# Greg Bahnsen & Substantival Monism?



## Alexander (Aug 6, 2017)

I used to be a physicalist. For those that do not know, physicalists believe that there is no immaterial aspect to man. I also was incredibly put off by the Cartesian Dualism that it seems many Christians hold to. I heard of an alternative... *Substantival Monism* as held to by Greg Bahnsen. I read his article on it but am still confused on what it is and how it differs from Dualism. Anyone care to explain?


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## Claudiu (Aug 17, 2017)

It's been years since my undergraduate studies when I dealt with this in a more meaningful way. I'll read Bahnsen's article tomorrow, refresh myself on the topic, and get back to you soon.


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## Claudiu (Aug 17, 2017)

Alexander, I read the following article by Greg Bahnsen on Substantival Monism (which I assume is the one you are referring to in the OP): http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/PA143.htm. Bahnsen is not the simplest writer, but the article outlines some of his refutations against the main alternatives to substantival monism. Below are some quotes from the article and then my input.



> The alternative which I wish to pose for the official dogma of a ghost in a mechanism is, basically, that man is a substantival monism, a material body which is special for reason of its capabilities (not its added substantival ingredient).



Dualism, or the "ghost in the machine" perspective, holds that man is composed of two substances, a material body and an immaterial mind (or soul, spirit, heart, etc.). Bahnsen's substantival monism, on the other hand, posits that instead of attributing immateriality to the mind (or soul, spirit, etc.) we can correctly speak of the mind as just being a different feature of our body. Hence, under substantival monism, as in physicalism, man is composed of just the material body (this would include the material mind), which is what we find in Bahnsen's quote above.



> The polarizing of mind and body in dualistic fashion amounts to committing a category mistake in the use of language, for facts about mental life belong to a different logical category than physicalistic statements. When this is forgotten or obscured then an occult locus is paralleled to the body and labeled "mind." Hence the descriptions of mental processes and bodily processes should not be mixed; the conjunction or disjunction of (denotatively understood) mind and body is a category blunder likened to "he bought a right hand glove, a left hand glove, and a pair of gloves" or "she came home in a V.W., not a flood of tears." Properly understood, language referring to "mind" is actually speaking (not of an immaterial substance) of certain kinds of intelligent behavior. "mind" is related adjectivally and adverbially, not substantively, to body. Man is neither a ghost nor a machine; rather he is a complex psycho-physical organism capable of a peculiar and complete sort of behavior called "intelligence" (and I would add, morality).



Bahnsen goes on further to open up what he means by man being "a material body which is special for reason of its capabilities." These capabilities include features dualism normally attributes to an immaterial mind: intelligence and morality. In the article Bahnsen further opens up, using Wittgenstein, the word games we employ to describe different features of this human body. Example: when someone experiences pain we say "he is in pain" rather than "his body is in pain." Here, we are referring to the totality of the human, and not one feature in particular. However, it is correct, Bahnsen argues, to use language to refer to particular features of man as either just body or mind. Example: when speaking of intelligence, we call that the mind, and not the body. Here, Bahnsen is in agreement with dualism in the use of language to differentiate between the different features of the body. However, he parts ways when dualism not only employs different categories for these features, but different substances as well. For Bahnsen, while the language of the dualist is correct, the metaphysical appropriation of these words is incorrect. (Mind is still technically body, ontologically, for Bahnsen, and not a separate entity. However, Bahnsen still wants to preserve the precision in our language when differentiating the features).



> ...
> and death can be seen as the loss of "life-breath" (="spirit"; e.g. Ps. 104:29), and the dead can be affirmed to still have self-conscious life by being called "spirit" (though very infrequently in scripture to be sure), but nowhere does scripture imply that man is a dual substance which divides as he dies (unless you read the Bible through Cartesian glasses). "Spirit" means life (centered in the breath image - just as "soul" is life centered in the blood image).





> Man is a personal body created in God's image. the Bible makes quite clear that man's hope is in resurrection of the body, not release from the body (John 2:19-22; Lk. 24:40; Rom. 8:23; 1 Cor; 15:3-4, 44, 48-49; 2 Cor. 5:1-5; Isa. 26:19; 66:22-23; Dan. 12:2). Moreover, it is embodied existence which is the criterion of future judgment (2 Cor. 5:10; Heb. 9:27). We may not know all the answers with respect to the intermediate state, but we do know what our final hope is, what our true constitution is, and how to ring some of the logical changes on the fact of the intermediate state (e.g. one does not despair in death before Christ's return, etc. etc.).



This is where I think Bahnsen's argument is the weakest (I wish he would say more, especially the underlined part). I think a crucial argument dualists make in the Judeo-Christian worldview is in regards to the personal identity of a person in death, the intermediate state, and the afterlife. Historically, Christian dualists have argued that the natural condition for man is a material body and immaterial soul. Death is unnatural in that a separation between the body and soul takes place. However, the hope of the resurrection is the reestablishment of mans natural condition in an even better state. Namely, the soul being reunited to an incorruptible, glorified body. Here, while Bahnsen highlights what death means under substantival monism, he does not say much about the intermediate state.

What are the implications, if any, of substantival monism on:
Christology?
Sheol in general? (Luke 16)


> Luke 16:19-31
> 
> The Rich Man and Lazarus
> 
> “There was a rich man who was clothed in purple and fine linen and who feasted sumptuously every day. And at his gate was laid a poor man named Lazarus, covered with sores, who desired to be fed with what fell from the rich man's table. Moreover, even the dogs came and licked his sores. The poor man died and was carried by the angels to Abraham's side. The rich man also died and was buried, and in Hades, being in torment, he lifted up his eyes and saw Abraham far off and Lazarus at his side. And he called out, ‘Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus to dip the end of his finger in water and cool my tongue, for I am in anguish in this flame.’ But Abraham said, ‘Child, remember that you in your lifetime received your good things, and Lazarus in like manner bad things; but now he is comforted here, and you are in anguish. And besides all this, between us and you a great chasm has been fixed, in order that those who would pass from here to you may not be able, and none may cross from there to us.’ And he said, ‘Then I beg you, father, to send him to my father's house—for I have five brothers—so that he may warn them, lest they also come into this place of torment.’ But Abraham said, ‘They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them.’ And he said, ‘No, father Abraham, but if someone goes to them from the dead, they will repent.’ He said to him, ‘If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should rise from the dead.’”


Numerous passages like Psalm 16:10?
and 2 Corinthians 12:2–4?


> I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows. And I know that this man was caught up into paradise—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows— and he heard things that cannot be told, which man may not utter.

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## jw (Aug 17, 2017)

Alexander said:


> Anyone care to explain?


As is evidenced by one subsequent response, coupled with my charitable surmising of said response, I can confidently answer in the affirmative to your question.


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## Claudiu (Aug 17, 2017)

Joshua said:


> As is evidenced by one subsequent response, coupled with my charitable surmising of said response, I can confidently answer in the affirmative to your question.


He strikes again!


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