# Benedict Pictet on the natural knowledge of God, innate and acquired



## Reformed Covenanter (Jul 16, 2020)

From what has been said, it appears that we can, by the power of nature, know God, and that God himself is the author of this knowledge, both by that notion of himself which he has engraven on the minds of all men, and by the excellent works he has done, from the contemplation of which it necessarily follows that God exists. Hence it is that the natural knowledge of God may be considered in two points of view, as _innate_ and _acquired_.

The _innate_ notion of the Deity is that which is so peculiar to man, that, as soon as he is capable of using his reason, he cannot avoid very often thinking of God, and is not able entirely to reject the thoughts of him, although he sometimes may attempt it. The _acquired_ notion is that which is drawn from the careful observation of created things. ...

For the reference, see Benedict Pictet on the natural knowledge of God, innate and acquired.


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## jwithnell (Jul 16, 2020)

The classic formulation of God giving us knowledge of himself through general and special revelation has been all I've considered over the years. Lately, though, I've been thinking that general revelation gives to us more than knowledge; creation is a place that God intended to meet with us. You see during the fall (Gen 3) that man was not startled at the notion that God was walking in the garden. After the fall, the imaginary in text such as 104 and Isaiah 40 suggest a close relationship to the creation. The puritans seemed to recognize this; their letters show a proclivity to walking in nature as they meditated upon a text (a rich association for me too.)

Anyway, I go around in circles here to suggest that man's reason should not be the central focus. That God both reveals himself and offers the opportunity to meet with him in the creation. The fall ruins both and without the illumination of the Holy Spirit, we would see neither the revelation nor the meeting space. Our condemnation comes because even the fallen sense something of the grandeur of God in his creation. But our natural tendency would be to suppress the truth in unrighteousness.

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## jwright82 (Jul 16, 2020)

jwithnell said:


> The classic formulation of God giving us knowledge of himself through general and special revelation has been all I've considered over the years. Lately, though, I've been thinking that general revelation gives to us more than knowledge; creation is a place that God intended to meet with us. You see during the fall (Gen 3) that man was not startled at the notion that God was walking in the garden. After the fall, the imaginary in text such as 104 and Isaiah 40 suggest a close relationship to the creation. The puritans seemed to recognize this; their letters show a proclivity to walking in nature as they meditated upon a text (a rich association for me too.)
> 
> Anyway, I go around in circles here to suggest that man's reason should not be the central focus. That God both reveals himself and offers the opportunity to meet with him in the creation. The fall ruins both and without the illumination of the Holy Spirit, we would see neither the revelation nor the meeting space. Our condemnation comes because even the fallen sense something of the grandeur of God in his creation. But our natural tendency would be to suppress the truth in unrighteousness.


How Vantillian of you! Also wouldn't our knowledge of God be more than our knowledge of say a cup sitting on the counter? Two different kinds of knowledge. Great post!


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## TylerRay (Jul 16, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Also wouldn't our knowledge of God be more than our knowledge of say a cup sitting on the counter? Two different kinds of knowledge.


Can you hash that out?


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## jwright82 (Jul 18, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Can you hash that out?


Sure. My knowledge of a cup sitting on the counter is limited to certain aspects of reality. My cup "functions" in these limited aspects, exists with a purpose. I can use it's physical aspects to hold a liquid or pens or change. But it won't get mad if I accidentally break it.
A person also functions with in the aspects as well, they would get mad if I accidentally "broke" them. In fact that's a crime. So two different "things" two different kinds of knowledge. I'm worried if my coworkers are mad that I don't clean up after myself but could care less about the cup. My knowledge is personal with regards to my coworkers, person to person. 
God being a person has similar kinds knowledge in a person to person relationship but I've never "physically" met him or had a conversation with him. I don't talk to him about his grandfather being sick or his wife leaving him. My relationship is different between my cup, coworker, and God. Three different types of relationships between three different "things". 
But sin distorts these relationships. If I think of using my coworkers the same as my cup than I've reduced them to a thing, not somebody (a person). If I think of using God as a thing (health and wealth type thinking) I have reduced him to a thing, not the ultimate somebody.


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## TylerRay (Jul 20, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Sure. My knowledge of a cup sitting on the counter is limited to certain aspects of reality. My cup "functions" in these limited aspects, exists with a purpose. I can use it's physical aspects to hold a liquid or pens or change. But it won't get mad if I accidentally break it.
> A person also functions with in the aspects as well, they would get mad if I accidentally "broke" them. In fact that's a crime. So two different "things" two different kinds of knowledge. I'm worried if my coworkers are mad that I don't clean up after myself but could care less about the cup. My knowledge is personal with regards to my coworkers, person to person.
> God being a person has similar kinds knowledge in a person to person relationship but I've never "physically" met him or had a conversation with him. I don't talk to him about his grandfather being sick or his wife leaving him. My relationship is different between my cup, coworker, and God. Three different types of relationships between three different "things".
> But sin distorts these relationships. If I think of using my coworkers the same as my cup than I've reduced them to a thing, not somebody (a person). If I think of using God as a thing (health and wealth type thinking) I have reduced him to a thing, not the ultimate somebody.


Those aren't three different kinds of knowledge; that's knowledge of three different kinds of things. You know each of these three things the same way. It's a distinction in metaphysics, not in epistemology.

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## jwright82 (Jul 22, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Those aren't three different kinds of knowledge; that's knowledge of three different kinds of things. You know each of these three things the same way. It's a distinction in metaphysics, not in epistemology.


That's simply semantics. Three kinds of knowledge is effectively the same as knowledge of three different things. But knowledge of God is qualitatively different from knowledge of anything else. Your point and the problem you point to is merely linguistic.


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## TylerRay (Jul 22, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> That's simply semantics. Three kinds of knowledge is effectively the same as knowledge of three different things. But knowledge of God is qualitatively different from knowledge of anything else. Your point and the problem you point to is merely linguistic.


No, sir. There's a big difference in what something is (a question of metaphysics) and knowing that thing (a question of epistemology).

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## jwright82 (Jul 22, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> No, sir. There's a big difference in what something is (a question of metaphysics) and knowing that thing (a question of epistemology).


What you wrote was merely a difference linguistically. I agree there is a difference between metaphysics and epistemology.


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## TylerRay (Jul 22, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> What you wrote was merely a difference linguistically. I agree there is a difference between metaphysics and epistemology.


You listed ontological differences between a cup, a man, and God, and said that because they are different things, we must have three different kinds of knowledge whereby we know each thing respectively. That's a confusion of metaphysics with epistemology.

Does it take a different kind of knowledge to know a glass cup vs a plastic cup? What about a plastic cup vs a Rottweiler? A Rottweiler vs a man? A man vs a woman?

There are important metaphysical differences between each of these. Does that imply that we have different kinds of knowledge whereby we know them?

One more question--how do you distinguish one type of knowledge from another? Is it only distinguished by the object of the knowledge, or does each kind of knowledge have distinct qualities?


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## jwright82 (Jul 22, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> You listed ontological differences between a cup, a man, and God, and said that because they are different things, we must have three different kinds of knowledge whereby we know each thing respectively. That's a confusion of metaphysics with epistemology.
> 
> Does it take a different kind of knowledge to know a glass cup vs a plastic cup? What about a plastic cup vs a Rottweiler? A Rottweiler vs a man? A man vs a woman?
> 
> ...


All linguistic differences. you know things the way you know things.


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## jwright82 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> You listed ontological differences between a cup, a man, and God, and said that because they are different things, we must have three different kinds of knowledge whereby we know each thing respectively. That's a confusion of metaphysics with epistemology.
> 
> Does it take a different kind of knowledge to know a glass cup vs a plastic cup? What about a plastic cup vs a Rottweiler? A Rottweiler vs a man? A man vs a woman?
> 
> ...


I see your point and I think I know what you're getting at. If I'm wrong here please correct me. You seem to be making knowledge the fixed point here and ontology the relative point (my knowledge is fixed and I only "know"different things). This seems to be, and again correct me if im wrong, exactly the debates that the Rationalists and Empiricists were having. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz says all knowledge is known by reason. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all knowledge is known by our senses. 

Romanticism says all knowledge is known through our feelings. I know this is a simplistic survey of the the debates in the "epistemological turn" in philosophy but I'm writing a response not a text book. In all those cases knowledge was the fixed thing and ontology was relative in the sense of how does my fixed way of knowing know this thing over that thing. Fast forward through Kant's "synthesis" and Hegel and let's look Existentialism and Postmodernism. 

For Existentialism they in general saw two distinct "beings" in this world. Beings-towards something (living things mainly human beings) vs "things at hand" Heidegger or beings-for-themselves and beings-in-themselves Sartre. They took the subject/object relationship and added a new element to it that the Rationalists and Empiricists generally didn't. The subject isn't just a "knowing thing" it has goals, desires, and seeks a purpose. Unlike the cup or even an animal it can ask these questions and desires to seek answers. The things out there are merely there to facilitate that quest, which is survival and answers to those questions. In general the only morality they had was your a subject and I'm a subject so don't treat me like an object (quite selfish because so what if I treat you like an object, just don't do that to me).

Now the grandchildren and great grandchildren of Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and Existentialism added a moral concept to this in the face of the Holocaust, the Postmodernists. I'm not an object and you're not an object, so how then do we "know" and with that treat eachother in a fundamentaly different way than how I "know"or treat a cup? The face of the "other" was a question Levinas asked in this vein. But notice with this added element we have made my knowledge of a person both more complex and qualitatively different from my knowledge of a cup. How do I know you through your face? 

Our knowledge of God is by definition qualitatively distinct from my knowledge of other people or things so I won't explain that one. Sorry for lengthy and oversimplified crash course in modern philosophy but it's necessary for anyone not that aquainted with these things. I try to post for everyones benefit. If I got your point wrong than please correct me. But I hope that "hashes out" my point better and shows the historical reason for it. If you or anyone has any questions feel free to ask.


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## TylerRay (Jul 28, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> I see your point and I think I know what you're getting at. If I'm wrong here please correct me. You seem to be making knowledge the fixed point here and ontology the relative point (my knowledge is fixed and I only "know"different things). This seems to be, and again correct me if im wrong, exactly the debates that the Rationalists and Empiricists were having. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz says all knowledge is known by reason. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all knowledge is known by our senses.
> 
> Romanticism says all knowledge is known through our feelings. I know this is a simplistic survey of the the debates in the "epistemological turn" in philosophy but I'm writing a response not a text book. In all those cases knowledge was the fixed thing and ontology was relative in the sense of how does my fixed way of knowing know this thing over that thing. Fast forward through Kant's "synthesis" and Hegel and let's look Existentialism and Postmodernism.
> 
> ...


My point is that knowledge is warranted/justified, true belief. We know things, in the proper sense of the term, propositionally, either through the intellect alone, or through the intellect working with the senses. My knowledge of cups, men, and God consists of sets of warranted, true beliefs (propositions). I know them the same way, even though they are different things.


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## jwright82 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> My point is that knowledge is warranted/justified, true belief. We know things, in the proper sense of the term, propositionally, either through the intellect alone, or through the intellect working with the senses. My knowledge of cups, men, and God consists of sets of warranted, true beliefs (propositions). I know them the same way, even though they are different things.


Yeah and this would be as you know a difference between continental and Anglo-saxon philosophy. I think you use the word know differentially from the way im using it. You seem to be using it more methodologicaly, how I know that a belief is true or warranted. I don't have any issues with that but I'm using it qualitatively (my knowledge of one kind of thing is qualitatively different from my knowledge of another kind of thing). You can still accept my broad stroke view and use your method to show a belief about those things is warranted. I'm emphasizing one aspect of the knowledge situation and you another. From your aspect all beliefs are warranted the same way. But from my aspect they are intuitively different kinds of beliefs. Im using "knowledge" in an existential way, that might clear things.


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## TylerRay (Jul 28, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Yeah and this would be as you know a difference between continental and Anglo-saxon philosophy. I think you use the word know differentially from the way im using it. You seem to be using it more methodologicaly, how I know that a belief is true or warranted. I don't have any issues with that but I'm using it qualitatively (my knowledge of one kind of thing is qualitatively different from my knowledge of another kind of thing). You can still accept my broad stroke view and use your method to show a belief about those things is warranted. I'm emphasizing one aspect of the knowledge situation and you another. From your aspect all beliefs are warranted the same way. But from my aspect they are intuitively different kinds of beliefs. Im using "knowledge" in an existential way, that might clear things.


I'm not talking about how we know that a belief is true; I'm talking about what knowledge is. If knowledge is belief, and beliefs can be reduced to propositions, then one piece of knowledge (one belief/proposition) is not qualitatively different from another. It's the same kind of thing. It may be a belief/proposition about one thing, as opposed to a belief/proposition about another thing, but that doesn't change the fact that both beliefs/propositions are the same in kind, though they differ in content.


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## jwright82 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> I'm not talking about how we know that a belief is true; I'm talking about what knowledge is. If knowledge is belief, and beliefs can be reduced to propositions, then one piece of knowledge (one belief/proposition) is not qualitatively different from another. It's the same kind of thing. It may be a belief/proposition about one thing, as opposed to a belief/proposition about another thing, but that doesn't change the fact that both beliefs/propositions are the same in kind, though they differ in content.


Well I don't believe all knowledge is propositional. Some of our most sacred beliefs are not straightforwardly propositional. I mean you can "rotate" any belief, if that's the right word, to be propositional. But that really just makes "propositional" almost tautological in nature, it doesn't really tells anything. Yes propositions are the same but I don't think simply having "propositions" about something exhausts the meaningfullness of it. It is "propositionaly" " true" that Mozart was technically a better composer and piano player than Beethoven but I listen to moonlight sonata and it's truly better than any piano concerto Mozart wrote.
So although I agree with much of what you're saying I think "knowledge" and "truth" are way more complex than that. Existential captures my view a little better. I don't see how a "propositional" view helps one adjudicate something like "a women's intuition" or other colloquial beliefs we find so meaningful?


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## TylerRay (Jul 28, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Well I don't believe all knowledge is propositional. Some of our most sacred beliefs are not straightforwardly propositional. I mean you can "rotate" any belief, if that's the right word, to be propositional. But that really just makes "propositional" almost tautological in nature, it doesn't really tells anything. Yes propositions are the same but I don't think simply having "propositions" about something exhausts the meaningfullness of it. It is "propositionaly" " true" that Mozart was technically a better composer and piano player than Beethoven but I listen to moonlight sonata and it's truly better than any piano concerto Mozart wrote.
> So although I agree with much of what you're saying I think "knowledge" and "truth" are way more complex than that. Existential captures my view a little better. I don't see how a "propositional" view helps one adjudicate something like "a women's intuition" or other colloquial beliefs we find so meaningful?


Intuition isn't a belief. It may inform a belief, but it isn't a belief. If I were to ask you what you believe (or what you know) about any given thing, you would start telling me propositions.


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## jwright82 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Intuition isn't a belief. It may inform a belief, but it isn't a belief. If I were to ask you what you believe (or what you know) about any given thing, you would start telling me propositions.


Well I do you think you can form a belief from intuition, I mean if you can reduce "love" to propossitions I'm not sure that matters much or could be exspressiable "propositionaly" to a cute couple sitting alone in a coffee shop staring with glassy eyes at one another. 
What about poetry? What's propositional about that? Again if you're strictly talking method we don't disagree. But where does that leave our philosophically inclined cute couple staring glassy eyed at one another in a coffee shop?


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## TylerRay (Jul 28, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Well I do you think you can form a belief from intuition, I mean if you can reduce "love" to propossitions I'm not sure that matters much or could be exspressiable "propositionaly" to a cute couple sitting alone in a coffee shop staring with glassy eyes at one another.
> What about poetry? What's propositional about that? Again if you're strictly talking method we don't disagree. But where does that leave our philosophically inclined cute couple staring glassy eyed at one another in a coffee shop?


I agree that knowledge can be gained via intuition.

Love isn't a belief; it's an affection. You can know (believe) that you have that affection, and you can express it propositionally: "I love you."


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## jwright82 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> I agree that knowledge can be gained via intuition.
> 
> Love isn't a belief; it's an affection. You can know (believe) that you have that affection, and you can express it propositionally: "I love you."


Ok but does it make it less true for the cute couple who believe they are experiencing love but can't propositionaly spell it out? I'm not disagreeing that proper "knowledge" isn't propositional only that knowledge can't be confined to that. It's not simple. I know I'm taking liberties with how we use the word "love" but I'm trying to show that it can't reduced to mere propositions and yet still count as knowledge. Hence my example what endless philosophical debates would it take to convince them they didn't know they were in love?


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## TylerRay (Jul 28, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Ok but does it make it less true for the cute couple who believe they are experiencing love but can't propositionaly spell it out? I'm not disagreeing that proper "knowledge" isn't propositional only that knowledge can't be confined to that. It's not simple. I know I'm taking liberties with how we use the word "love" but I'm trying to show that it can't reduced to mere propositions and yet still count as knowledge. Hence my example what endless philosophical debates would it take to convince them they didn't know they were in love?


If they don't _know _that they are in love, then they don't have _knowledge _of it. It may be that they are in love and don't yet realize it, but that only means that the affection is present without them being cognizant of the fact.


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## jwright82 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> If they don't _know _that they are in love, then they don't have _knowledge _of it. It may be that they are in love and don't yet realize it, but that only means that the affection is present without them being cognizant of the fact.


That seems like semantics to me. The thought problem is they know they are in love but can't propositionaly prove it or explain it. Does that mean they have no knowledge of being in love (and their emotive, psychological, and biological senses are wrong) or do they in fact "know" and that is a problem for the "knowledge is only propositional" POV? It's a thought problem.


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## TylerRay (Jul 28, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> That seems like semantics to me. The thought problem is they know they are in love but can't propositionaly prove it or explain it. Does that mean they have no knowledge of being in love (and their emotive, psychological, and biological senses are wrong) or do they in fact "know" and that is a problem for the "knowledge is only propositional" POV? It's a thought problem.


Sorry, I see that I misunderstood your last post. I thought you were saying that the couple didn't know that they were in love.

A person knowing he's in love is as much as him thinking to himself, "I'm in love," which is a proposition/belief.

I don't know what it could mean that someone knows something (has a warranted true belief concerning something), but that the belief can't be expressed propositionally.

It's certainly true that a person can have a belief without being able to express it well, but that doesn't mean that it can't be reduced to propositions.


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## PezLad (Jul 28, 2020)

What are your guys thoughts on Gordon H Clarke; his trinity foundation has enlightened me much. I agree with him that all knowledge is propositional and that Jesus Christ is the Logic, the Reason, the Argument, the one and only Truth.


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## User20004000 (Jul 28, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Love isn't a belief; it's an affection.



_Love isn't a belief; it's an affection._

“Is love a fancy or a feeling... or a Ferrars?” _Marrianne Dashwood_

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## jwright82 (Jul 29, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Sorry, I see that I misunderstood your last post. I thought you were saying that the couple didn't know that they were in love.
> 
> A person knowing he's in love is as much as him thinking to himself, "I'm in love," which is a proposition/belief.
> 
> ...


I agree that some part of it can be propositional. But that really kind of reduces the value of propositional. So a question is all our knowledge reducable to propositions, as a kind sure foundation?


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## jwright82 (Jul 29, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Sorry, I see that I misunderstood your last post. I thought you were saying that the couple didn't know that they were in love.
> 
> A person knowing he's in love is as much as him thinking to himself, "I'm in love," which is a proposition/belief.
> 
> ...


Ask the starry eyed couple staring at eachother? Everyone else knows they're in love. Its propositional from the onlookers POV. But they could be in love without being able to express it, but if you cant express it (but it happens to be true) it isnt propositional.


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## jwright82 (Jul 29, 2020)

PezLad said:


> What are your guys thoughts on Gordon H Clarke; his trinity foundation has enlightened me much. I agree with him that all knowledge is propositional and that Jesus Christ is the Logic, the Reason, the Argument, the one and only Truth.


I admire and respect Clark. His work has benefited me. But I think that, respectively, his inability to understand the later Wittgenstein (which he says in his book on language) means his thought is somewhat philosophicaly dated. It doesn't make him bad only dated. Just my opinion.


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## TylerRay (Jul 29, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Ask the starry eyed couple staring at eachother? Everyone else knows they're in love. Its propositional from the onlookers POV. But they could be in love without being able to express it, but if you cant express it (but it happens to be true) it isnt propositional.


If they can't express it, they don't know it. They may have the affection without knowing it.



> So a question is all our knowledge reducable to propositions, as a kind sure foundation?


Yes, all knowledge is reducible to propositions. That's a truth that can't be gotten around. The moment a belief is formed (and knowledge is warranted, true belief), it can be reduced to a proposition.


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## TylerRay (Jul 29, 2020)

PezLad said:


> What are your guys thoughts on Gordon H Clarke; his trinity foundation has enlightened me much. I agree with him that all knowledge is propositional and that Jesus Christ is the Logic, the Reason, the Argument, the one and only Truth.


I like Clark, but I'm not a Clarkian, if you follow.


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## PezLad (Jul 29, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> I like Clark, but I'm not a Clarkian, if you follow.


I follow you; his discussion on Sense vs Perception is very practical; iniquity distorts (our perception of what we have sensed), we perceive the world, the physical world differently to other people. Sin is so dangerous because it deceives the mind. I have thought for a very long time that they way other people perceive the material world is identical to I, it is not, our minds "interpret" our senses. Just another reason we must live by faith, not by sight, not by senses, not our perception of our senses, only by the the word of God, the propositions therein.


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## jwright82 (Jul 30, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> If they can't express it, they don't know it. They may have the affection without knowing it.
> 
> 
> Yes, all knowledge is reducible to propositions. That's a truth that can't be gotten around. The moment a belief is formed (and knowledge is warranted, true belief), it can be reduced to a proposition.


This is gonna sound flipint but it's not than what good is the term knowledge? If we are gonna referee on people's commonsense experience, than we should do better. So how does this insistence on our couple not having knowledge of being in love because they cant express illuminate or advance our understanding of the epistemic situation? Because it seems without that than it's a tautologilogical circle to defend a particular philosopher's/philosophy POV but it doesn't get us outside that circle.


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## TylerRay (Jul 30, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> This is gonna sound flipint but it's not than what good is the term knowledge? If we are gonna referee on people's commonsense experience, than we should do better. So how does this insistence on our couple not having knowledge of being in love because they cant express illuminate or advance our understanding of the epistemic situation? Because it seems without that than it's a tautologilogical circle to defend a particular philosopher's/philosophy POV but it doesn't get us outside that circle.


I honestly am not sure what you're getting at. Usually, when someone comes to love another person, he comes to know that fact very soon, perhaps immediately. Common sense, and not philosophising, is where most of our knowledge comes from.


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## jwright82 (Jul 30, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> I honestly am not sure what you're getting at. Usually, when someone comes to love another person, he comes to know that fact very soon, perhaps immediately. Common sense, and not philosophising, is where most of our knowledge comes from.


What I'm getting at is that it seems you're saying they have no "knowledge" of being in love if they can't express it even they and everyone else "knows" it. It can be intuitionso knowledge as well. But if you, and this is just how it seems, want to restrict knowledge to a very narrow field that's fine and philosophicaly relevant. But my point is that kind of knowledge or whatever you want is certainly no matter you qualify it a didn't kind of knowledge than say my knowledge. My knowledge of being in love is not the same as my knowledge of a cup.


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## TylerRay (Jul 30, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> What I'm getting at is that it seems you're saying they have no "knowledge" of being in love if they can't express it even they and everyone else "knows" it. It can be intuitionso knowledge as well. But if you, and this is just how it seems, want to restrict knowledge to a very narrow field that's fine and philosophicaly relevant. But my point is that kind of knowledge or whatever you want is certainly no matter you qualify it a didn't kind of knowledge than say my knowledge. My knowledge of being in love is not the same as my knowledge of a cup.


Back to basics. How do you define knowledge? I define it as warranted, true belief.


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## User20004000 (Jul 30, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> If they can't express it, they don't know it. They may have the affection without knowing it.
> 
> 
> Yes, all knowledge is reducible to propositions. That's a truth that can't be gotten around. The moment a belief is formed (and knowledge is warranted, true belief), it can be reduced to a proposition.



_If they can't express it, they don't know it. They may have the affection without knowing it._

Tarzan needn’t be able to _express_ his knowledge for him to possess knowledge.

You’ve defined knowledge as “warranted, true belief.”

Assume Tarzan knows no words and therefore cannot express beliefs propositionally.

Given your definition of knowledge, why can’t Tarzan possess knowledge as easy as 1,2,3?

For instance:

1. Tarzan believes there is a vine in front of him.

2. It is true there is a vine in front of him.

3. Tarzan’s cognitive faculties are functioning properly in a suitable environment that is sufficiently similar to the one for which God created his cognitive faculties... (and all the rest you require for warrant).

If you agree that Tarzan can know without propositional expression, then the question about love is either the same sort of thing or else it’s a matter of defying propositional construction. If the latter, then it has nothing to do with the inability to express it.


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## TylerRay (Jul 30, 2020)

RWD said:


> _If they can't express it, they don't know it. They may have the affection without knowing it._
> 
> Tarzan needn’t be able to _express_ his knowledge for him to possess knowledge.
> 
> ...


Your Tarzan doesn't sound like any real human being. Every human being whose cognitive faculties function properly uses language.

I'm not saying, by the way, that knowledge is identical to propositions. I'm saying that it can be reduced to propositions. When I see my wife, and know she's in front of me, I don't typically think to myself (propositionally), "My wife is in front of me." However, my knowledge that she is in front of me can be reduced to the proposition, "My wife is in front of me." Looking back at my posts, I see I haven't been nearly as clear on that point as I could have been.


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## User20004000 (Jul 30, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Your Tarzan doesn't sound like any real human being. Every human being whose cognitive faculties function properly uses language.
> 
> I'm not saying, by the way, that knowledge is identical to propositions. I'm saying that it can be reduced to propositions. When I see my wife, and know she's in front of me, I don't typically think to myself (propositionally), "My wife is in front of me." However, my knowledge that she is in front of me can be reduced to the proposition, "My wife is in front of me."



_Your Tarzan doesn't sound like any real human being. Every human being whose cognitive faculties function properly uses language._

Firstly, you don’t know that to be true. Secondly, even if you did there are possible worlds in which the Tarzan scenario is true. Therefore, it warrants your attention given the claim that one cannot know without being able to express. Thirdly, even if all whose cognitive faculties function use language, that doesn’t prove that language-expression of knowledge is a necessary condition for knowledge. (False disjunction.) Lastly, humans must use language before knowing? _Tabula Rasa_ / Blank Slate? No _a priori_ knowledge? How do babies come to know language?


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## Unique Name (Jul 30, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> My point is that knowledge is warranted/justified, true belief. We know things, in the proper sense of the term, propositionally, either through the intellect alone, or through the intellect working with the senses. My knowledge of cups, men, and God consists of sets of warranted, true beliefs (propositions). I know them the same way, even though they are different things.


What about the gettier cases?


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## jwright82 (Jul 30, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> Back to basics. How do you define knowledge? I define it as warranted, true belief.


I can agree with that but what expressiabiality problem RWD and I have pointed out. Also I find that definition, although technically true, unsatisfactory because you must ignore or contradict ordinary uses of the word "know". Part of the later Wittgenstein's brilliance was attacking such a pristine picture of early linguistic philosophy on this path. Basically trying to make a pristine perfect logically air tight language was like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The more interesting stuff is how we behave and talk ordinarily. I'm not saying that such analytical discussions are not interesting, I have had my fair share of discussions on this website. 
But back to original problem if you accept (and everyone must) how we use the word "know" than it is unmistakable that there different kinds of knowing. Hence I know as one knows a cup, I know a person as one knows a person, and I know God as one knows God. Three different uses of the same word.


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## Unique Name (Jul 30, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> I can agree with that but what expressiabiality problem RWD and I have pointed out. Also I find that definition, although technically true, unsatisfactory because you must ignore or contradict ordinary uses of the word "know". Part of the later Wittgenstein's brilliance was attacking such a pristine picture of early linguistic philosophy on this path. Basically trying to make a pristine perfect logically air tight language was like throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The more interesting stuff is how we behave and talk ordinarily. I'm not saying that such analytical discussions are not interesting, I have had my fair share of discussions on this website.
> But back to original problem if you accept (and everyone must) how we use the word "know" than it is unmistakable that there different kinds of knowing. Hence I know as one knows a cup, I know a person as one knows a person, and I know God as one knows God. Three different uses of the same word.


Justified true belief as the definition of knowledge has holes though doesn't it? If my boss says that Tim will get the promotion, and I see that Tim has 10 coins in his pocket, so I form the belief "the individual who gets promoted has ten coins in his pocket". But I get the promotion instead, and I have 10 coins in my pocket. That is justified true belief. But totally based on false grounds.


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## jwright82 (Jul 31, 2020)

Unique Name said:


> Justified true belief as the definition of knowledge has holes though doesn't it? If my boss says that Tim will get the promotion, and I see that Tim has 10 coins in his pocket, so I form the belief "the individual who gets promoted has ten coins in his pocket". But I get the promotion instead, and I have 10 coins in my pocket. That is justified true belief. But totally based on false grounds.


Your referring to the geitter problem I don't know enough about them to comment. But my opinion is that as a strict analytical type definition to further investigation into epistemic matters it's a nice place to start but it must realize that it can't be applied to all types of beliefs. Some beliefs like my "cute couple on date" thought experiment and RWD's wonderful"Tarzan" thought experiment show situations where the necessary strict and limited definition of JTB defies intuitions and coomon sense. 
My other Wittgensteinian argument about how varied a use of a word shows the range of its meaning, is a reflection of the limited nature of JTB will inherently be. 
Not to mention is the statement "All knowledge is a JTB" itself a JTB? It would basically be a tautology to say so and circular reasoning. I enjoy my discussions with Tyler because they make me think. But I think these are insurmountable problems for the JTB philosophy, not that it's inherently wrong (intuitionally it has to be somewhat right) only ought to be limited in scope.


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## jwright82 (Jul 31, 2020)

Sorry worked late so I'm up late. I know I can speak for myself but I think RWD is with me here. We are not presenting geitter type problems to JTB where you take essentially false beliefs and show how they are in justified but taking beliefs that don't meet the requirements of JTB but to deny such beliefs as knowledge defies intuitions and commonsense and hence some restructuring of the theory is in order.


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## TylerRay (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> _Your Tarzan doesn't sound like any real human being. Every human being whose cognitive faculties function properly uses language._
> 
> Firstly, you don’t know that to be true. Secondly, even if you did there are possible worlds in which the Tarzan scenario is true. Therefore, it warrants your attention given the claim that one cannot know without being able to express. Thirdly, even if all whose cognitive faculties function use language, that doesn’t prove that language-expression of knowledge is a necessary condition for knowledge. (False disjunction.) Lastly, humans must use language before knowing? _Tabula Rasa_ / Blank Slate? No _a priori_ knowledge? How do babies come to know language?



I didn't claim that language precedes knowledge. I specifically denied that. If you look at my previous reply to you, I said:


> I'm not saying, by the way, that knowledge is identical to propositions. I'm saying that it can be reduced to propositions. When I see my wife, and know she's in front of me, I don't typically think to myself (propositionally), "My wife is in front of me." However, my knowledge that she is in front of me can be reduced to the proposition, "My wife is in front of me."



I do believe in _a priori _knowledge, but I don't believe that is innate in the sense of being fully formed in the mind from the womb. From the womb, the mind is _tabula rasa_, but it is not without a constitution. The epistemic faculties of the human mind, so soon as they are utilized, presuppose certain _a priori _truths.

Bavinck is very helpful on this point (v.1, p.225):


> From the outset the intellect is pure potentiality, a blank page (_tabula rasa_) without any content, and is only activated, aroused to actuality, by the sensible world; it impinges upon the human mind, arouses it, urges it to action. But the moment the intellect is activated, it immediately and spontaneously works in its own way and according to its own nature. And the nature of the intellect is that it has the power (_vis_), ability (_facultas_), inclination (_inclinatio_), and fitness (_aptitudo_) to form certain basic concepts and principles. It does this by means of perception that is immediate, automatic, involuntary, and without any strain, previous effort, or exercise of reasoning power.



As for language, the faculty for language is inherent in the human constitution. You'd have to prove that universal human experience is mistaken to draw an argument from men whose cognitive abilities are fully functional but don't use language. As for your "possible worlds" argument, the humans in your possible world are apparently constituted with a different nature than we have. They don't have the same epistemic faculties.

As for babies, they have the inherent capacity for language, though they have not developed a facility with language. They naturally begin to use language as they develop. Though they don't have the facility with language to put their beliefs into propositional form, their beliefs, in and of themselves, are reducible to propositions.


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Sorry worked late so I'm up late. I know I can speak for myself but I think RWD is with me here. We are not presenting geitter type problems to JTB where you take essentially false beliefs and show how they are in justified but taking beliefs that don't meet the requirements of JTB but to deny such beliefs as knowledge defies intuitions and commonsense and hence some restructuring of the theory is in order.



Unique Name referred to Gettier problems but the example he gave doesn’t resemble one (at least in any typical sense). In the example he gave he offered two possible objects of knowledge. The _initial_ object of knowledge was the proposition contained in the sentence: Tim will get the promotion. Right off the bat that doesn’t end up being relevant to Gettier since the belief ended up being a false belief. I don’t think Unique Name was intending to use that as his Gettier example. He was just setting up the problem. 

The second object of knowledge pertained to his example of a Gettier problem. It contained an arbitrary inference: “the individual who gets promoted has ten coins in his pocket.”

Although that ends up being an unjustified true belief, the justification doesn’t present a Gettier problem because the belief is completely arbitrary. Recall, the justification was:


> If my boss says that Tim will get the promotion, and I see that Tim has 10 coins in his pocket, so I form the belief "the individual who gets promoted has ten coins in his pocket".



Gettier problems typically relate to beliefs that are true _and_ well supported by evidence but fail on the basis of insufficient warrant, not on the basis of total arbitrariness.

I see Gettier as a bigger problem for strict internalism and infalliblists.

But back to Tarzan and love. Tyler’s objection undermines his own sufficient condition for knowledge. He has now added the expression of knowledge and the use of language to warrant. That puts him on the horns of an epistemological dilemma. Why should we believe a child knows nothing until she expresses it in language? It’s seems rather intuitive that language enables the child to express what she may already know.

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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> I didn't claim that language precedes knowledge. I specifically denied that. If you look at my previous reply to you, I said:
> 
> 
> I do believe in _a priori _knowledge, but I don't believe that is innate in the sense of being fully formed in the mind from the womb. From the womb, the mind is _tabula rasa_, but it is not without a constitution. The epistemic faculties of the human mind, so soon as they are utilized, presuppose certain _a priori _truths.
> ...



Tyler,

I find your posts a bit scattered and internally incoherent. I‘m satisfied that you haven’t dealt adequately with your interlocutors. I see no need to continue.


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## TylerRay (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> Tyler,
> 
> I find your posts a bit scattered and internally incoherent. I‘m satisfied that you haven’t dealt adequately with your interlocutors. I see no need to continue.


How convenient.


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## TylerRay (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> Tyler’s objection undermines his own sufficient condition for knowledge. He has now added the expression of knowledge and the use of language to warrant. That puts him on the horns of an epistemological dilemma. Why should we believe a child knows nothing until she expresses it in language? It’s seems rather intuitive that language enables the child to express what she may already know.


You've misunderstood me entirety. Part of that was my fault, I'm not being sufficiently clear at the outset regarding the distinction of knowledge being _identical to propositions _and knowledge being_ reducible to propositions._

Nevertheless, I answered all of what you said here in post #44 (the one you've chosen not to respond to).


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> Your referring to the geitter problem I don't know enough about them to comment. But my opinion is that as a strict analytical type definition to further investigation into epistemic matters it's a nice place to start but it must realize that it can't be applied to all types of beliefs. Some beliefs like my "cute couple on date" thought experiment and RWD's wonderful"Tarzan" thought experiment show situations where the necessary strict and limited definition of JTB defies intuitions and coomon sense.
> My other Wittgensteinian argument about how varied a use of a word shows the range of its meaning, is a reflection of the limited nature of JTB will inherently be.
> Not to mention is the statement "All knowledge is a JTB" itself a JTB? It would basically be a tautology to say so and circular reasoning. I enjoy my discussions with Tyler because they make me think. But I think these are insurmountable problems for the JTB philosophy, not that it's inherently wrong (intuitionally it has to be somewhat right) only ought to be limited in scope.



_“Some beliefs like my "cute couple on date" thought experiment and RWD's wonderful"Tarzan" thought experiment show situations where the necessary strict and limited definition of JTB defies intuitions and coomon sense.”_

I don’t think my point with the Tarzan example contradicts JTB. Rather, it aimed to show that one can _possess_ sufficient warrant for true beliefs without being able to _express_ it. So, Tarzan can know a vine is in front of him without being able to express his JTB. Just like a child can know she’s in her mother’s arms without being able to express her JTB. Just like a person who doesn’t possess the Scriptures can still know God exists yet without being able to express her justification for her true belief in God.

The point was merely that this claim that you and I objected to is obviously false:

_“Therefore, If they can't express it, they don't know it.”_

That claim makes the common mistake of confusing (a) _having_ justification for belief in x with (b) the ability to _express_ justification for belief in x.


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> You've misunderstood me entirety. Part of that was my fault, I'm not being sufficiently clear at the outset regarding the distinction of knowledge being _identical to propositions _and knowledge being_ reducible to propositions._
> 
> Nevertheless, I answered all of what you said here in post #44 (the one you've chosen not to respond to).



So, this is false?

_“Therefore, If they can't express it, they don't know it.”_

And incidentally, when you say “I didn’t say x...” in response to my exposing x, I realize you didn’t say x. I was dealing with x because your position as stated _implies_ x.


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## TylerRay (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> So, this is false?
> 
> _“Therefore, If they can't express it, they don't know it.”_


An adult, with fully functioning cognitive faculties, will be able to express his knowledge. He may do it crudely, but he will be able to do it. This is true even when he cannot account for his knowledge or explain the warrant for it.


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## jwright82 (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> _“Some beliefs like my "cute couple on date" thought experiment and RWD's wonderful"Tarzan" thought experiment show situations where the necessary strict and limited definition of JTB defies intuitions and coomon sense.”_
> 
> I don’t think my point with the Tarzan example contradicts JTB. Rather, it aimed to show that one can _possess_ sufficient warrant for true beliefs without being able to _express_ it. So, Tarzan can know a vine is in front of him without being able to express his JTB. Just like a child can know she’s in her mother’s arms without being able to express her JTB. Just like a person who doesn’t possess the Scriptures can still know God exists yet without being able to express her justification for her true belief in God.
> 
> ...


I didn't mean to presume. I've had many problems the JTB only epistemological theory for years I even have a couple of arguments that might be described as "stretching" it but they'll have to wate. 
I don't think JTB only can account for the variety of ways we use the word "know" and I also think it fails Jame's pragmatic method of analyzing philosophical problems.


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

jwright82 said:


> I didn't mean to presume. I've had many problems the JTB only epistemological theory for years I even have a couple of arguments that might be described as "stretching" it but they'll have to wate.
> I don't think JTB only can account for the variety of ways we use the word "know" and I also think it fails Jame's pragmatic method of analyzing philosophical problems.



Keep in mind, JTB doesn’t address things like knowing how to golf. It pertains to propositional knowledge.


TylerRay said:


> An adult, with fully functioning cognitive faculties, will be able to express his knowledge. He may do it crudely, but he will be able to do it. This is true even when he cannot account for his knowledge or explain the warrant for it.





> “An adult, with fully functioning cognitive faculties, will be able to express his knowledge.”



It’s interesting that you’re now limiting this theory to adults. Seems to me you cannot sustain your theory as it applies to children. A robust theory wouldn’t need such qualification.* Your theory would also seem to rule out all externalist knowledge, like an adult’s knowledge of God through general revelation that she cannot explicate if she hasn’t been acquainted with special revelation. *

So, how can we say that all know God given that not all know their justification for their belief in God? Although all know God, not all know they are created in God’s image and that the Spirit reveals God’s invisible attributes through the things that are made. *Knowledge clearly doesn’t require the ability to express knowledge, even in adults.*



> “He may do it crudely, but he will be able to do it. This is true even when he cannot account for his knowledge or explain the warrant for it.”



Here are six wildly held cognitive faculties: perception, imagination, memory, reason, intuition and will. I don’t see expression of warrant on the list. In possible world W, Tarzan can know Jane is on the vine without ability to express it. If you’d only stop to consider, language expresses knowledge one already has.


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## jwright82 (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> Keep in mind, JTB doesn’t address things like knowing how to golf. It pertains to propositional knowledge.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Fair enough but the original question as I understood it was is all knowledge propositional and hence needs JTB to be considered knowledge. I say no for the reasons I've given. Fair enough as far as it goes.
The statement about golf I'm assuming is in reference to the pragmatism statement I made, fair again not actually what I was talking about.
James in his lectures published as "Pragmatism" states in the chapter entitled "what pragmatism means that "the Pragmatic method is a method of settling metaphysical disputes.....". 
So take my thought experiment and let's extend it out. Our cute couple goes year after to the same restaurant: first year a date, next year engaged, third year married, and on and on through all stages of life.
Now every year the local philosophy proffesser asks the same questions and their answer is the same "we can't give you justification for how we know we are in love, we just know that we know". 
James would say "so the dispute is over whether or not to ascribe the abstract term "knowledge" to their beliefs, the question is irrelevant because what difference does it make?" He'd go on "if the problem is either with the couple failing to give justification, despite living a life that intuition says is love, for their beliefs or a problem with the theory than there's a problem with theory."


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## TylerRay (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> It’s interesting that you’re now limiting this theory to adults. Seems to me you cannot sustain your theory as it applies to children. A robust theory wouldn’t need such qualification.


I'm not limiting it to adults. The knowledge of children is reducible to propositions, even when their cognitive powers aren't developed to the point that they can do it themselves.

Jamey's example was an example about adults. I applied my theory as it related to his example.

*



Your theory would also seem to rule out all externalist knowledge, like an adult’s knowledge of God through general revelation that she cannot explicate if she hasn’t been acquainted with special revelation.

Click to expand...

*


> So, how can we say that all know God given that not all know their justification for their belief in God? Although all know God, not all know they are created in God’s image and that the Spirit reveals God’s invisible attributes through the things that are made. *Knowledge clearly doesn’t require the ability to express knowledge, even in adults.*


As I said before, someone can have warranted knowledge without knowing what their warrant is. Part of the warrant for all foundational knowledge is the constitution of the human mind. Most people aren't aware of that, but they still rely upon it. In other words, you can know that something is true without being able to explain why it is true.



> If you’d only stop to consider, language expresses knowledge one already has.


I've affirmed that fact several times.


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> I'm not limiting it to adults. The knowledge of children is reducible to propositions, even when their cognitive powers aren't developed to the point that they can do it themselves.
> 
> Jamey's example was an example about adults. I applied my theory as it related to his example.
> 
> ...



“I've affirmed that fact several times.”

I think you’ve affirmed several things several times. I’m merely trying to reconcile things.

“Therefore, If they can't express it, they don't know it.” 

From that premise we can deduce by way of modus tollens: “if they do know it, they can express it.” Therefore, for you the expression of knowledge is a necessary condition for knowledge. (The consequent of an if-then proposition is a necessary condition for the antecedent.) You affirm that here: “An adult, with fully functioning cognitive faculties, will be able to express his knowledge.” and here: “He may do it crudely, but he will be able to do it.” That’s internalism. 

Yet later you said: “someone can have warranted knowledge without knowing what their warrant is.” That’s externalism.

First off, I’m pretty sure we’ve been talking about warranted belief, not warranted knowledge. Perhaps you are conflating first and second orders of belief. I’ll assume you mean “someone can have warranted true belief without knowing what their warrant is [for that true belief]. That would be relevant to the discussion. It is also *externalist* knowledge. 

Yet if someone can have externalist knowledge with respect to the object of knowledge - I am in love, then how can you also maintain your original internalist constraint that one *cannot* know he is in love without being able to express his knowledge? After all, what is it to express one’s knowledge of her love other than to give an *account* for her *warrant* for her true belief that she is in love, which you’ve said elsewhere one need NOT be able to do in order for knowledge to obtain?


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## TylerRay (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> “I've affirmed that fact several times.”
> 
> I think you’ve affirmed several things several times. I’m merely trying to reconcile things.
> 
> ...


It may help if I lay all my cards on the table, to let you know where I'm coming from.

My main influences, with regard to epistemology, are Herman Bavinck, A. H. Strong, and W. G. T. Shedd, with a smattering of Alvin Plantinga and Ronald Nash. I consider myself a foundationalist and a naive realist.

In terms of the relationship between knowledge, warrant, and expression, I believe:

That all knowledge can be expressed in propositional form. That's not to say that every "knower" can express his knowledge, but that all knowledge has a propositional equivalent.
That all knowledge, properly so called, is warranted.
That a person can have knowledge without being able to explain why it is warranted.
That most things we know, we know naively, without so much as considering the question of warrant.
A person may be in love (i.e. experience the affection) without knowing (believing) that he is in love.

Alternatively, if a person knows (believes) that he is in love, he will be able to express it: "I am in love."

In the case of recognizing an affection (such as love) in oneself, the fact is self-evident and incorrigible. That is to say, he can't know it without being conscious of the warrant for knowing it. The warrant is that he experiences the affection. There are other things that one can know without knowing the warrant they have for their knowledge. The existence of universals, or of God, is often known naively (i.e. without being conscious of the warrant one has for knowing them). In such cases, one has the proper epistemic foundations without knowing that he has them.

All of the above applies to people with fully developed, properly functioning epistemological equipment, including the cognitive faculties.

I sincerely hope this clarifies things. Could my thinking in these areas use some refining? Perhaps; but until that's demonstrated, I'm confident in the views I've embraced.

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## jwright82 (Jul 31, 2020)

TylerRay said:


> It may help if I lay all my cards on the table, to let you know where I'm coming from.
> 
> My main influences, with regard to epistemology, are Herman Bavinck, A. H. Strong, and W. G. T. Shedd, with a smattering of Alvin Plantinga and Ronald Nash. I consider myself a foundationalist and a naive realist.
> 
> ...


Well I appreciate you laying your cards on the table. I seem to be coming at those beliefs about love for instance that are not immediately recognizable to the person. They are unaware and may even deny it, but everybody else does so the third party could formulate propositions. But the first person couldn't/wouldn't so where that leaves JTB I don't know?


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

“Alternatively, if a person knows (believes) that he is in love, he will be able to express it: "I am in love."“

That seems simplistic to me. First off, believes is not equivalent to knows. So, I’m not sure why you’d express your point that way. I’ll deal with your statement by ignoring what you dropped in parentheses.

One can possess the warrant for the true belief that she’s in love yet simultaneously have enough doubt not to believe what she actually knows to be true. Knowledge isn’t always without reservation. Reservation can be the debilitating factor for expressing what we know, but that doesn’t necessarily undermine knowledge in such instances. 

There is serious consideration that ought to be given to belief conditionals. One might not believe she knows the answer to a test question. Yet she puts down the correct answer. She believes on one level she doesn’t know her answer is true. Yet she ends up being correct. If her answer wasn’t a lucky guess, then she had at least some justification for her belief that her answer was the best possible answer. Therefore, there can be enough warrant for her true belief in her answer of which she would not be cognizant of on another level. The point is, justifications for beliefs can often be masked. We can know some things that we don’t believe we know, and we at times can even believe (on another level) that we actually don’t know when in fact we do know. People often know more than they think. 

Thanks for the exchange, Brother. I think we might’ve learned a bit more about each other’s views. 

I enjoyed and am grateful for the exchange.

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## Unique Name (Jul 31, 2020)

RWD said:


> Unique Name referred to Gettier problems but the example he gave doesn’t resemble one (at least in any typical sense). In the example he gave he offered two possible objects of knowledge. The _initial_ object of knowledge was the proposition contained in the sentence: Tim will get the promotion. Right off the bat that doesn’t end up being relevant to Gettier since the belief ended up being a false belief. I don’t think Unique Name was intending to use that as his Gettier example. He was just setting up the problem.
> 
> The second object of knowledge pertained to his example of a Gettier problem. It contained an arbitrary inference: “the individual who gets promoted has ten coins in his pocket.”
> 
> ...


I was just giving a cruddy distillation of what I was taught by my UCB professor haha. If he's wrong or I am wrong in understanding the example he gave from the textbook, here is what was given to me in the textbook (I hope this isn't a distraction; thanks for the response):

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e) and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. Gettier concludes that in this case Smith has justified true belief in (e) but doesn't know (e) to be true. It's a matter of luck that he is correct. Other terms like "accidentally correct" or "correct as a matter of sheer coincidence" apply as well. (McGrath, _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction)_


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## User20004000 (Jul 31, 2020)

Unique Name said:


> I was just giving a cruddy distillation of what I was taught by my UCB professor haha. If he's wrong or I am wrong in understanding the example he gave from the textbook, here is what was given to me in the textbook (I hope this isn't a distraction; thanks for the response):
> 
> Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e) and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. Gettier concludes that in this case Smith has justified true belief in (e) but doesn't know (e) to be true. It's a matter of luck that he is correct. Other terms like "accidentally correct" or "correct as a matter of sheer coincidence" apply as well. (McGrath, _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction)_



I think your synopsis represents one of Gettier’s two original(?) problems well. The red barn Gettier problem (Goldman) is a more serious consideration. Other cases are also more serious. As a common denominator, fallibility and luck are in play. But philosophers have had the good sense to eliminate arbitrariness from the evidences. For instance the lucky justification in “red barn” is based upon *strong* evidence, unlike the arbitrary and irrelevant correlation of ten coins that is linked for no apparent or obvious reason to the truly reasonable justification for thinking Jones will get the job based upon the boss’ say so. Conjunctive propositions muddy the water and miss the force of the problem in my opinion.

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## jwright82 (Aug 1, 2020)

RWD said:


> _“Some beliefs like my "cute couple on date" thought experiment and RWD's wonderful"Tarzan" thought experiment show situations where the necessary strict and limited definition of JTB defies intuitions and coomon sense.”_
> 
> I don’t think my point with the Tarzan example contradicts JTB. Rather, it aimed to show that one can _possess_ sufficient warrant for true beliefs without being able to _express_ it. So, Tarzan can know a vine is in front of him without being able to express his JTB. Just like a child can know she’s in her mother’s arms without being able to express her JTB. Just like a person who doesn’t possess the Scriptures can still know God exists yet without being able to express her justification for her true belief in God.
> 
> ...


Well I still think there is good reason to doubt JTB as it relates to our most cherished beliefs. But i agree with everything you said.


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## jwright82 (Aug 1, 2020)

Unique Name said:


> I was just giving a cruddy distillation of what I was taught by my UCB professor haha. If he's wrong or I am wrong in understanding the example he gave from the textbook, here is what was given to me in the textbook (I hope this isn't a distraction; thanks for the response):
> 
> Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e) and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. Gettier concludes that in this case Smith has justified true belief in (e) but doesn't know (e) to be true. It's a matter of luck that he is correct. Other terms like "accidentally correct" or "correct as a matter of sheer coincidence" apply as well. (McGrath, _Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction)_


Yeah I would say that's true. There's so many other examples it's not funny.

Reactions: Like 1


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