# Hume on free action



## Claudiu

Is Hume right that if you act without external constraint imposed on your action by anyone else you act freely? If not, why not? If so, and if everything that happens is caused by other things that happened earlier, does that mean that you act freely even though your action was caused by other things that happened earlier (perhaps even before you were born)?


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## jwright82

Well I believe on your second question that he merely called into question the proof of the idea of causality. This I suppose could leave the door open for his "free action" but his main point was to call into question our beleif in causality as an idea.


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## Claudiu

Wouldn't we define "liberty" or "freedom" as more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action?" It seems to me that when we say someone has "free will" we mean more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action." Does anybody have a good objection to Hume's notion of liberty?


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## Reformed Thomist

Hume is trying to reconcile freedom -- enough, at least for moral responsibility -- and causal determinism. His is a 'compatibilist' position. This position, by definition, negates 'libertarian' free will (what most people think they have, or what most mean by 'free will'), but preserves what we really care about in talk of freedom: moral responsibility for our behaviours. 

Basically, causal determinism is true; there is no such thing as an action which is not caused. But there are two main 'kinds' of causation for the human being: One compatible with freedom/moral responsibility, and the other not. We are free and morally responsible for our (caused) actions insofar that our action is in line with our will (doing what we _want_ to do) -- which is normally the case with human action. Here _we_, _via_ our wills, are directly involved in the causation; we thereby _own_ the action. If, on the other hand, we are caused to do something mainly by _external_ agents (violating our will; doing what we do not want to do; in effect, forcing our action), this is an unfree act and we are not morally responsible for it. We are only indirectly involved in the causation; we do not own the action, but someone else does, using us as an unwilling 'instrument'. But, again, this is a relatively rare occurance in human action.


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## cih1355

Claudiu said:


> Is Hume right that if you act without external constraint imposed on your action by anyone else you act freely? If not, why not? If so, and if everything that happens is caused by other things that happened earlier, does that mean that you act freely even though your action was caused by other things that happened earlier (perhaps even before you were born)?


 
Moral freedom is more than acting without external constraint. Moral freedom has to do with acting according to one's desires. Moreover, those desires would need to be generated in an appropriate way (e.g. not being brainwashed).

Moral freedom does not necessarily entail the ability to do evil. God has moral freedom, but He does not have the ability to do evil.


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## Claudiu

cih1355 said:


> Claudiu said:
> 
> 
> 
> Is Hume right that if you act without external constraint imposed on your action by anyone else you act freely? If not, why not? If so, and if everything that happens is caused by other things that happened earlier, does that mean that you act freely even though your action was caused by other things that happened earlier (perhaps even before you were born)?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Moral freedom is more than acting without external constraint. *Moral freedom has to do with acting according to one's desires*. Moreover, those desires would need to be generated in an appropriate way (e.g. not being brainwashed).
> 
> Moral freedom does not necessarily entail the ability to do evil. God has moral freedom, but He does not have the ability to do evil.
Click to expand...

 
What if the desire one has is impossible to act on (i.e. a human desiring to fly). So would we have to say that the desire has to be possible (i.e. a healthy human desiring to walk from point A to point B - a distance of say 10 feet). [I think post #3 in this thread touches on this topic].

Also, would this be in line with what you were thinking about desire in an appropriate way: [-]a case of manipulation that is not constraint (e.g., your action being internally caused by neuroscientists using sophisticated machinery implanted in your brain) would be an example of an unfree act without external constraint[/-]? [I think this covered it].


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## MW

Claudiu said:


> Wouldn't we define "liberty" or "freedom" as more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action?" It seems to me that when we say someone has "free will" we mean more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action." Does anybody have a good objection to Hume's notion of liberty?


 
There is a psychological determinism which undermines human agency and responsibility built on that definition.

I would include "inclination to good" as basic to any definition of freedom. One must then account for the reason why humans choose what is evil. I think this is more natural than the alternative, which must reckon with the inexcusability of man for doing evil and the reason why humans do relatively good actions. The "inclination to good" position can explain the choice of evil under the concept of "deception," which is also the biblical way of explaining the problem.


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## Claudiu

Sometimes "freedom," or "free will" is defined as "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise" (The Principle of Alternate Possibilities) or "to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances." What's wrong with these again? I've read somewhere in the past that these two definitions are wrong, but I forgot the reasons why.


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## cih1355

Claudiu said:


> Sometimes "freedom," or "free will" is defined as "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise" (The Principle of Alternate Possibilities) or "to choose and do otherwise in exactly the same circumstances." What's wrong with these again? I've read somewhere in the past that these two definitions are wrong, but I forgot the reasons why.


 
I have heard that this conception of freedom has two implications. One implication is that some people will make decisions at random or for no reason. From God's perspective, no decision is truly random because God ordains what we will choose. From man's perspective, some of our decisions appear to be random. 

Another implication is that the reason a person chooses X is the same reason he has for not choosing X. Suppose person A murders person B and he had a reason for doing that. If history were rolled back to when person B was alive and person A chose otherwise, then the reason that person A had for murdering person B is the same reason he had for not choosing to murder person B.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> There is a psychological determinism which undermines human agency and responsibility built on that definition.



Psychological determinism is the usual route of most reformed thinkers, actually (including Jonathan Edwards).



armourbearer said:


> I would include "inclination to good" as basic to any definition of freedom.



In this case, you are talking past the issue. You are talking about moral ability whereas this discussion is about what Edwards called "natural ability."


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## Claudiu

Reformed Thomist said:


> *But there are two main 'kinds' of causation for the human being: One compatible with freedom/moral responsibility, and the other not.* We are free and morally responsible for our (caused) actions insofar that our action is in line with our will (*doing what we want to do*) -- which is normally the case with human action. Here _we_, _via_ our wills, are directly involved in the causation; we thereby _own_ the action. If, on the other hand, we are caused to do something mainly by _external_ agents (violating our will; *doing what we do not want to do*; in effect, forcing our action), this is an unfree act and we are not morally responsible for it. We are only indirectly involved in the causation; we do not own the action, but someone else does, using us as an unwilling 'instrument'. But, again, this is a relatively rare occurance in human action.


 
Could you provide an example to illustrate your point?


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> In this case, you are talking past the issue. You are talking about moral ability whereas this discussion is about what Edwards called "natural ability."


 
No, the terms are specifically aimed at what is natural to the will as will. Natural freedom includes the inclination to good. On the basis of the Christian doctrine of the fall a question arises as to whether this inclination to good was destroyed by man's voluntary choice to sin. At that point moral ability becomes an issue. But the fact remains that for reformed theologians the inclination to good is basic to the natural freedom of the will.

Edwards was a reformed thinker, not the reformed thinker. Calvin says, "his choice of good and evil was free, and not that alone, but the highest rectitude was in his mind and will, and all the organic parts were rightly composed to obedience, until in destroying himself he corrupted his own blessings" (Institutes 1.15.8).

Calvin's complaint of the philosophers is to the point -- "they were seeking in a ruin for a building."


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## Peairtach

It's the fact that God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent and that Man has a soul that makes human "natural"/metaphysical freedom and responsibility possible. Obviously fallen Man is _ethically_ bound by his own sin. See e.g. Luther's "Bondage of the Will" for a treatise on _that_. 

The more consistent atheists and materialists, e.g. the Marxists, are determinists when it comes to Man's will and all else.

Here's a suggestive article by Douglas Wilson on the subject, possibly before his Federal Vision heresy carried him away:

Antithesis at Reformed.org

Here's a couple of threads on the subject from the PB, which may or may not be enlightening:
http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/sovereignty-establishing-free-will-62841/

http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/causal-determinism-human-responsibility-63037/


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## Claudiu

Richard, thank you for the resources.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> Natural freedom includes the inclination to good.



Again, this is the old pre-enlightenment framing of the issue (cf. Anselm's definition). The question was reframed in philosophy during the 17th century and has become a question about how choices are determined. Again, this is the difference: moral freedom, Edwards would agree, includes the inclination toward morally right actions. The question that Hume is asking, though, is about the functioning of choice, regardless of its moral components. Both ways of framing the question have been engaged and dealt with in our tradition, so let's not write off the reframing.


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## Claudiu

How exactly does Hume define necessity (or necessary causality - determinism) since he says earlier that the idea we have of cause and effect is not based on reason but rather on "custom and habit"?


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## Philip

Claudiu said:


> How exactly does Hume define necessity (or necessary causality - determinism) since he says earlier that the idea we have of cause and effect is not based on reason but rather on "custom and habit"?


 
In some ways we have to remember that Hume is really playing with a lot of things. Yes, he claims that the idea of cause and effect that we have is custom rather than reason, but he later assumes it in the _Dialogues Concerning Natural and Revealed Religion_. The other thing to remember about Hume is that, like Locke, he is not terribly concerned about the practical implications of his thought, which is why he's considered part of the Scottish Enlightenment, but not part of the Scottish School of Common Sense.


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## Semper Fidelis

P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> Natural freedom includes the inclination to good.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Again, this is the old pre-enlightenment framing of the issue...
Click to expand...

 
I think you're missing Matthew's point. You stated that we was talking "...past the issue...." but Matthew was responding to the question:


Claudiu said:


> Wouldn't we define "liberty" or "freedom" as more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action?" It seems to me that when we say someone has "free will" we mean more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action." Does anybody have a good objection to Hume's notion of liberty?


He's not asking how Hume or post-Enlightenment thinking would frame the issue but how _we_ would define freedom. Matthew is providing the classically Reformed answer to the question.


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## MW

Semper Fidelis said:


> He's not asking how Hume or post-Enlightenment thinking would frame the issue but how _we_ would define freedom. Matthew is providing the classically Reformed answer to the question.


 
Thanks Rich. That is the point. There is an answer here which the traditional reformed have expounded from Scripture. The philosophers, as Calvin notes, basically do not account for man as fallen and look at the human constitution as if it functioned with complete integrity.


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## Philip

Semper Fidelis said:


> He's not asking how Hume or post-Enlightenment thinking would frame the issue but how we would define freedom.



Again, that depends on how the question is framed? Are we talking about freedom as a moral quality or ability (cf. Anselm, defines freedom as the ability to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake) or a metaphysical one?



armourbearer said:


> The philosophers, as Calvin notes, basically do not account for man as fallen and look at the human constitution as if it functioned with complete integrity.



I think Anselm and Edwards might be exceptions here. Perhaps (when I have my flash drive with me and am not sitting in a cafe) I should post some portions of my essay on the subject, where I compare Anselm, Edwards, Luther, and (more for fun than anything else) Chesterton on free will---all of them, I think, are operating with very similar notions of freedom and responsibility.


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## Claudiu

P. F. Pugh said:


> Semper Fidelis said:
> 
> 
> 
> He's not asking how Hume or post-Enlightenment thinking would frame the issue but how we would define freedom.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Again, that depends on how the question is framed? Are we talking about freedom as a moral quality or ability (cf. Anselm, defines freedom as the ability to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake) or a metaphysical one?
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> The philosophers, as Calvin notes, basically do not account for man as fallen and look at the human constitution as if it functioned with complete integrity.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I think Anselm and Edwards might be exceptions here. Perhaps (when I have my flash drive with me and am not sitting in a cafe) *I should post some portions of my essay on the subject*, where I compare Anselm, Edwards, Luther, and (more for fun than anything else) Chesterton on free will---all of them, I think, are operating with very similar notions of freedom and responsibility.
Click to expand...

 
That would be great.


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## Semper Fidelis

P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, that depends on how the question is framed? Are we talking about freedom as a moral quality or ability (cf. Anselm, defines freedom as the ability to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake) or a metaphysical one?



And, again, you accused Matthew of talking past the issue. He was not. When asked how _we_ would respond, he answered how Reformed dogmatists have handled it historically. This field is not co-extensive with the history of philosophy and gives different answers to the problems than you'll find in a history of philosophy. Unless you have spent a lot of time researching Reformed dogmatics, you should not presume to lecture another who has on whether he is talking past an issue he is giving an answer to. Simply because he is not framing the answer in the realm you are familiar with does not mean he is talking past the issue.


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## Philip

Semper Fidelis said:


> And, again, you accused Matthew of talking past the issue.



The issue he is addressing is not the issue that Hume is addressing.


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## Semper Fidelis

P. F. Pugh said:


> Semper Fidelis said:
> 
> 
> 
> And, again, you accused Matthew of talking past the issue.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The issue he is addressing is not the issue that Hume is addressing.
Click to expand...

 
Philip,

Pay attention because this is the last time I'm going to explain this to you and then I'm going to start moderating you if you will not pay closer attention.

Claudiu asked:


Claudiu said:


> Wouldn't we define "liberty" or "freedom" as more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action?" It seems to me that when we say someone has "free will" we mean more than just an "act without external constraint imposed on your action." Does anybody have a good objection to Hume's notion of liberty?



This is a question about how _we_ would define liberty or freedom. 

Matthew didn't _have_ to answer the question to the definition of liberty or freedom to Hume's satisfaction or even to _your_ satisfaction in order to provide a definition.

Are you at all studied in Reformed dogmatics on this issue?


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## Philip

Semper Fidelis said:


> This is a question about how we would define liberty or freedom.
> 
> Matthew didn't have to answer the question to the definition of liberty or freedom to Hume's satisfaction or even to your satisfaction in order to provide a definition.



But for what purpose? In Reformed dogmatics, freedom is what we have in Christ---freedom from sin and unto righteousness. In philosophy, freedom is that set of conditions that is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. That's where I see reformed dogmatics talking past the issue (and yes, I'm familiar with it) and it's where I see Edwards' work on the will extremely helpful in distinguishing between the two.

To put it another way, would we apply the definition of freedom given by reformed dogmatics in the realm of politics?


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## Semper Fidelis

P. F. Pugh said:


> In Reformed dogmatics, freedom is what we have in Christ---freedom from sin and unto righteousness. In philosophy, freedom is that set of conditions that is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. T



Is it seriously your contention that the Reformed dogmatists have said no more than freedom from sin and unto righteousness and have not written on the nature of the will prior to Edwards? On the one hand you state you have read on this and on the other this summation belies that assertion.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> I think Anselm and Edwards might be exceptions here. Perhaps (when I have my flash drive with me and am not sitting in a cafe) I should post some portions of my essay on the subject, where I compare Anselm, Edwards, Luther, and (more for fun than anything else) Chesterton on free will---all of them, I think, are operating with very similar notions of freedom and responsibility.


 
You might find Shedd's discussion of human will to be profitable, as found in his Dogmatics, 2:115ff. His discussion exposes a genuine difference between the elder and younger psychology -- the elder providing for true freedom as defined by the Bible and precluding necessitating theories. It also becomes clear from Shedd's discussion that Edwards' explanation of the will assumed the definition of his Arminian opponents and at times failed to distinguish between volition and inclination.


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## Philip

Ok, it seems my post was lost (bad connections last night).



armourbearer said:


> The "inclination to good" position can explain the choice of evil under the concept of "deception," which is also the biblical way of explaining the problem.



I'm requoting your explanation here so that I can explain how this works: this definition is very similar to Anselm's definition of freedom as an ability (implying inclination) to preserve rectitude of will. Thus, we get the _posse peccare, non posse non peccare_, etc. I have no quarrel with this conception of freedom.

But we must recognize its limitations: it is dealing primarily with inclinations _as they are_. What it does not deal with, though, is the issue of human responsibility, which is what Hume's definition is dealing with. In this vein, there have been three answers, historically: hard determinism (hyper-Calvinism, materialism, behaviorism), compatibilism (reformed theology, classic Thomism), and libertarianism (Arminianism, Molinism). The first is the idea that determination of decisions means that ultimately humans are not responsible for their actions, the second holds that some sort of determination is compatible with responsibility, and the third holds that ultimately responsibility depends on the decision not being determined by anything (including Divine Decree). Hard determinism, as we have said, is to be rejected. Libertarianism, on the other hand, ends in the logical conclusion of openness theology, which we would all agree is unbiblical. This is why Reformed theology has been historically compatibilist when it comes to philosophical freedom.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> But we must recognize its limitations: it is dealing primarily with inclinations _as they are_. What it does not deal with, though, is the issue of human responsibility, which is what Hume's definition is dealing with. In this vein, there have been three answers, historically: hard determinism (hyper-Calvinism, materialism, behaviorism), compatibilism (reformed theology, classic Thomism), and libertarianism (Arminianism, Molinism). The first is the idea that determination of decisions means that ultimately humans are not responsible for their actions, the second holds that some sort of determination is compatible with responsibility, and the third holds that ultimately responsibility depends on the decision not being determined by anything (including Divine Decree). Hard determinism, as we have said, is to be rejected. Libertarianism, on the other hand, ends in the logical conclusion of openness theology, which we would all agree is unbiblical. This is why Reformed theology has been historically compatibilist when it comes to philosophical freedom.


 
The categories which you have described are the result of the "younger psychology." I think you will come to see the subject in a different light after you have read Shedd.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> The categories which you have described are the result of the "younger psychology." I think you will come to see the subject in a different light after you have read Shedd.



Are his works available online at all? Does he deal with Divine Sovereignty/theological determinism as it relates to human freedom and responsibility?

But my question remains the same here: is this framing of the issue somehow invalid? If so, why? What presuppositions are there to this framing that make thinking of freedom in terms of moral responsibility and accountability unhelpful or unreformed?


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## PuritanCovenanter

P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> The categories which you have described are the result of the "younger psychology." I think you will come to see the subject in a different light after you have read Shedd.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Are his works available online at all? Does he deal with Divine Sovereignty/theological determinism as it relates to human freedom and responsibility?
> 
> But my question remains the same here: is this framing of the issue somehow invalid? If so, why? What presuppositions are there to this framing that make thinking of freedom in terms of moral responsibility and accountability unhelpful or unreformed?
Click to expand...

 It looks like you can read it online for free. 

http://www.archive.org/details/dogmatictheology01sheduoft

"Dogmatic Theology" by William Greenough Thayer Shedd Free Download. The book is added by William G. Moss III Read online books at OnRead.com.


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## Philip

I'm looking at the passage preceding the passage you cited, Matthew, and it looks like Shedd is taking a compatibilist position: specifically in his passage (II p.103ff) on what he calls "voluntary freedom."



> . . . if the will be really self-inclined and self-determined in its activity, internal and external, it is a free will.



The central fact of freedom, for Shedd, seems to be freedom from direct external determination of action (his position on internal determination is a bit confusing---possibly I'm just not understanding what he thinks counts as an internal determination). He even explicitly denies the principle of alternative possibility, firmly planting his thought as compatibilist.

It's also clear that on p. 116 and p. 120ff., Shedd is quoting Edwards as an opponent of Locke and an apologist for the elder psychology. So I'm not exactly certain where you think the two are opposed. Admittedly, this is a first reading, but I don't think there is any real disagreement between myself and Shedd, except possibly in some minor terminology and other matters (I wouldn't be so quick to separate understanding from the will/affections but that's another discussion).


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## Prufrock

Phillip, older Reformed dogmatics did _not_ deal with freedom only in what you're terming its "theological sense" (that is, man as bound to sin or free), but also addressed the fundamental issue of the quiddity of choice as choice, or _what_ freedom is. As you say you are familiar with Reformed dogmatics on the point, I'm inclined to ask what author's you've actually read on the topic. If you haven't pulled out your Turretin, Mastricht, Voetius, etc., but are relying on secondary sources, you may not be getting the full picture of Reformed discussion. It will only begin to scratch the surface, but for some helpful secondary sources, you may with to consider an essay by William Cunningham which has been mentioned several times on the board, and also a recent lecture floating around the internet by Richard Muller, comparing Edward's view of freedom with older Reformed views - whether one agrees with all his conclusions, it is still an illuminating discussion. If you have real interest in either of these, I can track them down for you.


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## Philip

Paul, that would be very helpful.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> But my question remains the same here: is this framing of the issue somehow invalid? If so, why? What presuppositions are there to this framing that make thinking of freedom in terms of moral responsibility and accountability unhelpful or unreformed?


 
As noted, the philosophers are seeking for a building amongst ruins. Numerous theological issues emerge as a result of their unbiblical definition. First, they make no account of natural righteousness. Man is deemed morally neutral, a clean slate, and thus a creature of his environment. This positively undermines the pre-conditions of morality because the will is not naturally inclined towards anything. Secondly, with no recognition of the fall they impose an integrity on human freedom which does not exist. There is no bondage of the will, no sense of higher purpose, no basis for a Christian explanation of evil.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> The central fact of freedom, for Shedd, seems to be freedom from direct external determination of action (his position on internal determination is a bit confusing---possibly I'm just not understanding what he thinks counts as an internal determination). He even explicitly denies the principle of alternative possibility, firmly planting his thought as compatibilist.


 
Shedd wrote,



> "The elder psychology divides the powers of the soul into Understanding and Will; the later psychology divides them into Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. *The former includes the moral affections and desires in the Will*; *the latter excludes them from it*. For the former, *inclination is the principal characteristic of voluntariness*; for the latter, *volition is the principal characteristic*. In classifying the powers of the soul under two modes, it is not meant that there is a division of the soul into two parts. The whole soul as cognizing, is the understanding; and *the whole soul as inclining*, *is the will*."
> 
> "Locke laid the foundation for the later view of the will, *by excluding moral desire and affection from the faculty*.
> 
> "We regard the elder psychology as correct, *in including the moral desires and affections in the total action of the will*, and in making two faculties of the soul: namely, understanding and will."
> 
> "The Will is that faculty or mode of the soul which self-determines, *inclines*, desires, and chooses *in reference to moral and religious objects and ends*. These objects and ends are all centred and summed up in God."
> 
> "*The elder theologians include the moral and religious desires and affections in the Will*."
> 
> "*The will*, unlike the understanding, *is mutable*. It is capable of a radical and total change, or revolution. It has met with such a change in the apostasy of Adam. Man now is inclined exactly contrary to what he was by creation. In respect to moral and religious ends and objects, *he inclines*, *desires*, *loves*, *and acts directly contrary to what he did when he came from the Creator's hand*. This great change is denominated a "fall." It is an overthrow, a catastrophe. *It is not a mere difference in the degree or intensity with which the will operates*, *but it is an entire alteration of the direction of its activity*. The fall of the will was a revolution, not an evolution."
> 
> "The elder psychology, by regarding the moral desires and affections as modes of the inclination of the will brings them within the sphere of responsibility; and distinguishes in kind between the moral or voluntary, and the natural or involuntary desires. *In this way*, *it precludes necessitating theories of human nature and agency*."
> 
> "*Moral desires and affections are the self-activity of the will*; its inclination and tendency showing itself in the phases of love or hatred of God; of desire or aversion towards goodness. They are commanded or prohibited by the moral law; which proves that they are voluntary. The feelings of supreme love towards God, and of equal love towards a fellow-creature, are not instinctive, but voluntary."
> 
> "The elder psychology agrees with Scripture, in its definition of the will. In the Biblical psychology, *the will includes the moral desires*, and is antithetic to the understanding."
> 
> "*The distinction between the will's inclination*, *and its volition*, *is of the highest importance in both psychology and theology*."



"Compatibilism" is a tautology. The discussion itself requires any theory of divine and human willing to be compatible in order to be coherent. It is a requirement for legitimacy and cannot be a specific theory. If older theologians spoke of the compatibility it is owing to this requirement and were putting forth a specific theory of compatibility.

"Determinism" is likewise a tautology. The certainty of actions as foreknown and/or determined is the reason why compatibility with human freedom must be sought. Older reformed theologians, because they were not psychological determinists, were not required to explain the sense in which God's will affects human choices. They would speak of God's determination as an "hypothetical" condition of human willing, neither a cause or occasion of the human will.

"Voluntarism" is also a tautology because the discussion about human will is seeking to discover in what sense man voluntarily determines his own course of action.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> "Compatibilism" is a tautology.



As are all true definitions.

Part of the issue is that will has been identified with choice. When people say "free will" what they mean is "free agency" or "free choice." They mean that the rational agent has acted such that he may reasonably be held accountable for his actions.

The other issue that muddies the waters, though, is the issue of indeterminism: is the will, even if identified with the affections, determined or undetermined?


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## jwright82

To be fair contemporary philosophy has shed both light and confusing darkness on this whole issue. Hume's exact problems are more properly located within the philosophy of mind. One thing that has been a blessing and a curse has been the realization that we can simply redefine a word to avoid the problems associated with previous definitions, so Edwards was ahead of his time in redefining what free will meant. So to answer Hume I would say that why must free will be defined as "acting without external constraint"? When we are "externally constraind" by the law and we "choose" to obey have we not excersized "free will" of a sort? The confusion comes in not by claiming that we have "free will" (we do what we want to do) but in some metaphysical explination of how this operates. Michael Horton uses Covenant Theology to resolve, as much as can be creaturely resolved, the paradox between divine soverighnty and human freedom, I think this next to Edwards is the best resolution to the problem you can get.

In the philosophy of mind Daniel Dennett has invoked linguistic philosophy to attempt at a materialistic and evolutionary explination of "freedom". He points out that all that is needed for "free will" is to ascribe intentionality to our actions, we intentionaly do things for whatever reason. You see he is atempting to avoid a metaphysical explination by simply stating that we intentionaly do things and thus are "free" and that doesn't require any explination to be right. We all "know" and believe that we do things on purpose without knowing why we do what we do. That is to say that it is perfectly reasonable to explain "free will" in this sense without describing how this works. The problem for him is that his strict matarialism has consequences for his theory of mind whether he likes it or not , they are not seperate things like many disciples of the later Wittgenstien would like to suppose (this is called dual explinations, two different language games can describe a thing in two seemingly paradoxical ways and both be meaningful). Because his mataerialism is a metaphysical theory about everything he must describe how in a universe governed by "physical laws" a material person can be free? This is just a modern restatment of Hume's problems. 

Hume simply thought that we couldn't prove that we have a "free will". We would define "free will" differently, from a biblical basis and not a fallen sinful basis. The autonomous man wants to be absolutly free and this is why Hume's criticism apply to autonomous thought so well and not Reformed thinking, we offer a third way.


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