# Molinism - Middle Knowledge and Divine Providence



## Brian Bosse (May 26, 2007)

This thread will be a critique of Thomas Rauchenstein’s article  “A ‘Middle’ Knowledge Perspective on the Doctrine of Divine Providence”. Middle Knowledge (MK) lends itself to be understood within the framework of Possible World Semantics, and as such I will begin with a very brief introduction to the logic of possible world semantics.

*Possible World Semantics*

The idea of a possible world is simply a world made up of a set of possible events. Our actual world is one such world in the set of all possible worlds. The only events that are precluded are events that are logically incoherent – whether this incoherence is relative to the event itself (a square circle), or incoherent relative to the events around it (a possible world with no oxygen cannot have water). Here are some possible worlds:

*Possible World 1 (our actual world):* All events as they have happened up to this point.
*Possible World 2:* All events as they have happened up to this point with the exception of me wearing a red shirt instead of a blue shirt. 
*Possible World 3:* A world where Cesar did not cross the Rubicon. 
*Possible World 4:* A world where Germany won World War II.

A logic was developed in an attempt to capture the ideas of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ within possible world semantics. This logic is called ‘Modal Logic’. In propositional logic, there are functions that assign truth-values to atomic sentences, and functions that assign truth-values to more complex sentences built up from these atomic sentences using the sentential connectives: ¬, →, ↔, Λ, V. In modal semantics, a set W of possible worlds is introduced where these truth-value functions assign a truth-value to each sentence for each of the possible worlds in W. It is possible for particular sentences to be assigned different truth-values in different possible worlds. For instance, in some possible world it is true that Germany won World War II; whereas, in another possible world, it false that Germany won World War II. This makes truth-value relative to a particular possible world. We can now introduce the modal operators of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ that make up modal logic. 

*Modal Operators*

□p = ‘p’ is necessarily true. For ‘p’ to be necessary (□p), then ‘p’ is true in all possible worlds.
◊p = ‘p’ is possibly true. For ‘p’ to possible (◊p), then ‘p’ is true in at least one possible world. 
p = ‘p’ is actually true. For ‘p’ to be actual (p), then ‘p’ is true in the real world. 

It should be noted that we can define both □ and ◊ in terms of each other as follows: 

*Rule N:* □p ↔ ¬◊¬p. That is to say, ‘p’ is necessarily true if and only if it is not the case that ‘p’ is false in at least one possible world. 
*Rule P:* ◊p ↔ ¬□¬p. That is to say, ‘p’ is possibly true if and only if it is not the case that ‘p’ is false in all possible worlds.

Modal logic is essentially propositional logic combined with the modal operators □ and ◊ as defined above. At this point we have laid the foundation necessary to understand Middle Knowledge (MK) within the framework of possible world semantics. My next post will begin my analysis. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## shackleton (May 26, 2007)

This might be a stupid question...but is this similiar to the multiple, now infinite, parallel universes that scientists have come up with under the development of string theory or rather membrane theory? 
As a joke I remember telling some people that now free will is possible, it just happens in an alternate universe. Like you said a world were Hitler won WWII. Imagine the number of infinite universes there would have to be for every persons free decision to play out in its own alternate universe, everyone would have to have their own universe. On the other hand, it would be logically impossible because everyone could not have libertarian free will because it does not take into account everyone elses libertarian free will. My free decision is going to conflict with your free decision. We both can't be free because we most likely want different things. No matter how you frame it, it always seems to come back to some sort of determinism. 

But again this may be completely differetn from what you are talking about.


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## Brian Bosse (May 26, 2007)

Hello Erik,

The multiple universe thingy is different than possible world sematics. This analysis certainly will deal with determinism and free will.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## turmeric (May 27, 2007)

My head hurts!


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## cih1355 (May 27, 2007)

Does the middle knowledge perspective define free will as the power of contrary choice? 

Doesn't God ordain all of the events in every possible world?


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## Cheshire Cat (May 27, 2007)

Looking forward to the critique. 



cih1355 said:


> Does the middle knowledge perspective define free will as the power of contrary choice?


Yes. I have yet to study the topic, but from what little I have read its purpose is to reconcile God's foreknowledge with a libertarian view of free will.


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## shackleton (May 27, 2007)

cih1355 said:


> Doesn't God ordain all of the events in every possible world?




Instead of this doesn't God in His wisdom know the outcome that He desires and works the world according to the way He wants so that it will fall out as He has planned? 

In Reymonds theology I read, that God started out with a plan. The eventual end of time so to speak, the way life will be _after _the Great White Throne judgment and we all have our resurection bodies. Incidentally, this includes _who_ He wants to spend eternity with. (but that is a different thread) He then set out to plan all the events of everyones life and everything that happens in history all the way back to the creation of the universe and Adam and Eve. Everything is falling out according to His plan. 

No matter how much we worry back and forth about a decision, it has alrteady been settled. Because everything falls out according to Gods plan.


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## Brian Bosse (May 27, 2007)

*Critique Part II*

With the preliminaries out of the way, I am going to begin interacting with the article. Someone has already mentioned this, and it is important to keep in mind – the purpose of the article is to explain how someone can affirm God’s omniscience and sovereignty and at the same time affirm libertarian freewill (LFW). ‘Molinism’ is the answer the author gives, and I will argue that Molinism fails. This means this critique is not so much a critique of LFW, a concept that I think is incoherent and unbiblical, but rather is a critique of Molinism failing to provide the answer. The author begins with several definitions:



> That God has foreknowledge of all future contingent events simply means that "there is no event still to occur of which God is ignorant or uncertain. God never has to ‘wait and see’ how things will develop."





> God exercises sovereignty over his world…in the sense that every event, no matter how large or small, is under God’s control and is incorporated into his overall plan for the world.



The author points out that God's knowledge of what will occur (foreknowledge) depends upon God predetermining what future events will come to pass. Divine foreknowledge is therefore a consequence of His sovereignty. 



> That is, His knowing the future is dependent on his sovereign decision to make the world a certain way.



It should be noted that Reformed Baptist James White has made the same point concerning how God knows the future. He says God knows the future because He ordains what the future is. Now, James White’s conception of how this happens and the Molinist’s conception of how this happens are different. But, alas, I get ahead of myself. Suffice it say that the author provides Biblical support for the idea that “foreknowledge and sovereignty describe (in part) God’s relationship to the actual world.” The author desires to be faithful to this Biblical witness. 

At this point, the author raises the issue how the above view seems to militate against the concept of human freedom, i.e., LFW. I will deal with this in detail.

*Libertarian Freewill*



> Consider the fact that a human action is genuinely free only if the entire context of prior and contemporaneous events is not causally sufficient to determine what one will do. In other words, if my actions are entirely the product of internal or external factors that constitute my circumstance, then what I do is causally "fixed," and therefore it is impossible for me to do otherwise. The only way an action can involve genuine alternatives is if it is undetermined. See below,
> 
> Circumstance [C] + Free Will [FW] = Undetermined Action [A]
> 
> According to those libertarians who espouse agent causation (i.e. the view that I actually cause my free actions), it is true that some aspects of C are necessary for my freely doing A, but nothing in C is sufficient to bring it about that A. Only the conjunction of FW and C causally implies that A is an undetermined action.



*Libertarian Freewill:* Human action ‘A’ is free if and only if all internal and external contemporaneous events do not determine human action ‘A’. 

If we let ‘C’ stand for all internal and external contemporaneous events as is in the above quote, then LFW can be expressed this way…

*Libertarian Freewill:* Human action ‘A’ is free if and only if ¬□(C → A). 

In possible world semantics, ¬□(C → A) says that it is not the case that in all worlds if you have C, then the agent will do A. That means there exists at least one possible world where you have C and the agent does ¬A. Today at church we sang “How Great Thou Art.” For this action to be free, then there exists some possible world were everything remained the same, but we sang something else instead. This is what is meant by the above definition. However, we already have a real problem Biblically. Consider the denial of Christ by Peter. If Peter’s action is free, then there must be a possible world where everything was exactly the same up until the time of Peter’s denial of Christ, yet the outcome was that Peter did not deny Christ. The problem with this is that Jesus said that Peter would deny Christ. Did Jesus make a mistake in this possible world? Now, the Libertarian will object by saying that all possible worlds are only those worlds where events logically cohere. Once Jesus prophesied that Peter would deny Him, then future events where Peter does not deny Jesus are not allowed since this would not logically cohere being that Jesus cannot make a mistake. I agree with the Libertarian on this point. However, this means that once Jesus prophesies Peter’s denial, then Peter’s future action no longer is free according to the definition above. In other words, there exists some C such that A is necessarily the case. It is not clear to me how the Libertarian can overcome this objection. It seems that at the very least the libertarian must acknowledge that there are some situations where human freedom is suspended. The open theist Greg Boyd has bitten this bullet in some of his writings. 

The author then takes the last paragraph in section A to argue philosophically for LFW. This is done in two ways: *(1)* Moral responsibility presupposes LFW; and *(2)* Rationality presupposes LFW. I deny both points, but will not argue the point here being that this is not the purpose of the critique. Suffice it to say, we will next turn to Molinism, explain what it is, and how it reconciles God’s foreknowledge and sovereignty with LFW. Actually, the idea is quite ingenious. 

Brian


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## shackleton (May 27, 2007)

I think Open Theism is the logical conclusion to how man could be truly free. This would only be possible if God did not even know the future but even if God only knew the future passively and not actively, the fact that He is perfect and cannot be wrong always takes it back to determination of some sort. The fact that God knows something will happen, necessitates its happening. 

The other thing I find interesting is that even though Jesus predicted Peter's denial only a few minutes or hours prior to its actually happening, Peter I am sure, still mulled over in his brain back and forth what was happening, what he should do and so forth before finally giving into what he was predicted to do. My point is that our "free" choices must be determined. That is a deeper issue, how God can use our "free" choices to fulfill His eternal purpose. This just proves how sovereign He really is. 

Great discussion!


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## tdowns (May 28, 2007)

*Wow!*

This very topic came up today in my Sunday School class, as we work through T.U.L.I.P. A guy who I have discussed this topic with before, was there, and I said that without proper understanding of these principles, we find ourselves, with Middle Knowledge, and possibly, Open theism....we had a good discussion, and will continue later, so I came on the internet to do a search, and of course, stopped by the Board for a quick read, and I see this High on the Today's Posts!!!!!....Awesome...I will read, copy and send via email when done...thanks.


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## cih1355 (May 28, 2007)

According to LFW, a person can act contrary to his desires. The cause of a person's actions is the person himself. Our desires are the final cause, not the efficient cause. LFW teaches that people are self-caused or self-determined. People are not determined by anything, except for themselves.


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## shackleton (May 28, 2007)

This is like saying that man is in a perpetual state of being a "tabula rasa." He makes a decision and it dissapears into a vacuum so that it will not effect our future decisions. Every decision we make effects events that effect every other decision we make and so on ad infinitum. 

In reality, everything from our genetics to our upbringing to everything that has happened to us throughout our entire lives effects every decision we make. What is amazing is how all this works right into the plan of what God wants for us. God does not make the best of what we have done with our lives. He has ordered our lives exactly the way he wanted them to be. This includes our "free" decisions which lead to our "free" actions. Don't get me wrong this does not make us robots or puppets. God designed us in such a way that we would be free to make decisions and perform free actions. Being in God's image we are free like He is free. (Not as free as He is, just free to make choices and decisions like He is) He is however so completely sovereign that our free decisions and actions work to accomplish what He wants from us and ultimately the world. 

To me this is very comforting because I can rest in the fact that whatever I do even though it seems like I made the wrong choice, it is what God wanted and is a part of His plan. The "All things work together for good" does not mean that God takes our mistakes and turns them unto something good like some Chtistians try to say. It means that everything that happens to us works together for good, God is in control, it is what He wanted to happen so it will not lead to your demise. Even if God only knew things passively, He still choose not to intervene which makes it what He wanted to happen. 

I don't know if I hi-jacked this thread, if I did it was not my intention.


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## Brian Bosse (May 28, 2007)

*Critique Part III*

In our last post I brought up an objection against the definition of LFW. I stated that I did not see how this objection could be overcome. In the next section titled “Theological Fatalism,” the author introduces certain concepts in an attempt to overcome this objection. These concepts will lead us directly into a “full-blown Molinist account.” 

The objection I raised in the earlier post concerned Jesus’ prediction of Peter denying Christ. In section B, the author deals with the issue regarding God foreknowing Peter denying Christ. There is a difference here between the two situations that has significant ramifications, but these ramifications will only be made specific latter on. Here is the situation…

If God believed at time t1 that Peter would deny Christ at time t2, then if Peter really could have not denied Christ, then at least one of three consequences results:

*(1)* It was within Peter’s power at time t2 to do something that would bring about God having a false belief. 
*(2)* It was within Peter’s power at time t2 to change God’s belief at t1. 
*(3)* It was within Peter’s power at time t2 to make it such that any person who believed that Peter would deny Christ at time t1 held a false belief.

All three of these possible consequences are very problematic, and as such libertarian freedom is a farce – at least as far as this argument goes. In response to this argument, the author appeals to arguments given by Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. 



> In response to…(this) argument for theological fatalism, Alvin Plantinga has argued quite persuasively that we possess a type of "power over the past" that does not entail the ability to change past events by retro-causation. That is, we have counterfactual power over the past.



Consider the proposition: “God believes at time t1 that Peter will deny Christ at time t2.” If LFW is true, then at time t2 Peter must be able to not deny Christ. According to Plantinga, Peter can refrain from denying Christ, and if he were to do so, then God would have always foreknown that Peter would not deny Christ. It is _de facto_ true that Peter will deny Christ, but had he done otherwise, God’s past knowledge would always have been different. 


> Thus, even if God’s foreknowledge is a function of the past, it does not follow that one is not free with regard to any action. On the contrary, Plantinga would assert that that I have the power to act such that, were I to do so, God would have always known differently. It is this notion of counterfactual power over God’s knowledge that proves fatal to …fatalism. Hence, at least one aspect of God’s providence – i.e. divine foreknowledge – is not incompatible with human free will.


Essentially, what is being stated is the following: 

*P1:* If Peter does A at t2, then God’s knowledge at t1 is K.

_and_

*P2:* If Peter does ¬A at t2, then God’s knowledge at t1 is ¬K. 

As a fatalistic determinist, I can affirm P1 and P2. It is like saying whatever happens God knew it would happen. However, asserting both of these propositions does not assert that Peter can do either A or ¬A. Clearly, he must be able to do one or the other. The libertarian wants to assert that he can do both, but this does not follow. So, in what sense is this fatal to my fatalism? What is the argument really being put forward by Plantinga and others? The key has to do with little phrase “counterfactual power over God’s knowledge.” This is Plantiga’s “power over the past” that does not entail retro-causation. The author tells us…



> …there are counterfactual truths governing the relationship between foreknowledge and one’s free actions. The affirmation of counterfactual truths, as we shall see, is crucial to the reconciliation of God’s sovereign will with human freedom. It is within this context that a full-blown Molinist account of providence can be elucidated.



In the next post we will make clear how this “counterfactual power over God’s knowledge” works. This answer is what is called Molinism. I would like to point out one thing here, though. The author, Plantinga, Craig and others feel the pressure that God’s foreknowledge places on the concept of LFW. The reason they are going through such machinations is because they realize that God’s foreknowledge seems to militate against LFW. They say in the end it does not. Can they really pull this off? We will find that in spite of their heroic and ingenious efforts, the answer is a resounding ‘No’!


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## tdowns (May 28, 2007)

*Brian.....*

When you are finished, will you link it as a complete document?


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## Brian Bosse (May 28, 2007)

Hello Trevor,

I will do better than this. When this is done, I will turn it into a single paper that I will make available as a PDF document.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## tdowns (May 29, 2007)

*Awesome....*

Thanks, I'm going to send him the link to the thread, so he can view this way as well....if you made it this far Tony, Welcome! and Hi!


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## Brian Bosse (May 31, 2007)

*Part IV*

Hello Everyone,

I am going to take a short excursion that I hope will lay a foundation. It is a little abstract, but is important. So, please ask questions. If someone is unsure about a concept here, then there are probably others who are unsure as well, and will benefit from the questions. Even though I will try to be clear, I am not always successful. Questions will help clarify points.

We are going to create our own system of possible worlds. This system will be very simple and hopefully will allow us to grasp the much more complicated system making up real possible world semantics. In fact, the construction of our system will parallel the system of real possible world semantics. 

Our system begins with only two possible initial stages, which we will call IS(1) and ¬IS(1). What is interesting, this is a logically necessary situation. Think of it as: you either start with IS(1) or you don’t. It is just an application of the law of non-contradiction. So, what is ¬IS(1)? Well, for our purposes, we will say that there is only one other possible initial state, which we will call IS(2). (Note: there is a reason as to why I started with IS(1) and ¬IS(1) rather than starting with IS(1) and IS(2). This reason will be made clear in the next post.) 

IS(1) and IS(2) each make up a complete set of events that we are calling the initial stage of a possible world. In real possible world semantics we have the same situation with one major exception. We have IS(1) and ¬IS(1), but ¬IS(1) is made up of a _huge_ number of possible worlds, rather than just one. Think of all the possible starting points there could have been for creation. This would be our initial set. Of course, this is much too large for us to work with, and as such we just pretend that there are only two initial states: IS(1) and IS(2). 

Now, there are a number of possible consequences to these initial stages. Think of them as the next stage as time moves forward. In other words, they are what happens next. For IS(1) the possible consequences are MS(1) and ¬MS(1). IS(2) has the possible consequences of MS(2) and ¬MS(2). (‘MS’ stands for middle stage, which is not to be confused with Middle Knowledge. They have nothing to do with each other.) In real possible world semantics the parallel is exact with the exception that there is a huge number of initial stages for which there are two possible consequences, namely MS(n) and ¬MS(n). In our system, we will define ¬MS(1) to be MS(2) and ¬MS(2) to be MS(1) for the sake of simplicity. Of course, this is not the same for real possible world semantics. ¬MS(n) stands for an even larger set of possible consequences than the huge set of possible initial stages. Two stages into real possible world semantics leaves us with a mind boggling number of possibilities. 

We will end our possible world system with the final stage FS(1) and FS(2) with all of the corresponding possibilities. In the real possible world semantics, we would not stop here. In fact, there would be numerous stopping points, some right after the initial stage, some after the second stage, and some after the billionth stage. The number of possible combinations is truly staggering. However, it is not too staggering for God to comprehend. In our possible world system, the number of possible worlds is only eight. In real possible world semantics, then number of possible worlds is gargantuan. Here are our eight possible worlds in our little bitty system:

*P(1)* IS(1) → MS(1) → FS(1)
*P(2)* IS(1) → MS(1) → FS(2)
*P(3)* IS(1) → MS(2) → FS(2)
*P(4)* IS(1) → MS(2) → FS(1)
*P(5)* IS(2) → MS(2) → FS(2)
*P(6)* IS(2) → MS(2) → FS(1)
*P(7)* IS(2) → MS(1) → FS(1)
*P(8)* IS(2) → MS(1) → FS(2)

Here is the math behind this: 2 (initial stage possibilities) x 2 (middle stage possibilities) x 2 (final stage possibilities) = 8 possible worlds. For illustration purposes, if you want to think for a minute what the math would look like to calculate the number of possible worlds in real possible world semantics you might start this way:

Number of Possible Initial Stages: 3.98x10^245
Number of Possible Second Stages: 9.78x10^245
.
.
.
Number of Possible Twelve Millionth Stages: 5.57x10^459

Total Possible Worlds = (3.98x10^245)x(9.78x10^245)x…x(5.57x10^459). Like I said, this number is gargantuan. 

Back to our much simpler system of only eight possible worlds. Each of these possible worlds has an event path that is unique. For instance our P(6) is made up of the following path: <2,2,1>. There is no other possible world that has this path. <1,2,1> is P(4), <2,2,2> is P(5), and <1,1,1> is P(1), etc…The parallel in possible world theory is exactly the same. Each possible world has its own unique event path. Different possible worlds may share many events in common, but each event path will all be unique - just like P(1) and P(2) share the first two stages the same, but end differently. In Molinism, God considers the humongous set of event paths that make up the humongous set of possible worlds in possible world semantics, and He chooses to actuate one of these possible worlds. It is in this sense that God ordains everything that comes to pass. He actuates one possible world and this in turn actuates the event path of this possible world. All events can then be spoken of as being ordained by God on the basis of Him choosing this particular possible world. So, if God were to actuate P(4), then it would be said that God ordained all events that make up the event path <1,2,1>.

Ok, as mentioned earlier, the above discussion was rather abstract. Please ask questions. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## shackleton (Jun 1, 2007)

Brian, are you implying that you believe this stuff? or are you just giving a critique of what someone else believes?


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## tdowns (Jun 1, 2007)

*Intro to thread....*

"This thread will be a critique of Thomas Rauchenstein’s article “A ‘Middle’ Knowledge Perspective on the Doctrine of Divine Providence”. Middle Knowledge (MK) lends itself to be understood within the framework of Possible World Semantics, and as such I will begin with a very brief introduction to the logic of possible world semantics."

He's arguing against it.....

I've been reading through William Lane Craig's site, and listening to his lectures. His lecture on the Doctrine of God, part 1, is spot on...he's a very good teacher, I just think he's so hung up on wanting libertarian free will, that he's using his great intellect to find a way to make it work.....it is interesting though, and so I'm enjoying Brian's work on it. Still seems it's simple in that it's simply wrong, because Craig puts man's decision, as the basis for salvation. Very complicated, as far as what Brian's dealing with though......


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## shackleton (Jun 1, 2007)

Sorry for the interlude.

So are you saying that God thinks out many possible world paths along with their consequences and then picks the best one based on His wisdom? Then proceeds to do what it takes to make that world a reality.


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## Brian Bosse (Jun 1, 2007)

Hello Gentlemen,

I do not accept Molinism, and Trevor is right to point out that the Molinst's commitment is to LFW, and as such they are attempting to come up with an account that brings together God's sovereignty in creation while maintaining LFW. Their solution is quite ingeneous as we will see. After we present the solution, then we will consider several objections to the proposed solution. However, there still is a little more ground work.



> So are you saying that God thinks out many possible world paths along with their consequences and then picks the best one based on His wisdom? Then proceeds to do what it takes to make that world a reality.



In essence, this is how the Molinist sees it, but I do want to clarify something. The set of possible worlds from which God chooses is not something that God creates by His will. Rather, this set is logically necessary, and as such can be spoken of as independent of God's will. So, God's "thinking out many possible world paths" is more like God knowing all the logical possibilities, and not Him determining these logical possibilities by His will. As we move forward, we will see that according to Molinism, God is limited in the number of possible worlds He can actuate. That is to say, there are some possible worlds that God cannot actuate. So, the set of possible worlds God can actuate is smaller than the set of possible worlds. This means that in my model it really is not the case that God can actuate any of the eight possible worlds. He may only be able to choose from six "feasable" worlds. This will all be explained. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## shackleton (Jun 1, 2007)

If I understand this correctly, you seem to be saying that something else is governing God's choice of how He is going to rule His universe. 
God is not ultimately sovereign in this universe because God is not directing the universe according to His will, but according to some standard that even_ He_ is subject to, which I guess is logic. 

Or, if God chooses the best possible world then implements it, it still leads to determinism because it cannot be changed, it is the best plan chosen by a perfect beings wisdom. If this is the case we still do not have true LFW only apparent free will in that we are still making choices and decisions but the outcome is the one God has chosen. 

Unless you are saying that we can pop in and out of worlds as we make choices. But then you would have to have more than 8 worlds, because you have to take into account _everyones_ LFW and the necessary consequences. No man is an island my LFW is no doubt going to affect someone elses LFW.


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## Brian Bosse (Jun 1, 2007)

Hello Erick,

I think there may be some confusion here.



> Unless you are saying that we can pop in and out of worlds as we make choices. But then you would have to have more than 8 worlds, because you have to take into account everyones LFW and the necessary consequences.



My little system with only eight possible worlds is for illustrative purposes only. It is not meant to capture "everyone's LFW and the necessary consequences." That system is what I called the "real possible world system," and as I mentioned the number of possible worlds in humonguous.



> If I understand this correctly, you seem to be saying that something else is governing God's choice of how He is going to rule His universe.
> God is not ultimately sovereign in this universe because God is not directing the universe according to His will, but according to some standard that even He is subject to, which I guess is logic.



That is not how the Molinist would put it. They would not say God is governed by logic in the sense that logic is over God. Rather, the Molinist would say that logic is part of God's nature and God cannot act contrary to His nature. 



> Or, if God chooses the best possible world then implements it, it still leads to determinism because it cannot be changed, it is the best plan chosen by a perfect beings wisdom. If this is the case we still do not have true LFW only apparent free will in that we are still making choices and decisions but the outcome is the one God has chosen.



We have not yet arrived at the Molinist solution. We have only laid a neccessary foundation. The Molinist will explain how God can actuate a possible world and yet maintain LFW. It is interesting at the very least.

Brian


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## Davidius (Jun 1, 2007)

Hey Brian,

As soon as you get part 2 on logic up I'll let ya know what I think!


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## Brian Bosse (Jun 1, 2007)




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## cih1355 (Jun 1, 2007)

According to Molinism, does God ordain everything that happens including all sinful actions? According to Molinism, why does God ordain what He ordains?


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## shackleton (Jun 1, 2007)

Brian Bosse said:


> That is not how the Molinist would put it. They would not say God is governed by logic in the sense that logic is over God. Rather, the Molinist would say that logic is part of God's nature and God cannot act contrary to His nature.


Do you know if this is similiar to Gordon Clark's view on logic and his book "The Johannine Logos?"

I am going to read the article you attached so that I can understand this better.


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## shackleton (Jun 1, 2007)

I read your link and found some other info pertaining to Molinism. I think I agree with it in the sense that God knows how we will act when put into certain circumstances. But I think rather that choosing the best of infinite worlds I think He decided want He wanted to do then arainged this world according to how He wanted it, including everyones free choices. This would include their parents, (genetics) where they are born, everything that happens to them throughout there lives making them the people they are and in that way causing them to decide based on how God has ordered their lives.


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## tdowns (Jun 1, 2007)

*Sin....*



cih1355 said:


> According to Molinism, does God ordain everything that happens including all sinful actions? According to Molinism, why does God ordain what He ordains?



1 Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 123. The doctrine of divine middle knowledge (media scientia), first articulated by the Counter–Reformation theologian Luis de Molina in 1588, holds that God's decree concerning which world to create is based upon and, hence, explanatorily posterior to His knowledge of what every free creature He could possibly create would do in any appropriately specified set of circumstances in which God might place him. Thus logically prior to His creative decree, God knows the truth of propositions describing how some creature would freely act in a specific set of circumstances, e.g., If Goldwater were to win the U.S. presidential election in 1964, he would order the invasion of North Viet Nam. The doctrine presupposes that there are such true counterfactuals and that their truth is logically independent of the divine decree. For an outstanding introduction to and translation of a crucial portion of Molina's Concordia, see Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. with an Introduction and Notes by Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

This is a summary from William Craig's site...I'm learning as I go, and don't want to get in Brian's way, but I thought it would help...Middle Knowledge is another term for Molinism.

I think, according to Middle Knowledge, that God ordains, what he ordains, because it is the best possible world he could ordain, like Brian says, God is limited, to the options of worlds He creates, by the Free Will of His creatures, so, He creates the BEST POSSIBLE world, given, all the possible worlds He could create given Libertarian Free Will....which is of course, I believe, the problem. 

It assumes, that, humans, with LFW, can and will choose God in some situations. It is my understanding, that Adam had the best chance, and he didn't choose God, in fact, he chose to make himself like God, and so would and do every other human created.......so the only POSSIBLE WORLD, was one where every human denies Christ....but...God creates that world, then changes the nature of some, who then, by nature, will Choose Christ......so even if we assume the Molinist assumptions of the mind of God, and his assumptions of LFW, we still end up with God needing to usurp that FREE WILL THAT FREELY CHOOSES TO BE LIKE GOD, change it's nature, so that it FREELY CHOOSES TO SERVE GOD.....I think....

This is from Theopedia:
The following is a synopsis of the logical order of decrees present in Molinism.

1. God's view of all possible worlds.
2. God's view of all feasible worlds.
3. Divine creation decree.
4. Foreknowledge set through His one world decree. 

These decrees correspond to the three forms of knowledge in Molinism: (1) His natural knowledge, (2) His middle knowledge, and (3) His free knowledge.
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## shackleton (Jun 2, 2007)

It seems like in this system God is first and foremost onmiscient. He views history like a chess came, copntemplateing all the best possilbe moves then picks one. It still kind of puts God in the back seat because He is only choosing from what man does. The universe does not have as its end what _God_ wants, only the best of all possible worlds. In this model it would mean that the eventual end of time and the life in heaven was chosen according to what God _saw_, not according to what He planned. Under this system God is not sovereign, LFW is still the controling factor, it is greater than God.

How does this system glorify God? One would have to suspend most of the teachings about God as taught in the scriptures to allow for this model. I think if you take out the part where God picks from the best posssible worlds according to man's LFW and leave in the part where God controls situations according to what He is wanting to accomoplish, then it is a good system. Turretin teaches something similiar to this in his Institutes, (Book 1, Topic 6, question 6) saying that God uses our free choices and decisions to accomoplish His purpose and He uses this as a secondary cause.


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## Brian Bosse (Jun 2, 2007)

*Molinism Part V*

Hello Everyone,

We continue…



> Molinists claim that God possesses "middle knowledge"…of all counterfactual truths, including those truths about creaturely freedom, logically prior to His creative decree to make a world. They also claim that there is a certain order of logical moments in God's Omniscience that corresponds to, or is symmetric with, the logical order according to which the actual world is instantiated.



What exactly is MK? Thomas Aquinas presented two categories of knowledge that God was said to have. One was “natural knowledge” (NK) and the other “free knowledge” (FK). MK is a third type of knowledge that God is said to have that fits in-between God’s NK and His FK. 

*Natural Knowledge*



> …God has natural knowledge of all propositions that correspond to logically necessary states of affairs…Broadly speaking, God's natural knowledge allows Him an intuitive grasp of what every logically possible world would be like, including what every free essence could do in any circumstances. Since these propositions are logically necessary, they are neither under God's control nor dependent on God's will for their truth.



Natural knowledge is that knowledge God has based on His very nature. It includes all necessary truths. For instance, the laws of logic would be part of God’s NK. The set of all possible worlds would be included in this, and along with this all of the possible events that make up these possible worlds. All mathematical truths would be part of this. Here are some examples of this…

God knows that “If P, then Q” is the case, then “If ~Q, then ~P” is the case. 
God knows that our actual world is possible.
God know that Germany winning WWII is true in some possible world. 
God knows that 2+2=4. 
God knows that He is love.

Any propositions like this are considered natural knowledge. What is interesting about this knowledge is that it is knowledge independent of God’s will – that is to say, it is pre-volitional. God did not will the law of non-contradiction. Rather, the law of non-contradiction is part of God’s essence. NK is grounded in the very nature of God.

*Free Knowledge*

Free knowledge is that knowledge that God has concerning what He wills - desires. For instance, "It is possible that I exist" is true whether or not God creates me. That is to say, I do exist in some possible world even if God does not choose to actuate that world. However, the actuallity that I exist depends upon God creating me, or more properly in God actualizing the possible worlds where I exist. All knowledge that is a result of God’s will is FK. Here are several examples of FK…

God knows who will be saved.
God knows that Christ died.
God knows that Germany lost WWII.
God knows that the president of the United States is George Bush.

All propositions of the actual world are part of God’s FK. This knowledge depends upon God’s will. It requires God doing something – actuating a particular possible world. It is "post-volitional" in nature. 

*Middle Knowledge*

In our next post we will explain this. Suffice it to say it comes between FK and NK. One can see that NK is logically prior to FK. NK is not dependent upon God’s will. NK is necessary. FK is contingent. MK is said to come between God’s NK and His FK. The characteristic of MK is that it is not dependent upon God’s will (it is pre-volitional like NK) _yet_, it is contingent like FN. We will explain the type of knowledge that makes up this category, and this will explain how the Molinist brings God’s sovereignty and man’s LFW together.

I mentioned briefly in one of my responses above that God, according to Molinism, is not able to actuate just any possible world. God’s NK allows Him to know what all possible worlds are. In my little system this is the same as saying God knows all eight possible worlds by His NK. However, it is God’s MK that lets Him know what worlds He can and cannot actuate. In my little system this is the same as saying the God’s MK informs Him that He cannot actuate either P(4) or P(6). Again, this knowledge is prevolitional. It is independent of God’s will. In my next post we will explain how this is so. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## tdowns (Jun 4, 2007)

*Nice!*

Cool. It's def. helping me to get a handle on it.


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## cih1355 (Jun 5, 2007)

Does Molinism teach that there is a best possible world or that all possible worlds are equally good?


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