# I got back my philosophy paper today...



## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

In my Philosophy 100 class I had to write a "Three Things" assignment: two based on readings we had and the third on some relevant philosophical topic. My three "things" were titled, _The Non-Problem of Evil_, _The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs,_ and _Presuppositionalism: A Superior Apologetic_.

The second of these has been discussed _ad nauseum_ elsewhere, and I've basically talked about the third one a lot in other threads on this board, but I just wanted to tell you guys generally what I wrote on the first and the response I received from my teacher.

My case against the problem of evil was essentially this:

The "problem" is entirely anticipated in the Bible (Amos 3:6, Isaiah 45:7, Rom. 9:19, _et al._).
Omnibenevolence does not necessitate that an evil action not occur, only that its occurrence have a good reason. To say otherwise is to attack a straw man.
The problem of evil is entirely an appeal to emotion: no one can actually prove that a given event could not be used for God's purposes except God Himself.
Scripture does not hide from the fact that God could be seen as the Author of sin and evil, but rather affirms it as a divine mystery. There is no inconsistency found in Christianity just because someone disagrees with one of its tenets.
In other words, we cannot definitively say that we know the entire nature of free will and thus that compatibilism is an impossible philosophy; we cannot say that it is a false philosophy without begging the question.
God's use of evil does not mean that humans should be allowed to use evil for good purposes too, because the Creator is in a qualitatively distinct position from the creature, one that is ubiquitously affirmed throughout Scripture (e.g. Rom. 3:8).

Anyway, I wrote all this, and her response was as follows:



> You're being a little simplistic here. The problem of evil says that there is a _prima facie_ conflict between an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and the existence of evil in the world. A theistic person needs to explain how they are compatible. _The problem itself is perfectly coherent; this doesn't change simply because you have a way of escaping it._ [emphasis added in last sentence]



What does that last sentence mean anyway? Is "escaping the problem" some way of saying that the problem is solved to a smaller degree? That's nonsense. Does it mean that I have not solved the problem? If so, it would have helped if she refuted my points, or at least _stated opposition to them_.

In her defense, I could have gone in more detail on why the emotional conflict might exist by pointing that humans are not deserving of anything before God except judgment, etc., but I was simply trying to point out the basic fallaciousness of the argument -- it is at root an appeal to emotion. My defense had sufficed.

Honestly, though, what came to my mind when I got this paper back was the following passage:

_In them is fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah: "You will be ever hearing but never understanding; you will be ever seeing but never perceiving."_ -- Matthew 13:14

I realize the context is different, but I still found it interesting that that was what God put on my mind in the situation.

What do you guys think?


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## Berit (Dec 17, 2008)

Hi Ben,

I find her response interesting. She calls you simplistic (which I don't think you are), but don't _prima facie_ conflicts tend to be simplistic? And as to her last statement, it does not seem to be coherent.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

Berit said:


> but don't _prima facie_ conflicts tend to be simplistic?



They do.  Often (from what I've seen on Facebook at least), the version of the problem of evil used by atheists is Epicurus's formulation:

"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then He is not omnipotent. Is He able, but not willing? Then He is malevolent. Is He both able, and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is He neither able nor willing? Then why call Him God?"

This would seem pretty startling at first, but when analyzed for a second or two it is seen to be ridiculous: omnibenevolence does not necessitate that God remove evil, but that He use it _benevolently_. I am truly surprised that she said I was making it too simplistic when I pointed out that the otherwise _prima facie_ aspect of the "problem" was actually false. Maybe she skimmed over it or something. She did have a lot of reading to do.



> And as to her last statement, it does not seem to be coherent.



That is very true.

Thanks for your response, and welcome to the PB, as this is the first time I have seen you.


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## cih1355 (Dec 17, 2008)

Confessor said:


> In my Philosophy 100 class I had to write a "Three Things" assignment: two based on readings we had and the third on some relevant philosophical topic. My three "things" were titled, _The Non-Problem of Evil_, _The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs,_ and _Presuppositionalism: A Superior Apologetic_.
> 
> The second of these has been discussed _ad nauseum_ elsewhere, and I've basically talked about the third one a lot in other threads on this board, but I just wanted to tell you guys generally what I wrote on the first and the response I received from my teacher.
> 
> ...



You said, "Omnibenevolence does not necessitate that an evil action not occur, only that its occurrence have a good reason.". This answers the problem of evil and your teacher should have seen that. If God has good reasons for allowing evil, then it is not a logical contradiction to say that God is all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing and that evil exists. 

The problem of evil makes the false assumption that an all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing God would never allow evil to come into existence. What you said refutes this false assumption. 

I would also like to say that God Himself is the standard of His own actions. We should not judge God. God does not conform Himself to what man thinks is right or wrong. He does not owe us an explanation for what He does.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

cih1355 said:


> The problem of evil makes this false assumption: "An all-powerful, all-loving, and all-knowing God would never allow evil to come into existence." You should refute this false assumption. [...] You said, "Omnibenevolence does not necessitate that an evil action not occur, only that its occurrence have a good reason.". Your teacher might want you to explain what that good reason is.



That bulleted point you quoted is my stating that the problem of evil uses a false assumption. Also, as I said at the bottom, I could have added reasons for evil's existence, but they are only for persuasive purposes on top of what I have already proven -- that the problem of evil is foundationally an appeal to emotion.



> He does not owe us an explanation for what He does.



This is why -- besides the spatial constraints of the paper -- I did not provide reasons why evil might exist. I do not have to "bail God out" of the situation. A sound refutation of the problem of evil is that omnibenevolence necessitates that evil has good purposes. Period. Further reasons for why evil may exist are persuasive but ultimately unnecessary.


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## Scott1 (Dec 17, 2008)

Good writing skills, Ben.


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## cbryant (Dec 17, 2008)

Ben,

It sounds like you ran into the same thing I did a couple of years ago in an ethics class when I wrote a 15 page paper affirming divine command ethics. The professor said my paper was well written and had good use of primary and secondary sources but he didn't agree with me (don't remember all the reasons). He recommended I read "Fear and Trembling" but "Fear and Trembling doesn't not speak against divine command ethics. In fact he had to appeal to the Graduate program coordinator who was a Philosophy of Religion professor.  

Your professor said that a theistic person needs to be able to explain how a divine being is resolved with evil in the world. But what I am willing to bet what she means is "The problem of evil says that there is a prima facie conflict between an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and the existence of evil in the world. A theistic person needs to explain how they are compatible without appealing to anything in the omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being." That's like saying you need to be able to swim without using your arms and legs.

It's amazing how much one runs into a reaffirmation of Romans 1.


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## he beholds (Dec 17, 2008)

Ben, I'm guessing your teacher isn't used to receiving work that was as in-depth as yours in a Philosophy 100 class. Maybe she was not expecting to read anything but her own opinion regurgitated.


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## Marrow Man (Dec 17, 2008)

Ben, forgive me, but where are you attending college?


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## tellville (Dec 17, 2008)

Confessor said:


> > You're being a little simplistic here. The problem of evil says that there is a _prima facie_ conflict between an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and the existence of evil in the world. A theistic person needs to explain how they are compatible. _The problem itself is perfectly coherent; this doesn't change simply because you have a way of escaping it._ [emphasis added in last sentence]



What she is actually saying, grammatically, is that the problem is coherent and that the fact that you have the answer to it doesn't mean the problem isn't coherent anymore.

For example, here is a math problem and it's answer:

2+2=4

Now even though I have an answer to 2+2 that doesn't change the fact that 2+2 is a math "problem". 

That is what she is saying _grammatically_. Now what she probably trying to say is that she thinks you are copping out of the problem some how - you're not actually solving it. But the burden is on her to prove that you are somehow _ad hoc'ing_ a cop out to the problem and not actually solving it.


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## Prufrock (Dec 17, 2008)

It's hard to make an informed statement without having read the paper itself, but perhaps her judgment isn't so "off." Regarding your second bulleted point: this, obviously, is where you answer has to lie. Did you develop this point fully? Or more importantly, did you state it and make the argument that's it is true _but_ without explicitly making it into a specific case? If you merely stated in hypothetical terms that "Omnibenevolence does not necessitate that an evil action not occur, only that its occurrence have a good reason," but did not demonstrate both what this good reason was, and that it, in fact, did happen, then I can understand her comment. For if this is true, then I suppose you have presented a way that, hypothetically, it _could_ not be a problem, but haven't haven't actually demonstrate that it _is not_, in point of fact, a problem. 

Not trying to criticize your work, just trying to offer a potential explanation without having read the paper.


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## Archlute (Dec 17, 2008)

Prufrock said:


> Not trying to criticize your work, *just trying to offer a potential explanation without having read the paper*.


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## Prufrock (Dec 17, 2008)

Archlute said:


> Prufrock said:
> 
> 
> > Not trying to criticize your work, *just trying to offer a potential explanation without having read the paper*.



Yes?

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 10:06:11 EST-----

He didn't post the paper, just an outline; thus, any commentary is restricted to what can be gleaned from that.

One of my undergrad majors was philosophy, and I remember it took a little while to get used to it. Some things that seemed so obvious to me as a Christian were, clearly, not a part of the professors thinking; thus, in my papers, I would sometimes not include things which they found vitally necessary, as, in my thought paradigms, they naturally followed from what I said or were just assumed. Most philosophy professors are pretty smart people, and I learned that lots of the time (but not all the time) when they point out a flaw in my work there may actually be one: perhaps I didn't prove something as well as I thought I did. Anselm was pretty convinced by his ontological proof, but let's see it convince an outsider.

Ben, I liked the other paper you posted; I'm sure this one was just as good.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 10:09:23 EST-----

Honestly? Ask her about it. If you can't figure out the source of her criticism, ask her. It can only help you to hear how a professional philosopher critiques your philosophical argument, especially when it's on a topic of such importance to you.


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## Reformed Baptist (Dec 17, 2008)

Try not to use too many big words, complex logic, or sound reasoning with most university professors. They struggle with it. hahaha


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## LawrenceU (Dec 17, 2008)

Ben, I'm not saying you are thinking this way, but all too often students assume there is an adversarial relationship between the professor and the student. This is especially true in the fields of rhetoric and philosophy when the professor and student hold to differing presuppositions. If the professor is really a teacher he will not be coming at you, but rather alongside you in order to sharpen your logic and reasoning skills. I hope that is the case with you.


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## Prufrock (Dec 17, 2008)

> Ben, I'm not saying you are thinking this way, but all too often students assume there is an adversarial relationship between the professor and the student. This is especially true in the fields of rhetoric and philosophy when the professor and student hold to differing presuppositions. If the professor is really a teacher he will not be coming at you, but rather alongside you in order to sharpen your logic and reasoning skills. I hope that is the case with you.


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## turmeric (Dec 17, 2008)

I would ask her to show you where you need to strengthen your case. She is probably not a believer, and it's very possible her presuppositions got in the way and she made her remark about you "escaping" the problem of evil out of emotion, but by politely and graciously asking her to expand on her critique, she'll have to think, and she may be able to express what she meant and help you strengthen your paper. I'm sure that's what she wants to do. Even unbelievers want to be good scholars. The conversation should be good for both of you.


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## Archlute (Dec 17, 2008)

Prufrock said:


> Archlute said:
> 
> 
> > Prufrock said:
> ...



I'm not picking on you here more than I would anyone else who would have posted that, but before the age of the Internet the portion of the text that I set in bold for you would have caused most persons to have paused and reconsidered before attempting to give advice. You really cannot offer anything of substance if the paper has not been read.


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## Prufrock (Dec 17, 2008)

Archlute said:


> I'm not picking on you here more than I would anyone else who would have posted that, but before the age of the Internet the portion of the text that I set in bold for you would have caused most persons to have paused and reconsidered before attempting to give advice. You really cannot offer anything of substance if the paper has not been read.



Thanks, but that's why my post was asking him questions: "did you ____?" Respectfully, he asked us what we thought of her response, and provided us with an outline of his paper upon which to base that judgment. I did, and asked him questions about the paper to point him to a possible explanation of her response.

But, since this isn't the topic of the thread, consider the matter dropped. I think Ben will understand my post.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

he beholds said:


> Ben, I'm guessing your teacher isn't used to receiving work that was as in-depth as yours in a Philosophy 100 class. Maybe she was not expecting to read anything but her own opinion regurgitated.



That is definitely true, to an extent. On the second third of my paper, focused on the shortcomings of natural theology, she wrote an "excellent" and a smiley face.

She seems like a rather honest person -- I doubt that she was only wanting to see her own opinion -- but I bet she still did not want to see something flatly contrary to her opinion.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 12:29:00 EST-----



Marrow Man said:


> Ben, forgive me, but where are you attending college?



Haha, it's alright. I'm not sure if I've said it very often on this board. I'm attending Ohio Northern University for pharmacy.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 12:30:41 EST-----



tellville said:


> That is what she is saying _grammatically_. Now what she probably trying to say is that she thinks you are copping out of the problem some how - you're not actually solving it. But the burden is on her to prove that you are somehow _ad hoc'ing_ a cop out to the problem and not actually solving it.



I was assuming she wasn't speaking complete nonsense , but I had hoped she would at least tell me why what I said did not destroy the problem. Just as you said, the burden is on her to disprove me after I at least _attempt_ to answer the problem; she can't simply assert that the problem is coherent in the face of my defense against the problem.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 12:35:10 EST-----



Prufrock said:


> Regarding your second bulleted point: this, obviously, is where you answer has to lie. Did you develop this point fully? Or more importantly, did you state it and make the argument that's it is true _but_ without explicitly making it into a specific case? If you merely stated in hypothetical terms that "Omnibenevolence does not necessitate that an evil action not occur, only that its occurrence have a good reason," but did not demonstrate both what this good reason was, and that it, in fact, did happen, then I can understand her comment. For if this is true, then I suppose you have presented a way that, hypothetically, it _could_ not be a problem, but haven't haven't actually demonstrate that it _is not_, in point of fact, a problem.



Well, I made the point that in the Bible the problem is resolved by the sheer fact that all evil is used for God's good purposes, citing some Bible verses.

Usually, the problem of evil consists of such questions as, "Wait, how did the Holocaust fit into God's plan?" or "Wait, how did my parent's death fit into God 's plan?" While these are certainly important questions, and while the grieving person ought to be emotionally consoled and lifted up in prayer, they are _not_ logical problems at all against God's existence, just emotional responses. I was pointing out that there is no logic _as the basis_ of the problem of evil, only emotion.

And as I said earlier, I would have provided some reasons why the evil in this world should actually not be seen as emotionally contrary to God's omnibenevolence, but spatial restraints limited me. I left them out because I had other parts of the problem to answer and because they were logically unnecessary.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 12:38:03 EST-----



LawrenceU said:


> Ben, I'm not saying you are thinking this way, but all too often students assume there is an adversarial relationship between the professor and the student. This is especially true in the fields of rhetoric and philosophy when the professor and student hold to differing presuppositions. If the professor is really a teacher he will not be coming at you, but rather alongside you in order to sharpen your logic and reasoning skills. I hope that is the case with you.



Oh yes, I am not doubting this at all. My philosophy professor is very kind from what I have seen. I guess what I am trying to point out is an aversion to God that she may have.


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## Prufrock (Dec 17, 2008)

Thanks, Ben. What I would suggest she _might_ be getting at is something as follows:

Simply saying that God uses evil for his own good purposes doesn't really give an answer to the philosopher; it's simply a _virtus dormitiva_. All that really does is to move the question one step further back, without really giving it a substantial answer. I think what the philosopher wants is 1.) an explanation as to how "evil" _is_ good, and 2.) a logical, philosophical reason as to why it _is_ so, not why it might be so. To someone who does not share our Biblical presuppositions, the statement "Evil exists for a good" is simply a game of semantics. It's hard for us to step outside our worldview. Maybe you did that, but again, I haven't read your paper. I've just been in similar situations before.


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## cih1355 (Dec 17, 2008)

Ben,

Does your teacher want you to answer the following question?

If God has good reasons for allowing evil, then what are those reasons?


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## Davidius (Dec 17, 2008)

So if we're Christians and our professors criticize some of our work, it's because our professors just hate God? Although this is possible, let's not jump too quickly to cry victimization. And I say this as a fellow college student, one who has taken classes at UNC from unbelieving professors on philosophy, church history, and Bart Ehrman's infamous New Testament class, yet received A's in all of them, even though I spoke my mind in class and in papers on behalf of orthodox Christianity. In my recent German class I wrote an essay against Socialism for a Marxist professor from East Germany. 

Even though you are (apparently) so convinced of the validity of your arguments, there are extremely brilliant thinkers in the world, both God-haters and lovers of God, who don't agree with your solution to the problem of evil or your apologetic method. Unless she gave you a terrible grade purely based on your conclusions, and not on the quality of your thinking and writing, I don't think it's right for us to all come together and pat each other on the back by beating her over the head for not immediately surrendering to the obviously unquestionable genius of what seems to clear to some of us.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

Prufrock said:


> Thanks, Ben. What I would suggest she _might_ be getting at is something as follows:
> 
> Simply saying that God uses evil for his own good purposes doesn't really give an answer to the philosopher; it's simply a _virtus dormitiva_. All that really does is to move the question one step further back, without really giving it a substantial answer. I think what the philosopher wants is 1.) an explanation as to how "evil" _is_ good, and 2.) a logical, philosophical reason as to why it _is_ so, not why it might be so. To someone who does not share our Biblical presuppositions, the statement "Evil exists for a good" is simply a game of semantics. It's hard for us to step outside our worldview. Maybe you did that, but again, I haven't read your paper. I've just been in similar situations before.



I wouldn't say I have to go that far, although doing so would be much more persuasive and rhetorical.

If the problem of evil aims to provide a logical inconsistency between an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and the existence of evil, but the system the problem is attacking claims for itself that evil exists for the good purposes of the omnipotent, omnibenevolent being, then _it does not logically follow_ that they are incompatible at all.

The explanation for how evil is good is simply what I have already stated: evil is used for good purposes. There may be a question of how this is simply letting the ends (immorally) justify the means, but I addressed that elsewhere in my paper, summarized in the last bulleted point.

Regarding (2), this is unnecessary and impossible. I cannot argue from a "neutral" standpoint that a given evil event exists only for the purposes of the Christian God's goodness. All I can argue for is my system's consistency. Thus, when I posit what exactly the Bible affirms regarding the purpose for evil, I am positing the Christian answer to the question, not a hypothetical, "hey, this might work" answer. (That's actually what annoys me about most free-will theodicies, but I digress.)

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 12:57:24 EST-----



cih1355 said:


> Ben,
> 
> Does your teacher want you to answer the following question?
> 
> If God has good reasons for allowing evil, then what are those reasons?



Possibly, but if so then she didn't say so.

And of course, the answer to that is I could give some possible reasons, but I couldn't give every reason. The Christian answer to the question is that God uses all events for good. That is the solution to the problem of evil, logically speaking.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 01:02:08 EST-----



Davidius said:


> So if we're Christians and our professors criticize some of our work, it's because our professors just hate God? Although this is possible, let's not jump too quickly to cry victimization. And I say this as a fellow college student, one who has taken classes at UNC from unbelieving professors on philosophy, church history, and Bart Ehrman's infamous New Testament class, yet received A's in all of them, even though I spoke my mind in class and in papers on behalf of orthodox Christianity. In my recent German class I wrote an essay against Socialism for a Marxist professor from East Germany.



Well, if the arguments are cogent, and others ignore them, telling me that "I'm just escaping the problem" and that the problem is still "perfectly coherent," then they got some 'splainin to do, at the very least. If upon further deliberation, they continue to assert that I am wrong and refuse to disprove my solution, then it is a moral problem indeed, even if I am in the wrong.



> Even though you are (apparently) so convinced of the validity of your arguments, there are extremely brilliant thinkers in the world, both God-haters and lovers of God, who don't agree with your solution to the problem of evil or your apologetic method. Unless she gave you a terrible grade purely based on your conclusions, and not on the quality of your thinking and writing, I don't think it's right for us to all come together and pat each other on the back by beating her over the head for not immediately surrendering to the obviously unquestionable genius of what seems to clear to some of us.



I realize that other "smart people" might disagree with me -- I just wish they would provide reasons! I'm not saying she bowed down to my paper and then hardened her heart by still refusing to acknowledge its divine veracity; I'm saying that she simply asserted its wrongness. She may have reasons for doing so. She may have _excellent_ reasons for doing so. But she left me in the dark on those reasons, which was both puzzling and frustrating for me.


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## Prufrock (Dec 17, 2008)

> The problem of evil is entirely an appeal to emotion.



This part may be a hang up as well: I'm not sure that's entirely true. There certainly is an emotional aspect to it, but I don't know that 1.) It is solely emotional, and 2.) That even if it is, that overthrows the usefulness. After all, the purpose of arguing against something such as this is to "convince" someone not simply that God is, but that he is good and praise-worthy. I know many people who acknowledge the possibility or even the probability of God, but with Ivan Karamazov, are appreciative of the offer but "kindly return the ticket." Even if you can convince someone of a logical possibility, if that proof does not resonate with the _pathos_, has anything really been accomplished?

But, more fundamentally, if you begin without the presupposition of God, and are making honest inquiry, this problem certainly presents an obstacle: and while, on the presupposition of God we are quite capable of saying "There is evil, and we don't always understand its use or purpose, this is irrelevant: we can't know the mind of God to pass judgment upon him and to know the utility of evils," the unbeliever cannot as easily make that statement anymore than we would expect the simple man in Germany in 1941 to say, "Well, I don't understand what Hitler is doing, and it seems wrong to me, but he is surely far wiser than I, so for now I'll accept that there must be a good end to his works." In our standard refutation of this argument we ask the unbeliever to suspend moral judgment and accept the wisdom of the very being whose existence is in question.

Now, this is not to say that our answer is thus invalid. It is surely a true answer, and should be given when the question is raised. However, from an agnostic philosophical position, it does nothing to actually forward the question in a meaningful way, as we must presuppose the existence of God and his wisdom in order to rest content with the answer.

This is my understanding of the problem, anyway. By way of parallel, Anselm's ontological argument may seem convincing enough to us, but it will never convince anyone else. Valid arguments which depend upon the existence of God for their validity have little utility in proving him. I am certainly no expert on philosophy (much less apologetics), but from experience of bringing philosophy into the world of actual people in actual circumstances, there is often a great disconnect.

Anyway, good work: your paper sounds good.

Out of curiosity, how did you professor respond to the other two?


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## Davidius (Dec 17, 2008)

Have you gone to your professor's (TA's?) office hours to ask her to elaborate on her comments in the paper?


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## JohnGill (Dec 17, 2008)

Confessor said:


> In my Philosophy 100 class I had to write a "Three Things" assignment: two based on readings we had and the third on some relevant philosophical topic. My three "things" were titled, _The Non-Problem of Evil_, _The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs,_ and _Presuppositionalism: A Superior Apologetic_.
> 
> The second of these has been discussed _ad nauseum_ elsewhere, and I've basically talked about the third one a lot in other threads on this board, but I just wanted to tell you guys generally what I wrote on the first and the response I received from my teacher.
> 
> ...



You didn't deal with the problem. You showed that there was no problem. You might have to provide the background demonstrating that there is no problem with the Biblical view of Christianity and that the problem only lies in a faulty understanding of Christianity in general and the nature of God in particular.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

Prufrock said:


> > The problem of evil is entirely an appeal to emotion.
> 
> 
> This part may be a hang up as well: I'm not sure that's entirely true. There certainly is an emotional aspect to it, but I don't know that 1.) It is solely emotional, and 2.) That even if it is, that overthrows the usefulness. After all, the purpose of arguing against something such as this is to "convince" someone not simply that God is, but that he is good and praise-worthy. I know many people who acknowledge the possibility or even the probability of God, but with Ivan Karamazov, are appreciative of the offer but "kindly return the ticket." Even if you can convince someone of a logical possibility, if that proof does not resonate with the _pathos_, has anything really been accomplished?



As I said, I know for a fact that I didn't make it as persuasive as possible: I didn't point out that some evil things are used for retributive judgment (because not everyone is one of God's beloved children), there is no such thing as a person "undeserving" of any particular evil, we are all deserving of eternal damnation, etc. Had I done this, the emotional barriers may have started to come down, but these take a long time to explain and are logically unnecessary: I simply do not have to point out why God does anything in any given situation.

I don't deny that an emotional response against evil is a reason for unbelief, but I do deny that such a reason is a logical one; therefore, it does not constitute a logical discrepancy between omnibenevolence and the existence of evil. That is all I was pointing out. You are right, however, in that I didn't make it nearly as persuasive as it could have been.



> But, more fundamentally, if you begin without the presupposition of God, and are making honest inquiry, this problem certainly presents an obstacle: and while, on the presupposition of God we are quite capable of saying "There is evil, and we don't always understand its use or purpose, this is irrelevant: we can't know the mind of God to pass judgment upon him and to know the utility of evils," the unbeliever cannot as easily make that statement anymore than we would expect the simple man in Germany in 1941 to say, "Well, I don't understand what Hitler is doing, and it seems wrong to me, but he is surely far wiser than I, so for now I'll accept that there must be a good end to his works." In our standard refutation of this argument we ask the unbeliever to suspend moral judgment and accept the wisdom of the very being whose existence is in question.



Well, honestly, such a person would be consistent with their presupposition. You couldn't flail him for being inconsistent. But, what you can do it point out to him that his original presupposition, i.e. regarding a mere human as some infallible authority, is faulty. This just goes to show the necessity of transcendental argumentation.



> Now, this is not to say that our answer is thus invalid. It is surely a true answer, and should be given when the question is raised. However, from an agnostic philosophical position, it does nothing to actually forward the question in a meaningful way, as we must presuppose the existence of God and his wisdom in order to rest content with the answer.



Well, the use of my defense is just that -- a defense. I don't expect anyone to positively believe something just because it isn't incoherent. But that doesn't mean the charges of incoherence should not be put down.



> Out of curiosity, how did you professor respond to the other two?



On my critique of natural theology, she wrote down an "excellent" and a smiley face, and I she didn't really say anything about presuppositionalism, which surprised me. At the end of the paper she said she was initially worried that I was just going to try to point out biblical contradictions as another unnamed student had done, but that fear was quickly allayed as I was merely pointing out that the Bible promotes a specific philosophical defense. She also told me later that she enjoyed my paper and I did a good job. I received a "check plus" which is the highest of three grades I could get on the assignment. Soli Deo gloria.

-----Added 12/17/2008 at 03:26:26 EST-----



Davidius said:


> Have you gone to your professor's (TA's?) office hours to ask her to elaborate on her comments in the paper?



No, but that is a good idea. I didn't have class today, but I may try speaking to her at another time. I think I might ask her to come to philosophy club or something.


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Dec 17, 2008)

Confessor said:


> > You're being a little simplistic here. The problem of evil says that there is a _prima facie_ conflict between an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being and the existence of evil in the world. A theistic person needs to explain how they are compatible. _The problem itself is perfectly coherent; this doesn't change simply because you have a way of escaping it._ [emphasis added in last sentence]
> 
> 
> 
> What does that last sentence mean anyway?


I think some are missing the point your prof is making, based on personal experience as a student and teacher of Philosophy courses.

I believe the prof is pointing out that while you may argue God has good purposes for using evil, you have not explained how this same omnipotent and omniscient God escapes being the author of the good purposes of evil you are defending.

The conversation between you and the prof is something like this:

You: God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil in the world.

Prof: _Is God omnipotent and omniscient?_

You: Of course.

Prof: _Then why does God need morally sufficient reasons for the existence of evil, when He, being omnipotent and omniscient, can only be the cause of this evil in the first place? Moreover, what is omnibenevolent in all of this? In other words, how do you reconcile God's infinite attributes with the existence of evil?_

I believe this is the root issue the instructor is trying to get across, especially given the prof's explicit reference to the om's in the critique.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> I believe the prof is pointing out that while you may argue God has good purposes for using evil, you have not explained how this same omnipotent and omniscient God escapes being the author of the good purposes of evil you are defending.



I'm not sure what you mean. Why wouldn't we want God to be the author of the good purposes of evil? God is the source of all goodness.



> Prof: _Then why does God need morally sufficient reasons for the existence of evil, when He, being omnipotent and omniscient, can only be the cause of this evil in the first place? Moreover, what is omnibenevolent in all of this? In other words, how do you reconcile God's infinite attributes with the existence of evil?_



I simply don't understand the question you are posing. I don't deny that He is the primary cause of evil (not making Him culpable).

Why _wouldn't_ He have morally sufficient reasons for evil's existence?

What is omnibenevolent in all of this is the fact that all things work together for good and for His glory.

I'm sorry; I just don't understand what you are trying to point out.


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Dec 17, 2008)

You are preaching to the choir in your response to me, Confessor. Naturally, I "get it". I was adopting the professor's attitude in my response. Have you thoroughly reconciled the om's of God with evil to bolster your position that there is "no problem"? From your outline in your opening post, I don't see that you have. Perhaps only a full read of the paper is required. If you like, I am happy to review it. Send email to me: _amr AT askmrreligion DOT com_

Your professor will argue that the distinction you draw between the first and contingent causes of evil is irrelevant in the face of omniscience. God is not caught by surprise for the actions of His creatures and He is certainly omnipotent enough to have prevented evil in the first place. (Again, here I am merely being the prof's devil's advocate).

Again, as a prof I would agree with your teacher's views, that you are being simplistic if what you have written in your opening post is the crux of your argument. You cannot claim simply that God has His ways and means without showing how those ways and means remain thoroughly righteous. You show nothing in your opening post that relates to the necessity of evil as a means of demonstrating mercy or grace, all to the glory of God. In fact, I see nothing about God's glory even mentioned in your paper's outline.

I am not trying to be harsh, and want to stress, that I have _been there, done that_, so I am willing to bet I know what the prof is thinking. Even as a Christian teacher of philosophy, I would hold my student's feet to the fire on the theodicy issue, not letting them off the hook with a simple "God has his own purposes" argument. I think your prof wants you to simply dig deeper.

AMR

Patrick


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Again, as a prof I would agree with your teacher's views, that you are being simplistic if what you have written in your opening post is the crux of your argument. You cannot claim simply that God has His ways and means without showing how those ways and means remain thoroughly righteous.



You seem to think that I am trying to offer a positive apologetic, i.e. a positive reason to believe that Christianity as true, but I am not. The problem of evil attempts to show an _internal inconsistency_, and I am showing why there is no internal inconsistency at all.



> You show nothing in your opening post that relates to the necessity of evil as a means of demonstrating mercy or grace, all to the glory of God. In fact, I see nothing about God's glory even mentioned in your paper's outline.



As I said, the statement, "All things work together for good" is completely self-sufficient to seal the gap that the problem of evil may create. Examples of how things may work together for good (e.g. demonstrating His glory by displaying His attributes) are helpful and persuasive, but _they are not logically necessary_. If they were logically necessary, I would have to "bail God out" of every single evil action ever done.

I would have given plenteous examples of how this is done, how it when rightly viewed is not an emotional case against God (in many cases, not all), etc. But I did not have enough room to deconstruct all aspects of the problem of evil, so I simply attacked the foundation and left it at that.



> I am not trying to be harsh, and want to stress, that I have _been there, done that_, so I am willing to bet I know what the prof is thinking. Even as a Christian teacher of philosophy, I would hold my student's feet to the fire on the theodicy issue, not letting them off the hook with a simple "God has his own purposes" argument. I think your prof wants you to simply dig deeper.



Again, I would have dug deeper, but I did not for two reasons: (1) spatial constraints (she placed a general range of a word limit), and (2) it was logically unnecessary. Seriously, "God has His own reasons" is a _perfect_ solution to the problem of evil. It is not very persuasive as a positive apologetic, but it is never intended as a positive apologetic. As I said above, I don't plan on converting people by showing how Christianity is not prone to the problem of evil. Showing that Christianity is not incoherent is not supposed to convert anyone.


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## cih1355 (Dec 17, 2008)

I said in a previous post that if God has good reasons for allowing evil to exist, then it is not a logical contradiction to say that God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful and at the same time evil exists. I would like to add that even if we do not know what those good reasons are, it still would not be a logical contradiction to say that God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful and at the same time evil exists.


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## Confessor (Dec 17, 2008)

cih1355 said:


> I said in a previous post that if God has good reasons for allowing evil to exist, then it is not a logical contradiction to say that God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful and at the same time evil exists. I would like to add that even if we do not know what those good reasons are, it still would not be a logical contradiction to say that God is all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful and at the same time evil exists.



Agreed. Giving specific reasons for specific events can be more persuasive and emotionally alleviating, but it is not a logical part of the argument. The proof against the "problem" of evil is simple and stout.


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## Zeno333 (Dec 19, 2008)

An all powerful God and Evil are compatible, since Evil is essentially "non-being"...and therefore this "non-being" does not have any "being" to effect the "being" of God. Therefore the 2 entities can so to speak "live together".
I wrote a paper in College on St Aquinas, and i used this "non-being" argument regarding God and Evil in that paper....At the time the idea of Evil is "non-being" was an idea that I came up with entirely on my own....At the time I was not aware that St Augustine had already exposed the idea that Evil was "non-being". So all of the other ideas in my College paper were footnoted, but my part about Evil and its "non-being" was not footnoted since it was my own idea at the time. (This is a good example where something can "appear" to be plagiarism when it is not.)
I of course am not trying to claim I am on the par with St Augustine, but it is a bit ironic that I came up with the idea that evil is "non-being" on my own....something that Augustine was already noted for.


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