# Can anyone solve Euphyro's dilemma?



## RamistThomist

*Can anyone solve Euphyro\'s dilemma?*



> Euthyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” In monotheistic terms, this is usually transformed into: “Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?”.



1. The first horn of the dilemma implies that morality is independent of God and, indeed, that God is bound by morality just as his creatures are. God then becomes little more than a passer-on of moral knowledge.

2. The second horn of the dilemma (known as divine command theory) runs into three main problems. First, it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon God's whim; if God had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been. Secondly, it implies that calling God good makes no sense (or, at best, that one is simply saying that God is consistent). Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what God has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’; see is-ought problem).


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## turmeric

Euphyro wouldn't know this but God is thrice holy, He is holiness itself; so what He decrees as good is good, but not on a whim, because His objective character is holy. Just taking a stab; not a philosopher by profession.


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by turmeric_
> Euphyro wouldn't know this but God is thrice holy, He is holiness itself; so what He decrees as good is good, but not on a whim, because His objective character is holy. Just taking a stab; not a philosopher by profession.



That's pretty good. That's what many Christian philosphers (Koukle, Frame, Bahnsen) say. There is more to it but if you are on the streets doing apologetics that would probably suffice.


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## Contra_Mundum

Doesn't the whole "dilemma" assume certain things as "given" that are challengable? What is descriptively moral/pious? And is the universe ultimately personal or impersonal?

My first response to the either/or question is to say "yes". I think the dilemma is false to begin with. Ultimate morality is definable as God's character, as an attribute of his, which (as with all his attributes) in ultimate form is co-extensive with his person. In addition, there are categories of "moral" behavior that apply to creatures alone, and are in fact "because I said so" and "this is what I want right now, maybe not later" kinds of moral dictates.

From the separate-and-ultimate standpoint, the first would be false because if God is under anything, then he isn't ultimate, hence he isn't God as the Bible defines him. But argued from God's character, the statement is perfectly true, if the moral virtue is a reflection of what God is, and we are obliged to bear his image. "Be holy, because I am holy."

Handling the "problems" of the second horn:
1) If "God cannot deny himself" then his commands aren't arbitrary; they reflect his will, which is perfect, good, and moral by definition. If God forbids human sacrifice, and yet commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, Abraham is no less obligated to obey the second command as a moral dictate, despite its apparent conflict with the first. God must have a morally sufficient reason (determined by himself, and consistent with his character) for ordering this action, as well as still being true to his promises. Abraham, Hebrews (and Genesis) tells us, believed in the resurrection on this basis.

The guesses about a hypothetical world where contrary vices are owned as virtues, are so much speculation. They assume that they are _possible_ worlds in the fullest sense. Which, given what we actually do know (being told) about God's nature, are actually impossible worlds on Christian presuppositions.

2) If God is self-consistent, how is that a problem? It certainly isn't *nonsense* to say "God is good," although one could argue that it is tautological. But it is still a *useful* statement, when we are a) distinguishing attributes and describing God, or b) saying that God is absolutely preferable.

If God isn't self-consistent, then humans need not be consistent. If there is no God (or standard of justice) then all judgment in human affairs is arbitrary. If God exists, but he isn't self-consistent, then there is no reason to think the future will be like the past, that morality isn't changeable. Logic is nothing more than a habit. Its been useful (we think) since it was proposed, but maybe not before, and maybe not tomorrow (since we don't have any certainty that the future will be like the past).

Bottom line: if you get rid of the God of Scripture, and you are headed to either skeptical athesism or terrified appeasement of the whimsical gods.

3) Yes, it IS the case that God commanded it, and therefore one OUGHT to do it. But we don't argue that the IS precedes the OUGHT. Because a) the creature OUGHT to do anything his Creator God tells him to do (based on the relationship; if he disobeys he dies, and God starts over--or institutes redemption); b) it IS the case that his Creator God did command the creature; therefore the creature OUGHT to do what he was told. In the Christian worldview, Creative Ethics precedes creaturely Metaphysics.


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## MW

What do we then do with the fact that reformed theology sees God's attributes as what He wills Himself to be? That seems to me to necessitate divine command theory, although we would also want to state that God wills Himself to be consistent (faithful, true) to His creatures.


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## Contra_Mundum

God's will and his nature, both being eternal and immutable, aren't we speaking about the same thing essentially?


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## Peter

Is this the same question as the argument over the primacy of God's will or his intellect?


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## MW

Yes, that is what I am getting at. God doesn't possess a nature apart from His will. He is what He wills Himself to be. So how can we speak about God willing something because He is something?


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## Contra_Mundum

I certainly think Euthypro's "dilemma" is bogus.

As I indicated, there are undeniable aspects of morality that can be interpreted as nothing less than divine command ("Because I said so, that's why"). I can live with a "divine command theory" that incorporates exactly that "willed consistency" to which you referred. I prefer to state the response in terms of God's existence because I think that obviates the question of other possibilities. Things are as they are because God "wouldn't have them any other way."

I believe that God's Noetics, Metaphysics, and Ethics are all equally ultimate.


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## MW

> _Originally posted by Contra_Mundum_
> I believe that God's Noetics, Metaphysics, and Ethics are all equally ultimate.



 That is worshipping God in spirit and truth. It is always profitable to rub minds with you, Bruce.


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## RamistThomist

> _Originally posted by Contra_Mundum_
> I certainly think Euthypro's "dilemma" is bogus.


Plato started it. Not me! (Ducking tomatoes). I like everyone's answers, though.


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## WrittenFromUtopia

Euthypro is taking for granted that God is temporal or successive in His Work, so the question is irrelevant. God is immediacy and eternal, making this question pretty much impossible.


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## Cheshire Cat

haha, I just got asked this question the other day. I didn't know it had a name. I pretty much answered the same as everybody is doing here. Its his character, nature, etc.


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## RamistThomist

When I was first confronted with this issue a while back, I was tempted to say "divine command theory" and h3!! with the consequences! I later learned that was fraught with difficulty, although I still like the divine command theory.


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## Me Died Blue

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> 
> 
> 
> Euthyphro: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” In monotheistic terms, this is usually transformed into: “Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?”.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1. The first horn of the dilemma implies that morality is independent of God and, indeed, that God is bound by morality just as his creatures are. God then becomes little more than a passer-on of moral knowledge.
> 
> 2. The second horn of the dilemma (known as divine command theory) runs into three main problems. First, it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon God's whim; if God had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been. Secondly, it implies that calling God good makes no sense (or, at best, that one is simply saying that God is consistent). Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what God has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’; see is-ought problem).
Click to expand...


We just read and discussed this dialogue in my Ancient Philosophy class a couple weeks ago, and this question was raised. Long answer short, the latter option is really the only "option" at all in the coherent, Christian worldview.

With respect to the first option, as you stated, it would mean that God is not the ultimate standard of the good, and that He is dependent upon a higher standard in that regard.

With respect to the second option, people always object that it makes morality arbitrary and that God could have just as easily made rape or murder pious. Well, we're not concerned with defending hypothetical "god-esque" would-have-been possibilities, but rather with defending the one Yahweh as He is and has revealed Himself. Furthermore, it being a part of His nature and within His good pleasure, but past our understanding beyond that does not make it "arbitrary" any more than sovereign election is arbitrary or meaningless in the charges of Arminians.

With respect to us calling God "good," that is indeed only meaningful insofar as we understand what "goodness" is, our _initial_ (chronologically speaking) understanding of which is essentially always first attainted by common grace and general revelation, and then once we are explicitly aware of God through regeneration and special revelation, that vague concept ("good") we had a notion of before is then given true meaning.

With respect to the naturalistic fallacy, the is-ought jump would indeed make no sense and have no ground if one only considers the present ethical dilemma alone; rather, one must consider the whole Christian worldview as a unit. And in doing that, the necessity of the "ought" from the truth of the "is" becomes clear in light of the Creator-creature distinction, God's supremacy over all realms, our being made in God's image, and the chief end of man. Even so, one still might ask the question of why our being made in God's image necessarily implies our chief end. That is brought to light by the observation that the is-ought connection is also explained in light of the fact that we were created as _inherently covenantal_ beings by nature (specifically with regard to the Covenant of Works), and as such, our very _existence_ has an inseparable connection with the presence of _obligation_ in our lives.


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## RamistThomist

Well said, Chris.
:thumbup:


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## MW

Chris, you have certainly covered all bases there. Only I would suggest that man is not an inherently covenantal being. He is inherently under obligation, but covenant is what provides eschatological orientation as a super-added element to human existence.


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## tewilder

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> 
> 2. The second horn of the dilemma (known as divine command theory) runs into three main problems. First, it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon God's whim; if God had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been. Secondly, it implies that calling God good makes no sense (or, at best, that one is simply saying that God is consistent). Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what God has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’; see is-ought problem).



*First*
"First, it implies that what is good is arbitrary, based merely upon God's whim; if God had created the world to include the values that rape, murder, and torture were virtues, while mercy and charity were vices, then they would have been."

"Arbitrary" means of or characterized by the will. In other words, what is good is based on the will of God. Is this "merely based upon God's whim"? "Whim" means more than will, it means the will of a capricious, changing nature. Does God have a capricious, changing nature? No. So, does "arbitrary" imply "based on whim"? No.

However, there is a long standing (centuries and centuries) theological problem of whether God's will is utterly free, and hence 1) God could have determed anything to be either good or evil in the original creation, and 2) whether God can change commands about good and evil subsequently. To deal with this problem medieval theology developed the idea of a covenant as an accomodation by God to man. For a discussion see:

Omnipotence and Promise: The Legacy of the Scholastic Distinction of Powers, Francis Oakley
http://www.contra-mundum.org/books/oakley.pdf

or read one of Oakley several books on this.

*Second*
"Secondly, it implies that calling God good makes no sense (or, at best, that one is simply saying that God is consistent)."

You will notice that there is much language in the Bible calling calling God "steadfast", "faithful", "ever abiding" etc. Does this language "make no sense" or "simply say God is consistent"? It is a particular sort of consistency, a consitency of character and covenant keeping. To say this is a substantial statement, certainly one with sense.

*Third*
"Thirdly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy; to explain the evaluative claim that murder is wrong (or the prescription that one should not commit murder) in terms of what God has or hasn't said is to argue from a putative fact about the world to a value (to argue to an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’; see is-ought problem)."

It derives an evaluative term "wrong" from an imperative, "forbidden", not a mere discription (e.g. "the grass is green"). So it is not naturalistic, but personalistic. So the next question is, who is the person who commanded, and am I responsible to that person? "Responsible" means, made to respond, called to account. Everyone is, like it or not. 

But people feel that this explanation is inadequate because it does not account for the feelings people have toward the specific acts that are judged good or bad, or the sense that they have or have not been delt with fairly. In other works, it does not address the particulars of man's moral nature. At this point, I would say that people are confusing explanations. There is still a role for an explanation of the creation order and for anthropology, but that it is another sort of explanation.


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## Vytautas

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> *Can Anyone Solve God's trilemma:*
> 
> either-
> 
> 1. Morality is independant of man, in which case man is obligated to a higher standard. Only persons can obliagte. Therefore man is obliagted to a higher person that is not man.
> 
> or
> 
> 2. Morality is based upon man's whims, desires, and guesses, in which case things like "rape is wrong" amount to subjective opinion.
> 
> Accepting either (1) or (2) result in an absurdity for secular humanism.
> 
> 3. If the humanist wants to claim that this is a false dilemma, so much the worse for his Euthyphro dilemma! Either way, we win.
> 
> [Edited on 10-11-2006 by Paul manata]



Would the Objectivist fall under category 2 even though they would claim that morality is objective such that there is no God, and ethics is not based on man’s whims, desires etc., but it is based on reality and reason?


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## Vytautas

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Vytautas_
> 
> 
> 
> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> *Can Anyone Solve God's trilemma:*
> 
> either-
> 
> 1. Morality is independant of man, in which case man is obligated to a higher standard. Only persons can obliagte. Therefore man is obliagted to a higher person that is not man.
> 
> or
> 
> 2. Morality is based upon man's whims, desires, and guesses, in which case things like "rape is wrong" amount to subjective opinion.
> 
> Accepting either (1) or (2) result in an absurdity for secular humanism.
> 
> 3. If the humanist wants to claim that this is a false dilemma, so much the worse for his Euthyphro dilemma! Either way, we win.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Would the Objectivist fall under category 2 even though they would claim that morality is objective such that there is no God, and ethics is not based on man’s whims, desires etc., but it is based on reality and reason?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> If it's not based on man, yet exists, then it falls under 1.
Click to expand...


Let morality, which is the knowledge of what is correct behavior, be independent of man, who is the highest and most supreme being. So there cannot be a higher standard than man because man is the highest. So there is a lower standard which is called reality that obligates man to act according to his reason. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> I don't know what sense it says for someone to say that it's not based on man, yet based on reason. Whose? God's? The aliens?



Man’s reason is knowledge of reality.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Furthermore, I don't know what it means to say it's based on "reality." When I look at "reality" I see all sorts of "immoral" things. And, how would this not be a classic example of is/ought.



The reality, which the knowledge of morality is taken, is that which shows what actions cause man to flourish under certain conditions. Immorality is that which causes man to deteriorate. 


> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> I'd also say this is subject to a dilemma. Is "reality" good because it conforms to some standard, or is it "good" based on something arbitrary. Reality could have been different, so could ethical norms have been different?
> 
> At any rate, the Objectivists claim, so far as you're representing it correctly, has more holes than Swiss Cheese.



The idea of flourishing and diminishing is important for the concept of ethics. When we see people being successful and gaining wealth, then that is an example of what is moral. When we see people starving and not having much money, then that is an example of what is immoral. If we find the causes of good behavior and bad behavior, then we should follow the good and neglect the bad.


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## Cheshire Cat

A normative claim is not merely a descriptive claim Vytautas. I am not even familiar with the is/ought fallacy but I have a strong inkling that you just violated it. I could respond to the other "points" but Paul can respond fine enough. 

[Edited on 10-12-2006 by caleb_woodrow]


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## DaveJes1979

http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1993Euthyphro.htm

Nuff said.


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## Vytautas

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Richard,
> 
> it was hard to descern your points. Anyway, I'll give it a go:



Wait. For the first two points I gave a general overview, so now I will try to specify. Ok, continue.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> 
> Let morality, which is the knowledge of what is correct behavior, be independent of man, who is the highest and most supreme being. So there cannot be a higher standard than man because man is the highest. So there is a lower standard which is called reality that obligates man to act according to his reason.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I wouldn't say that "morality" is the "knowledge of correct behavior." That's also very vague.
Click to expand...


Morality is a theoretical science which gathers data on ethical behavior and issues and interprets it. Ethics takes the data summarized by morality and produces certain ethical standards for which men are to follow. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> How should I "behave" when being attacked by an animal? Say that "playing dead" is the "correct behavior" for when a bear attacks. When I do that, am I being "moral?"



In this situation you are following a certain ethical program of which you subscribe to. Playing dead is the action you take which is informed by the intellect. If you have ethical knowledge informed by moral knowledge of playing dead when a bear attacks, then you will execute the action by falling to the ground and fulfill your duty in that situation.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Second, if it's based on man's reason (which puts it in class 2, sorry, I misunderstood), then i'd simply ask, "which man's reason?" At this point we become arbitrary.



We follow the reason that is most informed with the facts because this is the best reason.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Third, if the atheist advances euthyphro against me, and I advance the trilemma, and he advances your option, then I'll say that morality is based upon "God's reason." If that was good enough for him to avoid the dilemma, then how's it not good for me?



We have to discuss which reason, God’s or man’s, is based on the facts. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Fourth, how could something "lower" obligate man, which is, according to you, "higher?" My son doesn't obligate me to obey, likewise I don't obligate God.



Natural Revelation is telling us to follow a certain path or way of life. It gives us a lot of information which is useful for the advancement of civilization. It would be in our best interest to grasp this knowledge so we can be moral and ethical because otherwise we will not survive.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "Acting according to reason" need not be moral. I act "according to reason" when I infer that if p then q, p, then q. In one sense I can see how it can be moral, but you've not really taken the care to be very specific.



When I use reason in this context, I mean knowledge of historical information on the actions of men. From this information we will get a better understanding of ourselves. Everyone is a potential gentleman, especially if he is from the Midwest, which has the purest dialect of English. If we educate the people, then progress is inevitable. So civilization will continue to other planets and beyond the stars. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> 
> The reality, which the knowledge of morality is taken, is that which shows what actions cause man to flourish under certain conditions. Immorality is that which causes man to deteriorate.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Just because an action causes men to floursih does not mean that we *ought* to follow those actions.
Click to expand...


Yes, but we would *want* to follow the best path so that we would advance. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> And, which men? All men? Some? If all, then we should allow the pedaphile to flourish? If some, who? Whoever has the most gunes? And, whose view of realities? NAMBLA's? Or, Ghandi's? Or, maybe mine?



Everyone has access to the same information. But if understand it better or gather more research, then men in general will flourish, live long, and prosper. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> 
> The idea of flourishing and diminishing is important for the concept of ethics. When we see people being successful and gaining wealth, then that is an example of what is moral.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So I guess selling pure black tar heroin is "moral" since the drug dealers are successful and gaining wealth.
> 
> Further, this prgmatic approach requires one to be omniscient. How could you possibly know that, in the long run, an action causes success and capital gain?
Click to expand...


I am not advocating utilitarianism, which is the greatest good for the greatest number, which I agree is hard to calculate, but a classical understanding of the way to wealth. I view wealth as something subjective not objective. For example, objectively a 100 dollar bill is a cheap green piece of paper, but subjectively it is worth 100 dollars. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Are monks "immoral" since their actions end in poverty?



Again, wealth is in the eye of the beholder.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Also, how do we determine "success?"



Usually there should be a historical foundation to this question. One good example is the life of Benjamin Franklin which is written in his autobiography. He had a special program for morality in which he tried to be perfect. He made a list of moral attributes which he tried to fulfill day by day which he got from reading his books. One of his favorite books was Pilgrim’s Progress which is an example of good morality.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Is it immoral to be a garbage man? Are they "successful" and "wealthy?" Is being a garbage man "less moral" than being a doctor?



Not necessarily as I said above. 



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Anyway, there's so many problems and ambiguities, and conceptual tangles that this position wouldn't last a minute on the chopping block of an ethicist worth his salt.



I will try to explain more.


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## StevePoling

Apologies if I've missed something obvious in this discussion, but a quick perusal of the replies to this query did not make mention that God is neither under the law, nor above the law, but that God is a law unto himself. To wit, the character of the Christian deity is an embodiment of Law. 

Euphyro's dilemma stems from polytheism. Among the group of deities on Olympus, noone is personally identified with the holy or the good. The closest Socrates comes is a sort of consensus opinion endorsing a thing as holy/good. 

I think that this dilemma arises from allowing a separation between the deity in question and the good. Or thinking the good is an expression of the will of the deity as opposed to an expression of the deity's essential nature. I believe Christianity maintains that the essential law of God expressed in the OT reflects the essense or being of God and is no more changeable than God is capable of becoming someone else.

The speculated world in which vices are virtues and vice-versa, may be possible with Islam's deity. As Pope Benedict XVI recently reminded us, the deity of Islam is absolutely transcendent and not bound by our rational categories. I think Islam would cite the Abraham/Isaac sacrifice story here. And frankly, this story is quite troubling to me as a Christian.

Christianity distinguishes faith and works, but theoretical problems arise when we separate them. So, too, I think we ought to distinguish God and Law, but ought not separate them.


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## py3ak

Hey Steve, I think Mr. Winzer was addressing this point in stating that God wills Himself to be what He is.

And in Islam they think that Ishmael was the one to be sacrificed.


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