# Question raised by "Test your reasoning skills"



## a mere housewife (Oct 19, 2007)

I don't know how to phrase this in proper logical terms so will probably make a complete hash of it -- but I realized (at least if my reasoning is correct) thinking about the problem Brian posted that if a particular card didn't potentially disprove the rule, it couldn't go to proving the rule either. Of course it takes only a single card to disprove the rule and more than one of the potentially disproving cards to establish it in the limited set: so - I'm not trying to ask if a thing is _proved _if it isn't _disproved, _but only if a rule can possibly be potentially proved (in conjunction with other evidences) by any given piece of evidence that could not potentially disprove it entirely? 

In other words -- to give a more obvious example -- an atheist says to me that he rejects God because he's never had any experience of Him. This cannot potentially disprove the existence of God, since the natural man is spiritually blind: therefore it cannot go towards potentially proving His non-existence. It's simply irrelevant.

The problem I'm having with this is that I don't know how I can claim that this holds universally true, because I could never prove that it does. If the only way to arrive at that is by induction -- taking a set of data and demonstrating that it holds true for that data, then by applying that outside the set of data am I not doing somewhat the same thing as the atheist? That is, I have no experience of the rule being disproved, therefore it's proved (though in this case my experience could potentially disprove the rule if I had found it not to hold true, but cannot alone establish proof of it: even if my experience extends to the testimony of the experience of all others)?

Is this an a priori rule of logic? Is it a fallacy? Can I use it in a discussion with an atheist? Am I simply entirely confused? 

(Also, I was wondering if some of what happens in theological controversy is that we attempt to prove something about an opposing point of view, with a piece of evidence that could never have disproved the same -- and so we merely talk past each other?)


----------



## ChristianTrader (Oct 20, 2007)

a mere housewife said:


> I don't know how to phrase this in proper logical terms so will probably make a complete hash of it -- but I realized (at least if my reasoning is correct) thinking about the problem Brian posted that if a particular card didn't potentially disprove the rule, it couldn't go to proving the rule either. Of course it takes only a single card to disprove the rule and more than one of the potentially disproving cards to establish it in the limited set: so - I'm not trying to ask if a thing is _proved _if it isn't _disproved, _but only if a rule can possibly be potentially proved (in conjunction with other evidences) by any given piece of evidence that could not potentially disprove it entirely?



One thing to keep in mind is that proof is not the end all be all. One only attempts to prove things that are not immediately evident.

Now to your particular question, something is not proof for something if being otherwise, would count as evidence against that same something.



> In other words -- to give a more obvious example -- an atheist says to me that he rejects God because he's never had any experience of Him. This cannot potentially disprove the existence of God, since the natural man is spiritually blind: therefore it cannot go towards potentially proving His non-existence. It's simply irrelevant.



To a certain extent, you would be talking past each other. The atheist has a few hidden premises. Such as 1)If God exists, then I should have had experienced Him by now. 2)If I would have experienced him by now, I would have recognized that I was experiencing Him. etc.

If those premises are attacked, then his claim basically starts to crumble.



> The problem I'm having with this is that I don't know how I can claim that this holds universally true, because I could never prove that it does. If the only way to arrive at that is by induction -- taking a set of data and demonstrating that it holds true for that data, then by applying that outside the set of data am I not doing somewhat the same thing as the atheist? That is, I have no experience of the rule being disproved, therefore it's proved (though in this case my experience could potentially disprove the rule if I had found it not to hold true, but cannot alone establish proof of it: even if my experience extends to the testimony of the experience of all others)?



In the case of the card question, there is no proof occurring. The only thing being done is asking: "Given this rule, what else would have to be the case."

In the above paragraph, I am having problems understanding what you are attempting to prove, God's existence?




> Is this an a priori rule of logic? Is it a fallacy? Can I use it in a discussion with an atheist? Am I simply entirely confused?



I think idea is correct.



> (Also, I was wondering if some of what happens in theological controversy is that we attempt to prove something about an opposing point of view, with a piece of evidence that could never have disproved the same -- and so we merely talk past each other?)



Sounds about right.

CT


----------



## Jim Johnston (Oct 20, 2007)

a mere housewife said:


> I don't know how to phrase this in proper logical terms so will probably make a complete hash of it -- but I realized (at least if my reasoning is correct) thinking about the problem Brian posted that if a particular card didn't potentially disprove the rule, it couldn't go to proving the rule either. Of course it takes only a single card to disprove the rule and more than one of the potentially disproving cards to establish it in the limited set: so - I'm not trying to ask if a thing is _proved _if it isn't _disproved, _but only if a rule can possibly be potentially proved (in conjunction with other evidences) by any given piece of evidence that could not potentially disprove it entirely?



Hi Heidi,

This is context dependant. In Brian's game, there were only *4* cards. If that's all there were, then the two *proved* that the rule held since the only possible options. That is, all the disproofs were looked at, hence that proved the rule held with the set of 4. Now, if he only had us check 4 out of 50, then you'd be correct. 



> In other words -- to give a more obvious example -- an atheist says to me that he rejects God because he's never had any experience of Him. This cannot potentially disprove the existence of God, since the natural man is spiritually blind: therefore it cannot go towards potentially proving His non-existence. It's simply irrelevant.



Well, some atheists would disagree with you here. For example, they'd use the Argument from Divine Hiddenness. 

This is a sub-species from the problem of evil. To put it simply, If the God of the Bible existed we would expect more people to believe in Him.

Now, I'm not trying to get into a discussion of this argument. (Btw, you can read many responses to it here: Apollos.ws - Divine Hiddenness , unfortunately most are not Calvinistic, but they are helpful nonetheless). I am simply trying to show that there are some atheists who may very well take their non-belief as evidence against God. The lack of evidence, implies lack of existence, because in *this case* we'd *expect* tons of evidence. 



> The problem I'm having with this is that I don't know how I can claim that this holds universally true, because I could never prove that it does. If the only way to arrive at that is by induction -- taking a set of data and demonstrating that it holds true for that data, then by applying that outside the set of data am I not doing somewhat the same thing as the atheist? That is, I have no experience of the rule being disproved, therefore it's proved (though in this case my experience could potentially disprove the rule if I had found it not to hold true, but cannot alone establish proof of it: even if my experience extends to the testimony of the experience of all others


)

I wouldn't say that. Why? I think the "rule" is meant to be a *normative* constraint which should be applied if you want to make sure you belive things for good reasons. 

Now, you may say that it is *normally* the case that disproof doesn't imply proof. But we saw above that this isn't always true. Sometimes proof and disproof coincide. Anyway, we saw the reason why in the case of the finite set of cards. So, the atheist should *at least* provide a *reason* for why this rule, which helps us believe things for good reasons, is violated here. That is, has he done soimething like the cards? Disproved every possible option, thus proving the rule? I doubt it. So, I think you can make your claim - as it should be an uncontested normative rule - while challenging him to provide a reason for suspending the norm. I think those suspending norms have the burden of proof.


----------



## a mere housewife (Oct 20, 2007)

Thanks for both the answers: they're helpful and I'll reread them a couple times to make sure I get it. I asked Ruben this question last night as well, and he said pretty much the same thing: it's common sense that an argument has to be relevant to be -- well, relevant (though I'm still slightly confused on the proof/disproof thing and will reread those parts of the answers and think about it some more); this is 'normative' because of the structure of our minds: the process of reasoning has to be distinct from the things it is brought to bear upon (as I understood the explanation).

Hermonta: No, it's not so much, in what I was asking, that I was thinking about proving the existence of God so much as proving the validity of the rule of reasoning, and that by its own process or rule. Which it seems, is where I was going awry.... ? 

Paul, "Divine Hiddenness" sounds like Pascal (is that where it comes from?) -- he uses over and again the phrase 'the God who hides Himself', and points out that any argument of 'Divine Hiddenness' actually supports rather than otherwise the claims of Christianity, because Christianity teaches us of our corruption and incapability of God, the whole context in which we are offered salvation: also of God's purposes being hid in a mystery so He both reveals and conceals Himself. Certainly from the atheist's point of view he's making a point against a 'god', but Pascal points out that the atheist is thinking of God more in terms of the deist and Christianity is as far removed from one as from the other, so the atheist is making no relevant point about God: God can only be known in Christ, and His purposes are not simple but complex, and so He is not openly manifested everywhere. (I'm quite enthusiastic about Pascal at present, as betrayed by the enthusiastic rambling.) In any case I'm looking forward to reading the discussion and finding out more: thanks for the link.


----------

