# Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology - Turretin on the intellect and the will



## AlexanderHenderson1647 (Feb 15, 2013)

I wanted to share this quote (as I'm working my way through Hodge's "ST") as I was particularly encouraged and challenged by it. In fact, if you have a copy laying around and haven't read through it in a bit, reviewing his section on the doctrine of the Nature and Attributes of God in the section on His "Knowledge" and "Will," it is worth the reread (or read as the case may be.) In one particular place when He paraphrase Turretin's teaching, "...the object of the intellect is the true; the object of the will, the good." Few things have I read that have been as helpful in distinguishing these faculties of the soul in so excellent a way.

Sidenote: Part of the beauty of his layout of the section on the Nature and Attributes of God is that it is such a nice step up for children once they've learned the WSC as he patterns the entirety of Chapter V on Q/A 4.


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## irresistible_grace (Feb 15, 2013)

I'll have to crack open the binding on mine. It sounds like it is worth reading. So many books; so little time!
Thanks for posting.


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## SolaScriptura (Feb 15, 2013)

Thanks for the quote! I'll go read something of his.


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## RamistThomist (Feb 16, 2013)

It would be interesting to compare and contrast Hodge and Turretin on simplicity. I'm pretty sure that Turretin accepts the Scholastic model of simplicity whereas Hodge attacks it.


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## AlexanderHenderson1647 (Feb 16, 2013)

Cameronian said:


> It would be interesting to compare and contrast Hodge and Turretin on simplicity. I'm pretty sure that Turretin accepts the Scholastic model of simplicity whereas Hodge attacks it.



I believe you are right on that, but I don't have any reference to confirm it. Let me know if you find one.


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## RamistThomist (Feb 16, 2013)

AlexanderHenderson1647 said:


> Cameronian said:
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> 
> > It would be interesting to compare and contrast Hodge and Turretin on simplicity. I'm pretty sure that Turretin accepts the Scholastic model of simplicity whereas Hodge attacks it.
> ...



On my blog (Bayou Huguenot) I've documented Hodge's firm critique of Absolute DIvine SImplicity. I read most of Turretin's volume one this summer and he accepts it. I can find page numbers later. Basically if God's essence is so utterly simple that it is identical with any of his attributes, then it stands to reason, so Hodge argues, that God's attributes are all synonymous. Here's Leibniz' syllogism: if A = B and B = C, then A = C.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 16, 2013)

Cameronian said:


> AlexanderHenderson1647 said:
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> > Cameronian said:
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Offhand, I would say that it is important to remember that many intuitions (built from experience of a finite world) mess up when one starts to talk in terms of infinite. Next, would there be the same problem if we said, that all of God's attributes coinhere with each other?

CT


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## RamistThomist (Feb 17, 2013)

"Coinhere" is an excellent way to describe it, but I don't think that is how Hodge is reading the Schoolmen (and if I recall correctly, I want to say that Turretin is a Scotist on this point, but I could be wrong).


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## py3ak (Feb 17, 2013)

I'm not sure Turretin _et al_ would recognize that as a _critique_. Heppe cites Hottinger: 'The attributes are distinguished neither from the essence nor from each other but only by our conceiving.'
Muller cites Perkins: 'Therefore, whatsoever is in God is his essence, and all that he is, he is by essence. The saying of Augustine in his 6th book and 4th chapter of the Trinity, is fit to prove this: "In God" (saith he) "to be, and to be just, or mighty are all one: but in the mind of man, it is not all one to be, and to be mighty, or just...." '
And Leigh: 'God is absolutely simple; he is but one thing, and doth not consist of any parts; he hath no accidents; but himself, his essence, and attributes are all one thing, though by us diversely considered and understood.'


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## RamistThomist (Feb 17, 2013)

py3ak said:


> I'm not sure Turretin _et al_ would recognize that as a _critique_. Heppe cites Hottinger: 'The attributes are distinguished neither from the essence nor from each other but only by our conceiving.'
> Muller cites Perkins: 'Therefore, whatsoever is in God is his essence, and all that he is, he is by essence. The saying of Augustine in his 6th book and 4th chapter of the Trinity, is fit to prove this: "In God" (saith he) "to be, and to be just, or mighty are all one: but in the mind of man, it is not all one to be, and to be mighty, or just...." '
> And Leigh: 'God is absolutely simple; he is but one thing, and doth not consist of any parts; he hath no accidents; but himself, his essence, and attributes are all one thing, though by us diversely considered and understood.'



You are correct in explaining Turretin's view.


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## AlexanderHenderson1647 (Feb 17, 2013)

Cameronian said:


> AlexanderHenderson1647 said:
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> > Cameronian said:
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Thanks. This is a great example of Hodges' thoughts:

"Knowledge and Power not to be confounded.
2. The possibility of knowledge in God is virtually denied by those who deny any distinction
between knowledge and power. Knowledge, which is power, ceases to be knowledge; and therefore
if omniscience is only a different name for omnipotence, it ceases to be a distinct attribute of God.

It makes little difference whether we expressly deny a given perfection to God, or whether we so
determine it as to make it mean nothing distinctive. It is deeply to be regretted that not only the
Fathers, but also the Lutheran and Reformed theologians, after renouncing the authority of the
schoolmen, almost immediately yielded themselves to their speculations. Instead of determining
the nature of the divine attributes from the representations of Scripture and from the constitution
of man as the image of God, and from the necessities of our moral and religious nature, they allowed
themselves to be controlled by à priori speculations as to the nature of the infinite and absolute.
Even Augustine, as before stated, says: “Nos ista, quæ fecisti videmus, quia sunt: tu autem quia
vides ea, sunt.” And Scotus Erigena says, “Voluntas illius et visio et essentia anum est.”. . . .
“Visio Dei totius universitatis est conditio. Non enim aliud est ei videre, aliud facere; sed visio
illius voluntas ejus est, et voluntas operatio.” Thomas Aquinas also says, “Deus per intellectum
suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est, quod sua scientia sit causa
rerum.” The Lutheran and Reformed theologians represent God as simplicissima simplicitas, admitting of
no distinction between faculty and act, or between one attribute and another. Thus Gerhard says:
“Deus est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum.” “Solus Deus summe simplex
est, ut nec actus et potentiæ, nec esse et essentiæ compositio ipsi competat.” “Essentia, bonitas,
potentia, sapientia, justitia, et reliqua attributa omnia sunt in Deo realiter unum.” He also says:
“In Deo idem est esse et intelligere et velle.” In like manner the Reformed theologian Heidegger
says: “Voluntas ab intellectu non differt, quia intelligendo vult et volendo intelligit. Intelligere et
velle ejus idemque perpetuus indivisus actus.” This does not mean simply that in an intelligent
being, every act of the will is an intelligent act. He knows while he wills, and knows what he wills.
The meaning is, that knowledge and power in God are identical. To know a thing is, and to will it,
are the same undivided and perpetual act. From this it would seem to follow, that as God knows
from eternity He creates from eternity; and that “all He knows, is.” We are thus led, by these
speculations, into pantheistical views of the nature of God and of his relation to the world.
This mode of representation is carried still further by the modern philosophical theologians. With
Schleiermacher, all the attributes of God are virtually merged into the idea of causality. With him
God is ens summum prima causa. He says that God’s thinking and willing are the same, and that
his omnipotence and omniscience are identical. When we say that He is omnipotent, we only mean
that He is the cause of all that is. And when we say that He is omniscient, we only mean that He is
an intelligent cause. His power and knowledge are limited to the actual. The possible is nothing; it
is the object neither of knowledge nor of power. “Gott,” says Schleiermacher, “weiss Alles was
ist; und Alles ist, was Gott weiss und dieses beides ist nicht zweierlei sondern einerlei, weil sein
Wissen und sein allmächtiges Wollen eines und dasselbe ist,” i.e., God knows all that is, and all is
that God knows. God, therefore, is limited to the world, which is the phenomenon of which He is
the substance...
The Doctrine of the Scriptures on this Subject.
The Scriptural view of this subject, which distinguishes the attributes in God as distinct, and assumes
that knowledge in Him, in its essential nature, is what knowledge is in us, does not conflict with
the unity and simplicity of God as a spiritual being. There is a sense in which knowledge and power,
intellect and will, may be said to be identical in man. They are not different substances. They are
different modes in which the life or activity of the soul manifests itself. So in God when we conceive
of Him as a spirit, we do not think of Him as a compound being, but as manifesting his infinite life
and activity, in knowing, willing, and doing. What, therefore, we must hold fast to, if we would
hold fast to God, is, that knowledge in God is knowledge, and not power or eternity..." Systematic Theology 301-303


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## RamistThomist (Feb 17, 2013)

Look at the problem another way: if all of the ideas in God's mind are identical, which they are given simplicity, then the idea to create the world is the same idea as to destroy the world! Dolezal goes so far to say, and I hope I am not taking him out of context, that God is identical, not only with his will, but with the _object of knowledge_ (Dolezal, xx, 166). This is the same move Plotinus and Origen made. 

Dolezal, God Without Parts


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## py3ak (Feb 17, 2013)

This is one area where I will side with Bavinck over Hodge. The whole section (_Reformed Dogmatics_, II.pp.118-137) will reward consideration, but a few highlights.



> Now Christian theology has always been more or less conscious of this calling [to honor equally all the attributes of God]. On the whole, its teaching has been that God is "simple," that is, sublimely free from all composition, and that therefore one cannot make any real [i.e., ontological] distinction between his being and his attributes. Each attribute is identical with God's being: he _is_ what he _possesses_. (p.118)
> ...
> C. Pesch also calls the attributes "qualities _superadded_ to the divine substance."
> Given such a view, one cannot do justice to the Christian idea that _all_ God's attributes are identical with his essence. (p.120)
> ...



As I understand Bavinck (who employs Augustine positively in explaining simplicity), his conclusion does not differ materially from what Heppe records -


> Hence, since every attribute is a manifestation of the same absolutely simple essentiality of God, it may justifiably be said (BRAUN, I, ii, 2, 19) that "God's righteousness is His goodness, is His knowledge, is His will; or His mercy is His righteousness, etc. But it would be wrong for me to say that the concept I have of the righteousness is the same concept which I have of the deity, mercy or eternity."



Does Hodge have any _evidence_ that what he says here actually takes place?


> In like manner the Reformed theologian Heidegger says: “Voluntas ab intellectu non differt, quia intelligendo vult et volendo intelligit. Intelligere et velle ejus idemque perpetuus indivisus actus.” This does not mean simply that in an intelligent being, every act of the will is an intelligent act. He knows while he wills, and knows what he wills.
> The meaning is, that knowledge and power in God are identical. To know a thing is, and to will it, are the same undivided and perpetual act. From this it would seem to follow, that as God knows from eternity He creates from eternity; and that “all He knows, is.” We are thus led, by these speculations, into pantheistical views of the nature of God and of his relation to the world.


Did Heidegger actually entertain pantheistical views of the nature of God and his relation to the world? I haven't read him, but it is not the impression one gets from the citations in Heppe's _Reformed Dogmatics_.



Cameronian said:


> Look at the problem another way: if all of the ideas in God's mind are identical, which they are given simplicity, then the idea to create the world is the same idea as to destroy the world! Dolezal goes so far to say, and I hope I am not taking him out of context, that God is identical, not only with his will, but with the _object of knowledge_ (Dolezal, xx, 166). This is the same move Plotinus and Origen made.
> 
> Dolezal, God Without Parts



I don't think this is accurate, though, Jacob, because many theologians have managed to affirm divine simplicity without maintaining that the ideas are identical. Let's turn to the opprobrious Heidegger on God's will:


> Although God wills all things in one most single actus, e.g., to create and to destroy the world, to save some and condemn others, etc., yet we conceive various acts of the divine will by our reason and distinguish them by our conception. He cannot, it is true, will a thing otherwise, i.e., by a different act. Yet by one and the same act of willing He may will differently: e.g., that events should be one way and another and so that different sets of things should exist.


God's will is not to be confused with what his will effects. God knows all things by his essence in one eternal act of knowledge; God wills all things that occur in his one singular decree. But God wills that one thing should be different from another.


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## AlexanderHenderson1647 (Feb 18, 2013)

py3ak said:


> This is one area where I will side with Bavinck over Hodge. The whole section (_Reformed Dogmatics_, II.pp.118-137) will reward consideration, but a few highlights.





> Now Christian theology has always been more or less conscious of this calling [to honor equally all the attributes of God]. On the whole, its teaching has been that God is "simple," that is, sublimely free from all composition, and that therefore one cannot make any real [i.e., ontological] distinction between his being and his attributes. Each attribute is identical with God's being: he _is_ what he _possesses_. (p.118)
> ...
> C. Pesch also calls the attributes "qualities _superadded_ to the divine substance."
> Given such a view, one cannot do justice to the Christian idea that _all_ God's attributes are identical with his essence. (p.120)
> ...





py3ak said:


> As I understand Bavinck (who employs Augustine positively in explaining simplicity), his conclusion does not differ materially from what Heppe records -





> Hence, since every attribute is a manifestation of the same absolutely simple essentiality of God, it may justifiably be said (BRAUN, I, ii, 2, 19) that "God's righteousness is His goodness, is His knowledge, is His will; or His mercy is His righteousness, etc. But it would be wrong for me to say that the concept I have of the righteousness is the same concept which I have of the deity, mercy or eternity."



Ho boy...Idk, Ruben, Hodge still tends to win the day with me. Mind you, it might be the lateness of the hour, the simplicity of my thinking, and the illness that's dogging me (a nasty cocktail when entertaining the merest of thoughts, to say NOTHING of getting down to the will of Almighty God!) Thanks to you, I'm due for some deeper research and thinking. Actually, I can't thank you for that :/



py3ak said:


> Does Hodge have any _evidence_ that what he says here actually takes place?
> 
> 
> > In like manner the Reformed theologian Heidegger says: “Voluntas ab intellectu non differt, quia intelligendo vult et volendo intelligit. Intelligere et velle ejus idemque perpetuus indivisus actus.” This does not mean simply that in an intelligent being, every act of the will is an intelligent act. He knows while he wills, and knows what he wills.
> ...


Hodge throws out more than one such unqualified claim (without any disparagement to his godliness or his scholarship, both of which are unimpeachable in terms of innocence - but it seems that he does this in more than one place leaving the reader to "take his word for it" and that may have warrant insofar as he was writing to a more scholarly audience that I qualify for or a historical context that would have easily called to mind well known positions of such theologians...or both/and.) I personally do not know, but that certainly owes in part to my sophomoric knowledge of theological history.


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## py3ak (Feb 18, 2013)

Yes, I noticed that. It actually highlights one of the reasons I like Bavinck so very well: he appreciates every theologian for what they did right, and seems capable of deriving profit from anyone (well, maybe not Socinians, but who could blame him for that?) - yet without being drawn into their errors. If nothing else, that seems to put Bavinck in a good position to accurately and fairly represent the views of others, because he's reading them appreciatively as well as critically.


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## RamistThomist (Feb 18, 2013)

py3ak said:


> This is one area where I will side with Bavinck over Hodge. The whole section (_Reformed Dogmatics_, II.pp.118-137) will reward consideration, but a few highlights.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



All sides affirm simplicity. That was never in any doubt. The point was _absolute_ divine simplicity where everything is identical with each other. Aquinas is very clear on this and that is what Hodge is rejecting.


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## RamistThomist (Feb 18, 2013)

One of the old criticisms of absolute simplicity was that it tended towards pantheism, since God's essence was identical to will was identical to objects of knowledge (pace Dolezal)



AlexanderHenderson1647 said:


> py3ak said:
> 
> 
> > This is one area where I will side with Bavinck over Hodge. The whole section (_Reformed Dogmatics_, II.pp.118-137) will reward consideration, but a few highlights.
> ...


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## AlexanderHenderson1647 (Feb 18, 2013)

Cameronian said:


> One of the old criticisms of absolute simplicity was that it tended towards pantheism, since God's essence was identical to will was identical to objects of knowledge (pace Dolezal)



That was what I wondered and suspected. Personally, that really rings true.


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## py3ak (Feb 18, 2013)

Thanks for clarifying, Jacob. "Given divine simplicity" sounded rather sweeping. I would be interested in seeing an old source where that old criticism was offered. It seems the discussion of simplicity is somewhat hampered by a failure to distinguish things that differ, ironically enough. If God knows all things by his essence, then God is identical with his knowledge - but that does not and should not be taken to mean that therefore God is identical with the creation.
The language of "absolute" is used in more than one way - see Muller's discussion of this. Do you see a difference between Bavinck and Hodge? Bavinck appears to have thought there was, given his inclusion of Hodge in a footnote.


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