# Van Til's Presuppositional Apologetic - A Critique



## Brian Bosse

Hello Everyone,

I am new to the board, although I have interacted to some degree with several members of this board over the years including Civbert and Paul Manata. Paul and I have discussed at length apologetic methods and I have engaged in several debates with athiests using Van Til's apologetic. You can find my last debate here: The Shoot Out at the OK Corral - Does God Exist?. 

On my blog I am doing a series on Van Til's apologetic looking into the claim that it provides objective certain proof. My position is that it does not do so. I am currently seven entries into the series, which I estimate is about the half way point of my critique. I would love to interact in this thread with objections, questions and observations. I would also welcome comments at my blog site. Here is the link to the first entry: Van Tillian Presuppositional Apologetics - A Critique (Part 1). Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Brian Bosse

I am pathetic. I'm responding to my own sorry post - and I am the only response!  Aren't there any Van Tillians out their wanting to defened themselves. 

Lost and Lonely,

Brian


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## PresReformed

Maybe they already known that his Apologetic can't be defended


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Paul,

Good to hear from you. 



> In fact, other elements can be true, without the "objective, certain proof" part. Indeed, if not being able to provide "objective, certain proof" means that Van Tillian*ism* is false, then I dare say that *all* methods are false (depending on how 'objective certain proof' is defined).



Paul, you are right on here. If the Van Tillian removes his claim to “objective, certain proof,” then he is left with a very powerful apologetic indeed. Even though the proof does not meet the strict criteria for objective certainty, that does not mean it is wrong. 



> …since I don't think it's been proven that TAG provides the "necessary preconditions for intelligible experience," I'm not too bothered by Brian's post.



Just a slight technicality here. TAG does not provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. The Christian worldview does via the triune God. My claim is that this is not established in an objective certain manner. However, I do think the proof provides rational justification. 



> Transcendental arguments are proved by retortion, not reductio ad absurdums.



The very argument Van Til, Bahnsen, and you, Paul, make is a _Reductio Ad Absurdum_ argument (RAA). Another name is an indirect argument. The argument form referred to as 'retortion' aims at showing an opponent to be presupposing the truth of one proposition that contradicts another to which he is committed. This leads to the opponents position being refuted. Why is it refuted? Because it follows directly by the RAA method. Paul, retortion is a form of RAA. 



> Implimenting a reductio doesn't mean you're arguing transcendentally.



All transcendental arguments are RAA arguments. Not all RAA arguments are transcendental. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Aren't there any Van Tillians out their wanting to defend themselves.
> 
> Lost and Lonely,
> 
> Brian



Maybe this is not surprising. You've given them a lot to chew on, and quick responses are going to be difficult. Maybe if you snip a few quotes from you blog and post them here? Give them something you think they might have questions about. 

I myself am a bit slow to respond to a couple posts because your responses are thoughtful, and I want to respond when I have a clear window of time to sit down and clearly articulate my thoughts. (Is it articulation when it's written?? Maybe there's a better way to say that. :? )


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## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> ...
> 1) Clarkians can't use it because they can't *know* any of the claims the argument uses.



Then Neither can Van Tillians "know" any of the claims made because Van Til also said Scripture was the foundation of Christian knowledge. 

Really, if you take away the absolute claim in the Van Til's argument for Christianity - you are left with a Clarkian compatible apologetic. Clark applied many of Van Til's principles, only he did so in a more rational and consistent manner. 

We can have a debate on epistemology on another thread if you wish. But if you're going to make claims about knowledge, then be prepared to justify your own. It will be interesting to see how Van Tillian propositions end up sorted out between knowledge and opinion.


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## Magma2

> No thanks. I don't mean any offense, and *this response* may seem self-refuting, but I don't debate Clarkians about Clark/Van Til on discussion boards. That's my policy.



That’s a good policy, but I haven’t really noticed where you’ve actually applied it? Besides that, I do admit you have a tendency to lob bombs, which, in my view, merely reveal a near complete lack of appreciation for the problems of epistemology and an even greater lack of understanding of Gordon Clark. Not a very becoming posture for a man who claims to be a philosopher of sorts.



> Besides, you wouldn't want to do it because I'll just ask you to deduce every single sentence from Scripture. It's not my fault that I don't follow a system which doesn't allow me to know hardly anything, including the truth of my own system.



Note carefully, you wrote– “know hardly anything.” Then you grant that Clark’s Scripturalism provides a basis for *some* knowledge? The question is, what account can YOU give for the many things you merely assert and assume to know? The very things you repeatedly and unthinkingly chastise "Clarkians" for! I think your lazy argument here again belies a failure to grasp even the fundamental problems of epistemology. 

Now, if you only actually stuck to your stated policy, perhaps you wouldn’t look so foolish.


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## Magma2

> It's not my fault that I don't follow a system which doesn't allow me to know hardly anything, including the truth of my own system.



Not to detract from Brian’s post, but perhaps as a supplement, consider the above. Paul has just finished a thread in which he demonstrated the failure of TAG. Brian has done the same. Now Paul complains that Scripturalism fails to account for it’s own system. Well, that system is “Christianity” and it’s accounted for by the Scriptures alone; i.e., the system’s axiom. The system includes all those propositions set down or necessarily inferred from Scripture -- what Clark called the “Westminister principle” (see his reply to Mavrodes at TrinityFoundation.org). 

So what is Paul’s objection? It seems to me it’s how do you account for the Christian system’s axiom? Well, of course, in addition to demonstrating a lack of understanding of Clark, who Paul thinks himself fit to criticize and ridicule, such lazy arguments illustrate a further lack of understanding concerning the relationship of axioms to theorems or even how an axiom functions within a system. What Christians are to do in apologetics is to attempt to clear the battlefield in order to present the Christian alternative. Acceptance of the Christian axiom is, in the words of Calvin, “a pious assent.” It is a choice governed by the grace of God, not the conclusion of any prior or antecedent argument, transcendental or otherwise. Since the Scriptures are self-attesting (that is, unless you accept Van Til's doctrine of Scripture then I would say the Scriptures are self-refuting), there is no, nor can there be, any prior proof as to the truthfulness of Scripture. Scripture is its own account (Heb 6:13b; ". . . since He could swear by no one greater, He swore by Himself").

The job of Christian apologetics is to present our hearers with a choice (just read the final page or two of Clark's "Thales to Dewey" to get a flavor of how this might be done. Then read the rest of the book in order to do it). As John Frame put it, and which is something Paul should seriously take to heart, “Clark’s method is more like an exploration than like a proof. By renouncing proof, he avoids the circularity of having to prove the axiom by means of the axiom.” Amen. I don’t know that Clark could have said it better himself. 

But, since it’s taken Paul so long to discover TAG fails to do what it has always claimed, perhaps rather than lowering the epistemological bar by following the paths of men like Sudduth or Plantigna, or, even worse, John Frame, he might actually spend some time and study giving Clark a fair hearing instead?


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## Arch2k

Is the world coming to an end?


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## Civbert

Magma2 said:


> ... The job of Christian apologetics is to present our hearers with a choice (just read the final page or two of Clark's "Thales to Dewey" to get a flavor of how this might be done. Then read the rest of the book in order to do it). As John Frame put it, and which is something Paul should seriously take to heart, “Clark’s method is more like an exploration than like a proof. By renouncing proof, he avoids the circularity of having to prove the axiom by means of the axiom.” Amen. I don’t know that Clark could have said it better himself...



Good post! I still think a debate on epistemology would be good. I have yet to hear a viable alternative to Scripturalism.


P.S. We can call it a _discussion _if it makes anyone feel better. Nothing formal. Just toss some ideas around. See if anyone really knows anything.


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## Arch2k

Paul manata said:


> Jeff, did you miss my sarcasm?
> 
> I'll just let Sean live in his own little world. Where's he's king. He's the boss. The motto: WWCD.
> 
> Actually, I'm less and less interested in debating method. I'll be out there actually *doing* apologetics while Sean calls John Frame a heretic.
> 
> I have nothing to say to him. He's a blight on Scripturalists and you would do well to distance yourself from him.


 
Sorry, I guess I did!


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Everyone,

I have just finished installment number 11 of my critique, and things are beginning to wind down. It seems that there is going to be no Van Tillian who is going to defend himself. I would like to note that Paul has stated that I got off on the wrong foot by misidentifying the argument form as a _Reductio Ad Absurdum_ rather than as retortion. I am anxious to see whatever support he has. I think it will be obvious that when you formalize his argument utilizing retortion it will be a reductio argument. This objection of Paul's, however, is extremly minor. My critque has nothing to do with the argument form, which I said is good, but rather with how the premises are established. Are they established in a certain manner, or not? 

With all of that said, there are some who have posted in the thread that have been quite critical of Van Til's apologetic. I find his apologetic to be brilliant even when one acknowledges that it is not certain. I agree with Civbert that it is compatible with Clark in this regard. Also, Dr. Bahnsen is a "favorite dead guy" of mine (to borrow a phrase from Piper) even though I find him to be wrong on the points I make in my critque. He took Van Til's apologetic to the street. I say this to my shame. I have engaged in apologetics to some degree in the streets. I certainly have discussed apologetic method much more - and maybe even prefer to discuss it rather than to practice it. Again, this is to my shame. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## RamistThomist

Probably the reasons you aren't getting any responses:

Most of the Van Tillians here are in message board withdrawal. Manata hardly posts due to probable business. I swore to never post again last week and had to break that for a day (part of the week I am in class 12 hours a day, so I can't post much). And the others can answer for themselves.


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## RamistThomist

and the above post was probably my last post on PB, or one of them. Not because of you, mind you.


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## August

Brian, thanks for the series. I am sure that there are many, like me, who follow your arguments the confines of anonimity (until now). I have some questions, rather than a critique of your posts.

Please correct me if I wrongly represent you anywhere in my response, as it is hard to get exact meaning across in this format.

Your objection to the Van Tillian apologetic is that it does not provide objective, absolute proof based on the failure of the two-step process of 1. Proving that Christianity provides for rational argument, and 2. That no other worldview can provide for rational argument.

Mainly, your objection is that since, in step 2, one world view at a time is addressed, it becomes an inductive method, and no objective, absolute truth is by definition possible from that. 

However, is your objection not valid only if you can show that there are an infinite, or number approaching infinite, number of worldviews that provide for rational knowledge? If the number of worldviews are limited, then the Van Tillian apologetic holds true, provided it can address via internal critique the shortcomings of those views. I think this is also Paul M's objection to Van Til, that in theory the infinite number of contra-views is possible?

In such a case, is it then not possible to reduce the contra worldviews to a limited number of common axioms, which achieves the goal of Van Til? I am not sure what those common axioms may be though, but they cannot be unlimited in number.

I also struggle to come to terms with your whole argument, in that does not seem to provide for any objective truth. If there are two truth claims, by what standard do we determine objective truth? It cannot be done from outside of the observers worldview, so therefore all truth is subjective? For every objective truth claim, one can in theory invent a position that turns it into a subjective truth claim.

Sorry for the rambling, I hope some of that makes sense to you.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello John,

Thank you for your response.



> Your objection to the Van Tillian apologetic is that it does not provide objective, absolute proof…



Yes, this is my objection. But let me qualify this by saying that I equate “objective, absolute proof” with philosophical certainty. Van Tillians generally claim to have a philosophically certain proof. This is where my objection lies. 



> Mainly, your objection is that since, in step 2, one world view at a time is addressed, it becomes an inductive method, and no objective, absolute truth is by definition possible from that.



This is my main objection. However, throughout the critique I have raised other objections. For instance, the RAA argument put forth may be mistakenly applied. Greg Bahnsen, himself, made this point in his debate over apologetic methods with R.C. Sproul. He said that any argument that we think is a valid application of _Modus Ponens_ is not know with certainty. He said there is always a chance we are misapplying the argument. 

Another objection has to do with establishing the Christian worldview as sufficient to provide for intelligibility. This argument is never made explicit. Rather, it is just asserted. One never sees an exhaustive list of those preconditions necessary for intelligibility. One never sees a philosophically certain exegesis of Scripture making the same point. Etc……Normally, they just assert that it is true in their worldview. But again, they never prove that is true in their worldview in a philsoophically certain manner. These are minor points, but they are points nevertheless. The major point has to do with the one you mentioned above. 



> However, is your objection not valid only if you can show that there are an infinite, or number approaching infinite, number of worldviews that provide for rational knowledge?



No. All I need show is that the apologist never considers all of the possible worldviews. Consider the scientific theory that all electrons repel each other. There are a finite number of electrons; however, we have never observed all of them. The theory is based on an inductive argument. Unless every element is exhausted, then we cannot conclude with deductive certainty that all elements do or do not have some property. 



> In such a case, is it then not possible to reduce the contra worldviews to a limited number of common axioms, which achieves the goal of Van Til?



Yes, I think this may be possible, and would be an excellent way for the apologist to proceed. In post number 10 and 11 of my critique, I showed that this was precisely what Bahnsen was trying to do. He was arguing two common axioms: *(1)* All non-Christian worldviews are based on human autonomy; and *(2)* All worldviews based on human autonomy fail to provide sufficient conditions for knowledge. _If_, and this is a big _if_, the apologist is able to do this, then he has accomplished what he needs to do. The problem is that these to points are only asserted and never proved in a philosophically certain manner. 



> also struggle to come to terms with your whole argument, in that does not seem to provide for any objective truth.



There is a possible rub here. My point is not to try and draw any epistemological conclusions from my argument. My point is just to say that the presuppositional argument is not philosophically certain. If one defines objective truth as philosophically certain truth, then I do not think we can ever know that we know something objectively. However, I do not think one needs to define objective truth in this manner. I think we have epistemological limitations, and that is that we do not know anything with philosophical certainty – even this statement itself. I find the claim that we can have philosophical certainty to be arrogant and to confuse creature/creator distinction. The only being that has philosophical certainty is God. Again, I do not assert this with philosophical certainty. 

Let me know what you think about these things. I have been heavily criticized for saying that no creature has philosophical certainty – especially by Van Tillian apologists. I would be happy to discuss this further in another thread.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## August

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello John,
> 
> Yes, this is my objection. But let me qualify this by saying that I equate “objective, absolute proof” with philosophical certainty. Van Tillians generally claim to have a philosophically certain proof. This is where my objection lies.



Brian, when you say "philosophical certainty", what exactly do you mean? Again, I don't want to assume that I know the finer details of your argument. 

In my mind, philosophical certainty has to do with the correspondence of our perceptions (for want of a better word) to reality. I see lower down that you seem to deny that anyone can attain that kind of certainty. If God is a reality, then you are saying that we can never be 100% sure that He exists. This presents an interesting conundrum for me. How can one then be sure of one's own existence? And more importantly for a Christian, how can you be sure of your salvation? It all seems to descend into relativism.



> No. All I need show is that the apologist never considers all of the possible worldviews. Consider the scientific theory that all electrons repel each other. There are a finite number of electrons; however, we have never observed all of them. The theory is based on an inductive argument. Unless every element is exhausted, then we cannot conclude with deductive certainty that all elements do or do not have some property.



I want to explore this a little further. It is my opinion that you are making a small category mistake here. Again, maybe it is just my ignorance or misunderstanding of your position, so please don't jump all over me. 

The discussion of the existence of God is a second-order discussion, as opposed to the study of electrons, for example, which is a first-order discipline. The study of electrons, or for that matter the large majority of scientific phenomena, is a normative investigation of natural forces. There is no attempt to normalize anything in the discussion of God's existence, in fact, I would argue that it is the exact opposite. I would also venture that your analogy does not work, since you cannot assert that there are an infinite number of worldviews that are contra Christianity. For you to assert as such, you have to establish that there are an infinite number of axioms that can be used as premises for the non-existence of God. The number of contra-arguments will depend on the number of possible logical combinations from those axioms. There may be many, and many more to come, but they do not add up to an infinite number. Currently I am aware of about 22 broad categories of discussion between believers and non-believers, and those have been pretty consistent for the last century. One can continue to invent contra-arguments, but they will all ultimately come back to one of those categories, as well as facing the challenge that any new invented argument should at the very least exhibit some signs of credibility.

We discussed this briefly in the previous exchange, where you agreed that the shorter route will be to evaluate the validity of the contra-argument axioms. You also pointed out that this fails, since there is no philosophically certain argument made that shows that human autonomy cannot provide for sufficient conditions for knowledge. 

I have to admit, that somewhat confuses me. In making that statement, are you not assuming the very thing that you are trying to prove? I can even take my confusion one level higher, namely that in your entire argument against Van Til you assume that there is an objective measure, by which you can determine the validity of his argument or not. In making that argument, you either assume Van Tils position, or you assume human autonomy. If it is the first, then you may have proven yourself wrong, or, if it is the second, then you are circular. Again, Brian, this may just be my warped understanding of what you are trying to say, and not anything aimed at your person.



> I find the claim that we can have philosophical certainty to be arrogant and to confuse creature/creator distinction. The only being that has philosophical certainty is God. Again, I do not assert this with philosophical certainty.



Mmmm, that is an interesting perspective. How do you know that God has philosophical certainty?

Overall, I think you have done an excellent job with this whole series, and it has certainly caused my gray matter to flutter. Thanks for a most interesting conversation so far.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello John,



> Brian, when you say "philosophical certainty", what exactly do you mean?



*Philosophical Certainty:* Person A is philosophically certain about belief X if and only if person A knows in an infallible manner that X is true. 



> In my mind, philosophical certainty has to do with the correspondence of our perceptions (for want of a better word) to reality.



Let’s define what is real as that which is true in the mind of God. Let’s assume for the sake of the discussion that X is true in God’s mind. Let’s say I believe in X. What kind of belief is this? Is it a tentatively held belief? Is it strongly held? No matter what, from God’s perspective my belief in X is knowledge – knowledge being defined as true belief. From my perspective, I believe I have knowledge (I believe X to be true), but this belief can range from tentatively held all the way to philosophical certainty. So, philosophical certainty has to do with the state of my belief about X, and not about X itself.



> If God is a reality, then you are saying that we can never be 100% sure that He exists.



This is true. However, let’s be clear on what this means. I can be 99.999999999999% sure God exists, but this is not philosophical certainty which is nothing short of 100%. 



> How can one then be sure of one's own existence? And more importantly for a Christian, how can you be sure of your salvation? It all seems to descend into relativism.



If by surety you mean 100% certainty, then you cannot be sure. However, you could be 99.9999% sure you exist, or are saved, or whatever…. Consider the issue of your salvation. How do you know you are saved? Do you know the doctrines taught in Scripture with 100% certainty? Are you infallible? You might claim that the Holy Spirit bears witness with your spirit that you are saved. Fine, but my guess is that the guy in Matthew 7 would say the same thing. Do you know the testimony of the Holy Spirit in an infallible manner? If it is possible for any of these answers to be ‘no’, then you do not have philosophical certainty about your salvation. Now, you may have 99.99999% surety of your salvation. 



> I would also venture that your analogy does not work, since you cannot assert that there are an infinite number of worldviews that are contra Christianity.



You misunderstood my analogy. My objection _is not_ that there are an infinite number of possible worldviews. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that there are a finite number of possible worldviews. My argument is that the apologist _never_ demonstrates in a philosophically certain manner that out of all of these possible worldviews only Christianity provides the sufficient condition for knowledge. Let’s make this more concrete. Let’s say the set of all possible worldview is: W={C, ¬C(1), ¬C(2),…, ¬C(9)} where C is the Christian worldview, and the rest are non-Christian worldviews. In this scenario, there are only 10 possible worldviews. My claim is that the apologist never takes down all 9 non-Christian worldviews in his apologetic. (Don’t mistake this example. It would be easy for the apologist to do this if there were only 9 such worldviews. I am just trying to illustrate what he fails to do. The number of possible non-Christian worldviews is considerably larger than 9 even if it is finite.)



> …in your entire argument against Van Til you assume that there is an objective measure, by which you can determine the validity of his argument or not. In making that argument, you either assume Van Tils position, or you assume human autonomy. If it is the first, then you may have proven yourself wrong, or, if it is the second, then you are circular.



Two points: *(1)*The Van Tillian claims that he has an objectively certain proof. This claim needs to be understood within the rules of logic and inference in the apologist’s worldview. How is he using _his_ terms? What standard is _he_ using? My argument is that if you accept the Van Tillian conception of objective certainty and justification, then _he_ does not provide what _he_ claims on _his_ terms. So, the issue is not how I can use the laws of logic and rules as to what constitutes objective certain proof. The issue is how the Van Tillian can use _his_ worldview conception of the laws of logic and justification to provide an objectively certain proof. My critique is an internal critique of Van Tillian apologetics. *(2)* It is not clear to me that the dilemma you provided is a true dilemma. It is not clear that the only two possible positions are Van Til’s position and human autonomy. 



> How do you know that God has philosophical certainty?



Your question is a little ambiguous. I will answer it in two different ways. *(1)* The manner in which I know God has philosophical certainty is in a rationally justified manner. *(2)* I know God has philosophical certainty because God knows all true propositions in an infallible manner. 



> Overall, I think you have done an excellent job with this whole series, and it has certainly caused my gray matter to flutter. Thanks for a most interesting conversation so far.



Thank you for your kind words John. You are very gracious. I appreciate how you push back on me in such a kind way. It is refreshing. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## schaflera

*Access to the debate?*

Hi Brian,

You wrote: "Paul and I have discussed at length apologetic methods and I have engaged in several debates with athiests using Van Til's apologetic. You can find my last debate here: The Shoot Out at the OK Corral - Does God Exist?."

I followed your link but it says "Sorry, but only moderators can read topics in this forum."

Would it be too much to ask you to somehow make it available to readers? Could you send a copy to my email: [email protected]?

Thanks
Rhett


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Rhett,

I have emailed it to you.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## MW

I've always thought the beauty of presuppositionalism is its defiant resolution that "objective certain proof" is not based upon a rational but a relational consideration. It would be a shame to mar such a beautiful countenance.


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## ChristianTrader

armourbearer said:


> I've always thought the beauty of presuppositionalism is its defiant resolution that "objective certain proof" is not based upon a rational but a relational consideration. It would be a shame to mar such a beautiful countenance.



I believe that you are on to something. I think my post here: http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php?t=19545
leads to a potential counter to the critique.

CT


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## MW

ChristianTrader said:


> I think my post here: http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php?t=19545
> leads to a potential counter to the critique.



Good reference, Hermonta. Rom. 1:28, "They did not like to retain God in their knowledge." John Murray comments, "The sin in this case is described as refusing to have God in their knowledge. The godlessness of the state of mind is apparent -- they did not cherish the knowledge of God because they did not consider God worthy of such thought and attention." There is so much ink wasted in defence of the rationality of Christianity. One need only point to the moral bankruptcy of a system which refuses to acknowledge God and His claims, as the apostle does in the latter part of Rom. 1. If I remember correctly John Frame recognises the superiority of the moral argument.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello CT and AB, 



CT said:


> I believe that you are on to something. I think my post here...leads to a potential counter to the critique.



This 'something' was...



AB said:


> I've always thought the beauty of presuppositionalism is its defiant resolution that "objective certain proof" is not based upon a rational but a relational consideration.



I am not sure what this means. The context would indicate that my critique misses the mark because it is based upon "rational considerations" rather than "relational considerations." Can someone clarify this for me, and explain how this potentially ends up being a counter to my critique? Thank you for your consideration. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## ChristianTrader

If Christianity is in fact "Super Basic" then one would have to acknowledge that certain methods or forms that do not get one objective certainty for non super basic beliefs have no bearing on whether they will with a super basic belief.

On a lesser note, the ability to doubt the truth of something does not necessary render a matter less than objectively certain. One could in fact be behaving irrationally.

CT


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## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> I am not sure what this means. The context would indicate that my critique misses the mark because it is based upon "rational considerations" rather than "relational considerations." Can someone clarify this for me, and explain how this potentially ends up being a counter to my critique? Thank you for your consideration.



The point would be, that presuppositional apologetics begins with the fact that man already has actual knowledge of God. Man naturally thinks inside the theistic box. His problem is alienation from God. To then evaluate arguments for the knowledge of God as if knowledge of God were only possible, and something man must yet be brought to, is self-defeating.


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## MW

I would be interested in pursuing a particular line of thought suggested to me by the series critiquing CVT's apologetic. The basis for the critique is the claim, "if God does not exist, then rational inquiry is impossible." Mr. Bosse makes it his errand to prove this is an induction. So his critique could be summarised as follows: if induction, then false. My question: Why is it false? I think it can be proven that every premise includes an induction, from which it necessarily follows that all human thought is circular. If human thought is circular it is finite. If it is finite then any absolute truth claim is an implicit affirmation that truth exists in an infinite Mind outside of human rationality. It is also an implicit affirmation that this infinite Mind has revealed this truth in order that the human mind can know it.


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## Semper Fidelis

armourbearer said:


> I've always thought the beauty of presuppositionalism is its defiant resolution that "objective certain proof" is not based upon a rational but a relational consideration. It would be a shame to mar such a beautiful countenance.



I really like this. I don't think I would have appreciated this fully except for the TA/TE thread recently.


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> I would be interested in pursuing a particular line of thought suggested to me by the series critiquing CVT's apologetic. The basis for the critique is the claim, "if God does not exist, then rational inquiry is impossible." Mr. Bosse makes it his errand to prove this is an induction.



Brain shows that this premise is never shown to philosophically certain. It is simply assumed true.

The inductive part of the critique is that (although the argument is claimed to have philosophic certainty, in fact, only inductive arguments are used in it's favor. 




armourbearer said:


> ... So his critique could be summarised as follows: if induction, then false. My question: Why is it false?



It is not "false", it is philosophically uncertain. Induction /= false. Induction = uncertain. 




armourbearer said:


> ...I think it can be proven that every premise includes an induction, from which it necessarily follows that all human thought is circular.



Please explain how every premise includes an induction and then how this necessarily leads to all human thought is circular. And then, what bearing does this have on the critique?




armourbearer said:


> ... If human thought is circular it is finite. If it is finite then any absolute truth claim is an implicit affirmation that truth exists in an infinite Mind outside of human rationality.



It does no follow necessarily that "if human thought is circular" and "if there is an absolute truth claim" then "truth exists in an infinite Mind outside of human rationality." Obviously this is an enthymeme - but I don't see what additional premises will make your conclusion necessary.




armourbearer said:


> ...It is also an implicit affirmation that this infinite Mind has revealed this truth in order that the human mind can know it.


 Again, this does not seem to follow. 


I'm not trying to pick apart your response - it's simply that your writing is wonderfully concise. Each sentence seems to cover a lot of ground - so I need to unpack it.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> Brain shows that this premise is never shown to philosophically certain. It is simply assumed true.



I think the problem is your assumption that an argument of a certain form cannot be objectively certain. You are going to have to make an argument for that. And to be fair, it seems that Brain believes that philosophical certainty does not actually exist. At best all that can be argued there is that one has does not have such. But to go from there to it cannot exist is a bit of a leap.



> The inductive part of the critique is that (although the argument is claimed to have philosophic certainty, in fact, only inductive arguments are used in it's favor.



The argument is claimed to be objectively certain not because one does or does not hold to the conclusion as infallibly certain but because one should or has not right to deny the premises or the conclusion. 



> It is not "false", it is philosophically uncertain. Induction /= false. Induction = uncertain.



Okay, what part of the argument does anyone have a right to deny?

CT


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> I think the problem is your assumption that an argument of a certain form cannot be objectively certain. You are going to have to make an argument for that.


What form? What assumption? 



ChristianTrader said:


> The argument is claimed to be objectively certain not because one does or does not hold to the conclusion as infallibly certain but because one should or has not right to deny the premises or the conclusion.


Sorry, I'm not following you here. And Brain's claim was for "philosophical certainty", not "objective certainty".


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> What form? What assumption?



You definitely have heard Van Tillians say that the TAG is not an inductive argument. You say that it is. The only way that you can hope to make it stick is that you believe that the argument form implies induction. However math and logic are not taught inductively but has the same "format". In both, you are given examples so that you can "see" the truth. The same thing happens with TAG.

If you want to make everything induction, then I will have to come back at you in a different way.



> Sorry, I'm not following you here. And Brain's claim was for "philosophical certainty", not "objective certainty".



The critique was of the Van Tillian claim of objectively certain proof. So if he means something different, then I guess the critique dies.

CT


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> You definitely have heard Van Tillians say that the TAG is not an inductive argument. You say that it is.


No, I don't. The form of the TAG argument is deductive (ergo Brain's logical critique). Induction comes into play when the VT apologists (Bahnsen) defends his premises using inductive arguments. The argument is in the form of modus ponens (or tollens - I forget which is which ) 




ChristianTrader said:


> The critique was of the Van Tillian claim of objectively certain proof. So if he means something different, then I guess the critique dies.
> 
> CT


I think there is a difference between _objective_ and _philosophical_ certainty for Brian - but your are correct, either way the VT method dies.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> No, I don't. The form of the TAG argument is deductive (ergo Brain's logical critique). Induction comes into play when the VT apologists (Bahnsen) defends his premises using inductive arguments. The argument is in the form of modus ponens (or tollens - I forget which is which )



You mean like math and logic are defended? Or are they defended differently.



> I think there is a difference between _objective_ and _philosophical_ certainty for Brian - but your are correct, either way the VT method dies.



To say that objective certainty is not reached, then you have to have the right to doubt some part of the argument. Otherwise, you are just making a bare assertion that no one should listen to.

CT


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> You mean like math and logic are defended? Or are they defended differently.


 Nope. 





ChristianTrader said:


> To say that objective certainty is not reached, then you have to have the right to doubt some part of the argument. Otherwise, you are just making a bare assertion that no one should listen to.


 Right. Objective certainty is not reached. It is claimed, but never achieved. It is asserted, but never demonstrated.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> Nope.



So no, they are in fact defended the same way? Then why are you still arguing with me?



> Right. Objective certainty is not reached. It is claimed, but never achieved. It is asserted, but never demonstrated.



Alright. Let me repeat myself. Do you the right to deny a premise of TAG? If not then the discussion is done. If you believe that you can then, tell me which part?

On a side note: 

There are two points in contention.

1)Can objective certainty about anything be reached. According to Brain, the answer is no. I can see no way of defending that besides saying that "I have never had it, or heard of anyone who had it, so it cannot happen.

2)If it can be reached, then how.

I would like to see your answers to these issues.

CT


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> So no, they are in fact defended the same way? Then why are you still arguing with me?


You asked if the Van Til argument was defended the same way addition and subtraction is defended? I said no. The TAG is presented as being an objective proof of Christianity. But this is never demonstrated - merely claimed. Instead of demonstrating (giving the objective proof for Christianity), Bahnsen switches to doing a case by case assault on alternative worldviews. While this is a good method of arguing for Christianity, it does nothing to demonstrate that TAG as an objective proof. It does not even follow the same form or line of reasoning as TAG. 
If TAG is an objective proof of Christianity, then Bahnsen would merely need to give that one argument and he would be finished - case closed. And I don't think Bahnsen would claim that taking down any number of worldviews amounts to a objective proof of Christianity. That would be a classic inductive fallacy. 



ChristianTrader said:


> Alright. Let me repeat myself. Do you the right to deny a premise of TAG? If not then the discussion is done. If you believe that you can then, tell me which part?



The part were the apologist claims that objective certainty is reached - it has not. It is claimed, but never achieved. It is asserted, but never demonstrated.



ChristianTrader said:


> On a side note:
> 
> There are two points in contention.
> 
> 1)Can objective certainty about anything be reached. According to Brain, the answer is no. I can see no way of defending that besides saying that "I have never had it, or heard of anyone who had it, so it cannot happen.
> 
> 2)If it can be reached, then how.
> 
> I would like to see your answers to these issues.
> 
> CT



I think the point of contention is the claim that the TAG argument is objectively certain proof for Christianity. And Brian has demonstrated that it has not. 

As far as "can it be reached" - that is a different issue. It remains the case that it has not been achieved by the VT TAG argument.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> You asked if the Van Til argument was defended the same way addition and subtraction is defended? I said no. The TAG is presented as being an objective proof of Christianity. But this is never demonstrated - merely claimed. Instead of demonstrating (giving the objective proof for Christianity), Bahnsen switches to doing a case by case assault on alternative worldviews. While this is a good method of arguing for Christianity, it does nothing to demonstrate that TAG as an objective proof. It does not even follow the same form or line of reasoning as TAG.
> If TAG is an objective proof of Christianity, then Bahnsen would merely need to give that one argument and he would be finished - case closed. And I don't think Bahnsen would claim that taking down any number of worldviews amounts to a objective proof of Christianity. That would be a classic inductive fallacy.



Okay so you have two options.

1)Give up the objectivity of math and logic.
2)Demonstrate how they are defended differently from TAG.

What you have done is asserted that they are defended differently and then proceed to state how you believe that TAG is defended. It is now time to show the differences.



> The part were the apologist claims that objective certainty is reached - it has not. It is claimed, but never achieved. It is asserted, but never demonstrated.



Lets us remember something. An objectively certain proof has been given when someone is presented with something which they should have no doubt afterward. If they continue to have doubt it would be a failure on their part to use what they have properly. Some bias in them is the problem.

So it comes back to how does one reach objective certainty? Hopefully you have answered my question below, so that I can either agree or disagree with how you say it can be reached.



> I think the point of contention is the claim that the TAG argument is objectively certain proof for Christianity. And Brian has demonstrated that it has not.



Well he demonstrated one thing. If one asserts that objective certainty can only be obtained, by exhaustive demonstration, then TAG does not do it, and it is impossible to be obtained for anything (due to finiteness etc.)

Here I guess you can jump in and show me why I have to accept that view point of objective certainty and how it is reached.



> As far as "can it be reached" - that is a different issue. It remains the case that it has not been achieved by the VT TAG argument.



Well in order to make this claim, you have to show me that I must accept your position of how objective certainty is reached.

CT


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,

Allow me to step in a clarify some things. Civbert has done a good job explaining the issues. I will expand a little. Here is the claim by many Van Tillian apologists:

The transcendental argument for the existence of God (the presuppositional apologetic method of Van Til) provides objective certain proof for God's existence.

My paper argues that this has never been demonstrated, and in practical terms (how the apologetic is actually practiced) the method involves an inductive element that causes the whole argument to lose its logical necessity. As a result, this causes the proof to loose its objective certainty. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Okay so you have two options.
> 
> 1)Give up the objectivity of math and logic.
> 2)Demonstrate how they are defended differently from TAG.
> ...CT



1) does not follow
2) already done


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> 1) does not follow
> 2) already done



Where have you done 2? 

If you cannot do 2) then 1) absolutely does follow.

CT


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Where have you done 2?
> 
> If you cannot do 2) then 1) absolutely does follow.
> 
> CT



See posts 41 and 43. Inductive arguments does not a objective proof make.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> See posts 41 and 43. Inductive arguments does not a objective proof make.



Let me try to restate this: Do you give inductive arguments for the truth of addition? If not then show me what you do, and how it is not an example of induction.

CT


----------



## Cheshire Cat

The point that Hermonta is making (which I think I agree with) is that there is some equivocation here on the word *objective*. If we mean 'objective' in the epistemological certain sense, then perhaps the finiteness of man and our ability for error makes this impossible. Perhaps it doesnt; I don't know. 

At the same time, we usually mean objective in the logical sense. For example basic mathematics etc. I think I can be logically certain that 1+1=2 (Same thing with the deduction of a sound modus ponens), but epistemologically certain? Hmm, I'm not sure. So if 'objective' means logically certain (or objective), i'm not sure if there is a problem.


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Let me try to restate this: Do you give inductive arguments for the truth of addition? If not then show me what you do, and how it is not an example of induction.
> 
> CT



Are you saying the the TAG is a self evident as "1 + 1 = 2" or the law of non-contradiction? Apples and orangers...or more like apples and mountains.

TAG is claimed to be a argument that proves the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can account for intelligibility. This is not self-evidently true, or there would be little disagreement. And inductive arguments never lead necessarily to their conclusions by definition of logical necessity.

Lets say you have 8 apples and I have 12. If I said that if we combined our apples and divided them into 4 equal amounts, we would have 5 apples in each pile - it would be sufficient to show that (8 + 12)/4 equals 5. We would not need to combine and divide apples to prove this. But we can actually go through the process with different objects. But in the end, it is not the examples that prove the conclusion, it is the mathematics.

But the inductive arguments given for TAG do not go that far. With the apples, we could give examples using different objects (marbles, cats, oranges). Each example would follow the same pattern of combining 8 and 12 objects and dividing them into 4 piles, and counting the piles. But in no way does "knocking down individual worldviews" follow the pattern of "If p, then q; not-q; therefore, not-p." Bahnsen does not demonstrate TAG by giving examples that support the validity of modes ponens form. Nor does he attempt to defend the "If p, then q" premise. Even by the standards of "good inductive argumentation" the arguments do not support TAG.


----------



## Cheshire Cat

"Are you saying that the TAG is a self evident as "1 + 1 = 2" or the law of non-contradiction? Apples and oranges...or more like apples and mountains."

No, if I interpret him right, he is saying that the objectivity of 1+1=2 (deductive certainty) is the same sense we are using the term of ‘objectivity’.


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> Brain shows that this premise is never shown to philosophically certain. It is simply assumed true.



"Brain shows" -- is that with philosophical certainty? Here is the whole problem. Men make statements of fact, but men know nothing by themselves. Men must show why any statement of fact is true. The truth for any statement of fact does not depend upon its own rationality, but upon the correspondence of what he states to reality. When man says something is true he is saying that there is objective reality and that he can know it. That is an induction based not upon rationality but upon relationship, i.e., man to reality. Given this initial induction, every inference drawn from it is likewise inductive. Hence every statement of fact includes the element of induction.



Civbert said:


> The inductive part of the critique is that (although the argument is claimed to have philosophic certainty, in fact, only inductive arguments are used in it's favor.



"In fact" -- whence does one derive this idea that there are facts? It requires an inductive argument somewhere along the line. Therefore your facts are all to be regarded as philosophically uncertain, that is, playing by Mr. Bosse's set of rules.



Civbert said:


> It is not "false", it is philosophically uncertain. Induction /= false. Induction = uncertain.



From a purely logical point of view I can't see the difference. If an argument produces uncertainty it has failed to establish what it set out to do, and therefore must be considered false. But for the sake of understanding what each person is saying I will exchange "false" for "uncertain." Mr. Bosse's argument is that induction = uncertain. My question is still, Why?



Civbert said:


> Please explain how every premise includes an induction and then how this necessarily leads to all human thought is circular. And then, what bearing does this have on the critique?



I take induction to mean the inference of something general from something particular. Consider the famous premise, All men are mortal. Whence does this premise derive its certainty in order that it can be regarded as true? From the fact that all men in particular have been found to be mortal; ergo... And it will be found in every instance that the general statement contained in a premise is derived from particulars which cannot be proven to be universal.

Then, if it is true that all of our facts are nothing more than generalisations of particulars, it naturally follows that man knows nothing in general but must ever be caught in the circle of his own particular knowledge.



Civbert said:


> It does no follow necessarily that "if human thought is circular" and "if there is an absolute truth claim" then "truth exists in an infinite Mind outside of human rationality." Obviously this is an enthymeme - but I don't see what additional premises will make your conclusion necessary.



Given what has been said above -- that men only know particulars, yet they confidently derive generalisations from those particulars -- it must be the case that men's generalisations intuitively take for granted a relationship to a reality which guarantees the particulars are true in each and every case. What is that reality? It must be such as possesses Mind, else it could not provide a rational account of generality. It must be absolute Mind, else it could not account for all reality.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Caleb,

You make a good distinction, and one that I make in my argument. However, in my paper I demonstrate that the Van Tillian argument is both logically and epistemologically not certain.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

I'm happy you saw my post. I was afraid it would be overlooked since so many additional post followed it.



armourbearer said:


> "Brain shows" -- is that with philosophical certainty? Here is the whole problem. Men make statements of fact, but men know nothing by themselves. Men must show why any statement of fact is true.


 Not at all. One is free to assume some things are true without objective proof. In fact, all "rational" systems of thought assume some first principles or axioms. 



armourbearer said:


> The truth for any statement of fact does not depend upon its own rationality, but upon the correspondence of what he states to reality.


That's a whole new can of worms - what is "reality". And without some sort of assumption about "what reality in fact is", we can not determine what corresponds to it. 



armourbearer said:


> When man says something is true he is saying that there is objective reality and that he can know it. That is an induction based not upon rationality but upon relationship, i.e., man to reality.


 How is that an induction? Since the subject of the TAG argument is a "worldview", then what is considered reality is a function of the worldview. You can _not _ step out of a worldview and ask, does it conform with reality. You have to assume a worldview and then ask, how does reality look from within it.



armourbearer said:


> Given this initial induction, every inference drawn from it is likewise inductive. Hence every statement of fact includes the element of induction.


 I can't give you this as an induction since it can not be made. You can induce a worldview from reality. A worldview is how we understand what we thing is reality. 



armourbearer said:


> "In fact" -- whence does one derive this idea that there are facts? It requires an inductive argument somewhere along the line. Therefore your facts are all to be regarded as philosophically uncertain, that is, playing by Mr. Bosse's set of rules.


This may indeed be the case since we are talking about worldviews. Ultimately, there is nothing that we know as an independent fact. Facts are always deductions based on our worldview framework. Give me a fact, and it can be shown that it is either a tautology, or a deduction from other facts, or an induction (in which case it is not a fact at all).



armourbearer said:


> "From a purely logical point of view I can't see the difference. If an argument produces uncertainty it has failed to establish what it set out to do, and therefore must be considered false. But for the sake of understanding what each person is saying I will exchange "false" for "uncertain." Mr. Bosse's argument is that induction = uncertain. My question is still, Why?



The difference is important. A false statement is shown to be a contradiction or contrary to a true statement. An uncertain statement is one in which we can not determine if it is true or false. A statement with an undetermined true/false state is simply that. We can not deduce it from a priori true statements, and it is not contrary or contradictory to any a priori true statements. Uncertainty does not equate to false. An uncertain statement may be true. 




armourbearer said:


> "I take induction to mean the inference of something general from something particular. Consider the famous premise, All men are mortal. Whence does this premise derive its certainty in order that it can be regarded as true? From the fact that all men in particular have been found to be mortal; ergo... And it will be found in every instance that the general statement contained in a premise is derived from particulars which cannot be proven to be universal.



All men are mortal is assumed true. But we do not know this is the case independent of a worldview from which we can deduce it. We certainly do not know that the statement is true based on particulars. One may observe ten-thousand black crows, but still not know all crows are black. This is the nature and logic of induction. 



armourbearer said:


> Then, if it is true that all of our facts are nothing more than generalizations of particulars, it naturally follows that man knows nothing in general but must ever be caught in the circle of his own particular knowledge.


If indeed. But no fact can be determined with objective certainty from of particulars. That is the inductive fallacy. Such an argument would not necessarily be false, merely invalid. As are all truly inductive conclusions. 




armourbearer said:


> "Given what has been said above -- that men only know particulars, yet they confidently derive generalizations from those particulars -- it must be the case that men's generalizations intuitively take for granted a relationship to a reality which guarantees the particulars are true in each and every case. What is that reality? It must be such as possesses Mind, else it could not provide a rational account of generality. It must be absolute Mind, else it could not account for all reality.


 That would be nice, but it isn't necessary. Even if it is the case that there is an absolute Mind, it would not make logically invalid conclusion valid. The inductive fallacy is still a fallacy, not matter how many black crows one observes and whether or not there is an absolute Mind. 

While the existence of an absolute Mind that reveals universal truths provides conditions that allow for intelligibility - it is not the case that those are logically necessary conditions. And if an absolute Mind could be shown as a necessary precondition for man to have univocal knowledge, it is not necessary that the Mind be the one revealed in Scripture. 

(And throw in the Van Tilian concept of the incomprehensibility of this absolute Mind, and you erase the precondition for univocal knowledge.) 

I'll post this now and check for typos later.


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> Not at all. One is free to assume some things are true without objective proof. In fact, all "rational" systems of thought assume some first principles or axioms.



This is why I made the statement about the beauty of presuppositional apologetics -- you can't require a rational objective proof for something that depends upon a relation. But you seem to imply that because it is based on a relation it ceases to be objective proof; in which case we are doomed to the realm of negation and are unable to say anything positively meaningful about our existence. But Scripture teaches otherwise: "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God."



Civbert said:


> That's a whole new can of worms - what is "reality". And without some sort of assumption about "what reality in fact is", we can not determine what corresponds to it.



Exactly. Yet men who deny the existence of God assume this reality to which they are inextricably tied.



Civbert said:


> How is that an induction? Since the subject of the TAG argument is a "worldview", then what is considered reality is a function of the worldview. You can step out of a worldview and ask, does it conform with reality. You have to assume a worldview and ask, how does reality look from within it.



How does one step out of the worldview? If you can step out of it to rationalise then you can claim independence. The new basis upon which you rationalise must then be accounted for. How daft!



Civbert said:


> I can't give you this as an induction since it can not be made. You can induce a worldview from reality. A worldview is how we understand what we thing is reality.



Hence all that man knows is an induction.



Civbert said:


> This may indeed be the case since we are talking about worldviews. Ultimately, there is nothing that we know as an independent fact. Facts are always deductions based on our worldview framework. Give me a fact, and it can be shown that it is either a tautology, or a deduction from other facts, or an induction (in which case it is not a fact at all).



Hence proving my case about circularity.



Civbert said:


> If indeed. But no fact can be determined with objective certainty from of particulars. That is the inductive fallacy. Such an argument would not necessarily be false, merely invalid. As are all truly inductive conclusions.



You are calling it a fallacy, but that only applies to the logic, to the relation of the premises to the conclusion. My statement pertains to the premises themselves -- all facts (generalisations) are determined from particulars. Particulars are then understood in relation to generalisations. It is a constantly recurring spiral within a closed rationality.



Civbert said:


> (And throw in the Van Tilian concept of the incomprehensibility of this absolute Mind, and you erase the precondition for univocal knowledge.)



Yes, as explained elsewhere, the archetype/ectype formulation resolves the tensions raised by Van Til's insistence on incomprehensibility, and allows for true knowledge.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,

I think you are missing the point of my critique. You say…



> This is why I made the statement about the beauty of presuppositional apologetics -- you can't require a rational objective proof for something that depends upon a relation.



I am not making any requirements the Van Tillian has not already committed to. He claims to have an objectively certain proof, and yet fails to establish this claim. 



> How does one step out of the worldview?



An ability human beings have is introspection, or even simple inspection. I can analyze a worldview from that worldview’s perspective. If I cannot, then the Van Tillian presuppositional method is undermined. One vital component is an internal critique of the competing worldview. This means the Christian “steps out” of his worldview and “tries on” (Greg Bahnsen’s words not mine) the competing worldview in order to demonstrate how it leads to absurdity. If you take this away, not only do you undermine presuppositonal apologetics, but you undermine rational inquiry itself. 

Frankly, I am having a difficult time understanding your position much less how it possibly refutes my critique of Van Til. If I am in error, it should be easy for you to quote the portions of my series where I made mistakes, and then explain what those mistakes are. This would be a great service to me, and it probably would help bring some focus to this discussion.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> How does one step out of the worldview? If you can step out of it to rationalise then you can claim independence. The new basis upon which you rationalise must then be accounted for. How daft!



Daft indeed. I meant to say:


> You can _not _ step out of a worldview and ask, does it conform with reality. You have to assume a worldview and then ask, how does reality look from within it.



Sorry for the confusion. 

Our understanding of reality is interpreted through our worldview. And one major tool in the apologetic arsenal is to "assume" the opponents worldview and demonstrate by an internal critique that it is incoherent or self-contradictory. We can not say it does not conform to reality because how we conceive of reality is a function of a presumed worldview.

We can step from one worldview into another worldview, but it is impossible to step outside of all worldviews all together and make any kind of rational statement.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Matthew,
> 
> I think you are missing the point of my critique. You say…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is why I made the statement about the beauty of presuppositional apologetics -- you can't require a rational objective proof for something that depends upon a relation.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I am not making any requirements the Van Tillian has not already committed to. He claims to have an objectively certain proof, and yet fails to establish this claim.
Click to expand...


I think Rev. Matthew is saying that there are objectively certain proofs that would not be "rational objective proofs".

If he is not, then I am saying such.

Two related points that it seems that your critique seems to miss.

1)We do not believe that Christianity it properly basic, but instead "super" basic. That would imply that what one would need to do to reach objectively certain proof, for things that are not super basic, would not necessarily need to be done for a "super" basic belief.

2)From your critique: "According to Van Til, the unbeliever must be presented with an indirect argument (a.k.a. a Reductio Ad Absurdum proof) because, on the Reformed basis, there is no area of neutrality between the believer and the unbeliever."

It seems that your critique presupposes some area of neutrality in the laws and applications of logic.



> How does one step out of the worldview?
> 
> 
> 
> An ability human beings have is introspection, or even simple inspection. I can analyze a worldview from that worldview’s perspective. If I cannot, then the Van Tillian presuppositional method is undermined. One vital component is an internal critique of the competing worldview. This means the Christian “steps out” of his worldview and “tries on” (Greg Bahnsen’s words not mine) the competing worldview in order to demonstrate how it leads to absurdity. If you take this away, not only do you undermine presuppositonal apologetics, but you undermine rational inquiry itself.
Click to expand...


I think Rev. Matthew here is talking about "neutrally" observing a worldview from a worldviewless state. Such a location is not to be found anywhere. This is not an unintended attack on Van Til or Bahnsen.



> Frankly, I am having a difficult time understanding your position much less how it possibly refutes my critique of Van Til. If I am in error, it should be easy for you to quote the portions of my series where I made mistakes, and then explain what those mistakes are. This would be a great service to me, and it probably would help bring some focus to this discussion.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian



Of Course I am not Rev. Matthew so I could have interpreted him wrongly.

CT


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> ...
> You are calling it a fallacy, but that only applies to the logic, to the relation of the premises to the conclusion. My statement pertains to the premises themselves -- all facts (generalisations) are determined from particulars. Particulars are then understood in relation to generalisations. It is a constantly recurring spiral within a closed rationality.



Sorry, but I disagree. Fact's are not generalizations. Facts are conclusions to arguments (something known to be true). And to be factual (that is true) it can not be a generalization. A generalization (an inductive conclusion) is not, by definition, a known truth. It is possibility, a probability, an opinion maybe, or even a theory. The Theory of Evolution is a generalization, it is not a fact.


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> I think Rev. Matthew here is talking about "neutrally" observing a worldview from a worldviewless state. Such a location is not to be found anywhere. This is not an unintended attack on Van Til or Bahnsen.



I agree and I'm embarrassed by the confusion my typo implied - that I thought one can step out of a worldview and "neutrally" evaluate a worldview's conformance to reality. 

Mea culpa.


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> I am not making any requirements the Van Tillian has not already committed to. He claims to have an objectively certain proof, and yet fails to establish this claim.



Where does Van Til commit himself in this way? He maintains objectivity on the presupposition of the reformed faith. You can't require him to prove the rationality of a belief without which there could be no rationality. No man has to prove his own existence by proving he has a mother.



Brian Bosse said:


> An ability human beings have is introspection, or even simple inspection. I can analyze a worldview from that worldview’s perspective. If I cannot, then the Van Tillian presuppositional method is undermined. One vital component is an internal critique of the competing worldview. This means the Christian “steps out” of his worldview and “tries on” (Greg Bahnsen’s words not mine) the competing worldview in order to demonstrate how it leads to absurdity. If you take this away, not only do you undermine presuppositonal apologetics, but you undermine rational inquiry itself.



Whether or not Bahnsen was conveying the idea you are suggesting I leave to others to squabble over. The idea itself is nonsense and contrary to Van Til's antithetical approach. You can't prove the absurdity of a system you are thinking in terms of -- you only manage to approve of the autonomy with which the unbeliever reasons. You are better off showing how it is impossible to come to any conclusion at all given the God-denying nature of the system, just as we show the moral bancruptcy of humanism. This is all based upon the reformed worldview.



Brian Bosse said:


> Frankly, I am having a difficult time understanding your position much less how it possibly refutes my critique of Van Til. If I am in error, it should be easy for you to quote the portions of my series where I made mistakes, and then explain what those mistakes are. This would be a great service to me, and it probably would help bring some focus to this discussion.



I've pointed to the problematic part of your critique and interacted with Civbert on it. Please feel free to take up the remarks about induction as a focus for discussion. You would need to prove that any fact could be proven before you could find fault with Van Tillian apologetics for not proving a fact according to your pre-requirements.

If I were to formulate the transcendental argument in a logical manner I would simply be honest about my dependence on the traditional ontological argument. Facts are perfect. A claim to know a fact is a claim to know perfection. At which point St. Anselm's logic triumphs.


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## MW

Civbert said:


> Sorry, but I disagree. Fact's are not generalizations. Facts are conclusions to arguments (something known to be true). And to be factual (that is true) it can not be a generalization. A generalization (an inductive conclusion) is not, by definition, a known truth. It is possibility, a probability, an opinion maybe, or even a theory. The Theory of Evolution is a generalization, it is not a fact.



Listen to this statement: "Facts are generalisations." I stated a fact, which I understand to be true in all conditions -- a generalisation. The theory of evolution is a false generalisation.


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## Cheshire Cat

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Caleb,
> 
> You make a good distinction, and one that I make in my argument. However, in my paper I demonstrate that the Van Tillian argument is both logically and epistemologically not certain.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian


Once I got to part five, my computer froze. I was being lazy too. I'll read the rest.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> He maintains objectivity on the presupposition of the reformed faith.



When the apologist claims he has an objectively certain proof, he is claiming to have a proof that for any and all individuals cannot fail to be true. My critique is that this claim is too much. The apologist fails at several levels - the most serious being the inductive element he introduces into his argument. 



> You can't require him to prove the rationality of a belief without which there could be no rationality.



Sure you can, and so thought Van Til. It is the basis of his apologetic. His very argument is that the existence of God is necessary because apart from God there could not be rationality. Since there is rationality, then God exists. This is a good argument. This argument is established in a manner that is not objectively certain. That was the point of my critique. 



> The idea itself is nonsense and contrary to Van Til's antithetical approach.



Ok, my idea is nonsense. Since you are using this type of rhetoric, then I would submit to you that you do not understand Van Til’s apologetic. In his _The Defense of the Faith_ (Third Edition) on pages 100-101 we find the following…



> The Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent, assuming the correctness of his (the opponent’s) method merely for argument’s sake, in order to show him that on such a position the “facts” are not facts and the “laws” are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself upon the Christian position for argument’s sake in order that he may be shown that only upon such a basis do “facts” and “laws” appear intelligible.



Clearly, you do not understand Van Til if you think this is “nonsense.” 



> I've pointed to the problematic part of your critique and interacted with Civbert on it.



It is funny how a simple request like this simply goes unanswered. I asked you to quote the appropriate portions of my critique where I was wrong and explain how I was wrong. You would not even show me the courtesy of doing this, but yet you would say that my ideas are nonsense. Not only am I beginning to doubt whether you understand Van Til, but I am beginning to wonder if you have actually taken the time to read my critique. The funny thing is that I acknowledge that there probably are errors in my critique. I would welcome a genuine feedback. I just ask you to be specific. Your response to this post will be telling.

Sincerely,

Brian
P.S. I really do not enjoy the level our rhetoric has taken. I plead guilty in this post, and will try to tone it down.


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## Cheshire Cat

I should say that I agree with the conclusion of the critique, and that as far as I can tell (with my limited understanding of the subject) you represent Van Til well.


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## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> When the apologist claims he has an objectively certain proof, he is claiming to have a proof that for any and all individuals cannot fail to be true. My critique is that this claim is too much. The apologist fails at several levels - the most serious being the inductive element he introduces into his argument.



You have managed to confuse me, Brian. It seems to me that you are suggesting any apologetic which removes the burden of objective certainty away from the realm of human rationality is a failure. How have you not established autonomy?



Brian Bosse said:


> Sure you can, and so thought Van Til. It is the basis of his apologetic. His very argument is that the existence of God is necessary because apart from God there could not be rationality. Since there is rationality, then God exists. This is a good argument. This argument is established in a manner that is not objectively certain. That was the point of my critique.



Since me, then mum (or mom). That is objectively certain. It is based on an induction.



Brian Bosse said:


> Ok, my idea is nonsense. Since you are using this type of rhetoric, then I would submit to you that you do not understand Van Til’s apologetic. In his _The Defense of the Faith_ (Third Edition) on pages 100-101 we find the following…
> 
> Clearly, you do not understand Van Til if you think this is “nonsense.”



Not understanding Van Til is always a possibility, and something which doesn't worry me too much as I'm not VanTillian. However, I believe you have quoted VanTil offering a reason why we should argue ad hominem, not in justification of stepping out of our theistic worldview. If all you meant by stepping out of our worldview is that we should argue ad hominem, then that is fine. However, I took you to mean that we should critique according to the dictates of the natural man, who insists he can reason without God. On that basis we would have to rationally prove God exists according to a rationale which reasons independent of God -- an impossibility.



Brian Bosse said:


> It is funny how a simple request like this simply goes unanswered. I asked you to quote the appropriate portions of my critique where I was wrong and explain how I was wrong. You would not even show me the courtesy of doing this, but yet you would say that my ideas are nonsense. Not only am I beginning to doubt whether you understand Van Til, but I am beginning to wonder if you have actually taken the time to read my critique. The funny thing is that I acknowledge that there probably are errors in my critique. I would welcome a genuine feedback. I just ask you to be specific. Your response to this post will be telling.



I can't remember calling your ideas nonsense. The only thing I have called nonsense is the idea that we should step outside the plane to inspect it whilst it is flying mid-air. I analysed your critique and thought it boiled down to, "If induction, then false." Civbert tells me there is a difference between false and uncertain in a logical argument. I can't see it, but for the sake of discussion I corrected my analysis to, "If induction, then uncertain." My question was, and still is, Why? Now I could rehash everything I've said since then, but I'd only be repeating myself. One question I am inclined to put to you is, Can you prove that man knows anything? and can you prove this without depending on an induction? Blessings!


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## Semper Fidelis

Manata weighed in on this:

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2007/04/more-on-tag-and-certainity_05.html


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> It seems to me that you are suggesting any apologetic which removes the burden of objective certainty away from the realm of human rationality is a failure.



I am not making this suggestion. All I am saying is that the Van Tillian claims too much when he says he has an objectively certain proof for the existence of God. If the Van Tillian admits this, it still leaves him with a powerful apologetic. In fact, it is more powerful because it is no longer subject to this critique. 



> I analysed your critique and thought it boiled down to, "If induction, then false." Civbert tells me there is a difference between false and uncertain in a logical argument. I can't see it, but for the sake of discussion I corrected my analysis to, "If induction, then uncertain." My question was, and still is, Why?



By definition, inductive arguments are not certain. All inductive arguments leave open the possibility, however remote this possibility is, that the conclusion is false. Therefore, the conclusion of all inductive arguments fall short of 100% certainty to some degree or another.




> Can you prove that man knows anything?



This is a _non-sequitur_.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## August

Brian, wow, this thread is still going.

I may have missed this before, but can you maybe link me back to where you show the use of induction by Van Till? Am I right to conclude that the use of inductive argumentation by Van Till is the foundation of your counter-argument?


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## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> I am not making this suggestion. All I am saying is that the Van Tillian claims too much when he says he has an objectively certain proof for the existence of God. If the Van Tillian admits this, it still leaves him with a powerful apologetic. In fact, it is more powerful because it is no longer subject to this critique.



So, may I ask, can a Christian be certain that God exists? If so, and it is not based on objective certainty, we are left with the existential idea that certainty is subjective or a leap of faith; if not, we are left with a lingering angst which makes us continaully anxious that the life of faith is a lie.



Brian Bosse said:


> By definition, inductive arguments are not certain. All inductive arguments leave open the possibility, however remote this possibility is, that the conclusion is false. Therefore, the conclusion of all inductive arguments fall short of 100% certainty to some degree or another.



Perhaps I am not making myself clear, for which I apologise. It is a manmade dictum that inductive arguments are not certain. Sure, you can get the formal logic right, and deduce necessary conclusions from premises in a technically correct manner. But the premises themselves are filled with inductive arguments. They are nothing more than generalisations of particulars. Hence, everything we know is based on induction; if so, according to the manmade dictum for certainty, that would leave men uncertain of anything. But then how do you know your dictum is certain?

But I know with certainty that I have a mother. Which all goes to show that the manmade dictum -- inductive arguments arte not certain -- cannot be proven to be true.



Brian Bosse said:


> This is a _non-sequitur_.



How is a question a non sequitur? Perhaps you mean the question is irrelevant. I do not believe so. Your whole critique comes down to your assurance that "inductive arguments are not certain." My question is, How do you know this? Blessings!


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> So, may I ask, can a Christian be certain that God exists?



If by certain, you mean philosophical certainty (100% certainty), then I would say no.



> It is a manmade dictum that inductive arguments are not certain.



Inductive arguments are by nature of their definition not 100% certain arguments. 



> But I know with certainty that I have a mother.



You may be very very very confident in this, but you do not know this with 100% certainty. I will not debate this with you, but rather allow you to do a search on the web regarding philosophical certainty. Thank you for the discussion.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> If by certain, you mean philosophical certainty (100% certainty), then I would say no.



As you cannot say this with 100% certainty it is not of much significance to me; but I do fear for any man who is straying into this desert path. May God save you!


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