# Frame: History of Western Philosophy and Theology



## RamistThomist

What new material can a survey of Philosophy cover? I was wrong. Frame’s text has numerous ‘lagniappe’ that you won’t find in other texts (links to audio, references to modern Reformed thinkers, etc). In other words, it’s fun. But more importantly, it’s conducive to piety. Frame defines theology as the application, by persons, of God’s word to all of life (Frame 4). Sure, there is a Kuyperian thrust and that can be abused, but on the whole I appreciate it.

He reduces metaphysical discussions to: Is reality One, Many, or Both? *God is absolute tri-personality (16-17). He relates to his creation in terms of Lordship. Lordship is explained as authority (normative), control, and presence. I think this is a good move, but there is a subtle anti-substance metaphysic involved. Substance metaphysics would usually say that reality is “cut at the joints,” meaning a universe of parts, whole, etc. That’s fine as far as it goes and few would disagree. Traditionally, though, that concept would get applied to God.

Frame (perhaps subconsciously) does not allow that. We aren’t now speaking of God’s transcendence in a way that he is spatially “above” or separated from the universe (though certainly not identical with it). The language is no longer spatial, but covenantal.

Perspectives on Human Knowledge
*Our knowledge is related to God in 3 ways (19):
1. Control (our situation governed by his providence)
2. Authority (what God reveals in his Word and Creation)
3. Presence (Covenant)

Frame’s account is light on early philosophy and focuses more on early modern and recent philosophy. His thesis: The two renaissance themes–humanism and antiquarianism–couldn’t be integrated. Do we gain knowledge by reflecting on the past or do we gain knowledge by using our autonomous reason divorced from tradition (167)?

The Reformation

Presented alternatives in metaphysics and epistemology. Luther: in his metaphysics he turned away from the NeoPlatonic “One” and back to the absolute and personal God of revelation (169).

Calvin marks a new move: he begins his Institutes with the knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is never apart from reverence and love towards him. This also determines man’s self-knowledge: “how can we imagine knowing anything without knowing ourselves, that is, knowing our knowing” (Frame 173 n16)? Calvin’s epistemology breaks with Renaissance and medieval models. Correlated with Calvin’s absolute personal theism.

After the Enlightenment, Frame makes the rather strange suggestion that the two worst heresies the church faced are Deism and Liberalism (220). I…um…don’t know about that. But it does explain much of the book. He defines liberal as anyone who doesn’t submit to the authority of Scripture (216ff). This definition of liberalism is very important for Frame’s text and it allows him to misinterpret a number of key thinkers.

Frame has a magnificent chapter on Kant and Hegel. Without explaining Kant’s philosophy, the chapter allows Frame to make another important observation: the conservative drift in liberal theology. Liberals began to use more conservative language while retaining liberal constructs.

When Frame sticks to material in which he is an acknowledged authority, such as linguistic analysis, he shines. The chapters on Russell and Wittgenstein were outstanding. He ends his text with a survey of recent Evangelical theologians.

Evaluation

Should you buy this text? I think so. It has a number of drawbacks and he only rarely engages in more than a surface-level analysis, but it is better than most one-volume treatments. Frame includes annotated bibliographies, pictures, diagrams, and links to audio lectures.

Reactions: Informative 3


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## JimmyH

For a neophyte attempting to acquire an understanding of philosophical thought, to better understand frequent references within systematic theologies, to philosophers such as Heidegger, Barth, Hegal &c, is this a good starting point ?


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## earl40

In all your reading of Frame does he interact with archetypal ectypal theology? I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way. If so the basis of his philosophy on God in my opinion should be avoided, and what sprouts from this false concept of God in se.


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## RamistThomist

JimmyH said:


> For a neophyte attempting to acquire an understanding of philosophical thought, to better understand frequent references within systematic theologies, to philosophers such as Heidegger, Barth, Hegal &c, is this a good starting point ?



Mostly yes. Heidegegger and Hegel are the most difficult philosophers in Western history. Frame is good on explaining Hegel. Not so much on Heidegger. His section on Barth is okay, but will be challenged by Barth scholars.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> In all your reading of Frame does he interact with archetypal ectypal theology? I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way. If so the basis of his philosophy on God in my opinion should be avoided, and what sprouts from this false concept of God in se.



Indirectly yes. Frame, with Van Til and against some Clarkians, doesn't believe our knowledge can fully exhaust God. Our knowledge is analogical, so hence, there is an archetypal distinction. Frame is concerned, though, that some accounts of archetypal/ectypal distinction posit a different God, or God behind God.

Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Indirectly yes. Frame, with Van Til and against some Clarkians, doesn't believe our knowledge can fully exhaust God. Our knowledge is analogical, so hence, there is an archetypal distinction. Frame is concerned, though, that some accounts of archetypal/ectypal distinction posit a different God, or God behind God.
> 
> Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God.



Your last line "Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God" speaks against what Frame teaches. Thus my concern that this is a basic Reformed doctrine that Frame is denying.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> Your last line "Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God" speaks against what Frame teaches. Thus my concern that this is a basic Reformed doctrine that Frame is denying.



Can you show me where he denies that? He holds to analogical knowledge of God, which is by definition ectypal. You've accurately summarized some Clarkian views, but I'm not persuaded Frame would say that (I'm open to correction). My copy of _Doctrine of God _is at h ome, so I will check that later.


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## RamistThomist

Here is the offending quote:



> know God as he is in himself insofar as he has revealed that in Scripture" (DG, 204).



And Frame probably has in mind Scripture's revelation of "I am that I am," which is essence language.

If what Frame means is that we have access to the inner essence of God (something no one outside of early Trinitarian debates ever cared about), then Frame is wrong. of course, he isn't arguing that. He qualifies that statement by "as he has revealed that in Scripture." I don't see the problem.


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## Justified

BayouHuguenot said:


> Mostly yes. Heidegegger and Hegel are the most difficult philosophers in Western history. Frame is good on explaining Hegel. Not so much on Heidegger. His section on Barth is okay, but will be challenged by Barth scholars.


 Harder than Scotus?


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Can you show me where he denies that? He holds to analogical knowledge of God, which is by definition ectypal. You've accurately summarized some Clarkian views, but I'm not persuaded Frame would say that (I'm open to correction). My copy of _Doctrine of God _is at h ome, so I will check that later.



As I said before "I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way."

This is the reference that that I gathered here on the PB, with the quote....https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/errors-of-john-m-frame.12185/#post-160362....."3. His claim that we can know God "in himself," (not something the Reformed have taught),".

I assume, with good confidence, that the moderators here would shot the above quote down if it were not true.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Here is the offending quote:
> 
> 
> 
> And Frame probably has in mind Scripture's revelation of "I am that I am," which is essence language.
> 
> If what Frame means is that we have access to the inner essence of God (something no one outside of early Trinitarian debates ever cared about), then Frame is wrong. of course, he isn't arguing that. He qualifies that statement by "as he has revealed that in Scripture." I don't see the problem.



The problem there is no qualifier to knowing God "as He is in Himself".


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> The problem there is no qualifier to knowing God "as He is in Himself".



"as he has revealed in Scripture."


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> As I said before "I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way."



And as I've shown, I don't think that is what Frame is saying for a number of reasons:
1) he has already qualified what he means by "as he has revealed himself in Scripture."
2) No one who holds to analogical knowledge can say we know God archetypally.


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## RamistThomist

Justified said:


> Harder than Scotus?



Hegel is. heidegger isn't.


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## Claudiu

BayouHuguenot said:


> Calvin marks a new move: he begins his Institutes with the knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is never apart from reverence and love towards him. This also determines man’s self-knowledge: “how can we imagine knowing anything without knowing ourselves, that is, knowing our knowing” (Frame 173 n16)? Calvin’s epistemology breaks with Renaissance and medieval models. Correlated with Calvin’s absolute personal theism.



Can you say more about Calvin's epistemology? I've been meaning to study this subject.


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## RamistThomist

Claudiu said:


> Can you say more about Calvin's epistemology? I've been meaning to study this subject.


More can be said, but it will take some time.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> And as I've shown, I don't think that is what Frame is saying for a number of reasons:
> 1) he has already qualified what he means by "as he has revealed himself in Scripture."
> 2) No one who holds to analogical knowledge can say we know God archetypally.



May I ask if you think there is a similarity of being between God and man? The reason I ask is because when I see someone use the idea of analogical knowledge many times they think that God thinks like us in some way and is like us in being.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> "as he has revealed in Scripture."



The revealed is accommodated and is not Himself, in that God is wholly other. To use the phrase "as he is in himself" is inappropriate and no amount of qualification can overcome the poor phrasing he used in my opinion.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> May I ask if you think there is a similarity of being between God and man? The reason I ask is because when I see someone use the idea of analogical knowledge many times they think that God thinks like us in some way and is like us in being.



In the Catholic sense of analogia entis, no. But in Bavinck's sense, I hold to analogical knowledge. @Ask Mr. Religion has a good summary of the issue here
https://puritanboard.com/threads/need-help-on-some-cvt-clark-questions.92879/#post-1132807

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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> The revealed is accommodated and is not Himself, in that God is wholly other. To use the phrase "as he is in himself" is inappropriate and no amount of qualification can overcome the poor phrasing he used in my opinion.



If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

See also:
http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php/20313-Exploring-Ectypal-vs-Archetypal-Theology

https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/clarkian-knowledge-and-archetypal-ectypal-theology.20450/

Reactions: Like 1


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.



When speaking of Our Lord one ought to not use such as befitting a teacher which I consider this to be very important. Also not owning or reading any of Frames works is the reason I asked if he delved into any ectype archetype discussion which I am grateful for your response here.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.



I suspect others who have complained about Frame saying we can know God as "He is" base there accusations on other writings besides this one poorly phrased line. This is why I asked you about his discussions of ectypal and archetype theology which appears to be scant as you said above.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.



When speaking of Our Lord one ought to not use such as befitting a teacher which I consider this to be very important. Also not owning or reading any of Frames works is the reason I asked if he delved into any ectype archetype discussion which I am grateful for your response here.


Ask Mr. Religion said:


> See also:
> http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php/20313-Exploring-Ectypal-vs-Archetypal-Theology
> 
> https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/clarkian-knowledge-and-archetypal-ectypal-theology.20450/



Fine fine threads.  I still wonder how Frame would responded within them. I know how CVT and Clark would have, and I believe they would had benefited greatly from them. The Ectypal-Archetypal distinction appeared to have been lost on the CVT Clark times as it is today. I know when I ask my elders about this I only get a blank stare, and if not I get a rash distortion of the distinction of the ARH-ECT differences by using analogy in saying God is like us.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> I still wonder how Frame would responded within them. I know how CVT



Then you know how Frame would have responded.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> When speaking of Our Lord one ought to not use such as befitting a teacher



True, but I can find fault with every major thinker on that point. Very few theologians have a satisfactory definition of what a divine person is. Basil and Augustine explicitly said they don't know. Yet, imagine a guy at Presbytery getting up and saying, "I believe in three persons but I have no idea what a person is."

I'm not bothered by Frame on this. The ET/AT distinction is important, but if it is pressed too far, then we run the risk of having a God behind God to whom we don't have cognitive access.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

earl40 said:


> I still wonder how Frame would responded within them. I know how CVT and Clark would have, and I believe they would had benefited greatly from them.


You will find much laboring over the matter by Frame in his _Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_.

A sampling from various portions of Chapter One:

(e) Van Til on "analogy." Van Til does teach that all of our thinking about God is "analogical," but in his vocabulary analogical means "reflective of God's original thought."28 Because both "literal" and "figurative" language can be "analogical" in Van Til's sense, his view of analogy does not resolve the question before us. As far as I know, Van Til nowhere comments on the question of whether or not language about God can be literal.

From the #28 footnote:
28. Reflective has two senses here. In one sense, all human thought reflects God; in another other sense, only obedient, believing thought does. This distinction corresponds to the traditional tional Reformed distinction between "wider" and "narrower" senses of the image of God. Unbelieving thought does not image God's truth and goodness (except in ironic ways), but it does reflect God in its skillfulness. See our later discussion of the unbeliever's knowledge.

6. Does God's "thought-content" always differ from man's? Content played a crucial role in the OPC controversy. Van Til's followers insisted that when a man thinks about a particular rose, for example, the "content" in his mind always differs from the "content" in God's mind when He thinks about the same rose. It would be a mistake for us to assume that thought-content has a perfectly clear meaning and then to leap on one bandwagon or another. In my booklet _Van Til the Theologian_, I argue that the idea of "thought-content" is ambiguous. In some senses, I would argue, Van Til is right; in others, Clark. (a) Content can refer to mental images. I think Van Til has this in mind, for example, on page 184 of _Introduction_: "When man says that God is eternal, he can, because of his own limitations, think of God only as being very old. He can think of eternity only in terms of endless years." That statement is false, unless "think of" refers to imaging of some sort, the imagining of what it would be like for us to be eternal. If imaging is not in view, then there certainly are ways in which we can think of eternity as other than endless time. Otherwise, how do theologians (including Van Til) come to define eternity as supratemporal? If content in the controversy means "mental images," then the whole argument is speculative and foolish. We have no ground for supposing that God thinks in anything like our mental images. (Even we can think without out using images.) And even if He does, there is no reason to suppose that God's images are the same as ours or that they are not.

7. Is there a "qualitative difference" between God's thoughts and ours? Qualitative difference was the great rallying cry of the Van Til forces against the Clark party. On the one hand, Clark (we are told) held that there was only a "quantitative difference" between God's thoughts and ours, that is, that God knew more facts than we do. On the other hand, Van Til believed that the difference was "qualitative." I am willing to affirm that there is a qualitative difference between God's thoughts and ours, but I am not convinced of the value of the phrase in the present controversy. What is a "qualitative difference"? Most simply defined, it is a difference in quality. Thus a difference between blue and green could be a "qualitative difference." Such a usage, of course, is totally inadequate to do justice to the Creator-creature distinction, which the Van Til forces were trying to do. In fairness, however, we should also recognize that in English qualitative difference generally refers to very large differences in quality, not differences like that between blue and green. We tend to speak of "qualitative differences" where the differences are not capable of quantitative measurement. But even on such a maximal definition, the phrase still denotes differences within creation; it does not uniquely define the Creator-creature distinction. I therefore tend to avoid the phrase, though I have no objection to it. Although it is appropriate to use a superlative term like this to describe the Creator-creature relation, we should cure ourselves of the notion that qualitative automatically takes us outside of the sphere of intracreational relations and that no other terms may be substituted for it in such a context.34 Rather than using qualitative difference, I prefer to use terms that are more directly related to the covenantal terminology of Scripture, for example differences between Creator and creature, Lord and servant, Father and son, original and derivative, self-attesting and attested by another. other. In some contexts, those terms can also designate intracreational relations; all terms in human language can apply to something or other within creation. But when they refer to the divine-human difference, they are no less clear than qualitative difference, and in most respects, they are clearer. The suggestion that qualitative difference somehow designates a larger difference than these other terms or that it is more appropriate than the biblical terms to denote the difference in view is entirely groundless. It was most unfortunate that qualitative difference became a kind of partisan rallying cry in the OPC controversy. For such work the phrase is entirely unsuited.

From the #34 footnote:
34. This notion seems to pervade Halsey's article. He continually suggests that since I do not speak of "qualitative differences," I must hold that the differences in view are merely "quantitative." That suggestion is entirely false. 
{_Nb_: Frame here refers to Halsey, James S. "_A Preliminary Critique of 'Van Til: the Theologian_'." WTJ 39 (1976): 120-36.}


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> The ET/AT distinction is important, but if it is pressed too far, then we run the risk of having a God behind God to whom we don't have cognitive access.



That "God behind a God" is the God of scripture and is the point.


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## Steve Curtis

earl40 said:


> That "God behind a God" is the God of scripture and is the point.



You are going to have to clarify this...


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> That "God behind a God" is the God of scripture and is the point.



So which God do we worship? Sounds like you just posited two different Gods.


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## earl40

kainos01 said:


> You are going to have to clarify this...



I was responding to what I have a feeling Frame means when he say "that some accounts of archetypal/ectypal distinction posit a different God, or God behind God." I of course would like to see the context where he said what he did, and I suspect the basis of what he said may (I say may) be based on a faulty view of archeytypal theology. 

When one says we cannot know God as He is, and that He is incomprehensible, I suspect many would take issue with such, and think one is posting about a "God behind a God". To assume one can know God, without accommodation to us creatures, is foreign to most Christians.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> So which God do we worship? Sounds like you just posited two different Gods.



The God we worship is the one revealed in Jesus.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> The God we worship is the one revealed in Jesus.



Exactly. What I and Frame were getting at is there is no abstracted deity behind the back of Jesus to whom we do not have cognitive access.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Exactly. What I and Frame were getting at is there is no abstracted deity behind the back of Jesus to whom we do not have cognitive access.



So are you saying you have a cognitive idea of The Divine Essence?


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> So are you saying you have a cognitive idea of The Divine Essence?



Sure. The essence is simple.

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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Sure. The essence is simple.



If you can comprehend this you are indeed divine.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> If you can comprehend this you are indeed divine.



You asked for a cognitive idea of the divine. I gave you one. Not sure how that is comprehending the divine essence.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> You asked for a cognitive idea of the divine. I gave you one. Not sure how that is comprehending the divine essence.



The idea you and I have of the divine is ectypal is my point. I asked if you have cognitive idea of The Divine Essence? In other words, do you have thoughts after God's thoughts as He is or "operates".


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> The idea you and I have of the divine is ectypal is my point. I asked if you have cognitive idea of The Divine Essence? In other words, do you have thoughts after God's thoughts as He is or "operates".



I think God's thoughts after him. I am not sure what you mean by "operates."


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> I think God's thoughts after him. I am not sure what you mean by "operates."



I did phrase my question poorly. Do you think like God "thinks" in any way shape or form?


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> I did phrase my question poorly. Do you think like God "thinks" in any way shape or form?



Not in the way we do. Scholastically speaking, God knows all things in one instantaneous act of knowing.


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## Justified

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> 7. Is there a "qualitative difference" between God's thoughts and ours? Qualitative difference was the great rallying cry of the Van Til forces against the Clark party. On the one hand, Clark (we are told) held that there was only a "quantitative difference" between God's thoughts and ours, that is, that God knew more facts than we do. On the other hand, Van Til believed that the difference was "qualitative." I am willing to affirm that there is a qualitative difference between God's thoughts and ours, but I am not convinced of the value of the phrase in the present controversy. What is a "qualitative difference"? Most simply defined, it is a difference in quality. Thus a difference between blue and green could be a "qualitative difference." Such a usage, of course, is totally inadequate to do justice to the Creator-creature distinction, which the Van Til forces were trying to do. In fairness, however, we should also recognize that in English qualitative difference generally refers to very large differences in quality, not differences like that between blue and green. We tend to speak of "qualitative differences" where the differences are not capable of quantitative measurement. But even on such a maximal definition, the phrase still denotes differences within creation; it does not uniquely define the Creator-creature distinction. I therefore tend to avoid the phrase, though I have no objection to it. Although it is appropriate to use a superlative term like this to describe the Creator-creature relation, we should cure ourselves of the notion that qualitative automatically takes us outside of the sphere of intracreational relations and that no other terms may be substituted for it in such a context.34 Rather than using qualitative difference, I prefer to use terms that are more directly related to the covenantal terminology of Scripture, for example differences between Creator and creature, Lord and servant, Father and son, original and derivative, self-attesting and attested by another. other. In some contexts, those terms can also designate intracreational relations; all terms in human language can apply to something or other within creation. But when they refer to the divine-human difference, they are no less clear than qualitative difference, and in most respects, they are clearer. The suggestion that qualitative difference somehow designates a larger difference than these other terms or that it is more appropriate than the biblical terms to denote the difference in view is entirely groundless. It was most unfortunate that qualitative difference became a kind of partisan rallying cry in the OPC controversy. For such work the phrase is entirely unsuited.
> 
> From the #34 footnote:
> 34. This notion seems to pervade Halsey's article. He continually suggests that since I do not speak of "qualitative differences," I must hold that the differences in view are merely "quantitative." That suggestion is entirely false.
> {_Nb_: Frame here refers to Halsey, James S. "_A Preliminary Critique of 'Van Til: the Theologian_'." WTJ 39 (1976): 120-36.}


 While the difference between blue and green is an example of a qualitative difference, it is hardly apposite or relevant to the question at hand. When we say God's knowledge is qualitatively different from our own, we are not saying that we are thinking about different things, as if the objects of our knowledge are different. The difference, as the Scholastics would say, is in the mode of the knower. Take my thinking about a rose. God and I can both have an idea of a rose. The difference lies in the mode of knowing. God knows it according to a simple, infinite, and intuitive mode of knowing, whereas for me the way I know things is according to a complex, finite, and otherwise creaturely way of knowing.

I'm not going to say much more as I don't think I've read enough Frame to be fair, but I am always weary of claims like "I prefer to be more critique, covenantal, concrete." You have to _prove _why these concepts are preferable to the traditional systematic philosophical categories. His example of Master-Slave etc., seems to have absolutely nothing to do with predication and thus provides no alternative to what has been offered.


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## RamistThomist

Justified said:


> but I am always weary of claims like "I prefer to be more critique, covenantal, concrete." You have to _prove _why these concepts are preferable to the traditional systematic philosophical categories. His example of Master-Slave etc., seems to have absolutely nothing to do with predication and thus provides no alternative to what has been offered.



Horton is good on this point. Did Frame say "Master-Slave?" I can't remember. A more covenantal way of speaking would be:

1) Image-bearer
2) Suzerain-Vassal

Master-slave is literally Hegelian.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

Justified said:


> Take my thinking about a rose. God and I can both have an idea of a rose. The difference lies in the mode of knowing. God knows it according to a simple, infinite, and intuitive mode of knowing, whereas for me the way I know things is according to a complex, finite, and otherwise creaturely way of knowing.


Frame, from his DOKG,

"In the 1940s there was a debate within the Orthodox Presbyterian Church about the concept of God's incomprehensibility. The major opponents were Cornelius Van Til and Gordon H. Clark. Neither man was at his best in this discussion; each seriously misunderstood the other, as we will see. Both, however, had valid concerns. Van Til wished to preserve the Creator-creature distinction in the realm of knowledge, and Clark wished to prevent any skeptical deductions from the doctrine of incomprehensibility, to insist that we really do know God on the basis of revelation. Van Til, therefore, insisted that even when God and man were thinking of the same thing (a particular rose, for example), their thoughts about it were never identical-God's were the thoughts of the Creator, man's of the creature. Such language made Clark fear skepticism. It seemed to him that if there was some discrepancy between man's "This is a rose" and God's (concerning the same rose), then the human assertion must somehow fall short of the truth, since the very nature of truth is identity with God's mind. Thus if there is a necessary discrepancy between God's mind and man's at every point, it would seem that man could know nothing truly; skepticism would result. Thus the discussion of incomprehensibility-essentially a doctrine about the relation of man's thoughts to God's being-turned in this debate more narrowly into a discussion of the relation between man's thoughts and God's thoughts. To say that God is incomprehensible came to mean that there is some discontinuity (much deeper in Van Til's view than in Clark's) between our thoughts of God (and hence of creation) and God's own thoughts of himself (and of creation)."

He then spends many pages teasing out the whys and wherefores behind the above, ending with this summary:

"Let us summarize our discussion of the incomprehensibility of God. The lordship of God must be recognized in the area of thought, as well as in all other aspects of human life. We must confess that God's thoughts are wholly sovereign and therefore sharply different from ours, which are the thoughts of servants. God's being, too, is quite beyond our comprehension, but we must not interpret God's incomprehensibility in such a way that we compromise the knowability of God or the involvement of God with us in the process of thinking and knowing. God is revealed, and we know Him truly, but it is in that revelation and because of that revelation that we stand in wonder. The "Clark Case" is a classic example of the hurt that can be done when people dogmatize over difficult theological issues without taking the trouble first to understand one another, to analyze ambiguities in their formulations, and to recognize more than one kind of theological danger to be avoided."

Src: John M. Frame. _Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, The_ (A Theology of Lordship)

See also:
https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/analogical-knowledge.93949/#post-1147008

Reactions: Informative 1


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Not in the way we do. Scholastically speaking, God knows all things in one instantaneous act of knowing.



Speaking properly the difference between God and man is indeed qualitative, and no amount of analogy can bridge the difference. This is why I asked if Frame discusses archetype theology in his writings specifically. I have to thank Mr. Religion for the following....."The suggestion that qualitative difference somehow designates a larger difference than these other terms or that it is more appropriate than the biblical terms to denote the difference in view is entirely groundless. It was most unfortunate that qualitative difference became a kind of partisan rallying cry in the OPC controversy. For such work the phrase is entirely unsuited."

For our information the bible does use the reference of qualitative difference (contra Frame). "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord."


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## Ask Mr. Religion

earl40 said:


> Speaking properly the difference between God and man is indeed qualitative, and no amount of analogy can bridge the difference. This is why I asked if Frame discusses archetype theology in his writings specifically. I have to thank Mr. Religion for the following....."The suggestion that qualitative difference somehow designates a larger difference than these other terms or that it is more appropriate than the biblical terms to denote the difference in view is entirely groundless. It was most unfortunate that qualitative difference became a kind of partisan rallying cry in the OPC controversy. For such work the phrase is entirely unsuited."
> 
> For our information the bible does use the reference of qualitative difference (contra Frame). "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord."


Interestingly, Frame never once directly uses _ectype_, _ectypal_, _archetype_, or _archetypal_ in his entire book on the knowledge of God. I do not know why he did not, or whether it was a purposeful omission to avoid some perceived baggage that the terms carry.


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## earl40

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> "Let us summarize our discussion of the incomprehensibility of God. The lordship of God must be recognized in the area of thought, as well as in all other aspects of human life. We must confess that God's thoughts are wholly sovereign and therefore sharply different from ours, which are the thoughts of servants. God's being, too, is quite beyond our comprehension, but we must not interpret God's incomprehensibility in such a way that we compromise the knowability of God or the involvement of God with us in the process of thinking and knowing. God is revealed, and we know Him truly, but it is in that revelation and because of that revelation that we stand in wonder.



It appears to me Professor Frame is mixing up ectypal and archetypal knowledge, and is compromising the distinction of The Creator from the creature. Personally I have read enough of Him here to avoid him. Number one being they way he writes, and number two being his basic unreformed fundamental philosophical presuppositions.


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## earl40

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Interestingly, Frame never once directly uses _ectype_, _ectypal_, _archetype_, or _archetypal_ in his entire book on the knowledge of God. I do not know why he did not, or whether it was a purposeful omission to avoid some perceived baggage that the terms carry.



Either interesting or because maybe he has not looked into such very deeply. Of course he may have written about such somewhere else.


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## earl40

For our edification from Pastor Winzer on the CVT Clark problems.

"CVT appealed to the incomprehensible nature of archetypal theology while he was speaking of ectypal theology. This confusion was the source of his paradox.
For Clark divine and human knowledge correspond. He did not work with anything like the archetypal-ectypal distinction."


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## Ask Mr. Religion

earl40 said:


> For our information the bible does use the reference of qualitative difference (contra Frame). "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord."


Frame refers to these matters as discontinuities:


Spoiler



My contribution to this discussion will be to offer the reader a list of discontinuities between God's thoughts and ours that I believe can be substantiated from Scripture, a list of continuities between the two that ought to be acknowledged, and a list of alleged relations between the two that seem to me to be stated ambiguously and that therefore are capable of being affirmed in one sense and denied in another.. 

(i) _Discontinuities_. Scripture teaches the following discontinuities between God's thought and ours.
1. God's thoughts are uncreated and eternal; ours are created and limited by time.

2. God's thoughts ultimately determine, or decree, what comes to pass. God's thoughts cause the truths that they contemplate; ours do not. This is the lordship attribute of control in the realm of knowledge.

3. God's thoughts, therefore, are self-validating; they serve as their own criteria of truth. God's thoughts are true simply because they are His. None of us can claim to have such self-attesting thoughts. Our thoughts are not necessarily true, and when they are true, it is because they agree with the thoughts of someone else, namely God, who furnishes the criteria for our thinking. This is the lordship attribute of authority in the area of knowledge.

4. God's thoughts always bring glory and honor to Him because God is always "present in blessing" to himself. Because God is "simple," His thoughts are always self-expressions. Our thoughts are blessed only by virtrue of God's covenantal presence with us. This is the lordship attribute of presence as applied to knowledge. Note that in 1-4, "incomprehensibility" is an aspect of God's lordship. All the divine attributes can be understood as manifestations of God's lordship, as applications of divine lordship to different areas of human life.

5. God's thoughts are the originals of which ours, at best, are only copies, images. Our thoughts, therefore, would not exist apart from God's covenantal presence (see 4 above).

6. God does not need to have anything "revealed" to Him; He knows what He knows simply by virtue of who He is and what He does. He knows, then, at His own initiative. But all of our knowledge is based on revelation. When we know something, it is because God decided to let us know it, either by Scripture or by nature. Our knowledge, then, is initiated by another. Our knowledge is a result of grace. This is another manifestation festation of the lordship attribute of "control."'

7. God has not chosen to reveal all truth to us. For example, we do not know the future, beyond what Scripture teaches. We do not know all the facts about God or even about creation. In the OPC debate, the difference between God's knowledge and ours was called a "quantitative difference"-God knows more facts than we do.

8. God possesses knowledge in a different way from us. He is immaterial and therefore does not gain knowledge from organs of sense perception. Nor does He carry on "processes of reasoning," understood as temporal sets of actions. Nor is God's knowledge limited by the fallibilities of memory or of foresight. Some have characterized His knowledge as an "eternal intuition," and however we may describe it, it clearly is something quite different from our methods of knowing. In the OPC debate, this discontinuity was called a difference in the "mode" of knowledge.'

9. What God does reveal to us, He reveals in a creaturely form. Revelation tion does not come to us in the form in which it exists in God's mind. Scripture, for example, is in human, not divine, language. It is "accommodated," dated," that is, adapted in some measure to our ability to understand, though it is not exhaustively understandable to us even in that accommodated dated form.

10. God's thoughts, when taken together, constitute a perfect wisdom; they are not chaotic but agree with one another. His decrees constitute a wise plan. God's thoughts are coherent; divine thinking agrees with divine logic. That is not always true of our thoughts, and we have no reason to suppose that even as we deal with revelation we may not run into truth that our logic cannot systematize, that it cannot relate coherently with other truth. Therefore we may find in revelation what Van Til calls "apparent parent contradictions.""

11. Discontinuity 7 is affected by the progress of revelation: the more God reveals, the more facts we know, though we never reach the point where we know as many facts as God. The other discontinuities, however, are not at all affected by revelation. No matter how much of himself God reveals, there always remains an "essential disproportion between the infinite nite fullness of the being and knowledge of God and the capacity and intelligence telligence of the finite creature." Thus even what God has revealed is in important senses beyond our comprehension (cf. Judg. 13:18; Neh. 9:5; Pss. 139:6; 147:5; Isa. 9:6; 55:8f.). According to these passages, there is not merely a realm of the unknown beyond our competence, but what is within our competence, what we know, leads us to worship in awe. The hymn of wonder in Romans 11:33-36 expresses amazement not at what is unrevealed but precisely at what is revealed, at what has been described in great detail by the apostle. The more we know, the more our sense of wonder ought to increase, because increased knowledge brings us into greater contact with the incomprehensibility of God.13 It was this "essential disproportion" proportion" between Creator and creature that sometimes in the OPC controversy was described as a "qualitative difference" between divine and human knowledge, as distinguished from the "quantitative difference" described above in 7.

12. And doubtless, there is much more; we cannot exhaustively describe scribe the differences between God's mind and ours-if we could, we would be divine. Thus we must add an "et cetera" to the eleven differences that we have already enumerated. This "et cetera" seems to have been another part of what was meant in the OPC controversy by the phrase "qualitative difference." At one point in that controversy, the Clark party challenged the Van Til party to "state clearly" what the qualitative difference was between God's thoughts and man's. The Van Til group replied that to accept that challenge would be to retract their whole position; if we could "state clearly" this qualitative difference, the difference would no longer exist. Again, I think, there was some mutual misunderstanding. At one level, it is possible (and necessary) to state clearly the nature of the difference. The difference is the difference between Creator and creature in the world of thought; it is a difference between divine thinking and human thinking, between the thoughts of the ultimate Lord and the thoughts of His servants. The implications of this basic difference can also be spelled out to some extent, as I have sought to do above. Insofar far as they were asking for that kind of information, the demand of the Clark group was legitimate. But we must remember that the concept of incomprehensibility comprehensibility is self-referential, that is, if God is incomprehensible, then even His incomprehensibility is incomprehensible. We can no more give an exhaustive explanation of God's incomprehensibility than we can give of God's eternity, infinity, righteousness, or love.

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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> Speaking properly the difference between God and man is indeed qualitative, and no amount of analogy can bridge the difference. This is why I asked if Frame discusses archetype theology in his writings specifically. I have to thank Mr. Religion for the following....."The suggestion that qualitative difference somehow designates a larger difference than these other terms or that it is more appropriate than the biblical terms to denote the difference in view is entirely groundless. It was most unfortunate that qualitative difference became a kind of partisan rallying cry in the OPC controversy. For such work the phrase is entirely unsuited."
> 
> For our information the bible does use the reference of qualitative difference (contra Frame). "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord."



Frame doesn't reject qualitative difference. He is not a Clarkian, after all. His point was that some Van Tillians overused qualitative difference as a stick to beat Clarkians with.

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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> Either interesting or because maybe he has not looked into such very deeply. Of course he may have written about such somewhere else.



You yourself admitted you hadn't read much of Frame. When I try to point out what Frame, as a Van tillian, is saying in how he affirms this distinction, you brush it off. I'm not sure what else you want.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> You yourself admitted you hadn't read much of Frame. When I try to point out what Frame, as a Van tillian, is saying in how he affirms this distinction, you brush it off. I'm not sure what else you want.



I have enough to know that he should have delved into the ET-AT in his Magnum Opus.  He may not be Clarkian, even though it appears he brushes off the VT arguments with his understanding of that debate. "Insofar far as they (Van Tillians) were asking for that kind of information, the demand of the Clark group was legitimate." One cannot "demand" something that is indescribable.


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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> I have enough to know that he should have delved into the ET-AT in his Magnum Opus.



He did. Pages 218 and 219. He is very clear. _Doctrine of God_.

"As there are two different kinds of reality, so there are two different kinds of....knowledge" (218).

"God's knowledge is knowledge of the Creator...ours, the creature" (218).

"Or, as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck used to say, God's love (or knowledge) is the *archetype*, and ours is the *ectype*" (219).

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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> He did. Pages 218 and 219. He is very clear. _Doctrine of God_.
> 
> "As there are two different kinds of reality, so there are two different kinds of....knowledge" (218).
> 
> "God's knowledge is knowledge of the Creator...ours, the creature" (218).
> 
> "Or, as Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck used to say, God's love (or knowledge) is the *archetype*, and ours is the *ectype*" (219).



I guess I may have to checkout this reference one day.  Though I have read from Horton that Frame does blur archetypal-ectypal distinction. I have a tendency to trust Horton and the facility Westminster Seminary California on what Frame...frames.

Jacob and Patrick I thank you both for the discussion and references.

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## RamistThomist

earl40 said:


> I guess I may have to checkout this reference one day.  Though I have read from Horton that Frame does blur archetypal-ectypal distinction. I have a tendency to trust Horton and the facility Westminster Seminary California on what Frame...frames.
> 
> Jacob and Patrick I thank you both for the discussion and references.



Horton's wrong on this one, though I heartily recommend his systematic theology. Horton also thinks that Turretin and Gregory Palamas can be reconciled on the divine energies, which is clearly false.


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## earl40

BayouHuguenot said:


> Horton's wrong on this one, though I heartily recommend his systematic theology. Horton also thinks that Turretin and Gregory Palamas can be reconciled on the divine energies, which is clearly false.



This quote is enough to see Horton is correct and that Frame is thinking in a Clarkian way and not dealing in the proper archtypal way of thinking....."But we must remember that the concept of incomprehensibility comprehensibility is self-referential, that is, *if God is incomprehensible*, then even His incomprehensibility is incomprehensible." Now the above is a pretty huge "if" and is in my opinion a denial of the WCF 2:1.

God (in se) is totally incomprehensible. I shall end here, and have a blessed weekend Jacob.

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