# Is all truth propositional?



## Philip

Fundamental question of philosophy and theology.

I maintain that not all truth is propositional. "God is Holy" is a proposition, yet to explain what is meant by holiness is more than mere words can describe or comprehend. I maintain that certain aspects of God cannot be fully expressed propositionally.


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## Christusregnat

P. F. Pugh said:


> Fundamental question of philosophy and theology.
> 
> I maintain that not all truth is propositional. "God is Holy" is a proposition, yet to explain what is meant by holiness is more than mere words can describe or comprehend. I maintain that certain aspects of God cannot be fully expressed propositionally.



Do you grunt or draw pictures? How exactly does one do this?

It is popular with many who have mystic leanings to speak this way, but if the finer things in God's revelation are mystic and symbolic, then why didn't God give us the holy comic book? Why? Because, God is the Logos, the Logic, the Reason, the Discourse, or whatever else you'd like to use to translate logos. God is not the picture, or the symbol, or the grunt.

Cheers,


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## steven-nemes

I'm not sure what is meant by "truth is propositional". Do you mean to say that there are things that are true that are not propositions? How? It seems the property of being "true" or "false" belongs to propositions...


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> Fundamental question of philosophy and theology.
> 
> I maintain that not all truth is propositional. "God is Holy" is a proposition, yet to explain what is meant by holiness is more than mere words can describe or comprehend. I maintain that certain aspects of God cannot be fully expressed propositionally.



Well, lets see you express a truth which is not propositional. And how do you "explain what is meant" without using "mere words"?


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gents,



Whitefield said:


> Well, lets see you express a truth which is not propositional.



When Jesus says, "I am the way, and the _truth_, and the life...," it seems to me that He is using 'truth' as a predicate nominative. So, Jesus Himself is in some sense truth, and Jesus ain't no proposition. Now, my point here is _*not*_ to agree with P. F. Pugh, but rather to point out that his question is ill-formed. He needs to define what he means by the terms 'truth' and 'propositional.' I think if he does this, then we are in a better position to determine whether or not the following statement (which expresses a proposition ) is true or false.

*P: *All truth is propositional. 

Brian


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## Whitefield

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gents,
> 
> 
> 
> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> Well, lets see you express a truth which is not propositional.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> When Jesus says, "I am the way, and the _truth_, and the life...," it seems to me that He is using 'truth' as a predicate nominative. So, Jesus Himself is in some sense truth, and Jesus ain't no proposition. Now, my point here is _*not*_ to agree with P. F. Pugh, but rather to point out that his question is ill-formed. He needs to define what he means by the terms 'truth' and 'propositional.' I think if he does this, then we are in a better position to determine whether or not the following statement (which expresses a proposition ) is true or false.
> 
> *P: *All truth is propositional.
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...


And at the same time "I am the truth." is a propositional statement. Either it is true (He is the truth), or it is false (He is not the truth).


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## rbcbob

P. F. Pugh said:


> Fundamental question of philosophy and theology.
> 
> I maintain that not all truth is propositional. "God is Holy" is a proposition, yet to explain what is meant by holiness is more than mere words can describe or comprehend. I maintain that certain aspects of God cannot be fully expressed propositionally.



A proposition, speaking grammatically and philosophically *proposes* something which can be either affirmed or denied. Thus not every sentence in the bible is a proposition; some are questions, commands, etc.; nevertheless all of God's Word is TRUTH and all truth can be expressed propositionally.


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## Philip

Truth: that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.

My contention here is that certain truths about God's nature cannot be expressed propositionally because all proposition are finite, whereas God's nature is infinite. Therefore no proposition or set of propositions can be said to fully describe God's nature (which is truth).

Can I explain the trinity propositionally? No, unless I want to start a cult.

*P:* Not all truth is propositional.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> Can I explain the trinity propositionally? No, unless I want to start a cult.



If you do not use propositions to explain the trinity, what do you use to express anything about the trinity to another person?

-----Added 7/6/2009 at 10:52:30 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> *P:* Not all truth is propositional.



Can you express that _without _using a proposition?


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## rbcbob

P. F. Pugh said:


> Truth: that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.
> 
> My contention here is that certain truths about God's nature cannot be expressed propositionally because all proposition are finite, whereas God's nature is infinite. Therefore no proposition or set of propositions can be said to fully describe God's nature (which is truth).
> 
> Can I explain the trinity propositionally? No, unless I want to start a cult.
> 
> *P:* Not all truth is propositional.



If there were TRUTH that could not be expressed propositionally, then of logical necessity it could be neither affirmed or denied. That we may express the Trinity propositionally and expect from the believer an affirmation does not imply that either the man *proposing* the proposition or the man affirming the proposition possesses exhaustive knowledge of the Trinity.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gents,

I think this discussion is best resolved by allowing P.F. Pugh to get very clear and explicit as to what he means. Here is the proposition under discussion - *P:* All truth is propositional. P.F. Pugh's position is that *P* is false. However, it is still unclear what he means by the terms 'truth' and 'propositional'. He did define 'truth' as...



> ...that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.



This seems to fall short. For instance, if Jesus was in some sense the truth, then according to P.F Pugh's definition Jesus was unshakeable. However, it seems likely he was shaken while hanging on the cross when "the earth shook and the rocks split." Now, I realize this is silly and I am sure P.F. Pugh means something different than this, but he has not made it clear as to precisely what he does mean. Everybody is getting hijacked by P.F.'s claim when he has yet to adequately express what he means. My advice is to see if P.F. can adequately define his terms, and if he is able to only then see if you agree or disagree. 

Brian


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## rbcbob

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gents,
> 
> I think this discussion is best resolved by allowing P.F. Pugh to get very clear and explicit as to what he means. Here is the proposition under discussion - *P:* All truth is propositional. P.F. Pugh's position is that *P* is false. However, it is still unclear what he means by the terms 'truth' and 'propositional'. He did define 'truth' as...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This seems to fall short. For instance, if Jesus was in some sense the truth, then according to P.F Pugh's definition Jesus was unshakeable. However, it seems likely he was shaken while hanging on the cross when "the earth shook and the rocks split." Now, I realize this is silly and I am sure P.F. Pugh means something different than this, but he has not made it clear as to precisely what he does mean. Everybody is getting hijacked by P.F.'s claim when he has yet to adequately express what he means. My advice is to see if P.F. can adequately define his terms, and if he is able to only then see if you agree or disagree.
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...


Quite so. I have defined *proposition* and if P.F. Pugh wishes to use the word differently then that will take us down another road.


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## Philip

> This seems to fall short. For instance, if Jesus was in some sense the truth, then according to P.F Pugh's definition Jesus was unshakeable.



And in His divinity, Jesus is unshakeable and certain. I would affirm that Jesus is talking of truth in this sense when He says "I am the truth."

A proposition is an absolute statement that can be either affirmed or denied.

My goal here is to avoid the common Reformed error of reducing the Christian faith to a series of propositions and leaving aside aspects of theology such as God's love, which is non-rational (as opposed to irrational). 



whitefield said:


> Can you express that without using a proposition?



Of course not--I'm finite. Propositions are a concession to our finitude.


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## CatechumenPatrick

Harder question: What are propositions?


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## CDM

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gents,
> 
> I think this discussion is best resolved by allowing P.F. Pugh to get very clear and explicit as to what he means. Here is the proposition under discussion - *P:* All truth is propositional. P.F. Pugh's position is that *P* is false. However, it is still unclear what he means by the terms 'truth' and 'propositional'. He did define 'truth' as...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This seems to fall short. For instance, if Jesus was in some sense the truth, then according to P.F Pugh's definition Jesus was unshakeable. However, it seems likely he was shaken while hanging on the cross when "the earth shook and the rocks split." Now, I realize this is silly and I am sure P.F. Pugh means something different than this, but he has not made it clear as to precisely what he does mean. Everybody is getting hijacked by P.F.'s claim when he has yet to adequately express what he means. My advice is to see if P.F. can adequately define his terms, and if he is able to only then see if you agree or disagree.
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...


 This conversation will go nowhere if terms are not clearly defined. Also, assertions need not apply.



P. F. Pugh said:


> This seems to fall short. For instance, if Jesus was in some sense the truth, then according to P.F Pugh's definition Jesus was unshakeable.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And in His divinity, Jesus is unshakeable and certain. I would affirm that Jesus is talking of truth in this sense when He says "I am the truth."
> 
> _*A proposition is an absolute statement that can be either affirmed or denied.*_
> 
> My goal here is to avoid the common Reformed error of reducing the Christian faith to a series of propositions and *leaving aside aspects of theology such as God's love, which is non-rational (as opposed to irrational). *
> 
> 
> 
> whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> Can you express that without using a proposition?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Of course not--I'm finite. Propositions are a concession to our finitude.
Click to expand...


Thank you for your definition of proposition. 

The bolded portion of your comment is compounding the problem. You must explain what is meant by your proposition that "God's love...is non-rational". I simply do not know what you are talking about.


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## Philip

What I mean by saying that God's love (in particular) is non-rational is that there is no logical reason why a just God should love sinners. Also, God created us as emotional beings in His own image. Emotions are non-rational.


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## rbcbob

P. F. Pugh said:


> This seems to fall short. For instance, if Jesus was in some sense the truth, then according to P.F Pugh's definition Jesus was unshakeable.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And in His divinity, Jesus is unshakeable and certain. I would affirm that Jesus is talking of truth in this sense when He says "I am the truth."
> 
> A proposition is an absolute statement that can be either affirmed or denied.
> 
> *My goal here is to avoid the common Reformed error of reducing the Christian faith to a series of propositions and leaving aside aspects of theology such as God's love, which is non-rational (as opposed to irrational).
> *
> 
> 
> whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> Can you express that without using a proposition?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Of course not--I'm finite. Propositions are a concession to our finitude.
Click to expand...


I believe that you are setting up a false dichotomy between knowledge and love which is carrying over into your (in my opinion) still clouded grasp of propositional truth.

God's knowledge and His love are each infinite attributes of His character. They are not conflicted.

Jeremiah 29:11 For I know the thoughts that I think toward you, says the LORD, thoughts of peace and not of evil, to give you a future and a hope.

Our knowledge of and assent to the propositions of His Word are likewise bound up in one another.

God commands us to love Him with both heart and mind.

Mark 12:30 'And you shall love the LORD your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.' This is the first commandment.

He commands us thus because we are to reflect His character:

WLC 95 Of what use is the moral law to all men ? A. The moral law is of use to all men, to inform them of the holy nature and will of God


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## CDM

P. F. Pugh said:


> What I mean by saying that God's love (in particular) is non-rational is that there is no logical reason why a just God should love sinners. Also, God created us as emotional beings in His own image. Emotions are non-rational.



I deny "there is no logical reason why a just God should love sinners" the answer is manifestly Jesus Christ. A just God loves sinners in Jesus Christ. Perfectly logical--just like God. 

I do not mean to steer the OP down a rabbit trail so I will back away if and until we get to the heart of the OP.

Grace and peace,


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## chbrooking

Philip,
I'm concerned that you may not be appreciating the simplicity of God or the nature of rationality. Our rationality is a shadowy reflection of God's thought. You mustn't think that there are these abstract rules of rational thought to which even God must submit. Rather, God is who he is, and it is because of that that WE have rules of thought. God does not think inferentially. We do. God's thought is one seamless whole. And logic does not stand independent of God. It is wholly dependent upon him. 

As to the simplicity element, you must understand that God is what he has. His being cannot be divided up, so that one attribute (love) can be distinguished and even set over against another (reason). You need to understand that our idea of love and our idea of reason are shadows that have their true essence in God. We partake of these things by way of image-bearing. We may be able to abstract God's love for heuristic reasons, or so that we, who have finite minds, can discuss it. But that does not mean that God's love is really distinct from his reason. We HAVE to think that way. We HAVE to talk that way. But we KNOW that God's love and reason cannot be truly distinguished that way. The doctrine of divine simplicity prohibits it. 

So, you might say that human love is non-rational. But you cannot say that divine love is non-rational, anymore than you could say that divine reason is unloving.

As for truth being non-propositional ... Okay. Once we realize that God is truth, we cannot regard truth itself as a proposition, but a person (or three). But I'm not sure what mileage you seek to get out of that fact. What are you driving at? Our minds do work by inference. Our thought is discursive. Once you speak of truth in human conception, you're probably bound to move into propositions. You need to clarify whether you are talking about truth itself (which is incomprehensible), or our conception of truth, which is dependent upon God and his revelation.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> Truth: that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.
> 
> My contention here is that certain truths about God's nature cannot be expressed propositionally because all proposition are finite, whereas God's nature is infinite. Therefore no proposition or set of propositions can be said to fully describe God's nature (which is truth).
> 
> Can I explain the trinity propositionally? No, unless I want to start a cult.
> 
> *P:* Not all truth is propositional.



I'm sure God can explain the trinity propositionally. We are not the measure of things and just because we can't explain the trinity propositionally does not mean it cannot be done by God. We may not be able to express all truth propositionally because of limitedness and lack of knowledge, but the same cannot be said for God.


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## Christusregnat

P. F. Pugh said:


> Truth: that which is unshakeable and certain, regardless of whether we are certain of it.
> 
> My contention here is that certain truths about God's nature cannot be expressed propositionally because all proposition are finite, whereas God's nature is infinite. Therefore no proposition or set of propositions can be said to fully describe God's nature (which is truth).
> 
> Can I explain the trinity propositionally? No, unless I want to start a cult.
> 
> *P:* Not all truth is propositional.



If you can't explain the trinity propositionally, the word is not "cult", the word is "heretic". The doctrine of the Trinity is itself a set of propositions.

Cheers,

-----Added 7/7/2009 at 11:26:57 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> What I mean by saying that God's love (in particular) is non-rational is that there is no logical reason why a just God should love sinners. Also, God created us as emotional beings in His own image. Emotions are non-rational.



God does not have emotions. Emotions are when a person is moved by external fources to an involuntary response. God has never had, nor will He ever have emotions.

Nice try though.

Cheers,


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gents,

The proposition under discussion is - *P:* All truth is propositional. Philip believes *P* to be false. He is trying to define what he means by the terms ‘propositional’ and ‘truth.’ His latest definition for ‘propositional’ is…



> A proposition is an absolute statement that can be either affirmed or denied.



Technically, this is not a definition for ‘propositional’ but rather ‘proposition’. Let’s assume from the definition given he means the following…

*Propositional (def.):* ‘X’ is _propositional_ if and only if ‘X’ is an absolute statement that can be affirmed or denied.

It is unclear what Philip means by ‘absolute’ in ‘absolute statement’. Nevertheless, let’s apply this to *P*. 

*P’:* All truth is an absolute statement that can be affirmed or denied.

If this is what Philip is saying, then on the basis that “Jesus is the truth,” I would agree that *P’* is false. Jesus is not an absolute statement that can be affirmed or denied. He is a person. Taken in this sense, my guess is that everyone else on the board would agree as well. * Case Closed?*  

Now, based on what has been said in this thread by Philip and others, the above does not feel quite right to me. To say that *P’* is false on the basis that “Jesus is the truth” uses the term ‘truth’ in a rather broad sense – a sense that Philip may or may not have originally intended. He has yet to define clearly what he means by the term ‘truth’. (He did attempt an earlier definition, but it was insufficiently clear.) Philip, when you use the term 'truth' what do you mean? Also, just to keep things moving, what does 'absolute' mean in 'absolute statement'?

Brian


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## chbrooking

Yes, I was wondering about that 'absolute' element in his definition as well. I seem to remember him using the same term in another thread to means something quite different. Thanks for highlighting it for discussion, Brian.


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## Vytautas

Brian Bosse said:


> If this is what Philip is saying, then on the basis that “Jesus is the truth,” I would agree that *P’* is false. Jesus is not an absolute statement that can be affirmed or denied. He is a person. Taken in this sense, my guess is that everyone else on the board would agree as well. * Case Closed?*



When Jesus said that he was the truth, he was using a metaphor much like when he said he was the door. So the term truth in, I am the truth, and, all truth is propositional, is being used in different senses. Jesus was not claiming he was truth qua truth, but rather what he says is true.


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## chbrooking

Vytautas said:


> When Jesus said that he was the truth, he was using a metaphor much like when he said he was the door. ..Jesus was not claiming he was truth qua truth, but rather what he says is true.



I could not disagree more.


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## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> Vytautas said:
> 
> 
> 
> When Jesus said that he was the truth, he was using a metaphor much like when he said he was the door. ..Jesus was not claiming he was truth qua truth, but rather what he says is true.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I could not disagree more.
Click to expand...


Then you must show how Jesus' statements to be the truth and a door are different in that respect.

As for my answer: as far as humans can conceive of and apprehend truth, yes, it's all propositional. But God does not think in terms of propositions.


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## chbrooking

I don't think that burden falls on me. I simply stated that I disagreed.

But there are numerous differences. For one thing, a door is concrete; truth is abstract. For another, a door is created; truth is not. For yet another, while I suppose there is a standard of sorts, a template, if you will -- the unifying category "door" in the mind of God, God is the definition of truth. The latter distinction isn't a hill I'd die on, but once we connect it with the second distinction, it has more force. Truth is coterminus and correlative with God because God's character is truth. It would be far more difficult to say the same of "doorness".

One thing that we should bear in mind, though, when we consider metaphoric language, is that God is the source. A rock is hard because God is steadfast. The reason the metaphor works is because the creation reflects his character.


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## CharlieJ

I don't have it on me right now, but Vos published an article entitled something like "True and truth in John's Gospel," and it's included in that collection edited by Gaffin. I'm pretty sure that the article is relevant to answering the question. Perhaps I'll get a chance later to re-read it.


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## Confessor

I still don't think John 14:6 can establish that God Himself is truth. His _word_ is truth (John 17:17).

If we start saying that God is truth, then we must say also that _according to our human understanding_ truth can be non-propositional. And I'm pretty sure that is impossible to demonstrate.


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## Philip

Ok, real quick, I'll define an absolute as something that must be either rejected or accepted as whole (ie: you can't accept one part and not another).

Truth, as I stated before, is that which is certain and _ultimately_ indubitable (we, as humans and sinners, of course, will doubt the truth, so in one sense truth is dubitable).

I'm not setting God's love against rationality here, but in a complementary position, much like free will is not set against God's divine decrees.

Part of what I'm trying to get at here is that there are parts of divine revelation that are not propositional in nature. I would consider an experience of God's presence to be a revelation here. I may be able to say "I felt God's presence", but I will not be able to express exactly why or how. 

The elephant in the room here is a term that I have used before that I will define--*numinous: the experience of feeling the presence of something wholly other*. I realize that the term is popular among liberals, the neo-orthodox, and Anglo-Catholics, but I think it needs to be considered in Reformed circles as well.

I would argue that for every Christian, there is, at times, this feeling of the numinous that signals God's presence in a unique way and leaves no room for doubt.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> The elephant in the room here is a term that I have used before that I will define--*numinous: the experience of feeling the presence of something wholly other*. I realize that the term is popular among liberals, the neo-orthodox, and Anglo-Catholics, but I think it needs to be considered in Reformed circles as well.
> 
> I would argue that for every Christian, there is, at times, this feeling of the numinous that signals God's presence in a unique way and leaves no room for doubt.



Never even heard the word before. Thanks.

Although I would certainly say that we can have numinous experiences, I would yet say that humans cannot describe them, not because of some objective indescribability, but because of our finitude and present inability to do so. So in that case, truth is still propositional as far as human apprehension goes. We would be able to describe numinous experiences if we had significantly more knowledge.

Of course, there's still a difference between, for instance, feeling happy and having cognizance of the proposition "I am happy." But in that case you do not need to resort to numinous experiences, just to any example of emotion.


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## Philip

The numinous is a particularly apt example, though, because it deals with an awareness of a spiritual realm (and BTW, Satan can, I believe, make use of the numinous, as it is a feature of world religions other than Christianity) and, for a Christian, of God's presence.

I don't think more knowledge would aid us in describing the numinous. The description, for example, in Isaiah 6 of the throne room of God provides great knowledge, but all of the propositions concerning what the prophet experienced merely encircle the actual experience. Even in the reading of it, inspired as it is, there is more in the experience than mere words could ever describe. As it is, the description always sends a tingle up my spine.

Personally, the best expressions of what the numinous feels like are expressed in art rather than propositionally. Music, in particular, can convey something of the numinous. I also think that places may have a sense of God's presence in a unique way (thus why God had the tabernacle and temple built to exact specifications). Gothic cathedrals, in particular, but here I'm just describing my own experience, not any general principle. God uses different vehicles to convey His presence for different people.

Unfortunately, no major works on the subject have been published except for Rudolf Otto's _The Idea of the Holy_ which is, at best, neo-orthodox (though it does contain, I think, some great insights on the effect of certain biblical passages). C. S. Lewis hints at the concept, but doesn't develop it. I'm hoping some reformed theologian will pick up on the topic, but so far it's mostly an Anglican/Roman Catholic thing.

That said, I'll also say that propositional truth is, of course, necessary--I am not trying to denigrate it in any way, simply to put it in its proper place in the created order and in our theology.


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## PuritanCovenanter

P. F. Pugh said:


> God uses different vehicles to convey His presence for different people.



Just to be honest with you, your post sounds subjective in nature and idolatrous in some form.


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## Philip

> Just to be honest with you, your post sounds subjective in nature and idolatrous in some form.



I think I was careful to note that Satan can and does counterfeit the numinous. The way to tell (and I use this criterion, by the way, in my analysis of tongues and miracles) is, if the experience of the numinous points me toward God and His word, then it's of God. If it does not, then it's of the Devil. There is the distinction.

I will admit that there is some subjectivity involved, but it's not unlike saying that God has different callings for different people. Some are called to be Anglicans and some to be Baptists and some to be Presbyterians. I don't think it idolatry to say that we are all worshipping the same God.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> I would argue that for every Christian, there is, at times, this feeling of the numinous that signals God's presence in a unique way and leaves no room for doubt.



1. Exactly how do you know this "numinous experience" to be true? Is it based on a "feeling"?
2. And if you can know this experience to be true, how can you communicate to another this "numinous experience"?
3. Have you been reading Schleiermacher or Otto?


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## rbcbob

Whitefield said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> 
> I would argue that for every Christian, there is, at times, this feeling of the numinous that signals God's presence in a unique way and leaves no room for doubt.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1. Exactly how do you know this "numinous experience" to be true? Is it based on a "feeling"?
> 2. And if you can know this experience to be true, how can you communicate to another this "numinous experience"?
> 3. Have you been reading Schleiermacher or Otto?
Click to expand...


These are good questions. A Mormon could reply "I know because of the burning in my bosom" which is a common answer with them.

A Quaker could appeal to the inner light.


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## Philip

1. If you read my clarification, I established a criteria for determining whether a numinous experience is of God or of Satan. If it points you back to God and His word, then it's from God. In other words, we know because of scripture.

2. There's the problem. It's a non-propositional experience, so it's going to be imprecise no matter how you try to communicate it. There are attempts in Edwards to try and do this, but at best, experiences of the numinous are personal evidences, not propositional.

3. Yes. In particular, I read Otto and while I disagree with his presuppositions and intellectual grounding, I think he has some good points, even if he takes them to conclusions (based on bad theology) that I wouldn't. Again, I really wish that some solid reformed theologian would write on the subject, but sadly, none have (though Edwards seems to set a stage for it).


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> 1. If you read my clarification, I established a criteria for determining whether a numinous experience is of God or of Satan. If it points you back to God and His word, then it's from God. In other words, we know because of scripture.
> 
> 2. There's the problem. It's a non-propositional experience, so it's going to be imprecise no matter how you try to communicate it. There are attempts in Edwards to try and do this, but at best, experiences of the numinous are personal evidences, not propositional.
> 
> 3. Yes. In particular, I read Otto and while I disagree with his presuppositions and intellectual grounding, I think he has some good points, even if he takes them to conclusions (based on bad theology) that I wouldn't. Again, I really wish that some solid reformed theologian would write on the subject, but sadly, none have (though Edwards seems to set a stage for it).



1. So we use the propositional truths of Scripture to test the validity/truth of "numinous experiences"? I'm not sure what "points you back to" means. 

2. Then there is no way I can determine the truth of your experience. That means the "truth" communicated to you through this "numinous experience" is meaningless to me. 

3. Maybe the fact that no Reformed theologian has written on this subject tells us something about the subject, since mysticism does not seem to advance the Reformed cause.


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## rbcbob

*Philip please consider this!*



> Fundamental question of philosophy and theology.
> 
> I maintain that not all truth is propositional. "God is Holy" is a proposition, yet to explain what is meant by holiness is more than mere words can describe or comprehend. I maintain that certain aspects of God cannot be fully expressed propositionally.
> __________________
> Philip
> 
> Ok, real quick, I'll define an absolute as something that must be either rejected or accepted as whole (ie: you can't accept one part and not another).
> 
> Truth, as I stated before, is that which is certain and ultimately indubitable (we, as humans and sinners, of course, will doubt the truth, so in one sense truth is dubitable).
> 
> I'm not setting God's love against rationality here, but in a complementary position, much like free will is not set against God's divine decrees.
> 
> Part of what I'm trying to get at here is that there are parts of divine revelation that are not propositional in nature. I would consider an experience of God's presence to be a revelation here. I may be able to say "I felt God's presence", but I will not be able to express exactly why or how.
> 
> The elephant in the room here is a term that I have used before that I will define--numinous: the experience of feeling the presence of something wholly other. I realize that the term is popular among liberals, the neo-orthodox, and Anglo-Catholics, but I think it needs to be considered in Reformed circles as well.
> 
> I would argue that for every Christian, there is, at times, this feeling of the numinous that signals God's presence in a unique way and leaves no room for doubt.
> __________________
> Philip
> 
> 
> The numinous is a particularly apt example, though, because it deals with an awareness of a spiritual realm (and BTW, Satan can, I believe, make use of the numinous, as it is a feature of world religions other than Christianity) and, for a Christian, of God's presence.
> 
> I don't think more knowledge would aid us in describing the numinous. The description, for example, in Isaiah 6 of the throne room of God provides great knowledge, but all of the propositions concerning what the prophet experienced merely encircle the actual experience. Even in the reading of it, inspired as it is, there is more in the experience than mere words could ever describe. As it is, the description always sends a tingle up my spine.
> 
> Personally, the best expressions of what the numinous feels like are expressed in art rather than propositionally. Music, in particular, can convey something of the numinous. I also think that places may have a sense of God's presence in a unique way (thus why God had the tabernacle and temple built to exact specifications). Gothic cathedrals, in particular, but here I'm just describing my own experience, not any general principle. God uses different vehicles to convey His presence for different people.
> 
> Unfortunately, no major works on the subject have been published except for Rudolf Otto's The Idea of the Holy which is, at best, neo-orthodox (though it does contain, I think, some great insights on the effect of certain biblical passages). C. S. Lewis hints at the concept, but doesn't develop it. I'm hoping some reformed theologian will pick up on the topic, but so far it's mostly an Anglican/Roman Catholic thing.
> 
> That said, I'll also say that propositional truth is, of course, necessary--I am not trying to denigrate it in any way, simply to put it in its proper place in the created order and in our theology.
> __________________
> Philip



Philip,
I believe that you are meaning to refer to noumenal from Immanual Kant’s *Noumenon*.

*noumenon,* in the philosophical system of Immanuel Kant, a "thing-in-itself"; it is opposed to phenomenon, the thing that appears to us. Noumena are the basic realities behind all sensory experience. According to Kant, they are not knowable because they cannot be perceived, but they must be thinkable because moral decision making and scientific investigation cannot proceed without the assumption that they exist. 

Kant, Schleiermacher, and others sought to ground the knowledge and experience of the Divine apart from His Self Revelation. *This is a dangerous and blind alley to go down.*

Carl F H Henry said,
Schleiermacher found the essence of religion in inner feeling, but insisted that the religious consciousness stands in a relations to the religious reality even though we can pronounce no objective judgments about that reality. … Given the declared absence of transcendent rational disclosure and valid propositional truth about God, the situational possibility soon arises of internal sentiments, symbolic expressions or mythical formulations which are believed to be in touch with the ultimate religious reality, even though they can lay no claim to objective truth or historical factuality. 

I implore you brother, beware all such subjective, non-revelatory mysticism. These roads do not lead to heaven.


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## Philip

The numinous is distinct from the noumenon, Bob. Otto, in writing, was careful to distinguish the two. The numinous is somewhat more concrete and comprehensible than the noumenon.

The numinous signals the presence of something outside the phenomena, but not wholly incomprehensible. The clearest examples of it in Scripture are described in Isaiah 6, Ezekiel, Daniel, and Revelation. This is completely different from what Schleiermacher taught because there are aspects that can be communicated, they just won't necessarily convey the message to all audiences. An unbeliever can read Isaiah 6 without having the reaction that I have, partially because He doesn't have the Holy Spirit.

On Lance's points:

1. I would say that we should judge experiences of the numinous in much the way that I (as a soft cessationist) judge evidence of spiritual gifts: if it motivates me to deepen my relationship with God and read His word, then it must be His Spirit at work.

2. Well, how does one communicate the glory of God, anyway? It ends up being more of a personal proof than anything else. That said, physical description tends to do the best job at communicating the numinous. C. S. Lewis, in particular, does an excellent job in certain of his works (_The Great Divorce_ in particular).

3. Well, I don't think most in reformed circles have given it much thought. To someone like Gordon Clark, the appearance of something more than logical would be anathema. As for it being mysticism, unless we're going to call Isaiah, the Apostle John, Jonathan Edwards, and C. S. Lewis mystics, it's not an apt term.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> 3. Well, I don't think most in reformed circles have given it much thought. To someone like Gordon Clark, the appearance of something more than logical would be anathema. As for it being mysticism, unless we're going to call Isaiah, the Apostle John, Jonathan Edwards, and C. S. Lewis mystics, it's not an apt term.



Twice now you have mentioned Edwards in this discussion. Are you trying to push Edwards into Otto's camp? If you are, I would like to see some evidence where Edwards would agree with Otto. If you are not trying to lend credence to Otto by invoking Edwards name, then leave Edwards out of it.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> I don't think more knowledge would aid us in describing the numinous. [...]
> 
> Personally, the best expressions of what the numinous feels like are expressed in art rather than propositionally.



Certainly there is a distinction between the experience of seeing an art picture and accurately describing the art picture. But that doesn't mean the latter can't be done.

Otherwise, do you think that God can describe a numinous experience propositionally? If not, then that's quite a statement.

Honestly Philip, I think you're getting too worked up about the fact that some of our experiences are non-propositional. Obviously feeling happy is not propositional -- but it can be perfectly described propositionally, and it of course doesn't follow that there exists some form of truth that is non-propositional (to the human apprehension, at least). You need to ensure that you keep your categories distinct, so you don't say that certain experiences are non-propositional and therefore truth itself can be non-propositional.


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## Philip

First of all, I need to clarify that I am walking a fine line here between two equal and opposite errors. The first is mysticism, which we all recognize as a grievous error, but the second is far more common in reformed circles: rationalism. Rationalism, in my mind, limits revelation to propositional revelation. However, I think God's revelation to us as individuals is not merely propositional (though it certainly contains propositions) but personal. There is something to knowing and experiencing God that definitely goes beyond the propositional. If this were not so, then God would not have used so many metaphors in Scripture to communicate it.



Whitefield said:


> Twice now you have mentioned Edwards in this discussion. Are you trying to push Edwards into Otto's camp? If you are, I would like to see some evidence where Edwards would agree with Otto. If you are not trying to lend credence to Otto by invoking Edwards name, then leave Edwards out of it.



I do think Edwards provided proper criteria in _Religious Affections_ for discerning between true and false affections (and the numinous would fall into the category of affections). I am bringing Edwards to the table as a witness to the fact that not all truth is propositional, but that some is experiential.

I brought Otto in because I use a term that he coined and defined, not because I agree with his conclusions about the numinous (which were cloudy and indistinct, in any case).



Confessor said:


> Certainly there is a distinction between the experience of seeing an art picture and accurately describing the art picture. But that doesn't mean the latter can't be done.
> 
> Otherwise, do you think that God can describe a numinous experience propositionally? If not, then that's quite a statement.



I think we do have examples of the numinous described in scripture (Isaiah 6, as I have noted before), so yes there can be descriptions (I'm still working all this out).

Where I might disagree (though I think we agree--not quite sure yet) say that the mere description is enough. I'll describe

For years, I have admired the architecture of Salisbury Cathedral in Salisbury, England. For years, I had studied pictures of it, noted its features, and looked a bit at its history. I could, conceivably, have become an expert on the building without ever going there. However, I cannot be said to know or really understand Salisbury unless I have been there (as a matter of fact, I have--beautiful place).

The experience is not enough to really appreciate the cathedral (ie: I wouldn't appreciate it if I didn't know how old it was, what the stories in the windows meant, some basic principles of architecture, etc), but mere propositions about it (it's 750 years old, there are Bible stories in its windows, it's early English Gothic, etc) would not be enough either. I have to have both.

Hope that clarifies somewhat.


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## Confessor

Philip,

I think your example does explain yourself very well. At this point, it's just a matter of using the right terms.

As you said, there is a distinct difference between properly describing an experience with propositions and simply having the experience. I totally agree with you on this. But from this distinction, it does not follow that _truth_ is non-propositional, just that experiences are (after all, we cannot describe experiences as "true" except metaphorically). They can still be described perfectly with propositions, but nonetheless, as you pointed out, there is a difference between describing these experiences with propositions and actually having the experience.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> I do think Edwards provided proper criteria in _Religious Affections_ for discerning between true and false affections (and the numinous would fall into the category of affections). I am bringing Edwards to the table as a witness to the fact that not all truth is propositional, but that some is experiential.



Could you please point me to the passage(s) in _Religious Affections_ which explain what you are trying to say about numinous experiences?

-----Added 7/8/2009 at 06:18:56 EST-----



Confessor said:


> As you said, there is a distinct difference between properly describing an experience with propositions and simply having the experience. I totally agree with you on this. But from this distinction, it does not follow that _truth_ is non-propositional, just that experiences are (after all, we cannot describe experiences as "true" except metaphorically). They can still be described perfectly with propositions, but nonetheless, as you pointed out, there is a difference between describing these experiences with propositions and actually having the experience.



And I'm still interested in finding out what truths are communicated through numinous experiences, which cannot be found out through scriptural propositions.


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## Philip

I do think it important to distinguish between knowledge of Truth and of truths.

A truth is propositional, whereas Truth (part and parcel of God Himself) is personal. I may deduce truths from an experience of Truth Himself (if that's an innacurate term, then I apologize). We may know God Himself without necessarily knowing a whole lot about Him--that can come later. It's just as possible to know a lot about God without ever knowing God Himself.



> Could you please point me to the passage(s) in Religious Affections which explain what you are trying to say about numinous experiences?



I'm not saying he was advocating such a concept, but anticipating it, and guarding against its misuse. Particularly in Chapter 2, when he speaks of false signs of true religious affections, Edwards draws a line that I am applying to the numinous as a guard against mysticism.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> A truth is propositional, whereas Truth (part and parcel of God Himself) is personal. I may deduce truths from an experience of Truth Himself (if that's an innacurate term, then I apologize). We may know God Himself without necessarily knowing a whole lot about Him--that can come later. It's just as possible to know a lot about God without ever knowing God Himself.



Thanks for the reference to chapter 2 in Edwards. I will reread it.

I still contend that since the truth imparted through "numinous experiences" is totally subjective, is not propositional, and cannot be objectified for verification, then it has no meaning to another. You may have all the "numinous experiences" of truth imaginable but I cannot experience your experiences. We can debate the truth or falsity of propositions, but we cannot debate experiences. One may truly have an experience, but there is no way another person can gain any truth from the first person's experience.


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## Philip

Is experience subjective? Yes, but then again, God deals with us as individuals as well as corporately. It's the one and the many, yet again.

However, just because experiencing God is subjective does not imply that such is not experience of Truth Himself. In fact, one may draw propositional truths from the experience, just as one might draw propositional truths from a conversation with a friend. Some of my greatest experiences of God's presence have resulted in theological insight (or vice versa).

I'm also probably using the term "numinous" slightly more loosely than Otto did.


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## py3ak

Philip, you may find these posts from previous discussions illuminating.

Propositional statements are one kind of relationship

http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/head-heart-37520/#post466896

http://www.puritanboard.com/f30/john-robbins-denounces-experiential-calvinism-29884/#post363935

http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/exploring-ectypal-vs-archetypal-theology-20313/#post256011


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## Confessor

py3ak said:


> Philip, you may find these posts from previous discussions illuminating.
> 
> Propositional statements are one kind of relationship
> 
> http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/head-heart-37520/#post466896
> 
> http://www.puritanboard.com/f30/john-robbins-denounces-experiential-calvinism-29884/#post363935
> 
> http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/exploring-ectypal-vs-archetypal-theology-20313/#post256011



There is gold to be found in those posts.


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## Philip

Indeed there is gold there, Ben (though I completely disagree with the statement that persons are propositions).


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## py3ak

The _threads_ found through the preceding links may contain the statement that persons are propositions: but the specific _posts_ I linked contain no such assertion.


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## Confessor

py3ak said:


> The _threads_ found through the preceding links may contain the statement that persons are propositions: but the specific _posts_ I linked contain no such assertion.



Exactly. I, for the record, do not believe that persons are propositions.


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## Philip

Ah--now that I read again, I see Rev Winzer directly refuting the idea--I saw it quoted and was tired when I read it. Too many suits and too little sleep today, I'm afraid.

Good to find that we have some agreement. I tend to agree with Chesterton that too much logic makes men go mad.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> I tend to agree with Chesterton that too much logic makes men go mad.



And maybe not enough makes one go Papist (i.e., Chesterton)


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## Philip

Chesterton was logical enough--he just had (I think) a wrong understanding of Calvinism, probably implied by the few Calvinists he would have known (he referred to universalism as an "optimistic Calvinism"--showing how badly he understood it).

There's more than one side of the horse to fall off of.


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## Whitefield

P. F. Pugh said:


> There's more than one side of the horse to fall off of.



No matter which side one falls off one still ends up in the horse "mud." I contend is it illogical (insert Spock imitation here) for one to reject Protestantism and wander out into the Roman wilderness.


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## dudley

*Just enough logic helps one escape the papist church*




Whitefield said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> 
> I tend to agree with Chesterton that too much logic makes men go mad.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And maybe not enough makes one go Papist (i.e., Chesterton)
Click to expand...


...and ....Just enough logic helps one escape the papist church!

Dudley


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## Philip

Logic may be valid and still wrong, Lance.

And don't forget that good reformed theology was scarce in England at the time. Many Christians went Catholic to avoid the error of liberalism. When there's no good reformed teaching and the only available options are liberalism, arminianism, and Catholicism, its no wonder people went Catholic: liberalism is obviously wrong and Arminianism is obviously shallow.

But we're off-topic . . .


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