# Is classical apologetics Pelagian at root?



## Confessor

When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.

Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.

What do you all think?


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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.
> 
> Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.
> 
> What do you all think?


 
I think you are wrong  

If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.

Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.

CT


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## sastark

ChristianTrader said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.
> 
> Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.
> 
> What do you all think?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think you are wrong
> 
> If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.
> 
> Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


Of course, the difference between a Christian presupposing the Bible to be true, as opposed to, say, a Muslim presupposing the Qur'an to be true is that *the Bible is actually true*.

My question to Ben would be: What role does the Holy Spirit play in apologetics? Have you thought about that question? It will dramatically effect everything else related to this field.


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## awretchsavedbygrace




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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> I think you are wrong
> 
> If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.
> 
> Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.
> 
> CT



Thank you for your honesty. 

I dispute that it would be a rejection of general revelation, and frankly I don't mind rejecting natural theology (I assume you mean in the Thomistic tradition). I would rather contend that presuppositionalism is a rejection of the idea that man's interpretation of reality is for the most part permissible, i.e., that it does not need to first submit to God's interpretation of reality (God says that we are totally depraved, etc.). So, presuppositionalism would be a rejection of general revelation only if we presuppose that man can in fact correctly understand general revelation, which should be denied given the terrible misinterpretations of general revelation by unbelievers, e.g. evolutionism.

If some other religion tried the same thing, I would test their foundations, analyzing the coherency of the worldview set forth. Therefore I would in fact use logic, as you suggested. But using logic doesn't equate an acceptance of classical apologetics.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 04:23:56 EST-----



sastark said:


> My question to Ben would be: What role does the Holy Spirit play in apologetics? Have you thought about that question? It will dramatically effect everything else related to this field.



As regards this thread, I would say that the (or rather, a) role the Holy Spirit plays in apologetics is in transforming the unbeliever, who used to believe in man's authoritative interpretation of reality (autonomy), to a believer who now believes in the preeminence of God's authoritative interpretation of reality (theonomy/Scripture).

That is, the change from autonomy to theonomy is wrought by the Holy Spirit. That is His role.


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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I think you are wrong
> 
> If what you put forward as the presuppositional system was correct, then at its core would be a rejection of general revelation/natural theology. And that position cannot be sustained from the Bible itself or just basic analytical thought.
> 
> Also if some other religion tried the same thing, you would cry foul, or just attempt to blow it apart using something more basic: logic etc.
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you for your honesty.
> 
> I dispute that it would be a rejection of general revelation, and frankly I don't mind rejecting natural theology (I assume you mean in the Thomistic tradition). I would rather contend that presuppositionalism is a rejection of the idea that man's interpretation of reality is for the most part permissible, i.e., that it does not need to first submit to God's interpretation of reality (God says that we are totally depraved, etc.). So, presuppositionalism would be a rejection of general revelation only if we presuppose that man can in fact correctly understand general revelation, which should be denied given the terrible misinterpretations of general revelation by unbelievers, e.g. evolutionism.
Click to expand...


But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.

Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation.



> If some other religion tried the same thing, I would test their foundations, analyzing the coherency of the worldview set forth. Therefore I would in fact use logic, as you suggested. But using logic doesn't equate an acceptance of classical apologetics.



Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.



This is a good point. I should have clarified that this a _moral_ inability and not a natural one. That is, man when left to his own devices will purposely distort and misinterpret reality from how he knows it should be interpreted.



ChristianTrader said:


> Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation.



And, just as they are culpable for their bad interpretations of special revelation, so others can be culpable for their bad interpretations of general revelation. Nonetheless, special revelation provides the necessary basis for a correct interpretation.



ChristianTrader said:


> Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.



Well, I think you might be equivocating on "standard." Logic/coherence/internal consistency/etc. cannot be seen as some type of foundation or basis, but rather as a tool.

And yes, people would be allowed to test the foundations when I assert the veracity of Christianity. But this does not mean that they should not accept the Gospel message immediately.


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## CharlieJ

ChristianTrader said:


> Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.



Quite right. Would I be correct in assuming, then, that you either reject foundationalism or embrace a very weak view of it?


By the way, Ben, Thomas Aquinas never appealed to any kind of autonomous reason to prove Christianity. His Five Ways are better regarded as _a posteriori_ demonstrations of the coherence of Christian theology with the natural world. In that framework, they serve rather nicely.

For a study on how Cartesian Christians reworked earlier apologetics into a form of "evidentialism," I would recommend Alister McGrath's _A Scientific Theology_, Volume 1.


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## steven-nemes

Does presenting a logical argument for the existence of a timeless, immaterial, powerful causer of the universe assume that a person and their reasoning faculties, etc., are unaffected by sin?

I fail to see where...


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## Confessor

CharlieJ said:


> By the way, Ben, Thomas Aquinas never appealed to any kind of autonomous reason to prove Christianity. His Five Ways are better regarded as _a posteriori_ demonstrations of the coherence of Christian theology with the natural world. In that framework, they serve rather nicely.



Thomas did have some things to say about the importance and validity of accepting Biblical statements on faith, but all of this was ultimately based on some evidentialism: fulfilled prophecy, evidence of miracles, and, of course, the Five Ways.

And frankly, if the Five Ways were used only to demonstrate that Christianity is consistent with certain facts of the world, I don't care at all. But classical apologetics always utilizes them in a sense that they try to _prove_ from the ground up Christian doctrine.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 05:13:40 EST-----



steven-nemes said:


> Does presenting a logical argument for the existence of a timeless, immaterial, powerful causer of the universe assume that a person and their reasoning faculties, etc., are unaffected by sin?
> 
> I fail to see where...



Such a proof, assuming it is logically cogent, would tell us nothing of the authority of the Scriptures and its role in telling us how things are. Such a proof would basically say, "Now, upon looking around the world, we have established that a timeless etc. first cause exists; go on living your lives," without pointing to the need of repenting and believing.

In retrospect, I should also have pointed out that I believe the autonomy of secular philosophy in general presupposes Pelagianism, and since some of this Enlightenment thinking is maintained by classical apologists, they also retain some latent Pelagianism.


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## steven-nemes

> Such a proof, assuming it is logically cogent, would tell us nothing of the authority of the Scriptures and its role in telling us how things are. Such a proof would basically say, "Now, upon looking around the world, we have established that a timeless etc. first cause exists; go on living your lives," without pointing to the need of repenting and believing.



Let's say natural theologian X is attending a debate or having a discussion with an atheist. Is it necessary for him to even bring up the importance of repentance, etc? I should think not; the question is firstly where there is even a god to obey; the question of repentance from sin and such seems irrelevent.


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## chbrooking

On the OP, 

Yes, it is semi-pelagian in method or approach. 

CT,

Three quick points:

Men are rendered "without excuse" because the suppress the truth in unrighteousness. The fall affected the whole of man. It is not because the evidence isn't there. God has manifested his attributes in them and to them. But the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; indeed, it cannot. And the natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned.

Secondly, our point of contact is that we both live in God's world, not that we agree on anything whatsoever. Any non-Christian view of the world will either be internally inconsistent or externally inapplicable. I wouldn't cry foul. I'd point out their inconsistency to the best of my ability, and show them that the Christian worldview accounts for the world as it is.

Thirdly, if you reject a presuppositional approach, how will you move from a 'god' who is subject to human reason to the God of the scriptures who grounds it? Once you bring 'god' before the bar of human reason -- to determine whether or not he is possible or probable, you have already given up your case for the God of the scriptures.


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## Archlute

I see the evangelists (speaking of the Gospel writers) and the apostles using classical apologetics in places, so....


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## rbcbob

"But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.

Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation."

General revelation is non-propositional and does not require 'interpretation' _per se_. If you encounter a german sentence, say _Ich bin_ you would not be confronted with the duty of affirming or denying it, unless you understood its propositional content. But you would come away with the awareness that some intelligent being had been at work.


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## Confessor

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> But if man cannot properly interpret general revelation, then why does the Bible say that it leaves man without excuse. If I cannot make sense of something written in German, no one would say that I am without excuse.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is a good point. I should have clarified that this a _moral_ inability and not a natural one. That is, man when left to his own devices will purposely distort and misinterpret reality from how he knows it should be interpreted.
Click to expand...


I want to clarify this. First, it is obvious that people who have not heard the Gospel have no ability at all to understand the world in Christian terms, for instance, Aristotle. For people such as he, they are still without excuse because there is a Creator-Judge who will punish their sins, and they know it, per Romans 1; but they are not punished for (e.g.) denying Total Depravity, because it was completely outside of their power to do so. But for someone who _has_ heard the Gospel, e.g. an unbelieving American philosopher, he is even more culpable for constructing a philosophy contrary to the Gospel of Christ.

Therefore, everybody is certainly unable, in a sense that would remove moral responsibility, to construct a Biblical philosophy and worldview -- if they have not heard the Gospel. But yet, everyone is still without excuse because general revelation clearly attests to God _qua_ Creator-Judge.

However, what I was saying is that any proofs of a Creator-Judge (e.g. the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God) necessarily fall short of bringing people to repentance. And if apologetics is incapable of that, then it is failing in its purpose of silencing the unbeliever. Such apologetics would tell the unbeliever that he is generally right in his worldview, because honestly those arguments prove next to nothing. (E.g. a secular humanist can view man as the "divine" Lawgiver and matter itself as the First Cause.)

Lastly, to get to the point -- that man is unable to interpret reality rightly -- to what I am referring is that humans, even when we have the Bible in our possession, which contains a complete world-and-life-view, we still have a rebellious tendency to prefer to interpret life according to our own limited perspective. This is both sinful (because it neglects God's Word) and stupid (because such a method cannot interpret reality correctly). And, as I said in the OP, it is Pelagian, for it believes that man is _capable_ of interpreting reality correctly, objectively, without sinful bias.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 06:34:09 EST-----



steven-nemes said:


> Let's say natural theologian X is attending a debate or having a discussion with an atheist. Is it necessary for him to even bring up the importance of repentance, etc? I should think not; the question is firstly where there is even a god to obey; the question of repentance from sin and such seems irrelevent.



Well, in this case, the apologist is trying to use a piecemeal method wherein the apologist's ultimate goal (I hope) is that the atheist see the error of his ways and repent. And in doing so, the apologist will never arrive near his destination, because such a method cannot prove Biblical authority. Instead, whatever he proves will easily be interpreted within the context of the unbeliever's worldview and push him to continue in his unbelief -- because he is generally fit to interpret the world as he desires, i.e. Pelagianism.

In other words, inasmuch as apologetics is a battle between two completely opposing worldviews and not an innocent "let's see where the facts lead" approach, _*yes*_, repentance is very relevant.


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## Archlute

I was serious with my little post above, but it always seems that crickets enter the room whenever that statement is presented.

There is room both for a presuppositional and a classical approach at different times. They do not have to be exclusive of each other, but far, far too often, Van Til lovers try and throw down the gauntlet (as was done in a round about manner in the OP) by attempting to gain some sort of moral high-ground in discrediting the theology behind other approaches. This is foolish.

If you thoughtfully read Luke-Acts in light of their opening statements you will see that both of those writings are basically one big evidentialist approach per - Luke in producing an extended account for the evidence of Christ's deity and work, and Acts in producing an furtherance of that account that also incorporates the validation of the works of the Holy Spirit. 

As well, the opening of 1 John uses evidentialist techniques in that they don't just say "thus sayeth the Lord!", but bring personal and eyewitness materials to bear regarding the authentication of that message.

It is really unhelpful to try and pit either against the other (and I use both) as if there is some sort of theological deficiency underlying our Christian brothers who may engage in a method different from our own. And although I greatly respect much about Van Til and his method, it too often seems that the greatest sinners in that regard are from the presuppositional exclusivist camp.

My


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## Confessor

Archlute said:


> I was serious with my little post above, but it always seems that crickets enter the room whenever that statement is presented.
> 
> There is room both for a presuppositional and a classical approach at different times. They do not have to be exclusive of each other, but far, far too often, Van Til lovers try and throw down the gauntlet (as was done in a round about manner in the OP) by attempting to gain some sort of moral high-ground in discrediting the theology behind other approaches. This is foolish.
> 
> If you thoughtfully read Luke-Acts in light of their opening statements you will see that both of those writings are basically one big evidentialist approach per - Luke in producing an extended account for the evidence of Christ's deity and work, and Acts in producing an furtherance of that account that also incorporates the validation of the works of the Holy Spirit.
> 
> As well, the opening of 1 John uses evidentialist techniques in that they don't just say "thus sayeth the Lord!", but bring personal and eyewitness materials to bear regarding the authentication of that message.
> 
> It is really unhelpful to try and pit either against the other (and I use both) as if there is some sort of theological deficiency underlying our Christian brothers who may engage in a method different from our own. And although I greatly respect much about Van Til and his method, it too often seems that the greatest sinners in that regard are from the presuppositional exclusivist camp.
> 
> My



I think some of this thought of apologetical pluralism stems somewhat from a desire for unity more than a concise understanding of terms.

Presuppositionalists do not eschew evidences. But we do eschew evidences that claim to prove God from a neutral framework, "from the ground up," piecemeal. I would contend that presuppositionalism puts evidence in its proper perspective.

So, if you would, please instantiate the verses where a classical apologetic is utilized, and I can show you what I mean or be rebuked.

Also -- and this is extremely important -- the fact that the Gospels describe a time _prior to the close of the canon_ is immensely significant. I will elaborate on this when I reply to whatever verses you provide.


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## Confessor

Joshua said:


> Would Van Til's dialog between Mr. Black, Mr. Grey, and Mr. White be applicable here?



It would be extremely applicable, especially Mr. Black's reaction to Mr. Grey's evidences for the resurrection.


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## mgeoffriau

If it's a moral inability and not a natural inability, then what is the purpose of describing it as sin's effect upon reasoning rather than describing it as sin's effect upon the will which wields reasoning to its own desires?

In other words, when my hands do evil things, I don't see the need to claim that sin has actually tainted my fingers and palms and nails. The actions of my hands are bound to my will, and therefore I commit sinful acts with my hands because my will is sinful. Why complicate the issue simply because we are talking about mental actions rather than physical actions? My will is sinful; therefore, it wields my ability to reason in a sinful way and perverts my natural ability to do good through my reasoning, just as my sinful will perverts my natural ability to do good with my hands.

Otherwise, I don't see how one can avoid the necessity of claiming that ALL natural capacities are individually perverted and tainted by sin, rather than the much simpler view that the will is sinful and wields those natural capacities to accomplish its sinful desires.


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## Semper Fidelis

Classical Apologetics might be said to be Semi-Pelagian if they assert that man, in his fallen condition, can be fruitful in his knowledge of the Creator from the things created.

Reformed theology maintains that the light of nature leaves men without excuse for worshipping God as He is revealed from Creation. Nevertheless, even as the Scriptures are explicitly that men are universally without excuse because the heavens and the earth declare the majesty of God but they also, without exception, suppress that knowledge and gain no fruition from it.

Notice how Aquinas essentially asserts that man, with unaided human reason, can attain to a great deal of knowledge and that Scripture only fills in the gaps with respect to things concerning salvation. I believe he underestimates the extent of the Fall on human reason:


> Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.
> 
> Objection 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science---even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.
> 
> On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.
> 
> I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.



Calvin writes in Book 1, Chapter 4


> Section 1. The knowledge of God suppressed by ignorance, many falling away into superstition. Such persons, however, inexcusable, because their error is accompanied with pride and stubbornness.
> 
> But though experience testifies that a seed of religion is divinely sown in all, scarcely one in a hundred is found who cherishes it in his heart, and not one in whom it grows to maturity so far is it from yielding fruit in its season. Moreover, while some lose themselves in superstitious observances, and others, of set purpose, wickedly revolt from God, the result is, that, in reward to the true knowledge of him, all are so degenerate, that in no part of the world can genuine godliness be found. In saying that some fall away into superstition, I mean not to insinuate that their excessive absurdity frees them from guilt; for the blindness under which they labour is almost invariably accompanied with vain pride and stubbornness. Mingled vanity and pride appear in this, that when miserable men do seek after God, instead of ascending higher than themselves as they ought to do, they measure him by their own carnal stupidity, and neglecting solid inquiry, fly off to indulge their curiosity in vain speculation. Hence, they do not conceive of him in the character in which he is manifested, but imagine him to be whatever their own rashness has devised. This abyss standing open, they cannot move one footstep without rushing headlong to destruction. With such an idea of God, nothing which they may attempt to offer in the way of worship or obedience can have any value in his sight, because it is not him they worship, but, instead of him, the dream and figment of their own heart. This corrupt procedure is admirably described by Paul, when he says, that "thinking to be wise, they became fools" (Rom 1: 22) He had previously said that "they became vain in their imaginations," but lest any should suppose them blameless, he afterwards adds that they were deservedly blinded, because, not contented with sober inquiry, because, arrogating to themselves more than they have any title to do, they of their own accord court darkness, nay, bewitch themselves with perverse, empty show. Hence it is that their folly, the result not only of vain curiosity, but of licentious desire and overweening confidence in the pursuit of forbidden knowledge, cannot be excused.
> 
> Section 2. Stubbornness the companion of impiety.
> 
> The expression of David, (Psa 14: 1, 53: 1) "The fool has said in his heart, There is no God," is primarily applied to those who, as will shortly farther appear, stifle the light of nature, and intentionally stupefy themselves. We see many, after they have become hardened in a daring course of sin, madly banishing all remembrance of God, though spontaneously suggested to them from within, by natural sense. To show how detestable this madness is, the Psalmist introduces them as distinctly denying that there is a God, because although they do not disown his essence, they rob him of his justice and providence, and represent him as sitting idly in heaven. Nothing being less accordant with the nature of God than to cast off the government of the world, leaving it to chance, and so to wink at the crimes of men that they may wanton with impunity in evil courses; it follows, that every man who indulges in security, after extinguishing all fear of divine judgment, virtually denies that there is a God. As a just punishment of the wicked, after they have closed their own eyes, God makes their hearts dull and heavy, and hence, seeing, they see not. David, indeed, is the best interpreter of his own meaning, when he says elsewhere, the wicked has "no fear of God before his eyes," (Psa 36: 1) and, again, "He has said in his heart, God has forgotten; he hideth his face; he will never see it." Thus although they are forced to acknowledge that there is some God, they, however, rob him of his glory by denying his power. For, as Paul declares, "If we believe not, he abideth faithful, he cannot deny himself," (2Ti 2: 13) so those who feign to themselves a dead and dumb idol, are truly said to deny God. It is, moreover, to be observed, that though they struggle with their own convictions, and would fain not only banish God from their minds, but from heaven also, their stupefaction is never so complete as to secure them from being occasionally dragged before the divine tribunal. Still, as no fear restrains them from rushing violently in the face of God, so long as they are hurried on by that blind impulse, it cannot be denied that their prevailing state of mind in regard to him is brutish oblivion.
> 
> Section 3. No pretext can justify superstition. This proved, first, from reason; and, secondly, from Scripture.
> 
> In this way, the vain pretext which many employ to clothe their superstition is overthrown. They deem it enough that they have some kind of zeal for religion, how preposterous soever it may be, not observing that true religion must be conformable to the will of God as its unerring standard; that he can never deny himself, and is no spectra or phantom, to be metamorphosed at each individual's caprice. It is easy to see how superstition, with its false glosses, mocks God, while it tries to please him. Usually fastening merely on things on which he has declared he sets no value, it either contemptuously overlooks, or even undisguisedly rejects, the things which he expressly enjoins, or in which we are assured that he takes pleasure. Those, therefore, who set up a fictitious worship, merely worship and adore their own delirious fancies; indeed, they would never dare so to trifle with God, had they not previously fashioned him after their own childish conceits. Hence that vague and wandering opinion of Deity is declared by an apostle to be ignorance of God: "Howbeit, then, when ye knew not God, ye did service unto them which by nature are no gods." And he elsewhere declares, that the Ephesians were "without God" (Eph. 2: 12) at the time when they wandered without any correct knowledge of him. It makes little difference, at least in this respect, whether you hold the existence of one God, or a plurality of gods, since, in both cases alike, by departing from the true God, you have nothing left but an execrable idol. It remains, therefore, to conclude with Lactantius, (Instit. Div. lib i. 2, 6) "No religion is genuine that is not in accordance with truth."
> 
> Section 4. The wicked never willingly come into the presence of God. Hence their hypocrisy. Hence, too, their sense of Deity leads to no good result.
> 
> To this fault they add a second, viz., that when they do think of God it is against their will; never approaching him without being dragged into his presence, and when there, instead of the voluntary fear flowing from reverence of the divine majesty, feeling only that forced and servile fear which divine judgment extorts judgment which, from the impossibility of escape, they are compelled to dread, but which, while they dread, they at the same time also hate. To impiety, and to it alone, the saying of Statius properly applies: "Fear first brought gods into the world," (Theb. lib. i.) Those whose inclinations are at variance with the justice of God, knowing that his tribunal has been erected for the punishment of transgression, earnestly wish that that tribunal were overthrown. Under the influence of this feeling they are actually warring against God, justice being one of his essential attributes. Perceiving that they are always within reach of his power, that resistance and evasion are alike impossible, they fear and tremble. Accordingly, to avoid the appearance of condemning a majesty by which all are overawed, they have recourse to some species of religious observance, never ceasing meanwhile to defile themselves with every kind of vice, and add crime to crime, until they have broken the holy law of the Lord in every one of its requirements, and set his whole righteousness at nought; at all events, they are not so restrained by their semblance of fear as not to luxuriate and take pleasure in iniquity, choosing rather to indulge their carnal propensities than to curb them with the bridle of the Holy Spirit. But since this shadow of religion (it scarcely even deserves to be called a shadow) is false and vain, it is easy to infer how much this confused knowledge of God differs from that piety which is instilled into the breasts of believers, and from which alone true religion springs. And yet hypocrites would fain, by means of tortuous windings, make a show of being near to God at the very time they are fleeing from him. For while the whole life ought to be one perpetual course of obedience, they rebel without fear in almost all their actions, and seek to appease him with a few paltry sacrifices; while they ought to serve him with integrity of heart and holiness of life, they endeavour to procure his favour by means of frivolous devices and punctilios of no value. Nay, they take greater license in their grovelling indulgences, because they imagine that they can fulfil their duty to him by preposterous expiations; in short, while their confidence ought to have been fixed upon him, they put him aside, and rest in themselves or the creatures. At length they bewilder themselves in such a maze of error, that the darkness of ignorance obscures, and ultimately extinguishes, those sparks which were designed to show them the glory of God. Still, however, the conviction that there is some Deity continues to exist, like a plant which can never be completely eradicated, though so corrupt, that it is only capable of producing the worst of fruit. Nay, we have still stronger evidence of the proposition for which I now contend, viz., that a sense of Deity is naturally engraven on the human heart, in the fact, that the very reprobate are forced to acknowledge it. When at their ease, they can jest about God, and talk pertly and loquaciously in disparagement of his power; but should despair, from any cause, overtake them, it will stimulate them to seek him, and dictate ejaculatory prayers, proving that they were not entirely ignorant of God, but had perversely suppressed feelings which ought to have been earlier manifested.



I believe that nature is only perspicuous as a source of revelation for those who have been born again and who are no longer hostile to God.


----------



## Craig

Confessor said:


> When I was thinking of the main difference between classical and presuppositional apologetics, I noted that the latter maintains that we should first submit to the Bible, to God's interpretation of the world, rather than to any man's supposedly authoritative interpretation of the world. The entire history of secular philosophy presupposes autonomy, that man's interpretation of the world has primacy.
> 
> Then I realized that this is partly because the latter presupposes that man is completely able and fit to interpret reality rightly, thereby denying that he is pervasively affected by original sin. And a denial of original sin is (semi-)Pelagian.
> 
> What do you all think?



That seems to be nearly overly simplistic. I would say that the big difference between Presupp and Classical is the word "revelation".

You're right that secular philosophy has an autonomous view of man's reasoning...but you seem to have shifted it from an "autonomous" view of reasoning, to a "non-autonomous" view...which is to reduce the difference to simply reasoning itself.

Foundationally, presuppositionalism rests on revelation from the Triune God...Classical apologetics, in practice, rejects the notion of natural revelation altogether.


----------



## Confessor

mgeoffriau said:


> Otherwise, I don't see how one can avoid the necessity of claiming that ALL natural capacities are individually perverted and tainted by sin, rather than the much simpler view that the will is sinful and wields those natural capacities to accomplish its sinful desires.



Honestly, if you want to sum up all the faculties you can think of under one label of "will," go ahead. Sometimes it can just help to convey concepts if I talk about sin's effect on man's reasoning rather than on his will which thereby affects his reasoning.

It's Total Depravity either way, so long as we define our terms correctly.


----------



## mgeoffriau

Except that's not really what Van Til is claiming -- he's not simply using the noetic effect of sin as shorthand for saying that the will is sinful and therefore is prone to use reasoning sinfully. He is specifically claiming that man's faculty of reasoning itself is in and of itself tainted by sin.


----------



## Confessor

mgeoffriau said:


> Except that's not really what Van Til is claiming -- he's not simply using the noetic effect of sin as shorthand for saying that the will is sinful and therefore is prone to use reasoning sinfully. He is specifically claiming that man's faculty of reasoning itself is in and of itself tainted by sin.



And he would say that this noetic effect of sin is manifested in that man chooses to accept his own interpretation of reality (i.e., secular philosophies) as the ground from which we prove things, rather than accepting God's interpretation (i.e., the Bible). The natural man will _choose_ to reason a specific way, starting from false bases. Thus sin affects his will, and his will plays a part in his reasoning; thus sin affects his reasoning.


----------



## mgeoffriau

And that view, I believe, stems from Van Til's inherent favor for a coherence view of truth, and that's one of the main issues I have with him.

Anyway, just testing that line of argumentation to see if anything new would pop up, I hadn't thought about it in a while. Please continue, apologies for the interruption.


----------



## Confessor

Craig said:


> You're right that secular philosophy has an autonomous view of man's reasoning...but you seem to have shifted it from an "autonomous" view of reasoning, to a "non-autonomous" view...which is to reduce the difference to simply reasoning itself.



I apologize if I misspoke; I meant to say that the alternatives are essentially to reason autonomously (i.e. view as authoritative our own interpretation of reality; secular thought) or to reason theonomously (i.e. view as authoritative God's interpretation of reality; Scripture).

Of course this is not an exhaustive dichotomy, for it does not take into account those who might view (e.g.) Koranic authority as properly basic. But for all intents and purposes secular thought is pervasive in American education, such that nearly all academic unbelief in America is secular. Even those of other religions, and even many Christians, have a secular understanding of life.



Craig said:


> That seems to be nearly overly simplistic. I would say that the big difference between Presupp and Classical is the word "revelation". [...] Classical apologetics, in practice, rejects the notion of natural revelation altogether.



Can you elaborate on these statements of yours? I especially do not understand what you mean by the latter.

-----Added 5/22/2009 at 08:22:51 EST-----



mgeoffriau said:


> Anyway, just testing that line of argumentation to see if anything new would pop up, I hadn't thought about it in a while. Please continue, apologies for the interruption.



No problem at all. 



mgeoffriau said:


> And that view, I believe, stems from Van Til's inherent favor for a coherence view of truth, and that's one of the main issues I have with him.



Do you want to start a new thread on this? It looks terribly interesting, but it's a bit . I never thought that Van Til accepted a coherence view of truth (perhaps of epistemic justification), so it could be very fruitful to discuss.


----------



## mgeoffriau

Confessor said:


> Do you want to start a new thread on this? It looks terribly interesting, but it's a bit . I never thought that Van Til accepted a coherence view of truth (perhaps of epistemic justification), so it could be very fruitful to discuss.



In brief, I believe Van Til's formulation of "worldviews" and the claim that the anti-Christian and the Christian worldview have no common ground implies that truth statements are evaluated relationally via internal consistency. I find the backdoor route of claiming the unbeliever's "psychology" can immediately apprehend parts of God's truth (when necessary to function in God's world) without interpretation or reasoning to be clumsy and overly complicated.

Anyway, if anyone wishes to follow that rabbit trail further I'd be happy to discuss it further in a new thread.


----------



## Craig

Confessor said:


> Can you elaborate on these statements of yours? I especially do not understand what you mean by the latter.



On the former, I'm only pointing out that presuppositionalism begins with the Triune God who speaks revelationally.

On the latter, I think I misspoke...I was thinking "evidential" when that is a different breed than "classical"...mea culpa


----------



## shackleton

sastark said:


> Of course, the difference between a Christian presupposing the Bible to be true, as opposed to, say, a Muslim presupposing the Qur'an to be true is that *the Bible is actually true*.



The problem with this is that it can tend to be a circular argument, the bible is inspired because it says that it is inspired, well anyone can say that. 

I thought the notion was that you start with the bible as a presupposition because that is how it is written, it does not seek to prove the existence of God it presupposes it and is written from the standpoint that God just exists.


----------



## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> Well, in this case, the apologist is trying to use a piecemeal method wherein the apologist's ultimate goal (I hope) is that the atheist see the error of his ways and repent.



Why must the apologists goal be to have the atheist repent of his sins? I have always thought that an apologist is defined as someone who defends the faith; but since when should an apologist likewise be an evangelist? Especially when the question of whether or not _Christianity_ is true (like, let's say during a debate on whether abortion is wrong, or God exists, etc.) is irrelevant.



> And in doing so, the apologist will never arrive near his destination, because such a method cannot prove Biblical authority.



Perhaps a classicist/evidentialist like William Lane Craig, who uses arguments for Jesus' resurrection during debates, could get to this point by arguing for the reliability of the New Testament documents.



> Instead, whatever he proves will easily be interpreted within the context of the unbeliever's worldview and push him to continue in his unbelief -- because he is generally fit to interpret the world as he desires, i.e. Pelagianism.



Some facts could be incredibly difficult to interpret through his worldview-filter, like perhaps an overwhelmingly complex and convincing argument for the existence of a necessary being external to the universe, or a very good case for the resurrection and a refutation of all other alternatives. In a situation like that, it could lead him to abandon his naturalistic worldview, like in Antony Flew's case.


----------



## Prufrock

Ben, I realize I'm jumping unto this dog-pile a little late; and also, I've never participated in an apologetics thread before, so sorry if I'm rehashing something that's been covered _ad nauseum_: but I think the answer to your question is not a simple yes or no. The best answer I can think of is: _It depends on what you're trying to do with it._ Questions like this demonstrate the importance of not divorcing apologetics from its larger _systematic_ theological framework. Our faith, while being most reasonable, is not _based upon_ reasonable proofs; the claims regarding God are accepted by faith, and the applicable claims are then confirmed, ratified and supported by reason. Natural theology is important for us, but not as the foundation upon which our faith or belief of God rests. So, if you're using "classical arguments" to either 1.) Affirm one's faith; or, 2.) Demonstrate the reasonability of the faith (within a properly established presuppositional framework, of course) to those outside in defense of the faith, then "classical apologetics" is great. If it is being used in an autonomous manner, such that the conclusion of natural theology is a necessary _a priori_ for faith, then it is being used most improperly, and in some sense could be linked with a form of a Pelagian-style religion.


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Why must the apologists goal be to have the atheist repent of his sins? I have always thought that an apologist is defined as someone who defends the faith; but since when should an apologist likewise be an evangelist? Especially when the question of whether or not _Christianity_ is true (like, let's say during a debate on whether abortion is wrong, or God exists, etc.) is irrelevant.



The goal of all _Christian_ apologists is to argue for the truth of _Christianity_. (We're not talking about mere abortion debates.) Therefore, if one's method of debate were to arrive at a dead end (e.g. when an atheist shrugs his shoulders at the cosmological or moral arguments), or if one's method of debate were to give an unbeliever more fuel for his unbelief (e.g. when he interprets the conclusions of the cosmological and moral arguments in his naturalistic worldview), then that method is clearly wrong. Yet that method is natural theology.

The unbeliever can in fact do either of those, i.e., shrug off the conclusions or interpret them in the context of his worldview. I know of one atheist on an apologetics group who was very intelligent, and he simply said something along the lines of, "It seems extremely unlikely that an infinite being who we can never see and who is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. exists solely because of a couple of phrasings of a few arguments." And he said that in the context of WLC's cosmological and moral arguments. Even if he weren't to brush it aside as sophistry, unbelievers can very easily interpret them in a naturalistic context, saying that a First Cause can easily be the universe itself (after all, we know nothing about what occurred "before" the Big Bang; causality goes haywire at that point) and that man himself can be the Lawgiver -- as is rampant among humanism.

The worst part about natural theology is that it assumes the unbeliever is _generally correct_ in how he interprets the world. Rather than saying that at every juncture of his worldview he is wrong, it reserves the God-arguments for a few parts -- namely, causality and morality -- such that the unbeliever has much less he must ignore in order to remain in his unbelief. By telling the unbeliever that there are only two or so things in his worldview which would make him believe in God, one can make his truth-suppression that much easier.

Of course, classical apologists will always claim that with natural theology they're not proving Christianity, but rather some generic theism; they then proceed to prove Christianity evidentially. But this has manifold problems in itself, as there are an _unbelievable_ amount of historical standards unbelievers will impose on someone if he attempts to prove the resurrection. Seriously, once one allows autonomy, he must submit to autonomous standards. And at that point a resurrection will very rarely be proven. I have encountered this firsthand, when I used to boast how my faith was stilted on historical evidence for the resurrection.



steven-nemes said:


> Some facts could be incredibly difficult to interpret through his worldview-filter, like perhaps an overwhelmingly complex and convincing argument for the existence of a necessary being external to the universe, or a very good case for the resurrection and a refutation of all other alternatives. In a situation like that, it could lead him to abandon his naturalistic worldview, like in Antony Flew's case.



This is absolutely true. Van Til often said how unbelievers would go so far as to write the resurrection off to natural causes, but that is simply unlikely. Many unbelievers gladly concede that were the resurrection proved, then Christianity is true.

However, that doesn't stop their Total Depravity from setting in on the entire process to prove the resurrection. As I said above, autonomously imposed standards on a resurrection-evidentialism are seriously impossible to overcome. I can give an example of this if you'd like (I'd just have to find the thread on Facebook).

Blessings.


----------



## steven-nemes

I'm leaving to go camping at the lake soon, but I will respond Ben!


----------



## Whitefield

I do think that classical apologetics has to down-play, if not ignore, total depravity and the noetic effects of sin.


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> I'm leaving to go camping at the lake soon, but I will respond Ben!





Have fun!

-----Added 5/23/2009 at 02:56:49 EST-----



Prufrock said:


> So, if you're using "classical arguments" to either 1.) Affirm one's faith; or, 2.) Demonstrate the reasonability of the faith (within a properly established presuppositional framework, of course) to those outside in defense of the faith, then "classical apologetics" is great. If it is being used in an autonomous manner, such that the conclusion of natural theology is a necessary _a priori_ for faith, then it is being used most improperly, and in some sense could be linked with a form of a Pelagian-style religion.



Indeed, I would say this is a presuppositional use of the theistic proofs. As long as it is understood that Christians are still rationally justified in accepting Scripture as authoritative (which is the root and foundation of all presuppositionalism), then I don't care. But almost all classical apologists, while indeed recognizing the importance of faith, and that the internal witness of the Spirit is the true foundation of our accepting Scripture; they fail to recognize that _the Spirit gives *rational support* for belief in the Scriptures_, instead saying that the theistic proofs or historical evidence are the rational supports.

Therefore, insofar as classical apologetics is not presuppositional -- i.e., insofar as it does not recognize the Christian's _rational justification_ of accepting Scriptural authority -- I would contend that it is Pelagian.

I hope that clarifies things.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also one could respond that people have just as horrible interpretation of special revelation as they do with general revelation.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And, just as they are culpable for their bad interpretations of special revelation, so others can be culpable for their bad interpretations of general revelation. Nonetheless, special revelation provides the necessary basis for a correct interpretation.
Click to expand...


I disagree, natural revelation can be correctly interpreted. It actually has to be correctly interpreted in order to believe the Bible. We do not see our need for redemption because we read it in the Bible. The Bible is not the bad and the good news. It is the good news for the bad news that we already know though general revelation/natural theology.



> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, I think you might be equivocating on "standard." Logic/coherence/internal consistency/etc. cannot be seen as some type of foundation or basis, but rather as a tool.
Click to expand...


I do not have a problem calling it both.



> And yes, people would be allowed to test the foundations when I assert the veracity of Christianity. But this does not mean that they should not accept the Gospel message immediately.



Okay.

CT

-----Added 5/23/2009 at 03:59:54 EST-----



CharlieJ said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Just as someone would be allowed to test the foundations when you tell them to submit to Christianity. The problem for your position is that the standard (logic, coherence, etc.) is more basic than that which is tested.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Quite right. Would I be correct in assuming, then, that you either reject foundationalism or embrace a very weak view of it?
Click to expand...


I currently think that I have a quite strong version of it actually. I think one can test and be certain of their foundations.

CT


----------



## Whitefield

I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.


----------



## cih1355

Whitefield said:


> I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.



They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> I disagree, natural revelation can be correctly interpreted. It actually has to be correctly interpreted in order to believe the Bible. We do not see our need for redemption because we read it in the Bible. The Bible is not the bad and the good news. It is the good news for the bad news that we already know though general revelation/natural theology.



A few things:

(1) Yes, natural revelation has to be interpreted correctly in some sense; otherwise there would be no truth to suppress -- for one has to _possess_ the truth in order to _suppress_ it.

(2) Yet, I would contend that the basic information given us by general revelation (i.e., "there is a god, and he will punish our sins") is non-inferential. There is simply no way that the truth-suppression Paul is referring to in Romans 1 is some abstruse philosophical argument -- and, in fact, that _one_ person who has never heard of Christ is unaware of the general outline of the cosmological/moral arguments is enough to disprove the notion that Romans 1 is referring to the cosmological/moral arguments. Otherwise, the absurd number of idols in humanity, and the fact that all humans can be smitten by their consciences, is evidence enough to understand that this knowledge ("there is a god, and he will punish our sins") is _non-inferential_.

(3) I have never seen a natural theology that provides the "bad news." At the most it can tell us that some Lawgiver exists, but not necessarily that He is Judge.

(4) The fact that natural theology cannot _identify_ the Lawgiver or First Cause is actually quite crucial, for it shows that general revelation, and therefore natural theology, tell us _nothing_ that can further the apologetical case for Christ. If a humanist is convinced that a First Cause and Lawgiver exists, he can then relegate the former to eternal matter pre-Big Bang and the latter to humans themselves. The "generic" things that can be proved from general revelation (i.e., a First Cause and a Lawgiver) are entirely worthless, apologetically speaking. Just as the fact that I ate a sandwich today can be proven from general revelation but only proves God if understood in light of the presupposition of Scripture (e.g. I ate a sandwich that had to be made by Jehovah), so also the conclusion of natural theology only proves God if understood in light of the presupposition of Scripture. I see no value to natural theology when it is not used presuppositionally.



ChristianTrader said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Well, I think you might be equivocating on "standard." Logic/coherence/internal consistency/etc. cannot be seen as some type of foundation or basis, but rather as a tool.
> 
> 
> 
> I do not have a problem calling it both.
Click to expand...


How can mere internal consistency be a foundation? What propositional content can be contained in the category of "internal consistency"?

I have a feeling we might be close to discussing our different views on foundationalism. 

-----Added 5/23/2009 at 06:29:45 EST-----



cih1355 said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.
Click to expand...


Yeah, this is basically it. Norman Geisler's and Frank Turek's _I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist_ essentially follows the format of (a) prove theism via natural theology; (b) after reducing the options to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam (which, by the way, is a false trichotomy given (a) but is not that crucial), prove Christianity via historical evidences.


----------



## Whitefield

cih1355 said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.
Click to expand...


I know this is what they try to prove. I didn't ask what they try to prove, but what *can* they prove (e.g., to the unregenerate and unbeliever)? For instance the ontological argument begins with a fundamental assumption, and if the listener (e.g., Kant, "existence is not a property of an object") doesn't accept that fundamental argument the entire "proof" falls the floor. The cosmological falters before the question "who caused God?" (since the first premise in the cosmological argument is "Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.") The teleological must assume design in everything, but is unsure of how to answer the challenge, "why do you assume order constitutes design?" The moral argument, the argument from religious experience, and the argument from miracles are so subjective that they carry no real weight in proving the objective. I find it difficult to believe that any of these arguments can be persuasive given human total depravity and the noetic effects of sin.


----------



## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> The goal of all _Christian_ apologists is to argue for the truth of _Christianity_. (We're not talking about mere abortion debates.) Therefore, if one's method of debate were to arrive at a dead end (e.g. when an atheist shrugs his shoulders at the cosmological or moral arguments), or if one's method of debate were to give an unbeliever more fuel for his unbelief (e.g. when he interprets the conclusions of the cosmological and moral arguments in his naturalistic worldview), then that method is clearly wrong. Yet that method is natural theology.



It is, I think, very difficult to interpret the cosmological and moral arguments (as William Lane Crag presents them, for example) within a naturalistic framework. I think they would incline a person away from naturalism. But even if they could be, and the unbeliever simply shrugs his shoulders and says, 'whatever'--so what? Is the apologist's job to get the unbeliever to get on his knees at that moment and pray for forgiveness? Clearly not, I should think; that sort of thing would be utterly impossible for mere argumentation to accomplish (which you would agree with), _even if_ the method is supposedly biblical or not. I think it possible that the unbeliever could give the same indifferent response to a presuppositionalist's arguments as well. "So what if I can't account for logic/morality/whatever. Who cares. Your word games don't prove a thing."



> The worst part about natural theology is that it assumes the unbeliever is _generally correct_ in how he interprets the world. Rather than saying that at every juncture of his worldview he is wrong, it reserves the God-arguments for a few parts -- namely, causality and morality -- such that the unbeliever has much less he must ignore in order to remain in his unbelief. By telling the unbeliever that there are only two or so things in his worldview which would make him believe in God, one can make his truth-suppression that much easier.



I think the Bible even says that unbeleivers are correct in some of their interpretations of reality--the moral sense that even the most evil of unbelievers have, for example, or their acceptance that nature is indeed grand and wonderful rather than bland and uninteresting. Working from what generally _is_ accepted by unbelievers to theistic conclusions is what natural theology sets out to do, and clearly there are some things that unbelievers perceive correctly, lest an unbeliever literally not have any true beliefs at all, which is nonsense.



> Of course, classical apologists will always claim that with natural theology they're not proving Christianity, but rather some generic theism; they then proceed to prove Christianity evidentially. But this has manifold problems in itself, as there are an _unbelievable_ amount of historical standards unbelievers will impose on someone if he attempts to prove the resurrection. Seriously, once one allows autonomy, he must submit to autonomous standards. And at that point a resurrection will very rarely be proven. I have encountered this firsthand, when I used to boast how my faith was stilted on historical evidence for the resurrection.



James White has pointed out in debate (I think) that the standards of judgment applied to resurrection evidence or New Testament document reliability, etc., often times would lead to the conclusion that almost nothing at all is known about the earliest times, which not a conclusion too many are willing to accept. That their arbitrary standards lead to nearly no knowledge is not a problem for the theist who was unable to prove the resurrection by them--it is a problem for the unbeliever who is being unreasonable and is denying any historical knowledge at all.


----------



## Whitefield

steven-nemes said:


> I think the Bible even says that unbeleivers are correct in some of their interpretations of reality--the moral sense that even the most evil of unbelievers have, for example, or their acceptance that nature is indeed grand and wonderful rather than bland and uninteresting. Working from what generally _is_ accepted by unbelievers to theistic conclusions is what natural theology sets out to do, and clearly there are some things that unbelievers perceive correctly, lest an unbeliever literally not have any true beliefs at all, which is nonsense.



What (_correct_) theistic conclusions can the unbeliever come to?
What _truth_ is derived from perceptions, even correct perceptions?
What _true_ beliefs does the unbeliever have?


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> It is, I think, very difficult to interpret the cosmological and moral arguments (as William Lane Crag presents them, for example) within a naturalistic framework. I think they would incline a person away from naturalism. But even if they could be, and the unbeliever simply shrugs his shoulders and says, 'whatever'--so what? Is the apologist's job to get the unbeliever to get on his knees at that moment and pray for forgiveness? Clearly not, I should think; that sort of thing would be utterly impossible for mere argumentation to accomplish (which you would agree with), _even if_ the method is supposedly biblical or not. I think it possible that the unbeliever could give the same indifferent response to a presuppositionalist's arguments as well. "So what if I can't account for logic/morality/whatever. Who cares. Your word games don't prove a thing."



My point about the atheist's shrugging off natural theology is that it only confronts the unbeliever on a limited number of points. Rather than telling him that his entire philosophy is wrong, since he assumes his own prerogative to interpret reality without any assistance from God, natural theology tells him that a couple facts of his worldview -- namely, causality and morality -- supposedly entail the existence of an infinite invisible Being. This is hardly convincing, hence the response, "That's just a word game." Presup, on the other hand, stresses the ubiquitous errors of unbelief, which requires a total change in worldview, based on manifold irreconcilable inconsistencies with (usually) a secular humanist outlook.

Otherwise, I would maintain my point that the contentions of natural theology can very easily be interpreted in a naturalistic framework. The First Cause of the cosmological argument can be discerned to be matter itself: "before" the Big Bang, no time existed, and an infinitesimally dense ball of matter was all that existed, or so goes secularist mythology. Causality has gone nuts, since no time exists. Otherwise, have you seen the amount of atheistic literature about explanations for this? A multiverse, string theory, it goes on and on. As for the moral argument, secularists love to point to an evolutionary view on the subject.

The problem with natural theology is that its results are far too generic and malleable, allowing unbelievers to conform them perfectly to their own worldview -- which is exactly what has happened.



steven-nemes said:


> I think the Bible even says that unbeleivers are correct in some of their interpretations of reality--the moral sense that even the most evil of unbelievers have, for example, or their acceptance that nature is indeed grand and wonderful rather than bland and uninteresting. Working from what generally _is_ accepted by unbelievers to theistic conclusions is what natural theology sets out to do, and clearly there are some things that unbelievers perceive correctly, lest an unbeliever literally not have any true beliefs at all, which is nonsense.



When I said that natural theology assumes the unbeliever is generally correct in his worldview, I was referring to his _espoused_ worldview. For instance, they would know that some actions are wrong, but they would somehow try to explain it on evolutionary terms; and they would view the grandioseness of nature to be something _other_ than the work of God. I would contend that unbelievers do have _some_ knowledge, and they do have some correct interpretations of reality -- but only because of blessed inconsistency.



steven-nemes said:


> James White has pointed out in debate (I think) that the standards of judgment applied to resurrection evidence or New Testament document reliability, etc., often times would lead to the conclusion that almost nothing at all is known about the earliest times, which not a conclusion too many are willing to accept. That their arbitrary standards lead to nearly no knowledge is not a problem for the theist who was unable to prove the resurrection by them--it is a problem for the unbeliever who is being unreasonable and is denying any historical knowledge at all.



First, I don't think unbelievers would be unwilling to create a historical skepticism to protect their unbelief if in fact the standards they create are unfair. Second, the criteria that I have seen have a nasty penchant to apply only to what I am trying to demonstrate (i.e., the historicity of the Gospels) -- for instance, the application of "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" to prove miracles.

In fact, I think it's safe to say that the anti-miraculous view of secularism is what creates all the outrageous standards they impose. And, sadly, as long as secularism is not challenged presuppositionally, they are entirely within their epistemic rights to hold those stringent standards.


----------



## Whitefield

Confessor said:


> When I said that natural theology assumes the unbeliever is generally correct in his worldview, I was referring to his _espoused_ worldview. For instance, they would know that some actions are wrong, but they would somehow try to explain it on evolutionary terms; and they would view the grandioseness of nature to be something _other_ than the work of God. I would contend that unbelievers do have _some_ knowledge, and they do have some correct interpretations of reality -- but only because of blessed inconsistency.



Yes, a broken clock is correct twice a day, but it doesn't know when that is.


----------



## mgeoffriau

How does a believer communicate intelligibly with an unbeliever, if their worldviews have no common ground? Don't words and propositions constructed of words rely on one's worldview for meaning?

Doesn't the fact that the believer can challenge the underpinnings of the unbeliever's worldview imply that in fact there is some common ground which allows for intelligible communication?


----------



## Confessor

mgeoffriau said:


> How does a believer communicate intelligibly with an unbeliever, if their worldviews have no common ground? Don't words and propositions constructed of words rely on one's worldview for meaning?
> 
> Doesn't the fact that the believer can challenge the underpinnings of the unbeliever's worldview imply that in fact there is some common ground which allows for intelligible communication?



The reason we can communicate is because of blessed inconsistency. Although there is absolutely no common ground in our _espoused_ worldviews (i.e., if the logical implications are drawn out fully for each), there absolutely is common ground in our _practiced_ worldviews; for the unbeliever must borrow from Christian principles to have knowledge and speak intelligibly. In fact, pointing out this worldview-theft to the unbeliever is the goal of Van Tillian presuppositionalism.

...or so the argument goes.  I'm a novice at demonstrating this adequately. I've got more reading to do.

But if nothing else, hopefully I have demonstrated that presuppositionalism is not inconsistent in speaking of the impossibility of common ground.


----------



## mgeoffriau

Doesn't language and communication require interpretive activity? How is the unbeliever able to converse with the believer at all? The believer is communicating via propositional truth -- how does the unbeliever "receive" these statements without first filtering them through his interpretive grid?

In other words, why is the unbeliever not going to use his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the transcendental argument just as he uses his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the classical arguments?


----------



## Confessor

mgeoffriau said:


> In other words, why is the unbeliever not going to use his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the transcendental argument just as he uses his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the classical arguments?



Because with the latter, he is able to interpret it through the scope of his presupposition (e.g. a secularist saying that the First Cause could be matter itself), whereas with the former, his presupposition is itself being attacked and his depravity unmasked.

Also, to address the first half of your post, I would say that unbelievers can intelligibly use language _in spite_, not _because_, of their presuppositions.


----------



## Brian Withnell

In response to the OP ...

One thing that is somewhat difficult for the classical apologist is that if there is logic, there are axioms upon which the system of logic is built. (This is from a formal logic perspective ... without a base, that is a set of axioms, you cannot make any deductions.) So in a very real sense, even classical apologetics is presuppositional at the base. There have to be some set of things that are accepted as true without proof, or you cannot prove anything. (Leave it to a mathematician to see things in pure logical terms!)

So the main difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics appears to be that the presuppositional apologist sees the axioms more clearly, and is much more open to stating the axioms up front.


----------



## Confessor

Brian Withnell said:


> In response to the OP ...
> 
> One thing that is somewhat difficult for the classical apologist is that if there is logic, there are axioms upon which the system of logic is built. (This is from a formal logic perspective ... without a base, that is a set of axioms, you cannot make any deductions.) So in a very real sense, even classical apologetics is presuppositional at the base. There have to be some set of things that are accepted as true without proof, or you cannot prove anything. (Leave it to a mathematician to see things in pure logical terms!)
> 
> So the main difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics appears to be that the presuppositional apologist sees the axioms more clearly, and is much more open to stating the axioms up front.



Well, the bases don't necessarily have to be _axioms_; the premises could be any properly basic beliefs, e.g. "A computer is in front of me presently."

But now we're getting into foundationalism, since we will probably have to discuss what can be allowed as properly basic...shall we continue? 

By the way, I like the quote in your signature.


----------



## Brian Withnell

Confessor said:


> Brian Withnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> In response to the OP ...
> 
> One thing that is somewhat difficult for the classical apologist is that if there is logic, there are axioms upon which the system of logic is built. (This is from a formal logic perspective ... without a base, that is a set of axioms, you cannot make any deductions.) So in a very real sense, even classical apologetics is presuppositional at the base. There have to be some set of things that are accepted as true without proof, or you cannot prove anything. (Leave it to a mathematician to see things in pure logical terms!)
> 
> So the main difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics appears to be that the presuppositional apologist sees the axioms more clearly, and is much more open to stating the axioms up front.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, the bases don't necessarily have to be _axioms_; the premises could be any properly basic beliefs, e.g. "A computer is in front of me presently."
Click to expand...

Every premise has a basic axiom at its foundation (the computer in front of you is not a figment ... so you extend a system of thought based on evidence of the physical world being "real" and so your statement of the computer is valid.)



> But now we're getting into foundationalism, since we will probably have to discuss what can be allowed as properly basic...shall we continue?
> 
> By the way, I like the quote in your signature.



Hmmm... I didn't know that my signature line was a quote, though I suppose it could be very close to something someone else has said. I said something akin to it when I was in the midst of my first beloved wife dying of cancer. It was years long. During that time, I could hardly read a Bible, and prayer was mostly crying to the God that was in control without any words that would form. I had been "training for war" long before that particular battle started. The fact that I could only keep focused for a very short time was the battle. I was living on trust in God that I had developed over years of preparing. I had not known the purpose of the preparation, but I was grateful that God had given me grace to prepare before need it.

If there is a quote that is similar, please direct me to it. I would LOVE to know the person that thinks the same way I do.


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> Doesn't language and communication require interpretive activity? How is the unbeliever able to converse with the believer at all? The believer is communicating via propositional truth -- how does the unbeliever "receive" these statements without first filtering them through his interpretive grid?
> 
> In other words, why is the unbeliever not going to use his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the transcendental argument just as he uses his sin-bound reasoning to dismiss the classical arguments?



If he does reject it, then he is left in stark contradiction. He would be using logic to deny logic. The purpose of presuppositionalism (cf. the Bahnsen/Stein debate) is to reveal that without borrowing from the Christian explanation for logic, he has no explanation for it. This is similar to the one who says, "There is a no absolute truth." That statement is an absolute truth statement that there is no absolute truth. *Presuppositionalism does not try to reason with the unbeliever to achieve some intermediate and agreed upon conclusions, as classical apologetics attempts,* but declares that the unbeliever at the very beginning cannot even get out of the "starting blocks" without using the very thing he denies.

(Van Til uses the image of the little girl he once saw on a train who was sitting on her father's lap. She slaps him in defiance, not realizing that if she hadn't been on his lap she couldn't have slapped him.)


----------



## snap_dragon

Just the thread I was looking for as I wade somewhat confusedly through the Bahnsen books I ordered. Thanks to all for the learned responses...and to Confessor for a great thread. 

(sorry for interruption...we now bring you back to the program...)


----------



## mgeoffriau

Whitefield said:


> If he does reject it, then he is left in stark contradiction. He would be using logic to deny logic. The purpose of presuppositionalism (cf. the Bahnsen/Stein debate) is to reveal that without borrowing from the Christian explanation for logic, he has no explanation for it. This is similar to the one who says, "There is a no absolute truth." That statement is an absolute truth statement that there is no absolute truth. *Presuppositionalism does not try to reason with the unbeliever to achieve some intermediate and agreed upon conclusions, as classical apologetics attempts,* but declares that the unbeliever at the very beginning cannot even get out of the "starting blocks" without using the very thing he denies.
> 
> (Van Til uses the image of the little girl he once saw on a train who was sitting on her father's lap. She slaps him in defiance, not realizing that if she hadn't been on his lap she couldn't have slapped him.)



I think the question remains -- how is the unbeliever able to understand these arguments without filtering them through his interpretive grid? Van Til wants to deny the classical apologist the common ground on which to reason with the unbeliever, but he readily accepts common ground of language, logic, and intelligibility in order to communicate his transcendental argument to the unbeliever.


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> If he does reject it, then he is left in stark contradiction. He would be using logic to deny logic. The purpose of presuppositionalism (cf. the Bahnsen/Stein debate) is to reveal that without borrowing from the Christian explanation for logic, he has no explanation for it. This is similar to the one who says, "There is a no absolute truth." That statement is an absolute truth statement that there is no absolute truth. *Presuppositionalism does not try to reason with the unbeliever to achieve some intermediate and agreed upon conclusions, as classical apologetics attempts,* but declares that the unbeliever at the very beginning cannot even get out of the "starting blocks" without using the very thing he denies.
> 
> (Van Til uses the image of the little girl he once saw on a train who was sitting on her father's lap. She slaps him in defiance, not realizing that if she hadn't been on his lap she couldn't have slapped him.)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think the question remains -- how is the unbeliever able to understand these arguments without filtering them through his interpretive grid? Van Til wants to deny the classical apologist the common ground on which to reason with the unbeliever, but he readily accepts common ground of language, logic, and intelligibility in order to communicate his transcendental argument to the unbeliever.
Click to expand...


And Van Til, when the unbeliever nods that he can understand the language, logic, and intelligibility, immediately declares the unbeliever a thief if he does not immediately attribute those abilities to the Christian God.


----------



## mgeoffriau

Whitefield said:


> And Van Til, when the unbeliever nods that he can understand the language, logic, and intelligibility, immediately declares the unbeliever a thief if he does not immediately attribute those abilities to the Christian God.



So then, we are in agreement that the unbeliever can reason rightly in limited and specific instances?


----------



## Beth Ellen Nagle

mgeoffriau said:


> I think the question remains -- how is the unbeliever able to understand these arguments without filtering them through his interpretive grid? Van Til wants to deny the classical apologist the common ground on which to reason with the unbeliever, but he readily accepts common ground of language, logic, and intelligibility in order to communicate his transcendental argument to the unbeliever.



Exactly.


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> And Van Til, when the unbeliever nods that he can understand the language, logic, and intelligibility, immediately declares the unbeliever a thief if he does not immediately attribute those abilities to the Christian God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So then, we are in agreement that the unbeliever can reason rightly in limited and specific instances?
Click to expand...


Well, now you insert a new twist. I think Van Til and Clark (and their descendants) would agree that the unbeliever can reason, but I doubt they would agree that then can reason _rightly_. The noetic effects of sin have knocked reason off its proper base. There is a difference between just launching a rocket and launching a rocket rightly. The fact that the rocket lifts off the ground one can say it launched, but that it flew west instead of east one would not say it launched correctly (rightly).


----------



## mgeoffriau

Fair point, let me rephrase more specifically:

Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> Fair point, let me rephrase more specifically:
> 
> Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?



I'm not a Van Tilian expert, but I think both Van Til and Clark would question the use of the word _fact_ without clear definition. It seems to me that both deny there are "independent facts" which the unaided mind can determine to be true.

If by _fact _you mean that which can be determined to be true, then I think, and definitely I could be wrong on this, that Van Til and Clark begin with the presupposition that Jesus Christ is the truth, and any reasoning which does not begin with that presupposition is doomed to error and failure when trying to determine what is true.


----------



## mgeoffriau

So if we reject the idea of "bare facts" or "independent facts", and embrace "system truths" (returning my previous comment that Van Til favored a coherence theory of truth), then it seems like we are forced to conclude not only that the unbeliever has no justification for the things he knows, but that _he actually does not know them._

Still agree?


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> So if we reject the idea of "bare facts" or "independent facts", and embrace "system truths" (returning my previous comment that Van Til favored a coherence theory of truth), then it seems like we are forced to conclude not only that the unbeliever has no justification for the things he knows, but that _he actually does not know them._
> 
> Still agree?



Sounds very much like Van Til to me. I think Van Til actually challenged a student in a classroom setting to give him an example of a "bare fact." If I remember the audio correctly, the student couldn't do it.


----------



## mgeoffriau

So if knowledge is impossible for the unbeliever, 

or in other words, if the unbeliever is incapable of correctly interpreting facts, 

or in other words, if any interpretive activity by the unbeliever produces untruth:

Then how can the believer communicate with the unbeliever? In what way are the believer's words meaningful and not simply absurd or void?


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> So if knowledge is impossible for the unbeliever,
> 
> or in other words, if the unbeliever is incapable of correctly interpreting facts,
> 
> or in other words, if any interpretive activity by the unbeliever produces untruth:
> 
> Then how can the believer communicate with the unbeliever? In what way are the believer's words meaningful and not simply absurd or void?



The presuppositional is not trying to reason with the unbeliever, but simply to say the unbeliever is starting in the wrong place. How can one deny the ultimate "fact" in the universe, and then hope to find any true facts afterwards? (The rocket is pointed in the wrong direction at launch.) Both can make reference to the oak tree in the backyard, but they are not really talking about the same thing. The unbeliever sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn; the believer sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn *and gives glory to the One who created it from nothing.*


----------



## mgeoffriau

Whitefield said:


> *The presuppositional is not trying to reason with the unbeliever, but simply to say the unbeliever is starting in the wrong place. *How can one deny the ultimate "fact" in the universe, and then hope to find any true facts afterwards? (The rocket is pointed in the wrong direction at launch.) Both can make reference to the oak tree in the backyard, but they are not really talking about the same thing. The unbeliever sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn; the believer sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn *and gives glory to the One who created it from nothing.*



[Emphasis in first line is mine]

Isn't Van Til claiming a bit more than this, though? If all that can be accomplished is publicly stating truth with no expectation that it will be intelligible by unbelievers, then why does he find fault with classical apologists?

I think he does claim something greater -- that the transcendental argument is intelligible by unbelievers and that real communication is possible -- what I can't figure out is how this is possible according to his formulation of the unbeliever's intellect and psychology.


----------



## Confessor

Brian Withnell said:


> Every premise has a basic axiom at its foundation (the computer in front of you is not a figment ... so you extend a system of thought based on evidence of the physical world being "real" and so your statement of the computer is valid.)



Yet, I don't think it's proper to say that any propositions we gain from sensory perception are derived from an axiom. It's not as if we consciously think, "I have taken as an axiom that sensory perception is reliable; I seem to perceive a computer; therefore I am justified in believing that a computer exists." The belief that I am seeing a computer is itself properly basic; it's not necessary to get a more basic axiom from which we derive it.

I think this is an important point to make, because I would say that Christians are to take Scriptural authority as properly basic; it doesn't have to be derived from anything else.



Brian Withnell said:


> Hmmm... I didn't know that my signature line was a quote, though I suppose it could be very close to something someone else has said. I said something akin to it when I was in the midst of my first beloved wife dying of cancer. It was years long. During that time, I could hardly read a Bible, and prayer was mostly crying to the God that was in control without any words that would form. I had been "training for war" long before that particular battle started. The fact that I could only keep focused for a very short time was the battle. I was living on trust in God that I had developed over years of preparing. I had not known the purpose of the preparation, but I was grateful that God had given me grace to prepare before need it.
> 
> If there is a quote that is similar, please direct me to it. I would LOVE to know the person that thinks the same way I do.



I was assuming it was a quote; I do not know of an actual quote similar to it. But thank you for telling the story behind it...that is heartwrenching.

-----Added 5/25/2009 at 01:16:24 EST-----



mgeoffriau said:


> Then how can the believer communicate with the unbeliever? In what way are the believer's words meaningful and not simply absurd or void?



Did you see the distinction I made between the unbeliever's _espoused_ and _practiced_ worldview? Iff the unbeliever were consistent with his unbelieving principles, it would in fact be impossible to communicate with him. But he is _not_ consistent with his principles, by God's grace. Therefore, the presuppositional apologist attempts to show the unbeliever the logical implications of his espoused worldview (_viz_., that knowledge is impossible); then, when the unbeliever sees that he has knowledge _despite_ his faulty worldview, he can repent to the God who kept him from an entirely consistent rebellion.


----------



## Whitefield

mgeoffriau said:


> Isn't Van Til claiming a bit more than this, though? If all that can be accomplished is publicly stating truth with no expectation that it will be intelligible by unbelievers, then why does he find fault with classical apologists?



His problem with classical apology is that it thinks the unbeliever is headed in right direction and only needs help along the intellectual way. For presuppositionalist the unbeliever is pointed in the wrong direction and must be challenged at the very starting line. The presuppositionalist takes the noetic effect of sin very seriously, the classical apologist often acts like it isn't there.


----------



## Reformed Thomist

The classical position is rooted in the recognition that faith rests upon knowledge. In order to believe _what_ God says (Divine Revelation, God's Word, God's communication to man) we must first know or at least have a natural awareness (whether _a posteriori_ or _a priori_) that God _is_, that is, that God exists. To put it another way, I must first 'believe _in_ God' (the Divine existence) before I can '_believe_ God' (the Divine testimony). Without the former (which always comes before the latter) faith would be a kind of aberration.

This schema mirrors simple ‘human’ faith: Jimmy must know that Dave exists (believe _in_ Dave) before Jimmy can believe what Dave tells him about so-and-so (_believe_ Dave). The same goes for Jimmy’s relationship with God. Having an awareness of the reality of God (general) comes before believing that God chose to become Man and die for our sins on the Cross (specific).


----------



## cih1355

Whitefield said:


> cih1355 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I know this is what they try to prove. I didn't ask what they try to prove, but what *can* they prove (e.g., to the unregenerate and unbeliever)? For instance the ontological argument begins with a fundamental assumption, and if the listener (e.g., Kant, "existence is not a property of an object") doesn't accept that fundamental argument the entire "proof" falls the floor. The cosmological falters before the question "who caused God?" (since the first premise in the cosmological argument is "Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.") The teleological must assume design in everything, but is unsure of how to answer the challenge, "why do you assume order constitutes design?" The moral argument, the argument from religious experience, and the argument from miracles are so subjective that they carry no real weight in proving the objective. I find it difficult to believe that any of these arguments can be persuasive given human total depravity and the noetic effects of sin.
Click to expand...


They only prove that something caused the universe to come into existence or that something caused moral values to come into existence. However, this does not mean that the unbeliever will be pointed in the right direction. The unbeliever's god will not be the Christian God. The unbeliever's god will be a false god.

Those classical arguments do not persuade non-Christians to repent and believe in Christ.


----------



## Reformed Thomist

cih1355 said:


> Those classical arguments do not persuade non-Christians to repent and believe in Christ.



No, of course not. But they may be what provides the necessary groundwork for the gift of faith and repentance to be received.

-----Added 5/25/2009 at 05:14:09 EST-----



cih1355 said:


> They only prove that something caused the universe to come into existence or that something caused moral values to come into existence. However, this does not mean that the unbeliever will be pointed in the right direction. The unbeliever's god will not be the Christian God. The unbeliever's god will be a false god.



That's only if one _stops_ at the Cosmological or Teleological Arguments -- 'therefore, the First Cause/Highest Being exists'. But natural theology proper does not end there. After the _existence_ of this Cause/Being has been established, we are to tackle Its _attributes_, in a 'geometrical' fashion, logically flowing from the established fact of existence and the existent's work (the world). For instance, from what is established by the Cosmo./Teleo. Arguments, it can _inferred_ eventually, along the line, that this Being is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Pretty soon 'It' starts to sound a lot like the God of classical theism. If the philosophical enterprise is successful it will not be proving 'the Christian God' in particular (but rather the 'monotheistic' God), but it will show Atheism to be an untenable position, Atheism being the rejection of the existence of the God of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.


----------



## Confessor

Reformed Thomist said:


> This schema mirrors simple ‘human’ faith: Jimmy must know that Dave exists (believe _in_ Dave) before Jimmy can believe what Dave tells him about so-and-so (_believe_ Dave). The same goes for Jimmy’s relationship with God. Having an awareness of the reality of God (general) comes before believing that God chose to become Man and die for our sins on the Cross (specific).



This is not necessary, nor is it common in real life. That is, when I am taking advice from my mother, I don't stop myself and say, "Wait, I have to make sure this person giving me advice _exists_; I better make sure she exists to ensure that the information I got was indeed from her." In fact, we consider people who do that to be rather weird.

If it is plainly evident, or if it is _properly basic_, that the Bible is God's Word and thereby ultimately authoritative, then God's existence can be understood from that knowledge. (It would be a near misnomer to say we _derive_ God's existence from the knowledge that the Bible is God's Word, because the inference is so obvious.)

In other words, although a person must exist in order for us to take advice from him, that we know we have received advice from him would logically lead to the proposition that such a person exists. A person's existence must logically precede his giving of advice/revelation, but that doesn't deny the veracity of the conditional proposition, "If person X gives advice/revelation, then person X exists."

-----Added 5/25/2009 at 11:52:38 EST-----



Reformed Thomist said:


> That's only if one *stops* at the Cosmological or Teleological Arguments -- 'therefore, the First Cause/Highest Being exists'. But natural theology proper does not end there. After the *existence* of this Cause/Being has been established, we are to tackle Its *attributes*, in a 'geometrical' fashion, logically flowing from the established fact of existence and the existent's work (the world). For instance, from what is established by the Cosmo./Teleo. Arguments, it can *inferred* eventually, along the line, that this Being is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Pretty soon 'It' starts to sound a lot like the God of classical theism. If the philosophical enterprise is successful it will not be proving 'the Christian God' in particular (but rather the 'monotheistic' God), but it will show Atheism to be an untenable position, Atheism being the rejection of the existence of the God of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.



(I bolded what you had italicized so it would show in the quotation.)

I would contend that the results offered in natural theology, even after the specification you mentioned that might pinpoint this being's attributes, are too generic and therefore too subject to the unbeliever's presupposition. This is especially true when you consider that the unbeliever can manhandle the conclusions you have at any step of the way; that is, if you try to prove a certain characteristic for the First Cause you just proved in the cosmological argument (i.e., you're trying to add on to the cosm. argument), you have to assume that the unbeliever will not relegate the First Cause to some other humanistic tenet and then "start fresh" with your new argument. It's hard to build this supposed basis from which you can add characteristics when you allow unbelievers their presuppositions, for they can wreak havoc at any step of the way.

Furthermore, unbelievers can always relegate the different conclusions of different arguments to different entities: e.g., the First Cause and Lawgiver you might prove in natural theology can be two different things in the secularist worldview. This tactic can make unbelief much more tenable, because it gives more options for the unbeliever.


----------



## Brian Withnell

mgeoffriau said:


> Fair point, let me rephrase more specifically:
> 
> Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?



I would haste to broaden your question.

Can anyone, believer or unbeliever, know true facts about reality?

In a sense nobody knows true facts (i.e., knows perfectly) reality; we all have the remnant of sin that corrupts all our faculties. Everything we do is imperfect, and only by grace do we get anything "right".


----------



## Reformed Thomist

Brian Withnell said:


> mgeoffriau said:
> 
> 
> 
> Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would haste to broaden your question.
> 
> Can anyone, believer or unbeliever, know true facts about reality?
> 
> In a sense nobody knows true facts (i.e., knows perfectly) reality; we all have the remnant of sin that corrupts all our faculties. Everything we do is imperfect, and only by grace do we get anything "right".
Click to expand...


Yay for fideism and skepticism. This seems to be what we end up with with presuppositionalism.


----------



## Reformed Thomist

Confessor said:


> If it is plainly evident, or if it is _properly basic_, that the Bible is God's Word and thereby ultimately authoritative, then God's existence can be understood from that knowledge. (It would be a near misnomer to say we _derive_ God's existence from the knowledge that the Bible is God's Word, because the inference is so obvious.)
> 
> In other words, although a person must exist in order for us to take advice from him, that we know we have received advice from him would logically lead to the proposition that such a person exists. A person's existence must logically precede his giving of advice/revelation, but that doesn't deny the veracity of the conditional proposition, "If person X gives advice/revelation, then person X exists."



I would challenge the premise that the Bible being God's Word is 'plainly evident' or, in Plantingian terms, 'properly basic'. I might say that of God's existence (a _preamble_ to the articles of faith, in Thomistic terms), but not of an article of faith. Articles of _faith_ are so-called because they are _not_ plainly evident. They are so _not plainly evident_ that individuals require Divine assistance to give assent to them -- they need to be Elect (which is not required in order to merely accept that the existence of God is a fact, since Jews and Muslims believe this).


----------



## Confessor

Reformed Thomist said:


> I would challenge the premise that the Bible being God's Word is 'plainly evident' or, in Plantingian terms, 'properly basic'. I might say that of God's existence (a _preamble_ to the articles of faith, in Thomistic terms), but not of an article of faith.



The usual objection to any given proposition's proper basicality is that such a proposition is not universally accepted. But this objection has manifold problems. (Just in case universal acceptance was what you had in mind.)



Reformed Thomist said:


> Articles of _faith_ are so-called because they are _not_ plainly evident.



This would require a good deal of defining your terms. Otherwise, I see no reason that all articles of faith, as a category, must be disallowed from the descriptor of "plainly evident."



Reformed Thomist said:


> They are so _not plainly evident_ that individuals require Divine assistance to give assent to them -- they need to be Elect (which is not required in order to merely accept that the existence of God is a fact, since Jews and Muslims believe this).



But isn't it true that all unbelievers _ought_ to accept the authority of the Bible? If there is not some obvious veracity to the proposition that the Bible is God's Word, then unbelievers would not be morally obliged to accept it as such. But they are obliged; therefore there is some obvious veracity to the proposition.

More importantly, the regeneration wrought by the Holy Spirit does not necessarily add some innocent belief to the person's noetic collection (contrary to Plantinga); it changes the _willful aversion_ that we have as sinners to God. That is, we already understand in some sense _as unbelievers_ that we ought to accept the Bible, yet we irrationally rebel -- and the Holy Spirit changes our _hearts_ in this matter, allowing us to give a warm assent to the proposition that we already ascertain to be true (and that proposition is that the Bible is God's Word).

In other words, it is not the case that regeneration gives us the belief that the Bible is God's Word. Rather, we already believe this in a sense, and upon regeneration our assent to this proposition is changed.

-----Added 5/26/2009 at 09:36:15 EST-----



Reformed Thomist said:


> Brian Withnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> mgeoffriau said:
> 
> 
> 
> Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would haste to broaden your question.
> 
> Can anyone, believer or unbeliever, know true facts about reality?
> 
> In a sense nobody knows true facts (i.e., knows perfectly) reality; we all have the remnant of sin that corrupts all our faculties. Everything we do is imperfect, and only by grace do we get anything "right".
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Yay for fideism and skepticism. This seems to be what we end up with with presuppositionalism.
Click to expand...


To judge from Brian's qualified comment that skepticism ensues, and to go even further and apply your conclusion to the entirety of presuppositionalism, is an error. Brian said that there is a _sense_ in which we know nothing, because we do not know any proposition in its fullest sense (e.g., in relation to all other true propositions). This notably precludes skepticism, for Brian said nothing about whether we can know _anything_ true. That is, although someone may not know a proposition in its fullest sense, they can know it in a more superficial sense; and this is still indeed _knowledge_.

And, honestly, I have no idea how you went from Brian's quoted post to your statement that all of presuppositionalism seems to result in skepticism and fideism. But that topic seems to be more fitting in a separate thread.


----------



## Philip

As I jump into this, I realize that I am a bit over my head.



Confessor said:


> The usual objection to any given proposition's proper basicality is that such a proposition is not universally accepted.



If I have been taught all my life to assume that Santa Claus exists, would that be properly basic? That's my objection.



> But isn't it true that all unbelievers ought to accept the authority of the Bible? If there is not some obvious veracity to the proposition that the Bible is God's Word, then unbelievers would not be morally obliged to accept it as such. But they are obliged; therefore there is some obvious veracity to the proposition.



If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.



> That is, we already understand in some sense as unbelievers that we ought to accept the Bible, yet we irrationally rebel -- and the Holy Spirit changes our hearts in this matter



Interesting that the Holy Spirit changes our hearts, not our heads. It's non-rational both ways because our irrationality is what makes us human--it's part of the image of God.



> In other words, it is not the case that regeneration gives us the belief that the Bible is God's Word. Rather, we already believe this in a sense, and upon regeneration our assent to this proposition is changed.



I cannot disprove this statement, but neither can it be proved. It's poor grounding.

As a Reformed Christian, I would agree with Van Til and Clark that ultimately it is the Holy Spirit who does the convincing. However, they do reduce apologetics to practical fideism (in Van Til's case) and skepticism (Clark). That is, Van Til may deny the claim that he is a fideist, but he leaves no logical reason to believe from common ground. If all truth really is God's truth, then he ought to be using arguments from common sense to prove that it's true. Likewise, Clark may deny that he is a skeptic, yet in everything except his acceptance of Revelation, he is a more consistent Cartesian than Descartes.

My job as an apologist is to give the non-Christian no excuse for not believing. It is not to simply tear down presuppositions (for an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions--I believe it's called inductive logic) but to present a rational alternative with good reasoning behind it. If proper reasoning presupposes God, then there is no harm in proving His existence, given that the reasoning process itself presupposes His existence.


----------



## Beth Ellen Nagle

> If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.



What exactly is a "presuppositional thomist"?


----------



## chbrooking

P. F. Pugh said:


> If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.
> 
> ...
> 
> Interesting that the Holy Spirit changes our hearts, not our heads. It's non-rational both ways because our irrationality is what makes us human--it's part of the image of God.
> 
> ...
> 
> My job as an apologist is to give the non-Christian no excuse for not believing. It is not to simply tear down presuppositions (for an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions--I believe it's called inductive logic) but to present a rational alternative with good reasoning behind it. If proper reasoning presupposes God, then there is no harm in proving His existence, given that the reasoning process itself presupposes His existence.



I would argue that you've misunderstood your job. He is already without excuse. God has taken care of that. Your job is to unmask him. To demonstrate that he is suppressing the truth that he actually knows.

Once you permit the unbeliever to sit in judgment on whether or not God exists, you've denied the God of the scriptures. You've denied his transcendence, his aseity, his sovereignty, etc. You're never going to end up with the God of the scriptures, since you are arguing for a 'god' that doesn't exist. CVT rightly saw that the unbeliever borrows the tools necessary for reasoning from the very God he denies. 

Undermine his ability to know anything by making him defend the foundation of his predication and leave him with two options: Know nothing or know Christ. Leaving him with probabilities (which is the most you might do from common ground) isn't sufficient even for the task you've claimed is your task as an apologist.

But do, please, shed light on what you mean by a 'presuppositional thomist'. If you mean that you are in favor of the use of evidence, but you are a presuppositionalist, then you aren't any different from CVT, who also approved of such use of evidence.


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> I would argue that you've misunderstood your job. He is already without excuse. God has taken care of that. Your job is to unmask him. To demonstrate that he is suppressing the truth that he actually knows.



Depends what is meant by knowledge. If it's absolute indubitable intellectual certainty, then obviously the unbeliever does not have knowledge, since he has no intellectual assent.

If knowledge means a reasonable certainty, here too the unbeliever cannot have knowledge since there is no intellectual assent. The unbeliever is blissfully ignorant of the truth and is ignorant of his own free will. The Holy Spirit has to provide a longing for truth, which is why apologists are sent to give reasons to believe.



> Once you permit the unbeliever to sit in judgment on whether or not God exists, you've denied the God of the scriptures. You've denied his transcendence, his aseity, his sovereignty, etc. You're never going to end up with the God of the scriptures, since you are arguing for a 'god' that doesn't exist.



If I argue to theism, to trinitarianism, and then to Christianity, it seems that I am arguing for the God of the Scriptures. Anselm of Canterbury demonstrated such a method quite well in his writings.



> CVT rightly saw that the unbeliever borrows the tools necessary for reasoning from the very God he denies.



Then why shouldn't we argue from that common ground? The Heavens declare the glory of God, therefore our job is to point it out. 





> Undermine his ability to know anything by making him defend the foundation of his predication



This is, to my mind, both the strength and the weakness of the presuppositional method. On the one hand, it can tear down strongholds of unbelief, but on the other hand, it is beyond the scope of an apologist to tear down every possible stronghold. There are always more options.



> But do, please, shed light on what you mean by a 'presuppositional thomist'.



It means that I favor arguments, but recognize that presuppositions skew our perception of the world. The question then becomes, does the perception square with reality. Islam is an internally consistent set of propositions--but it falls apart when it is shown up against the light of reality (not to mention history). Reality is truth and all truth is God's domain and therefore the domain of God's people. 

For example, I use the modal ontological argument (which Kant failed to even address--possibly because he didn't know of its existence) to prove the presuppositional point that God's existence is self-evident from the very concept of God. To even think of God is to assume that He necessarily exists.

We cannot come to absolute certainty in a purely rational manner--for even God is not purely rational (God is love and love is not logical). We can, however, come to reasonable certainty.


----------



## Confessor

Welcome to the PB Philip!



P. F. Pugh said:


> If I have been taught all my life to assume that Santa Claus exists, would that be properly basic? That's my objection.



It wouldn't be properly basic, but it'd be rationally justified (i.e. you wouldn't have violated any noetic duties in coming to a belief in Santa).



P. F. Pugh said:


> If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.



First, as Clark and Beth have surely had at the back of their minds when they asked what a "presuppositional Thomist" was, I'm fairly certain that such a term is an oxymoron. Both the Clarkian and Van Tillian schools of presuppositionalism repudiated Thomism. However, it might be the case that you have integrated some amount of presuppositionalism in such a way that the two are not dissonant. If so, I would enjoy to hear how.

Clark addressed the second point I was going to make.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Interesting that the Holy Spirit changes our hearts, not our heads. It's non-rational both ways because our irrationality is what makes us human--it's part of the image of God.



Irrationality is part of the image of God? Can you please elaborate on this. I would disagree, given that truth and knowledge ("God is a god of knowledge") are generally considered good things; and irrationality is antithetical to them.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I cannot disprove this statement, but neither can it be proved. It's poor grounding.



If you believe that men ought to believe that the Bible is the Word of God without its being proven evidentially, then it would seem that the statement is proved, correct?



P. F. Pugh said:


> As a Reformed Christian, I would agree with Van Til and Clark that ultimately it is the Holy Spirit who does the convincing. However, they do reduce apologetics to practical fideism (in Van Til's case) and skepticism (Clark). That is, Van Til may deny the claim that he is a fideist, but he leaves no logical reason to believe from common ground. If all truth really is God's truth, then he ought to be using arguments from common sense to prove that it's true.



Are you aware of Van Til's distinction between _metaphysical_ and _epistemological_ common ground -- or as I prefer to call them, _actual_ and _espoused_ common ground?



P. F. Pugh said:


> My job as an apologist is to give the non-Christian no excuse for not believing. It is not to simply tear down presuppositions (for an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions--I believe it's called inductive logic) but to present a rational alternative with good reasoning behind it. If proper reasoning presupposes God, then there is no harm in proving His existence, given that the reasoning process itself presupposes His existence.



1. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions, and your labeling it as inductive logic does not help me. Can you perhaps give an example?

2. A presuppositionalist would agree that proper reasoning presupposes God -- therefore it follows that reasoning that does not presuppose God is improper! (If proper reason, then God; ~God; therefore ~proper reason.) Hence a Van Tillian will call out the unbeliever on his false assumptions.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Depends what is meant by knowledge. If it's absolute indubitable intellectual certainty, then obviously the unbeliever does not have knowledge, since he has no intellectual assent.



He must have some amount of intellectual assent, given that he suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. One cannot suppress something without possessing it, and one cannot possess a truth without some sort of intellectual assent to it.



P. F. Pugh said:


> If I argue to theism, to trinitarianism, and then to Christianity, it seems that I am arguing for the God of the Scriptures. Anselm of Canterbury demonstrated such a method quite well in his writings.



The problems of this methodology are twofold: (1) If you begin by telling the unbeliever that his principles and assumptions regarding reality are not flawed at the outset, then you cannot consistently tell them they are flawed at the conclusion; it is impossible to tell an unbeliever at the beginning "reason does not necessarily presuppose God" and then tell him at the conclusion "reason necessarily presupposes God." (2) You will never get near the end of such a method if you have an unbeliever who is anywhere near consistent in his unbelief. The conclusions at each step are far too malleable.

I would be curious as to how you prove trinitarianism on top of theism, though.



P. F. Pugh said:


> This is, to my mind, both the strength and the weakness of the presuppositional method. On the one hand, it can tear down strongholds of unbelief, but on the other hand, it is beyond the scope of an apologist to tear down every possible stronghold. There are always more options.



I would disagree...there aren't _that_ many flavors of unbelief today. If you tear down evolutionism, then you've just disproven the view of a vast majority of unbelievers in America. And there's only so much to the history of philosophy. And there are many similarities between different schools of unbelief. Etc.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Islam is an internally consistent set of propositions--but it falls apart when it is shown up against the light of reality (not to mention history).



There is still a sense in which presuppositionalism deals with external consistency, though not to the extent that classical apologetics does. I hope this thread can be of some help.



P. F. Pugh said:


> For example, I use the modal ontological argument (which Kant failed to even address--possibly because he didn't know of its existence) to prove the presuppositional point that God's existence is self-evident from the very concept of God.



I have not yet studied Plantinga's modal ontological argument for God, so I will reserve judgment on anything specific about that. But I can say that such an argument does not make God's existence self-evident. (It is self-evident, but not for that reason.) For a proposition to be self-evident, it must be the case that upon understanding what a proposition means (not exhaustively), the person believes it. Therefore, the soundness of the modal ontological argument would not make "God exists" self-evident. No argument can possibly make a proposition self-evident.



P. F. Pugh said:


> for even God is not purely rational (God is love and love is not logical)



If you attempted to lay this out in syllogistic form, you would see that you're committing a fallacy of equivocation. The "love" that is signified when predicated of God and the "love" that is signified in "love is not logical" are different.


----------



## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> We cannot come to absolute certainty in a purely rational manner--for even God is not purely rational (God is love and love is not logical). We can, however, come to reasonable certainty.



Interesting syllogism: (_modus ponens_)

G is L
L is ~l
therefore G is ~l

.... in other words ....

God is love,
love is not logical,
therefore God is not logical.

Is that the conclusion you want to assert? If not, then one of the premises has to be rejected. 

As Ben points out: the equivocation leads to the assertion: God is illogical love.


----------



## harvelljr

I am going to post a response, even though I know that you all are over my head in this discussion, yet I will still speak, though I guess a fool ought to stay quite sometimes:

Presuppositional apologetics was a good method to use, probably in the early church and onward for several centuries, this does not however, suppose that some did not argue from natural revelation.

The fact being that, then the main apologies were written against other monotheistic religions, such as Judaism and Islam. But as Avery Cardinal Dulles so aptly put it in his "A History of Apologetics":

"Apologetics in the early modern period takes on a very different shape than it had had in earlier centuries. For the [Church] Fathers it was debate about the relative merits of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. For the medieval theologians, apologetics was a contest among the three great montheistic faiths--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--all of which appealed to historical revelation. But after the Renaissance, apologetics had to address thinkers who rejected revelation entirely and who in some cases denied the existence and knowability of God. For the first time in history, orthodox Christians felt constrained to prove the existence of God and the possibility and fact of revelation."

[Before I go any further I want to say that I know Avery Cardinal Dulles is a Catholic, but I am reading this history written by him, for an assignment that I was given through Ligonier ministries].

Today we live in a society that does not hold the scriptures as authoritive, matter of fact there are many Pastors who do not believe that the scriptures are the inpsired word of God, which is a sad fact indeed.

But I see apologetics arguing between two positions up through its history. It has developed as the doctrine of soteriology has by being caught between several views. Just as the doctrine of salvation has been in dispute between Pelagianism and Augustinism or Semi-Pelagianism [Arminianism, Catholicism]and Calvinism, even so apologetics has been caught between the views of reason and faith. Yet there are some that believe that we have a reasonable faith. 

In my study of apologetics I have found that the Bible gives reasonable or historical evidences for believing in Christ. There is eye witness testimony, the proofs from fulfilled prophecies, miracles, and the fact of the resurrection. I see this because I am saved. I see this because I have faith in God. But there are millions living in today's society that have been taught that there is no God or that this world has come into being by itself. 

I asked my neice the other week a question from science and then showed how the Bible refutes what science believes in that area, yet she still believed what the schools told her because that is what she has been taught.

Therefore for one to use presuppositional apologetics is, if you were to ask me, a circular argument or uses circular reasoning. Presuppositionalism in today's society is a method that tries to convince men that the Bible is true because it it says it is true, when those same men do not believe in the authority of the scriptures but rather in the authority of science, the schools, etc...

So now we argue from the same method that has been one of the methods used up through the history of apologetics and that is the method of reason. We show that we have a rational, logical faith. We show that science is secular science is wrong and that Christian science is right and is gaining grounds if not excelling those who argue from evolutionary beliefs. This is the reason my neice could argue that the teacher was right because she has been indoctrinated and not educated. We have to realize that what we are debating is a religion in and of itself, but this religion has no god, nor does it have proofs to back it up, only vain beliefs.

This being because man has suppressed the truth of scripture. Man does not want God to exist. Ben asked a question earlier:

"However, what I was saying is that any proofs of a Creator-Judge (e.g. the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God) necessarily fall short of bringing people to repentance. *And if apologetics is incapable of that, then it is failing in its purpose of silencing the unbeliever.* Such apologetics would tell the unbeliever that he is generally right in his worldview, because honestly those arguments prove next to nothing. (E.g. a secular humanist can view man as the "divine" Lawgiver and matter itself as the First Cause.)"

If Ben expects apologetics to bring people to repentance, then he is practising a futile art. Apologetics does not bring men to repentance, this is the purpose of the word of God and the work of the Holy Spirit. But apologetics is used to defend the faith of Christianity from attacks from outside the Christian faith. Therefore, if someone states that this world is eternal, then I can show from science that this world is going to end. By using the laws of themodynamics that shows that the amount of usable energy is winding down and will com to an end one day. Then as I silence the unbeliever from the stance of natural reason, I have the opportunity to give him the very word of the living God and to make an impact on him with scripture.

You see most today think that science has put to silence the scriptures and has proved that the Bible is not true. 

One day I used the method of showing an unbeliever the historical reliability of the scriptures through manuscript evidence. Did this convert him? No. But he did start reading the Bible and matter fact read it all the way through and would even come ask questions while he was reading it, but unfortunately he still is not born again.

You see there are no atheist. People may claim atheism, but they no in the heart that God exist and they surpress that truth in order to live the way they want to without having to be accountable to anyone.

Maybe I should not have spoken up but I want to say that Classical apologetics is a good method to use, but if we are looking for new births through apologetics then we have the wrong views because it is only through the preaching of the word that men are born again, but apologetics helps us get our foot in the door in order that we might present that word.


----------



## Confessor

harvelljr said:


> The fact being that, then the main apologies were written against other monotheistic religions, such as Judaism and Islam. But as Avery Cardinal Dulles so aptly put it in his "A History of Apologetics":
> 
> "Apologetics in the early modern period takes on a very different shape than it had had in earlier centuries. For the [Church] Fathers it was debate about the relative merits of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. For the medieval theologians, apologetics was a contest among the three great montheistic faiths--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--all of which appealed to historical revelation. But after the Renaissance, apologetics had to address thinkers who rejected revelation entirely and who in some cases denied the existence and knowability of God. For the first time in history, orthodox Christians felt constrained to prove the existence of God and the possibility and fact of revelation."



Thanks for the quotation. What he says doesn't really make a problem for presuppositionalism; in fact, it helps it out. Part of presuppositionalism is stressing the fact that without the starting point of divine revelation from God, we cannot understand the world. Presup involves arguing that the only possibility of knowledge is built on divine revelation. And, if presup is successful, a stronger argument for revelation cannot be made.



harvelljr said:


> I asked my neice the other week a question from science and then showed how the Bible refutes what science believes in that area, yet she still believed what the schools told her because that is what she has been taught.



I don't doubt that she ought to have accepted the Biblical testimony immediately (because it is the Word of God whether she likes it or not). However, please keep in mind that presup is not simply "This is what the Bible says, and if you disagree you're wrong." Rather, in your niece example, a presuppositionalist might have shown her how depending on science and its autonomous presuppositions is nonsensical -- In other words,, showing her that her choice to trust the authority of atheistic scientists rather than the authority of God's Word leads to the destruction of knowledge. 

I hope you can see from this example that presuppositionalism is not circular in any fallacious sense.

This being because man has suppressed the truth of scripture. Man does not want God to exist. Ben asked a question earlier:



harvelljr said:


> If Ben expects apologetics to bring people to repentance, then he is practising a futile art. Apologetics does not bring men to repentance, this is the purpose of the word of God and the work of the Holy Spirit.



I of course agree with you that apologetics _per se_ does not bring anyone to repentance. My point is that if apologetics does not/cannot give the unbelievers reasons why he _ought_ to repent, then it fails in its purpose.



harvelljr said:


> One day I used the method of showing an unbeliever the historical reliability of the scriptures through manuscript evidence. Did this convert him? No. But he did start reading the Bible and matter fact read it all the way through and would even come ask questions while he was reading it, but unfortunately he still is not born again.



I am glad this occurred, but honestly the only reason I can say it did occur is because the atheist was inconsistent in his unbelief. Historical reliability, while it is useful and has its place (usually in "defensive" apologetics), simply does not entail truthfulness, nor does it entail divine authorship. Were God not to restrain the man's unbelief, the unbeliever would have (rationally) continued about his life without caring about historical reliability.

Furthermore, I would say you were arguing as an inconsistent presuppositionalist. A presupper, if he were to use historical evidences as a means of "offensive apologetics" (though I never would because the conclusions can too easily be interpreted away by the unbeliever, as I've seen done), would essentially argue, "Given Biblical authority, this historical evidence makes good sense; given non-Biblical authority, this historical evidence doesn't really make good sense." In other words,, the presupper would argue for Biblical authority (1) as a "package deal" and (2) not as a mere conclusion, but a starting point -- the unbeliever has to look through the lens of Scripture to make sense of anything.

While this might sound bold or arrogant, I would go so far as to say that all successful evidentialists are inconsistent presuppositionalists (just as all saved Arminians are inconsistent Calvinists).


----------



## harvelljr

As I have shown, I was merely giving observations mainly from experience. I have studied apologetics some, but now more in-depth concerning the historical aspects and the arguments between faith and reason, so though you have made some good points I will concede that I would not even know where in the world to begin my defense against it. 

I just know that R. C. Sproul is a Classical apologist and that I am a big fan of his and follow his teachings. Who knows, though, I might after coming to more perfect knowledge, reject the classical approach.

However, towards your last comment: I never stated that the unbeliever that I used manuscript evidence on was an atheist, but only an unbeliever.


----------



## Philip

Whitefield said:


> As Ben points out: the equivocation leads to the assertion: God is illogical love.



My argument was badly phrased. However, I think I do need to make a distinction between illogic and non-logic. Love is not necessarily illogical, but is never completely logical. Show me a good logical reason why a just God would love and choose to save sinners (for He does not need them for any reason) and I'll show you Arminianism.



Confessor said:


> First, as Clark and Beth have surely had at the back of their minds when they asked what a "presuppositional Thomist" was, I'm fairly certain that such a term is an oxymoron.



It means, in essence, that no worldview or set of presuppositions is self-contained or completely disconnected from general revelation and therefore, general revelation may be used to lead a person to Scriptural revelation.



> Irrationality is part of the image of God? Can you please elaborate on this. I would disagree, given that truth and knowledge ("God is a god of knowledge") are generally considered good things; and irrationality is antithetical to them.



I said _non-rational_ not _irrational_. It is irrational for me to go jump off a cliff right now. It is non-rational for me to jump off a diving board right now. I have no logical reason to jump off a diving board, but I have every logical reason to avoid jumping off a cliff. One acts based on emotion (e.g. jumping off a diving board is fun) while the other acts against knowledge (jumping off a cliff will get me killed).



> If you believe that men ought to believe that the Bible is the Word of God without its being proven evidentially, then it would seem that the statement is proved, correct?



The Bible is its own evidence--if interpreted correctly. The trouble is that nonbelievers bring their presuppositions to the text and are therefore blind to it.



> Are you aware of Van Til's distinction between metaphysical and epistemological common ground -- or as I prefer to call them, actual and espoused common ground?



No, I hadn't. However, I would hesitate to draw that distinction for this reason: whatever actual common ground there is must, under presuppositionalism, be interpreted. If I come to the Bible with higher critical presuppositions, then I will interpret accordingly. My education has prevented me from seeing reality.

However, once the walls of higher criticism have been torn down, there is a problem. How do I approach the Bible? If I do not interpret, then it will make no sense, since interpretation is making sense of something. I must therefore be given a good reason to adopt a certain framework for interpretation.



> I'm not sure what you mean when you say that an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions, and your labeling it as inductive logic does not help me. Can you perhaps give an example?



Certainly:

1: Balls are round
2: Round things are not flat
3: Therefore the world is round

Obviously invalid, yet the conclusion is true.

Inductive logic is always invalid deductively. Example:

1: CNN said that Barack Obama is President of the United States
2: CNN is generally a reliable source for this kind of fact
3: Therefore Barack Obama is President of the United States

Not valid, but true nevertheless.



> A presuppositionalist would agree that proper reasoning presupposes God -- therefore it follows that reasoning that does not presuppose God is improper! (If proper reason, then God; ~God; therefore ~proper reason.) Hence a Van Tillian will call out the unbeliever on his false assumptions.



1) if A then B
2) B
3) Therefore A

Fallacious. Proper reasoning presupposes God, but simply assuming God does not guarantee proper reasoning. Karl Barth believed in God and rejected reason altogether.

I would argue that since all proper reasoning presupposes God a) all who reason properly presuppose God, even unconsciously. I do not expect to meet Plato in Heaven, but his reasoning is, on occasion, flawless. b) an apologist may therefore use reasoning. Did Anselm presuppose God in the _Proslogion_? Yes, because he reasoned properly and reached a true conclusion (God exists).



> There is still a sense in which presuppositionalism deals with external consistency, though not to the extent that classical apologetics does.



In theory--but rarely in practice. Logical consistency proves little, as I said before.

"Twas brillig and the slithey toves,
Did gyre and gymbol in the wabe,
All mimsy were the borogroves,
And the mome-wraths outgrabe." ~Lewis Carroll

Perfectly logical and internally consistent--and also complete nonsense. All that logic can show is that a set of presuppositions is internally consistent. It says nothing about the truth of those presuppositions.



> If you begin by telling the unbeliever that his principles and assumptions regarding reality are not flawed at the outset, then you cannot consistently tell them they are flawed at the conclusion



If certain of them were not correct, there would be no argument. You have already said that proper reasoning presupposes God, so if I reason properly, then I have already presupposed God and he, in reasoning with me, is presupposing God. Argument is God's ground.

I think C. S. Lewis's fictional devil Screwtape summed it up nicely (in his twisted way):

"It sounds as if you supposed that _argument_ was the way to keep him out of the Enemy's [God's] clutches . . . The trouble with argument is that it moves the whole struggle on to the Enemy's own ground. He can argue too; whereas in really practical propaganda of the kind I am suggesting He has been shown for centuries to be greatly the inferior of Our Father Below. By the very act of arguing, you awake the patient's reason . . . Even if a particular train of thought can be twisted so as to end in our favour, you will find that you have been strengthening in your patient the fatal habit of attending to universal issues and withrawing his attention from the stream of immediate sense experiences . . . Do remember you are there to fuddle him."



> He must have some amount of intellectual assent, given that he suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. One cannot suppress something without possessing it, and one cannot possess a truth without some sort of intellectual assent to it.



I think the suppression could be termed as "willful ignorance."



> You will never get near the end of such a method if you have an unbeliever who is anywhere near consistent in his unbelief.



If he won't believe, that's between Him and God. I'm just the messenger. As I also recall, Lewis (who is, by the grace of God, now a Calvinist) did it quite well in _Mere Christianity_ (granted, his logic was inductive--but I have considered his moral argument for the existence of God as an alternative to the ontological).



> I would be curious as to how you prove trinitarianism on top of theism, though.



Work on that argument is in progress and is tied up in the metaphysical debate between pluralism and monism.



> But I can say that such an argument does not make God's existence self-evident.



To an extent, I argee with you. God's existence would be self-evident without argument. However, the argument leaves no loopholes for denying such to be the case.



> If you attempted to lay this out in syllogistic form, you would see that you're committing a fallacy of equivocation.



As stated above, it was badly worded on my part.


----------



## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> As Ben points out: the equivocation leads to the assertion: God is illogical love.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Show me a good logical reason why a just God would love and choose to save sinners (for He does not need them for any reason) and I'll show you Arminianism.
Click to expand...


His choosing logically fit with "the most wise and holy counsel of his own will."


----------



## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> I said _non-rational_ not _irrational_. It is irrational for me to go jump off a cliff right now. It is non-rational for me to jump off a diving board right now. I have no logical reason to jump off a diving board, but I have every logical reason to avoid jumping off a cliff. One acts based on emotion (e.g. jumping off a diving board is fun) while the other acts against knowledge (jumping off a cliff will get me killed).



A lot of distinctions could be made here, but as long as we agree that God is not irrational we are in good shape. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> The Bible is its own evidence--if interpreted correctly. The trouble is that nonbelievers bring their presuppositions to the text and are therefore blind to it.



Yes, so therefore we critique the unbeliever's presuppositions rather than reason _from_ them.



P. F. Pugh said:


> No, I hadn't. However, I would hesitate to draw that distinction for this reason: whatever actual common ground there is must, under presuppositionalism, be interpreted.



The distinction that Van Til makes is that if the believer and unbeliever were consistent in their principles, then neither would have any common ground at all. The unbeliever would know nothing at all, not even that he knows nothing! That is the espoused common ground, and it is what the apologist tries to point out by hypothetically drawing out the implications of unbelief.

The actual common ground is what common ground actually exists because God in His grace restrains the unbeliever from being entirely consistent in his unbelief. In terms of polemical apologetics (i.e., critiquing the unbeliever's presupposition), these would be the "immutable facts" that I mentioned in the external consistency thread.

Take an example of this distinction: the unbeliever might assume that a providential God is not behind every fact. As a result, he would believe that Chance is. If he believes that Chance is behind every fact, then it would follow that universal, prescriptive laws of logic would not be able to exist in his worldview (this is the lack of espoused common ground). However, he _does_ believe in universal, prescriptive laws of logic -- in fact, he can't help but believe in them. The "immutable fact" (from the external consistency thread) that laws of logic exist is an instance of _actual_ common ground. It is the "bridge" so to speak that the presuppositionalist uses to launch a polemic on the unbeliever. Actual common ground are those beliefs held in common _despite_ and not because of his unbelieving presupposition.

As a result of this distinction, which is quite crucial to presuppositionalism, you can see that saying something like "whatever actual common ground there is must, under presuppositionalism, be interpreted" is not a hindrance at all to presup. We show unbelievers that the actual common ground can be interpreted according to unbelieving presuppositions, except that doing so would _destroy knowledge_.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Certainly:
> 
> 1: Balls are round
> 2: Round things are not flat
> 3: Therefore the world is round
> 
> Obviously invalid, yet the conclusion is true.
> 
> Inductive logic is always invalid deductively. Example:
> 
> 1: CNN said that Barack Obama is President of the United States
> 2: CNN is generally a reliable source for this kind of fact
> 3: Therefore Barack Obama is President of the United States
> 
> Not valid, but true nevertheless.



Okay, I understand that. But why is that a problem with presuppositionalism?



P. F. Pugh said:


> 1) if A then B
> 2) B
> 3) Therefore A
> 
> Fallacious. Proper reasoning presupposes God, but simply assuming God does not guarantee proper reasoning. Karl Barth believed in God and rejected reason altogether.



I'm sorry if I didn't make myself clear, but by ~God, I meant "not-God." My argument was therefore a valid structure, _modus tollens_: If proper reason, then God; not-God; therefore not-proper reason.

And Karl Barth was wrong. He did not assume the God of the Bible, but some dream concoction of Him. (A key tenet of presuppositionalism is to note that we are not arguing for some generic theism, but for Biblical Christianity at every point. When a presupper says, "God exists," that means the same thing as "The Bible is true.")



P. F. Pugh said:


> an apologist may therefore use reasoning.



I think you might be misunderstanding presup. We do not argue against "reasoning." We argue against reasoning from the basis of unbelieving presuppositions (assuming that God is not necessarily the providential organizer of the universe, assuming that laws of logic are self-existent rather than necessarily created by God, etc.).



P. F. Pugh said:


> In theory--but rarely in practice. Logical consistency proves little, as I said before.



No offense, but did you read that thread? I personally think it is monumental as far as presuppositionalism goes. I struggled for a long time in understanding how presup is not a "dream system" dealing only with internal consistencies, yet avoiding the flaws in evidentialism pointed out by presup. I struggled to provide a fusion between the two. I thought I found a good balance, and that is the thread I posted to you. Please read it if you don't mind.



P. F. Pugh said:


> If certain of them were not correct, there would be no argument.



Yes, that is why presuppers don't allow argument on autonomous presuppositions -- there is no argument that can proceed from them. The fact that some people continue to reason autonomously does not somehow show that the autonomous presupposition is correct!



P. F. Pugh said:


> You have already said that proper reasoning presupposes God, so if I reason properly, then I have already presupposed God and he, in reasoning with me, is presupposing God. Argument is God's ground.



This begs the question. You are assuming that you're reasoning properly and then saying that you must be presupposing God. As for "argument is God's ground," I agree; but it doesn't follow that argument from any presupposition is legit.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I think the suppression could be termed as "willful ignorance."



It depends on what you mean by "ignore." If you mean an ignorance that does not involve some acknowledgment of the truth, then I would disagree. Again, it does not make sense to say that one is suppressing a truth that one does not possess _in some sense_.



P. F. Pugh said:


> If he won't believe, that's between Him and God. I'm just the messenger.



No, that's not the point I was making. I realize that the unbeliever can just close his eyes to the whole apologetical endeavor -- that applies equally well to presup. But what I am critiquing is the fact that classical apologetics cannot actually yield an argument for the truthfulness of Christianity. It just can't happen. It's impossible to start by telling the unbeliever "your belief that God is not necessarily sovereign over reasoning is fine" and end by telling him that it's not fine. If God is sovereign over reasoning at the end, He's sovereign at the beginning. And our apologetics should reflect that.


----------



## Philip

Confessor said:


> Yes, so therefore we critique the unbeliever's presuppositions rather than reason from them.



Here's where I think we differ: no set of presuppositions is completely disconnected from reality. Therefore, every set of presuppositions contains some truth, however twisted and perverted it may be. The apologist may seize upon that truth and argue from it.



> The distinction that Van Til makes is that if the believer and unbeliever were consistent in their principles, then neither would have any common ground at all.



Yes they would. Consistent Islam and consistent Christianity do have common ground: I do not argue the existence of God with a Muslim, but the nature of God.

The only case that might be made for such a position is that of Friedrich Nietzche who actually lived consistently with Atheism: he went insane. There is no arguing with an insane person. If there is no common ground, then there is no apologetic whatsoever.



> The actual common ground is what common ground actually exists because God in His grace restrains the unbeliever from being entirely consistent in his unbelief.



Consistent Islam would still contain elements of God's truth (seeing as it is a Christian heresy). There is consistency outside of Christianity.



> Take an example of this distinction: the unbeliever might assume that a providential God is not behind every fact. As a result, he would believe that Chance is. If he believes that Chance is behind every fact, then it would follow that universal, prescriptive laws of logic would not be able to exist in his worldview (this is the lack of espoused common ground).



The laws of logic do not "exist" in any ordinary sense: they are merely true descriptions of the way things must necessarily be. Even chance would operate according to the laws of logic, since chance could still not produce B and ~B at the same time. The laws of logic are true regardless of any other factor.

In reading through your writing, I came across this:



> I believe I have found it, and the answer is what I term to be primary interpretations. Primary interpretations are interpretations which have not yet gone through the filter of our presuppositions and therefore cannot yet be distorted by our depravity.



Any interpretation is in itself a product of presuppositions. There are no "primary interpretations" in your sense for the simple reason that if there is an interpretation, then it must have been filtered already. Interpretation entails presupposition. At best, "Primary interpretations" are in themselves presuppositions.



> Although the unbeliever naturally sees all facts through his yellow glasses, there is a point at which God’s grace restrains him from distorting some facts, and it is those points which we attack.



What I would argue is that the grace of God keeps those yellow glasses from being a complete distortion. Somehow God's truth manages to sneak into every set of presuppositions.



> This begs the question. You are assuming that you're reasoning properly and then saying that you must be presupposing God. As for "argument is God's ground," I agree; but it doesn't follow that argument from any presupposition is legit.



Granted, but argument from any _true_ presupposition is legit.



> It depends on what you mean by "ignore." If you mean an ignorance that does not involve some acknowledgment of the truth, then I would disagree. Again, it does not make sense to say that one is suppressing a truth that one does not possess in some sense.



In a very loose sense, I suppose. I would call it suppressing the truth to deny that eating a hamburger is bad for me even though I refuse to look at the calorie count. I don't have knowledge of the truth, but I could, and still refuse to look for it.



> But what I am critiquing is the fact that classical apologetics cannot actually yield an argument for the truthfulness of Christianity. It just can't happen. It's impossible to start by telling the unbeliever "your belief that God is not necessarily sovereign over reasoning is fine" and end by telling him that it's not fine. If God is sovereign over reasoning at the end, He's sovereign at the beginning. And our apologetics should reflect that.



But if I was saying that his belief that God is not necessarily sovereign is fine, then I wouldn't argue the point. My arguing the point proves that I don't think it's fine. If I thought your presuppositionalism was fine, I wouldn't be arguing it.

Incidentally, I find it rather interesting that no presuppositionalist considers the modal ontological argument to be valid, despite the fact that it can only argue for the Christian God, as He is the Greatest Possible Being (the first premise of the argument). It's possibly because few realize that Anselm had two arguments (even Kant completely overlooked the modal argument). This is the presuppositionalist's dream: an argument for God's existence that presupposes His sovereignty and can only be talking about the Christian God.


----------



## chbrooking

Philip,
I'm basically an observer to the conversation. I am most definitely a presuppositionalist. Ben is doing a find job of representing the position. So I won't pile on, except to point out that Islam and Christianity share nothing. Christianity does not have a non-immanent monad as its God. That is, we do not share belief in the existence of God, because the very term must contain its definition. To say that we share belief in the existence of God is to equivocate on the term God.

Incidentally, one of Islam's core tenets (presuppositions) is that nothing which might be said of God may be said of man and vice versa. But that precludes revelation completely. Their system is internally inconsistent.


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> Islam and Christianity share nothing. Christianity does not have a non-immanent monad as its God. That is, we do not share belief in the existence of God, because the very term must contain its definition. To say that we share belief in the existence of God is to equivocate on the term God.



Then I will rephrase--we agree on the existence of _a_ God. It is the nature of that God that we are debating. It's quibbling to suggest that such a debate is a debate over God's existence: we are debating precisely whether God is a non-immanent monad. I don't argue for the existence of God with a Muslim for the same reason that I don't argue the divinity of Christ with a Catholic.

The Muslim already believes that God exists--I am merely proving that God is not who the Muslim thinks Him to be. I am arguing, in fact, that the non-immanent monad is not the greatest possible being and therefore cannot be God.



> Incidentally, one of Islam's core tenets (presuppositions) is that nothing which might be said of God may be said of man and vice versa. But that precludes revelation completely. Their system is internally inconsistent.



Actually, that inconsistency is (paradoxically) consistent. Since Islam denies reason utterly, it would be inconsistent for it to be consistent. Thus, it is actually consistent.


----------



## chbrooking

P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> Islam and Christianity share nothing. Christianity does not have a non-immanent monad as its God. That is, we do not share belief in the existence of God, because the very term must contain its definition. To say that we share belief in the existence of God is to equivocate on the term God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Then I will rephrase--we agree on the existence of _a_ God. It is the nature of that God that we are debating. It's quibbling to suggest that such a debate is a debate over God's existence: we are debating precisely whether God is a non-immanent monad. I don't argue for the existence of God with a Muslim for the same reason that I don't argue the divinity of Christ with a Catholic.
> 
> The Muslim already believes that God exists--I am merely proving that God is not who the Muslim thinks Him to be. I am arguing, in fact, that the non-immanent monad is not the greatest possible being and therefore cannot be God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Incidentally, one of Islam's core tenets (presuppositions) is that nothing which might be said of God may be said of man and vice versa. But that precludes revelation completely. Their system is internally inconsistent.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Actually, that inconsistency is (paradoxically) consistent. Since Islam denies reason utterly, it would be inconsistent for it to be consistent. Thus, it is actually consistent.
Click to expand...


The Muslim would not agree with your assessment that he denies reason utterly. And, in fact, he doesn't. By using language or math, the Muslim demonstrates that reason holds. He simply cannot give a reason for reason. His presuppositions are inconsistent with his life and worldview. That is what presuppositional apologetics points out to him. 

But I think you are quite missing the point. We cannot begin with agreement on the existence of 'a God', simply because it is no agreement at all. The term must have content or communication is pointless. This is why all reasoning is circular, good reason being virtuously circular, bad reason being viciously so. How will you move from a shared term 'God' which,, as shared, has nothing of the Christian God in its denotation or connotation, --How will you move from this to the Christian God? You might as well begin with agreement that we both have a holy book. We wouldn't agree that theirs is a holy book at all, so there is no agreement at all. 

We aren't asking the Muslim to tweak his theology. We are asking him for wholesale repentance.


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> This is why all reasoning is circular, good reason being virtuously circular, bad reason being viciously so.



It is this premise that leads me to the conclusion that presuppositionalism is fideistic and a cousin of Neo-Orthodoxy. Circular reasoning is (by definition) always fallacious, whether deductive or inductive. If we claim that Christianity is circular reasoning, we have claimed that Christianity is a fallacy.



> The Muslim would not agree with your assessment that he denies reason utterly.



A consistent Muslim would. He would maintain that just because the laws of logic apply now does not mean that they will apply in the future. 



> By using language or math, the Muslim demonstrates that reason holds.



He demonstrates that they hold now. He does not demonstrate that they will hold in the future.



> But I think you are quite missing the point. We cannot begin with agreement on the existence of 'a God', simply because it is no agreement at all. The term must have content or communication is pointless.



And yet, there is a definition of God that both the Muslim and the Christian will agree to: God is the greatest possible being. If the Muslim denies this, his presuppositions are shown to be inferior to Christianity. If he agrees, then the battle is basically over. This is the brilliance of Anselm's ontological arguments: they can lead only to one being--the God of the Scriptures.



> We aren't asking the Muslim to tweak his theology. We are asking him for wholesale repentance.



Indeed--we are showing him that the God he worships isn't the real one, but a perversion of the real one.


----------



## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> And yet, there is a definition of God that both the Muslim and the Christian will agree to: God is the greatest possible being. If the Muslim denies this, his presuppositions are shown to be inferior to Christianity. If he agrees, then the battle is basically over.



Could you explain how it is that "the battle is basically over," when the Muslim agrees that Allah is the greatest possible being?


----------



## chbrooking

P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> This is why all reasoning is circular, good reason being virtuously circular, bad reason being viciously so.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It is this premise that leads me to the conclusion that presuppositionalism is fideistic and a cousin of Neo-Orthodoxy. Circular reasoning is (by definition) always fallacious, whether deductive or inductive. If we claim that Christianity is circular reasoning, we have claimed that Christianity is a fallacy.
Click to expand...


All reasoning is necessarily circular. The moment you construct a syllogism, the middle term, which must bridge the major and minor, must be presupposed within each of the latter. In other words, the conclusion is guaranteed by the definition of the terms themselves. If the middle term were not included within the definition of the other terms, there would be no bridge between them and no conclusion could be drawn.

When I say, "All men are mortal", mortality is assumed in what it means to be man. And likewise, when I say that socrates is a man, I'm assuming both his humanity and mortality, not really demonstrating it. Unless I equivocate on man, the result is guaranteed by the definitions. It is inherently circular. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> The Muslim would not agree with your assessment that he denies reason utterly.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A consistent Muslim would. He would maintain that just because the laws of logic apply now does not mean that they will apply in the future.
> 
> He demonstrates that they hold now. He does not demonstrate that they will hold in the future.
Click to expand...


In a sense, you are quite right. The problem is that there is no such thing as a consistent Muslim -- nor can there be. A Muslim lives in the Christian God's world, and persists merely at the pleasure and long-suffering of the Christian God. He cannot be consistent in such a world while denying the existence of the Christian God. Were he consistent, he could not know; he could not speak; etc. The moment he speaks, he demonstrates that he actually knows that the laws of logic do not in fact change. And I'm sure he will not grant that his precious Quran may be true today, but not tomorrow. So even within his own self-deception he cannot be consistent.



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> But I think you are quite missing the point. We cannot begin with agreement on the existence of 'a God', simply because it is no agreement at all. The term must have content or communication is pointless.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And yet, there is a definition of God that both the Muslim and the Christian will agree to: God is the greatest possible being. If the Muslim denies this, his presuppositions are shown to be inferior to Christianity. If he agrees, then the battle is basically over. This is the brilliance of Anselm's ontological arguments: they can lead only to one being--the God of the Scriptures.
Click to expand...


I'm reluctant to replicate unbelievers' assault on Christian proofs, especially since I believe the classical proofs are true and cogent within a Christian worldview. But if the unbeliever does not grant the Christian presuppositions, he might argue as Gaskins does:

1. The creation of the world is the greatest achievement imaginable.

2. The merit of an achievement is the product of its intrinsic quality, and the ability of its creator.

3. The greater the handicap of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.

5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a greater being - namely, one who created everything while not existing.

6. An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.

Ergo:

7. God does not exist.

As I mentioned, I'm reluctant to republish such nonsense, but it is instructive in showing some of the problems with the ontological argument.

But what is most ironic to me is that you want to reject presuppositionalism on the basis of circularity, but of all the classical proofs, this is the most circular!


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> All reasoning is necessarily circular. The moment you construct a syllogism, the middle term, which must bridge the major and minor, must be presupposed within each of the latter.



Here you assume that the syllogism is true. A syllogism by definition is merely valid--it does not follow that it is true.

Example:

God and pointless evil cannot coexist
Pointless evil exists
Therefore God does not exist

Of course, this is countered by saying

God and pointless evil cannot coexist
God exists
Therefore pointless evil does not exist

Both are logically valid, but the second premise in each may be true or false--one has to compare it to reality to find out. I am not presupposing anything in this except what is stated.



> When I say, "All men are mortal", mortality is assumed in what it means to be man.



No it isn't. You are postulating that mortality is part of humanity. You have a proposition that may be either true or false. Your stating it proves nothing unless I agree.



> And likewise, when I say that socrates is a man, I'm assuming both his humanity and mortality, not really demonstrating it.



No, you are postulating it. Again, you have a proposition that may be either true or false. Socrates may not actually be a man--Socrates may be a dog or a cat or an idea. You must specify what is meant by "Socrates".

Unless I agree to the terms of the debate, you cannot debate with me. I must share your presuppositions, or your debating is futile. If non-Christians did not incorporate God's truth into their systems of thought, there would be no debate.



> The problem is that there is no such thing as a consistent Muslim -- nor can there be.



Sure there is: he's called a suicide bomber. The terrorists on 9-11 were consistent with their beliefs, just as Nietzche, in his insanity, was consistent with his beliefs. I wish I saw more Calvinists who were as consistent.



> He cannot be consistent in such a world while denying the existence of the Christian God. Were he consistent, he could not know



Fact is, he can because he is made in the image of God. His belief system allows for that. 



> The moment he speaks, he demonstrates that he actually knows that the laws of logic do not in fact change.



No--he simply demonstrates that they are true at this moment. He cannot be certain that they will be true in five minutes. A stable universe is a presupposition.



> I'm reluctant to replicate unbelievers' assault on Christian proofs, especially since I believe the classical proofs are true and cogent within a Christian worldview. But if the unbeliever does not grant the Christian presuppositions, he might argue as Gaskins does



He can argue it, but the argument postulates things that will not be granted.



> The creation of the world is the greatest achievement imaginable.



I do not grant this. By not granting his first premise, the argument cannot continue. The difference between this and the premise "God is the greatest possible being" is this: one is an assertion, while the other is a definition. The creation of the world is not, by definition, the greatest imaginable achievement, while God is, by definition, the greatest possible being. Once the definition of God is conceded, the debate is over, just as, when total depravity has been conceded, the debate over predestination is over.

I also should mention that the argument falls under Kant's assertion that existence is not a property, but a fact. 

Anselm's first ontological argument falls under this, but his second stands because it does not concern itself with existence as a property, but with mode of existence: is God necessarily existent, contingently existent, or impossibly existent?

The question is answered when contingent and impossible existence are shown to be inferior to necessary existence. Once we see that God is necessarily existent, it must be concluded that he exists.



> But what is most ironic to me is that you want to reject presuppositionalism on the basis of circularity, but of all the classical proofs, this is the most circular!



You addressed the more common ontological argument, not the modal ontological argument.



Whitefield said:


> Could you explain how it is that "the battle is basically over," when the Muslim agrees that Allah is the greatest possible being?



Because then Allah (which is just "God" in Arabic) cannot be the being described in the Koran. Only the being described in the Bible could be the greatest possible being.


----------



## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> Only the being described in the Bible could be the greatest possible being.



Where in the ontological argument is the type of God proved (_e.g._, triune and gracious) with whom we can compare the God described in Scripture?


----------



## chbrooking

My dear friend,
You are responding without considering that to which you respond. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> All reasoning is necessarily circular. The moment you construct a syllogism, the middle term, which must bridge the major and minor, must be presupposed within each of the latter.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Here you assume that the syllogism is true. A syllogism by definition is merely valid--it does not follow that it is true.
> 
> Example:
> 
> God and pointless evil cannot coexist
> Pointless evil exists
> Therefore God does not exist
> 
> Of course, this is countered by saying
> 
> God and pointless evil cannot coexist
> God exists
> Therefore pointless evil does not exist
> 
> Both are logically valid, but the second premise in each may be true or false--one has to compare it to reality to find out. I am not presupposing anything in this except what is stated.
Click to expand...


My statement had nothing whatsoever to do with soundness--only validity. But you have not carefully considered what I was saying. The moment you use a term, you have grouped under one head things that have common characteristics. Leaving the platypus aside, "mammals" bear live young, have hair, feed their young with milk, etc. I'm no zoologist, but I think these are characteristics of the group called mammals. My point is that the term contains the characteristics of the group. One of those characteristics must be the middle term of any valid syllogism, whose distribution is equal to the distribution of its use in the conclusion. If you think carefully about this, you will see that a circle is involved -- necessarily! 



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> When I say, "All men are mortal", mortality is assumed in what it means to be man.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No it isn't. You are postulating that mortality is part of humanity. You have a proposition that may be either true or false. Your stating it proves nothing unless I agree.
> 
> ...
> 
> No, you are postulating it. Again, you have a proposition that may be either true or false. Socrates may not actually be a man--Socrates may be a dog or a cat or an idea. You must specify what is meant by "Socrates".
Click to expand...


The term Socrates is not some blank space to which anything may be attributed. The term itself signifies its universal characteristics (see mammals above).



P. F. Pugh said:


> ]Unless I agree to the terms of the debate, you cannot debate with me. I must share your presuppositions, or your debating is futile. If non-Christians did not incorporate God's truth into their systems of thought, there would be no debate.



This last sentence is quite true, but the non-Christian does not acknowledge its truth. The presuppositional approach is intent on demonstrating the truth of this last sentence. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Sure there is: he's called a suicide bomber. The terrorists on 9-11 were consistent with their beliefs, just as Nietzche, in his insanity, was consistent with his beliefs. I wish I saw more Calvinists who were as consistent.



You are equivocating on the word "consistent".



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> He cannot be consistent in such a world while denying the existence of the Christian God. Were he consistent, he could not know
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Fact is, he can because he is made in the image of God. His belief system allows for that.
Click to expand...


Yes, but only inconsistently so. He cannot be consistent with his rejection of the Christian God and then borrow those things (such as predication) that depend upon the very Christian God he rejects. He does, of course. But in so doing he is suppressing the truth in unrighteousness. He's playing a deadly game of pretend. Our job is to unmask him.



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> The moment he speaks, he demonstrates that he actually knows that the laws of logic do not in fact change.
> 
> 
> 
> No--he simply demonstrates that they are true at this moment. He cannot be certain that they will be true in five minutes. A stable universe is a presupposition.
Click to expand...


My dear brother, I'm afraid you are so close and yet so far away. An unbeliever has no basis for his assumption that the universe is stable. That stability, as you rightly point out, is presupposed. But that presupposition is only consistent within the Christian worldview. By adopting a different worldview, he is forced to inconsistency. He lives as though the Christian God exists (because He does), but he CLAIMS that the Christian God does not exist. He lives as though he knows the universe is stable. He drives home at the end of the day expecting his house to still be there. AND YET his own worldview does not allow for him to have this confidence.



P. F. Pugh said:


> He can argue it, but the argument postulates things that will not be granted.



This is true, but it is true on the level of presuppositions. Now you are sounding as though you know there is no epistemological common ground from which to argue for the existence of God. There is ontological common ground. We both live in the Christian God's world, and we both bear His image. But as soon as the non-believer, be he Muslim or atheist or Hindu or Jew or whatever,--denies the Christian God, he removes his own ability to justify any belief or predication. I would be a fool to share that ground in my argument for the Christian God. The Christian God is excluded by the non-negotiable presuppositions of his epistemolgical starting point.

Incidentally, though, what will you do if he does not grant S5 of modal logic, which is necessary for Plantinga's argument?


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## Philip

chbrooking said:


> One of those characteristics must be the middle term of any valid syllogism, whose distribution is equal to the distribution of its use in the conclusion. If you think carefully about this, you will see that a circle is involved -- necessarily!



You are assuming that it is a categorical syllogism. 



> The term Socrates is not some blank space to which anything may be attributed. The term itself signifies its universal characteristics (see mammals above).



Unless all parties to the debate are in some agreement as to the nature of "Socrates" then it is just blank space.



> This last sentence is quite true, but the non-Christian does not acknowledge its truth. The presuppositional approach is intent on demonstrating the truth of this last sentence.



As is classical apologetics. The difference is how we get there.



> You are equivocating on the word "consistent".



If to be consistent is to live in complete accordance with one's espoused beliefs, then no one except Christ was really consistent. If it is to live in general accordance with one's beliefs, then there are plenty of non-Christians who are consistent.



> Yes, but only inconsistently so. He cannot be consistent with his rejection of the Christian God and then borrow those things (such as predication) that depend upon the very Christian God he rejects.



How does predication depend on God?



> An unbeliever has no basis for his assumption that the universe is stable.



I was under the impression that presuppositions, by definition, have no basis, but are merely assumed.



> This is true, but it is true on the level of presuppositions.



Not necessarily--it just means that the atheist is assuming common ground that isn't there. It's his assumption, not mine. His burden of proof. He must prove to me that the creation of the world is the greatest possible achievement. I would say that the creation of two such worlds would be an even greater achievement.

I don't use common ground unless it is common. I still contend that believers and unbelievers do share presuppositions.



> Incidentally, though, what will you do if he does not grant S5 of modal logic, which is necessary for Plantinga's argument?



I'm not using Plantinga's argument: I'm using Anselm's second argument (the one Kant did not refute). God is not possibly necessary--God _is_ necessary. God cannot be the GPB and not be necessarily existent.



Whitefield said:


> Where in the ontological argument is the type of God proved (e.g., triune and gracious) with whom we can compare the God described in Scripture?



I would argue that propositions of other sorts (triune, gracious, omnipotent, omniscient, etc) follow logically from the first proposition of the ontological argument: God is the greatest possible being (GPB). I would argue that this truth is the first principle of Christian theology.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> Where in the ontological argument is the type of God proved (e.g., triune and gracious) with whom we can compare the God described in Scripture?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would argue that propositions of other sorts (triune, gracious, omnipotent, omniscient, etc) follow logically from the first proposition of the ontological argument: God is the greatest possible being (GPB). I would argue that this truth is the first principle of Christian theology.
Click to expand...


I would like to see the ontological proofs for why the GPB has three persons instead of two or four (or better yet why the GPB wouldn't have an infinite number of persons in the one GPB). But I won't hold my breath for that ontological proof.


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## Philip

Whitefield said:


> I would like to see the ontological proofs for why the GPB has three persons instead of two or four (or better yet why the GPB wouldn't have an infinite number of persons in the one GPB). But I won't hold my breath for that ontological proof.



That's the argument for the trinity that I am still working on (and may not exist). I would suggest that three is the perfect number, but I have little basis for the postulation.

I also do think that apologetics has its limits. Most of the elect are brought to faith by other means.


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## Confessor

I hate the whole quote-a-snippet-and-post-a-brief-response format of posts, because they take so long and rarely get to the point, so I’m just going to outline a few main points I’ve gathered.

1. You said…


P. F. Pugh said:


> no set of presuppositions is completely disconnected from reality.


Assuming that you mean no set of presuppositions forms its own, completely isolated worldview (because I would argue that the one set of presuppositions not disconnected from reality is the Christian set), I would present this brief argument to counter your claim: A Christian believes every fact is created by the Triune God _ex nihilo_. No one else does. Therefore they will have a different view of things regarding all facts without exception in the universe.

2. As Clark pointed out, Islam is a system of epistemological despair. (If nothing else, realize that presuppositionalists don’t _believe_ it is, so for now you cannot say there is an obvious inconsistency in the presuppositionalist camp.) You responded to Clark’s point by noting that they do not believe in “reason,” and therefore there is no inconsistency (because consistency presupposes the law of contradiction). But, if this is true, it is an outrageous excuse for Islam. All Muslims believe in the law of contradiction (in practice, at the very least). Therefore they have an inconsistent worldview.

3. In the thread, “The Necessity of External Consistency in Apologetics,” if you had read the replies (which I should’ve suggested to you), you would have seen a clarification of the inconsistencies in the OP and a correction of terms. First, change “primary interpretation” to “immutable fact,” since I think the former is a horrendous term to use for the concept, as evidenced by your (non-culpable) misunderstanding of it. I would define an immutable fact as “a proposition which cannot be sinfully distorted by unbelieving presuppositions” (therefore it is immutable because it passes through the interpretive “filter” of the philosopher but it does not change, by God’s grace). An example of this would be that the laws of morality exist (it would be off-topic to argue whether or not it is permissible to say that laws of logic “exist” as you denounced earlier.)

4. You said…


P. F. Pugh said:


> But if I was saying that his belief that God is not necessarily sovereign is fine, then I wouldn't argue the point. My arguing the point proves that I don't think it's fine.


Then why do you allow it in the beginning of his reasoning? Philip, it makes _no sense at all_ to concede autonomous presuppositions in order to prove theonomous ones. You cannot prove the Bible is absolutely authoritative if you try to establish its authority by some other method.

5. The ontological argument in all its forms is rejected by presuppositionalists mostly because its conclusion “a being than which none greater can be conceived” is so absurdly malleable and contingent on anyone’s presuppositions that it proves almost nothing. All self-respecting unbelievers would say that a sovereign God who knows your thoughts and punishes all your sin is most definitely _not_ the greatest conceivable being. While the ontological argument might have some use if used presuppositionally, it is absolutely worthless when used in the classical approach.

6. Philip, have you read anything by Bahnsen or Van TIl regarding that presuppositionalism is circular? You seemed to be responding for the first time on the subject when you said that it must be fallacious because circularity is always fallacious.

7. You keep saying things to which I keep wanting to say, “EXACTLY – that’s exactly what presuppositionalists believe.” As a result, I fear you may completely misunderstand what presuppositionalism is. This is not meant to offend; a very large number of people see it as fideistic from first glance and defend that view to the death without fully understanding the system. Thus, I ask you to _please_ ask questions about it rather than assert what you think is true about it.


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## Prufrock

Excuse my chiming in here; there just seem to be some excesses in certain statements.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I also do think that apologetics has its limits. Most of the elect are brought to faith by other means.



e.g., The preaching of the gospel. Be cautious here; apologetics is not designed to be the cause of faith -- rather, it is a defense and explanation of the faith. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.



P. F. Pugh said:


> That's the argument for the trinity that I am still working on (and may not exist). I would suggest that three is the perfect number, but I have little basis for the postulation.



Also, be careful lest you adopt too high a view of reason and use it to prove/demonstrate/argue those things which are above the scope of reason.


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## Philip

I need to back out of the debate at this point, not because I am convinced (there's a lot I want to say), but because I need to do more research. Eventually I do need to update, expand, and revise my long critique of presuppositionalism and my alternative method.

But, before I do:



Confessor said:


> The ontological argument in all its forms is rejected by presuppositionalists mostly because its conclusion “a being than which none greater can be conceived” is so absurdly malleable and contingent on anyone’s presuppositions that it proves almost nothing.



In fact, the beauty of the argument is that it isn't dependent on _anyone's_ presuppositions. The idea of God as greatest conceivable being (e.g. the Greatest Possible Being) actually anticipates the presuppositions by saying that it's not the greatest being you can conceive but the greatest that _anyone_ can conceive. Even God cannot conceive a being greater than Himself.



Prufrock said:


> The preaching of the gospel. Be cautious here; apologetics is not designed to be the cause of faith -- rather, it is a defense and explanation of the faith.



Amen brother.



> Also, be careful lest you adopt too high a view of reason and use it to prove/demonstrate/argue those things which are above the scope of reason.



I well understand the limits of reason. I can't pretend that I will ever understand the paradox of the trinity. Reason can only point one to faith--it cannot take one all the way.


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## chbrooking

Confessor said:


> I hate the whole quote-a-snippet-and-post-a-brief-response format of posts, because they take so long and rarely get to the point,



Ain't that the truth. I rather like Chris Coldwell's approach. He tends to put his comments at the top, and let the quote follow, which is helpful, since it is easy on the eyes, yet allows you to see the context if you need to.

But when a lengthy post gets broken up and responded to little point by little point -- especially when the points aren't really dealt with adequately, it creates a domino effect.


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