# Atonement, strict particularism and WCF 3.1



## timfost (Dec 4, 2015)

I know that conversations on atonement can evoke strong opinions, so I’m hoping that my question can remain focused. I would like to ask/discuss how a strict particularist view of the atonement is reconciled with contingency and second causes (WCF 3.1).

Fesko writes in his _Theology of the Westminster Standards_:



> [F]ew early modern Reformed theologians saw themselves as the disciples of Calvin or as Calvinists. The term Calvinist was originally created as a term of derision in an effort by the opponents of the Reformed churches to isolate and brand them as sectarian. *Hence , if read through the alien grid of the TULIP, early modern views are distorted, and fine nuances that were once carefully argued are lost with the ham-fisted separation between five-point and four-point Calvinism, as if Calvin were the standard and taught a strict doctrine of limited atonement, and all other views fall under the category of universal atonement.* Consequently, it is necessary, first, to briefly set out the various views on the extent of the satisfaction of Christ and then, second, to determine to what extent the Standards accommodate these views, if at all.



He continues to set up the views that were represented in the formulation of the Westminster Standards:



> [T]hree of the four views were represented at the assembly (e.g., hypothetical universalism, sufficient-efficient, and strict particularism).



He also explains:



> These points in the Confession do not specifically advocate hypothetical universalism. In fact, the Standards lean in the direction of strict particularism, given the absence of the sufficiency-efficiency distinction. *But neither are they written in such a manner as to preclude or proscribe hypothetical universalism*.



Having set up the foundation that the Standards allow for views other than strict particularism, I would like to understand the following question. (For the sake of full disclosure, I do not advocate strict particularism, but am trying to understand it.) 

*Question*

How does strict particularism reconcile contingency (_hypothetical necessity_, WCF 3.1) without acknowledging that Christ _in some way_ died for every person sufficiently? In strict particularism, even the hypothetical belief of the non-elect would not save them since there is no sacrifice available for them, correct? I can’t figure out how the standards from a particularist perspective reconcile this without Edwards’s later denial of contingency in favor of _philosophical necessity_.

Thanks in advance for your help. Again, I’m hoping that this discussion can stay focused. I’m asking the question sincerely and do not intend to defend my understanding of Christ’s satisfaction in this post. I simply want to understand the answer to this question from a particularist view.

(Thank you, Rev. Winzer, for the book recommendation! It's been very thought provoking.)


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## timfost (Dec 4, 2015)

I should add that Fesko distinguishes hypothetical universalism from Amyraldianism:



> In summary, Amyraldianism is somewhat different from the hypothetical universalism of Ussher, Davenant, Calamy, and Twisse. All Amyraldians were hypothetical universalists, but not all hypothetical universalists were Amyraldians.



I don't think that the Standards would support Amyraldianism... I was not aware of the distinction between Amyraldianism and hypothetical universalism until Rev. Winzer recently pointed it out.


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## moral necessity (Dec 4, 2015)

timfost said:


> Thank you, Rev. Winzer, for the book recommendation! It's been very thought provoking.)



As a quick aside, what was the book recommendation? I might be interested in reading it myself.

Thanks and kind regards...


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## Afterthought (Dec 4, 2015)

timfost said:


> In strict particularism, even the hypothetical belief of the non-elect would not save them since there is no sacrifice available for them, correct?


I'll leave the answering of this question to others, but it seems to me that "contingency" is being misapplied.

In that part of the WCF, contingency and necessity are modes or manners of production of second causes. It does not deal with the intent or effects of second causes (one can speak of "contingent effects," but the "contingent" refers to the manner of production of the effect, not the effect itself.). Christ's atonement as an event was produced by a complex of contingent, necessary (the physical, biological, and chemical reactions involved), and free causes (Christ voluntarily sacrificed himself; wicked men freely chose to betray Christ).

A contingent second cause could have happened another way. If one applies contingency to intent, then the intent could have been different...in every logically possible way. No logical possibility can be excluded. If one wishes to use contingency to argue for a "in some sense" hypothetical element in Christ's atonement, one might as well use contingency to argue that in some sense, Christ died for no one, in some sense Christ did not die at all, in some sense belief is not required for the application of the atonement, and in some sense there was no intent to save anyone by the atonement. The problem here, of course, is that the intent relates to God's decree, which necessarily makes second causes occur, although the events do not occur in a necessary mode or manner of production.

One must not confuse the world of logical possibility with the actual world; and one must remember that the actual world is actualized by a decree that necessitates things to occur.


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## timfost (Dec 4, 2015)

moral necessity said:


> timfost said:
> 
> 
> > Thank you, Rev. Winzer, for the book recommendation! It's been very thought provoking.)
> ...



http://www.amazon.com/Theology-West...=1449253747&sr=8-1&keywords=fesko+westminster


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## Toasty (Dec 4, 2015)

Christ died for the elect alone. Christ had the power to die for everyone, but He only chose to die for the elect. He did not intend to die for everyone. 

God did not have to make a plan of salvation. He could have chosen to save no one. In order for sin to be atoned for, Christ had to die.


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## MW (Dec 4, 2015)

timfost said:


> How does strict particularism reconcile contingency (_hypothetical necessity_, WCF 3.1) without acknowledging that Christ _in some way_ died for every person sufficiently? In strict particularism, even the hypothetical belief of the non-elect would not save them since there is no sacrifice available for them, correct? I can’t figure out how the standards from a particularist perspective reconcile this without Edwards’s later denial of contingency in favor of _philosophical necessity_.



An intricate question, but beneficial to ponder. Raymond has helpfully started to peel the layers.

We have to distinguish contingency from God's view and man's. The Confession rules out the former but includes the latter. An argument has been made (which I consider persuasive), that philosophical necessity effectively does away with human choice because of its denial of internal contingency. We can leave that for another discussion.

If one posits contingency in God it can lead in a number of different directions -- middle knowledge and open theism are two which might be more popularly known. I trust open theism would be regarded as out of bounds on this discussion board. Middle knowledge has not been so decisively rejected in the reformed tradition, but I would recommend A. A. Hodge's Outlines of Theology as a summary reason for rejecting it. Turretin's Institutes also opposes it. A precise analysis reveals that the idea itself is a trick.

If one allows for counterfactual desires in God he will probably lean towards middle knowledge because that posits counterfactual knowledge in God, and for desire to be genuine it must be based on knowledge of some kind.

To return to strict particularism, Fesko's concession applies only to the make-up of the Assembly. The Assembly also included Erastians and Independents, but this does not mean the Assembly's productions must be read in the light of their peculiarities. One has to look at the documents themselves, and understand them in the historico-theological context in which they were written. Looking at the Confession itself, and its function as a standard in the church, together with the use of the Larger Catechism as an help in teaching, the "system" has no place for an hypothetical atonement. Any attempt to introduce something hypothetical into the system would effectively rip up the tent-pegs, so to speak, and leave it susceptible to the wind. The starting-point is an actual reality -- what God has accomplished in Christ. Soteriology is structured by redemption accomplished and applied. The only universality which is permitted in the Confession is in the free offer of the gospel. There the accomplishment of Christ comes within the reach of each and every hearer of the gospel, and is so near to each one that he only has to rest upon it to be saved. Even here, though, there is no hypothetical salvation. It is actual salvation, full and free, that is offered in Christ. Nothing less than this could warrant faith, minister full persuasion, or instill confidence.


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## timfost (Dec 4, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> A contingent second cause could have happened another way. If one applies contingency to intent, then the intent could have been different...in every logically possible way. No logical possibility can be excluded. If one wishes to use contingency to argue for a "in some sense" hypothetical element in Christ's atonement, one might as well use contingency to argue that in some sense, Christ died for no one, in some sense Christ did not die at all, in some sense belief is not required for the application of the atonement, and in some sense there was no intent to save anyone by the atonement. The problem here, of course, is that the intent relates to God's decree, which necessarily makes second causes occur, although the events do not occur in a necessary mode or manner of production.



Thanks for engaging. I'm not asking based on all possible contingents, but contingents based upon the actual sacrifice of Christ in relation to faith and unbelief. That should narrow it down a bit.



Afterthought said:


> One must not confuse the world of logical possibility with the actual world; and one must remember that the actual world is actualized by a decree that necessitates things to occur.



Yes, and yet there is freedom of the will. In some ways we have to understand God's sovereignty and man's free agency as parallel absolutes, although in a way that is incomprehensible to us since it is God's decree that establishes contingency under second causes as well as the actual event which occurs contingently. We need to be careful that our minds don't get in the way too much.  

Fesko put it well:



> As complex as these things might be, Reformed theologians have long maintained the seemingly contradictory teachings of divine sovereignty and human responsibility.



_________________



Toasty said:


> Christ died for the elect alone. Christ had the power to die for everyone, but He only chose to die for the elect. He did not intend to die for everyone.
> 
> God did not have to make a plan of salvation. He could have chosen to save no one. In order for sin to be atoned for, Christ had to die.



This is what I was trying to avoid in this post. History does not provide us with such a cut and dry doctrine of the Atonement in reformed theology. I understand that you and many other orthodox reformed believers think this way. You may want to study the formulation of Heidelberg 37 (Ursinus deals with this in his commentary under Q&A 40) and Dort Second head of doctrine in terms of scholastic distinctions before you oversimplify the doctrines that came out of the reformation on this issue.

_________________

Matthew,

Thanks for your help in understanding this. I really appreciate you interacting with the question. I have some follow-up questions, but don't have the time to write them out now. More later...


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## timfost (Dec 5, 2015)

MW said:


> We have to distinguish contingency from God's view and man's. The Confession rules out the former but includes the latter. An argument has been made (which I consider persuasive), that philosophical necessity effectively does away with human choice because of its denial of internal contingency. We can leave that for another discussion.



Yes, I agree. Philosophical necessity seems to only be an attempt to reconcile what is beyond the finite ability to comprehend, namely how to reconcile God's sovereignty and human responsibility.



MW said:


> If one posits contingency in God it can lead in a number of different directions -- middle knowledge and open theism are two which might be more popularly known. I trust open theism would be regarded as out of bounds on this discussion board. Middle knowledge has not been so decisively rejected in the reformed tradition, but I would recommend A. A. Hodge's Outlines of Theology as a summary reason for rejecting it. Turretin's Institutes also opposes it. A precise analysis reveals that the idea itself is a trick.



Middle knowledge seems to suggest autonomy in the natural order of creation, rather than seeing God as the One who upholds the creation. At least this is my initial impression of middle knowledge without having spent much time studying it.

Fesko makes an interesting observation:



> In a sense, the divines acknowledge that the category of middle knowledge exists, though they simply place this attribute under God’s necessary knowledge. Evidence of this appears in a scriptural proof text from Matthew 11:21, 23. In this text Christ tells Bethsaida and Chorazin that if the mighty works Jesus had performed before these two cities had been done in Tyre and Sidon, these Gentile cities would have repented in sackcloth and ashes. The point is that Christ did not perform miraculous works in Tyre and Sidon but nevertheless knew what would have happened if he had. So, yes, “although God knows whatsoever may, or can come to passe upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to passe upon such conditions”(3.2).





MW said:


> If one allows for counterfactual desires in God he will probably lean towards middle knowledge because that posits counterfactual knowledge in God, and for desire to be genuine it must be based on knowledge of some kind.



Personally, I would simply not go here. Since scripture does posit counterfactual desires in God, I have resolved not to wrap my mind around it but run what I understand to be two absolute truths about God's self revelation in parallel. I understand that you think I do not take into account anthropomorphic language as I should. I would rather acknowledge our difference on this and move on.



MW said:


> To return to strict particularism, Fesko's concession applies only to the make-up of the Assembly. The Assembly also included Erastians and Independents, but this does not mean the Assembly's productions must be read in the light of their peculiarities. One has to look at the documents themselves, and understand them in the historico-theological context in which they were written. Looking at the Confession itself, and its function as a standard in the church, together with the use of the Larger Catechism as an help in teaching, the "system" has no place for an hypothetical atonement. Any attempt to introduce something hypothetical into the system would effectively rip up the tent-pegs, so to speak, and leave it susceptible to the wind. The starting-point is an actual reality -- what God has accomplished in Christ. Soteriology is structured by redemption accomplished and applied. The only universality which is permitted in the Confession is in the free offer of the gospel. There the accomplishment of Christ comes within the reach of each and every hearer of the gospel, and is so near to each one that he only has to rest upon it to be saved. Even here, though, there is no hypothetical salvation. It is actual salvation, full and free, that is offered in Christ. Nothing less than this could warrant faith, minister full persuasion, or instill confidence.



Some observations:

1. The nature of allowing for multiple points of view in a document will necessarily translate to positive language that accommodates the most restrictive constituents, while omitting language advocated by those less restrictive. It seems like faulty reasoning to presume that the confession rules out those who favor the universal aspects of the Atonement because their distinctions were omitted. We can't create positive restrictions concerning those who argue for some universality in the Atonement because of what was omitted, since that would go beyond the Standards.

Fesko quotes the Westminster divine Calamy: 



> I am farre from universall Redemption in the Arminian sence, but that that [sic] I hould is in the sence of our devines in the sinod of Dort; that Christ did pay a price for all, absolute intention for the elect, conditional intention for the reprobate, in case they doe believe; that all men should be _salvibles, non obstante lapsu Adami_ [saveable, in spite of the fall of Adam]; that Jesus Christ did not only dy sufficiently for all, but God did intend in giving of Christ & Christ in giving himselfe did intend to put all men in a state of salvation in case they doe believe.



Fesko expounds on Twisse (another divine):



> Twisse intertwined his hypothetical universalism with his understanding of the decree, in that God ordained some things necessarily, others contingently, and others freely.



Additionally:



> Hence, a qualified universalism, that is, that Christ’s satisfaction in some sense extended to all, was part of the confessional air that the Westminster divines breathed, found both in the Thirty-Nine Articles and in the Canons of Dort with its use of the sufficient-efficient distinction.





> ...it is likely that the divines completely avoided the sufficiency-efficiency language to mitigate debates over the subject.



I included these quotes to demonstrate that the confession does not exclude such positions. In many ways, the Westminster creates a more inclusive atmosphere because of its exclusion of the sufficiency/efficiency distinction. A strict reading of Dort might actually exclude strict particularism, though that may be a hard pill for many to swallow.

2. In relation to my initial question, how can a strict particularist assert counterfactual truth without philosophical necessity? A particular proof text for 3.2, as Fesko points out, is Matt. 11:21, 23. Is the statement, though counterfactual, true? If so, how can a strict particularist reconcile this statement as truth apart from sufficiency, unless he believes that faith _itself_ merits eternal life? (One could also go to John 3:18, 2 Thes. 2:10.) If God is truth, would He say something counterfactual if it were not also true or can truth only be understood in relation to the decree? The only way I can understand internal consistency from the perspective of the strict particularist is if the strict particularist 1) denies contingency, 2) is Neonomian or 3) wraps it up in mystery. Hopefully that helps to clarify my question...

Thanks in advance!


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## MW (Dec 6, 2015)

timfost said:


> Yes, I agree. Philosophical necessity seems to only be an attempt to reconcile what is beyond the finite ability to comprehend, namely how to reconcile God's sovereignty and human responsibility.



Philosophical necessity begins with something that needs to be reconciled (because of Lockean empiricism) whereas WCF 3.1 explicitly teaches that there is no contradiction between divine sovereignty and human freedom. Liberty and contingency of second causes is "established" by the absolute divine decree. If effects were not absolutely decreed to flow from causes working according to their own nature there could be no freedom or contingency in the second causes.

The freedom of the will is not absolute. Only the decree is absolute. This means there is no contradiction needing to be resolved.



> In a sense, the divines acknowledge that the category of middle knowledge exists, though they simply place this attribute under God’s necessary knowledge.



That would finally amount to a denial of middle knowledge in any sense. The obscurity is no doubt owing to the fact that the adherents of middle knowledge have succeeded in tricking others into playing their language game.



timfost said:


> Personally, I would simply not go here. Since scripture does posit counterfactual desires in God, I have resolved not to wrap my mind around it but run what I understand to be two absolute truths about God's self revelation in parallel.



To avoid knowledge of these desires one would have to say that these counterfactual desires are "unknown" to God. If they are said to be "known" to God one is bound up to the concept of middle knowledge. Though one chooses to ignore it, it will still be present in everything the person says about counterfactual desires.



timfost said:


> The nature of allowing for multiple points of view in a document will necessarily translate to positive language that accommodates the most restrictive constituents, while omitting language advocated by those less restrictive. It seems like faulty reasoning to presume that the confession rules out those who favor the universal aspects of the Atonement because their distinctions were omitted.



First, Their distinctions were omitted after debate. That means the Assembly consciously refused to include the distinctions for which this party contended. The strict particularist proposition which was recommended to the Assembly was retained notwithstanding the hypothetical universalist objections. See Warfield's "Westminster Assembly and its Work," pp. 138-144. Secondly, the Confession and Larger Catechism contain explicit and exclusive statements which can only be understood in terms of strict particularism. WCF 8:3-5; LC 59. Thirdly, as noted, the "system" of soteriology is so firmly tied down that it allows no room for hypothetical universalism without undoing the system. Redemption is accomplished and applied for the elect. The introduction of any universal element at this point contradicts the Confession's positive teaching that the work of redemption is co-extensive in accomplishment and application.



timfost said:


> Fesko quotes the Westminster divine Calamy:



As a point of clarification, Fesko only quotes a minuted report of what he said. There is nothing in Calamy's writings which supports the position reported in the Minutes. The work on the two covenants which has been attributed to him only speaks in terms of strict particularism. As the Minutes are only recording the substance of what was said it is impossible to draw "motivation" from the statements.



> Twisse intertwined his hypothetical universalism with his understanding of the decree, in that God ordained some things necessarily, others contingently, and others freely.



This is a misunderstanding. Twisse was meeting the Remonstrants on their own terms of conditional salvation. He was not arguing for a hypothetical universalism but was showing there is no such thing. He does this in multiple volumes. The English volumes are available at EEBO TCP for anyone who desires to learn Twisse's view first hand. See especially The Riches of God's love, where the strict particularist position is taught and defended with a great deal of precision.



timfost said:


> I included these quotes to demonstrate that the confession does not exclude such positions.



They only demonstrate that "quotations" brought into evidence need to be considered together with their contextual "factors." When ripped from context they can be made to prove anything.



timfost said:


> In relation to my initial question, how can a strict particularist assert counterfactual truth without philosophical necessity?



As noted, WCF 3.1 teaches that human freedom is not absolute, but is dependent upon divine sovereignty. This means there is no contradiction requiring resolution. It is impossible to assert human freedom apart from divine sovereignty. The attempt to introduce contradiction will lead to aberrations.


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## TheOldCourse (Dec 6, 2015)

Some of this seems bound up in the old debate among the schoolmen of the necessity of the consequent and the necessity of the consequence. When we speak of the decrees, we may say something to the effect of "If God wills that John repents, then John repents". By virtue of the immutability of God's decrees there is a necessity to that relationship. Arminians and Semi-pelagians argued against the Reformed and Augustinians that if God decrees human actions, this statement is equivalent to "If God wills that John repents, then John repents necessarily". And since, we would have God decree everything that comes to pass and all actions of men, all actions of men are necessary and philosophical determinism is established. This relationship was called necessity of the consequent because the consequent thing, the repentance in this case, is rendered necessary by its relationship to the will of God. 

The Reformed universally (with the possible exception of Edwards) rejected this argument at its core. In this relationship, all that is necessary is the _consequence_, the relationship itself, rather than the consequent, the thing that is related to. In an "if A, then B" statement, it is the _then_ that is necessary in this type of situation, not "B". Both A and B can be contingent even though the relationship between them may be necessary. This is one way in which they held divine sovereignty and human freedom together. God contingently (or freely) determines all contingent actions and neither is necessary even though the consequence is. This is part of what WCF 3.1 is getting at, that God ordains whatsoever comes to pass but without abolishing contingency in the things ordained _contra_ Pelagian contentions. On the contrary, Reformed scholastics argued that middle knowledge actually established necessity because it posited a divine knowledge _antecedant_ to God's will and thus actually ends up imbuing the created order with a necessity of its own to which even God was subjected. Particularism then, in this matter, actually upholds contingency since it subordinates the will of man to God's free decree rather than allowing it antecedence.


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## MW (Dec 6, 2015)

TheOldCourse said:


> On the contrary, Reformed scholastics argued that middle knowledge actually established necessity because it posited a divine knowledge _antecedant_ to God's will and thus actually ends up imbuing the created order with a necessity of its own to which even God was subjected.



Well noted. The contingency shows itself to be a facade because the choice is internally necessitated and God is said to know it as such. Whereas from the reformed point of view only a contingency externally willed by God maintains the internal contingency of the choice. To get to this point, though, one has to deny the Arminian charge of contradiction and be prepared to subordinate human willing to the decree of God. Or, in express biblical terms, one has to recognise human dependence upon God as the One in whom man lives and moves and has his being.


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## timfost (Dec 7, 2015)

MW said:


> Philosophical necessity begins with something that needs to be reconciled (because of Lockean empiricism) whereas WCF 3.1 explicitly teaches that there is no contradiction between divine sovereignty and human freedom. Liberty and contingency of second causes is "established" by the absolute divine decree. If effects were not absolutely decreed to flow from causes working according to their own nature there could be no freedom or contingency in the second causes.



Certainly no contradiction. But contingency has little meaning apart from hypothetical necessity in relation to second causes and human freedom. If there is hypothetical necessity, there must also be hypothetical truth. Such hypothetical truth is supported in scripture and the Standards (3.2).



MW said:


> The freedom of the will is not absolute. Only the decree is absolute. This means there is no contradiction needing to be resolved.



If the decree is the only thing that we should consider in the context of this discussion, why would the divines feel it necessary to add 3.2, since it speaks to that which is counterfactual and hypothetical?



MW said:


> timfost said:
> 
> 
> > The nature of allowing for multiple points of view in a document will necessarily translate to positive language that accommodates the most restrictive constituents, while omitting language advocated by those less restrictive. It seems like faulty reasoning to presume that the confession rules out those who favor the universal aspects of the Atonement because their distinctions were omitted.
> ...



It's your word against Fesko. He spends a significant section demonstrating how hypothetical universalism and sufficient/efficient points of view can actually agree with the Standards. I'd be happy to quote if you our anyone else would find it helpful.



MW said:


> timfost said:
> 
> 
> > Fesko quotes the Westminster divine Calamy:
> ...



Are you saying the minutes got it wrong and that Fesko, the academic dean and professor of systematic and historical theology at Westminster CA, also got it wrong? Seriously?



MW said:


> > Twisse intertwined his hypothetical universalism with his understanding of the decree, in that God ordained some things necessarily, others contingently, and others freely.
> 
> 
> 
> This is a misunderstanding. Twisse was meeting the Remonstrants on their own terms of conditional salvation. He was not arguing for a hypothetical universalism but was showing there is no such thing. He does this in multiple volumes. The English volumes are available at EEBO TCP for anyone who desires to learn Twisse's view first hand. See especially The Riches of God's love, where the strict particularist position is taught and defended with a great deal of precision.



This is what was quoted in Fesko's book:



> We say that pardon of sinne and salvation of soules are benefites purchased by the deathe of Christ, to be enjoyed by men, but how? Not absolutely, but conditionally, to witt, in case they believe, and only in case they believe…. So that we willingly professe, that Christ had both a full intention of his owne, and commandment of his Father to make a propitiation for the sinnes of the whole world, so farre as thereby to procure both pardon of sinne and salvation of soule to all that doe believe…. Now as touching these benefites, we willingly professe, that Christ dyed not for all, that is, he dyed not to obtaine the grace of faith and repentance for all, but only for God’s elect; In as much as these graces are bestowed by God, not conditionally, least so grace should be given according to mens workes, but absolutely, And if Christ dyed to obtyene these for all absolutely, it would follow here hence that all should believe & repent and consequently all shoulde be.



In case this is not clear enough, consider Twisse's own words from the same book quoted above (_The Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles, Reduced to the Practise_), p. 143-144:



> Now for the cleering of the truth of this, when we say Christ dyed for us, the meaning is, that Christ dyed for our benefite. Now these benefites which Christ procured unto us by his death, it may be they are of different conditions, wherof *some are ordeyned to be conferred only conditionally, and some absolutely. And therfore it is fit we should consider them apart.* As for example it is without question (I suppose) that Christ dyed, to procure pardon of sinne, and salvation of soule, but how? absolutely, whether men believe or no? Nothing lesse, but only conditionally, to witt, that for Christs sake their sinnes shall be pardoned and their soules saved, provided they doe believe in him. *Now I willingly confesse that Christ dyed for all in respect of procuring these benefits, to witt conditionally, upon the condition of their faith, in such sort that if all and every one should believe in Christ, all and every one should obteyne the pardon of their sinnes, and salvation of their soules for Christs sake.*





MW said:


> timfost said:
> 
> 
> > I included these quotes to demonstrate that the confession does not exclude such positions.
> ...



I'm having trouble understanding why you recommended the book when you think the historian is butchering history.

As much as we may dislike our own history, rhetoric can't change it. Please consider.


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## MW (Dec 8, 2015)

timfost said:


> If the decree is the only thing that we should consider in the context of this discussion, why would the divines feel it necessary to add 3.2, since it speaks to that which is counterfactual and hypothetical?



The decree is the subject under discussion. It is the title of the chapter. They added 3.2 to invalidate the idea that things could be known as future apart from being determined as future by God.



timfost said:


> It's your word against Fesko.



No, it's reasoning from the facts against Fesko's conjectures. It's also Warfield's reasoning, which you are free to examine for yourself. A number of articles draw the same conclusion, which I can point you to if you are interested in pursuing the facts.



timfost said:


> Are you saying the minutes got it wrong and that Fesko, the academic dean and professor of systematic and historical theology at Westminster CA, also got it wrong? Seriously?



I said nothing about the Minutes getting it wrong. I clarified the nature and limits of the Minutes and what can be drawn from them. You should seriously read what is written, that is, if you are serious about having a discussion.



timfost said:


> This is what was quoted in Fesko's book:
> 
> 
> 
> > We say that pardon of sinne and salvation of soules are benefites purchased by the deathe of Christ, to be enjoyed by men, but how? Not absolutely, but conditionally, to witt, in case they believe, and only in case they believe….



Again, it was part of a polemical argument which met the opponents on their own ground. This will be seen if the context is allowed to speak for itself:



> Now for the cleering of the truth of this, when we say Christ dyed for us, the meaning is, that Christ dyed for our benefite.



That is, the death of Christ benefits those for whom it was made. His argument is that Arminians divide the benefits and say Christ died to procure forgiveness but not to procure faith; yet faith is a necessary condition for enjoying the benefit; so in effect the Arminians are saying Christ died for none. As he states, "Arminians spare not to professe, that these benefits Christ merited for none at all." It is evident that his whole point is to show that Arminians teach that Christ died for none, that is, so as to procure benefits for them. He was not teaching hypothetical universalism.

As noted, the original sources are freely available online for anyone interested in pursuing the facts.



timfost said:


> I'm having trouble understanding why you recommended the book when you think the historian is butchering history.



I recommended the book, along with other books and articles, to point out that Amyraldism and hypothetical universalism were not seen as the same thing by historians. I did not recommend the book as the be-all to end-all of historical theology.



timfost said:


> As much as we may dislike our own history, rhetoric can't change it. Please consider.



Facts are facts. Please consider them.


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## timfost (Dec 8, 2015)

Thank you, Raymond, Chris and Rev. Winzer for your insights. They have been helpful.

Blessings


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## Semper Fidelis (Dec 8, 2015)

MW said:


> First, Their distinctions were omitted after debate. That means the Assembly consciously refused to include the distinctions for which this party contended. The strict particularist proposition which was recommended to the Assembly was retained notwithstanding the hypothetical universalist objections. See Warfield's "Westminster Assembly and its Work," pp. 138-144. Secondly, the Confession and Larger Catechism contain explicit and exclusive statements which can only be understood in terms of strict particularism. WCF 8:3-5; LC 59. Thirdly, as noted, the "system" of soteriology is so firmly tied down that it allows no room for hypothetical universalism without undoing the system. Redemption is accomplished and applied for the elect. The introduction of any universal element at this point contradicts the Confession's positive teaching that the work of redemption is co-extensive in accomplishment and application.



I'd like to quote Berkhof and make further observations:


> 5. THE COMPROMISE OF THE SCHOOL OF SAUMUR. The School of Saumur represents an attempt to tone down the rigorous Calvinism of the Synod of Dort, and to avoid at the same time the error of Arminianism. This is seen especially in the work of Amyraldus, who boldly taught a hypothetical universalism, which was really a species of universal atonement. God willed by an antecedent decree that all men should be saved on condition of repentance and faith in Jesus Christ. He therefore sent Christ into the world to die for all men. But seeing that, left to themselves, none would repent and believe, He by a subsequent decree elected some as the objects of the saving operation of His grace. These and these only are actually saved.
> The outcome proved this to be an untenable position. Of the followers of this school some emphasized the first decree and the universal offer of salvation based on it, with the result that they landed in the Arminian camp; and others stressed the second decree and the necessity of effectual grace, and thus returned to the Calvinistic position. The views of the School of Saumur were practically shared by Davenant, Calamy, and especially Richard Baxter, in England. Its peculiar opinions gave occasion for the construction of the Formula Consensus Helvetica by Turretin and Heidegger, in which these views are combatted.
> 
> 
> Berkhof, L. (1949). The history of Christian doctrines (p. 195). Grand Rapids, MI: WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.



Tim,

You seem intensely interested in one part of the equation focusing very narrowly on language that "allows" for a view of hypothetical universalism. One cannot merely look at a confined portion of the Standards and say: "See! The Hypothetical Universalist was successful in leaving that portion of the Confessions vague..." when other parts of the system don't support a Hypothetical Universalism. In other words, if it is the case that Hypothetical Universalism is one of many possible views that the Standards teach then there is a *system* that flows from that in other portions of the Standards. You can't simply appeal to historical background and read between the lines to establish the idea. You have to look at the system as a whole.

Incidentally, the fact that Fesko is "...the academic dean and professor of systematic and historical theology at Westminster CA..." does not make an appeal to authority any less a logical fallacy on a Reformed board than in real life. If you haven't read Twisse's work in context and are simply relying upon a secondary source then, no matter how reputable, you can't merely say: "I don't trust your opinion of the primary source, I trust Fesko's scholarship" to establish a point.


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## timfost (Dec 8, 2015)

Semper Fidelis said:


> You seem intensely interested in one part of the equation focusing very narrowly on language that "allows" for a view of hypothetical universalism. One cannot merely look at a confined portion of the Standards and say: "See! The Hypothetical Universalist was successful in leaving that portion of the Confessions vague..." when other parts of the system don't support a Hypothetical Universalism. In other words, if it is the case that Hypothetical Universalism is one of many possible views that the Standards teach then there is a *system* that flows from that in other portions of the Standards. You can't simply appeal to historical background and read between the lines to establish the idea. You have to look at the system as a whole.



Thanks for taking the time to share your thoughts on the matter. Rev. Winzer helped me to understand various types of hypothetical universalism. The school of Saumur represents Cameron and Amyraut, not the earlier Davenant and the like. I recently thought they were all the same, but they are quite different, as Winzer helpfully pointed out. This prompted me to read Davenant's _Dissertation on the Death of Christ_ at the end of his Colossians commentary (almost finished the book). I'm mostly in agreement with him. He was one of the English delegates to Dort, and you will see much of his terminology and distinctions under the second head of doctrine.

I don't think I'm reading between the lines. We should keep in mind that if one uses the classic sufficient-efficient formula or English hypothetical universalism, they are also very particular as well in regards to absolute intention. Certainly, though, the Canons of Dort are much more accommodating to my views than the Westminster because of the sufficient-efficient formula. (As an aside, I initially came to my conclusions after reading Calvin, Ursinus, the Heidelberg and especially Dort. These documents were instrumental in turning me from severe hyper-Calvinism, which, of course, takes a very particularist view of the Atonement.)



Semper Fidelis said:


> Incidentally, the fact that Fesko is "...the academic dean and professor of systematic and historical theology at Westminster CA..." does not make an appeal to authority any less a logical fallacy on a Reformed board than in real life. If you haven't read Twisse's work in context and are simply relying upon a secondary source then, no matter how reputable, you can't merely say: "I don't trust your opinion of the primary source, I trust Fesko's scholarship" to establish a point.



Good point. Perhaps I should have clarified that the quote I used from Twisse with underlining (post 13) was not used by Fesko. I downloaded the book (https://books.google.com/books?id=b...ctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles&f=false), found that quote myself and read the context. He is comparing his own view of how Christ died for all (though not equally for all) in contrast to an Arminian's understanding of the universality of Christ's death. I'm in complete agreement with him.

Interestingly, Twisse employs the hypothetical, saying that _if_ all would believe then all would be saved since, according to Twisse, Christ died conditionally for the non-elect.

But please don't believe me. I added the URL. Please read it and tell me how I've misunderstood him. I don't want to bear false witness. Bottom of p. 143 through the top of 144, but by all means read around that area as I did before posting it. That would actually encourage me to know that you looked into it independently.


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## timfost (Dec 8, 2015)

Also, as a hyper-Calvinist, I was constantly fighting against any kind of universal language concerning Christ's death. And for what? Scripture never says that He did not die for some, only that He did not elect all. Strict particularism takes passages that speak to absolute intention (e.g. John 17), categorize all the universal passages and insert that He didn't die for some, a proposition that cannot be found in scripture. 

The universal texts are only problematic if we insert what is not there and qualify everything that is. I love Charles Hodge's treatment of the Atonement in his Systematic Theology. And Ursinus is wonderful.


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## MW (Dec 8, 2015)

This is what Twisse's argument amounts to:



> we say therefore, that Christ merited for us the pardon of sinne, & salvation of soule, to be conferred upon us onely conditionally, to witt, provided that we doe beleeve in him; and thus we may well say, that he dyed for all & every one; that is, he dyed to procure pardon of sinne, and salvation of soule for every one, in case every one should beleeve in him; which in effect is as much, as to say, that he dyed in this sense, *for none but such as sometimes or other are found to beleeve in him*.



Will any hypothetical universalist follow him in his conclusion? Of course not. Those who claim to be hypothetical universalists all say that their theory means Christ died in some sense for all men, whereas Twisse's argument amounts to saying that Christ died for none but those who will believe.

I reiterate, Twisse was using a polemical device, arguing according to the terms of the Arminian, in order to show the Arminian that he was confusing terms, and to bring the reader to the conclusion of strict particularism. To cut him off half way through his argument and insist that he be taken as setting forth hypothetical universalism indicates the reader is labouring under a prejudice.


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## timfost (Dec 8, 2015)

So those who are interested can read from the URL I provided. See for yourself.


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## MW (Dec 8, 2015)

Twisse's conclusion: "which in effect is as much, as to say, that he dyed in this sense, *for none but such as sometimes or other are found to beleeve in him*."

Do you agree with this conclusion, Tim? Yea, or nay?


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## py3ak (Dec 8, 2015)

timfost said:


> So those who are interested can read from the URL I provided. See for yourself.



Thank you for the link. I was especially struck by p. 143:



> But, first let me touch, by the way, one argument for the mayntenance of our doctrine in the generall. It is apparant Joh. 17. that Christ professeth he prayeth not for all, but only for those whom God had given him v.9. or shoulde hereafter believe, that is, be given unto him v.20. And it is as cleere that like as for them alone he prayed, so for them alone he sanctified himselfe vers. 19. Now what is it to sanctifie himselfe, but to offer up himselfe upon the crosse, by the unanimous consent of all the Fathers whom Maldorate had read, as himselfe professeth on that place of John.


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## MW (Dec 9, 2015)

py3ak said:


> I was especially struck by p. 143:



Expanded in equally decisive terms in Riches of God's Love, 1:193:



> "To the contrary, *that Christ died not for all*, *I prove thus*: First, the reason why none can lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect, is because Christ died for them Rom. 8 [Margin: Rom. 8.33, 34]. If therefore Christ died for all, none can lay any thing to the charge of a Reprobate, more then to the charge of Gods Elect. Secondly, Christ prayed only for those who either did or should believe in him; and for whom he prayed for them only he sanctified himself. John 17 [Margin: John 17.9, 19]. And what is the meaning of the sanctifying of himself for them, but that he meant to offer up himself in Sacrifice upon the cross for them; as Maldonate confesseth, was the joint interpretation of all the Fathers, whom he had read. Thirdly, did he die only for all then living, or which should afterwards be brought forth into the world, or for all from the beginning of the world? If so, then he died for all those that already were damned. Fourthly, if he died for them, then Christ hath made satisfaction for their sins; and is it decent that any man should fry in hell, for those sins for which Christ hath satisfied? Lastly, if Christ hath died for all, then hath he merited salvation for all; and shall any fail of that salvation which Christ hath merited for them? Is it decent that God the Father, should deal with Christ his Son, not according to the exigence of his merits? If we had merited salvation for our selves would God in justice have denied it unto us? Why then should he deny any man salvation, in case Christ hath merited salvation for him?"


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## timfost (Dec 9, 2015)

MW said:


> Twisse's conclusion: "which in effect is as much, as to say, that he dyed in this sense, *for none but such as sometimes or other are found to beleeve in him*."
> 
> Do you agree with this conclusion, Tim? Yea, or nay?



I agree that Christ did not die for all efficaciously. If He died sufficiently for all _only_ without also meriting faith for the elect, no one would be saved. In this way I am very particular. But I am conscience-bound not to add to scripture. Obviously you think that a negative statement regarding Christ's death can be proven through necessary inference (that in no way can it be said that He died for all). I don't see this as possible without bending scripture around our system.

Certainly I disagree with the Remonstrant formula which Twisse was contradicting.

Let's not make enemies of friends.

Blessings

PS. Ruben, thanks for reading it!


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## py3ak (Dec 9, 2015)

MW said:


> Fourthly, if he died for them, then Christ hath made satisfaction for their sins; and is it decent that any man should fry in hell, for those sins for which Christ hath satisfied? Lastly, if Christ hath died for all, then hath he merited salvation for all; and shall any fail of that salvation which Christ hath merited for them? Is it decent that God the Father, should deal with Christ his Son, not according to the exigence of his merits? If we had merited salvation for our selves would God in justice have denied it unto us? Why then should he deny any man salvation, in case Christ hath merited salvation for him?"



Thanks for that, Matthew. Both the ideas Twisse rejects seem very indecent.


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## MW (Dec 9, 2015)

timfost said:


> Let's not make enemies of friends.



Just trying to get the facts of history, and what Twisse taught. As you could not give a yes or no answer I take it that you do not agree with Twisse's conclusion, which might be indicative that you recognise his conclusion teaches strict particularism. Yes?


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## Semper Fidelis (Dec 9, 2015)

timfost said:


> Certainly I disagree with the Remonstrant formula which Twisse was contradicting.


But Twisse's own words are also contradicting what you claim he believes, namely, that Christ died for all "...in a sense...."

The sense that Twisse concludes is that Christ died for all all who would believe upon Him. He doesn't qualify that conclusion in any sense.

Incidentally, I quoted Berkhof not necessarily as relevant to Hypothetical Universalists but to demonstrate the connection to a larger Systematic theology that any version is going to create.

Let's quit the "...here is stand on the Scriptures and you particularists don't..." garbage. Telling us, over and over, that you're conscience bound to believe what the Scriptures teach is axiomatic. In dispute is whether you can support your conclusion that the Reformed confessions leave wiggle room for a Hypothetical Universalist postion. If we agree that the Confessions are men's conscience-bound conviction of a summary exposition of Scripture then we need to "connect the dots".

You've raised Twisse as supporting your view. He does not conclude with a statement of Hypothetical Universalism but a very particular view of the Atonement.

Assuming for a moment that this was demonstrated, however, you have not shown how that would be relevant to the larger system of doctrine. In other words, how would carrying this view through the rest of the system of doctrine be able to harmonize with other clear statements of particularity in the scope of the atonement? You haven't addressed that issue.


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## timfost (Dec 10, 2015)

Semper Fidelis said:


> You've raised Twisse as supporting your view. He does not conclude with a statement of Hypothetical Universalism but a very particular view of the Atonement.



Twisse, same book, p. 165:



> But seing pardon of sinne and salvation are benefits merited by Christ, not to be conferd absolutely but conditionally, to witt, upon condition of faith; we may be bold to say, that Christ *in some sense dyed for all and every one*, that is, he dyed to procure remission of sinnes, and salvation unto all and every one in case they believe; and as this is true, so way we well say, and the Councell of Dort might well say; that every one who heares the Gospell is bound to believe that Christ dyed for him in this sense, namely, to obtayne salvation for him in case he believe.


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## timfost (Dec 10, 2015)

Semper Fidelis said:


> Assuming for a moment that this was demonstrated, however, you have not shown how that would be relevant to the larger system of doctrine. In other words, how would carrying this view through the rest of the system of doctrine be able to harmonize with other clear statements of particularity in the scope of the atonement? You haven't addressed that issue.



I don't want to be argumentative. One reason this is important to me is not so that everyone thinks like me, but so that we don't alienate or "mis-label" someone who doesn't define Christ's satisfaction exactly like the strict particularists. I appeal to Heidelberg 37 and Dort 2nd Head, esp. articles 3, 5 and 6 to demonstrate that setting a universal aspect to Christ's satisfaction works quite well within the system.

I also fear that losing this distinction makes unbelief less grievous.

Ursinus:



> The reason why all are not saved through Christ, is not because of any insufficiency of merit and grace in him-for the atonement of Christ is for the sins of the whole world, as it respects the dignity and sufficiency of the satisfaction which he made-but it arises from unbelief; because men reject the benefits of Christ offered in the gospel, and so perish by their own fault, and not because of any insufficiency in the merits of Christ.



And:



> For it cannot be said to be insufficient, unless we give countenance to that horrible blasphemy (which God forbid!) that some blame of the destruction of the ungodly results from a defect in the merit of the mediator.



If I am alone in this and this destroys our system, please check out this webpage I found last night.

http://calvinandcalvinism.com/?page_id=7147

Again, I'm hoping to bring together, not tear apart. I'm not interested in debating at this point. 

Blessings!


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## MW (Dec 10, 2015)

timfost said:


> If I am alone in this and this destroys our system, please check out this webpage I found last night.
> 
> http://calvinandcalvinism.com/?page_id=7147



Tim, the compiler of this page gathers his snippets with the aim to find variations among reformed theologians without any regard for context. He has a tendency to present writers as directly contradicting themselves. If this is the road you desire to travel, I am sure you will find what you are looking for, but it is very poor scholarship.

Let's return to Twisse. You haven't yet acknowledged the obvious fact that he concludes with strict particularism. Why? The way you are reading him you have him overtly contradicting himself within a few pages. You stop him mid-argument and insist that his conditional statement must be his final position on the matter. Why do you choose to interpret him this way? The man was known for his deep erudition, especially on the doctrines of grace, but you make him out to be a novice. Why?

Honesty of interpretation requires the reader to weigh what the author was saying, and not lay hold of odd statements because they seem to suit the reader's agenda.


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## Semper Fidelis (Dec 10, 2015)

timfost said:


> don't want to be argumentative. One reason this is important to me is not so that everyone thinks like me, but so that we don't alienate or "mis-label" someone who doesn't define Christ's satisfaction exactly like the strict particularists. I appeal to Heidelberg 37 and Dort 2nd Head, esp. articles 3, 5 and 6 to demonstrate that setting a universal aspect to Christ's satisfaction works quite well within the system.



Whether you *want* to be argumentative or not, you are being so. You are making arguments and claiming that Hypothetical Universalism is comppatible with the Reformed Confessions. You're on a hobby horse and convinced that it's really the only way to truly account for man's condemnation for failing to believe the Gospel.

We took up this conversation here: http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php/87650-Why-does-Limited-Atonement-Matter/page5

Therein we cited multiple Puritans and other sources that demonstrated that saving faith was a "condition to interest" in the Covenant of Grace. You think that, by stringing together quotes from multiple Reformed teachers, that you've established the views compatibility as if it fits like a "hand in a glove" with the Westminster Standards. You appeal to Hodge, which in the previous thread it was never established that he gave you the room you thought you had to demonstrate that failure to exercise saving faith (a condition to interest in the CoG for the elect) is the basis upon which men are condemned. It was also demonstrated that when the Puritans spoke in certain ways (that you appropriate for your view) they are not using the language in the way you think they are doing because you are not grasping the way in which they used language even when they stated that Christ "died for all".

The bottom line is that Theology is not a buffet line and appealing to a website that treats theology like a buffet line is not convincing simply because it supports the tune of a one string banjo.


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## timfost (Dec 10, 2015)

I don't want to argue, so I won't continue.


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## Semper Fidelis (Dec 11, 2015)

timfost said:


> I don't want to argue, so I won't continue.



Tim,

You'll have to make a decision then. It seems to me this is a pretty common pattern now:

1. Ask questions about whether or not the Confessions allow something or how the Confessions can't consistently hold to something.
2. Offer that some Reformed person(s) agree with a view you've developed.
3. Tell us that you used to be a Hyper-Calvinist and that this view was what rescued you from hyper-Calvinism.
4. Tell us how you think the Confessional view would torture Scripture on some points.

But you don't want to argue...


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## py3ak (Dec 13, 2015)

MW said:


> As noted, WCF 3.1 teaches that human freedom is not absolute, but is dependent upon divine sovereignty. This means there is no contradiction requiring resolution. It is impossible to assert human freedom apart from divine sovereignty.



As Beza put it in his Confession (1560):

*4. God Is Immutable *
God is immutable in His counsels (Mal. 3: 6; James 1: 17), so it follows that all which comes or happens to man has been eternally ordained by Him (Eph. 1: 11), according to what we have said of His providence. * 
*5. The Counsel of God Does Not Exclude Second Causes* 
This does not cancel but establishes second causes by which all things come to pass. For God, in ordaining what ought to come (2 Sam. 12: 11), ordains also the measures by which it pleases Him that such things should come to pass; yes in such a way that although there is found some vice or fault in the second cause, yet is there no evil in the everlasting counsel of God.​
James T. Dennison Jr.. Reformed Confessions of the 16th and 17th Centuries in English Translation (Kindle Locations 19584-19589). Reformation Heritage Books.


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## MW (Dec 13, 2015)

py3ak said:


> As Beza put it in his Confession (1560):



Thankyou for the quotation, Ruben. It is very pertinent to the point.


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## Reformed Covenanter (Dec 14, 2015)

If Christ hypothetically died for all men, would it not also follow that Christ hypothetically intercedes for all men (since he intercedes for those for whom he has made atonement)? If so, John 17:9 needs to be rewritten, "I pray for them. I do [hypothetically] pray for the world [and] for those whom You have given Me, for they are Yours."

Also, if one wishes to avoid hyper-Calvinism, it is perfectly possible to do so without being a hypothetical universalist. The fact that many orthodox Calvinists are neither hyper-Calvinists nor hypothetic universalists surely demonstrates that point. You could also avoid hyper-Calvinism by being an Arminian, but simply avoiding one form of aberrant theology is hardly a good excuse for embracing another form of aberrant theology.


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## MW (Dec 14, 2015)

Reformed Covenanter said:


> If Christ hypothetically died for all men, would it not also follow that Christ hypothetically intercedes for all men (since he intercedes for those for whom he has made atonement)? If so, John 17:9 needs to be rewritten, "I pray for them. I do [hypothetically] pray for the world [and] for those whom You have given Me, for they are Yours."



That is the problem with something hypothetical. You could say it about everything and have contributed nothing to one's understanding of reality. I read somewhere that Amyraut himself acknowledged that an hypothetical is in reality nothing.



Reformed Covenanter said:


> Also, if one wishes to avoid hyper-Calvinism, it is perfectly possible to do so without being a hypothetical universalist.



I would go further and say that to avoid hyper-Calvinism one should reject hypothetical universalism. Why? Because (1) HU makes the free offer of the gospel dependent upon something that can only be known to God (an hypothetical condition which he alone has decreed to fulfil in certain cases). (2) HU requires the individual to have experience of faith and repentance before he can be certain that what is offered is real.

Particular redemption is true Calvinism because it sets forth an actual, real redemption of men as sinners, and the gospel offers this particular redemption to sinners as such. No person has to go up to heaven to discover God's secret decree to give faith and repentance to some. No person has to descend into the depths of their own experience to conclude they have been called. The gospel itself gives a full and free warrant to receive and rest upon Christ alone for salvation.


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## timfost (Dec 15, 2015)

Reformed Covenanter said:


> If Christ hypothetically died for all men, would it not also follow that Christ hypothetically intercedes for all men (since he intercedes for those for whom he has made atonement)? If so, John 17:9 needs to be rewritten, "I pray for them. I do [hypothetically] pray for the world [and] for those whom You have given Me, for they are Yours."



I'm not interested in debating the issue at hand, but I also don't want to reduce HU to a caricature representation.

No one advocates a "hypothetical death." Christ actually died. This is not what is hypothetical about HU. Davenant may be helpful in understanding the distinctions that HU makes his _Dissertation on the Death of Christ_:



> Therefore the prayer which Christ specially and effectually put up for the elect, had its foundation in the oblation, in which he specially and effectually offered up himself for them. Observe the force of the argument; Whatever Christ obtains for individual persons by his special intercession, that he merited for them with the Father by the offering of himself which pertained to them especially: But by his intercession he obtains for the elect faith, perseverance, and salvation itself: Therefore he specially offered himself for them, that he might infallibly procure for them these benefits.



https://books.google.com/books?id=P...and effectually put up for the elect"&f=false

The hypothetical comes in concerning intercession this way:



> Therefore we do not put asunder those things which God hath joined together; but we teach, that the death, resurrection, and intercession of Christ are joined together in indissoluble union, but in a different way. If we consider the whole human race, that is, each and every man, then we say, not only that the death, but the resurrection and intercession of Christ regards them, *as to the possibility of their enjoying these benefits, the condition of faith being pre-supposed*. If we consider the elect, we affirm that all these things regard them as to the infallibility of enjoying them, because of this condition of faith being destined for, and in time bestowed upon them. Although, therefore, in some special way, the death and resurrection of Christ, with the great treasure of his merits, may be restricted to the elect alone (of which we shall discourse afterwards), yet it is not to be denied that the death and merits of Christ, who took the one nature of all, and undertook the one cause of all, are of that kind, that they may be announced, offered, and by faith applied to every individual partaker of human nature. This Christ himself hath indicated in a manner sufficiently clear, in those words, John iii 17, 18, _God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved; he that believeth on him is not condemned; but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God_. Those, therefore, who never believe, nor will believe, *would nevertheless have had life procurable through the death and merits of Christ, according to the ordination of God, if they had believed*.



https://books.google.com/books?id=P...eath, resurrection, and intercession"&f=false

We shouldn't confound the helpless God of Arminianism with how God is represented in HU, for while HU promotes a hypothetical benefit for those who are passed over, it nevertheless gives substance to the free offer.



Reformed Covenanter said:


> Also, if one wishes to avoid hyper-Calvinism, it is perfectly possible to do so without being a hypothetical universalist. The fact that many orthodox Calvinists are neither hyper-Calvinists nor hypothetic universalists surely demonstrates that point. You could also avoid hyper-Calvinism by being an Arminian, but simply avoiding one form of aberrant theology is hardly a good excuse for embracing another form of aberrant theology.



Agreed. Certainly strict particularism does not equal HC.

We should be careful not to bear false witness against even those positions with which were disagree.


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## Reformed Covenanter (Dec 15, 2015)

Tim, I read your post earlier and have chosen not to respond until now. I am afraid that I fail to see any sense in the hypothetical universalist position. Nobody was disputing whether or not Christ actually died. To adopt hypothetical universalism as a basis for the free offer of the gospel seems to be basing the free offer on a hypothetical atonement that does not atone for the sins of those for whom it was hypothetically made. On this basis, the free offer is based on a lie. Christ never preached any such thing, and he was quite willing to tell people that he only lays down his life for the sheep and not for those who are not his sheep.


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## Justified (Dec 15, 2015)

Reformed Covenanter said:


> Tim, I read your post earlier and have chosen not to respond until now. I am afraid that I fail to see any sense in the hypothetical universalist position. Nobody was disputing whether or not Christ actually died. To adopt hypothetical universalism as a basis for the free offer of the gospel seems to be basing the free offer on a hypothetical atonement that does not atone for the sins of those for whom it was hypothetically made. On this basis, the free offer is based on a lie. Christ never preached any such thing, and he was quite willing to tell people that he only lays down his life for the sheep and not for those who are not his sheep.


If I remember right, John Murray in his _Redemption Accomplished and Applied_ makes the same argument: the particularist, non-hypothetical, atonement is the ground of the free offer of the gospel. We offer Christ crucified having made full satisfaction for sins for _sinners_. As Rev. Winzer has astutely remarked before, the gospel is offered to sinners _as_ sinners.


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## timfost (Dec 15, 2015)

Daniel,

Again, I did not respond to argue a position, only to demonstrate how a HU would respond to your comments. I'm still not sure if you're gasping what is hypothetical about the position. According to Davenant, Christ merited faith for the elect alone. This is not hypothetical but very actual. What is hypothetical regards the salvation rejected by the reprobate. Davenant argues that it is untrue to say to someone individually that "if you believe you will be saved" if Christ sacrifice had nothing to do with each person in any sense. In other words, HU believe that the reprobate actually reject salvation because it is actually offered on condition of faith. It is maintained that the condition cannot possibly be met unless Christ meets the condition. However, they maintain this distinction so that it is nevertheless true that _if_ one would repent (even if God didn't decree it), they would be saved.

If you would like to understand it, why not go to a primary source and read Davenant's Dissertation? Again, regardless of anyone's disagreement with it, we should always try to represent it fairly so that we uphold the truth.


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## Reformed Covenanter (Dec 15, 2015)

Tim, I understand that HUers argue that Christ only actually atoned for the sins of the elect. My point is that they also argue that he in some sense he hypothetically died for the non-elect, and that this position leads to absurdity as it makes no sense when weighed against the scriptures that clearly teach particularism. For what it's worth, my friend wrote a book on hypothetical universalism and John Preston.


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## timfost (Dec 15, 2015)

Justified said:


> If I remember right, John Murray in his _Redemption Accomplished and Applied_ makes the same argument: the particularist, non-hypothetical, atonement is the ground of the free offer of the gospel. We offer Christ crucified having made full satisfaction for sins for _sinners_. As Rev. Winzer has astutely remarked before, the gospel is offered to sinners _as_ sinners.



Yes, and this distinction allows for the indiscriminate offer from a strict particularist perspective (which is a great thing!).

The HU would say that salvation is offered to sinners because it is applicable to all sinners, not because it was intended to be infallibly applied to all sinners. Davenant employs the words "reconcilable" and "salvable" with an absolute intention to save the elect alone. 

(I've read most of Murray's book by the way. I really like much of it.)


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## timfost (Dec 15, 2015)

(Accidental repost)...


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## timfost (Dec 15, 2015)

Reformed Covenanter said:


> Tim, I understand that HUers argue that Christ only actually atoned for the sins of the elect. My point is that they also argue that he in some sense he hypothetically died for the non-elect, and that this position leads to absurdity as it makes no sense when weighed against the scriptures that clearly teach particularism. For what it's worth, my friend wrote a book on hypothetical universalism and John Preston.



And this is where the impass in terminology arises. The HU cannot understand why Christ's death is synonymous with Christ's intention to save the elect in the mind of the strict particularist. They would not say that He hypothetically died for the non-elect because Christ's death is not synonymous with His intention to save the elect. Salvation applied does not occur on the cross, but at the point of faith. John Murray makes this clear in his book mentioned above.

BTW, is your friend Moore?


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## Reformed Covenanter (Dec 15, 2015)

timfost said:


> BTW, is your friend Moore?



Yes.


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## Semper Fidelis (Dec 15, 2015)

Tim,

The problem with the "free offer" of the HU position is that it moves from ectypal theology to archetypal theology. It moves from the liberality of the offer being made on a historical basis to sinners to repent and believe that Christ died for sinners to the idea that God has some sort of "hypothetical ordination" that a person would be saved if they believe. Davenport is at least agreeing that the evangelical graces of repentance and faith are what Christ procures for the Elect but he then moves to posit that the only way in which ectypal theology can be true (namely, that Christ came into the word not to condemn but to save) is to posit something about God in Himself (archetypal). The only ground that Davenport (and you it seems) can accept that the offer can be free is to assume something about the hidden counsel of God - namely, that in a hypothetical decree God might have ordained that a person be given all the evangelical graces He ordained in Christ's atonement if a particular sinner believes the Gospel.

This is no basis for the creature to believe the intention of the offer of the Gospel. The Scriptures reveal to men, as creatures, to have creaturely confidence, the maximal possible confidence they can have, that Christ is offered for their salvation in the Gospel. They need not peer into hidden things and wonder about whether they have been hypothetically or really decreed to believe the Gospel. It is sufficient for them to hear and believe or reject the *historical* proclamation of the Gospel.


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## MW (Dec 15, 2015)

The gospel offer is, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." Holy Scripture teaches it in express terms. Nowhere in Scripture do we find a sinner addressed with the offer, "Christ died for you if you will believe on Him." Hypothetical universalism is an invention of the human brain. It is pure sentimentality. It begins with an anthropocentric view of God's love and works its way like leaven through the reformed soteriological system until it has taken away the assurance of faith which reformed soteriology ministers. It swallows up the bread of life in pure conjecture. Having no real basis in the saving work of Christ, it has to create artificial categories and speak of hypotheticals as if they were real.


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## Justified (Dec 15, 2015)

Semper Fidelis said:


> Tim,
> 
> *The problem with the "free offer" of the HU position is that it moves from ectypal theology to archetypal theology.* It moves from the liberality of the offer being made on a historical basis to sinners to repent and believe that Christ died for sinners to the idea that God has some sort of "hypothetical ordination" that a person would be saved if they believe. Davenport is at least agreeing that the evangelical graces of repentance and faith are what Christ procures for the Elect but he then moves to posit that the only way in which ectypal theology can be true (namely, that Christ came into the word not to condemn but to save) is to posit something about God in Himself (archetypal). The only ground that Davenport (and you it seems) can accept that the offer can be free is to assume something about the hidden counsel of God - namely, that in a hypothetical decree God might have ordained that a person be given all the evangelical graces He ordained in Christ's atonement if a particular sinner believes the Gospel.
> 
> This is no basis for the creature to believe the intention of the offer of the Gospel. The Scriptures reveal to men, as creatures, to have creaturely confidence, the maximal possible confidence they can have, that Christ is offered for their salvation in the Gospel. They need not peer into hidden things and wonder about whether they have been hypothetically or really decreed to believe the Gospel. It is sufficient for them to hear and believe or reject the *historical* proclamation of the Gospel.


Well noted, Rich.


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## timfost (Dec 16, 2015)

Rich,

I'm not sure if I understand your application concerning an ectypal/archetypal distinction in relation to this subject. Are you saying that the free offer has no basis in archetypal theology?

Also, I'm not satisfied with language like a hypothetical decree (Davenant at one place calls it a "conditional decree"). There is only one decree which is not based on any antecedent conditions. However, conditions have their place in second causes. If you're calling the doctrine of second causes ectypal, I'm not sure if this accounts properly for His revealed will. Unfortunately, that would get us into the territory of the sincere offer. Those conversations don't go so well on PB.

Matthew,

I agree that the biblical example is "repent and believe the gospel." There is not a biblical precedent for proclaiming "Christ is dead for you." I don't think what you and I would declare to the lost would sound any different. This conversation concerns the theology behind identical phraseology.

___________

BTW, I'm not sold on HU. I'm convinced that Christ died sufficiently for everyone as I subscribe to Dort, but I'm still studying the distinctions made by HU.

Thanks for continuing the conversation.


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## MW (Dec 16, 2015)

timfost said:


> I agree that the biblical example is "repent and believe the gospel." There is not a biblical precedent for proclaiming "Christ is dead for you." I don't think what you and I would declare to the lost would sound any different. This conversation concerns the theology behind identical phraseology.



Tim, thankyou for the clarification. I am encouraged by your willingness to weigh things up.


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## Semper Fidelis (Dec 16, 2015)

timfost said:


> I'm not sure if I understand your application concerning an ectypal/archetypal distinction in relation to this subject. Are you saying that the free offer has no basis in archetypal theology?
> 
> Also, I'm not satisfied with language like a hypothetical decree (Davenant at one place calls it a "conditional decree"). There is only one decree which is not based on any antecedent conditions. However, conditions have their place in second causes. If you're calling the doctrine of second causes ectypal, I'm not sure if this accounts properly for His revealed will. Unfortunately, that would get us into the territory of the sincere offer. Those conversations don't go so well on PB.



My problem is this from your quote:


timfost said:


> Those, therefore, who never believe, nor will believe, would nevertheless have had life procurable through the death and merits of Christ, *according to the ordination of God, if they had believed.*


The idea is that there is a "hypothetical ordination" where, had the sinner believed, he would have been ordained to believe unto eternal life. Archetypal theology is God's knowledge in Himself. There is no hypothetical ordination, there is only what is ordained. Davenport is arguing that the basis that the sinner can ultimately know that the Atonement is sufficient is to know that, even if not ordained unto eternal life, if he *could* believe then in some possible world the Atonement is sufficient to save if he had been given the evangelical graces that Christ procured for him in another possible world where the Father decrees to give him to the Son. 

Proper theology must avoid speculation about the hidden counsel of God and that includes speculating about how God might have ordained other worlds as the basis for the sufficiency of the Atonement. There is no room for the creature to base his assurance of God's willingness to save based upon the sufficiency of the Atonement in possible worlds.


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## timfost (Dec 16, 2015)

Rich, 

Have you read Davenant's book? I don't believe he ever talks about things being ordained hypothetically. He makes a distinction between "mere sufficiency" and "ordained sufficiency." I'm not sure if you are properly understanding Davenant's usage of "ordained."

(As an aside, we are talking about the Reformed theologian Davenant, not the Catholic theologian Davenport, right?)


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## MW (Dec 16, 2015)

timfost said:


> I don't believe he ever talks about things being ordained hypothetically.



He falls back on a "conditional decree." This is another problem with the different varieties of hypothetical universalism. Because the death of Christ draws its virtue from God's decree (as Christ came to do the will of the Father), it has to fall back on the decrees in order to substantiate the hypothetical reference. This is the more significant when it is kept in mind that the French Synods, reflecting on the charges against Amyraut and Testard, gave direction that teachers abstain from speaking of conditional decrees.


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## timfost (Dec 17, 2015)

MW said:


> timfost said:
> 
> 
> > I don't believe he ever talks about things being ordained hypothetically.
> ...



Yes, I agree that a "conditional decree" is highly problematic. I believe (but could be mistaken) that the French synod to which you refer specifically rejected the Amyraldian scheme which promoted a failed decree of God to save all men prior to the decree to elect a part of them. Regardless, any kind of conditional decree is problematic because the decree of God has no antecedent conditions, and scripture always represents the decree as one and eternal based on the unchanging God.

Below is a quote from Charles Hodge's ST. I'll break up the quote for some observations, but it is not cut-and-pasted from all over, but continuous from 3.8.2:



> Admitting the satisfaction of Christ to be in itself of infinite value, how can it avail for the non-elect if it was not designed for them? It does not avail for the fallen angels, because it was not intended for them; how then can it avail for the non-elect, if not designed for them?



Davenant had a significant portion dedicated to this subject.



> How can a ransom, whatever its intrinsic value, benefit those for whom it was not paid? In this form the objection is far more specious. *It is, however, fallacious*. It overlooks the peculiar nature of the case. It ignores the fact that all mankind were placed under the same constitution or covenant. What was demanded for the salvation of one was demanded for the salvation of all. Every man is required to satisfy the demands of the law. No man is required to do either more or less. *If those demands are satisfied by a representative or substitute, his work is equally available for all. The secret purpose of God in providing such a substitute for man, has nothing to do with the nature of his work, or with its appropriateness. The righteousness of Christ being of infinite value or merit, and being in its nature precisely what all men need, may be offered to all men*.



Hodge takes the position of what Davenant calls "ordained sufficiency" instead of what he calls "mere sufficiency," which is what Owen promoted. 



> It is thus offered to the elect and to the non-elect; and it is offered to *both classes conditionally*. That condition is a cordial acceptance of it as the only ground of justification.



According to Hodge, the same condition is required for the elect and non-elect. Hodge states earlier the certainty that the elect would meet this condition when he said: "The effect of a ransom and sacrifice may indeed be conditional, but the occurrence of the condition will be rendered certain before the costly sacrifice is offered."



> If any of the elect (being adults) fail thus to accept of it, they perish. If any of the non-elect should believe, they would be saved.



Of course, none of the non-elect will (or could) exercise faith and none of the elect can fail to exercise faith. It seems that if we are measuring only by God's decree (which Hodge warns against), there could be no truth to Hodge's assertion, but, it would seem, according to hypothetical necessity, the statement is true and does not necessitate a "conditional decree."

It seems to me that this mode of representation is consistent with 2 Thes. 2:10, among many other passages.

I know that speaking of "conditions" for salvation has been debated recently, but certainly the Reformed do not all represent this issue identically. I quoted Hodge since he represents one who makes the sufficient-efficient distinction, promotes hypothetical necessity in relation to the Atonement and was a Westminster Presbyterian.


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## MW (Dec 17, 2015)

timfost said:


> Yes, I agree that a "conditional decree" is highly problematic. I believe (but could be mistaken) that the French synod to which you refer specifically rejected the Amyraldian scheme which promoted a failed decree of God to save all men prior to the decree to elect a part of them.



According to Quick's Synodicon the decision of the Synod does not make mention of post-redemptionism or the order of the decrees, but only prohibits teaching conditional decrees, that is, a conditional will "in" God which denies conditionality is an anthropopathism. Amyraut explained that he meant it anthropopathically and that he was really only exploring the issue from the human side (an admission of the speculative nature of his scheme). I gather that he received the right hand of fellowship because the Synod accepted this explanation and understood that he would no longer speak of conditional decrees.



timfost said:


> Davenant had a significant portion dedicated to this subject.



Davenant's presentation simply repeats what all the Reformed taught on intrinsic sufficiency, but tries to demonstrate a problem with limiting it to the absolute decree. We find him falling back on a conditional design to support the idea that the sufficiency has some kind of conditional intention for all men.



timfost said:


> Hodge takes the position of what Davenant calls "ordained sufficiency" instead of what he calls "mere sufficiency," which is what Owen promoted.



From where do you derive this idea? Owen has a significant passage on sufficiency in Death of Death (book 4, section 1), and he appears to me to grant to this sufficiency everything which Hodge would later maintain.

As noted by J. I. Packer in the introductory essay, "we should observe that the old gospel of Owen contains no less full and free an offer of salvation than its modern counterpart. It presents ample grounds of faith (the sufficiency of Christ, and the promise of God), and cogent motives to faith (the sinner’s need, and the Creator’s command, which is also the Redeemer’s invitation)."



timfost said:


> Of course, none of the non-elect will (or could) exercise faith and none of the elect can fail to exercise faith.



The "could" part of this statement sounds necessarian and diametrically opposed to the very idea of an offer. As far as the gospel offer is concerned all men "could" exercise faith as a point of natural capability and responsibility. It is because they "will not" exercise faith as a result and manifestation of their own natural depravity that they are entirely inexcusable. As noted previously, I think it creates confusion to bring election and reprobation into the gospel offer.



timfost said:


> I know that speaking of "conditions" for salvation has been debated recently, but certainly the Reformed do not all represent this issue identically.



There are nuances to the idea of "conditions," and it is possible that readers misunderstand some of these nuances; but there is a boundary of "irresistible grace," which should restrict discussion and ensure that "conditions" are identified as revealed "connections" in the divine purpose of bestowing salvation.


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## timfost (Dec 17, 2015)

Thank you, Matthew, for your thoughtful response.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do see a nuanced difference between the scholastic sufficient-efficient and Owen's. I've quoted Davenant and Owen below with the distinctions underlined.



> The death of Christ is the universal cause of the salvation of mankind, and Christ himself is acknowledged to have died for all men sufficiently, not by reason of the mere sufficiency or of the intrinsic value, according to which the death of God is a price more than sufficient for redeeming a thousand worlds; but by reason of the Evangelical covenant confirmed with the whole human race through the merit of this death, and of the Divine ordination depending upon it, according to which, under the possible condition of faith, remission of sins and eternal life is decreed to be set before every mortal man who will believe it, on account of the merits of Christ. (Dissertation, 401-402)





> It was, then, the purpose and intention of God that his Son should offer a sacrifice of infinite worth, value, and dignity, sufficient in itself for the redeeming of all and every man, if it had pleased the Lord to employ it to that purpose; yea, and of other worlds also, if the Lord should freely make them, and would redeem them. Sufficient we say, then, was the sacrifice of Christ for the redemption of the whole world, and for the expiation of all the sins of all and every man in the world. (Owen, Death of Death)



It seems that there is a nuanced distinction with Owen that's different from scholastic literature. 

1. Scholastic distinction allows for the phrase "Christ died sufficiently for all."

2. Owen could only say that the _price paid_ was sufficient for all, not that Christ died sufficiently for all.

Certainly Owen does not reject the free offer. But it would seem that the scholastic distinction of sufficient for all is used by Hodge and others as the basis of the free offer, the condition of faith being equal for every individual to whom it is offered regardless if salvation was procured for them by God's design.

Davenant makes an interesting observation regarding God's absolute decree and the intention of Christ's sacrifice:



> For we do not contend that God by his absolute will (which not only predetermines the ordination of means to an end, but also the infallible production of the end) intended actually to procure the salvation of each and every man through the death of Christ; *but that he appointed, willed, and ordained that the death of his Son should be, and should be esteemed, a ransom of such a kind that it might be offered and applied to all men individually*. (391)



He stops short of saying that God absolutely willed the salvation of all, but rather that He absolutely willed that the sacrifice would be applicable to all so that it could be offered to all.

Davenant further defines this in relation to sufficiency:



> Now to this mere sufficiency, which regards nothing else than the equal or superabundant worth of the appointed price of redemption, I oppose another, which, for the sake of perspicuity, I shall call ordained sufficiency. This is understood when the thing which has respect to the ransom, or redemption price, is not only equivalent to, or superior in value to the thing redeemed, but also is ordained for its redemption by some wish to offer or actual offering. (403)



Even though I disagree with Davenant's occasional usage of "conditional decree," he makes an interesting observation concerning the (absolute) decree/design of the Atonement and the free offer. This seems consistent with Hodge's application (although admittedly both Hodge and Davenant would promote a sincere offer from God).

Thanks again for your willingness to discuss. I really do appreciate it (and I really don't want to come across as being argumentative). I'm enjoying the conversation and learning a lot.


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## MW (Dec 17, 2015)

timfost said:


> Correct me if I'm wrong, but I do see a nuanced difference between the scholastic sufficient-efficient and Owen's.



Owen's view allows everything quoted from Hodge, which leads me to conclude there is no solid basis for alleging Hodge maintained something different. As for the scholastics or Davenant, they had their own modes of reasoning.

What does Davenant's idea of conditional ordination amount to? Conditional sufficiency. That is not conducive to faith. Owen taught absolute sufficiency as a certain ground of faith. That appears to me to be a stronger basis for the gospel offer than God ordaining something on the condition that men perform their part.

Hodge's comment is quite pertinent. The same thing is offered to all men on the same conditions. There is not one gospel for the elect and another for the non-elect. We should be holding out the sufficiency of Christ to all men indefinitely, not the sufficiency of Christ to some men conditionally and to others unconditionally.


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## Clark-Tillian (Dec 17, 2015)

Matthew Winzer wrote: _That is the problem with something hypothetical. You could say it about everything and have contributed nothing to one's understanding of reality._ That is exactly the point; "hypotheticals" are fun when discussing sports, politics etc. But I've discovered, as a pastor, that all too often a "hypothetical" in theology, dogma and doctrine can easily fall prey to _*bold and curious searching into his secrets*_ which LC 105 makes clear is forbidden.


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## timfost (Dec 17, 2015)

Were Christ's bones capable of being broken?


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## MW (Dec 18, 2015)

timfost said:


> Were Christ's bones capable of being broken?



In themselves, yes; by God's decree, no.


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