# For those opposed to "Scripturalism"



## Jon (Feb 13, 2006)

*For those opposed to \"Scripturalism\"*

In the unceasing endeavor to honor God according to his word, I would like to hear some definitive arguments from anti-Clarkians concerning the presuppositional view commonly referred to as, Scripturalism. Please note that I do not mean the variety espoused by Cheung or any other system that incorporates a doctrine of Occasionalism. Instead, the simple axiomatic principle that the Bible alone is the source of all knowledge would be what I consider to be "Scripturalism." I would like to hear arguments against this position to see if I have erred in believing the persuasiveness of its arguments.

I would also like to participate and interact with some of the objections given to see if I cannot clarify some misunderstandings and perhaps even provide satisfactory answers.

If anyone is interested to read my blog, I am about halfway through a series on Scripturalist epistemology. There are around 30 pages or more of 12 point single spaced text to read, though. I am not sure if anyone wants to actually read that much. Even more, the arguments are still incomplete, since I am only halfway done with the series.

In any case, my hope and prayer is to glorify God in the manner he requires. One requirement is to defend the faith, and I want to be sure I am doing so properly. Thanks in advance.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon

[Edited on 2-14-2006 by Jon]

[Edited on 2-14-2006 by Jon]


----------



## Myshkin (Feb 13, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> ... Instead, the simple axiomatic principle that the Bible alone is the source of all knowledge would be what I consider to be "Scripturalism."...



Jon-

I would respond with a simple question:

If the bible _alone_ is the source of _all_ knowledge, then how can anyone read your post/question and understand it (have knowledge from it) since it is not the bible? I believe the argument for "scripturalism" is self-defeating. We gain much knowledge of many things without reading our bibles. For instance I have the knowledge that your name is Jon. I didn't find that in the bible. So "all" cannot be correct. You would have to qualify what "all" means.

I would suggest a book called "The Shape of Sola Scriptura" by Keith Mathison to see the difference between fundamentalist and classically reformed understandings of sola scriptura.


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by RAS_
> Jon-
> 
> I would respond with a simple question:
> ...


Hi RAS,

Thanks for your question. The easy answer is you do not have "knowledge" of my question. In order for a proposition to be an object of knowledge it must be true, but there is nothing inherently true about the proposition that I asked the question. That is, it is not inferred from anything necessarily. Nevertheless, you perceived that I asked a question that merited a response, so you made a _judgment_ that you should respond, based on your _belief_ that I posed the interrogative. In short order, you do not know my name is Jon (perhaps I am lying) and you do not know that I asked such and such question (maybe a naughty moderator posted it in "Jon's" name).

I believe this illustrates one of the many misunderstandings people have with the colloquial use of the term "knowledge" and the strict philosophic usage of justified true belief. I use "know" and "knowledge" informally sometimes too (although, I am trying to break myself of that--cosistency, you know).



> _Originally posted by RAS_I would suggest a book called "The Shape of Sola Scriptura" by Keith Mathison to see the difference between fundamentalist and classically reformed understandings of sola scriptura.


Thanks, but that would be reading the Reformers out of context. The Reformers did not deal with the philosophical issues that arise when we talk about theories of justification and truth. They expounded a theological doctrine that asserted the Bible alone is the foundation of the Christian faith. To read back into what they wrote for affirmation or denial of Scripturalism is to make a dubious and distracting appeal to authority. Even more, I could readily cite a number of instances of in Calvin that would support the proposition that the Bible is the sole source of truth, but then I would be guilty of the same fallacious reasoning.

No, instead, we must address the subject within the present context.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Civbert (Feb 14, 2006)

I think anti-Clarkian would mean someone who is against being a Clarkian or against Clarkians, not someone who is against Gordon Clark's views (just in case someone objects to being thought of as against Gordon Clark). I'd like to hear more non-Clarkian views myself. Since I'm a Clarkian, I'm disqualified.


----------



## ChristopherPaul (Feb 14, 2006)

Good call Anthony.

Gordon Clark is cool. It is his apologetics that are disputed.


----------



## RamistThomist (Feb 14, 2006)

Misleading question. I am not against Clark. In fact, I am quite sympathetic to a lot of what he says. My first intro to presup was reading Carl Henry's God Revelation and Authority, first two volumes. 

That being said, I do not hold to some of his views, but I don't have the time/desire to critique scripturalism at the moment.


----------



## Peter (Feb 14, 2006)

I am open to investigating Clarkian epistemology and the Clarkian method of apologetics but a few tendencies of Clarkians I am decidedly against is their narrowing of faith to knowledge and assent without trust, the removal of the faculty of affections from the soul and religion and denial of personal assurance. The Clarkian obsession with mind and the understanding to the complete exclusion of all subjectivity is a tremendous departure from the Reformed faith and a big issue for me.


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

Topic title changed in view of comments. Additionally, I have a very specific problem that I would like to pose that I believe cripples Scripturalism. That problem is languge.

Now, assuming the Scripturalist begins with the axiom of Scripture, how does he deduce language from the Bible? Even more, how can one avoid linguistic skepticism when attempting to deduce theorems from the Bible without begging the question? A good example of this is found in Clark's argument that man knows language (and this must be fallible) because Scripture says God talked to Adam; therefore, God must have given Adam the gift of language. I find this argument to be viciously circular, even as a semi-Scripturalist, myself. It just screams for a demonstration of how such an inference can be drawn from the Bible. Even more, how can the Scripturalist justify his appeal to extra-biblical grammars for indications on the meaning of the texts? How does the Scripturalist support the appeal to Strong, Thayer, or BDB, when such "empirical" evidence lies outside of the bounds of Scripture?

What Scripturalism--especially as Clark manifested it--critically lacks in a demonstrable theory of language that is deducible from the Scriptures. Without that, the system just collapses upon itself.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Peter_
> I am open to investigating Clarkian epistemology and the Clarkian method of apologetics but a few tendencies of Clarkians I am decidedly against is their narrowing of faith to knowledge and assent without trust, the removal of the faculty of affections from the soul and religion and denial of personal assurance. The Clarkian obsession with mind and the understanding to the complete exclusion of all subjectivity is a tremendous departure from the Reformed faith and a big issue for me.


You know, this is a good post because it actually illustrates a number of points that I believe people misunderstand about Clark.

In the first, I do depart from Clark and maintain a tripartite formulation of saving faith and rather think that Clark missed the point in ignoring _fiducia_ based on etymological considerations.

A small correction would clarify that Clark did not deny affections proceed from the soul. Clark argued that all of human nature proceeds from the soul. In other words, he did not distinguish among mind, will, and emotions. Rather, he said that mind _is_ will and _is_ affections.

Clark does exclude the possibility of infallibly knowing that one is saved, but that's a biblical propositon, for God alone knows the name and number of the elect. It is not proposed in Scripture that one may know with infallible certainty that one is justified. Indeed, much of Scripture focuses on the dedication of oneself to sanctification, which is the fruit of justification. But engaging this topic could probably derail this thread pretty quickly, so I'd rather not even get into it.

And Clark does not deny subjectivity at all. In fact, his philosophy makes _all_ human experience subjective in additional to all natural phenomena. That rains makes the ground wet is not an objectively true scientific proposition for Clark, but a subjective personal proposition. In this regard, Clark provides a greater realm for subjective experience than most philosophies do.

I should also like to clarify that Clark was in almost every theological matter, an historic Presbyterian. Even more, the Reformers did not deal with the issues raised by Clark in a matter specifically philosophical and it is probably a fallacious appeal to them to argue that Clark does not merit the label, "Reformer," because of this. Clark was _very_ Reformed, and a cursory read of his books on theology (see especially, _What Presbyterians Believe_) will demonstrate that.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Civbert (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> Topic title changed in view of comments. Additionally, I have a very specific problem that I would like to pose that I believe cripples Scripturalism. That problem is language.
> 
> Now, assuming the Scripturalist begins with the axiom of Scripture, how does he deduce language from the Bible? Even more, how can one avoid linguistic skepticism when attempting to deduce theorems from the Bible without begging the question? A good example of this is found in Clark's argument that man knows language (and this must be fallible) because Scripture says God talked to Adam; therefore, God must have given Adam the gift of language. I find this argument to be viciously circular, even as a semi-Scripturalist, myself. It just screams for a demonstration of how such an inference can be drawn from the Bible. Even more, how can the Scripturalist justify his appeal to extra-biblical grammars for indications on the meaning of the texts? How does the Scripturalist support the appeal to Strong, Thayer, or BDB, when such "empirical" evidence lies outside of the bounds of Scripture?
> ...



I know I'm a Clarkian, but I can't help it. Language is an important issue, but I don't think it is critical. It helps to look at what knowledge is, and what language is. It's easy to get them confused because the Clarkian view of knowledge is propositional. And we think of propositions as verbal. But this is not the case. You can say the same proposition in multiple languages. Language itself is not a element or requirement knowledge, it is a means of conveying knowledge. We can know things without language. But be careful, this does not mean knowledge is not propositional. If you can not express knowledge propositionally, then it is not knowledge - but the words and terms that we think of as the content of propositions, are pointers to the knowledge. 

Can one deduce language from Scripture - yes. Language is the outworking of logic. Can we deduce English from Scripture, indirectly. Any language is a verbalization of knowledge. If there was no knowledge, there would be no language and no Scripture.

I'm not saying this as well as I would like.

Another point. Scripturalism is an epistemology. For a justified true belief, to be a justified true belief - we must justify the truth of the belief. Does that make sense. The belief is there. A truth is a truth. A truth one believes is either an opinion, or knowledge. Epistemology may simply divides beliefs between knowledge and opinion. Scripturalism say the what we can call knowledge is the propositions of Scripture, and what we can deduce from those propositions. But implied in this is the axiom of logic and language. I don't think Scripturalism justifies language and logic, but that both are implicit in any rational epistemology. By taking the axiom of Scripture as true, we implicitly take that logic is also necessary. The alternative is to assuming language and logic is irrationalism.

So take any given proposition, and Scripturalism says that it is knowledge if it can be deduced from Scripture. But I think the assumption of the Scripturalist Axiom can lead to much more than what we assume at first blush. We can deduce geometry (both Euler's and Hyperbolic). Because by asserting the validity of logic and language, we are asserting the any axiom-based self-referential rational system is valid. Any particular language can be used. Logic is so ingrained in any system of thought, that any denial of it is absurd. Logic is the foundation of all languages and mathematics.

I could put this more clearly with more time, but I think this is true. Any rational system of knowledge assumes and demands the laws of logic, and from logic we can deduce any language and mathematics. If knowledge - then logic. If logic, then language and mathematics. 

Scripturalism is not logically prior to language, logic is. And Scripturalism assumes logic is prior to itself. 

Does that make sense? I'm sure I've messed this up and you can restate it more clearly if you can understand what I'm trying to say. But I think we need to set Scripturalism in it's right place. It does not define the source of knowledge, or really the method of knowing, it really defines the _justification_ of knowledge. We know what comes from the revelation in Scripture and what we can deduce therefrom.

[Edited on 2-14-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Arch2k (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Peter_
> I am open to investigating Clarkian epistemology and the Clarkian method of apologetics but a few tendencies of Clarkians I am decidedly against is their narrowing of faith to knowledge and assent without trust, the removal of the faculty of affections from the soul and religion and denial of personal assurance.



I am a Clarkian, and so for the most part, will stay out of this discussion as requested. Just for clarifications sake though, Clark does not reject trust so to speak, he rejects trust as a SEPERATE element of saving faith. Whereas the traditional reformed view of saving faith is "Faith=knowledge+assent+trust", Clark's view would be more like "Faith=knowledge+assent=trust." 



> _Originally posted by Peter_
> The Clarkian obsession with mind and the understanding to the complete exclusion of all subjectivity is a tremendous departure from the Reformed faith and a big issue for me.



I understand what you mean on one hand, but not so much on the other. I think you would have to clarify exactly what you mean before I could comment.


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

Hi Civbert. Glad you decided to join the discussion (and Jeff Bartel, too). I find it pretty helpful to discuss the problems of Scripturalism with others who think similarly.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> I know I'm a Clarkian, but I can't help it. Language is an important issue, but I don't think it is critical. It helps to look at what knowledge is, and what language is. It's easy to get them confused because the Clarkian view of knowledge is propositional. And we think of propositions as verbal. But this is not the case. You can say the same proposition in multiple languages. Language itself is not a element or requirement knowledge, it is a means of conveying knowledge. We can know things without language. But be careful, this does not mean knowledge is not propositional. If you can not express knowledge propositionally, then it is not knowledge - but the words and terms that we think of as the content of propositions, are pointers to the knowledge.


I should clarify what I believe the problem is. I do not find the plurality of languages as much a problem as Clark's theory of meaning. Clark maintains that meaning can be communicated through language because man has a rational mind and God has used language to communicate meaning to man. Incidentally, this is really a problem for any philosophy that appeals to revelation, but I digress from the present problem. Empirical philosophies can appeal to experience as the genesis for a person's knowledge of language. But the Scripturalist must demonstrate how one obtains the knowledge of language from Scripture. One of the escapes for this problem has been Occasionalism, but that raises a whole host of other problems. Augustine tried to apply the Platonic theory of remembrance to the biblical proposition that Christ is the light that lights the minds of all men. In _De Magistro_ he proposed that all "learning" was nothing more than the remembrance of previously conveyed ideas from the mind of Christ to the mind of the man. This uniquely Platonic view did not catch on much and suffers many of the problems that Occasionalism does. Thus, the Scripturalist is hard-pressed to demonstrate a theory of meaning and its expressibility through language from the Scrpitures.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Can one deduce language from Scripture - yes. Language is the outworking of logic. Can we deduce English from Scripture, indirectly. Any language is a verbalization of knowledge. If there was no knowledge, there would be no language and no Scripture.


I am sorry, but I must disagree. Language is not the outworking of logic. Logic itself is non-lingual. It is simply the science of the forms of valid inference. And it can be expressed symbolically, without the use of language (although language is needed to express the meaning of the symbols, but that is preciely the point). The meanings of all logical propositions are expressible in language, but the meanings of all language are not expressible in logical propositions. An interrogative or exclamation is logically meaningless, but language conveys meaning in these forms. Because not all language conveys logical propositions, language cannot universally be "verbalization of knowledge." A question is not an object of knowledge. You have said yourself that propositions are the lone objections of knowledge (something Clark also maintained), and I agree with you on this count, but that is precisely why I see a theory of language as critical to Scripturalism.

It also does not follow that if there were no knowledge, there would be no language. What follows is that if there were no meaning, there would be no language. Meaning is what language communicates, and only some of the meanings conveyed are propositions, _i.e._ objects of knowledge.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Another point. Scripturalism is an epistemology. For a justified true belief, to be a justified true belief - we must justify the truth of the belief. Does that make sense. The belief is there. A truth is a truth. A truth one believes is either an opinion, or knowledge. Epistemology may simply divides beliefs between knowledge and opinion. Scripturalism say the what we can call knowledge is the propositions of Scripture, and what we can deduce from those propositions. But implied in this is the axiom of logic and language. I don't think Scripturalism justifies language and logic, but that both are implicit in any rational epistemology. By taking the axiom of Scripture as true, we implicitly take that logic is also necessary. The alternative is to assuming language and logic is irrationalism.


See, this is where the problem creeps in. I agree that logic is implicitly assumed in the system. It also happens that logic is indeed demonstrable from Scripture, so both bases are covered. But the problem comes when we start to interpret the Scriptures.

The commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is not a logical proposition. The proposition, "The Bible says, 'Thou shalt not kill,'" is. But here is the problem. How do you _know_ the Bible means, "Thou shalt not kill"? How do you know that _raÌ‚tsach_ means "kill"? At this point, one _must_ appeal to extra-biblical sources for the usage. In order to do this, he must first demonstrate that such procedure is consistent with his axiom that the Bible alone is the source of all knowledge.

How does one determine the identity of the meaning of a biblical proposition. I readily grant that a given meaning must mean A and not non-A, but how do you know the meaning is A to begin with? How do you know it is not non-A? I just don't think the axiom addresses this problem adequately. I think a theory of meaning is needed, and to be internally consistent, it must be deduced from the Scriptures.

Assuming language as axiomatic is wrought with innumerable problems. The biggest problem is expressing "language" in a proposition from which all the functionality of language (or at least sufficient functionality to interpret the Scriptures) can be deduced. That is a daunting task. And even more, if such a principle cannot be deduced from Scripture, it makes the system all the more suspect. And if it contradicts Scripture, then it makes the whole system inconsistent.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> So take any given proposition, and Scripturalism says that it is knowledge if it can be deduced from Scripture. But I think the assumption of the Scripturalist Axiom can lead to much more than what we assume at first blush. We can deduce geometry (both Euler's and Hyperbolic). Because by asserting the validity of logic and language, we are asserting the any axiom-based self-referential rational system is valid. Any particular language can be used. Logic is so ingrained in any system of thought, that any denial of it is absurd. Logic is the foundation of all languages and mathematics.


The problem with the argument that any axiom-based self-referential system is valid comes when we ask, "But is it true?" Unless the axioms can be demonstrated from Scripture, we must answer, "No." Clark understood this, which is why he praised Keister for demonstrating the axioms of arithmetic from Scripture. So, in Clark's system, we know arithmetic, but not geometry.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> I could put this more clearly with more time, but I think this is true. Any rational system of knowledge assumes and demands the laws of logic, and from logic we can deduce any language and mathematics. If knowledge - then logic. If logic, then language and mathematics.


I think the problem with this inference has been demonstrated above.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Scripturalism is not logically prior to language, logic is. And Scripturalism assumes logic is prior to itself.
> 
> Does that make sense? I'm sure I've messed this up and you can restate it more clearly if you can understand what I'm trying to say. But I think we need to set Scripturalism in it's right place. It does not define the source of knowledge, or really the method of knowing, it really defines the _justification_ of knowledge. We know what comes from the revelation in Scripture and what we can deduce therefrom.


Yes, that does make sense, and it really helps to narrow the problem as well. Thanks again for responding. I am hoping we can put our heads together and tackle the problem of meaning. I am currently planning a project to attempt to solve this problem from Scripture, but I wanted to see what other people thought, first.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Peter (Feb 14, 2006)

Jon and Jeff,
thanks for your help here. Trust does not equal knowing and believing. Trust is a seperate receiving and resting on the truth we accept. So I see no difference in rejecting trust and making Faith=trust. But I will see the thread on the subject. 

"A small correction would clarify that Clark did not deny affections proceed from the soul. Clark argued that all of human nature proceeds from the soul. In other words, he did not distinguish among mind, will, and emotions. Rather, he said that mind is will and is affections.In other words, he did not distinguish among mind, will, and emotions. Rather, he said that mind is will and is affections."

It seems like a heathen Greek mistake to equate mind with soul. Mind, will and emotions are all *seperate* faculties of the soul. Also its typical of Pelagians (and probably the source of the error) to confuse mind (understanding) with will, as if the mind could be pursuaded then the will shall follow. I think Boston's "Human Nature in its Four-fold State" is the best treatment of this though I haven't read it myself. The reason I mentioned this was Robbins' tirade against Joel Beeke and experimental calvinism.

The common denominator in all these things is Clarks aversion to the personal aspect of religion and exclusive focus on objective notions. But this impression only comes from fragments of debates I've read on the PB and John Robbins' hysterical emails so its possible I'm misinformed.


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Peter_
> It seems like a heathen Greek mistake to equate mind with soul.


I wish you would rather address the error directly than accusing those who maintain such a lack of distinction are thinking like "heathen Greeks." No one has accused those who divide the nature of man of "Arminian heresy."



> _Originally posted by Peter_
> Mind, will and emotions are all *seperate* faculties of the soul. Also its typical of Pelagians (and probably the source of the error) to confuse mind (understanding) with will, as if the mind could be pursuaded then the will shall follow. I think Boston's "Human Nature in its Four-fold State" is the best treatment of this though I haven't read it myself. The reason I mentioned this was Robbins' tirade against Joel Beeke and experimental calvinism.
> 
> The common denominator in all these things is Clarks aversion to the personal aspect of religion and exclusive focus on objective notions. But this impression only comes from fragments of debates I've read on the PB and John Robbins' hysterical emails so its possible I'm misinformed.


I am afraid you yet misunderstand much of what Clark said. He was not at all adverse to personal religion. In fact, he was an ordained Presbyterian minister for a majority of his life. And please do not associated Robbins's diatribute against Beeke as being indicative of Clark's position on the matter.

In any case, I can see you do not have much to add to the present subject, which is Scripturalism. Thanks for your thoughts, though.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Myshkin (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by RAS_
> ...



Jon-

As one who was immersed in Clark's writings during my introduction to the reformed faith, your resonse was what I anticipated. And it is why I do not get too involved in this debate anymore with folks. It is like playing the exact same game of chess move for move in the same order, only with a different person doing the moves each time. I responded to your question because I thought you were tackling something new to you (scripturalism), I did not realize your question was really a set up for the response I gave.

In this I was only trying to help. I was not aware you wanted a debate. I guess I misread the intent of your original post?

In my referencing you to the Mathison book, I am most definitely not appealing to authority or any other fallacy you may find. I was not presenting an argument. I simply thought it would help you over the issue of sola scriptura, and clear up any distortions of it whether due to "scripturalism" or anything else. But again, you were looking to advance debate, and not seeking help on a basic level. My apologies.

I know what it is like to be enamored with the deep exposure to logic one feels when being immersed in Clark. I found myself more concerned with how many fallacies I could find in a person's arguments than I was in actually understanding their arguments for what they were. I have nothing against Clark; and I am not a Van Tillian either.

For what it's worth, your response to my question avoided what I was asking. It was not about whether I should have faith that you didn't lie about your name being Jon, or that someone else wrote your post. I made the inference out of charity that one would not purposely lie. My point was that if I am reading the phrase "the bible alone has all knowledge", I am receiving some knowledge from reading this phrase on my computer screen. I am not reading it from the bible. In this sense I am receiving knowledge from a source outside of the bible, thereby showing that the bible does not contain "all" knowledge. My illustration of learning your name (does knowledge come without learning?) was that I see the letters J-o-n on my screen. Whether that is your name or not, I am inferring from the letters on my screen (not from the bible) that it says the name Jon. If this simple truth is denied, then all thats left is absolute idealism (i.e. nothing is learned at all through the senses). If nothing is learned by reading your post, then you and I aren't really communicating are we? Our words on the screen are meaningless. The only way I could communicate to you is through quoting scripture.

Perhaps you are aware that this idea of scripturalism/Clarkian epistemology has had qualifications even among Clarkians. Robert Reymond pointed out to Clark (see "Clark Speaks from the Grave") that if his idea of scripturalism were consistent then Gordon Clark could not even know himself nor Robert Reymond. I believe R. Nash points out the same things. The question for me is whether the soft-clarkians like Reymond and Nash or if the hyper-clarkians like Cheung are more consistent with what Clark was saying. I tend to believe the latter.

Anyways, you may want to check out some previous threads involving a guy named Paul Manata who is a member of the Puritanboard. He was willing to go deeper into the debate than most of us. I hope this helps.

Welcome to the PB, by the way.

-Allan


----------



## JohnV (Feb 14, 2006)

Well, just for the record, today is Valentines Day, and chocolates speak clearer than words. Somehow they make more sense than anything I might say. Don't ask me where this fits in with Clark's theories, 'cause I don't know about that. But that doesn't mean that I don't know that chocolates are better than words today.


----------



## Peter (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Peter_
> ...



The accusation was framed to elicit a clearer explanation of Clark's views. I dont understand Clark, I was hoping you could clear my objections but from your answers I see you don't understand or desire to understand what I'm asking. My apologies for diverting attention from the subject of the thread. Thank you for entertaining my curiosities for a while any way, I will seek answers else where.


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by RAS_
> Jon-
> 
> As one who was immersed in Clark's writings during my introduction to the reformed faith, your resonse was what I anticipated. And it is why I do not get too involved in this debate anymore with folks. It is like playing the exact same game of chess move for move in the same order, only with a different person doing the moves each time. I responded to your question because I thought you were tackling something new to you (scripturalism), I did not realize your question was really a set up for the response I gave.
> ...


Oh, no, I am not really looking for a debate. I am interested in hearing sound arguments against Scripturalism. Honestly, I really am. When I said I would "interact" with the responses, I meant that if I felt the objections missed the point or were weak, that I would show why I thought so. I do that because it can really help us all to recognize the precise problems and narrows the discussion to some specific points of contention that really help to illustrate the problems Scripturalism faces. One of those I brought up myself, which is the need for a theory of meaning for Scripturalism to be consistent.



> _Originally posted by RAS_
> In my referencing you to the Mathison book, I am most definitely not appealing to authority or any other fallacy you may find. I was not presenting an argument. I simply thought it would help you over the issue of sola scriptura, and clear up any distortions of it whether due to "scripturalism" or anything else. But again, you were looking to advance debate, and not seeking help on a basic level. My apologies.


I hope I did not sound to critical on that point. I certainly was not trying to. I only wanted to bring to light that addressing the problems with Scripturalism really requires that the philosophical issues be addressed over against appealing to traditional theological principles and asserting Scripturalism is inconsistent with them. Mathison's book does look good, though. I think I will read it all the same.



> _Originally posted by RAS_
> My point was that if I am reading the phrase "the bible alone has all knowledge", I am receiving some knowledge from reading this phrase on my computer screen.


That depends on the definition of knowledge used. And it also depends on the criteria of justification used to justify the proposition. That is, knowledge is not simply a cognitive proposition, but justified true belief. The reason I objected that I might be lying or a moderator might have played a trick is that either of these cases would ruin the possibility of justifying that I, Jon, said such-and-such, thus denying that the proposition is an object of knowledge.



> _Originally posted by RAS_
> I am not reading it from the bible. In this sense I am receiving knowledge from a source outside of the bible, thereby showing that the bible does not contain "all" knowledge. My illustration of learning your name (does knowledge come without learning?) was that I see the letters J-o-n on my screen. Whether that is your name or not, I am inferring from the letters on my screen (not from the bible) that it says the name Jon. If this simple truth is denied, then all thats left is absolute idealism (i.e. nothing is learned at all through the senses). If nothing is learned by reading your post, then you and I aren't really communicating are we? Our words on the screen are meaningless. The only way I could communicate to you is through quoting scripture.


Well, no, you could still communicate with me without quoting Scripture. The only caveat is that nothing you say is inherently true except were it is validly inferred from Scripture. Even the propositon that you said something is unknown. The proposition certainly has meaning, too (although that brings up the problem of meaning that I did). Simply because something is not known to be true does not mean it suddenly becomes devoid of its other significant points, such as meaning, communicability, etc. It just doesn't follow that these things disappear with truth. That something is true only means it is necessarily so.



> _Originally posted by RAS_
> Perhaps you are aware that this idea of scripturalism/Clarkian epistemology has had qualifications even among Clarkians. Robert Reymond pointed out to Clark (see "Clark Speaks from the Grave") that if his idea of scripturalism were consistent then Gordon Clark could not even know himself nor Robert Reymond. I believe R. Nash points out the same things. The question for me is whether the soft-clarkians like Reymond and Nash or if the hyper-clarkians like Cheung are more consistent with what Clark was saying. I tend to believe the latter.
> 
> Anyways, you may want to check out some previous threads involving a guy named Paul Manata who is a member of the Puritanboard. He was willing to go deeper into the debate than most of us. I hope this helps.


Yes, I am hoping Mr. Manata will drop by and offer his objections to Scripturalism. I have read some of them, and while I think a number of them miss the point rather critically, I think that he has some very significant objections that must be addressed.



> _Originally posted by RAS_
> Welcome to the PB, by the way.
> 
> -Allan


Thanks a lot! I'm glad to be here.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Jon (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Peter_
> The accusation was framed to elicit a clearer explanation of Clark's views. I dont understand Clark, I was hoping you could clear my objections but from your answers I see you don't understand or desire to understand what I'm asking. My apologies for diverting attention from the subject of the thread. Thank you for entertaining my curiosities for a while any way, I will seek answers else where.


Ah, well I suppose that misrepresenting someone's position can be one way of raising a subject. It is not usually my preferred venue, though, so it caught me off-guard a bit. I would take up the issues you have addressed in an effort to help you understand Clark a little more, except that, honestly, I am not altogether interested in defending Clark personally, and am more interested in the implications of his philosophy, over against his theology. I would be more than happy to recommend some of his books that you could read for a better understanding his theology, though. Alternatively, if you'd rather not acquire them, you can read much of his though through back issues of the Trinity Review, available at the Trinity Foundation's website.

Thanks again.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Civbert (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> ...
> The problem with the argument that any axiom-based self-referential system is valid comes when we ask, "But is it true?" Unless the axioms can be demonstrated from Scripture, we must answer, "No." Clark understood this, which is why he praised Keister for demonstrating the axioms of arithmetic from Scripture. So, in Clark's system, we know arithmetic, but not geometry.
> 
> Jon



What is 'true' is a good question - and many people will come up with many answers. My take is basically mathematical - a true proposition is true in relationship to prior true propositions. But there is also the view of true in a more cosmic or spiritual sense, as in "God's Truth" or Knowledge with a capital K. And there is an empirical view of true which says whatever we can confirm with observation or experience is true. Then there is "true is whatever is real", but this is really avoiding the question since what is real is not defined.

So I see truth in a simple mathematical way as a relationship between propositions. I believe that the rules of logic can determine if propositions are true, and that axioms must also be assumed in order to do this. Scripturalism uses the axiom of Scripture to define what proposition we can call knowledge. But inherent in the adoption of Scripturalism is the adoption of the formal laws and rules of logic (law of contradiction, law of identity, and the rules of inference). 

The implication of this is that ANY axiomatic and coherent system can identify true propositions under Scripturalism (as long as the axioms do not contradict Scripture and are formal) - including Euler's Geometry (which Clark identified as a kind of ideal system) as well as Hyperbolic Geometry. The propositions (statements) which are deduced within these systems are true _within these systems_ (with regard to their axioms and the rules of deductive logic). Since these examples of mathematic systems are purely formal, then they are valid under Scripturalism which implicitly adopts formal logic as valid. 

What Scripturalism doe not accept is empiricism because that epistemology violates formal logic due to the induction fallacy.

Before anyone objects to rejecting empiricism - this is not saying that we can not believe things based on inductive reasoning from observation - many beliefs that are based on observation are quite reasonable - but they are not knowledge. This is really a technical distinction. We technically don't "know" Bill Clinton was President, but that is not to say it is unreasonable to _believe_ he was President - even believe without doubt. But that is not on the level of propositions like "Jesus is the Son of God" which we can know is true. Or 2+3=5 which we know. Or that 'All (a is b) implies that Some (a is b)' is true.

The last example - which no doubt Clark would declare true (a formal logical rule of implication) is why I say the Scripturalism allows for Geometry of any form that is logically coherent. 'a' and 'b' are variable with undefined content, but the 'implication' is a truth.

So I think unless one wants to reject logic, one can not reject any formally coherent system. These systems are valid to God as well as man. 

An aside - does Scripture solve the Problem of Induction? Is there a proof text that can give a good reason to know that for any effect there is a prior cause. If so, we could extend Scripturalism even further than Geometry and into Physics.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> ...
> 
> 
> ...


 I'm enjoying this discussion. 

I do think that logic is the basis for language, even the meaning of questions and commands. That is because each word in a sentence that expresses a question or command has a proposition that defines it, and rules of grammar that define the way the words and sentence structure covey meaning as questions and commands. 

The meaning of any sentence may be a question or a command, but logic is required to understand the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar are propositions. And these rules are essentially formal - which is why we can use the same words in different sentences, and the same sentence structures with different words. There are also rules for context that help us understand sentence. 

We don't normally conscientiously think of these propositions that make up the rules of grammar, the meaning of words, the rules of context, and the many other rules that allow us to know the meaning of language, but they are still the basis of meaning. We implicitly assent to these rules when we speak and expect that people understand and know what we mean. Words are symbols for propositions, sentences are forms, and logic is the core of all language.

[Edited on 2-14-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Don (Feb 14, 2006)

Dr. Michael Sudduth, not sure what happened to his screen name - maybe he'll be back, has some critiques of Scripturalism. He's a former Clarkian. He's a Reformed Epistemologist (Plantinga) who stated in his bio here he leans toward VT, but didn't want to be 'pigeon holed' in methodology. 

He posted this critique on the All-Bahnsen yahoo group a while back, which was directed toward Cheung. You'll need to register to view. 

His critique was in response to this post by George Macleod Coghill.

[Edited on 2-14-2006 by Don]


----------



## Don (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Dr. Michael Sudduth, not sure what happened to his screen name - maybe he'll be back, has some critiques of Scripturalism. He's a former Clarkian. He's a Reformed Epistemologist (Plantinga) who stated in his bio here he leans toward VT, but didn't want to be 'pigeon holed' in methodology.
> 
> He posted this critique on the All-Bahnsen yahoo group a while back, which was directed toward Cheung. You'll need to register to view.
> ...




Any comments? Able to register? He deals with 3 or 4 'versions' of scripturalism.

I thought this was pretty much the nail in the coffin against Scripturalism - probably the best critique I've read to this day. 

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]


----------



## Civbert (Feb 14, 2006)

Could you ask Dr. Sudduth if you can copy it here?


----------



## Don (Feb 14, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Could you ask Dr. Sudduth if you can copy it here?



I'll try to email him.


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> In the unceasing endeavor to honor God according to his word, I would like to hear some definitive arguments from anti-Clarkians concerning the presuppositional view commonly referred to as, Scripturalism. Please note that I do not mean the variety espoused by Cheung or any other system that incorporates a doctrine of Occasionalism. Instead, the simple axiomatic principle that the Bible alone is the source of all knowledge would be what I consider to be "Scripturalism." I would like to hear arguments against this position to see if I have erred in believing the persuasiveness of its arguments.
> 
> I would also like to participate and interact with some of the objections given to see if I cannot clarify some misunderstandings and perhaps even provide satisfactory answers.
> ...





Jon, 

Also not sure if you are aware but 'aquascum' also has some devastating critiques. He is a professional philosopher who wishes to remain anonymous. I thought he had been referenced here before, so I didn't post it earlier. His critiques are directed at Cheung. Though Cheung incorporates Occassionalism, I think that these critiques are quite relevant. I think aquascum incorporates some of Sudduth's criticisms. These critiques of Scripturalism, infallibilism, internalism, and occassionalism remain unanswered to my knowledge. 


http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/

Top Ten Reasons to Reject the "œScripturalist Package"


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Jon,
> 
> Also not sure if you are aware but 'aquascum' also has some devastating critiques. He is a professional philosopher who wishes to remain anonymous. I thought he had been referenced here before, so I didn't post it earlier. His critiques are directed at Cheung. Though Cheung incorporates Occassionalism, I think that these critiques are quite relevant. I think aquascum incorporates some of Sudduth's criticisms. These critiques of Scripturalism, infallibilism, internalism, and occassionalism remain unanswered to my knowledge.
> ...



Don Jon, 

I've read aquascum and where I think he has missed the mark in not understanding the nature of axioms in any system of epistemology. Basically, his argument is that since the Axiom of Scripturalism can not be deduced from Scripturalism, it is self-referentially incoherent. But if this was the case, then _all_ rational epistemologies are incoherent. (The irrational systems do no even get started. ) Basically speaking, all systems have axioms or some presuppositions which can _not_ be proven from within their systems without being circular. You can not prove Structuralism's axioms any more than you can prove the axioms of Empiricism or Geometry.

Not that this is relevant, but why would aquascum want to remain anonymous?


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Don_
> ...




Civbert, 

A professional philosopher and an epistemologist do not understand the 'nature of axioms'! Oxford University should be notified! 

Let me first say that I understand your (Clarkians) concern with being true to the Word and glorifying God, but I don't see Scripturalism as the way to accomplish that. 

It is not my intention to get involved in a long debate. But a few points: Self-referential incoherency does not enscapulate all of aquascum's (steve hays and manata are linked there) critique. Nevertheless, self-referential incoherency (a proposition(s) defeating itself) is different from being able to not prove axioms that are supposedly self-evident, so I'm not sure how your response is even relevant. Not all forms of foundationalism are self-referentially incoherent/self-defeating (Plantinga, Alston, Wolterstorff, and some others would come in handy here). So equating self-referential incoherency with self-evident axioms (or even epistemic circularity) would not be a sufficient response to salvage scripturalism. But even if what you say is true, this is still no justification for Scripturalism, since all epistemologies sink in the same epistemic boat. 

As far as aquascum remaining anonymous, I don't know his reasons. I don't know even know who he is. He does have an email posted at his site though. 

Regards, 
Don


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

Ok, this is copied from the All-Bahnsen yahoo group with permission received from Dr. Sudduth. 



> George,
> 
> As you know, I have indicated on other occasions that epistemic scripturalism is not necessarily self-referentially incoherent, whereas alethic scripturalism is necessarily self-referentially incoherent.
> 
> ...



[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> According to SGP, at the very least something like SS1 is either a proposition of Scripture or is validly deducible from propositions of Scripture.
> A Response to Vincent Cheung



Not let's replace the abbreviations:

According to ("œBiblical epistemology...necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics."), at the very least something like (Propositions "œdirectly stated in Scripture" ) is either a proposition of Scripture or is validly deducible from propositions of Scripture. 

The second part of the sentence say the according to Cheung's " Scripturalist Grounding Principle", that the axiom that knowledge is "Propositions "œdirectly stated in Scripture" must be a proposition of Scripture or is validly deducible from propositions of Scripture.

That is, the Axiom must be a deduction of the axiom. Ironically, any proposition implies itself. But that is not what Aquascum is saying. He is saying the there must be a scripture verse or deduction from Scripture that proves the axiom that knowledge is the propositions of Scripture or deducible therefrom. He is demanding a tautological deduction of the axiom. Since the axiom is the conclusion Aquascum wants, here is the argument.


P1. Knowledge is Scripture or deducible therefrom. (the axiom)
P2. Jesus is God's Son (or any other Scripture you want).
...
Pn
therefore:
C. Knowledge is Scripture or deducible therefrom.


Now Aquascum would object to P1 saying I have not proven it, and I can not assume it. But that is the nature of the axiom. The Bible is God's Word, not based on some proof or extra-biblical data, but that is to be believed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit and on no other authority.

The Axiom of Scripturalism is knowledge is God's revelation in Scripture and what is deducible therefrom. Axioms are never proven, and are not validly deducible from anything. They must be assumed. Even if there were an explicate Scripture that stated the Axiom, this would not be a valid proof of the Axiom. Demanding it a Aquascum does is fallacious.

Aquascum may complain that Cheung has claimed that the axioms follow from the Biblical metaphysics. This may be a fine complaint, because axioms do not logically follow from anything. But one could say that the axiom of Scripturalism is consistent with Biblical Metaphysics. But Biblical metaphysics is not the axiom of Scripturalism - and Aquascum error remains the same.


----------



## rmwilliamsjr (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Dr. Michael Sudduth, not sure what happened to his screen name - maybe he'll be back, has some critiques of Scripturalism. He's a former Clarkian. He's a Reformed Epistemologist (Plantinga) who stated in his bio here he leans toward VT, but didn't want to be 'pigeon holed' in methodology.
> 
> He posted this critique on the All-Bahnsen yahoo group a while back, which was directed toward Cheung. You'll need to register to view.
> ...



thanks for the links.
is it possible to get those authors to (re)post these messages here?
it looks that it is not simple to get into the Bahnsen group to read them there.


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by rmwilliamsjr_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Don_
> ...



I just posted Michael's message to George. Check my post before this one.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Ok, this is copied from the All-Bahnsen yahoo group with permission received from Dr. Sudduth.
> 
> 
> ...



I hate to say this, but from the start there are several Straw men in this - starting with [1]. 

Now it may be the case that there are some who make this claim, but that's beside the point. And the "rocky-road" is hardly different from [1] which is a straw-man. Basically, Sudduth has found some errors in a few Scripturalist claims, claims that are not supported by the axiom of Scripturalism. But this is not a defeater of the axiom of Scripturalism, but a few claims made by some Scripturalists.

I can give this a more detailed response latter but in summary:

[1] is strawman

[7] is an error in reasoning of some Scripturalism - technically we can not "know" or prove from a priori knowledge our axioms. But we can "know" in the sense of have total confidence or assurance. This is not epistemological knowledge - it's just simple Christian faith.

The part following [7] down to Cheung is beating the straw man.

[CS1] is the axiom which we already said can not be "know" epistemologically. Again it is a failure to understand the function of axioms in ALL epistemologies.

[CS3] technically, this is nothing more than saying that what we can not demonstrate from a-priori knowledge is opinion. Yep. That's right. Not a problem. If you can not deduce something from a-prior knowledge, it is opinion. Many things which we strongly believe are technically opinions. Any "problem" with this is psychological, not logical.

The rest is more picking on perceived inconsistencies with Cheung's presentation. Again, these are not defeaters of Scripturalism, just arguments against the same error Aquascum makes through-out his argument, claiming that Cheung must prove his axioms. Cheung's only error (not Scripturalism) is if he claims that one can know _epistemologically_ the axiom of Scripturalism. But axioms must be assumed true, that's all. That's why it is called _presuppositionalism_. Scripturalism remains undefeated, even if a few Scripturalist have some bruises.

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

Civbert, 

One quick response:

You said, "Now Aquascum would object to P1 saying I have not proven it, and I can not assume it. But that is the nature of the axiom. The Bible is God's Word, not based on some proof or extra-biblical data, but that is to be believed by the testimony of the Holy Spirit and on no other authority."

No, I think Aquascum would say that P1 cannot be an *object* of knowledge, not necessarily that it couldn't be proven. In that way, it is self-defeating.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Civbert,
> 
> One quick response:
> ...



What is an "object of knowledge"? Nothing more than a proposition that is a justified true belief. Since one can not justify an axiom, it is left as a simple belief (assumed true). Saying it is not an "object of knowledge" means nothing more than we can not "know" it is true. I say that's right, but we can "believe" it is true. This is required for any axiom of epistemology.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

Don,

Thanks for posting the arguments. It's an important issue that should be debated. It's worth study and I hope no one take anyone's word that Scripturalism is defeated any more than they should take mine that it is undefeated. There are greater minds who have take both positions, but our minds are not so poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves.

Thanks!


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Don,
> 
> Thanks for posting the arguments. It's an important issue that should be debated. It's worth study and I hope no one take anyone's word that Scripturalism is defeated any more than they should take mine that it is undefeated. There are greater minds who have take both positions, but our minds are not so poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves.
> ...




No problem, brother! 

I've not exactly taken anyone's word for it, rather I've looked at both sides' arguments and the Clarkians tend to be the ones with wholly inadequate responses to criticism. I don't know if this is meant to be a jab or what, but I've never said nor intended to imply that our minds are so 'poor that we can not consider the issue for ourselves'. This is exactly my reasoning for posting the critiques, so people can consider it for themselves instead of being rhetoricized to death!  These critiques are within the original purpose of this thread, which have still not been satisfactorily answered. 

So your response is basically that it's one big strawman (and that we just posit Scripturalism, though we can't know it, but we can have confidence)? That's interesting that Sudduth won the 'Clark Prize' and attempted to deduce mathematics from Scripture before he abandoned Clark (per the VT Lists) yet he would try to refute Clark by arguing against all these strawmen. Maybe you could show how he's arguing against strawmen? 

Anyway, good talking to you! I'm out!

Don

(Oh and I'm not basing my hopes that it's not a strawman b/c of Michael's past affiliation with Clark - that was meant for rhetorical purposes) 

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> Ok, this is copied from the All-Bahnsen yahoo group with permission received from Dr. Sudduth.
> 
> <snip>


Yep, Dr. Sudduth nailed it. There really is no rational basis for accepting epistemic Scripturalism. That has been one of my on-going difficulties with the system. Not only does it posit its own "verification principle," but, like logical positivism, it presents no knowable proposition denying the possibility of knowledge being obtainable outside of the axiom.

Now, at best, this simply strips Scripturalism of any claim to obligatory acceptance (since it cannot be known to be true), but it also clearly shows that the system is incomplete. Just as the lack of a theory of meaning cripples the Scripturalist's claim to be able to deduce theorems from the data of Scripture, the lack of a sound argument to justify the axiom also defeats the obligation to accept the system. One may not be correct in accepting the evidentialists' position on other reasons, but not because one has chosen something contrary to Scripturalism.

Given these criticisms of Scripturalism, I will nonetheless admit that I believe the general intent of the axiom, _viz._, that nothing not explicitly stated in Scripture or deducible from Scripture is an object of human knowledge. Obviously, I cannot demonstrate this. That has always been the problem with Scripturalism, _especially_ as Clark had it. The system makes great claims to be able to justify all knowledge, but many of the assertions that Clark and other Scripturalists make are poorly demonstrated or not even demonstrated at all. My prior comment on Clark's extremely inadequate theory of language is one of these.

The reason I started this thread is to illustrate these very large holes in Scripturalism. I don't know if the problems can be solved or not. But one thing is certain, if it cannot be done, Scripturalism will quickly fade away like so many Greek philosophic schools of antiquity. On that count, I was wondering if anyone here had begun to take up some of these problems. As for me, I am currently working to demonstrate propositional logic from Scripture. After that, I plan to take up the problem of meaning.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> What is 'true' is a good question - and many people will come up with many answers. My take is basically mathematical - a true proposition is true in relationship to prior true propositions. But there is also the view of true in a more cosmic or spiritual sense, as in "God's Truth" or Knowledge with a capital K. And there is an empirical view of true which says whatever we can confirm with observation or experience is true. Then there is "true is whatever is real", but this is really avoiding the question since what is real is not defined.
> 
> So I see truth in a simple mathematical way as a relationship between propositions. I believe that the rules of logic can determine if propositions are true, and that axioms must also be assumed in order to do this. Scripturalism uses the axiom of Scripture to define what proposition we can call knowledge. But inherent in the adoption of Scripturalism is the adoption of the formal laws and rules of logic (law of contradiction, law of identity, and the rules of inference).
> ...


I think there is a big problem with this position. Maintaining that any logically valid system is true provided that it follows necessarily from its axioms allows for all manner of absurdities.

For instance, given the axiomatized proposition, "I am the king of the world," I could infer that, "The United States is a country of the world; therefore, I am the king of the United States." Now, the axiom, "I am the king of the world," does not contradict Scripture. Given the principles you have outlayed, this axiom, and the absurd theorem, would be true under Scripturalism simply because the inference is valid. Even more, if we accept that Euclidean geometry is true because its theorems follow from its axioms, then we must accept that I am king of the United States because it follows from the axiom, "I am king of the world." And, of course, since "I am king of the world" is an axiom, I need not demonstrate it. And since it does not contradict Scripture, I cannot be denied positing it.

This is why I argued that there can be no extra-biblical propositions accepted in the Scripturalist system whatsoever, else, the distinguishing between "appropriate axioms" (whatever those are) and "inappropriate axioms" within the Scripturalist system becomes a viciously circular process of reasoning. That is, given that axiom a1 is acceptable, what is it that determines axiom a2 is unacceptable?



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> What Scripturalism doe not accept is empiricism because that epistemology violates formal logic due to the induction fallacy.
> 
> Before anyone objects to rejecting empiricism - this is not saying that we can not believe things based on inductive reasoning from observation - many beliefs that are based on observation are quite reasonable - but they are not knowledge. This is really a technical distinction. We technically don't "know" Bill Clinton was President, but that is not to say it is unreasonable to _believe_ he was President - even believe without doubt. But that is not on the level of propositions like "Jesus is the Son of God" which we can know is true. Or 2+3=5 which we know. Or that 'All (a is b) implies that Some (a is b)' is true.
> ...


We are agreed here. Empiricism has great difficulties--crippling difficulties, even.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> I'm enjoying this discussion.


Me too. I'm glad to be able to address these issues in a forum that is not immediately and irrationally hostile against the idea of Scripturalism.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> I do think that logic is the basis for language, even the meaning of questions and commands. That is because each word in a sentence that expresses a question or command has a proposition that defines it, and rules of grammar that define the way the words and sentence structure covey meaning as questions and commands.
> 
> The meaning of any sentence may be a question or a command, but logic is required to understand the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar are propositions. And these rules are essentially formal - which is why we can use the same words in different sentences, and the same sentence structures with different words. There are also rules for context that help us understand sentence.
> ...


I'm afraid I cannot see how this could possibly follow. What is the logical inference that conveys the meaning of the exclamation, "Dance!" What is the inference that conveys the meaning, "What year did Columbus discover America?" How does one deduce the meaning of the word, Jesus, from logic alone?

Logic is formal. It restricts the _forms_ of inferences, not the content. Without content, logic has no sovereignty. Without meaning, logic is meaningless. Meaning is logically prior to logic (funny how that works). A word w1 must be w1 and not w2 before the inference that w1 is w2 can be determined to be invalid. Now, granted that logic covers statements of identity, but if identity had no meaning, the logical law of identity would not hold, for it would be meaningless.

In any case, I think it simply must be shown how meaning is deduced from logic before such an assertion can be maintained. Granted, logic will be required for a theory of meaning, but it is posterior to meaning. That is, from logic, one cannot get language. Try starting with symbolic logic and then deducing, "Here comes the ice cream truck!" from it. If you can do that, I will be proven quite wrong. 

Logic can certainly say what language can and can't do, but it can't generate language.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Don_
> ...



No time to cover all of this but a quick question: 

What do you mean by "no rational basis for accepting epistemic Scripturalism"?

It appears that there are many reasons for accepting Scripturalism, just none that demands it. For example, it is explains our experiences, provides for morality, is comprehensive and coherent... basically, it has all the properties one would desire from a epistemology.

As for "no knowable proposition denying the possibility of knowledge being obtainable outside of the axiom", need it? Is there any reasonable alternative? 

I believe there are "truths" outside of what we can know through Scripturalism, but that does not harm Scripturalism. I think the intent of Scripturalism is not to delineate the total of knowledge, but the delineate what truths we can justify knowing.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> ...I'm afraid I cannot see how this could possibly follow. What is the logical inference that conveys the meaning of the exclamation, "Dance!" ...
> 
> _Soli Deo Gloria_
> ...



First there are the definitions of "dance" - which are propositions. Then there are rules of context (additional propositions). And what propositions describe the situation? These will determine if the meaning. It could be "the speaker is excited about seeing a dance, or dance advertisement".. or maybe it means "the speaker is commanding the listener to dance. " But whatever it take, it take rules and definitions to understand the exclamation"Dance!" and these are propositions from which we deduce the meaning.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Don_
> .... Maybe you could show how he's arguing against strawmen?
> 
> Anyway, good talking to you! I'm out!
> ...



Sure thing.

It's a straw man because Scripturalism does not say that no extra-biblical propositions are true. It says the we can not justify the truth of extra biblical propositions - ergo we can not 'know" them epistemologically. We can know them in a colloquial sense, like I might say I know my car is safe to drive. Technically, I can not know that, for I can not see the future. So "alethic Scripturalism" is a straw man. This is merely Dr. Sudduth finding fault in the reasoning of certain Scripturalist, not defeating Scripturalism.


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> No time to cover all of this but a quick question:
> 
> What do you mean by "no rational basis for accepting epistemic Scripturalism"?
> ...


Good question. By no "rational basis" I simply mean no "logically necessary" basis.

As for me, I implement a Scripturalist apologetic because it is so effective at surmounting typical atheistic arguments. I accept the philosophy of Scripturalism also because I accept the axiom that the word of God is the lone source of knowledge for men.

Good question. By no "rational basis" I simply mean no "logically necessary" basis.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> As for "no knowable proposition denying the possibility of knowledge being obtainable outside of the axiom", need it? Is there any reasonable alternative?
> 
> I believe there are "truths" outside of what we can know through Scripturalism, but that does not harm Scripturalism. I think the intent of Scripturalism is not to delineate the total of knowledge, but the delineate what truths we can justify knowing.


Yes, I agree. The problem is that if Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent, it becomes a case of begging the question to say anything that does not follow from the axiom is not an object of knowledge because the axiom itself does not follow from the axiom, and thus, is also not an object of knowledge. If we say this is true and simply maintain that one must trust the axiom to be true then we forfeit any rational basis for Scripturalism. As such, there is no reason to claim that an extra-biblical proposition is not an object of knowledge because the only basis we have for such a claim is belief in the axiom of Scripturalism. But if one does not believe in the axiom, we have no rational rebuttal to his disbelief.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> .... As such, there is no reason to claim that an extra-biblical proposition is not an object of knowledge because the only basis we have for such a claim is belief in the axiom of Scripturalism. But if one does not believe in the axiom, we have no rational rebuttal to his disbelief.
> 
> _Soli Deo Gloria_
> ...



Do you mean we can not claim an extra-biblical proposition is 'not true', or 'not knowable'? All true propositions are objects of knowledge because God knows them. But that does not mean we can know them. And I am using 'know' to mean justify the truth of the proposition.


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Don_
> ...




Well considering the majority of the article was not about alethic Scripturalism, I still don't really see your point. However, alethic scripturalism is definitely an optional position for the Scripturalist so I'm not quite seeing how your charges of 'strawman' are even relevant. If you don't take that position, then so what? I think Dr. Sudduth knew that some/most didn't and is why much of article is about *epistemic* scripturalism (did you read that far?). Like I said before, he deals with 3 or 4 types of Scripturalism.


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> First there are the definitions of "dance" - which are propositions.


This is just moving the problem to another level. You must still justify the meaning of the words that are used to define "dance." These words--the content, their meaning--do not follow from logic alone.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Then there are rules of context (additional propositions). And what propositions describe the situation? These will determine if the meaning. It could be "the speaker is excited about seeing a dance, or dance advertisement".. or maybe it means "the speaker is commanding the listener to dance. " But whatever it take, it take rules and definitions to understand the exclamation"Dance!" and these are propositions from which we deduce the meaning.


I think I might not be illustrating the problem well enough. I am talking about the problem of _meaning_ not rules of grammar. The meaning of the sign, "tree," inheres in some proposition. That's true enough. But how does one arrive at the meaning of this proposition? I think the best way to illustrate this is through a logical fallacy, namely, accent.

I'll use Clark's example from _Logic_, which we're both familiar with. He gives the following example of the fallacy of accent, "We should not speak ill of the dead." There are many meanings to this sentence simply based upon how it is said.

1) _We_ should not speak ill of the dead. (But it is okay if others do.)
2) We _should_ not speak ill of the dead. (But we're going to, anyway.)
3) We should not _speak_ ill of the dead. (But we will write nasty things about them.)
4) We should not speak _ill_ of the dead. (But we can say nice things about them.)
5) We should not speak ill of the _dead_. (But we can insult his living brother.)

Here we have a single proposition with five different meanings, which are implied through various inflections. We can disambiguate this sentence by putting each of them into separate, coherent propositions, but Scripture does not always do this. Instead, there are many passages in Scripture that can be interpreted in different ways if they are read differently. Now, the science of exegesis can answer most of these challenges to the point of plausible conclusion, but sometimes there is no certainty. Even more, the simple practice of comparing biblical usage with secular usage is too much for the Scripturalist theory to bear because it relies on extra-biblical propositions to obtain the meaning of biblical propositions. How is this activity justified? Moreover, how do we know that the biblical authors are not making novel use of a given biblical term, such as John did with the _Logos_ of Heraclitean and Stoic philosophy? Liberalism is a perfect example of how easily the Bible can be confused by unillumined minds. How do we rationally defend Scripturalism against the charge of novelty? How do we defend against the charge that our deductions are invalid because of equivocation?

In other words, how do you know the identity of a given word or phrase? How do you come to it? Logically, _if_ the meaning of x is x, then all x is y, all y is z, all x is z, follows. But how do you know x is x? And how do you know y is y and z is z? In other words, you think the meaning of biblical proposition is x. But if I think the meaning is y, how do we determine who is right? Appealing to rules of grammar is fine, but these rules are not without exception and not so stringent as to prevent ambiguity. That is precisely why we have informal fallacies.

A theory of meaning is essential.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Do you mean we can not claim an extra-biblical proposition is 'not true', or 'not knowable'? All true propositions are objects of knowledge because God knows them. But that does not mean we can know them. And I am using 'know' to mean justify the truth of the proposition.


Not an object of human knowledge is what I meant. I define knowledge as Plato did, which necessitates belief in the proposition for it to be properly knowable. That is, a proposition can be understood (cognition) by a disbeliever, but not known. So, I add belief to your requirements of "justified truth."

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Don (Feb 15, 2006)

Jon said, 



> But one thing is certain, if it cannot be done, Scripturalism will quickly fade away like so many Greek philosophic schools of antiquity. On that count, I was wondering if anyone here had begun to take up some of these problems. As for me, I am currently working to demonstrate propositional logic from Scripture. After that, I plan to take up the problem of meaning.




I don't think it will necessarily fade away but will end up being recycled with new 'twists'. 
Don

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Don]


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> ...
> I'll use Clark's example from _Logic_, which we're both familiar with. He gives the following example of the fallacy of accent, "We should not speak ill of the dead." There are many meanings to this sentence simply based upon how it is said.
> 
> ...



OK. I see where you are going. And yes, logic, in and of itself, can not give us knowledge (that is rationalism yes?). But language is impossible without logic. The question is, what content do we put into the forms of logic. How do we fill the blanks in the forms of logic with content that allow us to understand the meaning of propositions.

I think this is a matter of the Spirit. I think language and reason conform to the forms of logic, and these forms are the same used by God in his knowledge (as far as we know what God reveals), but the content is filled by the Spirit. This is what non-believers think is innate knowledge. 

But it is also why Scripturalism needs to be seen as a system, because the content is formed by the system. a->b->c->...->x->y->a! We know the meaning of the content because the content _is_ the system. Really, each proposition we know is inferred from prior propositions inferred from prior propositions ....etc. To figure out the meaning of the terms requires two things, a foundation, and a kick off point. The foundation is the God of knowledge, the kick off point is the Scriptures. 

I see these examples you gave, not as one proposition, but as 5 propositions, because each has a different meaning. "A proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence" as Clark would say. It is not the prose, it is the meaning. And the meaning is an integrated structure, a system of interrelated propositions which if not for God to enlighten us, we could never know. But this is faith. 

So if you see Scripturalism as the starting point of Scripture, logic and reason are the guides, and the Holy Spirit is the guaranteer. The whole thing is like a network that we attempt to construct using systematic theology, but it is not limited to "religion" but includes a whole philosophy for out world. And the only assurance we have that we understand the meaning of the propositions, is we have the enlightenment of the Spirit.

How do we know what the Scriptures are? We might induce candidate meanings, and then we test them against others. We know that Scripture does not contradict itself, and so we can eliminate those that are contradictory. We start with the obvious ones, and work from there. 

As I type this I can see that I should really re-write this several times to make it coherent. But I think the main thing is that meaning is systematic, and Scripturalism gives us what we need to find meaning. I don't think there is any core true propositions, no "first" proposition. Even the meaning of God is part of the system of Scripture. What "God"? the God of Scripture.

[Edited on 2-15-2006 by Civbert]


----------



## JohnV (Feb 15, 2006)

Dr. Sudduth's response is a lengthy formulation of something that goes through the mind instantaneously. It is mental block for the Christian, if you will, for accepting so many propositions that come to us from inauthoritative sources, proposed by men, and posited as being foundational in some way. Most of us do not have it worked out in propositional form such as Michael has done for us, but these are all there when things like Scripturalism are suggested. 

For me the key is the phrase is "no extra-Biblical proposition", as if no truth can be known unless it is put in propositional form in Scripture. For example, the Bible does not begin with "In the beginning there was God, and God was...."; but "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." And if Scripture is revelation, then this is not incoherent, but revelatory. 

As soon as man opines that he needs to formulate a Scripture-based grid in propositional form in order to "interpret" the Bible, then he has already defeated his purpose just in proposing it. He is proposing the very thing that compels and yet forbids him to this. 

The question for someone like myself, then, is the necessity of Clarkian epistemology. Is it necessary? Is not the mere suggestion of its necessity not already a reason for rejecting it, even upon Clarkian arguments alone? And has Scripture at all revealed to me that I either should or shouldn't accept Clarkian epistemology prior to knowing Scripture?

In other words, is it possible that chocolates can say something better than words can? 

I say "yes" to this, that it is possible that things can be "said" without words, whether through actions or other signs; and that things can be said in words that are not propositions, such as poetic licence allows for, whether by subtle connotation, symbolic representation, allegorical summations, or propositional juxtaposition instead of syllogism. Not only are all these found in Scripture, but there are many, many such things that may be gathered from general revelation as well, without necessarily proposing such a thing as the definitions of "neutrality" or "brute fact" that Presuppositionalism proposes. 

I haven't bothered to read Clark, never really being compelled to it. I still believe that to understand Scripture I need both Scripture and the Spirit. And so knowing Scripture depends upon knowing the Spirit of Christ. So I seek Him in person, not just in idea or ideology. And I seek His personal presence in revealing to me what I must know, a presence of His Spirit which is willingly granted me by the foreknowledge of the Father through the Son. 

So when I am faced with a situation where all I have to rely on is Christ's say-so, that it will be as He says it will, then when I trust in Him and act according to that promise, then I find it is just as He promised, and even more so. And then when I turn again to His Word, the Scriptures, I am surprised to find that the new truth that I learned was in the Word all along, and now plainer to me. And yet also not surprised as well.

The short of it is that "knowing" Scripture is commensurate with "knowing" Christ Himself, not having some manufactured formula. It is not possible to know God without Him first knowing me. It is not possible to have God revealed to me without Him revealing Himself to me first. It is not possible to separate the gospel from Christ. It is not possible to separate the Word from God. Therefore it is not possible that even Scripture plus anything other than the Spirit will reveal truth to us. Yet it is true that God reveals Himself in creation as a first revelation, and in Scripture as a second and fuller revelation. So it is possible to know God and be known by God before being introduced to Scripture, but salvation is known only through Christ's Scripture; that calling by God is logically prior to justification and glorification through the Son, and by the Spirit. 

So I think this can be discussed, but it does not have to be in Clarkian terms. I am not excluded because I don't follow Clark, or that I don't know his arguments.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> ...The short of it is that "knowing" Scripture is commensurate with "knowing" Christ Himself, not having some manufactured formula. It is not possible to know God without Him first knowing me. It is not possible to have God revealed to me without Him revealing Himself to me first. It is not possible to separate the gospel from Christ. It is not possible to separate the Word from God. Therefore it is not possible that even Scripture plus anything other than the Spirit will reveal truth to us. ...



So much I agree with here except the assumption that there is some manufactured formula. Nothing has been manufactured, everything has been in place from the beginning. You can not separate Christ from the Gospel because Jesus _is_ the Word. Scripturalism says revelation is the source of knowledge and logic is the form. You can not separate knowledge from thinking. You can not know Christ without knowing the Word. And you can not know anything without thinking which is all logic is, correct thinking.

I beg you to please read Clark. But I also would encourage you to discuss what is being discussed. There are many great books and if you are interested, I will send a copy of my own. (I'd buy you a Bible first but I sure you already have one.  )


----------



## Civbert (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> ...
> For me the key is the phrase is "no extra-Biblical proposition", as if no truth can be known unless it is put in propositional form in Scripture. For example, the Bible does not begin with "In the beginning there was God, and God was...."; but "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." And if Scripture is revelation, then this is not incoherent, but revelatory.
> ....



I really don't follow what you said here, so I hope you can explain further. 

I just wanted to say that truth is propositional. You don't need to put it in propositional form, it already is fits the forms. But truth and meaning is not the prose and words written on a page, and not the sentences themselves, because we can say the same truth using different ways, different languages, different contexts and words. 

For Clark, a proposition is the meaning of the prose. The purpose of putting the prose into logical forms is so we can better understand what the meaning is that is being conveyed. We do not lose meaning by rearranging the prose into propositional forms, we clarify meaning by doing this. We need to understand propositions in relation to other proposition. 

To divorce meaning from logic is to assert meaninglessness. There is nothing to know if it can not be thought about. You don't lean from "feelings" or "sensations" but by thinking and understanding. Logic is the way we think when we think correctly. And this we know because we have the verbal revelation of God in Scripture. If the law of contradiction is lost, then nothing has any meaning and all I've said is the pizza is getting cold when Martha send the apple love baker too. 

You can not argue against logic without using logic so any attempt to separate the form from the meaning is self-refuting. And you can not know Christ without knowing the Gospel and the Word because He is the Word and you use logic and reason to understand the Word. This is not some artificial grid that deforms meaning, it is the requirement for understanding the meaning of the Word. And you are already doing it as we are discussing these things. 

Every word you write proves logic because your words have meaning and you want me to know what the meaning is. The alternative is utter non-sense and skepticism.


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> OK. I see where you are going. And yes, logic, in and of itself, can not give us knowledge (that is rationalism yes?). But language is impossible without logic. The question is, what content do we put into the forms of logic. How do we fill the blanks in the forms of logic with content that allow us to understand the meaning of propositions.


Yes, now you've got it.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> I think this is a matter of the Spirit. I think language and reason conform to the forms of logic, and these forms are the same used by God in his knowledge (as far as we know what God reveals), but the content is filled by the Spirit. This is what non-believers think is innate knowledge.


Indeed, the doctrine of illumination clearly spells out how one comes to believe the propositions of the Bible: illumination by the Holy Spirit. I found Warfield's treatment of Calvin's doctrine of illumination (_testimonium Spiritu Sancti_) to be particularly helpful in understanding this (Warfield, Works, V, 70ff., Oxford, 1932). But what Warfield and Calvin teach is that the Spirit convinces us of the content of Scripture, _i.e._ causes us to believe the truth. Illumination is not an actual conveyance of knowledge. In fact, such would conclude us in a doctrine of Occasionalism, which has always been wrought with difficulties.

Augustine adopted Plato's doctrine of reminiscience in his _De Magistro_, doubtless influenced by John 1:9"”"That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" (KJV). There are still problems with even this view, though, for one cannot help but ask why some men remember some things, whereas others remember different things. And why does one man remember much, but another remember little? Augustine appeals to sensation, to hearing in particular, but the Scripturalist has already insisted sensation furnishes no knowledge; thus, saying, "I know language because I remembered it by my parents talking to me," is obviously outside of the realm of possible arguments for the Scripturalist.





> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> But it is also why Scripturalism needs to be seen as a system, because the content is formed by the system. a->b->c->...->x->y->a! We know the meaning of the content because the content _is_ the system. Really, each proposition we know is inferred from prior propositions inferred from prior propositions ....etc. To figure out the meaning of the terms requires two things, a foundation, and a kick off point. The foundation is the God of knowledge, the kick off point is the Scriptures.


No doubt. But that is also one of the weaknesses of Scripturalism. So much of the very principle of the system relies on a great deal of scripturally derived "theorems" that one needs to have an arsenal of arguments prepared just to defend the assumption of Scripture. This has from the very beginning been an argument against not just Scripturalism, but presuppositionalism. But it is a philosophically untenable objection because the practicality of the system has no bearing on its truthfulness.

The problem really comes in the apparent fact that there are a lack of defensible arguments to defeat some of the best objections. Scripturalism promises much, but many of these promises seem to be nothing more than hopeful assertions and not demonstrations from the Bible. It seems we have much, much more work to do before we really have anything worth talking about. And then that sort of raises the question of whether we ought to be doing it or not. That is another problem that needs to be answered. That is, the axiom of Scripturalism needs to be demonstrated from Scripture.



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> I see these examples you gave, not as one proposition, but as 5 propositions, because each has a different meaning. "A proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence" as Clark would say. It is not the prose, it is the meaning. And the meaning is an integrated structure, a system of interrelated propositions which if not for God to enlighten us, we could never know. But this is faith.


You are quite right, but that raises the question that I had been trying emphasize all along. In Scripture, there are some sentences such as the one I have given. Given that the example I gave has five possible interpretations, and hence, five possible meanings, how does one say that the Scripture verse is meaning m1 over against meaning m2, m3 ... m_n_? Exegesis can be applied. But this empirical science cannot be justified by the axiom of Scripturalism alone. It requires a validly deduced theory to support it. But in some instances, exegesis cannot certainly resolve the matter, either. What about those cases?



> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> So if you see Scripturalism as the starting point of Scripture, logic and reason are the guides, and the Holy Spirit is the guaranteer. The whole thing is like a network that we attempt to construct using systematic theology, but it is not limited to "religion" but includes a whole philosophy for out world. And the only assurance we have that we understand the meaning of the propositions, is we have the enlightenment of the Spirit.
> 
> How do we know what the Scriptures are? We might induce candidate meanings, and then we test them against others. We know that Scripture does not contradict itself, and so we can eliminate those that are contradictory. We start with the obvious ones, and work from there.
> ...


I think I understand what you mean.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## Myshkin (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Jon_
> Yep, Dr. Sudduth nailed it. There really is no rational basis for accepting epistemic Scripturalism. That has been one of my on-going difficulties with the system. Not only does it posit its own "verification principle," but, like logical positivism, it presents no knowable proposition denying the possibility of knowledge being obtainable outside of the axiom.
> 
> Now, at best, this simply strips Scripturalism of any claim to obligatory acceptance (since it cannot be known to be true), but it also clearly shows that the system is incomplete. Just as the lack of a theory of meaning cripples the Scripturalist's claim to be able to deduce theorems from the data of Scripture, the lack of a sound argument to justify the axiom also defeats the obligation to accept the system. One may not be correct in accepting the evidentialists' position on other reasons, but not because one has chosen something contrary to Scripturalism.
> ...



Jon-

How is what you are saying here any different from my original point in principle? I did not use as many technical words, but it is the same basic argument that you are saying is why you cannot accept scripturalism: it is irrational, it is self-defeating.


----------



## Jon (Feb 15, 2006)

> _Originally posted by RAS_
> How is what you are saying here any different from my original point in principle? I did not use as many technical words, but it is the same basic argument that you are saying is why you cannot accept scripturalism: it is irrational, it is self-defeating.


It's incoherent. In other words, it fails to justify itself because it does not imply itself (it contains no statement of identity). At this point, it is simply an incomplete system, one that one must take on faith, not on rigorous self-referential coherence. If it were true that Scripturalism _can't_ be coherent, then the conclusion that it is irrational would have merit; however, that is precisely the point to be proven. I happen to think it can be shown to be coherent--just that it hasn't been done, yet. I plan to work on the problem myself in the future.

_Soli Deo Gloria_

Jon


----------



## JohnV (Feb 16, 2006)

> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by JohnV_
> ...



I was trying to convey the idea that one can discard Scripturalism without discarding Scripture; that one can discard Clarkianism without discarding Clark; that one can discard Van Tillianism without discarding Van Til; but most of all that one can discard JohnV-ism without discarding JohnV. Discarding all the former is not my intent, but discarding the latter is fully my intent. 

Though I claim membership in Christ, and though I claim to know Him, and to be known by Him, yet it is also true that He reveals Himself to me also through others that also have relationship to Him. I am not superior to others because I have personal contact with Christ; for they too have personal contact with Him. This demonstrates the vast broadness of the knowledge that is through Him: none of us can contain sufficient knowledge so as to be independent of others who also have knowledge. 

Any one system of epistemology, therefore, must by definition be insufficient to answer the need. It is far too complex to be reigned in by men's theories. I can be taught as much by Clark as I can by a little child's trusting and idealistic assertions. The reason for this, as I understand it, is that knowledge is not an apprehension of facts and propositions so much as it is a seeing of God Himself. To know Him is to know. Therefore knowledge can come through even a child as much as through a sophisticated theory, because it is based on His revelation of Himself, not merely of facts or propositions. No human theory can cover that, for it transcends formulation.

[Edited on 2-16-2006 by JohnV]


----------



## Theogenes (Feb 17, 2006)

JohnV: It sounds like you are promoting neo-orthodox mysticism. Having an encounter with God apart from propositional Truth is not Biblical.
Jim


----------



## Theogenes (Feb 17, 2006)

Jon said: Now, assuming the Scripturalist begins with the axiom of Scripture, how does he deduce language from the Bible? Even more, how can one avoid linguistic skepticism when attempting to deduce theorems from the Bible without begging the question? A good example of this is found in Clark's argument that man knows language (and this must be fallible) because Scripture says God talked to Adam; therefore, God must have given Adam the gift of language. I find this argument to be viciously circular, even as a semi-Scripturalist...


Jon, 
It seems that you are trying to prove the axiom by the axiom and as Civbert has pointed out that if you attempt to do that then the axiom (in this case Scripture) is not your starting point. By revelation (Scripture) we know that the origin of language is from God and because He has created us in His image we have language because language is the ability to communicate rationally. Language is intelligible signs for ideas. Clark's theory of language is therefore deducible from Scripture, if Scripture is where you start. But if you try to start from somewhere else you certainly will not have the Truth but rather error. And, how do we know that Scripture is Truth ( and the only Truth), read WCF chap one. Jesus said in John 17, Thy Word is Truth. Doesn't that make Scripture self-referentially coherent??

In Christ, the Logos
Jim


----------



## Theogenes (Feb 17, 2006)

Hey,
How do I make those little box thingies around quotes from other posters?
TIA
Jim


----------



## JohnV (Feb 17, 2006)

Jim:

There are different ways to get those quotes into separate boxes. You could just click on the quote button in the upper right hand corner of each post; or you could look up the codes. I often just click on the [, then type "quote" ( without the quotation marks ) and then the right hand ]. Then after the quote I want to quote is in place I type the same thing again, only with a backslash in front of the word "quote", but after the [ . 

Of course that's only when I don't depend on the quotes mystically appearing. 

In answer to your question about mysticism, I want to be careful about how I make an answer. If I've left the impression of mysticism, then I've overstated the case. But I've done so because I want to convey that there is a deep reality to Christianity. It is not merely using the word "relationship", or "communion", but having these terms really mean what they mean. The relationship is real, and the communion if real. There really is answer to prayer. It is not at all what the world thinks of prayer, or of relationship to God. 

Yes, you are right that it is not direct like that we have with our fellow men. And yet it is direct, in a way that men cannot have with each other. I only wanted to convey that one can not only receive answer to prayer, but he can know that his prayers are heard by the real person of God the Father. One can know that his salvation is secure. One can know that he truly is in the Covenant. These are not mere wishful thinking; nor are they only true in the believing of them. Rather, one can believe in them because they are true. It is not just reading about it in the Bible, and binding it to oneself. It is finding that we have been bound by a real and loving God, Who does speak into this world, and who does touch our lives. 

It is not mysticism to claim that. But it is mysticism to those who have no idea about it. 

And this was my point. Knowing is more than intellectual exercise. It is more than formula. It is more than theory. It is more than building upon an impersonal Scripture. One grows mature in the faith as one leans on Christ through His Scripture and the Spirit, as he is faced with the many tests of his faith throughout life. It is dependency upon the person of Christ, not just upon the idea of Christ. 



> 2Co 4:6 For God, who said, "Let light shine out of darkness," has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.


----------



## Theogenes (Feb 17, 2006)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Jim:
> 
> There are different ways to get those quotes into separate boxes. You could just click on the quote button in the upper right hand corner of each post; or you could look up the codes. I often just click on the [, then type "quote" ( without the quotation marks ) and then the right hand ]. Then after the quote I want to quote is in place I type the same thing again, only with a backslash in front of the word "quote", but after the [ .
> ...


----------



## Magma2 (Feb 17, 2006)

> You mentioned the Scriptures as impersonal. The Bible doesn't do that. Christ said His words are Spirit and Life. Paul call God the Scriptures in Galatians 3:8. John calls Christ the Word, the Logos- the words, the speech, the reason, the logic of God. You are trying to separate Christ from His words and have a naked encounter with Him.
> This, my brother, is mysticism.



 +


----------



## JohnV (Feb 17, 2006)

> John,
> The mind of God, of Christ, interpenetrates our minds completely (Heb.4), and we have the mind of Christ (1Cor2:16), at least part of it, in the Scriptures. Now that relationship is the most intimate one there can be. This involves the whole soul, since man's immaterial soul is unitary and not divided into parts like the body. It sounds like you think that man is a soul which possesses many parts, like a mind, a will, emotions, and whatever else. But I see man as a soul inhabiting a body (the Scriptures call the body a tent or a house)and the soul is unitary. It thinks and wills.
> You mentioned the Scriptures as impersonal. The Bible doesn't do that. Christ said His words are Spirit and Life. Paul call God the Scriptures in Galatians 3:8. John calls Christ the Word, the Logos- the words, the speech, the reason, the logic of God. You are trying to separate Christ from His words and have a naked encounter with Him.
> This, my brother, is mysticism.
> Jim


Jim:
First you tell me that I'm saying the exact opposite of what I'm saying, and then you call it mysticism. All I was trying to convey was the a relationship with Christ is not a pretence, but is real; and you keep telling me that a relationship with Christ is not a pretence, but is real. I say the Scriptures are not impersonal; and you say the Scriptures are not impersonal. I don't know what you are saying to me. All I can gather from what you say is that I am somehow into mysticism.

I suppose that you might be getting this idea because I refuse to be condescended upon by those claiming a higher system of analyses. I have had to prove that I too am a Christian, and am Reformed, even though I do not hold to these scholasticisms. I have had to try to prove that ordinary Christianity is not at all inferior to these new-fangled ideas. I've had to excel at things that I was never taught, that I never took any classes for. I've sat face to face with a couple of scholars in the field to find out exactly what they are saying, not just the iterations and repetitions of their students. I stand my ground against those who tout and insist upon the necessities of the theories of men; I say that the Scriptures are sufficient and clear enough, but that it is the Scriptures of the Christ that are sufficient and clear. Thus I do not subject the Scriptures to cultural movements ( which is why I left the CRC eventually ), nor to traditional movements ( which is why I left the URC eventually ) nor to philosophical movements ( which is why I am now in difficulty in the OPC. ) If there is no room for the ordinary Christian without man-created tabs attached, then there is no room for me. I don't want to be tossed about by the winds of doctrine that have been blowing through the churches for the past number of decades.

Does that make me mysitical? I don't see how. It would be the essence of what I oppose in our modern churches. Mysticisms abound in so many forms that it is almost useless to use that term anymore. But yet it is clear in its simple formula, as nothing more than an encounter with one's own ideals, instead of with the real Christ. 

No, I could not speak of an encounter with Christ as you describe it, as if He communes with me without the Scripture and without the Spirit: a "naked encounter with Him", as you call it. I believe I have stated that I stand against this clearly enough; that it is through the living Scripture and His own Spirit and through prayer that I have communion with Him. I have also stated that a vital part of communion with Him is also through the communion of the saints and in corporate worship. I have included all the ingredients that true communion with God depends upon because each one is important to that relationship; but I have never centred it upon myself alone. 

And that is what I was driving at. If there is an analytical system of comprehending the fullness of theological epistemology, then no one man or system is big enough for it. There must be a Church. Our systems cover the basics at best, and even then we cannot rely upon them to keep us on the straight and narrow. We have had Confessional covenants for centuries already, and that has not kept the churches pure. We have pages and pages of direction that the preaching of the Word is to remain pure, that it is to be Christ's message through His Word; but that has not kept men from expounding their own theories and opinions within that mandate. 

Am I a mystic because I refuse to be alienated from Christ so that I won't be alienated from the _status quo_ of the churches? If so, then I prefer that mysticism to that _status quo_ which cannot understand the simple objection to things such as Presuppositionalism preached from the pulpit as a very serious objection. While it is possible for preachers to use the pulpit to propound their own particular _adiaphora_ ideas of the creation days, of the eschatological millennium, and even of new views of justification, then clearly mysticism is preferrable. But I also repudiate mysticism, and I mean to refuse, with all my endeavour, to fall prey to that too.


----------



## Civbert (Feb 17, 2006)

Brother John, 

Knowledge can not hurt your relationship with Christ. The enemy is not a rational thought or logic or reason. The enemy is the rejection of reason. Communion with Christ is meaningless if you don't know Him, and you don't know him by experience but by knowledge which requires clear reasoning. 

Had the church not abandoned the Confessions, it would have remained pure. Doctrine is what keeps the Church united. When we lose site of that, we just float about and splinter apart. That's why there are so many denominations - because the majority of the church has said doctrine is to abstract and we need to have relationships. But doctrine is the Word understood. The confessions were written to refute errors that were killing the unity of the Church. Failures to reason and understand the doctrines of justification, trinity, atonement, salvation, adoption. We split apart because we decided experience and relationship trump knowledge and wisdom. We've even redefined knowledge in terms of mystical experience and undefined religious terms that have no clear meaning. 

Scriptures were given to us so that we can know Christ. Doctrine is how Scripture is understood. Logic and systematic theologies are just the tools used to keep us firm in the knowledge that is communion with Christ. Not experience, not journeys, not passions, it is knowledge. There is an analytical system of comprehending the fullness of theological epistemology - we have this in the WCF, and the Larger and Smaller Catechisms. Knowing correct doctrine is the key to union with Christ. This goes against everything the world and the post-modern and neo-orthodox have been trying to ingrain into our brains - which is why we have a sense of distrust of doctrine. We think "dry knowledge" can kill our union with Christ - that we need to balance the heart and head (mystical eastern clap-trap). Don't fall for it. Read the Word. Look up the word "relationship", then "experience", then try "know", "knowledge", "wisdom". Ask what does Christ mean when his says if you believed him you would believe his words. Words! Mere abstractions. We want love and union and feelings. But what is Biblical love - relationship to Christ - no, it's obedience. "Yuck! Give me love" is how we react. Obedience is not love. But that's what Christ said to us in his Word. Keep my commands. This calls for knowledge, wisdom, and understanding. I don't care how many times you "experience" the "living Word" if you don't know what the Word is. You can not keep his commands if you don't know good old dry cold doctrine.

Now I know this is not what you are saying entirely - I am exaggerating to make my point. Reason is not the enemy - but fear of knowledge and logic is. Don't fall for it. Define you terms, reason carefully, know doctrine. What does "real" mean. What about "existence"? Can we reason from loosely defined terms? Does that help us know Christ?

You seem far from being a mystic, but you seem to resist reason. You seems to embrace reason on one hand, but undermine it with the other. That is why I worry about you. Because you don't seem to trust reason - to the point that you want to set it aside. Like you think it's impossible to be as rational as you can and still be in Christ. The Spirit is not some irrational being, but a fully rational person who will keep you safe if you don't reject the Word by rejecting reasoning you need to know it. 

...

I hope I've been of some use to you. I'm not trying to attack you - more the irrationalism that has infected the church going back to St. Thomas who tried to separate reason and faith. It's still a problem for the Catholics who embrace thoughtless "faith" and the charismatics who embrace sensation and experience - and many who have assumed the yin-yang heart head dichotomy. The church quit thinking and Bacon said science the theology shall never meet again as if we could compartmentalize faith and reason and the public schools system has divorced Christianity from education as if this would cause no harm to push secularism. So I'm unloading a bit on you because of the stupidity of the "church" which has let us down when if gave up doctrine as if this were not really a rejection of Scripture. 

So I'm going to stop even if I've not really wrapped this up. 

God bless,


----------



## JohnV (Feb 17, 2006)

Anthony:


> _Originally posted by Civbert_
> Brother John,
> 
> Knowledge can not hurt your relationship with Christ. The enemy is not a rational thought or logic or reason. The enemy is the rejection of reason. Communion with Christ is meaningless if you don't know Him, and you don't know him by experience but by knowledge which requires clear reasoning.


Thank you. That was what I was trying to say too. 



> Had the church not abandoned the Confessions, it would have remained pure. Doctrine is what keeps the Church united. When we lose site of that, we just float about and splinter apart.


And again; we do not disagree, then. 



> That's why there are so many denominations - because the majority of the church has said doctrine is to abstract and we need to have relationships. But doctrine is the Word understood. The confessions were written to refute errors that were killing the unity of the Church. Failures to reason and understand the doctrines of justification, trinity, atonement, salvation, adoption. We split apart because we decided experience and relationship trump knowledge and wisdom. We've even redefined knowledge in terms of mystical experience and undefined religious terms that have no clear meaning.


Perhaps here we may be focusing on different errors in the church, but again this poses not major difference. 



> Scriptures were given to us so that we can know Christ. Doctrine is how Scripture is understood. Logic and systematic theologies are just the tools used to keep us firm in the knowledge that is communion with Christ.


Upto this point we agree. 


> Not experience, not journeys, not passions, it is knowledge. There is an analytical system of comprehending the fullness of theological epistemology - we have this in the WCF, and the Larger and Smaller Catechisms. Knowing correct doctrine is the key to union with Christ. This goes against everything the world and the post-modern and neo-orthodox have been trying to ingrain into our brains - which is why we have a sense of distrust of doctrine. We think "dry knowledge" can kill our union with Christ - that we need to balance the heart and head (mystical eastern clap-trap). Don't fall for it. Read the Word. Look up the word "relationship", then "experience", then try "know", "knowledge", "wisdom". Ask what does Christ mean when his says if you believed him you would believe his words. Words! Mere abstractions. We want love and union and feelings. But what is Biblical love - relationship to Christ - no, it's obedience. "Yuck! Give me love" is how we react.


This last sentence misrepresents the conclusion that I've come to. Yes, love is indeed central. But it does not reject reason or obedience. But neither does reason or obedience reject a true love. 


> Obedience is not love.


But it surely is.


> But that's what Christ said to us n his Word. Keep my commands.


To be more precise, He said, "If you love me you will keep my commandments", and, " By this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and obey his commandments. For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments. And his commandments are not burdensome." 



> This calls for knowledge, wisdom, and understanding. I don't care how many times you "experience" the "living Word" if you don't know what the Word is. You can not keep his commands if you don't know good old dry cold doctrine.


That is exactly right. And the reverse is also true, that no matter how well you know the dry cold doctrines, without the relation to Christ through the Spirit, His Word, and the communion of the saints, you do not know the dry cold doctrines as you should. 



> Now I know this is not what you are saying entirely - I am exaggerating to make my point. Reason is not the enemy - but fear of knowledge and logic is. Don't fall for it. Define you terms, reason carefully, know doctrine. What does "real" mean. What about "existence"? Can we reason from loosely defined terms? Does that help us know Christ?


That is right, Anthony: does it help us to know Christ? We cannot keep going around in circles, saying we know Him when all we know is the reasoning, or saying we know the reasoning when all we are claiming is knowing Him without the reasoning. Just as we are called to a true relationship with Him, so we are called to reason truly. For God is not a God of confusion. 



> You seem far from being a mystic, but you seem to resist reason.


I am merely resisting the modern notion of reasoning; the notion that cannot recognize the clear abuse of the Word, the offices, and the pulpit when men's theories are proclaimed as equal to, and even normative to God's Word. Have you not seen how Presuppositionalism is nothing more than the reigning orthodoxy? Yet no one, not even the one denomination considered the bastion of Presuppositionalism, has ordained it as doctrinal necessity. Yet here are men openly and boldy proclaiming it as the higher Reformed theology as if it were God's Word. Do you not see that you cannot on the one hand call it _adiaphora_, and on the other hand place it as a cornerstone in Reformed theology? It cannot be both: it must be either or. That is simple enough logic. That is very reasonable. 

I am not arguing against anyone holding to Presuppositionalism; I'm only saying we should get it back to it proper place. And at the same time, to bring back close and careful propagation of the Word as the Word of God. 


> You seems to embrace reason on one hand, but undermine it with the other. That is why I worry about you. Because you don't seem to trust reason - to the point that you want to set it aside. Like you think it's impossible to be as rational as you can and still be in Christ.


What I am saying is that what is commonly held as reasonable and rational is not as reasonable and rational as it should be. And it is because I do trust reason because I trust Christ. Rejecting the modern trend is not rejecting reason or being irrational. I can reject Van Tillianism, Bahnsenism, Clarkism, and many more, on reasonable and rational grounds, as I have been doing. And I have been doing it on solely rational grounds. And yet I have not rejected Van Til, Bahnsen, or Clark themselves, or even their main teachings. I've only rejected exclusivism carried out in their names. And I've done it rationally.


> The Spirit is not some irrational being, but a fully rational person who will keep you safe if you don't reject the Word by rejecting reasoning you need to know it.


That has been the same warning bell I have been ringing. Don't give yourself to a poor imitation of the real thing. 



> I hope I've been of some use to you. I'm not trying to attack you - more the irrationalism that has infected the church going back to St. Thomas who tried to separate reason and faith. It's still a problem for the Catholics who embrace thoughtless "faith" and the charismatics who embrace sensation and experience - and many who have assumed the yin-yang heart head dichotomy. The church quit thinking and Bacon said science the theology shall never meet again as if we could compartmentalize faith and reason and the public schools system has divorced Christianity from education as if this would cause no harm to push secularism. So I'm unloading a bit on you because of the stupidity of the "church" which has let us down when if gave up doctrine as if this were not really a rejection of Scripture.


And it has been replaced by a new rationalism, though not so altogether different. I too have been unloading because the churches have been ignorantly following the times, giving in on doctrine in the names of culture, tradition, or philosophy, and even thinking themselves rational all the while. As you have said, "The Spirit is not some irrational being, but a fully rational person who will keep you safe if you don't reject the Word by rejecting reasoning you need to know it." I mean to uphold both: His personhood; and His truth in unity, which is what reason entails. 

It is not reason I reject. It is what some would call reason that I reject. Therefore I am not a mystic.


----------



## Theogenes (Feb 21, 2006)

John,
Please forgive me for misunderstanding you. I meant no offense. This is a perfect example of what I don't like about web forums like this: Communication can be derailed. Again, Please accept my apologies.
Jim


----------



## JohnV (Feb 21, 2006)

Jim:

I am not offended at all, Jim. All is forgiven. In fact, I am thankful for the exhange. It helped to put things in perspective for me again. Please forgive me too, for I am not as good a writer as I wish I were. But that's one thing I like about this web forum: if at first you don't succeed, then write, write again; there are friends who give you the chance.


----------

