# Against the subjectivity of truth



## steven-nemes (Mar 5, 2009)

I devised a sort of reductio ad absurdum argument against the idea that truth is relative to a person (or a community, or whatever). I'd like to know if you al think it is sound. It goes kinda like this.

If truth is relative to a person, that person cannot hold any false beliefs. That seems easy enough to swallow; if truth is what he makes it to be, then any of his beliefs are true for himself. What he believes is true within his framework or schema or whatever, is, for himself, true.

Now let's suppose a person comes to believe that he was wrong about something in the past. Let's say he thinks this girl Suzy Q likes him, when really he finds out that she is only nice to him because she thought he was mentally deficient or just plain dumb and felt bad for him. He now believes his past belief was false. This is where the problem comes in.

If his new belief (namely, that his past belief that Suzy Q liked him) is true, then one of his beliefs were false. But it is impossible that a person hold false beliefs if the standard of truth are simply his beliefs. But if this is true, then his present belief (that he held a false belief in the past) would have to be false. For he cannot hold any false beliefs. So either way his beliefs are false, which are impossible if truth is relative to a person. So, therefore, truth cannot be relative to a person.


If truth is relative to a person, then that person cannot hold any false beliefs, for his beliefs are the measure of truth.
Suppose a person comes to believe his past belief 'B' was false.
Either his new belief is true or false.
If it is true, then his past belief was false, which is impossible (1).
If it is false, it is false, which is impossible (1).
Therefore, truth is not relative to a person.


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## Zenas (Mar 5, 2009)

I find it easier to assault the presupposition itself rather than running it through trials, but your way seems to work. 

Assuming you're unaware, you can also show that the subjectivity of truth is a self-defeating statement. 

The maxim, "All truth is subjective." is a truth that's offered as an objective one. 

If all truth is subjective, then that truth must be subjective, and they cannot offer it as an objective one to defeat your assertion of truth.

In essence, in stating that all truth is subjective, the proponent has precluded them self from refuting anything you say as being false, because everything you hold is true, relative to yourself.

Moreover, the statement fails its own test and becomes a self-defeating statement. It violates the law of non-contradiction.


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## steven-nemes (Mar 5, 2009)

Zenas said:


> In essence, in stating that all truth is subjective, the proponent has precluded them self from refuting anything you say as being false, because everything you hold is true, relative to yourself.



True, but I want to show that the idea of "truth for oneself" is impossible. 

The whole deal about self-refutation and such is interesting, although I suppose perhaps the maxim can be reworded or affirmed in a different manner, so I want to argue against what is basically the practical explanation and consequences of the position.


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## Zenas (Mar 5, 2009)

It can't, at least not that I've seen and I've had a lot of people pull it on me. From the outset, it is their single biggest mistake besides their denial of Christ.

The alternative that I've seen used most frequently is, "There is only one objective truth, that there is no subjective truth." 

That, too, violates it's own test. If there are no objective truths, then there can't be one, because there's supposed to be none. Again, failure.


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## Skyler (Mar 5, 2009)

steven-nemes said:


> I devised a sort of reductio ad absurdum argument against the idea that truth is relative to a person (or a community, or whatever). I'd like to know if you al think it is sound. It goes kinda like this.
> 
> If truth is relative to a person, that person cannot hold any false beliefs. That seems easy enough to swallow; if truth is what he makes it to be, then any of his beliefs are true for himself. What he believes is true within his framework or schema or whatever, is, for himself, true.
> 
> ...



I think you're assuming that subjective truth doesn't change. While it's certainly true that objective truth doesn't, I see no reason why subjective truth shouldn't.

If I may correct your list to reflect this:



> If truth is relative to a person, then that person cannot hold any false beliefs, for his beliefs are the measure of truth.
> Suppose a person comes to believe his past belief 'B' was false.
> Either his new belief is true or false.
> If it is true, then his past belief [was true, but now] is false
> ...


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## steven-nemes (Mar 5, 2009)

Interesting point... Firstly, I disagree that objective truth can't change; surely the proposition _My shoe size is 10½_ is objectively true, but the truthhood of that proposition can change...

Let's see if I can save the argument.

Let's say if truth is relative to a person, then that person cannot hold true beliefs, for his beliefs are the standard of truth of propositions for himself. Let's also say that Billy believes that some of his beliefs are false. It seems possible that a person might come to believe something knowing it was false, like that Suzy Q really does love him, despite knowing better, out of wish-fulfillment or some other process.

If that is true, then some of his beliefs are false, which is impossible; if it is false, then one of his beliefs is false, which is impossible.

Does that save it at all? How does it sound?

Or perhaps this:

Let's suppose Billy believes that his past belief that Suzy Q really did love him is false, and always was false, even when he believed it. If that is true, then Billy held false beliefs; if it is false, then Billy holds false beliefs.

How does that sound?


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