# Apologetic Game Changing Book?



## ChristianTrader

The Clarity of God's Existence
The Ethics of Belief After the Enlightenment
by Owen Anderson

Description:
The Clarity of God's Existence examines the need for theistic proofs within historic Christianity, and the challenges to these since the Enlightenment. Historically (and scripturally), Christianity has maintained that unbelief is inexcusable. If failing to know God is a sin, the implication is that humans can and should know God. Humans should know God because his eternal power and divine nature are clearly revealed in the things that are made. And yet, Anderson argues, more time is spent on avoiding the need for clarity to establish inexcusability than on actually providing an argument or proof. Proofs that rely on Aristotle or Plato and that establish a Prime Mover or designer are thought to be sufficient. But the adequacy of these, not only to prove the God of theism, but also to prove anything at all, has been called into question by Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume.

After considering the traditional proofs, and tracing the history of challenges to theistic proofs (from Hume to Kant and down to the twentieth century), Anderson argues that the standard methods of apologetics have failed to sufficiently respond. Classical Apologetics, Evidentialism, Presuppositionalism, Reformed Epistemology, and others fail to adequately answer the challenges of the Enlightenment. If this is the case, what is the outcome for Christianity?

Anderson offers an explanation as to why traditional proofs have failed, and for what is necessary to offer a proof that not only responds to Hume and Kant but also establishes the clarity of God's existence. The traditional proofs failed precisely in not aiming at the clarity of God's existence, and they failed in this because of a faulty view of the goal of Christian life. If the blessed life is to be attained in a direct vision of God in heaven, then there is little to no reason to ask for more than the bare minimum required to get into heaven (justification). Furthermore, if the highest blessing is this direct vision, then the glory of God revealed in his work is considered as less important and even set aside. By way of contrast, if God's eternal power and divine nature are clearly revealed in his works, and the blessing comes in knowing God, then it is of the utmost importance for Christianity to demonstrate the clarity of God's existence.


https://wipfandstock.com/store/The_..._The_Ethics_of_Belief_After_the_Enlightenment


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## ChristianTrader

*Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function: The Inexcusability of Unbelief*

Here is a link to a paper that contrasts Dr. Anderson's project with Alvin Plantinga's

*Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function: The Inexcusability of Unbelief*
by Owen Anderson

Why do I need redemption? For what do I need to be forgiven? From what do I need to be saved? These questions posed to a Christian should elicit answers about sin, the punishment for sin, and the need for redemption. Yet is this account fair? Specifically, what is to be made of Reformed Epistemology and its well known advocate Alvin Plantinga? Does Plantinga's account of proper function make sense of the need for redemption, and preserve necessary concepts such as inexcusability, clarity, and rationality? In the following Plantinga's position will be described and then considered in light of the above questions. The assertion here is that Plantinga's position does not make sense of sin, or the need for redemption through the death of Christ. This is because on Plantinga’s view the unbeliever has an excuse for their unbelief, it is not clear that God exists, and human rationality is defective/not properly functioning. For the purposes of this paper it can be granted that Plantinga has established that theists are within their epistemic rights. This paper is not an argument against that aspect of Plantinga’s work, and some might say that that is all Plantinga was trying to do.

...

Quodlibet Online Journal: Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function: The Inexcusability of Unbelief - by Owen Anderson


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## owenanderson

*Clarity of God's Existence book*

Thank you for mentioning my book on this forum. I noticed that you also mentioned an older article I wrote about Alvin Plantinga. I have updated this article and used it as a chapter in another book of mine titled "Reason and Worldviews." 

If you've had a chance to read my book about the clarity of God's existence I'd like to hear your thoughts.

Owen Anderson


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## ChristianTrader

owenanderson said:


> Thank you for mentioning my book on this forum. I noticed that you also mentioned an older article I wrote about Alvin Plantinga. I have updated this article and used it as a chapter in another book of mine titled "Reason and Worldviews."
> 
> If you've had a chance to read my book about the clarity of God's existence I'd like to hear your thoughts.
> 
> Owen Anderson



I loved the book as well as your reason and worldviews book. I also read the book on basic beliefs by the guy who wrote the natural theology chapter of your reasons and worldviews book.

As a person coming from the Van Tillian viewpoint, it seemed to be somewhat of the next step. The unique thing about the Van Til project was how it seemed that he and his followers attempted to give the unbeliever no excuse while other "competitors" seemed to just go for Christianity being more probably than others.

Your project looks to be identical but instead of going by the way of transcendental argumentation (TAG), you focus more on just going from basic to less basic, so it is much easier to follow.

I have talked to a friend about your reason and worldview book and he has objected that your model does not work for infants and the mentally slow. We understand that they can be saved but if your model is right then they should not be able to be so.

I think that the objection would be akin to attacking Westminster confession ch. 1, for talking about the necessity of special revelation, but would like your view on it.

My biggest problem is that I have not read but so deep in philosophy past a few van tillian works, so I can't really see if your work is truly awesome or that I only think it is awesome due to my lack of philosophical depth.

Lastly, on your webpage it says that you are working on a new book. What does that work deal concerning?

CT


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## Semper Fidelis

Thanks for the heads up on this and welcome to the forum Owen.

I don't think I'll ever have the time to dive deep into philosophy but have read/listened to several histories of philosophy or of Western thought.

I've recently been going through the Institutes and find a certain simplicity and clarity in Calvin's simple assertions that man knows exactly what he's up to when he's supressing Truth.

I would never dismiss the work that those who are much more talented and studied than I put into working out a Reformed epistemology or apologetic but I often wonder what it achieves at a very ground level.

I find some of your summations very lucid, Hermonta, and I'm also looking forward to reading Owen's work when I get through a pile of other books that I need to read.


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## ChristianTrader

One other thing: Owen's books seems to have awaken me from my Theonomic slumbers. A key point made in his books concern the relationship between general and special revelation. General revelation has actual content to which people are responsible and are inexcusable for rejecting. It also puts some constraints on what special revelation looks like. Put another way, there is and has to be a natural law. 

For me, Theonomy has its true bite only when one rejects natural law. Without natural law, one either has Theonomy or chaos. With natural law, one does not have to push so hard for continuity between the Old Testament and New Testament. One can then accept that some things were special for the jewish administration in the OT and don't need to be explicitly repealed in order to question the validity. If one attempts something like this without a robust natural law, then one is back again looking chaos in the face.

CT


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## owenanderson

*clarity and inexcusability*

Thanks again for your replies. My current book is titled "Religion and Reason in America" and is a history of religion in America, especially tracing how the Westminster Confession has been challenged, and how "reason" has been viewed in America. I hope it will be out next summer.

I also appreciate Van Til, but I think there is an important difference. He is helpful in arguing that there is no excuse. But I don't think that his appeal to the Triune God of the Bible can establish inexcusability because most people have not had access to the Bible. Instead, all people are and have been inexcusable because all alternatives to belief in God are contrary to reason.

When I was in graduate school one of my professors told me I was an intellectual pelagian because of my views about reason and inexcusability. I don't think this is true. I think it can be the case both that it is clear to reason, and that humans are predestined. I suspect that Reformed Epistemology goes the way it does in order to protect predestination, and sees little need to show it is clear if a person is predestined anyway. But we are called to show what is clear apart from a person's condition with respect to predestination.

As far as natural law goes, I believe this is also necessary for inexcusability. If the law cannot be known then from general revelation then those without special revelation cannot be held responsible. I agree with the WCF chapter 19.4 that "To them also, as a body politic, He gave sundry judicial laws, which expired together with the State of that people; not obliging under any now, further than the general equity thereof may require."

In other words, I believe that challenge of our day is to show that there is a clear, general revelation that is full and comprehensive, and applies to all areas of our life. I think you were right when you said that the other views seem to only aim at possibility. What do you think?

I think you are doing a great job in your reading, apart from having a background in philosophy. Keep up the good work. I look forward to any other questions you might have. And thanks again for reading my books, it is very good to know that they are being read thoughtfully and are of help.

Owen


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## owenanderson

*thank you*

Semper Fidelis,

Thank you for your welcome and for including me on your forum. I look forward to hearing your thoughts if you get around to reading my book. 

If I understand you about Reformed Epistemology, I agree that it does not seem to establish much. "Warranted belief" does not seem to help in showing that unbelief in inexcusable. It has been helpful in getting believers a seat at the academic table, but it might undermine that seat if there is not any further proof. If it is not clear that God exists, and there is an excuse for unbelief, then what does this mean for the Christian Gospel?


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## Semper Fidelis

ChristianTrader said:


> One other thing: Owen's books seems to have awaken me from my Theonomic slumbers. A key point made in his books concern the relationship between general and special revelation. General revelation has actual content to which people are responsible and are inexcusable for rejecting. It also puts some constraints on what special revelation looks like. Put another way, there is and has to be a natural law.
> 
> For me, Theonomy has its true bite only when one rejects natural law. Without natural law, one either has Theonomy or chaos. With natural law, one does not have to push so hard for continuity between the Old Testament and New Testament. One can then accept that some things were special for the jewish administration in the OT and don't need to be explicitly repealed in order to question the validity. If one attempts something like this without a robust natural law, then one is back again looking chaos in the face.
> 
> CT



CT,

Check out Book I of Calvin's Institutes. Calvin labors the light of nature to demonstrate God's clear revelation in the things created and then makes some profound points about the way men clench their eyes shut in relation to it to their own destruction.

When I read _The Divine Right of Church Government_, I was struck by how comfortable the Puritans were in arguing for Presbyterian government using the light of nature and the way that men had organized governments as but one of many supports for their case.

I would like to read more but I agree with Owen that it is possible to do a great deal from the light of nature. I think the fact that men are created in the image of God leaves them no "room" to escape some conclusions. Oh, they will throw up canards but they really know better.

I was speaking with a very devout Jew by accident a couple of weeks ago and we got into the discussion of the Messiah. It was clear that his authority and lens for the Scriptures was not going to permit me any way for him to agree on the proper interpretation of the Scriptures. Thus, when I asked him what he did with sin now and he stated that his prayer atones for sin I simply declared that it didn't and he was still in his sin. I had to simply declare what I knew he knew deep down even if he wasn't going to admit it. I felt inadequate in the sense that I wish I knew more about where he was coming from but the clarity of natural revelation can never fail to convict of sin on a certain level.


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## ChristianTrader

Dr. Anderson,
I do have a few questions somewhat related to your books. 
1)In your reason and worldviews book, Natural Theology Chapter, Point #12 talks about addressing rational challenges to doctrines of Christianity. The Philosophical Foundations book by Gangadean was supposed to address them but I do not remember much in that book about the trinity or the incarnation. Is there a future book on those topics forthcoming?

2)What is your view of paradox? Is it unavoidable in core Christian Doctrines or is it avoidable by paying close attention to basic beliefs?

CT


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## owenanderson

*Christian doctrines*

Yes, Surrendra Gangadean is working on a book that will look at specific Christian doctrines like that. His earlier book is not about special revelation but focuses on general revelation.

Once we say that paradoxes are necessary we have no way of distinguishing between Christian paradoxes and paradoxes in other worldviews. Why believe Christian paradoxes? If we say it is because they are revealed to us, this is what the other religions say as well.

Further, when we say we believe a paradox, what do we mean? If something really is a paradox, is it meaningful? My understanding of the term is that it is a contradiction, and therefore it would not be meaningful (like square-circle). So how can we believe something that is not meaningful?

Does that help?


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## owenanderson

*Calvin*

Hi Rich,

My concern with Calvin's approach, and the sensus divinitatis, is that it can easily be reversed. We say "they know deep down," but "they" can say this of us as well. Richard Dawkins can say that we all know deep down that he is correct.

My impression is that we have to show that Richard Dawkin's view, naturalism, is self-contradictory at the basic level. Matter cannot have existed from eternity, nor can it account for intelligence--the human mind. What do you think?


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## ChristianTrader

Thanks for the quick reply,
I asked the question about paradox in part because of a new Doctoral Thesis published by a Van Tillian called, Paradox in Christian Theology: Reviewed by a friend here: Triablogue: Paradox In Christian Theology

A basic point raised is that no one has ever been able to take all the biblical data and avoid either contradiction or paradox. This however can be avoided if you do not accept all the Biblical data but instead go in some sort of heretical direction. Since this is the case, one needs to figure out how to accept at least some paradox's as an under defined problem.

I have the book and will read it sometime in the future, but was just looking for your current thoughts on the issue.

CT


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## Semper Fidelis

owenanderson said:


> Hi Rich,
> 
> My concern with Calvin's approach, and the sensus divinitatis, is that it can easily be reversed. We say "they know deep down," but "they" can say this of us as well. Richard Dawkins can say that we all know deep down that he is correct.
> 
> My impression is that we have to show that Richard Dawkin's view, naturalism, is self-contradictory at the basic level. Matter cannot have existed from eternity, nor can it account for intelligence--the human mind. What do you think?



I think there's a difference between external and internal apologetics. I might be using the wrong terms.

Core to Reformed theology, however, is the testimony of the Holy Spirit and there is no philosophical way around that problem which will make it acceptable to a Roman Catholic much less a skeptic. 

Thus, I think when we're talking about what really convinces us that Jesus is the Christ, there has to be an apologetic that we communicate within theology that explains why believe certain things and others don't.

On the other hand, as you note, we probably need to do a bit more than simply telling people that, if you're elect like me, then the Holy Spirit will reveal this to you.

My main point with Calvin, however, is that there is a very lucid explanation of the light of nature and he doesn't dismiss the fact that men have an innate knowledge of the things of God - albeit suprressed. I haven't read your book and feel inadequate to discuss more but I'm simply noting that an external apologetic can use this knowledge of God as leverage with men to get them to the point where they have to deal with their supression of Truth. Yet, in the end, it will be the Spirit's work to convict through the Gospel.


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## ChristianTrader

Semper Fidelis said:


> owenanderson said:
> 
> 
> 
> Hi Rich,
> 
> My concern with Calvin's approach, and the sensus divinitatis, is that it can easily be reversed. We say "they know deep down," but "they" can say this of us as well. Richard Dawkins can say that we all know deep down that he is correct.
> 
> My impression is that we have to show that Richard Dawkin's view, naturalism, is self-contradictory at the basic level. Matter cannot have existed from eternity, nor can it account for intelligence--the human mind. What do you think?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think there's a difference between external and internal apologetics. I might be using the wrong terms.
> 
> Core to Reformed theology, however, is the testimony of the Holy Spirit and there is no philosophical way around that problem which will make it acceptable to a Roman Catholic much less a skeptic.
> 
> Thus, I think when we're talking about what really convinces us that Jesus is the Christ, there has to be an apologetic that we communicate within theology that explains why believe certain things and others don't.
> 
> On the other hand, as you note, we probably need to do a bit more than simply telling people that, if you're elect like me, then the Holy Spirit will reveal this to you.
> 
> My main point with Calvin, however, is that there is a very lucid explanation of the light of nature and he doesn't dismiss the fact that men have an innate knowledge of the things of God - albeit suprressed. I haven't read your book and feel inadequate to discuss more but I'm simply noting that an external apologetic can use this knowledge of God as leverage with men to get them to the point where they have to deal with their supression of Truth. Yet, in the end, it will be the Spirit's work to convict through the Gospel.
Click to expand...


From reading Dr. Anderson's books, my feelings for what he is saying is this:
People seem to put too much wait on the idea of the Sensus divinitatis to do something that it should not do. The SD should be used as an explanation of how/why people act certain ways versus an argument against unbelief. If one shows that unbelief is irrational then go on about SD, then one does not veer off towards fideism. 

The will is the problem, not the evidence etc. This argument can be made when the unbelievers mouth is closed, but until then it looks very much like special pleading.

CT


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## Semper Fidelis

ChristianTrader said:


> Semper Fidelis said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> owenanderson said:
> 
> 
> 
> Hi Rich,
> 
> My concern with Calvin's approach, and the sensus divinitatis, is that it can easily be reversed. We say "they know deep down," but "they" can say this of us as well. Richard Dawkins can say that we all know deep down that he is correct.
> 
> My impression is that we have to show that Richard Dawkin's view, naturalism, is self-contradictory at the basic level. Matter cannot have existed from eternity, nor can it account for intelligence--the human mind. What do you think?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think there's a difference between external and internal apologetics. I might be using the wrong terms.
> 
> Core to Reformed theology, however, is the testimony of the Holy Spirit and there is no philosophical way around that problem which will make it acceptable to a Roman Catholic much less a skeptic.
> 
> Thus, I think when we're talking about what really convinces us that Jesus is the Christ, there has to be an apologetic that we communicate within theology that explains why believe certain things and others don't.
> 
> On the other hand, as you note, we probably need to do a bit more than simply telling people that, if you're elect like me, then the Holy Spirit will reveal this to you.
> 
> My main point with Calvin, however, is that there is a very lucid explanation of the light of nature and he doesn't dismiss the fact that men have an innate knowledge of the things of God - albeit suprressed. I haven't read your book and feel inadequate to discuss more but I'm simply noting that an external apologetic can use this knowledge of God as leverage with men to get them to the point where they have to deal with their supression of Truth. Yet, in the end, it will be the Spirit's work to convict through the Gospel.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> From reading Dr. Anderson's books, my feelings for what he is saying is this:
> People seem to put too much wait on the idea of the Sensus divinitatis to do something that it should not do. The SD should be used as an explanation of how/why people act certain ways versus an argument against unbelief. If one shows that unbelief is irrational then go on about SD, then one does not veer off towards fideism.
> 
> The will is the problem, not the evidence etc. This argument can be made when the unbelievers mouth is closed, but until then it looks very much like special pleading.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


Roger. I think I stated that in my own way. I was only noting that Calvin isn't really writing to the unconverted but, nevertheless, gives clear expression to the light of nature and lends some credence to the thought that arguments for God's existence are sustainable at that level, which the unbeliever must take stock of apart from special revelation.


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## owenanderson

*SD*

I like the way you both put it in terms of external/internal, and in terms of SD as an explanation but not proof. Hodge and Warfield distinguish between the work of the Holy Spirit, and knowing that it is the Holy Spirit working. What the Holy Spirit does is enliven a person to know God, thus if a person does not know, then in what sense can they appeal to the Holy Spirit?

A well known Christian philosopher/apologist once told me that we know based on the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit (as if this were a premise in an argument). I asked: what about the many other religions that make the same appeal? He responded: just because there are many counterfeits does not mean that the real thing isn't real. But my question was: how do we tell the difference? I think Christian is right that it becomes a case of special pleading, or table pounding, if we appeal to the Holy Spirit as a premise in an argument. Instead, the Holy Spirit enlivens a person to understand arguments, but the arguments in themselves are either sound or unsound and this is what must be shown regardless of whether a person comes to believe it or not. 

So, can it be shown that all arguments that are raised up against belief in God the creator are unsound?


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## Zenas

owenanderson said:


> Yes, Surrendra Gangadean is working on a book that will look at specific Christian doctrines like that. His earlier book is not about special revelation but focuses on general revelation.
> 
> Once we say that paradoxes are necessary we have no way of distinguishing between Christian paradoxes and paradoxes in other worldviews. Why believe Christian paradoxes? If we say it is because they are revealed to us, this is what the other religions say as well.
> 
> Further, when we say we believe a paradox, what do we mean? If something really is a paradox, is it meaningful? My understanding of the term is that it is a contradiction, and therefore it would not be meaningful (like square-circle). So how can we believe something that is not meaningful?
> 
> Does that help?



I seem to be confused about the nature of a paradox.

How I have come to understand the term is that it is in one sense contradictory, but in another sense entirely true.

For instance, it is true in Christianity that the low are made high and the high are made low; the rich are poor and the poor are rich; the unrighteous are righteous and the righteous are unrighteous, the mighty are weak and the weak are mighty, etc., etc. 

Now, to simply say the poor are rich is contradictory on its face, but that's only if you're speaking in a monetary sense. The first term, poor is speaking in a spiritual sense, i.e. those who are contrite in heart. My understanding is that this only seems contradictory because the second term is qualifying a different category, i.e. reward or something other than spiritual poverty. If this is true, then the phrase is contradictory in its terms only, but not in its true meaning because the contradictory terms aren't being used in a contradictory fashion, they are speaking of different categories, the latter being affected by the quality of the first, i.e. if you are poor in spirit you are rich in heavenly reward and if you are rich in spirit you are poor in heavenly reward. 

This is my understanding of a paradox, but it seems that I'm disconnected at some point, or have an entirely erroneous veiw of the term.


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## owenanderson

*paradox*

I think that could be one sense, in other words, there isn't really a contradiction although it initially appears contrary to what we expect. But some theologians have meant that there actually is a contradiction and yet we still must believe. This is the origin of Tertullian's phrase about the Trinity "I believe because it is absurd." But I don't really think the Trinity is a paradox or absurdity.


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## sastark

Dr. Anderson,

I must admit that I am unfamiliar with your work, but after reading this thread, I am very interested in reading "Clarity of God's Existence" as well as "Reasons and Worldviews."

I do have one question for you: on the ASU page describing "Clarity of God's Existence" (link) it is written that in your book you argue "If humans are guilty for failing to know God, as Christianity maintains, then they must be able to know God." I wonder though, if this can be established, biblically? What I mean to say is, I agree that men are inexcusable based on the knowledge of God in creation (ie, General Revelation); however, can we say that in order for men to be guilty they must be able to know God? I just don't see how that follows. Because of sin, men do not have the ability to know God (apart from the work of the Holy Spirit) and yet men are still guilty even having never heard the Gospel. It is true that General Revelation leaves men without excuse, but General Revelation alone is not enough for men to know God (in a salvific sense).

Perhaps you can help me understand your reasoning a bit?

Thank you, in advance.


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## owenanderson

*inexcusability*

Thanks for your question. By the way, I'd be blessed to hear your feedback on my books, but I do not want to pressure anyone to buy them. 

I think what you said in your last sentence, and what the WCF says in 1.1, is what I maintain. Humans must be "able" to know, not actually know. So they are able to know God as creator through general revelation, but cannot having a knowledge of God as redeemer apart from special revelation. Is that what you were saying? What this means for Christians is that if the Holy Spirit has restored persons to knowing God, then they should be able to show this--and yet much energy is spent by Christians in trying to avoid this responsibility. That's what I look at in chapter two of my "Clarity" book.


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## ChristianTrader

sastark said:


> Dr. Anderson,
> 
> I must admit that I am unfamiliar with your work, but after reading this thread, I am very interested in reading "Clarity of God's Existence" as well as "Reasons and Worldviews."
> 
> I do have one question for you: on the ASU page describing "Clarity of God's Existence" (link) it is written that in your book you argue "If humans are guilty for failing to know God, as Christianity maintains, then they must be able to know God." I wonder though, if this can be established, biblically? What I mean to say is, I agree that men are inexcusable based on the knowledge of God in creation (ie, General Revelation); however, can we say that in order for men to be guilty they must be able to know God? I just don't see how that follows. Because of sin, men do not have the ability to know God (apart from the work of the Holy Spirit) and yet men are still guilty even having never heard the Gospel. It is true that General Revelation leaves men without excuse, but General Revelation alone is not enough for men to know God (in a salvific sense).
> 
> Perhaps you can help me understand your reasoning a bit?
> 
> Thank you, in advance.



It seems that the whole discussion turns on three points

1)What does "able to know" mean
2)What are the consequences of the fall/sin
3)What does "not having an excuse" mean


1)Think about the case, that a cop pulls you over for speeding. You go to court to fight it. There are two situations in which you are guilty and one in which you are not.
a)The speed limit signs clearly specified what the speed was, you saw the signs but ignored them
b)The speed limit signs clearly specified what the speed was, however you did not pay attention and did not look at the signs so you did not know the speed
c)The speed limits signs were non existent, the speed limit changed with out any signs saying that it had changed so you did not know.

In a) and b) you are guilty because you either knew or should have known what the law was and slowed down. In c) you had no way of knowing and therefore the case against you should be thrown out.

In Dr. Anderson's book he attempts to show that for Christianity's claims to work, we have to argue that a) or b) are the case and that c is off the table.

2)In his books, it seems that Dr. Anderson is saying that the fall and sin do not change us to the extent that c) from above becomes the case. Sin and the fall messes with our will and related stuff and not with our ability to see clearly that we are deservedly hell bound and nothing that we can do to fix it. That false idols are in fact false etc.

If c) became the case, then it would seem that sin becomes an incoherent notion. Sin is acting against what God has clearly revealed for you to do (Either omission or commission). If God's revelation is not clear, then it seems that all one has are a bunch of (reasonable) excuses.

3)It seems that you in order to make the claim that someone has no excuse, then one would need to be able to say that one acted irrationally (based on what was available to them) in acting the way that they did.

Today, there are very few people that are willing to say that unbelief is irrational. Less probably maybe, but not irrational.

If there are problems in my thinking, then hopefully Dr. Anderson could correct me.

CT


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## sastark

owenanderson said:


> Thanks for your question. By the way, I'd be blessed to hear your feedback on my books, but I do not want to pressure anyone to buy them.
> 
> I think what you said in your last sentence, and what the WCF says in 1.1, is what I maintain. Humans must be "able" to know, not actually know. So they are able to know God as creator through general revelation, but cannot having a knowledge of God as redeemer apart from special revelation. Is that what you were saying? What this means for Christians is that if the Holy Spirit has restored persons to knowing God, then they should be able to show this--and yet much energy is spent by Christians in trying to avoid this responsibility. That's what I look at in chapter two of my "Clarity" book.




I think I follow what you are saying. Thank you. I look forward to seeing your answer to this question, then, in "Clarity".


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## sastark

Thanks, Hermonta. I agree with you, up to this:



ChristianTrader said:


> Today, there are very few people that are willing to say that unbelief is irrational. Less probably maybe, but not irrational.



I do believe unbelief is irrational, but I understand you qualify that with "what is available to them." I'm still not convinced that an unregenerate person is able to act "rationally" at all, based on their presuppositions, though. 

Something for me to think about, I suppose.


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## ChristianTrader

sastark said:


> Thanks, Hermonta. I agree with you, up to this:
> 
> 
> 
> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Today, there are very few people that are willing to say that unbelief is irrational. Less probably maybe, but not irrational.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I do believe unbelief is irrational, but I understand you qualify that with "what is available to them." I'm still not convinced that an unregenerate person is able to act "rationally" at all, based on their presuppositions, though.
> 
> Something for me to think about, I suppose.
Click to expand...


Could you explain your objections a bit more? Are you saying that their presuppositions cut them off from being reached?

CT


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## sastark

ChristianTrader said:


> sastark said:
> 
> 
> 
> Thanks, Hermonta. I agree with you, up to this:
> 
> 
> 
> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Today, there are very few people that are willing to say that unbelief is irrational. Less probably maybe, but not irrational.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I do believe unbelief is irrational, but I understand you qualify that with "what is available to them." I'm still not convinced that an unregenerate person is able to act "rationally" at all, based on their presuppositions, though.
> 
> Something for me to think about, I suppose.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Could you explain your objections a bit more? Are you saying that their presuppositions cut them off from being reached?
> 
> CT
Click to expand...



Sorry if I was unclear. What I am saying is, the unregenerate man who says "There is no God" is being irrational. His entire worldview/philosophy will also be irrational at its base because it is built on the presupposition that "there is no God" or more specifically "The God of the Bible is not the true God."

These men can be reached due to the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit enlivening them.

That's what I meant by saying unregenerate men are irrational.


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## owenanderson

Thanks for your example CT, I like that one.

Warfield distinuished between the role of the Holy Spirit, and a person's role as a witness. Of course it is true in Reformed Theology that a person cannot respond without the work of the Holy Spirit. But whether or not the Holy Spirit will work is beside the point that the Christian is to be able to show what is clear. If a person hardens in response to that, or accepts it, either way God is revealed (either in his justice or mercy). 

I sometimes get the impression that Christians think that since the Holy Spirit must enliven a person for them to accept the Gospel, one need not be able to show what is clear. In this line of thinking, any argument could be given since it is not the argument that matters, it is the work of the Holy Spirit, and so one may just as well say anything.

I'm reminded of the person who told William Carey not to go to India as a missionary because "if God wants to convert the heathen He will do it Himself."

Warfield speaks of it this way: Paul plants, Apollos waters, but the Holy Spirit brings the increase. To say "it is up to the Holy Spirit" is like saying Paul may as well not plant, and Apollos may as well not water.

So on the one hand the Christian should be able to show what is clear, and on the other, if it cannot be shown then this is a significant problem for the Christian message of inexcusability.


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## MW

Unbelief is not non-belief; it contains its own internal rationality. Its irrationality is external to itself and is seen in relation to Ultimate Rationality -- God. John 3:20, "For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved." The sense of divinity accounts for man's rationality and irrationality.


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## ChristianTrader

armourbearer said:


> Unbelief is not non-belief; it contains its own internal rationality. Its irrationality is external to itself and is seen in relation to Ultimate Rationality -- God. John 3:20, "For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved." The sense of divinity accounts for man's rationality and irrationality.



What is entailed by the sense of divinity? Or put another way, because of a person's sense of the divine what do they know?

CT


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## MW

ChristianTrader said:


> What is entailed by the sense of divinity? Or put another way, because of a person's sense of the divine what do they know?



His eternal power and Godhead, Rom. 1. Some concept of right and wrong, Rom. 2.


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## owenanderson

*meaning of "know"*

hello all,

maybe we can clarify what we mean by "know". In philosophy we use this term to contrast with "opinion" or "belief." Thus, a person "knows" if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true. 

Are we saying that all persons know God in this sense of the word?


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## MW

owenanderson said:


> maybe we can clarify what we mean by "know". In philosophy we use this term to contrast with "opinion" or "belief." Thus, a person "knows" if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true.
> 
> Are we saying that all persons know God in this sense of the word?



Yes; hence the act of deliberate and unrighteous suppression.

We can illustrate this from the way philosophy uses the terms "know" and "true." The very idea of knowing something requires the existence of an Absolute which can verify the reality of the referent in all times (eternity), places (infinity), and conditions (immutability).


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## owenanderson

*knowing and proving*

So if they know it in this sense of the term, then they must be able to prove it is true. Are we saying that all persons can prove that it is true that God exists? Speaking for my students, they have a hard time even proving that they exist 

While it is true that "truth" requires some standard, most people (again, consider my students) are unable to articulate this and are not aware of it. Of the others that are, many have given non-theistic accounts of the absolute, such as Plato's forms/demiurge, or Brahman of Hinduism. Hence, it wouldn't be enough to say that people "know" God (as a true, justified belief) because their truth claims require an absolute, since much more is meant by "God" than "the absolute."

Perhaps a different sense of the term "know" is what is meant?


----------



## MW

owenanderson said:


> So if they know it in this sense of the term, then they must be able to prove it is true. Are we saying that all persons can prove that it is true that God exists? Speaking for my students, they have a hard time even proving that they exist



Yes; every time they make a truth statement they are proving an infinte, eternal, and unchangeable Mind exists.

The irony here is that your joke is actually serious. They cannot prove they exist without the existence of God.


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## owenanderson

*proof*

Maybe we'll have to define what is meant by "prove." In observing them we would say they are proving this, like by observing a rock in motion we say it proves the laws of motion. But they cannot prove it in the sense of answering a question, and thus they do not "know." So they prove it externally, but they cannot prove it internally.

Also, an absolute Mind is not the same as God, much more would be needed. But you're right that a person could stop at an absolute mind and say this is enough for truth. 

So can we say that although they live in the world, they do not understand the world?


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## MW

I think "prove" can be used in its ordinary signification as rationally demonstrate. A person can make no truth claim unless he has an ultimate reference point whereby to verify what is said. The Bible presents us with two alternatives -- God and destruction. If a man denies God he chooses destruction, and that includes rationality. Scepticism is in fact the annihilation of reason.

The incommunicable attributes of God are shown by means of negation. Infinity, eternity, and immutability are required because they are negations of the creature's imperfections. The communicable attributes are shown by means of affirmation, whereby the creature's personal qualities are perfected. So not only the Absolute Mind, but Personal Being is also demonstrable from the creature's own personal existence. From the communicable attributes we are then able to prove that God would reveal Himself. From there we can show that the Bible reveals this God.


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## owenanderson

*prove*

We have two lines going now, what it takes to show that God exists, and whether or not all persons can internally prove that God exists. I like the method you are using, which is that we can show, step by step, that theism is the only conclusion. Maybe we can identify the steps so that we can make sure we have addressed all relevant challenges from other worldviews?

But the other issue is whether all persons know God in the sense of believing that God exists, and being able to prove that God exists. I take it as obvious that many people do not claim to believe that God exists, and instead claim to believe something else (as you pointed out earlier). While in this condition, these people are not able to prove that God exists. If they were asked to do so, they would not be able to do so. Now, this condition might change later, they might come to be able to do so. And in the very state of denying God's existence this might prove something about God (in the same way that the rock in motion proves the laws of motion). But the sense of "proving" we are speaking about is that the person can offer a proof, as in a math student being able to prove a theorum on an exam. 

Certainly not all persons are able to offer a proof that God exists in this sense. And this means that they do not "know" God in the sense of having a true, justified belief. Indeed, the people I'm thinking of would say "I don't believe it, and I can't prove it is true."


----------



## MW

Are there really two lines here? Not if we take presuppositions into account. What does it take to show God exists? It cannot be done because unbelievers use their rationality to justify their own autonomy. They do this whether they formally believe in God or not. Yet the autonomous use of reason internally proves that God exists. Their very attempt to rationalise their autonomy evidences their irrationality and proves theonomy. The reason is that there are only two alternatives -- God or destruction.

In what manner did Jesus Christ press His claims on Pilate? He testified, "Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice." How did Pilate seek to rid himself of the claims of Christ? He ridiculed the notion of truth. In other words,, he destroyed the very foundation on which his own rationality could be sustained. This is what every unbeliever is forced to do in oder to maintain autonomy. But as soon as he does this he destroys his own humanity and his claim to reason.

I think our first task is not to prove the existence of God; one could accomplish this while still supporting man's autonomy. We should be aiming to prove the autonomist's suppression of the truth. The unbeliever's unrighteous suppression of the truth is an undeniable, experiential argument for the existence of God and at the same time preliminary to the gospel call to repent.


----------



## owenanderson

Yes, I think there are two lines going. On the one hand you're offering what you consider to be a successful proof, which we could look at to see if it is successful. On the other hand, we're discussing what it means to "know." When you say "it cannot be done," I think you're shifting to speaking about how to persuade a person, and I agree this might not be able to be done. But I'm asking about a proof, not what persuades.

I agree with you that persons undermine their own rationality with autonomy, although I think you've skipped some steps in showing this, trying to get too quickly from the nihilism of autonomy to theism.

From my previous post I'm still not clear as to whether you think the person who claims to not believe that God exists, and also is unable to give a proof that God exists, "knows" that God exists?


----------



## MW

owenanderson said:


> From my previous post I'm still not clear as to whether you think the person who claims to not believe that God exists, and also is unable to give a proof that God exists, "knows" that God exists?



Yes, he "knows" that God exists. His autonomous reasoning is in fact a suppression of that knowledge and the clearest argument for the existence of God. E.g., a materialist argues seeing is believing. If we were to prove God exists according to this basis we could not prove the God of the Bible because God is invisible, without body, parts, or passions. What shall we say? We point to the fact that beliefs and ideals are not seen yet believed by the materialist. He believes seeing is believing, yet he does not see this belief. His belief system points to a world beyond the material. No matter how coherently rational he has made his materialist system, the system itself is irrational when related to ultimate reality. We cannot "know" anything when self is made the starting point. All knowledge points beyond self to a perfect reference point. That point is always God.


----------



## owenanderson

This is a different meaning of the term "know" than I asked about earlier. Remember, in that case knowledge means a true, justified belief. But in the example you gave, the materialist does not believe that God exists, nor can he (at that moment) explain why it is true that God exists. 

But what you are doing is showing that the materialist's own beliefs are self-contradictory, and so he cannot consistently maintain that only the material world exists. He believes an error. But unless he comes to believe that God exists and comes to be able to prove this, he does not "know" in the sense of having a true, justified belief about God. Instead, he is a witness to the truth of God. But he does not seek, does not understand, and does not do what is right.

Given this assertion (that none understand), I take the suppression spoken about in Romans 1 to be occurring through the offering up of alternative views to God the creator. So, the materialist suppresses the truth by claiming that only the material world exists.

From the subject's point of view (in your example the materialist) he does not know because he does not believe and cannot prove, but objectively it can be shown that consistency requires theism.


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## MW

owenanderson said:


> But what you are doing is showing that the materialist's own beliefs are self-contradictory, and so he cannot consistently maintain that only the material world exists.



But the demonstration of self-contradictory beliefs takes place on the basis that he has beliefs which prove the existence of God. I cannot prove them self-contradictory otherwise.


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## owenanderson

Right, his beliefs can be used to prove the existence of God, but he himself has not yet seen this or done that work. If I give my students a blank piece of paper and say "prove that God exists," they will not be able to do this. In this sense, they don't know it. And yet, if it is clear, then they should be able to do it (just like they should be able to tell me what 2+2 is), and so they are inexcusable.

I think this reveals the full reality of moral evil, both in the intellect and in the will.


----------



## Cheshire Cat

owenanderson said:


> When I was in graduate school one of my professors told me I was an intellectual pelagian because of my views about reason and inexcusability. I don't think this is true. I think it can be the case both that it is clear to reason, and that humans are predestined.
> Owen


S/he probably said this because one of your key premises affirms that moral responsibility presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). This is seen in your ‘Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function’ paper, when you wrote that “Inexcusability presupposes ability: if a person is inexcusable in their failure to know God then they must have been able to know God.” The view that moral responsibility presupposes the PAP is inconsistent with theistic determinism (predestination) and other aspects of Calvinism. Not only that, but given Frankfurt type counterexamples, it seems such a view is misplaced.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Cheshire Cat said:


> owenanderson said:
> 
> 
> 
> When I was in graduate school one of my professors told me I was an intellectual pelagian because of my views about reason and inexcusability. I don't think this is true. I think it can be the case both that it is clear to reason, and that humans are predestined.
> Owen
> 
> 
> 
> S/he probably said this because one of your key premises affirms that moral responsibility presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). This is seen in your ‘Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function’ paper, when you wrote that “Inexcusability presupposes ability: if a person is inexcusable in their failure to know God then they must have been able to know God.” The view that moral responsibility presupposes the PAP is inconsistent with theistic determinism (predestination) and other aspects of Calvinism. Not only that, but given Frankfurt type counterexamples, it seems such a view is misplaced.
Click to expand...


I think the cleanest response is the Edwardian counter that one does what they desire the most. Because we are slaves to sin, we desire sin and not doing what we ought to do. If we desired good, then we would be doing good. To reject this viewpoint, one basically runs into hypercalvinism.

The problem is not a defect in general revelation or a defect in our reasoning ability. So you have ability and you have predestination.

CT


----------



## Cheshire Cat

ChristianTrader said:


> I think the cleanest response is the Edwardian counter that one does what they desire the most. Because we are slaves to sin, we desire sin and not doing what we ought to do. If we desired good, then we would be doing good. To reject this viewpoint, one basically runs into hypercalvinism.
> 
> The problem is not a defect in general revelation or a defect in our reasoning ability. So you have ability and you have predestination.
> 
> CT


Hi CT, Edwardsian counter to what or who? Although that is a form of compatibilism, I don't see how it negates my point...

If one claims something like," "S is morally responsible for * iff S had to ability to * or not *", they are clearly assuming some kind of PAP or "ought implies can.""

Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, *but now he commands all people everywhere to repent*." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God. 

So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."

Quotes are from Paul M. I could reformulate them in my own words and then give him props, but I couldn't have said it better myself.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Cheshire Cat said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I think the cleanest response is the Edwardian counter that one does what they desire the most. Because we are slaves to sin, we desire sin and not doing what we ought to do. If we desired good, then we would be doing good. To reject this viewpoint, one basically runs into hypercalvinism.
> 
> The problem is not a defect in general revelation or a defect in our reasoning ability. So you have ability and you have predestination.
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> Hi CT, Edwardsian counter to what or who? Although that is a form of compatibilism, I don't see how it negates my point...
> 
> If one claims something like," "S is morally responsible for * iff S had to ability to * or not *", they are clearly assuming some kind of PAP or "ought implies can.""
Click to expand...


If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem? 



> Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, *but now he commands all people everywhere to repent*." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.



Where above was this denied?



> So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."



a)
Where above was this denied?



> Quotes are from Paul M. I could reformulate them in my own words and then give him props, but I couldn't have said it better myself.



I know and I am as bewildered by seeing it here as when I saw it elsewhere.

CT


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## Cheshire Cat

ChristianTrader said:


> If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?


The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option". 



ChristianTrader said:


> Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.
> 
> 
> 
> Where above was this denied?
Click to expand...

This passage contradicts the PAP, which seems to be affirmed by Anderson in the quote I provided in my original post. 



ChristianTrader said:


> So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."
> 
> 
> 
> Where above was this denied?
Click to expand...

See my above response. 



ChristianTrader said:


> Quotes are from Paul M. I could reformulate them in my own words and then give him props, but I couldn't have said it better myself.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I know and I am as bewildered by seeing it here as when I saw it elsewhere.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...

Don't be.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Cheshire Cat said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?
> 
> 
> 
> The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".
Click to expand...


The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.

CT


----------



## MW

ChristianTrader said:


> If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?



Good question.


----------



## Cheshire Cat

ChristianTrader said:


> Cheshire Cat said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?
> 
> 
> 
> The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...

Where does he affirm that old version of compatibilism?


----------



## owenanderson

*Pap*

I definitely do not hold to PAP, and am a compatibalist. I do not believe one could affirm the Westminster Confession and be a libertarian or pelagian. I think CT has said it well above, as has the Westminster Confession. I don't believe the ought/can principle requires PAP or pelagianism. My grad advisor said that because he was used to being around Calvinists who, like the one that tried to discourage William Carey, say "if God wants to covert the heathen he will do it himself." Its unfortunate that this is what Calvinists are known for in academia. That is one reason I appreciate Warfield, because he affirmed that although it is the Spirit that brings the increase, the Spirit uses Paul as the planter and Apollos as the waterer.

That paper on Quodlibet has been revised and now appears as a chapter in my book "Reason and Worldviews." I believe that book, and my new one "The Clarity of God's Existence" address some of these questions.

Hope this helps.


----------



## owenanderson

*Clarity*



Cheshire Cat said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Cheshire Cat said:
> 
> 
> 
> The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Where does he affirm that old version of compatibilism?
Click to expand...


I discuss it in my book "The Clarity of God's Existence: The Ethics of Belief After the Enlightenment."


----------



## owenanderson

I agree, this seems to solve the problem.



armourbearer said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Good question.
Click to expand...


----------



## ChristianTrader

Cheshire Cat said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Cheshire Cat said:
> 
> 
> 
> The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Where does he affirm that old version of compatibilism?
Click to expand...


The problem is where does he affirm or imply PAP? He affirms the complete sovereignty of God, Predestination, and Human Responsibility. He also affirms that unbelief is inexcusable. How can one affirm all four things and not come to ought equals (some sort of) can? If ought does not equal (some form of) can then it seems that you have an excuse.

CT


----------



## Cheshire Cat

Posted on behalf of Paul M...



Cheshire Cat said:


> Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.



CT: "Where above was this denied?" 

Me: From OA's book Reason and Worldviews: "Problematically, he maintains that the natural man cannot comprehend what he ought to comprehend of God. This is extremely problematic because it means that while humans ought to comprehend God, they cannot. How can they be held responsible?" 

Clearly OA just said that if one OUGHT to x, then they CAN do x; otherwise, "how can they be morally responsible." This at least affirms "ought implies can", and probably PAP. Since it affirms "ought implies can" then that's one place where "the above was denied." 



Cheshire Cat said:


> So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."



CT: "a) Where above was this denied? 

Me: Now you can clearly see. I have more juicy morsels from his book. Stay tuned. 

CT: "The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do." 

Me: (a) like fly to the moon by flapping their arms?, and (b) libertarians can affirm this with agent causation (cf. Kane: Intro to Free will). Therefore, you've not done enough to exculpate OA or yourself. 

CT: "If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?" 

Me: The only way one has the ability to do otherwise, naturally or morally, is if the decree had been different. Some Reformed folk seem to want a libertarianism in one realm but not in another. Furthermore, Edwardsian compatibilaism has been called into question. To keep asserting it violates OA's repeated complaints against dogmatism and begging the question in his Reason and Worldviews. Just because you say the name "Edwards," doesn't mean one has to bow down and shudder in fear. The Bible teaches compatibalism, it doesn't necessarily specify *which kind*. We're free to build better conceptions. This entails (as OA would be fond to say) that, presumably, Edwards wasn't God, which would entail that he wasn't infallible. 

OA: I definitely do not hold to PAP, and am a compatibalist. 

Me: That may be, but some are seeing some inconsistencies with your *affirmation* of compatibilism and some of your *other* statements. Just *saying* you're a compatibilist doesn't absolve you from criticism. The same remarks could be lodged against D.A. Carson in some places given some of his statements on free will and compatibilism...and his sometimes affirmation of middle knowledge. 

OA: " I don't believe the ought/can principle requires PAP or pelagianism." 

Me: (a) that's debatable as many libertarian action theorists have pointed out (cf. the Wideker Mckenna vol. _Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities), and (b) it isn't clear that you've denied the ought-implies-can maxim; indeed, it looks like you've just affirmed it. O-I-C is refuted by (i) Frankfurt counter-examples and (ii) the Acts 17 passage cited above. 

OA: "Its unfortunate that this is what Calvinists are known for in academia." 

Me: It's unfortunate that we are laughed at and mocked even when they have characterized us correctly. "Academia" scoffs at predestination as morally repugnant and determinism as either (a) philosophically absurd when dealing with a libertarian or (b) if dealing with a materialist determinist they view it as immoral since it is a person who could have ordained otherwise doing the determining rather than blind laws of nature. So, since "academia" laughs at us anyway, I find your appeal to them in this instance a fallacious scare tactic. 

OA: "That is one reason I appreciate Warfield, because he affirmed that although it is the Spirit that brings the increase, the Spirit uses Paul as the planter and Apollos as the waterer." 

Me: But that's a reason I appreciate those hundreds of years before Warfield. The majority of competent Reformers have always affirmed secondary causation. So it duplicitous to act as if Warfield is at odds with most Calvinists. 

OA: "I agree, this seems to solve the problem." 

Me: I and many others disagree.


----------



## Cheshire Cat

Posted on behalf of PM...

On page 1 of that thread OA stated, 

"Thus, a person 'knows' if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true." 

Does he know that? Can he prove it? Does he know his proof? Can he prove it? Does he know his second proof? Prove it. And so on...

He's also assuming internalism with this. Unfortunately, internalism is on the outs. For example, Michael Bergman has dealt externalism some major blows. See his _Justification Without Awareness_. One might also read the arguments of Plantinga, Sudduth, Anderson, Welty, etc. 

Another problem is that OA argues that "all men" are "inexcusable" because God's existence is "clear" and they can know it via "right reason." But are we to assume that young children and mentally handicap people are excusable?? If not, then it is not clear that "all men" can know God, nor that "all men" are inexcusable because God's existence is clear and they can know it. 

More to the point, can young children not know God? I mean, OA spoke of how hard it was for college students to prove such things as their existence (which seems odd because they'd have to exist to prove it or doubt it). I doubt any child could "prove" that God exists along OA's rigorous lines. 

What's also strange is that he claims we should be able to prove God like 2+2=4. Not only is this proof actually a lot harder to do than most people think (for example, the majority of people that would try to prove this would appeal to some empirical argument, say, 2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples), I'd love to see OA's proof for God that is such that one would be be epistemically certain that he exists. No one has done this in the entire history of apologetics. 

He furthermore places a ton of confidence in basic laws of thought, esp. the universality of the LNC. But dialetheists would differ. OA may claim that they refute themselves but that is probably based on a view of logic which is explosive. To assume this with a dialetheist would be question begging by assuming the falsity of paraconsistent logic. OA frequently complains about other apologetic methods that assume the truth of their view according to their worldview. But OA assumes the truth classical logic and Aristotle's proof of the LNC over against a dialetheist worldview (and obviously the comeback to this that if it were true it would be false is based on misunderstanding dialetheism for trivialism, so put that counter on the shelf). 

Now, dialetheism may be false, but one just can't assume it. Moreover, OA has the problem of showing how each and every single worldview, and variations within each, are false or contradictory. I refer readers to Sean Choi's critique of the TAG on this exact matter in the book Reasons for Faith (ed. Geisler and Meister).


----------



## MW

Cheshire Cat said:


> Me: From OA's book Reason and Worldviews: "Problematically, he maintains that the natural man cannot comprehend what he ought to comprehend of God. This is extremely problematic because it means that while humans ought to comprehend God, they cannot. How can they be held responsible?"
> 
> Clearly OA just said that if one OUGHT to x, then they CAN do x; otherwise, "how can they be morally responsible." This at least affirms "ought implies can", and probably PAP. Since it affirms "ought implies can" then that's one place where "the above was denied."



This is simply the classic way of stating the problem. Shouldn't you be addressing his answer to the problem?


----------



## Cheshire Cat

Posted on behalf of PM...



ChristianTrader said:


> The problem is where does he affirm or imply PAP? He affirms the complete sovereignty of God, Predestination, and Human Responsibility. He also affirms that unbelief is inexcusable. How can one affirm all four things and not come to ought equals (some sort of) can? If ought does not equal (some form of) can then it seems that you have an excuse.
> 
> CT



First off, people can be inconsistent, second, there are some major and detailed arguments that show "ought-implies-can" assumes PAP (to my knowledge, Andrew Baily is the only determinist who holds both, and he admits he's got an uphill battle), third, Acts 17 showed that "ought implies can" is false. But, if one chooses to ignore that, there's "Be thou perfect as your heavenly father is perfect." And, there's Frankfurt too. Fourth, it seems original sin is compromised since we ought to, as our confessions and catechisms teach, both do (or not fail to do) and be what God requires. Infants are born with a sin nature, heald guilty for that, yet they can't do anything about being born with said nature.


----------



## Christusregnat

ChristianTrader said:


> One other thing: Owen's books seems to have awaken me from my Theonomic slumbers. A key point made in his books concern the relationship between general and special revelation. General revelation has actual content to which people are responsible and are inexcusable for rejecting. It also puts some constraints on what special revelation looks like. Put another way, there is and has to be a natural law.
> 
> For me, Theonomy has its true bite only when one rejects natural law. Without natural law, one either has Theonomy or chaos. With natural law, one does not have to push so hard for continuity between the Old Testament and New Testament. One can then accept that some things were special for the jewish administration in the OT and don't need to be explicitly repealed in order to question the validity. If one attempts something like this without a robust natural law, then one is back again looking chaos in the face.
> 
> CT



Hermonta,

I am intrigued by your statements, and they prompt a few questions:

1. What do you mean by "natural law"; can you define?

2. What is the means by which one may determine which "natural laws" are to be chosen? For instance, do we choose Hume's version, or the Marquis de Sade's? By what standard do we decide?

3. Does law (whether natural or otherwise) have any place in glorifying God, or in enjoying Him forever? If so, what rule hath God given to direct us in the use of such laws?

4. What is the method that natural man uses to ascertain "natural law"? Does he intuit natural law, empirically judge which laws are natural, democratically decide, or is it subject to a rational process? If so, who's reason is to be used?

5. If law is natural, why is nature so lawless?

6. Can natural man be subject to natural law? Can natural man ascertain natural law?

7. Can you explain an exegetical defense for your responses to the above questions? 

8. How do you link Paul's use of general revelation as a means of condemntation with a positive system of law?

Interested in your thoughts. 

Cheers,


----------



## owenanderson

Since I'm OA, maybe one way to proceed is to ask me: "when you said ... did you mean ...?" It is in this sense that CT's question has not been answered. Since my book was not about these details of the free will issue, I didn't cover that in any depth in the book. However, I don't think Frankfurt counterexamples or Acts 17 refute ought implies can. 

In the Acts 17 example, the person is held responsible for not repenting, which is to say they are getting what they want. They do not want to repent. So there is no excuse available here. In the case of wanting to flap your arms and fly to the moon, this is not within man's natural ability. But knowing God is within that ability. So a problem would only arise if a person wanted to know God but could not.

I wasn't suggesting that Warfield was at odds with earlier Calvinists. As CT pointed out, the common distinction has been between natural and moral ability. And as I said, I believe the WCF navigates these waters very well.

Behind all of these other issues, the question we're asking is: does unbelief have an excuse?


----------



## owenanderson

*knowing*



Cheshire Cat said:


> Posted on behalf of PM...
> 
> On page 1 of that thread OA stated,
> 
> "Thus, a person 'knows' if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true."
> 
> Does he know that? Can he prove it? Does he know his proof? Can he prove it? Does he know his second proof? Prove it. And so on...
> 
> He's also assuming internalism with this. Unfortunately, internalism is on the outs. For example, Michael Bergman has dealt externalism some major blows. See his _Justification Without Awareness_. One might also read the arguments of Plantinga, Sudduth, Anderson, Welty, etc.
> 
> Another problem is that OA argues that "all men" are "inexcusable" because God's existence is "clear" and they can know it via "right reason." But are we to assume that young children and mentally handicap people are excusable?? If not, then it is not clear that "all men" can know God, nor that "all men" are inexcusable because God's existence is clear and they can know it.
> 
> More to the point, can young children not know God? I mean, OA spoke of how hard it was for college students to prove such things as their existence (which seems odd because they'd have to exist to prove it or doubt it). I doubt any child could "prove" that God exists along OA's rigorous lines.
> 
> What's also strange is that he claims we should be able to prove God like 2+2=4. Not only is this proof actually a lot harder to do than most people think (for example, the majority of people that would try to prove this would appeal to some empirical argument, say, 2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples), I'd love to see OA's proof for God that is such that one would be be epistemically certain that he exists. No one has done this in the entire history of apologetics.
> 
> He furthermore places a ton of confidence in basic laws of thought, esp. the universality of the LNC. But dialetheists would differ. OA may claim that they refute themselves but that is probably based on a view of logic which is explosive. To assume this with a dialetheist would be question begging by assuming the falsity of paraconsistent logic. OA frequently complains about other apologetic methods that assume the truth of their view according to their worldview. But OA assumes the truth classical logic and Aristotle's proof of the LNC over against a dialetheist worldview (and obviously the comeback to this that if it were true it would be false is based on misunderstanding dialetheism for trivialism, so put that counter on the shelf).
> 
> Now, dialetheism may be false, but one just can't assume it. Moreover, OA has the problem of showing how each and every single worldview, and variations within each, are false or contradictory. I refer readers to Sean Choi's critique of the TAG on this exact matter in the book Reasons for Faith (ed. Geisler and Meister).



I was aware of these problems when we began speaking about the definition of "know," which is why I asked if this is what we should work with. But I think the problems you mention can be solved. The same is true for issues about the law of non-contradiction. I mentioned my students having a problem with that exactly to highlight that they would have a problem doing something so simple because they do not think about such things. And I don't think that children or person's with handicaps present a difficulty. It would be great to work through these questions together.

What is your sense of how to defend the inexcusability of unbelief?


----------



## Cheshire Cat

Posted on behalf of PM...

On the ought-implies-can maxim and its problems:

i) "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil" (Jer. 13:23).

ii) Suppose that I promised to pick CT's parents up from downtown New York, after the Chinese new years parade. One would say I 'ought' to do so since, after all, I promised that I would do that.

Now, suppose that I purposefully handcuff myself to the bed in my hotel ('cause an awesome movie is on in the hotel). Thus it appears that people can control their moral obligations. If you don't want to be obligated by a moral "ought," render yourself unable to do it. In that case, then obligation disappears. 

Once I eliminate my "can," I eliminate the obligation. To respond that I should not posture myself as to not be able to do the obligation seems wrong since up until I render myself unable, I still "can" do it, but the second I incapacitate myself, the obligation leaves that second. And, now there is no more obligation. It "disappears" as soon as I render myself unable to perform it. Further, if we have 2nd level duties to perform 1st level duties, do we have 3rd level duties to perform 2nd level duties, and on and on...

iii) Does O-I-C imply PAP? What is O-I-C? Someone might say: "Necessarily, if S is obligated to perform a at t, then S is able to perform a at t." But this is problematic, suppose Adams promises to meet Brown at 6. But at 5, Adams goes to a movie. The theater is 65 minutes from the meeting place, so if 'ought' entails 'can,' then at 5 (when the movie starts), it is not the case that Adams ought to meet Brown at 6.

How does PAP relate to O-I-C? Here's some definitions of PAP:

Let me give you four definitions of PAP from prominent libertarians who are specialists in this field (quotes taken from Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006):

"PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given action A only if he could have avoided performing it" (Widerker, p.53).

"PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p." (Ginet, 75).

"Frankfirt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine 'the principle of alternative possiblities' or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise." (Kane, p. 91, see fn. 4 for an elaboration. Kane agrees that in *particular* cases FSCs show that an agent was morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise just in case he had some libertarian free choices in his past that shaped his character.)

"PAP: A person is (libertarian) free in what he has done (= A) only if there is something he did (= B) which is such that (i) he could have done otherwise than B and (ii) it is (at least in part) in virtue of his doing B that he is (libertarian) free in doing A" (Hunt, p.167).

Notice the use of "could" or "can" in them. Okay...

Since many (most?) people have seen PAP embedded in O-I-C, Baily gives this definition of O-I-C, he calls it "the Tracing Maxim":

Tracing Maxim is as follows: Necessarily, S is obligated to perform act a at t only if S is able to perform act a at t or S was at some time t* able to perform act b such that were S to have performed b at t*, S would have been able to perform a at t and it is not the case that S is obligated to refrain from performing b at t*.

Now, our question is: Does the Maxim (O-I-C) entail some version of PAP?


Putting aside worries over what has been shown by the various Frankfurt cases, for example: Say an omnipotent fiend wants you to kill your wife. He knows you have chosen to do so. He lets you proceed, but just in case you have a change in heart, he makes sure that he will block any choice to do otherwise. It just so happens that you never change your mind. You're resolved. You couldn't have chosen otherwise, though. You hack your wife. Are you not responsible?

As I said, we're by-passing Frankfurt discussions right now. A bigger worry we have is with the person who holds to the above O-I-C, determinism, and denies PAP. I charge that Hermonta and OA are assuming libertarian free will _without even realizing it_. This accounts for why they can say, "But I affirm the sovereign decree, so how can I assume PAP or any other nasty non-Calvinist assumption!?"

Reformed theology admits to a necessity given the decree of God. For example, Vermigli

"If, as we believe, all things are directed by God and happen by His counsel, where will their contingency be? ... for everything will fall out by *necessity*. Some think this argument against divine providence so strong that the freedom of our will can hardly be defended."

Or Luther,

"When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God's working by mere passive *necessity*..."

Or Turretin:

"The foreknowledge of God implies indeed the infallibility of futurition and of the event and the *necessity* of the consequence, and yet does not imply coaction or violence, not take away from the will its intristic liberty."

And again,

"Twelfth Question: Do all things fall under the knowledge of God, both singulars and future contingencies? We affirm against Socinus.

[...]

23. The infallibility and certainty of the event does not take away the nature of the contingency of things because things can happen *necessarily* as to the event and yet contingently as to the mode of production. 

24. Although men's actions may be free (because done spontaneously and by a previous judgment of reason), they do not cease to be the *necessary* with respect to the divine decree and foreknowledge."

I could go on. I assume I've established the reformed view on this matter. This isn't to assert: If God knows S will do x, necessarily S will do x, but it does mean that there is no possible world at which, if God knows S will do x, S will not do x.

Every action one performs, then, given the decree, one could not do otherwise. Now, CT and OA want to hold that for inexcusability and responsibility, that "If S 'ought' to x, then S 'can' S, otherwise, how is S responsible for x-ing?" This seems to lead to PAP. 

Note this argument:

1. Suppose some individual, John, does something morally wrong. 
2. If John's Xing was wrong, then he ought to have done something else instead.
3. If John ought to have done something else instead, then he could have done something else instead. (The OA and CT premise)
4. So John could have done something else instead. (from 3, PAP)
5. But if causal determinism is true, then John could not have done anything other than he actually did. (Reformed premise)
6. So, if causal determinism is true, it cannot be the case that John's Xing was wrong. (Entailed by CT's and OA's position).

So, it doe seem that O-I-C implies some kind of PAP, and also implies that we deny some key tenant(s) of Calvinism (hence the reason some people are suspect of the claims of CT an OA).

We can close out showing another problem with O-I-C compliments of Fisher:

"Imagine that a person—call him 'Stanley'—deliberately keeps himself very still. He refrains, for some reason, from moving his body at all. … suppose that here is someone with a powerful interest in having Stanley refrain from making any deliberate movements, who arranges things in such a way that Stanley will be stricken with general paralysis if he shows any inclination to move. Nonetheless, Stanley may keep himself still quite on his own altogether independently of this person's schemes. Why should Stanley not be morally responsible for keeping still, in that case, just as much as if there had been nothing to prevent him from moving had he chosen to do so? 

I agree with Frankfurt here. And surely Stanley could be considered blameworthy, should something morally important hang on his moving his body rather than keeping still.

Stanley's not moving his body, or refraining from moving, is a "simple omission": the omission is entirely constituted by his failure to move his body. There are many more such omissions, and in these cases it is plausible that the agents are indeed morally responsible—and potentially morally blameworthy—although they could not have refrained from keeping still.

[...]

It is evident where the problems lie. The conclusion that if an agent is morally required to do A but cannot do A, then all of her options are morally ruled out, infelicitously elides the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical options. From the mere fact that an agent lacks a certain metaphysical option it does not follow that she lacks the corresponding epistemic option. So, from the mere fact that an agent in fact cannot do A, it does not follow that she knows that he cannot do A. Thus, all that follows from the moral requirement and the metaphysical fact is that all of the agent's epistemic alternatives are ruled out, except A. But there is nothing problematic about this; and now the moral requirement can have its distinctive role in guiding deliberation and action. Moral requirements insert themselves into the space of epistemic possibilities, not directly into the space of metaphysical possibilities.

I conclude that despite his noteworthy efforts, David Copp has not successfully presented a compelling motivation for the Maxim. If we reject the Maxim, we can reject PAP. And we are thus not pushed toward a compatibilist account of freedom; as I explained above, a compatibilist must say that we are free either to "change" the past or the natural laws. That is, the compatibilist must deny that our freedom is the freedom to extend the given past, holding the laws of nature fixed. But this is quite implausible."

Pax,


----------



## Cheshire Cat

Posted on behalf of PM...

OA wrote:

_"In the Acts 17 example, the person is held responsible for not repenting, which is to say they are getting what they want. They do not want to repent. So there is no excuse available here." _

No, God commads all men everywhere to repent. But they CANNOT unless the HS regenerates them.

The question is not over them WANTING it's over ABILITY. You are saying that they CAN repent, wich is what allows for responsibility. If you affirm Reformed categories you must hold:

i) These men CANNOT repent.

and,

ii) These men are resposible for what they CANNOT do.


_"In the case of wanting to flap your arms and fly to the moon, this is not within man's natural ability. But knowing God is within that ability. So a problem would only arise if a person wanted to know God but could not."_

All men do know God, they do not want to know God savingly AND they cannot.

Furthermore:

6The mind of sinful man is death, but the mind controlled by the Spirit is life and peace; 7 the sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God's law, nor *can* it do so. 8 Those controlled by the sinful nature *cannot* please God. 

This is problematic with O-I-C. This doesn't say that they do not WANT to, though that is true, it says that they CANNOT sumbit to God's law. Even so, God holds them morally responsible.


----------



## Cheshire Cat

armourbearer said:


> Cheshire Cat said:
> 
> 
> 
> Me: From OA's book Reason and Worldviews: "Problematically, he maintains that the natural man cannot comprehend what he ought to comprehend of God. This is extremely problematic because it means that while humans ought to comprehend God, they cannot. How can they be held responsible?"
> 
> Clearly OA just said that if one OUGHT to x, then they CAN do x; otherwise, "how can they be morally responsible." This at least affirms "ought implies can", and probably PAP. Since it affirms "ought implies can" then that's one place where "the above was denied."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is simply the classic way of stating the problem. Shouldn't you be addressing his answer to the problem?
Click to expand...


Posted on behalf of PM...

That's odd Rev. Winzer, OA is claiming that Warfield was saying something PROBLEMATIC because he DENIED O-I-C, yet you claim guys like CT and OA are stating the "classic" position while Warfield was not! Reformed have ALWAYS (traditionally) denied O-I-C over and against the Arminian.

In fact, there is no need to adress his answer because it is beyond me how Edwards is a help to him here. I suggest some may be unaware of the philosophical categories being invoked here. Much of this has to do with contemporary philosophical discussion on moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will. In all of the literature I have read, I've never seen anyone resort to Edwards or something like that to defend "ought-implies-can." In fact, O-I-C is traditionally defended by the libertarians. Indeed, Kant is famous for invoking it, and Kant was a notorious libertarian action theorist.


----------



## Semper Fidelis

Gentlemen,

Even though PM is my friend, we cannot have a debate by proxy here. The occasional insertion of thoughts from elsewhere is one thing but answering point by point will get distracting.


----------



## Jim Johnston

Dr. Anderson, if/when I write up a review of your book Reasons and Worldviews, I will email you and send you a copy and engage in dialogue with you.

For what it's worth, when you wrote:



> Since I'm OA, maybe one way to proceed is to ask me: "when you said ... did you mean ...?"



I'm not sure how much that is needed.

See, you are fairly clear both here, and in your book, that you affirm:

i) Paul's all men in Romans 1 are merely _able_ to know God, they do not _know_ God.

ii) Ought-implies-can. Inability limits responsible.

iii) That if S believes P without being able to prove P, then S is a fideist or dogmatist.

a) Internalism

b) Evidentialism

c) Deontologicalism

(cf. p. 13, _Reasons and Worldviews_)

iv) Doxastic voluntarism (ibid, p.6, top).

v) And other questionable views on the knowledge of God along with what I take to be some serious misunderstandings of Van Til and a forcing on Plantinga something which his program doesn't pretend to do. (Btw, you also switch back and forth in your Van Til chapter by claiming that Van Til said the presupposition for knowledge was the Ontological Trinity, and other times that he said it was the Scriptures (cf. ibid, 60, 59, 57, 56, 55)).

These are foundational disagreements that have been and can be debated at length. Your position rests on the truth of many of these, along with certain views of reason and what it can do that I do not share. But as I do not post on the PB, I can't spend the time I'd like to interact with you, and I can't keep sending Caleb emails. The bottom line is that on my end I'd have to make some historically Arminian concessions to go along with much of what you've wrote, and if it's not Arminianism, then it is things I take to be philosophically problematic. But if I go through with a review I'll email you.

And, since you asked, my view of inexcusability is that all men _do_ have a knowledge of God (in the Rom. 1 sense), not just that they _can_. You must be bound to agree that if I, along with the top-notch exegetes on Romans 1 are correct, then I've fully side-stepped your entire program and rendered it fairly irrelevant, despite what other positives might be said of it. That's why you argue against that view. But that view is the historic view on the knowledge of God, esp. in Calvin, the Reformed Scholastics, Turretin, Bavink, Murray, et. al.

Thanks for your time,

PM out...


----------



## owenanderson

There are certainly many things to discuss here and we'll need to do so one by one. I don't agree that I maintain evidentialism or deontology. I do maintain ought/can, but not in a way that leads to or assumes libertrianism or arminianism. I argue specifically against both (aiming at Kant) in "Clarity," and argue that ought/can can be developed in a way that is affirmed by predestination. I also don't agree with how you've characterized my view of ability and responsibility. In other words, there are many nuances that need to be taken into account before we say "so-and-so believes S because so-and-so said P." That is why it is important to ask what the other means, and be careful to avoid telling them what they mean.

The way your explained Acts 17 in your most recent post is what I'd say: they don't want to, and they can't. 

I suspect most/all of the apparent disagreements are due to needing to be careful in how we attribute things to others, and in the limitations of this format. I've said a few brief things in a very focused book, and you've wanted to draw from that many more things that will take some time to work over together. Have you had a chance to read my more recent and developed book? It would be great to sit down together and have some time to discuss these things. Then I think we'd see we agree on more than we thought.

More to the point for this thread is the issue concerning Romans 1. There was an earlier discussion on this thread trying to clarifying that. I think we made some progress. It largely depends on what is meant by "know". What would you say this term means?


----------



## owenanderson

I agree with what is expressed by the Reformed thinkers you quotes concerning necessity, and I think there is still an important sense of ought/can that we can rely on.

I appreciate your many references to sources. I think while you and I are aware of these books and thinkers, it may not be familiar to everyone on the thread. Do you think there is a way we could discuss the subject so as to be accessible to everyone and encouraging to others to join in? One way I try to do that in "Clarity" is to discuss levels of freedom. I distinguish between these levels:

practical, psychological, worldview, presuppositional, and reason. 

Your examples (and those used by the authors you reference) are limited to the first two levels, and on those levels I completely agree with you. But this is what I mean by recognizing nuances that require time to develop and discuss. I argue that at the most basic level there is a sense in which want and can blend or become indistinct. I can iff I want to, and my want is entirely predetermined by God, and since it is my want I am responsible for it. 



Cheshire Cat said:


> Posted on behalf of PM...
> 
> On the ought-implies-can maxim and its problems:
> 
> i) "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil" (Jer. 13:23).
> 
> ii) Suppose that I promised to pick CT's parents up from downtown New York, after the Chinese new years parade. One would say I 'ought' to do so since, after all, I promised that I would do that.
> 
> Now, suppose that I purposefully handcuff myself to the bed in my hotel ('cause an awesome movie is on in the hotel). Thus it appears that people can control their moral obligations. If you don't want to be obligated by a moral "ought," render yourself unable to do it. In that case, then obligation disappears.
> 
> Once I eliminate my "can," I eliminate the obligation. To respond that I should not posture myself as to not be able to do the obligation seems wrong since up until I render myself unable, I still "can" do it, but the second I incapacitate myself, the obligation leaves that second. And, now there is no more obligation. It "disappears" as soon as I render myself unable to perform it. Further, if we have 2nd level duties to perform 1st level duties, do we have 3rd level duties to perform 2nd level duties, and on and on...
> 
> iii) Does O-I-C imply PAP? What is O-I-C? Someone might say: "Necessarily, if S is obligated to perform a at t, then S is able to perform a at t." But this is problematic, suppose Adams promises to meet Brown at 6. But at 5, Adams goes to a movie. The theater is 65 minutes from the meeting place, so if 'ought' entails 'can,' then at 5 (when the movie starts), it is not the case that Adams ought to meet Brown at 6.
> 
> How does PAP relate to O-I-C? Here's some definitions of PAP:
> 
> Let me give you four definitions of PAP from prominent libertarians who are specialists in this field (quotes taken from Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006):
> 
> "PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given action A only if he could have avoided performing it" (Widerker, p.53).
> 
> "PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p." (Ginet, 75).
> 
> "Frankfirt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine 'the principle of alternative possiblities' or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise." (Kane, p. 91, see fn. 4 for an elaboration. Kane agrees that in *particular* cases FSCs show that an agent was morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise just in case he had some libertarian free choices in his past that shaped his character.)
> 
> "PAP: A person is (libertarian) free in what he has done (= A) only if there is something he did (= B) which is such that (i) he could have done otherwise than B and (ii) it is (at least in part) in virtue of his doing B that he is (libertarian) free in doing A" (Hunt, p.167).
> 
> Notice the use of "could" or "can" in them. Okay...
> 
> Since many (most?) people have seen PAP embedded in O-I-C, Baily gives this definition of O-I-C, he calls it "the Tracing Maxim":
> 
> Tracing Maxim is as follows: Necessarily, S is obligated to perform act a at t only if S is able to perform act a at t or S was at some time t* able to perform act b such that were S to have performed b at t*, S would have been able to perform a at t and it is not the case that S is obligated to refrain from performing b at t*.
> 
> Now, our question is: Does the Maxim (O-I-C) entail some version of PAP?
> 
> 
> Putting aside worries over what has been shown by the various Frankfurt cases, for example: Say an omnipotent fiend wants you to kill your wife. He knows you have chosen to do so. He lets you proceed, but just in case you have a change in heart, he makes sure that he will block any choice to do otherwise. It just so happens that you never change your mind. You're resolved. You couldn't have chosen otherwise, though. You hack your wife. Are you not responsible?
> 
> As I said, we're by-passing Frankfurt discussions right now. A bigger worry we have is with the person who holds to the above O-I-C, determinism, and denies PAP. I charge that Hermonta and OA are assuming libertarian free will _without even realizing it_. This accounts for why they can say, "But I affirm the sovereign decree, so how can I assume PAP or any other nasty non-Calvinist assumption!?"
> 
> Reformed theology admits to a necessity given the decree of God. For example, Vermigli
> 
> "If, as we believe, all things are directed by God and happen by His counsel, where will their contingency be? ... for everything will fall out by *necessity*. Some think this argument against divine providence so strong that the freedom of our will can hardly be defended."
> 
> Or Luther,
> 
> "When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God's working by mere passive *necessity*..."
> 
> Or Turretin:
> 
> "The foreknowledge of God implies indeed the infallibility of futurition and of the event and the *necessity* of the consequence, and yet does not imply coaction or violence, not take away from the will its intristic liberty."
> 
> And again,
> 
> "Twelfth Question: Do all things fall under the knowledge of God, both singulars and future contingencies? We affirm against Socinus.
> 
> [...]
> 
> 23. The infallibility and certainty of the event does not take away the nature of the contingency of things because things can happen *necessarily* as to the event and yet contingently as to the mode of production.
> 
> 24. Although men's actions may be free (because done spontaneously and by a previous judgment of reason), they do not cease to be the *necessary* with respect to the divine decree and foreknowledge."
> 
> I could go on. I assume I've established the reformed view on this matter. This isn't to assert: If God knows S will do x, necessarily S will do x, but it does mean that there is no possible world at which, if God knows S will do x, S will not do x.
> 
> Every action one performs, then, given the decree, one could not do otherwise. Now, CT and OA want to hold that for inexcusability and responsibility, that "If S 'ought' to x, then S 'can' S, otherwise, how is S responsible for x-ing?" This seems to lead to PAP.
> 
> Note this argument:
> 
> 1. Suppose some individual, John, does something morally wrong.
> 2. If John's Xing was wrong, then he ought to have done something else instead.
> 3. If John ought to have done something else instead, then he could have done something else instead. (The OA and CT premise)
> 4. So John could have done something else instead. (from 3, PAP)
> 5. But if causal determinism is true, then John could not have done anything other than he actually did. (Reformed premise)
> 6. So, if causal determinism is true, it cannot be the case that John's Xing was wrong. (Entailed by CT's and OA's position).
> 
> So, it doe seem that O-I-C implies some kind of PAP, and also implies that we deny some key tenant(s) of Calvinism (hence the reason some people are suspect of the claims of CT an OA).
> 
> We can close out showing another problem with O-I-C compliments of Fisher:
> 
> "Imagine that a person—call him 'Stanley'—deliberately keeps himself very still. He refrains, for some reason, from moving his body at all. … suppose that here is someone with a powerful interest in having Stanley refrain from making any deliberate movements, who arranges things in such a way that Stanley will be stricken with general paralysis if he shows any inclination to move. Nonetheless, Stanley may keep himself still quite on his own altogether independently of this person's schemes. Why should Stanley not be morally responsible for keeping still, in that case, just as much as if there had been nothing to prevent him from moving had he chosen to do so?
> 
> I agree with Frankfurt here. And surely Stanley could be considered blameworthy, should something morally important hang on his moving his body rather than keeping still.
> 
> Stanley's not moving his body, or refraining from moving, is a "simple omission": the omission is entirely constituted by his failure to move his body. There are many more such omissions, and in these cases it is plausible that the agents are indeed morally responsible—and potentially morally blameworthy—although they could not have refrained from keeping still.
> 
> [...]
> 
> It is evident where the problems lie. The conclusion that if an agent is morally required to do A but cannot do A, then all of her options are morally ruled out, infelicitously elides the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical options. From the mere fact that an agent lacks a certain metaphysical option it does not follow that she lacks the corresponding epistemic option. So, from the mere fact that an agent in fact cannot do A, it does not follow that she knows that he cannot do A. Thus, all that follows from the moral requirement and the metaphysical fact is that all of the agent's epistemic alternatives are ruled out, except A. But there is nothing problematic about this; and now the moral requirement can have its distinctive role in guiding deliberation and action. Moral requirements insert themselves into the space of epistemic possibilities, not directly into the space of metaphysical possibilities.
> 
> I conclude that despite his noteworthy efforts, David Copp has not successfully presented a compelling motivation for the Maxim. If we reject the Maxim, we can reject PAP. And we are thus not pushed toward a compatibilist account of freedom; as I explained above, a compatibilist must say that we are free either to "change" the past or the natural laws. That is, the compatibilist must deny that our freedom is the freedom to extend the given past, holding the laws of nature fixed. But this is quite implausible."
> 
> Pax,


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## owenanderson

And, since you asked, my view of inexcusability is that all men _do_ have a knowledge of God (in the Rom. 1 sense), not just that they _can_. You must be bound to agree that if I, along with the top-notch exegetes on Romans 1 are correct, then I've fully side-stepped your entire program and rendered it fairly irrelevant, despite what other positives might be said of it. That's why you argue against that view. But that view is the historic view on the knowledge of God, esp. in Calvin, the Reformed Scholastics, Turretin, Bavink, Murray, et. al.

Thanks for your time,

PM out...[/QUOTE]

My sense is that this was cleared up earlier in the thread. I agree with these thinkers depending on what "know" means. The meaning of the term I am focused on includes some form of assent or believing, so that a person does not "know" if they do not agree to the truth of a claim. Thus, Richard Dawkins does not "know" God in this sense. But I believe there are other senses of the term "know" that people use and that can explain the quotes above.

What I'm interested in is the excuses Dawkins (or whoever) gives for not believing. I ask: do you believe the following is true: "God exists." He says: "no." I ask: "why not?" Whatever his answer is, I believe it is inexcusable. 

I hope this helps.


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## JohnV

Wow! I don't think I can read all this thread. I got to the point where discussion was taking place by proxy, and then I had to leave off reading. It was going in another direction, and my mind was still busy with the previous points.

I think I could write about twenty pages or more of notes just on the first page of this thread. There's so much to consider here. And I haven't read the book yet.


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## JohnV

May I take it that this thread is ready for a new direction? I have a few questions I'd like to ask. Please excuse me for not having read your book. This is the first I'd heard of it, and I surelywould like to read it when I get the chance. Right now I'm in the middle of two other studies. 

I'd like to know about "knowing". How many ways are there to know something? That's too general; let me be more specific: How many ways are there to know from general revelation that God exists? I'm not referring to proofs here, but rather to the size of the field of knowledge. It's big enough, I know, for someone to confuse the facts sufficiently to scholastically hide his willful unbelief behind a rational explanation. But does that immensity really provide an excuse after all? 

Your previous posts seem to suggest that the immensity of the field of knowledge does not matter to the case, that the simple truth is still the simple truth, and that everyone is alike in his indefensible position that he did not know when all his dissembling is set aside.


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## owenanderson

*general revelation*

Thanks for your question. I think that there are many more views out there that need to be addressed than most apologists/Christian philosophers actually do address. Many times it seems that they feel if they've shown there is a beginning to the universe then this means God exists. But on the other hand, I don't think that there are so many views such that we cannot know and should not spend any time sorting them out.

I guess I would begin in general revelation with this question: what has existed from eternity? I think the answers to this question amongst the world's religions can be categorized into only a few possibilities.

Does that help?


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## JohnV

Thank you Dr. I'm going to think about that. 

In the meantime, I have another question: 

Well, it's a series of questions trying to get at one answer. I'm going to try to keep it simple. 

Let's say that I was out at night, all by myself, and encountered an alien space ship. It landed right in front of me. The aliens came out and talked to me (asking directions I suppose), and then after we shook hands they left. I was the only one who saw this.

I can't prove any of this to anyone, because I have no solid evidence. There's not even a mark on the grass from their space ship taking off. All I have is my own experience as witness. I would know what I saw, and that it was true, but would have nothing to prove it. To the world I would be a kook. 

Is my knowledge of what happened subjective knowledge? Does this change the facts? How does the lack of evidence in this scenario differ with the oft-argued lack of evidence for the existence of God?


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## owenanderson

I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?

Does that help?


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## MW

Cheshire Cat said:


> In fact, there is no need to adress his answer because it is beyond me how Edwards is a help to him here. I suggest some may be unaware of the philosophical categories being invoked here. Much of this has to do with contemporary philosophical discussion on moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will. In all of the literature I have read, I've never seen anyone resort to Edwards or something like that to defend "ought-implies-can." In fact, O-I-C is traditionally defended by the libertarians. Indeed, Kant is famous for invoking it, and Kant was a notorious libertarian action theorist.



I haven't read the book in question so I cannot argue pro or con concerning the position of the author. I was merely noting that the summary posted here included a statement of the problem, and the criticism of it represented the statement of the problem as if it were the answer to the problem.

It is true that the natural/moral distinction is sometimes criticised for its wording; e.g., the Hodges show the sinner's moral inability is "natural" to him, but this merely comes down to wording. The distinction itself is held by all reformed theologians. (1.) Because man is a free agent even when his will is enslaved to sin. (2.) Because in regeneration the Holy Spirit does not infuse new powers into the soul, but renews the power of will and reason which are constitutional to him.

Further, reformed theology is careful to clarify that the moral inability includes "spiritual good," that is, relative to God. It acknowledges ye being evil "know" how to give "good gifts" to you children, and therefore confesses that man has ability to make good civil choices, that is, relative to his fellow man.

My preference would be to see philosophy and theology confined to their own realms. The words "knowledge" and "ability" have metaphysical connotations in philosophy which they do not possess in theology.


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## Beth Ellen Nagle

Mr. Anderson, great to see you posting here. I enjoyed reading_*Benjamin B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics*. I didn't realize you have two other books out. I look forward to reading them. Thank you for your good work.


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## Jim Johnston

owenanderson said:


> I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?
> 
> Does that help?




I think Alston answered that 'issue" fairly well in his response to Fales in Blackwell's _Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion_


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## owenanderson

Beth Ellen Nagle said:


> Mr. Anderson, great to see you posting here. I enjoyed reading_*Benjamin B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics*. I didn't realize you have two other books out. I look forward to reading them. Thank you for your good work.



Good to hear from you! I should tell you that "Reason and Worldviews" is a revised edition of the Warfield book. There is a new chapter, and the old chapters are revised.


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## owenanderson

Jim Johnston said:


> owenanderson said:
> 
> 
> 
> I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?
> 
> Does that help?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think Alston answered that 'issue" fairly well in his response to Fales in Blackwell's _Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion_
Click to expand...


Really? I don't think Alston recognizes the range of possible experiences relating to the possible basic beliefs.


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## owenanderson

Joshua said:


> Does anyone else come into these philosophy/apologetic threads and feel like this:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Or is it just me?



No, I don't think its just you


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## JohnV

owenanderson said:


> I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?
> 
> Does that help?



Was it really aliens? You'd have to ask the aliens, not me. 

Could it have been a hoax? You'd have to ask the alleged hoaxsters, not me.

Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in my salad? I can't tell whether it is more presumptuous to assume what I had to eat than that what I ate was more at work than my true senses. 



> How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?



I think that this answers my intent of the question. I was trying to get to a point where we could discuss more deeply the distinction between "proving" and "convicting". 

In response I'd like to tell you what I think about this question. It'll give more of an idea of the direction I'm going. 

Some things, it seems to me, are so much outside of others' personal experience that you cannot "prove" to them what you know to be true. It has nothing to do with gullibility, obstinacy, or will; it's just outside their experience. Though this may be the case with a considerable amount of religious experience, of lived doctrine let us say, it is not the case with the existence of God. No one can deny God's existence without also affirming it; it is just a matter of finding a person's argumentative vulnerability so that you can humbly and caringly show it to him. 

The point I wish to ask about is the difference between being able to show what one knows to be true and the various other aspects involved: namely whether another accepts the "proofs", whether the "proofs" are related faithfully, or differentiating between knowing the truth and comprehending all truth, ... and such like distinctions. If one needs to be equal with God in order to "prove" God exists, then only Christ and the Spirit can "prove" God exists. But people don't believe them either; and yet this world has them every bit as much as it has me or you. But does one need to be equal with God in order to "prove" God exists? I don't think so, because the "proof" itself has nothing to do with you or I: proof is proof whether you or I know what it is or not, whether you or I can "prove" or not, whether the one we are trying to "prove" God's existence to accepts the "proof" or not. 

And no matter how closely this world studies the creation, they cannot find another's stamp of manufacture on it. It only has God's. So the proof is there; I would say that it cannot be the case that it is not there. 

That's why my inclusion of the word "dissembling". I take it from, I believe, Cranmer's last confession, referring to our pretensions of knowledge which are really nothing more than excuses. Are not some of our arguments defending Christianity perhaps (sometimes) not much less a dissembling than the world's refusals of God's displaying His majestic divinity and sovereignty? some Christian philosophers say that you cannot "prove" God's existence. May it be that we sometimes argue in pride every bit as much as the world refuses God in pride, rather than arguing to "proving" God exists? 

Do we not, in point of fact, live in such a period, in Christian philosophy particularly, as Dickens describes above?


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## owenanderson

I think you're right that we can be guilty of arguing in pride, especially when we start by saying "I'm going to show that Christianity is true." We are taking it for granted that the tradition we are in is true, and we're going to show this to everyone else. I'm wondering about the broader question, "how do I know which tradition to accept?" This puts the burden more on my shoulders as the individual inquirer. What do you think?


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## JohnV

> I'm wondering about the broader question, "how do I know which tradition to accept?" This puts the burden more on my shoulders as the individual inquirer. What do you think?



That's a question I asked myself 40 years ago when, as a young teenager I witnessed my father's responses to some Jehovah's Witnesses. How could he be so sure, I wondered, seeing that they were defending their tradition and my father his. I knew it was more than tradition, but still I wondered how it could be made more plain to others that we were not defending our tradition, our personal beliefs, our predispositions, but were defending the truth. 

I think the burden is on us to a degree. But I think the burden on us is for honesty and integrity, which ought to include first of all our humility in knowing that we are just as guilty in sin as the unbeliever, and perhaps more to blame because of the grace given us to build on the faith granted us. 

But I don't see that onus as if the defence of the truth bears the burden of proof. At least I've always approached defending the truth of the Bible from the standpoint of it being the king of the hill, the thing that has to be knocked down if another truth is to succed, to become the new king of the hill. No matter what anyone else says, the truth of the Bible is the king of the hill. There are other ideas that make that claim, but only on the grounds of popularity or from the support of subjective earthly authorities. They have the onus to prove what they claim, I believe. 

Where I think we have to carry the weight is in acknowledging that when it comes to believing other things to be true we are more on the side of the unbeliever, needing ourselves to be convicted of truth every bit as much as they. On our own we're no better than they. It is the Spirit's work; and He has chosen to work through His witnesses. Humbly acknowledging our poverty of knowledge in bearing true witness to that truth we know so little of comes first, and that puts us almost on par with the unbeliever. What puts us above them is not our own doing; it is the Spirit's doing. So we shouldn't be trying to trump the Spirit. 

So I begin by assuming that the person I am talking to about truth already knows that God exists. I don't have to convince him of that. But if it is the existence of God that we are talking about, and he claims that he can't believe God exists, then it is his rationalizing his refusal to acknowledge God that I have to deal with, not sufficient proofs of the existence of God. Working with his presuppositions is part of it, but there is so much more than that to deal with. And if I lose his heart anywhere along the way, then there's no use talking to his brain. I won't get anywhere showing him the errors of his thinking if I don't at the same time show him that I was received by God in grace, my having no less obstinacy than him. 

If I don't show him that I'm an object of grace, then I don't think that true grace is the object of my speaking to him. And if that's not happening, then I'm not really defending the truth, no matter how precise and thorough my arguments for truth may be. I'm just defending my personal beliefs. And if that's the case, then why should he not think that I'm standing only in my upbringing, my tradition? Rather, my personal self should be disappearing in the interchange, and God should be appearing; then I know that true apologetics is working. 

That's my thoughts on this. I'll have to reread this thread. I've been thrown off my thoughts by other things happening around me. I had a number of questions I wanted to ask, but I'll have to refresh my thoughts first. I think I mostly wanted to get the conversation going in a different and happier direction. Apologetics is a topic about a far too sacred a thing to get caught up in arguing about methodologies.


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## tdowns

*Wow....*

Not only is this thread, like all the philosophy threads, fun, but it really gets wild and super spy like, when people who don't post on the PB, post on the PB, through someone else....I can't remember or missed the history on that one...but seems... I do miss the days when he did post though, which, I guess, was today?


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## ChristianTrader

Christusregnat said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> One other thing: Owen's books seems to have awaken me from my Theonomic slumbers. A key point made in his books concern the relationship between general and special revelation. General revelation has actual content to which people are responsible and are inexcusable for rejecting. It also puts some constraints on what special revelation looks like. Put another way, there is and has to be a natural law.
> 
> For me, Theonomy has its true bite only when one rejects natural law. Without natural law, one either has Theonomy or chaos. With natural law, one does not have to push so hard for continuity between the Old Testament and New Testament. One can then accept that some things were special for the jewish administration in the OT and don't need to be explicitly repealed in order to question the validity. If one attempts something like this without a robust natural law, then one is back again looking chaos in the face.
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hermonta,
> 
> I am intrigued by your statements, and they prompt a few questions:
> 
> 1. What do you mean by "natural law"; can you define?
> 
> 2. What is the means by which one may determine which "natural laws" are to be chosen? For instance, do we choose Hume's version, or the Marquis de Sade's? By what standard do we decide?
> 
> 3. Does law (whether natural or otherwise) have any place in glorifying God, or in enjoying Him forever? If so, what rule hath God given to direct us in the use of such laws?
> 
> 4. What is the method that natural man uses to ascertain "natural law"? Does he intuit natural law, empirically judge which laws are natural, democratically decide, or is it subject to a rational process? If so, who's reason is to be used?
> 
> 5. If law is natural, why is nature so lawless?
> 
> 6. Can natural man be subject to natural law? Can natural man ascertain natural law?
> 
> 7. Can you explain an exegetical defense for your responses to the above questions?
> 
> 8. How do you link Paul's use of general revelation as a means of condemntation with a positive system of law?
> 
> Interested in your thoughts.
> 
> Cheers,
Click to expand...


I am still working some stuff out and should be back later to attempt to flesh out some more of my views but here is an interesting article by Dr. Anderson that started me to thinking.

http://www.owenanderson.net/reviews/AndersonNaturalLaw.pdf


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