# Scottish Common Sense Realism



## Justified

I saw that there were earlier threads on this, but nothing really substantive. I wanted to know your guys' thoughts on SCR. Is it biblical? If not, what should our approach to epistemology be? I've heard that SCR might be at the root of the fall of Old Princeton. I personally think there were probably other, greater factors than that. Let me know your thoughts.


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## Philip

Historical notes:

Direct realism of some sort was pretty much assumed by all Christian theologians before Descartes and even most before Kant. The empirical tradition of Locke and co. raised critical questions in the 18th century that were brought to a head with the thoight of David Hume. After Hume, there were two trajectories: Kant (transcendental idealism) and Thomas Reid (SCR). The Kantian/Hegelian tradition only made inroads in American institutions at the end of the 19th century, by which time Common Sense Realism had, for the most part, given way to its red-headed stepchild, pragmatism.

The modernists who made inroads at Princeton in the early 20th century were all schooled in the German liberalism of the day, which assumed a Kantian framework rather than that of SCR.


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## RamistThomist

I am SCR mediated through plantiga


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## Backwoods Presbyterian

A good place to go is this book

http://www.amazon.com/Right-Reason-Princeton-Mind-Unorthodox/dp/1596381434


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## Justified

Philip said:


> Historical notes:
> 
> Direct realism of some sort was pretty much assumed by all Christian theologians before Descartes and even most before Kant. The empirical tradition of Locke and co. raised critical questions in the 18th century that were brought to a head with the thoight of David Hume. After Hume, there were two trajectories: Kant (transcendental idealism) and Thomas Reid (SCR). The Kantian/Hegelian tradition only made inroads in American institutions at the end of the 19th century, by which time Common Sense Realism had, for the most part, given way to its red-headed stepchild, pragmatism.
> 
> The modernists who made inroads at Princeton in the early 20th century were all schooled in the German liberalism of the day, which assumed a Kantian framework rather than that of SCR.


Thanks, I was thinking that the Christian view of things ought to be some form of realism.

Ben, thanks for the book recommendation. I will probably read it eventually. The thesis of it is interesting. I was always wary of the claims that CSR was the cause of the fall of Princeton. As already mentioned by Phillip, it seems Kantian Modernism was the cause of the fall of Old Princeton.


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## Grafted In

You might find this recent discussion on the Reformed Forum interesting and instructive. 

Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism - Reformed Forum


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## RamistThomist

Justified said:


> I was always wary of the claims that CSR was the cause of the fall of Princeton.



Read George Marsden's essay on CSR in _Faith and Rationality_. At the end of the day everyone affirms some form of common sense realism when it comes to giving justifications for one's foundation. As Marsden notes, however, it was when CSR was wedded to a crass empiricism that it failed. As such, it couldn't withstand Darwinism.

But as Plantinga has shown today, Thomas Reid need not be wedded to empirical models.


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## Afterthought

I have appreciated the philosophy, although I still have some unresolved questions on the matter, including some asked by the pragmatists. But when it comes right down to it, it seems this sort of realist philosophy is inevitable. Indeed, that's what James McCosh argues in favor of it. I have also appreciated how one can use the philosophy in the context of presuppositional apologetics; even just trying to understand the arguments in favor of this realist philosophy is helpful in training the mind to see what is at the back of people's claims. Of course, the philosophy could be taken too far (e.g., being too confident in the abilities of inductive reasoning), but if we view our reasoning abilities as having come from the "self-attesting God of Scripture" and take into account the noetic effects of sin, then it seems to me to fall nicely within a Christian view of things.

Ronald Nash's works, especially his _Life's Ultimate Questions_ have been recommended to me in the past on the matter. _Life's Ultimate Questions_ is useful, but I personally found Dabney's _The Sensualistic Philosophy of the 19th Century_ more useful. Perhaps because I am more familiar with the philosophy near that time period.


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## Justified

Grafted In said:


> You might find this recent discussion on the Reformed Forum interesting and instructive.
> 
> Covenantal Apologetics and Common-Sense Realism - Reformed Forum



Watched the segment, it seems to provide some pretty decent critiques to CSR, although clearly one hour is not enough time to settle the subject. Regardless if CSR is true, I think as Christians _some_ form of realism is demanded.


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## jwright82

Well we all have beliefs that seem so obvious but that isn't the problem with CSR. The problem is in defining what counts as "common sense" and what doesn't. Without some criteria to determine what is "common sense" it is a usefull but problematic notion. I prefer the term immediate belief because it allows for what we all experience as what we may call "common sense" beliefs without In my humble opinion succombing to the problems of defining "common sense". As a Vantillian I must point out that I can't whole sale accept CSR but it has some useful ideasif qualified.


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## MW

We are in the realm of general revelation so the question of whether it is "biblical" will have to be adjusted accordingly. The Bible does not teach it per se, but it may be shown to agree with the facts of special revelation.

It comes down to whether this gives a good account of human consciousness. It obviously does, and it was articulated to emphasise certain fundamental beliefs which human beings share. However, from a Cartesian point of view, which requires the impossible task of doubting everything until proven by its own evidence, and with the rise of Hume's Gap and Kant's Wall, a foundationalist theory is hard to sustain philosophically. At that point the presuppositional approach becomes necessary.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> The problem is in defining what counts as "common sense" and what doesn't. Without some criteria to determine what is "common sense" it is a usefull but problematic notion.



If what you mean is that one may have immediate (and warranted, on some coherent model of warrant) beliefs that are not "common sense" for people not sharing one's model of rationality, it's not necessarily problematic for common sense. Common sense is a family resemblance concept referring to beliefs that most rational people would hold.

In other words, many immediate beliefs are common-sense beliefs, but not all. And many (not necessarily all) immediate beliefs would be common sense (example of non-immediate common sense beliefs: Euclid's postulates).


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Well we all have beliefs that seem so obvious but that isn't the problem with CSR. The problem is in defining what counts as "common sense" and what doesn't. Without some criteria to determine what is "common sense" it is a usefull but problematic notion. I prefer the term immediate belief because it allows for what we all experience as what we may call "common sense" beliefs without In my humble opinion succombing to the problems of defining "common sense". As a Vantillian I must point out that I can't whole sale accept CSR but it has some useful ideasif qualified.



Defining what is "common sense" isn't what CSR is all about. Wolterstorff (_Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology_) makes that clear. It is not a database of knowledge (i.e., defining what common sense is) but rather a mode of knowing. Classical foundationalism is wrong because it is self-referentially incoherent. It is not the case that the foundationalist claim (a belief is properly basic because it is either self-evident to me or immediately present to my senses) meets its own criteria: it is not self-evidently true nor is it available to the senses . If a belief is formed in proper circumstances according to its proper cognitive design, it has warrant.


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## Grafted In

K. Scott Oliphint's critique of A. Plantinga and SCR in his excellent work _Reasons for Faith_ is worth taking a look at.


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## johnny

For those of us that use logos occasionally.
Thomas Reid's work is on pre pub at the moment for only eight dollars. 
(I have it ordered)

https://www.logos.com/product/29827/the-works-of-thomas-reid


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## TylerRay

In my extremely limited knowledge, I understand there to be various nuanced positions that would fall under the umbrella of epistemological realism. One would be the perspective of Calvin and of Augustine (who I understand to be virtually identical in their epistemology, unless someone can correct me), one would be Reid's SCSR, another would be Old-Princetonian realism, still another would be Plantinga and Wolterstorff's Reformed Epistemology. 

I consider myself an epistemological realist, but I don't know just where I would fall in among all these perspectives.


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## RamistThomist

TylerRay said:


> In my extremely limited knowledge, I understand there to be various nuanced positions that would fall under the umbrella of epistemological realism. One would be the perspective of Calvin and of Augustine (who I understand to be virtually identical in their epistemology, unless someone can correct me), one would be Reid's SCSR, another would be Old-Princetonian realism, still another would be Plantinga and Wolterstorff's Reformed Epistemology.
> 
> I consider myself an epistemological realist, but I don't know just where I would fall in among all these perspectives.



That's kind of accurate. All would agree that universals exist extra mente. The difference is how to account for belief-formation.


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## Reformed Covenanter

johnny said:


> For those of us that use logos occasionally.
> Thomas Reid's work is on pre pub at the moment for only eight dollars.
> (I have it ordered)
> 
> https://www.logos.com/product/29827/the-works-of-thomas-reid



There is also a whole lot of material by Thomas Reid on archive.org


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## jwright82

well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation? 

Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.

It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us. 

But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.


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## RamistThomist

That's not really what CSR is aiming to do. 

For example,

Bahnsenians used to parrot that "knowledge was justified, true belief." Bahnsen (and his disciples) were attempting to give an account of _belief-formation_, not whether particular beliefs (like how do we know the 66 books of the bible are the true canon?) are in fact correct. I don't see how CSR is any different. Of course it can't give a "silver-bullet" answer to every question. Bahnsenians at one time wanted TAG to do the same thing, but Frame dissauded them from that.


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## MW

McCosh's Scottish Philosophy indicates there were different strains of thought within common sense realism, so it is not really accurate to present it as if it were an unified system. Different perspectives had an influence on some thinkers within this school of thought. McCosh himself, and especially James Orr, introduced distinct presuppositional directions into the system. If I remember correctly it was Orr who had some influence on Van Til.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?



That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.



jwright82 said:


> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?



What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?



jwright82 said:


> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?



What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.


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## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> That's not really what CSR is aiming to do.
> 
> For example,
> 
> Bahnsenians used to parrot that "knowledge was justified, true belief." Bahnsen (and his disciples) were attempting to give an account of _belief-formation_, not whether particular beliefs (like how do we know the 66 books of the bible are the true canon?) are in fact correct. I don't see how CSR is any different. Of course it can't give a "silver-bullet" answer to every question. Bahnsenians at one time wanted TAG to do the same thing, but Frame dissauded them from that.



No point of view can give a "silver bullet" answer to every question but we can make persuasive arguments in our favor. The question is what sort of argument does that? I would say that CSR as Plantinga and Wolterstorff interpret it is useful to a certain point but need to supplemented by something else. The original post asked what anyone thought about CSR so I thought it would be useful to include both positive and negative assessments of it. I agree with you to the extent that CSR has limitations and we ought to realize that upfront but is useful to some extent as well and ought to be incorporated in our thinking.

I also agree that Vantillians can just as much as anyone miss use their P.O.V. to be obnoxious, their are some presuppositionalists I could name but won't, as anyone else can, CSR included. It is hard to know how much Bahnsen had interaction with Plantinga but he did have a Phd in epistemology, so he wasn't ignorant of anything. I do worry that CSR, like Presuppositionalists, can miss use their view to avoid answering certain questions that are begging to be answered.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.
> 
> CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.
Click to expand...



Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.
> 
> CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.
Click to expand...


Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.

Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics.



What precisely does this mean? It might mean a) that the only explanation that could be provided is a Christian one (empirically false) b) that only a Christian explanation could, even in principle, be logically coherent (unprovable and unlikely) c) that the only existentially satisfying explanation is Christian (subjective) d) that the Christian explanation is the best one that we know of (pragmatic and subjective).

Part of why I bring this up is that most Christian accounts of ethics merely import a Christian metaphysical grounding into a pre-existing mold. Thus some Calvinists and fundamentalist treat Scriptural commands as categorical imperatives (Kantianism and other rule-based forms of reasoning), or pop Evangelicalism argues from consequences (utilitarianism, pragmatism, and ethical egoism), or the more recent virtue ethics of MacIntyre and Hauerwas.

I think we would all agree that the central ethical question is "how should we live?" but answering it depends, not merely on the metaphysics of one's worldview, but on the pre-theoretical commitments which underlie it.



jwright82 said:


> By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate.



Even in this case, though, two individuals might arrive at two very different conclusions despite beginning with very similar commitments. For example, Calvinistic theonomists, 2kers, and transformationalists.


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## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.
> 
> CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.
> 
> Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.
Click to expand...

 You will either have no Ethick or 
A Christian one.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What precisely does this mean? It might mean a) that the only explanation that could be provided is a Christian one (empirically false) b) that only a Christian explanation could, even in principle, be logically coherent (unprovable and unlikely) c) that the only existentially satisfying explanation is Christian (subjective) d) that the Christian explanation is the best one that we know of (pragmatic and subjective).
> 
> Part of why I bring this up is that most Christian accounts of ethics merely import a Christian metaphysical grounding into a pre-existing mold. Thus some Calvinists and fundamentalist treat Scriptural commands as categorical imperatives (Kantianism and other rule-based forms of reasoning), or pop Evangelicalism argues from consequences (utilitarianism, pragmatism, and ethical egoism), or the more recent virtue ethics of MacIntyre and Hauerwas.
> 
> I think we would all agree that the central ethical question is "how should we live?" but answering it depends, not merely on the metaphysics of one's worldview, but on the pre-theoretical commitments which underlie it.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Even in this case, though, two individuals might arrive at two very different conclusions despite beginning with very similar commitments. For example, Calvinistic theonomists, 2kers, and transformationalists.
Click to expand...


It would mix nicely with my pov but you seem rule that out. Maybes CS has more do with V An TIl than you think.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.
> 
> CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.
> 
> Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> You will either have no Ethick or
> A Christian one.
Click to expand...


I think you mean to say "no consistent ethic." Anyway, it doesn't touch Reid's position, since Reid began his epistemology with God.


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## joebonni63

jwright82 said:


> well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?
> 
> Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.
> 
> It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.
> 
> But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.



I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.


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## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.
> 
> CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.
> 
> Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> You will either have no Ethick or
> A Christian one.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I think you mean to say "no consistent ethic." Anyway, it doesn't touch Reid's position, since Reid began his epistemology with God.
Click to expand...


Well that assumes a neutral space that is not Christian in principle. Since nothing can be nonchristian in principle at all we assume that either Reid was a Vantillian or something else.


----------



## jwright82

joebonni63 said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?
> 
> Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.
> 
> It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.
> 
> But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.
Click to expand...



Well I think that CSR may at times allow too much neutrality to the unbeliever.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Well that assumes a neutral space that is not Christian in principle.



It depends on what one means. If the neutral space isn't really neutral, then what does one have to fear in using it? If reality really does reflect God's revelation and design, then such should be apparent to reason. When we say that reason is neutral ground, we merely acknowledge that it is mutually-agreed-upon ground. It is the ground from which one starts in the philosophical endeavour.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.
> 
> CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally _post hoc_ and on an _ad hoc_ basis.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.
> 
> Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> You will either have no Ethick or
> A Christian one.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I think you mean to say "no consistent ethic." Anyway, it doesn't touch Reid's position, since Reid began his epistemology with God.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Well that assumes a neutral space that is not Christian in principle. Since nothing can be nonchristian in principle at all we assume that either Reid was a Vantillian or something else.
Click to expand...


What does this actually mean? I've bent over backwards to prove that Reid didn't hold to an autonomous ethics. I've long had the suspicion that Van Tillians really don't want to know what Reid taught (see the dearth of quotations by Van Tillians of Reid). 

Ironically, in _Survey of Christian Epistemology_ (pp. 132-134) Van Til grudglingly conceded that Reid was in fact right.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> joebonni63 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?
> 
> Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.
> 
> It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.
> 
> But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Well I think that CSR may at times allow too much neutrality to the unbeliever.
Click to expand...


Prove it from Reid's writings.


----------



## MW

ReformedReidian said:


> Ironically, in _Survey of Christian Epistemology_ (pp. 132-134) Van Til grudglingly conceded that Reid was in fact right.



I don't think that is a legitimate reading of Van Til at this point. He was arguing that God is the ultimate subject of knowledge and was accusing Scottish realism of making man the ultimate subject of knowing. I don't agree with Van Til's unrealistic requirements for the justification of human knowing, but he was clearly faulting realism, and that with some degree of conviction.


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## nicnap

I have an OPC minister friend who wrote a paper called, _Presuppositional Realism_. Wherein he argues that a presuppositional approach to apologetics is compatible with a realist epistemology. I think he's right. He addresses each and shows them to be on separate planes. I might see if I can get his permission to share it here.


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## jwright82

Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day. 

My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep" into someone's thinking whether they realize it or not. I don't, nor do I believe Vantil did, think any Christian thinker sets out to be "autonomous" in their thinking. No Christian disagrees with us that ethics is ultimately founded in God. It is when we sometimes attempt to base ethics on say something other than God's will that we cannot get from whatever bases it is, say common sense, to God. The attempt, however noble, must logically assume neutrality of some form whether or not the person sets out to do so.

And since neutrality is ultimately unbiblical we must avoid as much as possible. To base ethics on common sense works fine when everyone agrees but it breaks down when people disagree on ethics or anything else. Our theology demands we know this when go into the discussion. I believe that Reid fully believed common sense ethics could only come from God and the people of his time would have agreed in general. But how well would work today?


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.
> 
> My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep"



"Neutral" and "common" aren't the same thing. My vocation is "common" because I am not a clergyman; yet I don't think it is neutral or autonomous. The Reformed has always said the "common" is a good arena and doesn't need "grace" added on to it. Anyway, I haven't really seen Reid's critics state what Reid believes. I'll help:

Common Sense Realism is the understanding that certain belief-formations are warranted because of how God created me, and as a result do not need an infinite number of justifications of first principles.


----------



## jwright82

By nonchristian space I mean, and I should have explained that better my apologies, two things.

1. All space is God's space and can only realistically be understood as Christian but unbelievers in rebellion try in vain to undermine this. Even when they "know" true things they refuse to acknowledge the only source of all truth. 

2. No space is religiously neutral. Yes we all inhabit aa common world and do the same common things but all perspectives all ultimately religious in nature. The idea of secularism, which I suspect may have developed from CSR in some way, is philosophically bankrupt and unbiblical. 

I hope I explained that better. If not than please point it out to me and I will try better.


----------



## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.
> 
> My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Neutral" and "common" aren't the same thing. My vocation is "common" because I am not a clergyman; yet I don't think it is neutral or autonomous. The Reformed has always said the "common" is a good arena and doesn't need "grace" added on to it. Anyway, I haven't really seen Reid's critics state what Reid believes. I'll help:
> 
> Common Sense Realism is the understanding that certain belief-formations are warranted because of how God created me, and as a result do not need an infinite number of justifications of first principles.
Click to expand...


I agree with that but where do we go from here? Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based? How does this contradict what Vantil said? How is it even possible in the first place to form common sense beliefs? 
If you you say because of how God made us than fine but the unbeliever doesn't believe that, so now what? Where's the grand apologetic value in that? I like CSR and is useful but at some point must be supplemented with something more.


----------



## MW

jwright82 said:


> Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based?



Do you exist? How do you account for self-consciousness? Do you exist as a being who thinks his own thoughts and makes his own decisions? How do you account for this individuality and "autonomy?" Without certain foundational beliefs it is impossible to connect what we do with ourselves. Transcendental approaches are good for examining the pre-conditions of knowledge and morality in the abstract, but they cannot ground that knowledge and morality in the person. There must be something within the person as an individual which enables us to say that his thoughts and choices are authentically his.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.
> 
> My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Neutral" and "common" aren't the same thing. My vocation is "common" because I am not a clergyman; yet I don't think it is neutral or autonomous. The Reformed has always said the "common" is a good arena and doesn't need "grace" added on to it. Anyway, I haven't really seen Reid's critics state what Reid believes. I'll help:
> 
> Common Sense Realism is the understanding that certain belief-formations are warranted because of how God created me, and as a result do not need an infinite number of justifications of first principles.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I agree with that but where do we go from here? Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based? How does this contradict what Vantil said? How is it even possible in the first place to form common sense beliefs?
> If you you say because of how God made us than fine but the unbeliever doesn't believe that, so now what? Where's the grand apologetic value in that? I like CSR and is useful but at some point must be supplemented with something more.
Click to expand...


As I and others have repeatedly said, CSR isn't meant to be a silver-bullet argument.



> If you you say because of how God made us than fine but the unbeliever doesn't believe that, so now what?


CSR, at least Plantinga's version, was developed in response to the Cliffordian challenge on evidential belief. As such, it has met that challenge.



> Where's the grand apologetic value in that?


Who says CSR's goal was a grand apologetic value? Why should I judge a certain epistemological system simply on whether it can provide an architectonic apologetic value? 



> Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based?


William Alston's the only CSR guy I know that really delved into perceptual knowledge. Most of Reid's "First Principles" aren't perceptual at all. Again, a quick survey of Reid would demonstrate this.

You have used language to get your point across. You assumed I know what you are talking about, yet neither of us felt the need to give an infinute number of epistemic justifications for an infinite regress. Hence, CSR.


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## jwright82

Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.



Okay. My problems with VT is that I reject defining knowledge as justified, true belief (see Bahnsen, CVT: R&A, p. 182). I also don't buy the Transcendental Argument (or, I don't see how it doesn't also prove Fristianity). 

I do mostly agree with CVT's reading of the history of philosophy. I think Van Tillians have always been on stronger grounds when they run genealogical critiques. And I still listen to Van Til on this point. I think his One/Many critique of Greek Philosophy is grand. I don't think Presuppositionalism is as effective an apologetical methodology as listening to the Stein Debate leads one to believe. It's weak on defining and defending the canon, for example.


----------



## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
Click to expand...


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
Click to expand...


----------



## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
Click to expand...


----------



## joebonni63

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> joebonni63 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?
> 
> Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.
> 
> It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.
> 
> But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Well I think that CSR may at times allow too much neutrality to the unbeliever.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Prove it from Reid's writings.
Click to expand...


there is nothing i really have to prove it was just a common sense post........... i think in earlier post in this thread you guys covered most of it ........


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.
> 
> And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.
Click to expand...


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## joebonni63

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
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> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
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> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.
> 
> And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> reformedreidian,
> 
> wow that's great stuff you know your subject well. this is a great tread amen to that........
Click to expand...


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## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
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> ReformedReidian said:
> 
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> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.
> 
> And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I love Plantinga as well as well James K.A. Smith but I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it. But I do think that Vantillianism has gone a bit overboard with distinguishing our view from others too critically without acknowledging the good in that view. But a careful reading of Vantillians will reveal acknowledgement just like a careful reading of Plantinga will reveal his strong points. In fact Oliphint in one essay, "the new reformed epistemology" I believe it is called, says that Plantinga's model can be "reformed" theologically speaking to be useful. One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.
Click to expand...


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
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> jwright82 said:
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> ReformedReidian said:
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> jwright82 said:
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> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
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> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.
> 
> And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I love Plantinga as well as well James K.A. Smith but I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it. But I do think that Vantillianism has gone a bit overboard with distinguishing our view from others too critically without acknowledging the good in that view. But a careful reading of Vantillians will reveal acknowledgement just like a careful reading of Plantinga will reveal his strong points. In fact Oliphint in one essay, "the new reformed epistemology" I believe it is called, says that Plantinga's model can be "reformed" theologically speaking to be useful. One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I wonder how mainstream Van Til was in respect to the Reformed Tradition. When it comes to election and the doctrine of God, he was mainstream. When it comes to apologetic method, not so much (not saying he was wrong, per se).
Click to expand...


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it.



Yeah, that's part of the issue that I tend to have with Van Til's reading of history: he reinterprets Calvin and the reformed tradition to fit his own project, whereas, read on their own terms, the early reformers really aren't pushing all that hard against the prevailing philosophical epistemologies of the day. Calvin in particular fits in ery nicely with the kind of Northern Renaissance Humanism of his time, albeit with a slightly more pessimistic slant than his contemporaries.



jwright82 said:


> One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.



Sure, but Plantinga says that too.


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## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
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> ReformedReidian said:
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> jwright82 said:
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> ReformedReidian said:
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> jwright82 said:
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> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.
> 
> I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.
> 
> And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I love Plantinga as well as well James K.A. Smith but I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it. But I do think that Vantillianism has gone a bit overboard with distinguishing our view from others too critically without acknowledging the good in that view. But a careful reading of Vantillians will reveal acknowledgement just like a careful reading of Plantinga will reveal his strong points. In fact Oliphint in one essay, "the new reformed epistemology" I believe it is called, says that Plantinga's model can be "reformed" theologically speaking to be useful. One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I wonder how mainstream Van Til was in respect to the Reformed Tradition. When it comes to election and the doctrine of God, he was mainstream. When it comes to apologetic method, not so much (not saying he was wrong, per se).
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Actually thanks to students of of Richard Muller and Van Til it would seem that he really was in line with the tradition. I recommend _Reason and Revelation: new essays in Reformed Apologetics_ that not only show Van Til's agreement with tradition but also provide an exegetical foundation for his thought.
Click to expand...


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah, that's part of the issue that I tend to have with Van Til's reading of history: he reinterprets Calvin and the reformed tradition to fit his own project, whereas, read on their own terms, the early reformers really aren't pushing all that hard against the prevailing philosophical epistemologies of the day. Calvin in particular fits in ery nicely with the kind of Northern Renaissance Humanism of his time, albeit with a slightly more pessimistic slant than his contemporaries.
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Sure, but Plantinga says that too.
Click to expand...



Well sure but Muller's work certainly shows how far Reformed thinkers were obligated to distance themselves from the prevailing philosophies of the day. In fact recent scholarship has shown Van Til's continuity with the Reformed tradition. Plantinga does say this but I think he is not even arguably Reformed so whatever theology informs his thought may not be so helpful.


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## jwright82

MW said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Do you exist? How do you account for self-consciousness? Do you exist as a being who thinks his own thoughts and makes his own decisions? How do you account for this individuality and "autonomy?" Without certain foundational beliefs it is impossible to connect what we do with ourselves. Transcendental approaches are good for examining the pre-conditions of knowledge and morality in the abstract, but they cannot ground that knowledge and morality in the person. There must be something within the person as an individual which enables us to say that his thoughts and choices are authentically his.
Click to expand...


The fact we are made in God's image and his common grace.


----------

