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## MW (Jun 21, 2016)

Raymond, Yes, a mind that springs into being is not an eternal mind.

On your dualism, (1) Is this dualism good or bad? Either way, the individual has to attribute a moral value to the dualism which demonstrates that moral values exist apart from the dualism. It effectively requires the existence of goodness over the dualism. (2) But you haven't really set forth a dualism. While the world exists, and the existence of the world is seen as something good, that general goodness is manifested over any particular display of evil. At that point it is clear that evil is first and foremost a privation of good. It is not an entity in itself, but a corruption of a good entity. So there is no actual dualism. A proper dualism would require two absolute entities.


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## Afterthought (Jun 22, 2016)

MW said:


> (2) But you haven't really set forth a dualism. While the world exists, and the existence of the world is seen as something good, that general goodness is manifested over any particular display of evil. At that point it is clear that evil is first and foremost a privation of good. It is not an entity in itself, but a corruption of a good entity. So there is no actual dualism. A proper dualism would require two absolute entities.


Ah, this is where I am getting confused. Earlier, we had established by our foundational beliefs that an eternal, unchangeable will to evil follows from the fact that evil is the same in all times, places, and conditions. That seems imply an absolute evil entity exists. So how does this not set forth a dualism?

Also, could you draw out your argument some more for evil being a privation of the good? This was my initial thought, but I wasn't sure how to argue for it, and I am not entirely following your reasoning here. The existence of the world is good; I think that can be established because one requires being in order to say that the existence of the world is not good, i.e., the goodness of one's judgment is being relied upon in declaring being to be evil. I am not sure how this implies evil is a privation of the good though; it seems just to require that good is strong enough to suppress evil to allow for the existence of the world.


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## MW (Jun 22, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Also, could you draw out your argument some more for evil being a privation of the good?



Perhaps I could appeal to the reasoning in Augustine's Enchiridion, where he discusses the problem of evil. The quotation below is from the Outler translation. The portions in bold bring out the main lines of reasoning.



> 11. In this universe, even what is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, commends the good more eminently, since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when compared to the bad things. For the Omnipotent God, whom even the heathen acknowledge as the Supreme Power over all, would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil. *What, after all, is anything we call evil except the privation of good?* In animal bodies, for instance, sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of health. When a cure is effected, the evils which were present (i.e., the sickness and the wounds) do not retreat and go elsewhere. Rather, they simply do not exist any more. For such evil is not a substance; the wound or the disease is a defect of the bodily substance which, as a substance, is good. Evil, then, is an accident, i.e., a privation of that good which is called health. *Thus, whatever defects there are in a soul are privations of a natural good. When a cure takes place, they are not transferred elsewhere but, since they are no longer present in the state of health, they no longer exist at all.*
> 
> CHAPTER IV. The Problem of Evil
> 
> ...


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## Afterthought (Jun 23, 2016)

Thank you, that is very useful. To my mind, if evil is not an entity, one cannot argue for the existence of an eternal, unchangeable will for evil, as one can argue for goodness, since evil does not, properly speaking, exist, whereas goodness does. So that seems to settle the holes in the argument.

However, in case there is something I am missing still, it would be helpful to see where you were going with this argument before I got confused. I had said that evil being the same in all times, places, conditions implied and eternal, unchangeable will to evil. You agreed. Doesn't this mean our foundational reasoning shows an absolute will to evil exists? Clearly, you disagree, and you gave some points against dualism. But that leaves me wondering: Why does an eternal, unchangeable will to evil not imply dualism?


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## MW (Jun 23, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Why does an eternal, unchangeable will to evil not imply dualism?



Such a will does not exist. Goodness is eternal and unchangeable because it exists in an eternal and unchangeable being who only wills the good. Even when He permits evil He only does so for the purpose of doing good. There is no being who eternally and unchangeably wills evil; ergo, evil is not eternal and unchangeable. All will to evil that we see in the world is mixed and restrained by the good providence of God.


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## Afterthought (Jun 23, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?
> 
> 
> MW said:
> ...



Do you still agree with this? Or have I completely misunderstood to what you were saying "Yes?" Wait. Were you simply saying "yes" to the fact that the argument could be made, not that the argument was valid?


While I have you here, what would be an example of eternal, unchangeable goodness?


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## MW (Jun 23, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Afterthought said:
> 
> 
> > And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?
> ...



I must have misunderstood the intent of your question, for which I apologise. I thought it was intended as an ad absurdum argument against the denial of eternal goodness; as if to say that without "goodness" there would be no way of defining the limitations of evil. We then went on to the fact that evil is the privation of good, and good stands over against evil, which imposes limitations upon evil.


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## MW (Jun 23, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> While I have you here, what would be an example of eternal, unchangeable goodness?



"The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand." This brings out the personal nature of goodness, which shows the importance of the Trinity for understanding the nature of goodness, truth, etc. Without the Trinity there is no foundation for the "personal" quality of virtue. This is important for understanding the "Theos" of the Theistic arguments.


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## Afterthought (Jun 23, 2016)

MW said:


> I must have misunderstood the intent of your question, for which I apologise. I thought it was intended as an ad absurdum argument against the denial of eternal goodness; as if to say that without "goodness" there would be no way of defining the limitations of evil. We then went on to the fact that evil is the privation of good, and good stands over against evil, which imposes limitations upon evil.


Ah, I see. My apologies too for not being more clear! The ensuing discussion was very useful though, and thinking of my question as an ad absurdum argument is also helpful, since I am not sure what object could be an example of eternal unchangeable goodness.




MW said:


> "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand." This brings out the personal nature of goodness, which shows the importance of the Trinity for understanding the nature of goodness, truth, etc. Without the Trinity there is no foundation for the "personal" quality of virtue. This is important for understanding the "Theos" of the Theistic arguments.


Very interesting! However, if we are arguing from our foundational beliefs and the Trinity is specially revealed, what example of eternal unchangeable goodness could be used? (Edit: On second thought, I might be overthinking things; eternal unchangeable goodness is not required for the argument to be made; only goodness that is the same in all times, places, conditions. This then requires an eternal will to goodness as we had before with the eternal Mind and unchangeable truth.)

By "personal" quality of virtue, you mean virtue that is attached to a person, as opposed to some impersonal Form (or whatever other impersonal object philosophers have cooked up over the years)? I'm not sure I'm asking the question properly, but I have often found it difficult to describe what is meant by a "personal" quality.


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## MW (Jun 23, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> However, if we are arguing from our foundational beliefs and the Trinity is specially revealed, what example of eternal unchangeable goodness could be used?



The Trinity as revealed is a matter of special revelation, and we could not know the Trinity apart from special revelation, but the pre-condition of personal knowledge is a matter of general revelation; this is a result of rationality being part of the image of God in personal man. Foundational beliefs are preconditions of rationality. If beliefs are personal and require personal revelation then there must be a personal aspect which is pre-conditional to revelation.



Afterthought said:


> By "personal" quality of virtue, you mean virtue that is attached to a person, as opposed to some impersonal Form (or whatever other impersonal object philosophers have cooked up over the years)? I'm not sure I'm asking the question properly, but I have often found it difficult to describe what is meant by a "personal" quality.



Knowledge itself is part of what we call a person. The ability to know is a personal ability. For man to know truth means the truth is knowable, and it is knowable only because a person makes it known to man. So the very fact man knows anything reveals a revealer.


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## Afterthought (Jun 23, 2016)

I will need to think about the last post some more. It does seem though that these foundational arguments have the possibility of arguing for God's existence in the incommunicable attributes, the communicable attributes (at the very least goodness; it seems to me, although it might be a harder argument to make, similar arguments could be made concerning the other attributes; or maybe even just arguing for one, "truth," would be enough. Divine simplicity seems to imply that all perfections are in essence one; and indeed, it seems whatever is true, is good, wise, etc.), immateriality, and personality!

I am still grasping why a personal revelation is required for truth to be known, and I will think about it some more. Do you know if Gordon Clark or someone else discusses this matter? This concept is definitely a weak point for me. I have a stronger intuition for "goodness" in this matter. A standard of goodness could exist without our knowledge; "is" never gives us an "ought;" so if we are to know what the standard of goodness requires in some particular situation, somewhere the "oughts" need to be revealed to us, even if they are just basic moral intuitions plus the ability to reason that come with our mental equipment. But if something is revealed to us, something must have revealed it, and I cannot see how a revealer of this standard of goodness could be an impersonal entity; maybe some sharp skeptic might have an idea of how.


Edit: Perhaps the only thing missing from these foundational arguments is that all these qualities must be found in one entity, i.e., that God is one. Could there be more than one infinite, eternal, unchangeable? I know the classical answer is "no," but I never found the reasons I've heard (i.e., that the two entities would have to be identical) to be convincing/did not understand why those reasons were convincing.


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## MW (Jun 23, 2016)

Gordon Clark's axiomatic presuppositionalism includes the notion that logic is eternal with God, that our logic is univocally the same as God's, and that the difference is in the quantity of propositions known; so I cannot recommend going any further with Clark down that road. We must accept the Creator-creature distinction and that we are bound to ectypal theology.

Simplicity is in God Himself; but as He reveals Himself to us God voluntarily condescends to a variety of relations and actions which are accommodated to our creaturely limitations; and so although the attributes are one in God, they are still different to us, and we are obliged to trace through the differences as revealed.

Knowing requires subject and object. That much is accepted by all philosophers. That being the case, knowledge functions with a conscious distinction of persons. So personhood is inherent in the very concept of knowledge.

With regards to your edit, if we just take the word "infinite," it will be obvious that an entity which fills and transcends all space must be alone. Two infinite entities filling and transcending all space is impossible.


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## Afterthought (Jun 24, 2016)

MW said:


> With regards to your edit, if we just take the word "infinite," it will be obvious that an entity which fills and transcends all space must be alone. Two infinite entities filling and transcending all space is impossible.


This should be obvious, but I'm not seeing it: Why is it impossible? An infinite entity is immaterial, so unlike a material entity, they could overlap (for lack of a better word) in their filling and transcending of all space? I don't see where one infinite entity filling and transcending all space necessarily imposes limitations on the other infinite entity's filling and transcending all space. We as humans would not be able to disentangle and distinguish them by where the entities are located, but whether more than one infinite entity can exist is a question of being, not our ability to distinguish them.


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## MW (Jun 24, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> An infinite entity is immaterial, so unlike a material entity, they could overlap



The very idea of "overlap" creates dimensions of space, and these impose a limitation upon it. But it might be clearer if we consider the will. Does this hypothesised second infinite essence have a will? Is this will dependent on the will of the first infinite essence? If yes, then it is not infinite. If no, then the first essence must be finite, because it has a will that is limited by the hypothesised other infinite essence. There can only be one infinite being.


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## Afterthought (Jun 24, 2016)

MW said:


> The very idea of "overlap" creates dimensions of space, and these impose a limitation upon it. But it might be clearer if we consider the will. Does this hypothesised second infinite essence have a will? Is this will dependent on the will of the first infinite essence? If yes, then it is not infinite. If no, then the first essence must be finite, because it has a will that is limited by the hypothesised other infinite essence. There can only be one infinite being.


I don't see how "overlap" creates dimensions of space any more than saying a being fills and transcends space. These two beings fill and transcend space and so fill and transcend (? Oh! Maybe that is the problem, but it is not fully clear to me yet that such is required by two beings filling and transcending space independently of and co-extensively with each other...) each other?

So far as the will goes, why can't both wills be independent and so not be limited by each other? It could be that these two wills are harmonious; considering that Goodness and Truth should agree with each other, we have no reason to believe they would will different things.


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## MW (Jun 24, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> I don't see how "overlap" creates dimensions of space any more than saying a being fills and transcends space. These two beings fill and transcend space and so fill and transcend (? Oh! Maybe that is the problem, but it is not fully clear to me yet that such is required by two beings filling and transcending space independently of and co-extensively with each other...) each other?
> 
> So far as the will goes, why can't both wills be independent and so not be limited by each other? It could be that these two wills are harmonious; considering that Goodness and Truth should agree with each other, we have no reason to believe they would will different things.



You suggest there might be an "overlap." Overlap two sheets of paper in your mind. The concept of the overlap creates something greater than either one of the sheets of paper. You cannot have something greater than infinity. Clearly, then, the idea of an overlap of infinities is a contradiction in terms. We can only conceive of one infinity.

How can an infinite essence be independent of another infinite essence? The infinite essence did not will that other infinite essence. This means it is limited as to what it wills. At the point it has not willed something which exists it is limited in its will and therefore not infinite.


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## Afterthought (Jun 24, 2016)

MW said:


> You suggest there might be an "overlap." Overlap two sheets of paper in your mind. The concept of the overlap creates something greater than either one of the sheets of paper. You cannot have something greater than infinity. Clearly, then, the idea of an overlap of infinities is a contradiction in terms. We can only conceive of one infinity.
> 
> How can an infinite essence be independent of another infinite essence? The infinite essence did not will that other infinite essence. This means it is limited as to what it wills. At the point it has not willed something which exists it is limited in its will and therefore not infinite.


Well, maybe overlap isn't quite the right word. Maybe something more like interpenetration? I'm trying to get the idea that both beings occupy the same space; there is no place where both beings are not. And that both beings transcend space so that their beings are coextensive with each other. An analogy would be mixing two liquids in a bucket with holes. The liquids interpenetrate each other both inside the bucket and outside the bucket where the liquid is pouring out through the holes. They occupy the same location both inside the bucket (space) and wherever they transcend the bucket, they continue to interpenetrate each other equally.

Obviously, the analogy breaks down: liquids are material objects, so they do not literally occupy the same space; and mixtures can be imperfect, so there could be one liquid where the other liquid is not. But we are speaking of immaterial entities and an exact interpenetration.


Oh, I think I see what you are getting at with the will. One infinite essence did not will the other into existence (since they are hypothetically independent), so there is something that the infinite essences cannot will; hence, a limited will. And since willing into being is not a non-thing, this stays safe of the "rock too big to lift" paradoxes? Unless it is a self-contradiction to will another independent being, in which case willing the existence of this other being is a non-thing, and so it is not a limitation of the will for this other being to exist?


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## MW (Jun 24, 2016)

May I suggest that your terms and analogies are breaking down precisely because the suggestion of two infinite essences is irrational. Now you have introduced the idea of "mixture." That is effectively what the interpenetration of essences is. Interpenetration is "personal" action, not an "essential" one. As a personal action it allows for the maintenance of individual personal properties. But the interpenetration of two essences or two natures creates a sui generis, or what you have called a "mixture." And at the point they interpenetrate you will have created a new essence which marks a new beginning of time, and this now rules out the attributes of eternity and immutability.


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## Afterthought (Jun 24, 2016)

Well, from searching around, it certainly seems all agree--theist and otherwise--that two infinite essences is irrational. I still don't get it, but I'm also out of ideas of how to figure out why I don't get it, i.e., what premise(s) am I missing? I'll think about it and return on Monday! (I'm still thinking about the idea of knowledge requiring a revealer; I'm almost there in understanding that.)


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## MW (Jun 25, 2016)

I might have a line of reasoning which can simplify it a little, and bring it back on topic.

The topic is "goodness." Can there be more than one essence that is infinitely good of itself? No. If one essence has all goodness in and of itself, then another essence cannot have all goodness in and of itself. The goodness that is in the other essence would not originally be in the first essence, and so it could not be said that the first essence had all goodness in and of itself.

Foreseeing a question about the term "of itself," let me add, that infinite goodness must be such that it is not derived from another. Insofar as it was derived or drawn from another it would not be infinite of itself, and it would also lack the attributes of eternity and immutability.


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## earl40 (Jun 25, 2016)

MW said:


> I might have a line of reasoning which can simplify it a little, and bring it back on topic.
> 
> The topic is "goodness." Can there be more than one essence that is infinitely good of itself? No. If one essence has all goodness in and of itself, then another essence cannot have all goodness in and of itself. The goodness that is in the other essence would not originally be in the first essence, and so it could not be said that the first essence had all goodness in and of itself.
> 
> Foreseeing a question about the term "of itself," let me add, that infinite goodness must be such that it is not derived from another. Insofar as it was derived or drawn from another it would not be infinite of itself, and it would also lack the attributes of eternity and immutability.



I remember a tread a while back about knowing God "in se" and the subject came up about how Jesus said that only God was good. Now knowing that Jesus is both human and divine I know He would affirm that He is good in His divine essence. Would Jesus affirm that He was good in Himself apart from His divine nature? In asking this I in no way wish to divide but only distinguish the two natures of our Lord.


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## earl40 (Jun 26, 2016)

earl40 said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> > I might have a line of reasoning which can simplify it a little, and bring it back on topic.
> ...


]

In "essence" I think my question boils down to creaturely goodness which is derived from the divine and the goodness of God which is not derived. For Our Lord Jesus assumed flesh, which like Adam, was good.


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## MW (Jun 26, 2016)

earl40 said:


> In "essence" I think my question boils down to creaturely goodness which is derived from the divine and the goodness of God which is not derived. For Our Lord Jesus assumed flesh, which like Adam, was good.



Excellent answer. We can also add that our Lord took human nature into union with His divine person, so although the goodness of His human nature is derived and dependent, it is also personally united with His original and independent goodness as God. Believers behold Christ full of grace and truth in this perfect way of mediation, which, sadly, the rich young ruler could not see because he was blinded by his trust in material things and counted these his riches.


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## Afterthought (Jun 27, 2016)

Thank you! I think I get why two infinite beings cannot exist. Simply, by having two beings that transcend and fill each other, the two beings create a spatial boundary for each other: namely, their beings themselves. By creating a spatial boundary, the beings cannot be infinite. If a being was infinite, then the other being could not encompass the first being--else a spatial boundary would be made for the first being. This seems like solid reasoning; what do you think?

John Gill writes, "If we suppose two [infinite beings], either the one must reach unto, comprehend, and include the other, or it must not; if it does not then it is not infinite and immense, and so not God; and if it does reach unto, comprehend, and include the other; then that which is included by it, is finite, and so not God." (Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 6-7)

The only tricky detail is that there are infinities in mathematics that are of different sizes (odd how things come around again sometimes; this was one of the first conversations I had with someone when I moved to NC; wasn't expecting to see the question come up again, especially in this context). I would distinguish between mathematical and philosophical infinity, but the idea in math that there is something that has no limit that is larger than something else that has no limit is philosophical. I'm not sure how to reconcile this, but it seems a technical detail, and it may be related to Zeno's paradox.

A similar argument can be made for there being only one eternal and unchangeable being: if a being reaches each time that another being does, then the other being is not infinite with respect to time; if a being reaches each motion that the other being is in, then the other being is not infinite with respect to motion (although this last one is trickier to see).


At this point, I am curious about some of the arguments put forward in our discussion, and I will ask questions about them at the end of this post, but I have a few more important questions.



MW said:


> The topic is "goodness." Can there be more than one essence that is infinitely good of itself? No. If one essence has all goodness in and of itself, then another essence cannot have all goodness in and of itself. The goodness that is in the other essence would not originally be in the first essence, and so it could not be said that the first essence had all goodness in and of itself.


This makes sense: If all the cards in a deck are in one's left hand, then no cards can be in the other hand. But is goodness like cards in this way? Why can't there be two identical copies of this goodness, so that both essences have all goodness of themselves?



MW said:


> Knowledge itself is part of what we call a person. The ability to know is a personal ability. For man to know truth means the truth is knowable, and it is knowable only because a person makes it known to man. So the very fact man knows anything reveals a revealer.


Okay, I understand now that knowledge is a personal property (with the exception of one odd query, which I'll ask after this), since only people know things. But why is the truth only knowable because a person makes it known to man? Man can know truth by applying his faculties to nature and to consciousness, so it is not clear that it takes a different person to reveal truth to man. Is it simply that man is finite and so cannot know truth in any particular instance unless it is revealed (perhaps by our rational faculties and first truths implanted in our minds); and revelation is a personal property, so only an infinite, eternal, unchangeable person could reveal this truth?

So far as a revealer goes, it still seems to me that a revelation is a personal act, so a revealer would have to be personal. But is it possible for the revealer to reveal something impersonal to man?


Okay, and now for the odd query. What do we do with animals? They seem to have knowledge and beliefs of a sort. They can even show remorse and have language. The Bible treats them as different from mere matter and motion, in the sense that they have "life" with them. Does this mean that animals are aware of the immaterial realm?

Does this mean animals have a soul?

If animals are merely matter and motion, then how do we know that men are not simply "knowing," "communicating," and having "remorse" in the instinctive way that animals do, i.e., how do we know that men are not mere matter and motion, given that animals are and show forth certain things that we attribute to the soul or mind in men? Yes, the knowing and believing of animals is of a different sort than for men, but if matter and motion can produce such a thing in animals, why not something higher in men?



Now for the questions on some of our other discussion. It would be ultimately helpful to know these things, but since I now understand why there cannot be two infinite beings, please feel free to skip this part of the discussion in the interests of time.


MW said:


> Now you have introduced the idea of "mixture." That is effectively what the interpenetration of essences is. Interpenetration is "personal" action, not an "essential" one. As a personal action it allows for the maintenance of individual personal properties. But the interpenetration of two essences or two natures creates a sui generis, or what you have called a "mixture." And at the point they interpenetrate you will have created a new essence which marks a new beginning of time, and this now rules out the attributes of eternity and immutability.


Why can't this personal action be going on for eternity, like the personal actions of the Trinity? Why can't it be an essential action; their essences require that they are present in all places at all times, so it would seem that the interpenetration and "mixture" would be a necessary requirement of infinitude in space and immateriality?


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## MW (Jun 27, 2016)

Raymond, There are some important questions to pursue here, and well worth the time, but being finite there is only so much time. 



Afterthought said:


> The only tricky detail is that there are infinities in mathematics



It means something different in that context, so it is equivocal. It is a finite idea (or an idea used to quantify finite realities) rather than an infinite reality; as when decimals have an infinitely repeating number, the number is still finite. When we use "infinite" theologically or metaphysically we are negating all limitation, so as to affirm that the infinite being has absolutely no "finis" or end. Perhaps a simpler way of saying this is that 6.9 infinitely repeated represents a finite idea, as it is succeeded by the number 7; but metaphysical infinity represents an infinite reality without number, and is succeeded by nothing.



Afterthought said:


> This makes sense: If all the cards in a deck are in one's left hand, then no cards can be in the other hand. But is goodness like cards in this way? Why can't there be two identical copies of this goodness, so that both essences have all goodness of themselves?



The problem there is that you have "the other hand." That is a conceptual thing which negates your infinity to begin with.

All the problems you have mentioned against an infinite One are the result of negating the One is infinite. Every time true infinitude is attributed to the One it is clear that He is the only One to whom infinity can be attributed.



Afterthought said:


> Man can know truth by applying his faculties to nature and to consciousness



What faculties? They are the faculties of personhood. "Applying faculties" is a phenomenon assumed as a part of rationality, but this rationality is itself a power arising from personhood. Why can man know truth this way? What makes this so-called "nature" observable by man, and what makes man capable of observing nature? The very word "nature" requires a universal and personal property, and speaks of a personal Creator revealing to us the things which have been made.

Man has opinions which are not necessarily true. We know that one person observing another person arrives at opinions about the second person, but when the second person reveals himself to the first person there is the possibility of correspondence between the opinion and the reality, and this is truth in the proper sense.




Afterthought said:


> But is it possible for the revealer to reveal something impersonal to man?



No. The bare fact it is revealed places man under personal obligations to the revealer.



Afterthought said:


> Does this mean animals have a soul?



They have life, and life is a synonym for soul in some contexts; but it remains the case that their souls or their lives are not "reasonable." They are not reasonable because they were not made with the ability to relate personally to their Creator and the creation, and so they have no power of reflection in or upon themselves.



Afterthought said:


> how do we know that men are not simply "knowing," "communicating," and having "remorse" in the instinctive way that animals do



How do we know that we know? Self-consciousness and consciousness of other minds. We would not be having this conversation otherwise, so it is common sense or a basic belief.



Afterthought said:


> Why can't this personal action be going on for eternity, like the personal actions of the Trinity?



There is One and there is Three. That which we call One is substance or essence. That which we call Three is subsistence or person. When we speak of "personal action" we are speaking of the Three. When we speak of essence we are speaking of the One. In the context of this discussion we were speaking of the infinite One, which relates to essence, not person. So the "mixture" of which you were speaking was an "essential action," not a "personal action." An "essential action" of interpenetration was shown to be impossible because that involved mixture, and so the essence would cease to be itself.


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## Afterthought (Jun 29, 2016)

A man was once late for an appointment because he was thinking about infinity and lost track of time. 

I'm still thinking over most of the post, but here is a response to some items.



MW said:


> Afterthought said:
> 
> 
> > how do we know that men are not simply "knowing," "communicating," and having "remorse" in the instinctive way that animals do
> ...


I see; animals do not have self-consciousness, so we see immediately that we are doing these things in a different manner from the instinct of animals.



MW said:


> Afterthought said:
> 
> 
> > Does this mean animals have a soul?
> ...


But this soul is immaterial? If so, that is very interesting. A materialist, matter-and-motion view could not even account for the "lower" animals (although come to think of it; that philosophy might not even be able to prove matter exists). If this soul is immaterial, is this soul mortal?




MW said:


> It means something different in that context, so it is equivocal. It is a finite idea (or an idea used to quantify finite realities) rather than an infinite reality; as when decimals have an infinitely repeating number, the number is still finite. When we use "infinite" theologically or metaphysically we are negating all limitation, so as to affirm that the infinite being has absolutely no "finis" or end. Perhaps a simpler way of saying this is that 6.9 infinitely repeated represents a finite idea, as it is succeeded by the number 7; but metaphysical infinity represents an infinite reality without number, and is succeeded by nothing.


A fair point. I wonder though about things like power sets (sets of all subsets; e.g., if your set was {1, 2, 3}, the power set would be {empty set, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}, {1, 2, 3}}), which are even larger? Or even larger entities? Perhaps these too are using "infinity" to represent a finite idea; I shall think on it.


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## MW (Jun 29, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> A man was once late for an appointment because he was thinking about infinity and lost track of time.



 Good one!



Afterthought said:


> I see; animals do not have self-consciousness, so we see immediately that we are doing these things in a different manner from the instinct of animals.



Yes, I would say so; and I would also take up the word "immediately" to bring out the fact that our consciousness directly and inescapably brings our thoughts, desires, etc., to our attention as something for which we feel responsible. In this sense knowledge is self-reflection. Hence the oft repeated theme in Christian theology about knowing ourselves.



Afterthought said:


> If this soul is immaterial, is this soul mortal?



We would be equivocating on the words "immaterial" and "mortal" because the life given to animals was of the earthly order. It consisted only in natural qualities which served a temporal purpose. If animals were created only for natural, temporal life, then their life cannot be "immaterial" and their death is not "mortality" in the sense we use these words of humanity.


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## Afterthought (Jun 30, 2016)

MW said:


> What faculties? They are the faculties of personhood. "Applying faculties" is a phenomenon assumed as a part of rationality, but this rationality is itself a power arising from personhood. Why can man know truth this way? What makes this so-called "nature" observable by man, and what makes man capable of observing nature? The very word "nature" requires a universal and personal property, and speaks of a personal Creator revealing to us the things which have been made.
> 
> Man has opinions which are not necessarily true. We know that one person observing another person arrives at opinions about the second person, but when the second person reveals himself to the first person there is the possibility of correspondence between the opinion and the reality, and this is truth in the proper sense.


Let's see if I have this straight. I can see how revelation allows for correspondence between our faculties and reality: both man's faculties and reality are adjusted in such a way that man can know it, i.e., the faculties are revelation as is nature. I can also see how this rationality arises out of personhood. We discussed how the "knowledge" of animals is different from the knowledge of which we speak: the knowledge of which we speak has self-consciousness to it. It is said that nothing impersonal can be revealed because what is revealed places personal obligations on the one who receives the revelation, by which I understand to include, at least, the obligation to believe or reject the revelation--these are actions of persons and so are personal duties. I can also see how observation of nature requires a person--namely, oneself; I am just having difficulty of seeing why a second person is needed (and really, observation of nature and self is the only case I can think of where we might possibly gain knowledge without a second person originally revealing knowledge to us).

It seems that in answer to the objection that we can know "nature" without another person, that it was stated that we can only know "nature" because another person had already made a revelation to us. By "nature" being a universal property, do you mean the concept of "nature" is a universal, so man cannot know "nature" as a concept exists without revelation? Or is something else going on here to require another person's revelation in order to know things by observation of "nature"?

What do you mean by "nature" being a personal property?

I understand the personal obligations placed on someone, but could the content of what is revealed be impersonal (e.g., that fire burns wood or that some animals eat plants seem to be impersonal)? It seems the personal element is not related to the content but to what is done with the content by the recipient of revelation?

It seems in all this, we have two propositions. (1) We cannot know anything unless it has been revealed by another person. (2) Whatsoever is impersonal cannot be revealed. Is (1) being argued on the basis that man cannot know universals, so those universals must have been revealed--which revealing must be done by a person? Or is there something else going on here, perhaps similar to how one does not know "oughts" unless a person reveals the "oughts" because one is otherwise left with an impersonal "natural world" that just "is"?

Perhaps some of these questions are repeated and collapse into fewer questions.


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## MW (Jun 30, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> What do you mean by "nature" being a personal property?



This is probably at the centre of the questions which were posed so it might be best to focus attention on this.

"Nature" is often used without understanding from where it has come. A nature is the result of something having been born or made. Our informal way of speaking attributes personal properties to this "nature," like the ability to make things known. In a Christian context this had some basis as a figure of speech because it was understood that second causes derived their power from the First Cause. Any personal attribution to nature was ultimately owing to the revelation of the Personal God who made all things, and also made known that He made all things to declare His glory. From this the concepts of natural law, natural theology, natural religion, etc., emerged. After the rejection of the Christian framework within which our societies used the concept of "nature," the word continued to be used in an abstract and absolute sense as if it were its own cause, and so personal attributes like "making known" are assumed in the use of the term without any metaphysical validation.

It is only the Christian view of God which can justify the use of the idea that "nature" makes things known to us. General revelation is the revelation of God in general to all men by the things that are made. Apart from this conceptual framework we have no reason to speak of nature, nor could man know things as having a nature unless a Personal Interpreter exists to give meaning to the things which He has made.


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## Afterthought (Jun 30, 2016)

Okay, I think I see that. It is a technicality in how the word "nature" has been and now is used, which gives it personal properties such as revealing truth. To make sure I am following: When we speak of "nature" revealing something, we are not just talking about God revealing Himself by nature and by truths of nature, but God revealing the truths of nature too?

Suppose then we throw out the loaded term in order to strengthen the objection that a second person is not needed in order to know truth. If we do that, we see that the world about us does not speak, so it can never literally reveal something to us. The knowledge that the world "reveals" is nothing more than a person applying personal faculties to the world about or world within and then possibly making an interpretation. (I don't think interpretation is required to note that fire burns--only induction is required--, or that a person at some particular time, place, and motion is staring at a computer screen, or that a person cannot think except by the law of noncontradicton, except insofar as our language always has something metaphorical to it, i.e., personal properties.) The word "world" here is used metaphorically to denote the "Not-Me," rather than a universal property that binds all that is "Not-Me" together. Here it would seem that only one person was all that was required to know truth, rather than a second person revealing that truth?



MW said:


> It is only the Christian view of God which can justify the use of the idea that "nature" makes things known to us.


I can see how the Christian view of God can justify the use of that idea. Is there a way to directly show that only the Christian view can do it, or is this more of a process of elimination?


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## MW (Jun 30, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Here it would seem that only one person was all that was required to know truth, rather than a second person revealing that truth?



He is operating on the assumption of the law of identity. For him to be different from the world he must be the same with himself and different from the world. Without this revelation he could not differentiate between himself and the world, or between himself and other minds. And yet by common sense he accepts it. Who is the lawgiver of this law, and who upholds it in all times and places?



Afterthought said:


> I can see how the Christian view of God can justify the use of that idea. Is there a way to directly show that only the Christian view can do it, or is this more of a process of elimination?



I would think, discursively, without a direct appeal to authority, we are bound to follow a process of elimination when there are competing claims to exclusivity.


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## Afterthought (Jul 1, 2016)

MW said:


> He is operating on the assumption of the law of identity. For him to be different from the world he must be the same with himself and different from the world. Without this revelation he could not differentiate between himself and the world, or between himself and other minds. And yet by common sense he accepts it. Who is the lawgiver of this law, and who upholds it in all times and places?


Ah, I think I see where this is going. So the revealer gives us first truths, and by them, we know other things. And a revealer must be another person, so all we know is revealed by another person. But I'm getting ahead of myself. The idea is that this law of identity could not give us truth--which must be the same in all times and places--unless this law both corresponded with reality and could be relied upon to generate ideas that are the same in all times and places. This is why common sense is not enough; it gives us the truths necessary for knowledge, but it does not explain from where those truths come.

Perhaps a couple of simple objections: Suppose someone said that the law of identity developed, perhaps along evolutionary lines? Or suppose someone said, who cares? The law of identity gives us truth; it is just the way we are and it is necessary for knowledge. We do not need to ask from where those truths come.


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## MW (Jul 1, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Perhaps a couple of simple objections: Suppose someone said that the law of identity developed, perhaps along evolutionary lines?



"Perhaps" is not a solid reason for explaining away what "is."

To test the hypothesis of evolution one must employ the laws of the mind, thus making the laws of the mind independent of evolution. If these laws were an evolution there would be no way of objectively testing anything because the laws themselves would be subject to change as a result of being affected by the same forces of necessity and development which affect everything else.



Afterthought said:


> Or suppose someone said, who cares? The law of identity gives us truth; it is just the way we are and it is necessary for knowledge. We do not need to ask from where those truths come.



What "is" does not establish what "ought to be." The idea, "it is just the way we are," is a truth claim which defeats itself. On the one hand it suggests we can be indifferent to the independent and objective nature of truth, and on the other hand it stands on the independent and objective nature of truth.


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## Afterthought (Jul 1, 2016)

Thank you! I concede that all knowledge is by revelation, although it will likely take me some practice and further reflection before I can argue for it well.

So far as the subtopic that brought us here, that just leaves me in doubt about whether anything impersonal can be revealed. It has been stated that this is impossible because the recipient of revelation is under personal obligations. I am not sure how that makes it impossible for something impersonal to be revealed. When I read "whatever is impersonal cannot be revealed" I am thinking about the content of what is revealed. Being under personal obligations does not seem to me to make the content personal. Thoughts? Perhaps I just need further explanation as to what is meant by something impersonal not being possible to reveal?


Incidentally, it's been a while, but I think Charles Peirce modified the Scottish School of Common Sense with evolution being the process that generates common sense beliefs. I think he also argued that common sense beliefs could change with time. He also argued that law could arise by pure chance. But I say all that as an interesting aside. It is good to see some response to such ideas.


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## MW (Jul 1, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Thoughts?



Simply, we are persons sharing the same nature and this lays obligations upon us towards each other; moreover, these obligations exercise an influence over the content of what we say, do, or think. That being the case, there is a personal side to truth which is distinguishable from its propositional content.


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## Afterthought (Jul 6, 2016)

MW said:


> Simply, we are persons sharing the same nature and this lays obligations upon us towards each other; moreover, these obligations exercise an influence over the content of what we say, do, or think. That being the case, there is a personal side to truth which is distinguishable from its propositional content.


What sort of obligations do you have in mind, especially with the "doing" or "thinking"? Persons not sharing the same nature would also have obligations?

If there is a personal side, there is also an impersonal side? Obligations might influence the propositional content, and there may even be a personal motivation for concealing certain truths, but however the proposition is stated, it is still the same proposition? And so it may be better said that "nothing can be revealed impersonally or in an impersonal manner" rather than "nothing impersonal can be revealed"? (Edit: Actually, I may have figured it out. When one says nothing "impersonal" can be revealed, one means "impersonal only;" as you have stated, there is a personal side to truth.)

This is a rather interesting thought. I'm beginning to see how this parallels the inability to get an "ought" from an "is" (something impersonal) in the case of morals.


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## MW (Jul 6, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> When one says nothing "impersonal" can be revealed, one means "impersonal only;" as you have stated, there is a personal side to truth.)



Yes. We should not say all truth is relative; but we are bound to recognise that truth is inherently relational. It must correspond with reality; and our reality is filled with personal relations which give moral value to what we know.

To move beyond general to special revelation, it might be worth noting at this point that truth and faithfulness are one and the same word in the Hebrew of the Old Testament.



Afterthought said:


> I'm beginning to see how this parallels the inability to get an "ought" from an "is" (something impersonal) in the case of morals.



Excellent.


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## Afterthought (Jul 7, 2016)

I haven't read much of Augustine's thought on epistemology, but I remember something of his "light of the mind." Is there a similarity between this and stating that God has revealed to the mind first truths/laws of thought, e.g., the law of identity?

Going far back in the thread to your post about the ontological argument: I was wondering if you might explain how one must move from concept to reality in order to deny God's existence?


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## MW (Jul 7, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> I haven't read much of Augustine's thought on epistemology, but I remember something of his "light of the mind." Is there a similarity between this and stating that God has revealed to the mind first truths/laws of thought, e.g., the law of identity?



There are a number of interpretations of Augustine's theory of illumination or reflected light, and some who argue an earlier and later Augustine just to make it more complex. The interpretation of Ronald Nash, if I recall correctly, is that of innate ideas functioning as the precondition for knowledge. That seems to me to come fairly close, but it is difficult to be dogmatic when everyone reads their own framework into Augustine's scheme so as to give order to it.



Afterthought said:


> Going far back in the thread to your post about the ontological argument: I was wondering if you might explain how one must move from concept to reality in order to deny God's existence?



Here is the basic form of the atheist's dilemma as exposed by the ontological argument:

The God that the atheist denies is the God who has all perfections; existence is a perfection; ergo, the God that the atheist denies is the God who has existence.

It exposes the fallacy of the atheist. His very conception of God must include His existence. The exclusion of existence is conceptual, from which a leap is made to reality. It is really just a denial of another god which is no God at all, since it is not the God of all perfections.

There is an article by Shedd defending the Anselmic ontological argument which is worth reading.


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## earl40 (Jul 8, 2016)

I have been thinking this all boils down to this. It is foolish trying to prove the existence of God to people because God already has done such. To try to do such supposes God has not done what He said He did as spoken in the beginning of the book Romans.


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## Afterthought (Jul 8, 2016)

earl40 said:


> I have been thinking this all boils down to this. It is foolish trying to prove the existence of God to people because God already has done such. To try to do such supposes God has not done what He said He did as spoken in the beginning of the book Romans.


It really depends on how one approaches the matter. God is revealed by the things that have been made, including our rationality. Rationally demonstrating the existence of God to show that God has revealed himself here is no different than pointing to various aspects of the creation (e.g., the wisdom and power behind it) to show that God has revealed himself there. There is also a difference between trying to prove God's existence because His existence is in doubt, and using an argument for God's existence to rationally demonstrate the suppression of the truth and show the dependence of our reason on God's existence and revelation; and a difference between trying to rationally prove God's existence because an unbeliever is an unprejudiced reasoner and using a proof for God's existence that God might make use of it to awaken the unbeliever's sense of Divinity that has been suppressed. All these suppose that God did do what he has said and are foolish trying to do if God did not do as he has said, no?


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## Afterthought (Jul 8, 2016)

Here is an attempt to argue for the communicable attributes, in hopes of strengthening my arguments for them. A tricky thing is: Whether these arguments should be predicated of truth or of the Mind which holds the truth? And there is the issue of arguing that truth is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable _being_; it would seem one requires a Mind in order for there to be being, unless we predicate being of all eternal unchangeable concepts. Due to divine simplicity, I think one ends up in the same place either way, but the nature of the argument seems to be different, and divine simplicity requires further argumentation. There may also be the issue of arguing that the communicable attributes are infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, rather than just being qualities of truth.


When one claims something is true, one is arguing that truth is....

Wisdom. The truth is something that all pursue after. Even those who decide to pursue falsehood, they do so because of some other perceived truth. Those who pursue the way of truth acknowledge a wisdom to it. Even mundane truths, when one claims them to be true, one is claiming the wisdom of one's claims because if the truth is acknowledged and believed one knows something about reality; if not believed, one ends up in a fantasy world on this point. If one wishes to argue that it is the Mind that is wise, rather than truth itself, one need note that truth is perceived as wisdom because it corresponds to reality and knowing reality gives wisdom (knowing falsehood gives folly, since one will run against reality eventually): an eternal unchangeable Mind thus has eternal unchangeable access to all of reality and hence eternal unchangeable wisdom.

Power. Truth has power because hearing it can persuade minds and change the will; force can at best make feigned submission. Truth sets one free from superstition and darkness by giving the way to reality. Those who claim falsehood has power must recognize that its power comes from any perceived or real truth in the falsehood. If one argues that the Mind is powerful: knowing something of reality gives power to the one knowing it. Knowing all of reality gives the power to persuade all minds and change all wills by revealing truth on all matters. Furthermore, as our sciences have shown, knowing something of reality gives power to use reality in a variety of ways; so the Mind must be most powerful.

Holiness. This one is easy. There is a purity to truth that all acknowledge. Those who seek falsehood do so because of the perceived purity in their views or due to their unease with the purity of the truth. Truth is also "wholly other" and set apart: it is something entirely superior and separate from us. If one argues the Mind is holy: the Mind which holds all truth holds all purity and seeks purity. Knowing all truth is beyond man, so the Mind must also be "wholly other" and set apart.

Justice. When one speaks of the truth, one is dismayed at the unfairness of those who understand the truth but reject it or dodge it. There is an inequity in rejecting the truth. How can this be? Truth must have the property of justice, and those who make truth claims are arguing that their claims are just, ought to be heard and believed. Likewise, the Mind that holds all truth knows the way of justice and desires all to conform to the justice of that truth; the Mind being eternal and unchangeable, the Mind must have eternally and unchangeably been this way and so is eternal and unchangeable in His justice (we've previously argued that the Mind is personal).

Goodness. We always seek the good, and there is something good about a truth claim. We hence attribute falsehood to something morally wrong. And those who seek falsehood do so under the pretence of some perceived good in the perceived truth. The Mind that holds all truth holds all goodness and since goodness is the object of the will, must have a will that seeks all goodness.

Truth (Faithfulness). This one is also easy. Truth is utterly reliable and will never fail, since it will always give reality and never falsehood. Likewise the Mind that knows all truth will seek all faithfulness, since truth is something to be sought.


Comments? Thoughts? There may be parts not argued tightly enough, and there may be parts where I overstate the case or need to tighten up my language.



MW said:


> There is an article by Shedd defending the Anselmic ontological argument which is worth reading.


I shall look into it!


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## MW (Jul 8, 2016)

Raymond, it is very beneficial to contemplate these in brief. The accumulation of attributes provides a helpful way of showing the moral force of truth, and how it cannot stand on its own as if it were some intellectual abstraction.

The various institutions of society seem to give some expression to these qualities. If we go to the school the aim is wisdom; in government, power; in the church, holiness; in the law court, justice; in the hospitals, goodness; in the family and other social relations, faithfulness. Though each institution aims at every attribute in common with the others, they also have a focus which seems to concentrate on one of the attributes in distinction from the others. Truth is demanded of each one, and without the quality of "truth" we would not say that the institution is exhibiting "true" wisdom, power, etc. At the same time, without wisdom, power, etc., the truth itself would be a meaningless abstraction.

The one thing that appears to be missing is "being." "Being" is also communicated. How can truth exist without a being in which to ground its reality? But we are getting back to the ontological argument.


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## Afterthought (Jul 8, 2016)

Grounding being is important. I think it would suffice to note that truth must exist in a Mind?

However, there are a couple of difficulties. The conclusion of the argument is, "truth is God" or "God is truth" and therefore God exists, since truth exists. But God is a "being." So either the conclusion is hasty, or in arguing for truth being eternal, unchangeable, personal, etc., we have already argued that truth is "being" also. If we have already argued truth is "being," how did we argue that?

If we have not, then strictly speaking, we need the being/Mind to have all these qualities of truth; but how do we argue that this "being" has all these qualities from noting that a Mind exists to hold truth or that a being must exist to ground the truth in reality, when all we have argued is that truth has these qualities? Also, if we have not, then in what sense are we concluding that truth is God, when God has being and we have not shown that for truth?


I also take it that you would argue that truth has being or a being to ground by using the ontological argument? Is there a simpler way, as has been done for the other communicable attributes?


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## Afterthought (Jul 11, 2016)

If it is valid to argue that the communicable attributes must also be eternal and unchangeable because otherwise truth would not be eternal and unchangeable (because its attributes are conditioned by time, space, motion), then that takes care of that loop hole--the communicable attributes must be eternal and unchangeable, even if we can only denote certain aspects of them (e.g., truth has power to persuade, as argued, but no argument can be made that truth also has power to create unless the power to persuade is infinite, eternal, unchangeable).


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## MW (Jul 11, 2016)

Coming back to a discussion of this nature after a few days is like waking up in the car without any idea of how far we have driven. Where are we? 

I think, if we have pursued communicable truth back to an incommunicable source, we have accomplished our objective. Once we say it is communicable we have really shut ourselves up to the will of the Infinite to reveal Himself to the finite. It is not something we can pursue further without denying the communicable nature of it. In other words, we have been brought to the necessity of special revelation.


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## Afterthought (Jul 11, 2016)

MW said:


> Coming back to a discussion of this nature after a few days is like waking up in the car without any idea of how far we have driven. Where are we?


 Yes, sorry about that! We are almost at our destination though!

Thus far, I think I am satisfied with the argument from Goodness; some may deny that "being" is "good" but simply "is" without any moral value, but I'm not skilled enough to show how such statements rely on "being" being "good."

We have been discussing the argument from truth. I can see how one can argue that truth is infinite, eternal, unchangeable, and personal.

I tried to outline explicitly how one might argue for truth having the communicable attributes. There were three difficulties (1) whether a communicable attribute is also eternal and unchangeable, and not merely some finite attribute (I presented a possible argument for the eternal unchangeable nature of the communicable attributes of truth in my most recent post before this one); (2) I wasn't sure whether we should argue for truth being God or for the Mind that must hold truth being God, so I tried arguing both ways, although further argumentation for divine simplicity likely makes both routes the same; and (3) you pointed out that I did not argue that truth had infinite, eternal, unchangeable being, but suggested the ontological argument was needed to make that argument.

With regards to (3), I made this post of questions. As I understand, the conclusion of the argument from truth is "Truth is God. Therefore, God exists." I suppose my questions are somewhat technicalities in argumentation, but I am trying to see how "being" fits into the equation without drawing a formal fallacy in the conclusion of the argument, i.e., I am trying to put together the last pieces so that I could turn it into a formal argument if someone desired me to do so (one could change the argument to: "The Mind that holds the truth is God. Therefore, God exists." But see my questions in the linked post.).

With regards to (2), which is related to (3), I wrote...



Afterthought said:


> A tricky thing is: Whether these arguments [for the communicable attributes] should be predicated of truth or of the Mind which holds the truth? And there is the issue of arguing that truth is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable *being*; it would seem one requires a Mind in order for there to be being, unless we predicate being of all eternal unchangeable concepts.


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## MW (Jul 11, 2016)

OK. Sorry about my slowness. I am not good at jumping in and out of metaphysics, especially when I am intermingling languages at the same time.

I would say there is a leap from "truth is God" to "God exists." "Truth exists" would need to serve as a middle term. This is established by the ontological argument. My understanding is that the ontological argument is useful precisely because it deals with the subject of being. Other "perfections" are spoken of as if they had being. Appeals are made to them in epistemology, ethics, etc., without grounding their existence in anything. The OA basically shows that perfection is presupposed to exist in all of these appeals, and so the denial of the existence of perfection itself undermines all appeal to perfection. Essentially, then, the ontological argument is functioning as a "presuppositional" or "a priori" apologetic. In foundationalist terms, it manifests the basic belief that perfect being must exist as a pre-condition of rationality, morality, etc.


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## Afterthought (Jul 12, 2016)

[I might miss something here; I haven't had a chance to look at Shedd yet, and tomorrow looks like it will be twice as busy as today...]




MW said:


> I would say there is a leap from "truth is God" to "God exists." "Truth exists" would need to serve as a middle term. This is established by the ontological argument. My understanding is that the ontological argument is useful precisely because it deals with the subject of being. Other "perfections" are spoken of as if they had being. Appeals are made to them in epistemology, ethics, etc., without grounding their existence in anything. The OA basically shows that perfection is presupposed to exist in all of these appeals, and so the denial of the existence of perfection itself undermines all appeal to perfection.


How interesting! It would seem that I too had assumed that perfection had being: seeing how I had thought we had already shown truth exists. Could you explain a bit more/maybe give an example of how the denial of the existence of a perfection undermines the appeal to that perfection?

If the OA is key to making this foundationalist argument, I wonder what advantage the foundationalist argument has then? Perhaps, simply, that more people agree that truth exists, than those that do not? I'm not entirely sure the OA is needed though. The OA says that a Being of all perfections exists because existence is a perfection. Whereas, we need only show truth exists. If someone denies that truth exists, they are making a truth claim. If they say truth just "is," they are again making a truth claim. If they say truth is a human concept, then that too is a truth claim which is unreal if truth is just a human concept. So truth is presupposed to exist, unless we deny the possibility of knowledge (since knowledge presupposes true belief), in which case we run into the usual counter against skepticism. I don't see how this form of argumentation relies on the OA, unless this form of argumentation merely shows truth is "real" rather than "exists" (if that is even a valid distinction)?

I suppose if the OA is needed, then one will need to defend that existence is a perfection, i.e., that being is good. If one denies being is good or says that being is neither good nor evil--it just is, it seems to me that such a person is relying on the goodness of his or her own being in order to make the claim. However, if someone is stubborn over this matter, I am not sure how to demonstrate that a person is presupposing the goodness of his or her own being when that person states that being just "is" or is not good (not good in itself; it is bad when one has ill-being; only well-being is good). Do you have any suggestions for demonstrating the goodness of being?


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## MW (Jul 12, 2016)

As far as I can see foundationalism is appealing to common sense or intuition, that is, something everyone is supposed to accept, whereas the ontological argument is seeking to establish a proof.

Shedd's essay is helpful. The ontological argument was neglected because the a posteriori (effect to cause) arguments came to have a superior place in philosophy. Shedd urged its reconsideration by showing the importance of the a priori mind. He noted how the exclusivity of the a posteriori arguments went hand in hand with the rise of materialism (something Dabney's work on the Sensualistic Philosophy demonstrates). The a priori will have significance insofar as individuals are conscious of their own minds and their capabilities.

How does this relate to foundationalism? Consciousness of one's own mind and of other minds is a basic belief. Our a priori cognitive equipment gives credence to the necessary existence of certain ideas. Realism teaches a correspondence between those ideas and the real world. E.g., cause and effect.

Imagine if, while speaking to you, I were to question your existence. Likewise, appeal to certain ideas, whilst denying their real existence, is self-refuting. Although the ideas cannot be justified a posteriori (from effect to cause), no knowledge could be justified without them, not even a posteriori arguments.

I suppose foundationalism can give common sense support to the OA, and the OA can provide evidence for the realism which undergirds basic beliefs. That is just a tentative suggestion.


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## Afterthought (Jul 13, 2016)

MW said:


> I suppose foundationalism can give common sense support to the OA, and the OA can provide evidence for the realism which undergirds basic beliefs. That is just a tentative suggestion.


I see. I guess the foundationalism shows that, e.g., truth must have being in order for us to have knowledge; since we have knowledge, truth must have being. While the OA goes in the other direction: our idea of truth implies its necessary existence and therefore actual, real existence. So in the end, it would seem the OA is not needed in making foundationalist arguments, but it may be useful in showing _why_ our basic beliefs correspond to reality, as opposed to just showing the necessity of their existence for us to have knowledge. (I really do prefer to avoid the OA; despite its brilliance, it is difficult to argue for its premises when people without philosophical knowledge dispute them; perhaps though only slightly more difficult than arguing for truth's communicable attributes.) Am I reading you correctly?

It is interesting thinking about the subjective pull of these arguments. In a culture that has thought much about rationality and truth, arguing from truth works well. In a culture that has thought much about wisdom, I would think that attribute would be useful for showing God's existence. 

I got a chance to read Shedd. I had read that article before towards the beginning of my study of philosophy, so it's interesting looking at it again now. He did not address how being is a perfection though (except insofar as to show that "necessary existence" is a proper predicate, in response to Kant), but assumed that being is good. How would you answer a skeptic about the goodness of being?

I wrote earlier, "If one denies being is good or says that being is neither good nor evil--it just is, it seems to me that such a person is relying on the goodness of his or her own being in order to make the claim. However, if someone is stubborn over this matter, I am not sure how to demonstrate that a person is presupposing the goodness of his or her own being when that person states that being just "is" or is not good (not good in itself; it is bad when one has ill-being; only well-being is good). Do you have any suggestions for demonstrating the goodness of being?"


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## MW (Jul 13, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Do you have any suggestions for demonstrating the goodness of being?"



Here is Boethius, in De Hebdomadibus: "Now the question is of this sort. Things which exist are good. For the common view of the learned holds that everything which exists tends toward good. But everything tends toward its like. Therefore, the things which tend toward good are themselves good."

In more general terms: everything seeks its own perfection; perfection presupposes a good to be perfected; ergo...

Ironically, even nihilism has to posit the nihil or nothing is good.


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## Afterthought (Jul 13, 2016)

MW said:


> In more general terms: everything seeks its own perfection; perfection presupposes a good to be perfected; ergo...


What if it is objected: Why can't something amoral seek perfection? The agent (the person) is moral, but the moral agent seeks perfection for its amoral being? And the perfection itself is amoral qualities, e.g., healthiness, wealth, quality of life?

What if it is objected: That not everything seeks its own perfection? That some things seek defects or that being doesn't seek anything: it just is? If someone says beings seek defects, I suppose one could point out that the being only does so on the belief that the defects are good; but how does one demonstrate that, not merely assert it as common sense, to a stubborn objector?


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## MW (Jul 13, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> What if it is objected: Why can't something amoral seek perfection? The agent (the person) is moral, but the moral agent seeks perfection for its amoral being?



Seeks perfection of WHAT? The WHAT must be considered good in order for it to be capable of perfection.



Afterthought said:


> What if it is objected: That not everything seeks its own perfection?



This is the irony of nihilism. Not seeking its own perfection would then be considered a "good," and this "good" would be pursued unto perfection.

As for seeking defection, it does so under the notion that it is seeking its perfection. Otherwise it could not be called a defection.


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## Afterthought (Jul 14, 2016)

MW said:


> Seeks perfection of WHAT? The WHAT must be considered good in order for it to be capable of perfection.


Could the WHAT be evil and be capable of perfection? Or maybe the WHAT is amoral, and it is not perfection of being that is desired, but perfection of the person? Perhaps it would be helpful to explain what is meant by "perfection."



MW said:


> This is the irony of nihilism. Not seeking its own perfection would then be considered a "good," and this "good" would be pursued unto perfection.
> 
> As for seeking defection, it does so under the notion that it is seeking its perfection. Otherwise it could not be called a defection.


I'm not following you on how it could not be called a defection. It would seem a defection would be an adding of defects, so I do not see how it is done under the notion of seeking perfection.

How is it shown that not seeking perfection, i.e., one's being is amoral and remains amoral with nothing good or evil in it, would be considered "good"? In the case of noting that nihilism is pursued to "perfection," does one observe what people do, and make a general conclusion, or does one only observe what oneself does?


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## MW (Jul 14, 2016)

If something is "evil" it is "not good," and by definition assumes goodness of being because of its privative nature, which we established previously from Augustine.

The same applies to a "defect." A defect is a defect of something held to be ideally good.

There cannot be amorality where the will is involved. The will is an inclination to good. The exercise of the will is the self-determination of the person; and personhood itself is regarded as a good, otherwise we would not have all this clamour over individual's rights.


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## Afterthought (Jul 15, 2016)

Ah, I think I see now. I was even wondering whether it might be proper to argue that "death" and "ill-being" cannot be viewed as evil if being just "is" and is an amoral entity? Perhaps given the aversion to murder, it might be argued that the wrongness of murder in part presupposes the goodness of being (strictly speaking, the goodness of a particular kind of being; so perhaps not good for showing the matter in general); I suppose it might be countered that it merely presupposes the wrong of doing something against someone's will, which would be tricky to argue as being a part of a person's being.



MW said:


> There cannot be amorality where the will is involved. The will is an inclination to good. The exercise of the will is the self-determination of the person; and personhood itself is regarded as a good, otherwise we would not have all this clamour over individual's rights.


And if someone argues that personhood is not "being," strictly speaking, but is grounded upon being, which being is an amoral entity?



MW said:


> If something is "evil" it is "not good," and by definition assumes goodness of being because of its privative nature, which we established previously from Augustine.


I was hoping to establish Augustine's view on the basis of being being good, especially since that's partly how Augustine arrived at his view. I suppose Augustine's view will have to be established on other grounds in order to argue the goodness of being with someone who stubbornly objects to its having a moral condition or to its being good.


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## MW (Jul 15, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> I was hoping to establish Augustine's view on the basis of being being good, especially since that's partly how Augustine arrived at his view. I suppose Augustine's view will have to be established on other grounds in order to argue the goodness of being with someone who stubbornly objects to its having a moral condition or to its being good.



I am content to move in a circle at that point, since we are circumscribed by the fact of created existence, and created existence owes its being to the goodness of the Creator's will. If anyone desires to move outside of the circle, they will have to explain how it is possible that something comes out of nothing. Only when they can explain that impossibility can they stand as an authority to explain how being is not in itself good. But even then, why explain anything if being is not good. Explanation itself is proof of the fact since being is considered worthy of explanation. And what purpose is explanation serving if it is not part of the movement of being seeking its own perfection? Which brings us back to the irony of nihilism.


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## Afterthought (Jul 15, 2016)

MW said:


> I am content to move in a circle at that point, since we are circumscribed by the fact of created existence, and created existence owes its being to the goodness of the Creator's will. If anyone desires to move outside of the circle, they will have to explain how it is possible that something comes out of nothing. Only when they can explain that impossibility can they stand as an authority to explain how being is not in itself good. But even then, why explain anything if being is not good. Explanation itself is proof of the fact since being is considered worthy of explanation. And what purpose is explanation serving if it is not part of the movement of being seeking its own perfection? Which brings us back to the irony of nihilism.


Good points. We do tend to explain everything though, which supposes the inherent worth of everything; indeed, I wonder whether saying something "just is" is itself an explanation. I suppose a problem could arise if the objector doubts the Creator's goodness or doubts that a good Creator necessarily implies that all aspects of the creation is good--rather than some things, like being--that which is required for existence but neither good nor evil in itself--being amoral.

Incidentally, I thought creation was a matter of special revelation? It would seem we could reason back to the fact of creation by noting that nothing comes from nothing, and that our world is not eternal (since it is subject to the condition of time).


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## MW (Jul 15, 2016)

Afterthought said:


> Incidentally, I thought creation was a matter of special revelation? It would seem we could reason back to the fact of creation by noting that nothing comes from nothing, and that our world is not eternal (since it is subject to the condition of time).



That sounds right. Certain facts about creation can be shown to be reasonable because reason itself depends upon them (e.g., cosmological, teleological, moral arguments, etc.). But the constitutive acts of creation (the fiats) would require special revelation, Heb. 11:3.


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## Afterthought (Jul 15, 2016)

MW said:


> That sounds right. Certain facts about creation can be shown to be reasonable because reason itself depends upon them (e.g., cosmological, teleological, moral arguments, etc.). But the constitutive acts of creation (the fiats) would require special revelation, Heb. 11:3.


Well, thanks for the good discussion and for the time you have put into it (a one month long thread!)! (And thanks, Earl, for popping in!) I have found this thread very helpful. I think I am satisfied for now. If I think of further questions, I may ask them here, but I will likely reserve them for a future thread.

Unfortunately, a situation I know of is one in which the goodness of the Creator is doubted; if I appeal to the goodness of and preservation of being as evidence of the goodness of the Creator, the goodness of being is doubted (being is affirmed as amoral)! Hopefully, some of the thoughts in this thread will prove useful in the matter, especially as I continue to reflect on them and try to make them sharper in my mind. I find it interesting that all these matters (dualism, privative nature of evil, goodness of Creator, goodness of being, foundationalism and the OA) are tied together in such a way. They seem to be fundamental presuppositions--a web of fundamental beliefs--that come together as a package. I probably would not have noticed that beforehand.


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## MW (Jul 15, 2016)

Thankyou for the discussion, Raymond. I hadn't realised it had been a month. It is good to go over and refresh some of these things, especially the points made by Augustine and Boethius. Blessings!


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