# Darkwing Duck and the Case of the COW



## py3ak (Sep 27, 2006)

Here is a pretty plain statement:



> _The first covenant made with man was a covenant of works (Gal. 3:12), wherein life was promised to Adam; and in him to his posterity (Rom. 10:5; 5:12ï¿½20), upon condition of perfect and personal obedience (Gen. 2:17; Gal. 3:10)._
> 
> Periodically, great Homer nods and I believe that is the case here. While there is no necessary problem with the doctrine, the Westminster divines have badly named this covenant. To call this covenant with Adam a covenant "of works" leads people to confuse it either with the Old Testament economy, or with pharisaical distortions of the law. This misunderstanding is evident in the scriptural reference given for this point. To call it works opposes it, in the scriptural terminology, to grace. But the covenant given to Adam prior to the Fall was in no way opposed to grace. It would be far better to call this pre-Fall covenant a covenant of creation. In this covenant, life was promised to Adam and his descendents as the fruit of perfect and personal obedience. But notice the word fruitï¿½as a covenant of creation, grace is not opposed to it, and permeates the whole. If by "covenant of works" is meant raw merit, then we have to deny the covenant of works. But if this covenant made with Adam was inherently gracious (as many Reformed theologians have held), then the only problem is the terminological one. And, with regard to whether the covenant was gracious, a simple thought experiment will suffice. If Adam had withstood temptation successfully, would he have had any obligation to say "thank You" to God. If not, then it is not a gracious covenant. If so, then it was.



Thoughts? Blessings? Bile?


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## VictorBravo (Sep 27, 2006)

"If Adam had withstood temptation successfully, would he have had any obligation to say "thank You" to God. If not, then it is not a gracious covenant. If so, then it was."

Interesting test. It may point to the heart of the dispute, but not to the heart of the matter. Do we have any authority to acknowledge this as the sine qua non?

The Genesis account does not seem to place an obligation upon Adam to say "thank you". But, I would think, that Adam would have said so anyway, had he remained obedient.

But that is just my speculation.


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## Scott Bushey (Sep 27, 2006)

Wilson! Wrong!

[Edited on 9-27-2006 by Scott Bushey]


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## VictorBravo (Sep 27, 2006)

Oops, Scott, I forgot my manners. (Cool smilies!)


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## Peter (Sep 27, 2006)

I don't think anyone believes it was not gracious and lovingkind of God to put Adam in a Covenant of Works or that had Adam fulfilled the covenant he would have any grounds to be unthankful. If someone gets an "A" on a test then they have earned the satisfaction of that grade (merit) yet they owe it to the giver and grader of the test.


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## Scott Bushey (Sep 27, 2006)

> _Originally posted by victorbravo_
> Oops, Scott, I forgot my manners. (Cool smilies!)



RV,
I have benefitted greatly from much of Wilsons works. On this issue, he is wrong; obviously, again, he is redefining things outside of that which the historic church has held.


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## Puritan Sailor (Sep 27, 2006)

> If Adam had withstood temptation successfully, would he have had any obligation to say "thank You" to God. If not, then it is not a gracious covenant. If so, then it was.



This is simply confusing the matter. The divines were clear enough. The first covenant was not gracious but God condescending to man. God set the stipulations and the reward. Adam would indeed say 'thankyou' to God for making the covenant with him and equipping him with everything adequate to fulfill those stipulations. But the promised reward was still based upon the performance of Adam, not the intervention of God on his behalf due to his inability.


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## Contra_Mundum (Sep 27, 2006)

Hardly anyone disputes that God was not under obligation to set up any sort of covenant with man, or to set up his covenant any certain way; nor is there much dispute that man should be grateful for any sort of covenant.

But we ought to follow the older writers, and wisely use terminology like "voluntary condescension" *instead of* "grace" when speaking on these terms, precisely because we want to express something more definite by the term "grace" than merely a blanket expression for divine condescension. "Grace" to post-fall sinners is practically a different species of relation entirely from condescension to unfallen man. Our terminology ought to reflect this; and as it happens, I believe it clearly does in the Bible as well, so the terminology the WCF uses is Scriptural.

The fact is that God set up a _meritorious_ covenant, and made promises contingent on Adam's obedience. Thus, by obedience Adam would merit the blessing _according to the promise of God._ The covenant is properly opposed in this very sense to the covenant of grace, because grace is diametrically opposed to works.

In the frst covenant, God *allowed* that man should have a claim, a debt, to respectfully ask for, should he be obedient to the end of his probation. So in this sense, no, he wouldn't be obliged to say "thank you, even though I am laying a claim to your self-imposed promise/ obligation."

In the present covenant (of grace) the promise of God to man is not contingent on human obedience *at all.* The human obedience that is found in the redeemed is reckoned a _product_ of divine work. We certainly owe a "thank you" in this case that sublimely transcends anything we might have conceived of in gratitude prior to the fall.

Recognizing that it is a "works" covenant is Pauline to the core, the above author's protests notwithstanding. So, the problem with people's misunderstanding the terminology is not a problem inherent in the terminology, but the age-old sin problem in deficient hearers and teachers.

Fruit=product. I'm not sure what this portion of the extract refers to, except the author's own re-wording of confessional terminology for his own purposes. "Fruit" is a biblical word--so is "wages". And the wages of sin is death (Rom. 6:23). And the wage of work is a debt (Rom. 4:4). Paul clearly speaks of "fruit" in the post-fall context of sin (Rom. 7:5) and redemption and sanctification (Rom 6:22). So, I think the author has yet to even demonstrate that which he postulates--namely that "fruit" and "grace" are twin paradigmatic concepts around which to build a single covenant concept.


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## MW (Sep 27, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Scott Bushey_
> I have benefitted greatly from much of Wilsons works. On this issue, he is wrong; obviously, again, he is redefining things outside of that which the historic church has held.



One is obliged to know what the historic church meant by the phrase "covenant of works," especially seeing the Standards use the word "commonly called" with respect to it. It is often the case that a renaissance fails to recognise all the nuances of an original movement; and I believe that is what has taken place here. Wilson is certainly struggling to come to terms with the phraseology; but it seems his detractors are importing too much into the phraseology.

In the Standards and in the writings of the Westminster divines, there is one sense only in which works is applicatory to the prelapsarian covenant. Works = personal, perfect, and perpetual obedience, and is the condition upon which life was promised. That is all. To require a person to articulate more than that is unreasonable.


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## py3ak (Sep 27, 2006)

Does any one have any idea who "the many reformed theologians" who think that the pre-lapsarian covenant was "inherently gracious" might be?


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Sep 27, 2006)

"Grace" is a post-lapsarian term.


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## tewilder (Sep 28, 2006)

> _Originally posted by py3ak_
> Does any one have any idea who "the many reformed theologians" who think that the pre-lapsarian covenant was "inherently gracious" might be?



It is important to distinguish two things. There is God's condescension in initiating the covenant, and there is the relation between God and man within the terms of the Covenant of Works.

There are plenty of theologians of many periods who have used terms such as grace to describe God's initiantive in making the covenant in the first place, but still hold that a Covenant of Works was made. Others have preferred to reserve the term "grace" for God's saving initiatives after the Fall.

But there are those who use the argument that the fact that it has been called gracious that God initiated the covenant shows that the covenant qua covenant was an arrangement of grace and not one of conditions with reward or punishment bound to them, and that therefore there was no Covenant of Works.

There are those who have sought to confuse things by quoting theologians with a view to confusing the condescension of God in initiating the covenant with man's situation under the covenant when it had been made. 

Secondly, there are theologians who deny that there was such a thing as a Covenant of Works. These include various Dutch people, such as S.G. De Graaf who wrote Promise and Deliverance, the South African C. Van Der Waal, and in America Herman Hoeksema and the Protestant Reformed People, and R.J. Rushdoony.

In a sort of weird half-way position between the Westminster Cf and the Hoeksema view is Richard Bacon who says:

<blockquote>There was a covenant instituted in the garden. That much is clear. While it is arrogant of theologians to speculate regarding "what-ifs," in my opinion, nevertheless this has become fair game it seems. My exegesis of 1 Cor. 15:45ff leads me to conclude that 1) Adam had no life-giving ability; his sin but not his righteousness could be imputed; 2) his origin and therefore his life was completely earthy, not heavenly; 3) his life was a natural life, not a spiritual life; 4) the Adamic image in us could only have led to an earthly, natural life and the image of the Lord of heaven would under any circumstances have been needful for us to attain to a spiritual, heavenly life. </blockquote>

and 

<blockquote>My opinion is that Adam was not only created righteous, but with a positive inclination to obey God in all particulars. However, to inherit eternal heavenly life, he would need the imputed righteousness of Christ.</blockquote>

and 

<blockquote>What I actually said (earlier) was that Adam needed the righteousness of Christ in order to advance to any other than an earthly estate. He would not have been able to advance to glory apart from the righteousness of Christ. However, he did have a personal righteousness of his own. Since the fall, we do not have a personal righteousness. We are totally depraved -- i.e. not even a "smidgeon" of righteousness remains for us. So, since the fall, there is no other righteousness available to man. Prior to the fall, there was an earthly, losable, righteousness in Adam. So, not a contradiction; simply distinctions.</blockquote>

which goes to show that all sorts of variations are possible.

One further qualification. Hoeksema denied the Covenant of Works, but he did not deny the imputation of the merit of Christ's active obedience. But Hoeksema then had to identify a covenant to which Christ was obedient in a meritorious way, and he said this was the Covenant of Redemption, involving Christ's humiliation in the incarnation.


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Sep 28, 2006)

> My opinion is that Adam was not only created righteous, but with a positive inclination to obey God in all particulars. However, to inherit eternal heavenly life, he would need the imputed righteousness of Christ.



This is straight out of the WCF, which states in Chapter VI, *"By this sin they fell from their original righteousness and communion with God..."*.


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## py3ak (Sep 28, 2006)

Gabriel, I think the second sentence of the fragment you quote is what Mr. Wilder thinks is a bit strange.


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## nominalist747 (Oct 11, 2006)

It seems to me that Doug is pretty close in substance to Turretin:

"...God so stipulated [the cov't of nature] that man--by the powers received in creation--could perform it, although in order that he might actually perform it, he still needed the help of God both to actuate these powers and to preserve them from change." (IET, 8.3.14) Thus, Adam would still have owed thanks to God for His actuating and preserving of Adam's created powers.

"But with respect to God, it [the cov't of nature] was gratuitous, as depending upon a pact or gratuitous promise (by which God was not bound to man, but to himself and to his own goodness, fidelity, and truth, Rom. 3:3, 2 Tim. 2:13). Therefore there was no debt (properly so called) from which man could derive a right, but only a debt of fidelity, arising out of the promise by which God demonstrated his infallible and immutable constancy and truth...If therefore upright man in that state had obtained this merit, it must not be understood properly and rigorously. Since man has all things from and owes all to God, he can seek from him nothing as his own by right, nor can God be a debtor to him--not by condignity of work and from its intrinsic value...but from the pact and the liberal promise of God...and in comparison with the covenant of grace...However, this demanded antecedently a proper and personal obedience by which he obtained both his own justification and life..." (IET, 8.3.16-17) 

Let me observe that FT seems to be very careful to use every term besides "grace" (although I haven't access to the original Latin--can anyone check the Latin terms for me?): gratuitous pact, promise. Still, he seems to be close in substance to Wilson here, especially with the striking comparison to the covenant of grace! I've left out the parenthetical comments in the interests of space, but it seems that the comparison is that in both the cov't of nature and the cov't of grace, man could only gain because of the action of God (NB: in 12.2.5, FT refers to the CoG as "a gratuitous pact," a very similar phrase to the CoW). So, FT would seem also to deny "raw merit."

I really could wish that Wilson would accept the CoW terminology in at least a qualified way, but it seems that in substance he is quite close to Turretin's expressions regarding the fundamentally, shall we say, gratuitous nature of the cov't with Adam.


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## py3ak (Oct 11, 2006)

Nominalist, does Turretin use the covenant of works language?


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## nominalist747 (Oct 12, 2006)

Yes, very extensively, in the Twelfth Topic, and it's a fantastic discussion, distinguishing between the CoG and CoW in a variety of subtle and elegant ways. I just wanted to highlight the fact that FT make some pretty strong statements on the promissory and gratuitous nature of the CoW, which Wilson's line about Adam giving thanks to God for fulfilling the stipulations of his covenant reminded me of. As I said, I do wish Wilson would accept the CoW language, even if he wishes to qualify it in the same way that FT does. But Wilson seems to distinguish the cov't of creation, as he wants to call it, from the CoG by the following:

-The parties of the latter are God and sinful mankind, while in the former, they are God and righteous Adam.
-The Mediator in the latter, which was not needed in the former.
-The benefits of the latter include pardon from sins and life, while the former was simply life.

All of these are among the key distinctions that Turretin makes. Taking the earlier statement alone could make us raise our eyebrows, but things are cleared up later, and I find much the same thing to be the case with Wilson (although I still really wish he would accept the CoW terminology, even in a qualified sense!).


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## py3ak (Oct 12, 2006)

Where would Turretin stand on the issue of merit?


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## BobVigneault (Oct 12, 2006)

Turretin would say,



> "To be true merit, then, these five conditions are demanded: (1) that the "work be undue"--for no one merits by paying what he owes (Luke 17.10), he only satisfies; (2) that it be ours-for no one can be said to merit from another; (3) that it be absolutely perfect and free from all taint-for where sin is there merit cannot be; (4) that it be equal and proportioned to the reward and pay; otherwise it would be a gift, not merit. (5) that the reward be due to such a work from justice-whence an "undue work" is commonly defined to be one that "makes a reward due in the order of justice." (Institutes 17.5.4)




and




> "Adam himself, if he had persevered, would not have merited life in strict justice, although (through a certain condescension) God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense...)" (Institutes 17.5.7)





[Edited on 10-12-2006 by BobVigneault]


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## Arch2k (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by BobVigneault_
> Turretin would say,
> 
> 
> > "Adam himself, if he had persevered, would not have merited life in strict justice, although (through a certain condescension) God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense...)" (Institutes 17.5.7)



I'm not sure that I understand what Turretin is getting at in this quote. Have any ideas?


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## tewilder (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by BobVigneault_
> Turretin would say,
> 
> 
> ...



One must understand Scholastic terminology. Terms were used in a "proper" sense and in an extended sense.

For Turretin, the proper sense of "merit" was natural, non-covenantal merit, what Adam could do _qua_ man, apart from the covenant. Merit arising from keeping the terms of the covenant was not "proper" merit, but an analogous or extended usage of the term. 

There is nothing that man can do that by natural law would deserve what God promised in the covenant. Hence it is not "proper" merit. It is interesting to see how many people like Turretin's denial of "proper" merit and yet who are also Van Tillians who do not like the natural law basis of the distinction in other matters.


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## tewilder (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by BobVigneault_
> ...



"Strict justice" correlates to "proper merit". That is, the actions that Adam was called upon to do would naturally (by natural law) be in proportion to the promise offered. 

Now Kline says it would be strict justice. Why? Because Kline does not begin with natural law and the associated idea of "proper merit" etc. constructed in terms of natural law concepts. 

Now if you don't believe in natural law, how do you deal with ideas such as "to deserve"? What would Adam have deserved, if there is not a law of nature dictating a proportion between actions and rewards? 

A divine command ethics theorist would say that "deserve" does not opperate until there are commands and conditions from God, i.e. covenant and things similar to covenants. Therefore, to a divine command theorist there is not any merit until there is a covenant, and then the covenant says what it is to merit. 

For a divine command ethicist it is not that, outside the covenant, Adam's actions would be un-deserving of the reward, but that there would be no criteria to give meaning to "deserve". 

Someone with some other ethical theoery would have to put forward the theory and then explain what it is to "deserve" in terms of that theory.

What the Federal Vision people do is that they become natural law theorists just long enough to attack the Covenant of Works, insisting that it is not compatible with merit (in the Scholastic sense of "proper merit") and then they go back to being Van Tillians.

[Edited on 10-12-2006 by tewilder]


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## VanVos (Oct 12, 2006)

Of course it will come as no surprise for those who know me, but I agree with Kline. We need to speak of the Covenant of Works as a matter of strict justice, this will safe guard us from blurring the law-gospel distinction of scripture. The CoW has to be sharply defined in antithesis to the Covenant of Grace. Maybe I'm being too simplistic, but I do believe that Kline's position best reflect the unified simplistic nature of God.

VanVos


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## MW (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by VanVos_
> Maybe I'm being too simplistic, but I do believe that Kline's position best reflect the unified simplistic nature of God.



Aren't you over-simplifying the nature of God, by binding a single attribute to a single dispensation of God? Reformed theology teaches that God's justice was satisfied under the covenant of grace. Hence there is no dilemma created by saying that God's grace was magnified in the covenant of works.


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## VanVos (Oct 12, 2006)

I don't think I'm binding a single attribute to a single dispensation of God, I'm saying that grace seen in a legal covenant sense is absent from the Covenant of works. I don't see how it's helpful to speak of Covenant works as the magnification of God's grace. But I also know that it can be semantics and not necessarily a disagreement. I'm just arguing that we should be over obvious in our terms and language when discussing this issue.


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## MW (Oct 12, 2006)

Then I must confess, I don't understand your claim as to the unified simplistic nature of God.


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## VanVos (Oct 12, 2006)

I mean God is a unified simple being and His creation, including his covenants, should reflect this. That is we should not expect to find contrary principles in the makeup of the covenants of scripture. So to speak of the Covenant of works as a blend of grace and works is to arguably cast a shadow on God's unity and simplicity.

VanVos

[Edited on 10-12-2006 by VanVos]


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## MW (Oct 12, 2006)

I see the problem. In that case, we are not actually blending works and grace in the prelapsarian covenant. For we are saying there is a sense in which it is of grace, that is, so far as disposition is concerned; but there is another sense in which it is of works, that is, so far as dispensation is concerned. Your interest is in preserving the dispensation, and calling it altogether of works. That is not denied. Adam only could have obtained the promise by personal, perfect, and perpetual obedience. This does not negate the fact, however, that the promise itself was altogether of grace. And so far as his posterity are concerned, it would have been grace to them both in disposition and dispensation, since the reward was not of their working, but of their father's.


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## VanVos (Oct 12, 2006)

I think I agree. The only query I have is your last comment about the reward being of grace. If you mean by this that it would have been a supernatural of God in glorifying humanity then I agree, but I would add that it would have been based upon the merited active obedience of Adam. The reward would have been commensurate and proportionate to his work as the image of God.

VanVos

[Edited on 10-12-2006 by VanVos]


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## MW (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by VanVos_
> I think I agree. The only query I have is your last comment about the reward being of grace. If you mean by this that it would have been a supernatural of God in glorifying humanity then I agree, but I would add that it would have been based upon the merited active obedience of Adam. The reward would have been commensurate and proportionate to his work as the image of God.



Here is the problem with "merit," because the language of congruity and condignity is brought into it, as when you use the words "commensurate" and "proportionate." This is the very idea the older divines were avoiding by removing the word "merit" from their vocabulary.

The problem arises from an over-working of the two Adam structure of Paul's thought. One starts by saying Christ merited life for the elect, therefore Adam was to merit life for his posterity. But the parallel fails to account for the differences which Paul himself announces. The first Adam was of the earth, earthy, the second Adam was the Lord from heaven. To say that Adam was to merit life in a manner parallel to Christ meriting life is to deny one of the foundations of the Christian faith -- that life comes to us through Christ as God-man. See Larger Catechism, answer 38, on why it was requisite that the Mediator should be God.


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## tewilder (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by armourbearer_
> 
> Here is the problem with "merit," because the language of congruity and condignity is brought into it, as when you use the words "commensurate" and "proportionate." This is the very idea the older divines were avoiding by removing the word "merit" from their vocabulary.
> 
> The problem arises from an over-working of the two Adam structure of Paul's thought. One starts by saying Christ merited life for the elect, therefore Adam was to merit life for his posterity. But the parallel fails to account for the differences which Paul himself announces. The first Adam was of the earth, earthy, the second Adam was the Lord from heaven. To say that Adam was to merit life in a manner parallel to Christ meriting life is to deny one of the foundations of the Christian faith -- that life comes to us through Christ as God-man. See Larger Catechism, answer 38, on why it was requisite that the Mediator should be God.



This is the correct perception of the problem but the wrong solution.

If it is essential that the life of the sort that comes through Christ could only come through Christ in the incarnation, then the correction would _not_ be that that life came through a covenant of Works with Adam in which grace and works are mixed. That would be a contradiction. 

If it is true that what we receive could not have come through Adam (that is, had to come though Christ), then the correct solution is to say that the promise in the Covenant of Grace is greater than that which was in the Covenant of Works. 

At this point, there is a fork in the road. One branch is _felix culpa_ and the other is that the incanation and a greater covenant head would have come anyway without the Fall.


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## MW (Oct 12, 2006)

All we have done then is arrived at the proposition with which Rutherford begins his great work on covenant theology -- that Adam was always going to fail to obtain what was promised as a figure of the one to come. And when you say that the covenant of works was mixed, this is an incorrect stating of the case, because it was clarified above that the dispensation was wholly of works.


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## ChristianTrader (Oct 12, 2006)

> _Originally posted by armourbearer_
> All we have done then is arrived at the proposition with which Rutherford begins his great work on covenant theology -- that Adam was always going to fail to obtain what was promised as a figure of the one to come. And when you say that the covenant of works was mixed, this is an incorrect stating of the case, because it was clarified above that the dispensation was wholly of works.



Which great work by Rutherford do you speak of?

CT


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## MW (Oct 12, 2006)

That's the Covenant of Life Opened. Consider this example of his thinking from chapter 2:



> But if we speak of such a life, to wit, of a heavenly communion with God, as Adam was a comprehensor, or one who is supposed now to have run well, and won the gold, and the crown, such a life was due to Adam, not by nature, but by promise.
> Adam in his first state was not predestinated to a law glory, and to influences of God to carry him on to persevere. Nor could he bless God, that he was chosen before the foundation of the world to be Law-holy, as Eph. 1:3. What? Was not then Adam predestinated to life eternal, through Jesus Christ? He was, But not as a public person representing all his sons, but as another single person, as Abraham, or Jacob; for Gospel predestination is not of the nature, but of this or that person. Therefore were we not predestinated to life eternal in him, but in Christ, Rom. 8:29, 30.
> Therefore Adam fell from the state of Law-life both totally and finally, but not from the state of Gospel election to glory. For the Lord had in the Law-dispensation a love design, to set up a theatre and stage of free grace; and that the way of works should be a time-dispensation, like a summer-house to be demolished again. As if the Lord had an aim that works and nature should be a transient, but no standing court for righteousness. Hence it is now the relics of an old standing court, and the Law is a day of assize, for condemning of malefactors, who will acknowledge no tribunal of grace, but only of works. And it is a just court to terrify robbers, to awe borderers and loose men, but to believers it is now a court for a far other end.


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## py3ak (Oct 13, 2006)

Mr. Winzer,

What would the disanalogy be between Adam's inheriting of life for his posterity (had he kept the terms of the Covenant of Works) and Christ's obtaining life for all who are in Him, apart from the obvious point that Christ had to overcome demerit?


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## MW (Oct 13, 2006)

Ruben,

I raised it because it suggests we cannot conclude Adam merited the reward simply because Christ merited the reward. The infinite merit of Christ's righteousness results from the fact that He offered it upon the altar of His divine nature, and it is the altar which gives value to the gift. Adam had no such altar upon which to offer his obedience.

[Edited on 10-13-2006 by armourbearer]


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## py3ak (Oct 13, 2006)

OK, Mr. Winzer, I think I understand that. But when you state it like that, it does make me wonder if you take a _felix culpa_ view or an incarnation without sin view.
It doesn't sound like you deny that Adam would have obtained life for his posterity if he had kept the terms of the covenant of works, but I am not sure how if he had, this statement you made earlier could be true: 


> To say that Adam was to merit life in a manner parallel to Christ meriting life is to deny one of the foundations of the Christian faith -- that life comes to us through Christ as God-man.


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## MW (Oct 13, 2006)

Sorry Ruben, I thought my Christological supralapsarianism was understood from other threads. Yes, Adam was always a figure of the one to come. His sin has the happiness of antithetically typifying Christ's righteousness.

[Edited on 10-13-2006 by armourbearer]


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## py3ak (Oct 13, 2006)

It may well be; I have not read all the other threads, I am afraid. Thank you for clarifying, Mr. Winzer.


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## tewilder (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by armourbearer_
> Sorry Ruben, I thought my Christological supralapsarianism was understood from other threads. Yes, Adam was always a figure of the one to come. His sin has the happiness of antithetically typifying Christ's righteousness.
> 
> [Edited on 10-13-2006 by armourbearer]



Would you say that Adam's works are also typological, and that the reason you think they are without merit, is that they are only the shadows and types of the real works to come?


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## Arch2k (Oct 13, 2006)

I guess I am looking at merit from an economical (capitalistic) point of view.

Who is to decide how much something is worth? Do things have an instrinsic value to them, or is it merely what a person is willing to pay for it?

A real life example:
Person A is hired to dig ditches at $10/hr. Person B is hire to dig the same ditch at $20/hr. What is it worth for the ditches to be dug? It is obviously different. Both could be said to merit their wage. *But it is the agreed upon amount that determines the worth of the job.*

If "eternal life" (as seen under the CoW) has an instrinsic value, then I can see that to some degree, the reward must have been partly of grace. If however, God in his covenant determined that eternal life was worth the act of refraining from the forbidden fruit, then an equal barder was agreed upon (or imposed upon Adam by a sovereign God).

I am not trying to demean the value of eternal life, but trying to think of this in terms of economics. If things have an intrinsic value, how does one determine what that value is? The capitalistic system says "whatever one is willing to pay for it." 

I realize that the issue become vastly more complicated when one is dealing with contracts between man and God vs. man and man, but it seems to me that the use of the term covenant retains its definition for both cases.

Any thoughts or resources to point me to?


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## VanVos (Oct 13, 2006)

I would refer all to this article for my position on this issue http://www.upper-register.com/ct_gospel/several_quick.html

Concerning the necessity of God-man for salvation I would whole heartily affirm. But Adam was at one time without the need of redemption under the covenant of works.

VanVos


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## tewilder (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> I guess I am looking at merit from an economical (capitalistic) point of view.
> 
> Who is to decide how much something is worth? Do things have an instrinsic value to them, or is it merely what a person is willing to pay for it?
> ...



_Sic et non._

God created the world with a proportionality to it between things and values, but it is _not_ the case that the proportionality is the cause of the value. 

Now, does the intrusion of grace restore the proportionality or blow it sky high? There is a point where you end up with speculative arguments drawn from hidden, unexamined assumptions.


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## Arch2k (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by tewilder_
> God created the world with a proportionality to it between things and values, but it is _not_ the case that the proportionality is the cause of the value.



Do you know of anything that proves this assumption? It seems to me that if this is the case, God would have revealed these proportions, or at least a method of deriving them.


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## tewilder (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by tewilder_
> ...



The best way to demonstrate this, though not prove it, is to punish you severely for a minor infraction. Then you would join the forefront of those claiming proportionality had been violated.


[Edited on 10-13-2006 by tewilder]


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## py3ak (Oct 13, 2006)

> The best way to demonstrate this, though not prove it, is to punish you severely for a minor infraction. They you would join the forefront of those claiming proportionality had be violated.



Oh, that sounds good. Jeff, any minor infractions you'd care to put up for severe punishment? And if I may propose the punishment, with something a former co-worker always threated me with: "I'm going to scrape all your skin off with an apple peeler and dip you in bleach".


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## MW (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by tewilder_
> Would you say that Adam's works are also typological, and that the reason you think they are without merit, is that they are only the shadows and types of the real works to come?



Speaking about the hypothetical value of Adam's works is really only useful insofar as it gives us a better understanding of the apostle's dichotomy between faith and works as a distinct method of obtaining life (which itself suggests the works were an instrumental means, not a meritorious cause). As Rutherford notes, his law-condition was transient, so that there was no intention in God that Adam should ever actually keep the covenant of works; his eternal life depended solely upon the good pleasure of God which would be accomplished in Christ (as all consistent predestinarians, or supralapsarians, acknowledge).

So avoiding unwarranted speculation, I would have to say that because the earthly man was only a "type" of the Heavenly Man, he ipso facto did not come up to the measure of the Antitype. While there is a divinely appointed analogy between the two, the type always labours under creaturely imperfection -- that is, natural imperfection, when compared with the perfections of the One who is pre-figured. Hence, negatively, I think it is improper to conclude that Adam was required to merit life on the assumption that the second Adam had the capacity to merit by His obedience.


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## MW (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> Who is to decide how much something is worth? Do things have an instrinsic value to them, or is it merely what a person is willing to pay for it?



Matt. 20:14-16, "Take that thine is, and go thy way: I will give unto this last, even as unto thee. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil, because I am good? So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many be called, but few chosen."

It would be great to see a day when reformed theology reaffirms the Sovereign Freedom of God, and stops binding Him to some secondary nature, which intellectually is nothing more than a second God. God's nature is what He wills Himself to be. He is not bound by proportion; He created proportion.


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## Arch2k (Oct 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by armourbearer_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel_
> ...



This was surely not my intention. Perhaps my wording was not good. I assure you that I believe whatever God does is right.


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## Arch2k (Oct 13, 2006)

[


> _Originally posted by py3ak_
> 
> 
> > The best way to demonstrate this, though not prove it, is to punish you severely for a minor infraction. They you would join the forefront of those claiming proportionality had be violated.
> ...



I am still thinking through this. I agree with you that someone should not be punished severely for a minor infraction. The punishment must fit the crime. The reward must fit the work.


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## MW (Oct 13, 2006)

Jeff, I was only answering the question you posed, not insinuating that you held the opposite. Sorry if there was any misunderstanding.


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