# Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein)



## RamistThomist

I read this because of Wittgenstein’s importance in 20th century analytic philosophy, not because I enjoyed it. The book is tough sledding. It is a series of notes loosely following larger sections of ideas. That’s not a bad style, and if pulled off correctly, it can be philosophically devastating. Nietzsche was the undisputed master of it. Blaise Pascal good do it as well. Wittgenstein...doesn’t quite accomplish it.

(2)


But his ideas are important. 

(3)

I haven’t read Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus, but I get the idea that he is rejecting that work. In this work he is analysizing Augustine’s statement (Confessions I.8) that words describe objects. True, but words do far more. 

(4)

Words act. The meaning of a word is often in how it is used (5 red apples example). Language game: the speaking of language is part of an activity/form of life (para 23). The definition of a word is seen in its use. “Language is a medium of action.”

(5) 

Language games. All Language Games are public. They have rules that are established through repeated trials. Language games operate on tacit presuppositions.

(6) 

Is this speech-act theory? It points the way towards it. And I think this is Wittgenstein’s biggest pay-off. 

(7)

An excursus on Being and Non-Being. 

Problem: if everything that we call being and non-being consists in the connections between elements, it make no sense to speak of an element’s being...existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist one could not name it (sec. 50).

(8)

Can there be the Platonic form of a negative number? Do negatives have being? What about placing a negative sign in front of the infinity symbol? What is Platonic universal for that?

(9)

-∞

Conclusion

It wasn’t conceptually hard to read, but it was hard to “get to the next page.” For those of us who cut our teeth on John Frame and Vern Poythress, a lot of Wittgenstein will be familiar. There were many valuable and keen insights (e.g., Moore’s Paradox). However, I don’t know if I would make this the staple of my philosophy diet.


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## MW

ReformedReidian said:


> The definition of a word is seen in its use. “Language is a medium of action.”



If I follow this through, the statement, "language is a medium of action," is itself an action of which I cannot understand the meaning until I have grasped the use. So now I am in the sorry state of having to judge motives before I can take a man at his word. The idea that there are men who wish to be taken at their word, and who speak of the more important matters of life in plain language, must itself be judged as having some motive other than what it professes. Where does that leave the gospel and its simple proclamation?


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## RamistThomist

I don't think Witt. is saying it is either/or. (He might be; half the time I couldn't follow him). I think he is saying that sometimes we don't understand a word until we see it in its "use."

Or we understand words in their language-games (contexts maybe?)


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## MW

ReformedReidian said:


> I don't think Witt. is saying it is either/or. (He might be; half the time I couldn't follow him).



If we were supposed to understand his "meaning," he would be self-refuting. He who finds that frustrating might be more of a realist than he thinks.


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## Philip

So I've been fascinated by Wittgenstein for a number of years, ever since I attended a series of lectures by Peter Hacker at Oxford.

You are correct, Jacob, that Witt is pointing toward what would become speech-act theory. What he's reacting against is the so-called picture theory of language which sees propositions as the only interesting feature of language and sees all words as corresponding either to objects or to logical relations.

Every time I come back to this one I find something new. Witt's style is calculated so that you have to follow the entire thing from the beginning to get what's going on. This is in conscious contrast to the _Tractatus_ which had been analyzed and over-analyzed by the logical positivists of the 20s and 30s.

One place of caution, though, is what I've called the Helen Keller problem. His philosophical analysis of language works well when describing how competent language users use language and discern meaning. What it doesn't really address, except circumspectly, is that the only people we know of who are able to report what the process of becoming competent in language looks like don't describe it that way. For example, Helen Keller in the wellhouse.


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## Philip

MW said:


> If I follow this through, the statement, "language is a medium of action," is itself an action of which I cannot understand the meaning until I have grasped the use.



I think you misunderstand here. He isn't talking about use in terms of intention but in terms of place in the language. In other words, meaning is often understood in terms of use in relation to other words. He's pointing out that plain language is actually more complex than it appears. But he's not denying its reality.


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## MW

Philip said:


> But he's not denying its reality.



What are you "doing" in saying this? If you follow him I can't follow either you or him.


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## Philip

MW said:


> What are you "doing" in saying this?



I am making a descriptive statement. When saying that we are doing things with words, what Witt is pointing out is that descriptive statements (the obsession of Logical Positivism, Bertrand Russell, etc) are not the only thing we do with words. For example, we promise things. We ask questions. We compliment. We supplicate. We even pray (though Witt is curiously silent on that one). Austin's work is clearer here, but speech-act theory isn't obscurantism. On the contrary, it's actually fairly basic in terms of how we actually use language.

For example, as a minister of the Gospel, when you perform a marriage, you say "I pronounce you man and wife." This is a type of speech act that accomplishes that which it pronounces. That is, you, speaking as a minister of the Gospel, have authority to make certain pronouncements which take effect.


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## RamistThomist

Proponents of speech-act aren't saying that all verbal moments are necessarily speech act. We are just saying that words can do things. Words can produce effects. Let's say I am an American soldier behind German lines. I only know a few lines of German, but I won't to convince the German or Italian soldiers that I am German. I say to them "‘Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?’ I don't particularly care whether they in fact know where the lemon trees are. My question aims at a perlocutionary effect.


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## MW

Philip said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> What are you "doing" in saying this?
> 
> 
> 
> I am making a descriptive statement.
Click to expand...


What are you "doing" in stating that you are making a descriptive statement?

You see the problem. You never actually say anything meaningful because meaning is always subordinate to use.


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## Philip

MW said:


> You see the problem. You never actually say anything meaningful because meaning is always subordinate to use.



Meaning is not subordinate to use. Meaning is use. A word's meaning depends on how it is used. For example, the difference between "A Panda eats shoots and leaves" and "A Panda eats, shoots, and leaves." The word "shoots" in one instance seems to be a noun referring to small plants, while in another instance it seems to mean an action involving a weapon. Most puns are examples of plays on ambiguities in use.

Similarly, speech-act theory merely points out that we use words to do various kinds of things. I think your worry is that there is a kind of skepticism involved here, but more likely it is a hermaneutic circle.

Take, for example, all kinds of everyday cliches, metaphors, and allusions that we take for granted. "There's method in his madness." This, of course, is an allusion to _Hamlet_ but most of us, when using it, are not intentionally referencing Shakespeare, but commenting on how someone's seemingly irrational behaviour is making sense. Even the use of the word "mad" here is a metaphorical one.

The point is that even in the kinds of plain speaking which you clearly prefer, there are layers of complexity that we are able to take for granted, whether speech-acts, common metaphors, or homophones, and I would hold that these phenomenon are part of God's intention in language--they are aids to understanding, not necessarily impediments.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Meaning is not subordinate to use. Meaning is use. A word's meaning depends on how it is used. For example, the difference between "A Panda eats shoots and leaves" and "A Panda eats, shoots, and leaves." The word "shoots" in one instance seems to be a noun referring to small plants, while in another instance it seems to mean an action involving a weapon. Most puns are examples of plays on ambiguities in use.



Trying to dress up non-realism to look like the science of semantics is just silly.


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## Philip

MW said:


> Trying to dress up non-realism to look like the science of semantics is just silly.



I'm curious as to which realism you mean here. For example, if we're talking about epistemological realism, then Witt is not necessarily in conflict with it. On the other hand, he probably is opposed to realism about universals, but that doesn't necessarily make him wrong, as Thomas Reid (along with much of the reformed tradition) is a nominalist about universals. In fact Reid's philosophy of language looks very similar to that of the ordinary language philosophy that followed Wittgenstein.


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## MW

Philip said:


> I'm curious as to which realism you mean here. For example, if we're talking about epistemological realism, then Witt is not necessarily in conflict with it. On the other hand, he probably is opposed to realism about universals, but that doesn't necessarily make him wrong, as Thomas Reid (along with much of the reformed tradition) is a nominalist about universals. In fact Reid's philosophy of language looks very similar to that of the ordinary language philosophy that followed Wittgenstein.



Reid's nominalism only related to abstract ideas and essences, and was based on the presupposition of personal creation: "Yet, as was before observed, our conception of them is always inadequate and lame. They are the creatures of God, and there are many things belonging to them which we know not, and which cannot be deduced by reasoning from what we know: they have a real essence or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow; but this essence our faculties do not comprehend: they are therefore incapable of definition; for a definition ought to comprehend the whole nature or essence of the thing defined."


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## Philip

MW said:


> Reid's nominalism only related to abstract ideas and essences



So the realism you were talking about is universal realism, correct?


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## MW

Philip said:


> So the realism you were talking about is universal realism, correct?



Realism means the mind knows the real thing, not just an idea of the thing. We know the world; we do not create the world. Language reflects reality; it does not create reality.


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## MW

Reid: "Language being the express image of human thought..." "Things that are distinguished in all languages, such as substance and quality, action and passion, cause and effect, must be distinguished by the natural powers of the human mind. The philosophy of grammar, and that of the human understanding, are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined."


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## Philip

MW said:


> Realism means the mind knows the real thing, not just an idea of the thing. We know the world; we do not create the world. Language reflects reality; it does not create reality.



As I said, I am not sure that Wittgenstein is entirely opposed to this. What he's skeptical of is the value of much of metaphysical discourse, because he thinks that in many cases we mistake grammatical necessities for ontological or metaphysical truths. Which is why your quote from Reid actually puts a bit of perspective on it: Reid is not an uncritical realist, recognizing that there are certain things that most/all languages have in common, but also recognizing that there are differences. If language reflects human thought, then German-speakers really do think differently from English-speakers.


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## Philip

Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.


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## RamistThomist

I just read Bill Alston's _The Reliability of Sense Perception_ and he suggests that the neo-Reidian take on on doxastic practices (Plantinga, Wolterstorff) is similar to Wittgenstein's language games.


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## MW

Philip said:


> If language reflects human thought, then German-speakers really do think differently from English-speakers.



Language must reflect human thought for there to be truth-speaking; Psalm 15, "and speaketh the truth in his heart."

Everyone will grant there are differences between humans and broad differences between cultures, although as Christians we are committed to the fact there is a common nature which is shared by all humanity.


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## Philip

ReformedReidian said:


> I just read Bill Alston's _The Reliability of Sense Perception_ and he suggests that the neo-Reidian take on on doxastic practices (Plantinga, Wolterstorff) is similar to Wittgenstein's language games.



It really is. Witt is skeptical, though, about the possibility of metaphysics because he thinks it usually mistakes the structure of language for the structure of reality. I, on the other hand, would tend to say that metaphysics is itself that language-game which is concerned with the structure of reality.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.



An atheist and an agnostic differ theoretically but they practically function the same way. Likewise anti-realism and non-realism. Herod and Pilate become friends in condemning the truth.


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## Philip

MW said:


> Likewise anti-realism and non-realism.



Again, I don't know that he's a non-realist. His anti-metaphysical stance may indicate that, and on some readings (D.Z. Phillips for instance) he is, but on others (P.M.S. Hacker comes to mind) the question of realism simply isn't one that he is addressing as such. Certainly Austin and the speech-act theorists who followed Wittgenstein would hold to realism (really the whole analytic tradition leans in that direction, sometimes too heavily).

He _is_ a fallibilist, but then again so are most realists.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Again, I don't know that he's a non-realist. His anti-metaphysical stance may indicate that, and on some readings (D.Z. Phillips for instance) he is, but on others (P.M.S. Hacker comes to mind) the question of realism simply isn't one that he is addressing as such. Certainly Austin and the speech-act theorists who followed Wittgenstein would hold to realism (really the whole analytic tradition leans in that direction, sometimes too heavily).



What does his famous statement about solipsism, idealism, and realism amount to?

That aside, the statement relating to use and meaning, which I originally addressed in this thread, is fundamentally non-realist. Without a realist view of meaning there really is no use because the inquiry into use is an endless one.



Philip said:


> He _is_ a fallibilist, but then again so are most realists.



A real realist holds some beliefs as most basic; hence the "fallibilism" would have to be severely modified and/or restricted to specific empirical inquiries. A proper fallibilist is self-defeating. He cannot assert his position with any certainty.

At any rate, if Jesus is "the truth," we cannot be fallibilist. The gospel is meaningless without realism.


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## Philip

MW said:


> What does his famous statement about solipsism, idealism, and realism amount to?



I believe that's in the _Tractatus_, which he later rejected.



MW said:


> Without a realist view of meaning there really is no use because the inquiry into use is an endless one.



Ok, so there are two things being discussed here: "Meaning as use" is the first. This simply means that in _many_ (not necessarily all) cases, the meaning of a word is understood primarily in its context, both its immediate locutionary context and the larger grammatical context of language and the particular language-game being used.

The second is in regard to speech-act theory, where we understand an utterance by perceiving what the speaker is doing with it. So for example, a reader who picks up _A Modest Proposal_ and comes to the conclusion that Jonathan Swift advocated cannibalizing children has failed to recognize that the speech-act in which Swift is engaged is satirical.

If you like, we could think of speech-acts as similar to literary genres. To understand what you say, I have to read your words according to their genre.



MW said:


> A real realist holds some beliefs as most basic; hence the "fallibilism" would have to be severely modified and/or restricted to specific empirical inquiries. A proper fallibilist is self-defeating. He cannot assert his position with any certainty.



Fallibilism is generally a subspecies of realism. I hold that my faculties are not infallible, but generally reliable. The basic beliefs of which you speak are methodological assumptions grounded, at least in my case, in a particular metaphysical commitment to the God revealed in Scripture, namely the Trinitarian God. Of this I am persuaded and I pray daily that I would grow more and more certain in this truth. 

But certainty is a fickle thing. I find myself certain of many things one day and less certain the next. It's not that I disbelieve it, it's just the hermaneutic circle kicking back in.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Ok, so there are two things being discussed here: "Meaning as use" is the first. This simply means that in _many_ (not necessarily all) cases, the meaning of a word is understood primarily in its context, both its immediate locutionary context and the larger grammatical context of language and the particular language-game being used.
> 
> The second is in regard to speech-act theory, where we understand an utterance by perceiving what the speaker is doing with it. So for example, a reader who picks up _A Modest Proposal_ and comes to the conclusion that Jonathan Swift advocated cannibalizing children has failed to recognize that the speech-act in which Swift is engaged is satirical.
> 
> If you like, we could think of speech-acts as similar to literary genres. To understand what you say, I have to read your words according to their genre.



As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up. In traditional rhetoric or the science of semantics meaning is not a matter of use. Both require fundamentally realist approaches to meaning in order to have these limited uses. Words "extend" their meanings and function within semantic fields, but this is only discernible because there is meaning in both the word and its field.



Philip said:


> Fallibilism is generally a subspecies of realism.



Are you sure? Obviously not! Unreal realism is no realism.


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## Philip

MW said:


> Are you sure?



Reasonably.



MW said:


> As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up.



Is use not real?



MW said:


> Words "extend" their meanings and function within semantic fields, but this is only discernible because there is meaning in both the word and its field.



Sure, and that meaning derives from a competent language-user. Apart from intention (illocution) sounds or shapes (locution) will be meaningless. Another way of describing this would be with Peirce's triad of sign-signified-interpretant (or, in Percy's reinvention, interpret_er_).


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## MW

Philip said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> Are you sure?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Reasonably.
Click to expand...


So within the confines of your "reason," you are supposing you do not in fact err, and thus contradicting your previous commitment.



Philip said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Is use not real?
Click to expand...


Use of what? The "what" requires meaning prior to use. The meaning is not in the use.



Philip said:


> Sure, and that meaning derives from a competent language-user.



From wherever it is derived, it has to exist in order to be used; hence meaning is distinct from use. Realism strikes again!


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## RamistThomist

Philip said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> Are you sure?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Reasonably.
> 
> 
> 
> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Is use not real?
> 
> 
> 
> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> Words "extend" their meanings and function within semantic fields, but this is only discernible because there is meaning in both the word and its field.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Sure, and that meaning derives from a competent language-user. Apart from intention (illocution) sounds or shapes (locution) will be meaningless. Another way of describing this would be with Peirce's triad of sign-signified-interpretant (or, in Percy's reinvention, interpret_er_).
Click to expand...


when you say Pierce's triad, what book are you talking about?


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## RamistThomist

MW said:


> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An atheist and an agnostic differ theoretically but they practically function the same way. Likewise anti-realism and non-realism. Herod and Pilate become friends in condemning the truth.
Click to expand...


Aren't Alvin Plantinga and William Alston fallible realists?


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## Philip

MW said:


> So within the confines of your "reason," you are supposing you do not in fact err, and thus contradicting your previous commitment.



Again, no. To say that one is reasonably certain is not to say that one is absolutely certain. Certainty is a threshold concept, not an absolute concept. Absolute certainty is a philosophical chimera that ultimately reflects a desire to know as God knows rather than to know as God's creature.



MW said:


> The meaning is not in the use.



Again, you seem to forget that use does not here merely mean immediate use but the word's place in relation to other words.

If I say "bring me the block" you have no idea what the word "block" means unless you know the context. A block of wood? Stone? Cheese? A block for use in rigging (as in the block and tackle)? The starting block? The chopping block?



ReformedReidian said:


> when you say Pierce's triad, what book are you talking about?



I would reference Peter Skagestad, “Peirce’s Semeiotic Model of the Mind,” in _The Caambridge Companion to Charles Sanders Peirce_ as well as the philosophical interlude in Walker Percy's _Lost in the Cosmos_ as well as his collection of essays _The Message in the Bottle_. In many respects I am appropriating Peirce's semiotic by way of Percy's reinterpretations and improvements.


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## MW

ReformedReidian said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An atheist and an agnostic differ theoretically but they practically function the same way. Likewise anti-realism and non-realism. Herod and Pilate become friends in condemning the truth.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Aren't Alvin Plantinga and William Alston fallible realists?
Click to expand...


Their epistemology modifies the traditional realist system. It tends to justify any religious experience.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Again, no. To say that one is reasonably certain is not to say that one is absolutely certain.



One would have to suppose his reason was absolute in order to think this negation was warranted. I said, "within the confines of your reason." As far as you are concerned, you are not erring. I did not say, as far as anyone else was concerned. Once you grant that you operate on the assumption that you do not err you are functioning as a realist whether you like to admit it or not.



Philip said:


> Again, you seem to forget that use does not here merely mean immediate use but the word's place in relation to other words.



That is, in relation to other words that mean something. It is an inescapable concept. Reality requires meaning in order to be real. Biblical ontology does not lie. God created things, set them in their places, and circumscribed their uses. For language to be real it must reflect this reality.



Philip said:


> If I say "bring me the block" you have no idea what the word "block" means unless you know the context. A block of wood? Stone? Cheese? A block for use in rigging (as in the block and tackle)? The starting block? The chopping block?



You have defined the word "block" within a limited range of ... wait for it ... MEANING. You can't avoid it.


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## Philip

MW said:


> As far as you are concerned, you are not erring.



Correct, but I am certainly open to contrary arguments.



MW said:


> Reality requires meaning in order to be real.



Correct. Creation has a _telos_.



MW said:


> For language to be real it must reflect this reality.



So what is the _telos_ of language?



MW said:


> You have defined the word "block" within a limited range of ... wait for it ... MEANING. You can't avoid it.



I have never denied the existence of meaning. I have simply averred that meaning, from a linguistic standpoint, is a function of use within a language and within a particular context. This doesn't mean that it isn't real. Of course it's real.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Correct, but I am certainly open to contrary arguments.



You defined your "certainty" as "reasonable;" hence you are not actually open to "contrary" arguments, for they would be contrary to what is reasonable; you are only open to "reasonable" arguments. Inescapable realism again!



Philip said:


> So what is the _telos_ of language?



That which is the goal of its "ontos."



Philip said:


> I have never denied the existence of meaning. I have simply averred that meaning, from a linguistic standpoint, is a function of use.



You call meaning a "function." The realist calls it a "foundation." Without an IS, there is no DOES.


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## Philip

MW said:


> You defined your "certainty" as "reasonable;" hence you are not actually open to "contrary" arguments, for they would be contrary to what is reasonable; you are only open to "reasonable" arguments. Inescapable realism again!



Reasonability means that one is open to reasoned arguments to the contrary. It is a disposition to accept reasoned arguments to the contrary. I have not encountered such. If you can convince me, I will happily change my view. I have done so in the past and will most likely do so in the future with other beliefs.



MW said:


> That which is the goal of its "ontos."



Which is? You've argued here that reality depends on meaning, implying that reality is contingent upon purpose. Essence precedes existence.



MW said:


> You call meaning a "function." The realist calls it a "foundation." Without an IS, there is no DOES.



But under a teleological ontology, there is no IS without a purpose. Essence precedes existence.


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## Contra_Mundum

I'm not chiming in, because I'm not competent to do so; just reading and hoping something vital sticks with me.

But as I understand things (I think more from Rev. Winzer's perspective), not only does essence precede existence; but ethics (ought) precedes essence at the level of the creation. If so, would this not make a Christian worldview quite the opposite of almost any purely rationally constructed system? (ala Descartes)

I really just want to know if such an observation "fits" anywhere in this discussion. Please, continue...


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## Philip

Contra_Mundum said:


> not only does essence precede existence; but ethics (ought) precedes essence at the level of the creation.



If Christian ethics means simply following the will of God, then yes. However, as God's will works itself out in creation, we find that the purposes of creation reveal the will of God. God speaks first and meaning is actualized.


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## Justified

I've found this exchange interesting, although maybe there is some talking past each other (or maybe not). It seems to me that Rev. Winzer wants the meanings of words to refer or correspond to objective realities, while Phillip wants to emphasize that meaning is based on use. No doubt one of the many uses of words is to refer to objective realities in the world. Many times, however, we use words with the intention or for the _use_ of bringing about some desired effect. For instance, "Honey, the trash is getting full" probably means take out the trash, given the context and use of that statement. It probably doesn't mean, or at least doesn't mean exclusively, there is some trashcan here that is very full (and I just thought I'd let you know). By claiming that use determines meaning, it seems to me that Phillip wants to embrace the diverse ways that we employ language; he doesn't want to deny the fact that we often use language to refer to objective realities in the world around us.

At least that's what I've taken away. Perhaps I'm mistaken. I'm not seeing the conflict really between realism and Phillip's claim.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Reasonability means that one is open to reasoned arguments to the contrary.



"Reasonable" means you are already committed to certain things which cannot be contradicted. The very existence of "reason" in "reasonable" presupposes numerous basic facts which are not open to contrary arguments.

The fact you argue for the "rightness" of your belief demonstrates to all and sundry that you are operating on the assumption that you are not in error. Your actions contradict your "fallibilism." It is self-refuting.



Philip said:


> Which is? You've argued here that reality depends on meaning, implying that reality is contingent upon purpose. Essence precedes existence.



What it IS should not matter to you. The fact you ask "Which is?" demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that you require meaning in order to have an use. Once again, your own procedure refutes you.



Philip said:


> But under a teleological ontology



A teleological ontology makes as much sense as a square circle.


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## MW

Contra_Mundum said:


> I really just want to know if such an observation "fits" anywhere in this discussion. Please, continue...



Only insofar as one has to determine whether ethics is deontological or teleological. The Christian tradition has committed itself to the former with its view of natural law and the ten commandments.


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## MW

Justified said:


> Many times, however, we use words with the intention or for the _use_ of bringing about some desired affect.



I would say that the effect is "always" the intended use of words. But my use of a thing and the thing itself are not the same.


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## Justified

MW said:


> Justified said:
> 
> 
> 
> Many times, however, we use words with the intention or for the _use_ of bringing about some desired affect.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would say that the effect is "always" the intended use of words. But my use of a thing and the thing itself are not the same.
Click to expand...

 So you would want to say that these words already have their meaning, but they are being used in such a way to bring about a desired effect? The meaning of words precedes their use, rather than vis versa. Am I evaluating your position fairly? Is that last statement the fundamental dispute between you and Phillip?


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## MW

Justified said:


> Am I evaluating your position fairly? Is that last statement the fundamental dispute between you and Phillip?



Yes, and yes. The meaning of words already determines the way they can be used. Even when language is used creatively it has to have some meaningful base from which to operate, and that creation does not sever its rational connection with its meaningful base. For the development of a word to have meaning it must be the development of something meaningful.


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## RamistThomist

MW said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An atheist and an agnostic differ theoretically but they practically function the same way. Likewise anti-realism and non-realism. Herod and Pilate become friends in condemning the truth.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Aren't Alvin Plantinga and William Alston fallible realists?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Their epistemology modifies the traditional realist system. It tends to justify any religious experience.
Click to expand...


Only if one doesn't include the category of defeaters. Their is nothing wrong with warrant and "initial warrant." But any position is open to defeaters.


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## Philip

MW said:


> "Reasonable" means you are already committed to certain things which cannot be contradicted.



If you mean that I am operating with certain methodological assumptions then yes.



MW said:


> What it IS should not matter to you. The fact you ask "Which is?" demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that you require meaning in order to have an use. Once again, your own procedure refutes you.



I hold that the _telos_ precedes the _ontos_. To tell me what a thing is for is to tell me what it is. If I ask, "what is that thing?" and you say "a knife" you have given me an essence, not the existence. The host of uses inherent in the concept "knife" is what you have told me. If you instead replied "a collection of metallic atoms" then you have given me the bare ontos but nothing really interesting.



MW said:


> A teleological ontology makes as much sense as a square circle.



Would the world exist apart from Divine purpose?



MW said:


> Only insofar as one has to determine whether ethics is deontological or teleological.



The answer to this question is "yes." Deontology and teleology are not mutually exclusive.



MW said:


> I would say that the effect is "always" the intended use of words.



Would you then say that miscommunication is impossible? Or that words are always persuasive? If I say "go take out the trash" to a roommate and he refuses to do so, that seems to contradict this. The perlocutionary aspect of my speech-act may not necessarily match my illocution.



MW said:


> The meaning of words already determines the way they can be used.



But the only way that the meaning can be understood is if the words are used. A word is a mere sign--the meaning is that which it signifies, and its signification depends on how we perceive the word in the language as a whole.

Consider the case of one of the few people who has been able to tell us how, exactly a person learns language: Helen Keller. Before she learned to use language, Helen suffered a debilitating illness that robbed her of hearing and of sight. Her parents eventually brought in a teacher who attempted to get through to her. Helen described the moment when her teacher brought her into the wellhouse:



> As the cool stream gushed over one hand, she spelled into the other the word water, first slowly then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something forgotten—a thrill of returning thought; and somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew then that “w-a-t-e-r” meant the cool wonderful something that was flowing over my hand.



The bare word has no meaning without context (in this case, the context being water flowing over the other hand). Adam could not name the animals unless he had been talking to God first. You cannot understand language without being a language-user in some minimal sense.


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## MW

Philip said:


> If you mean that I am operating with certain methodological assumptions then yes.



It is more than method and it is more than assumptions. If it is "reason," it is a must-have. You can't operate without it.



Philip said:


> Would the world exist apart from Divine purpose?



No, but it would exist without your purpose. The problem with your view is that man has to transcend himself and become a self-existent being in order to imitate God.



Philip said:


> The answer to this question is "yes." Deontology and teleology are not mutually exclusive.



And here you require yourself to play God with the consequences of your actions.



Philip said:


> Would you then say that miscommunication is impossible?



People make mistakes, so failing to communicate is always a possibility.



Philip said:


> But the only way that the meaning can be understood is if the words are used.



The person has to have an understanding of the meaning of the words in order to use them intelligibly.


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## MW

ReformedReidian said:


> Only if one doesn't include the category of defeaters.



I will simply refer to John Frame's response to "reformed epistemology" in Five Views of Apologetics. "But surely Christian faith is not defeasible in this sense. It is sure, certain. We are not merely _permitted_ to believe in God until we are persuaded otherwise; rather, we are _obligated_ to believe in him."

Any "defeaters" of basic beliefs would defeat the possibility of defeating anything since the basic beliefs are necessary.


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## Philip

MW said:


> No, but it would exist without your purpose. The problem with your view is that man has to transcend himself and become a self-existent being in order to imitate God.



But that's just my point. Reality is teleological because God created it with a _telos_. Man does not have to transcend himself here because he is created in the image of a creator as a sub-creator and a maker of meaning. What was the first task that God gave man? Naming things--ordering reality under Divine sovereignty.



MW said:


> People make mistakes, so failing to communicate is always a possibility.



On all sides. People may have disingenuous intent, seeking to communicate falsehoods, making empty promises, etc. And a failure to communicate may not always be due to a mistake on the part of a speaker. 



MW said:


> The person has to have an understanding of the meaning of the words in order to use them intelligibly.



And to understand their meaning, one has to already be a competent user. To understand the meaning of your words I have to be capable of using them myself, at least in principle. I have to make that connection between the marks on the screen, or the sounds you are making, and the concepts that you are attempting to communicate. And to do that, I have to already be a competent interpreter.

In order to read music, I must be capable of carrying a tune on some instrument, or at least with my voice. Apart from the capability for music, notes on a page have no meaning. They only have a meaning if they can be used. They can have no meaning for a person born deaf, whereas Beethoven could create them even after losing his hearing.


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## MW

Philip said:


> But that's just my point. Reality is teleological because God created it with a _telos_. Man does not have to transcend himself here because he is created in the image of a creator as a sub-creator and a maker of meaning. What was the first task that God gave man? Naming things--ordering reality under Divine sovereignty.



There is no sub-"creation." Man does not give being to things. Man is himself a creature. You are deifying man with naive concepts you have not thought through to their logical conclusions.



Philip said:


> And to understand their meaning, one has to already be a competent user.



A competent user of WHAT? Every time we come back to IS and WHAT. You simply dodge the concept of the THING being used, and you have to do this in order to avoid the REALISM that the THING must have MEANING as an entity in itself.


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## Philip

MW said:


> A competent user of WHAT? Every time we come back to IS and WHAT. You simply dodge the concept of the THING being used, and you have to do this in order to avoid the REALISM that the THING must have MEANING as an entity in itself.



Language. A competent user of language. A thing does not have meaning as an entity in itself apart from a purpose. Meaning is given to it by a mind and will which orders it. And language is the tool of human communities in organizing reality, not simply physical reality, but cultural reality. Language is simply the ability to create culture.

In that sense, words have meaning in the sense that a hammer has meaning. A hammer has meaning because it is the product of a culture that uses nails and needs a means by which to drive them. Apart from this purpose, a hammer would be a meaningless object. Similarly, words mean what they mean only in relation to a whole language and way of life.



MW said:


> There is no sub-"creation." Man does not give being to things.



I did not say that man gives being to things, I said that man gives meaning to things. I am using the term "sub-creation" in Tolkien's sense (though I am broadening it somewhat). But of course the fall has meant that we no longer recognize the Divine order, and so sub-creation becomes, yes, the desire to deify ourselves rather than to recognize the Divine will over us. We create our own meaning, seeing objects in space without meaning and without purpose, and so we attempt to remake the world in our image rather than God's. But the reality is that we simply get further lost in the cosmos.


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## MW

Philip said:


> Language.



Language means something then.



Philip said:


> A competent user of language.



A competent user of language means something then.



Philip said:


> A thing does not have meaning as an entity in itself apart from a purpose.



Of course it does. If it did not exist it could not fulfil any purpose.



Philip said:


> Meaning is given to it by a mind



The mind searches out its meaning.



Philip said:


> I did not say that man gives being to things,



Creation in Christian theology means giving being to things. If you create meaning, however, you obviously have god-like powers to make "creation" mean whatever you please.


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## Philip

MW said:


> Of course it does. If it did not exist it could not fulfil any purpose.



No, the purpose is the reason for its existence. God wouldn't have made it for no reason. If there is a hammer, someone must have purposed to drive nails. Otherwise they wouldn't have made the hammer.



MW said:


> The mind searches out its meaning.



Only if it already has a purpose for which it was created in the first place.



MW said:


> Creation in Christian theology means giving being to things.



Yes, and I am using it in a much less technical sense. I am using creation in the sense that Tolkien was the creator of Middle-Earth or Leonardo was the creator of _Mona Lisa_ or the Queen creates a knight.



MW said:


> If you create meaning, however, you obviously have god-like powers to make "creation" mean whatever you please.



Well we are created in the image of God, so there must be some sense in which our abilities are analogous to God's.


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## Nicholas Perella

There is a shift in the "who" is doing the act at least in this particular part of the discussion. 

For instance, in trying to follow this starting here:



MW said:


> The person has to have an understanding of the meaning of the words in order to use them intelligibly.



The "who" is a person (man).



Philip said:


> And to understand their meaning, one has to already be a competent user.



Pastor Winzer was talking about a "person" (man) as seen above. Philip you responded with a "one" (who is a competent user). Who is "one" here?

I followed this particular thought in the discussion as follows. Pastor Winzer quoted Philip's response that I quote above and addresses it below:



Philip said:


> And to understand their meaning, one has to already be a competent user.
> 
> 
> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> A competent user of WHAT? Every time we come back to IS and WHAT. You simply dodge the concept of the THING being used, and you have to do this in order to avoid the REALISM that the THING must have MEANING as an entity in itself.
Click to expand...


My question moves along. Who is "one"? Philip when you responded to Pastor Winzer you used the word "one" in response to his talking about a "person" (man).



MW said:


> A competent user of WHAT? ...THING must have MEANING as an entity in itself.
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> Language. A competent user of language. A thing does not have meaning as an entity in itself apart from a purpose. Meaning is given to it by a mind and will which orders it. And language is the tool of human communities in organizing reality, not simply physical reality, but cultural reality. Language is simply the ability to create culture.
Click to expand...


Pastor Winzer is talking about a "person" (man) who is a "competent user".
Philip you are saying the "one" is a competent user of language, and meaning is not separate from "purpose". Here you seem to be saying that the "one" are humans or "human communities".

Please be patient with me. It goes on.



Philip said:


> A thing does not have meaning as an entity in itself apart from a purpose.
> 
> 
> MW said:
> 
> 
> 
> Of course it does. If it did not exist it could not fulfil any purpose.
Click to expand...


Pastor Winzer is talking about a "person" (man) who would fulfill the purpose, maybe?
Philip so far you have defined the "one" in this particular part of the discussion as a human or "human communities".

But lastly.



MW said:


> Of course it does. If it did not exist it could not fulfil any purpose.
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> No, the purpose is the reason for its existence. God wouldn't have made it for no reason. If there is a hammer, someone must have purposed to drive nails. Otherwise they wouldn't have made the hammer.
Click to expand...


Now the discussion seemingly has jumped to man and God.

Pastor Winzer is talking about the purpose which I think has to do with being a competent user of language, so, purpose is emphasized in the 'competence'? The person is fulfilling a purpose which is in being a competent user of language.

Yet Philip you are talking about the purpose of being a competent user of language not in man's doing of this competent act, but in God doing this purpose. Is God doing this competent purpose in man? Or is it man doing the competent act of using language?

There was a switch in "who" is doing the act somewhere along the way in this particular part of the discussion.


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## Philip

Nicholas Perella said:


> Philip you are saying the "one" is a competent user of language, and meaning is not separate from "purpose". Here you seem to be saying that the "one" are humans or "human communities".



I am saying that language is a communal activity such that language does not exist apart from a community and that a person cannot be said to know a language unless they are, in principle, capable of using it. The competent user of language is a person who is capable of doing various kinds of things with it. Meaning is not separate from purpose.

So when we ask about the meaning of life, for instance, we are really asking about the purpose of our existence, as per WSC Q1.



Nicholas Perella said:


> Is God doing this competent purpose in man? Or is it man doing the competent act of using language?



Yes. One of the ways in which humanity images God is in its capacity for purposing, and competently using language. However, as a reformed Christian I also hold that God does work out purposes in creation, including humanity.


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## MW

Every time we come back to WHAT? WHAT is language? WHAT uses the language? WHAT has purpose? WHAT is creation? WHAT is man? Indeed, WHAT is God? Poor Philip can't answer because he is committed to saying meaning is in the USE of these things, not in the THINGS themselves. If a person thinks that the WHAT needs to be answered, that is a fair indication he is a realist and places meaning in the reality of THINGS. I have nothing more to say.


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## Philip

MW said:


> Every time we come back to WHAT? WHAT is language?



Language is that by which man communicates.



MW said:


> WHAT uses the language?



People do.



MW said:


> Poor Philip can't answer because he is committed to saying meaning is in the USE of these things



Meaning is in purpose. Meaning is in the essence of things.



MW said:


> the THINGS themselves



This is a Kantian chimera which ignores the fact that God created the world with purposes in mind. The _ding an sich_ is the essence, not the substance.



MW said:


> If a person thinks that the WHAT needs to be answered, that is a fair indication he is a realist and places meaning in the reality of THINGS. I have nothing more to say.



And the reality of things depends on the purpose of things. If men did not want to drive nails, there would be no hammers.


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## MW

What?


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## Philip

MW said:


> What?



Objects in space.


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## Nicholas Perella

Philip and Pastor Winzer,

Philip, simply the point you are making is that purpose is the cause, or maybe not the cause, but comes first before a 'thing in itself'. And that the 'thing' can be defined according to its 'purpose', but the 'thing' is still defined just only in accord to the 'things' purpose. Why is this significant? For instance a sandstone rock sitting in a field is a sandstone rock, and when somebody picks it up to cement and pile on a chimney, yes it is part of a chimney, a sandstone rock chimney. Would you agree that this indeed is agreeable to two or more people? And if so then what is so significant about starting with 'purpose' that if a person does not that person would be losing, or not realizing, or not profiting significantly?

Pastor Winzer, why is it significant that starting from 'purpose' to define the 'thing in itself' harmful?

Obviously this topic is worthy of a heartfelt, intelligent argument for two people find it to be thus but why? What stakes are involved? What is the profit or ill-profit?


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## JimmyH

Nicholas Perella said:


> What is the profit or ill-profit?



From my limited perspective it has been a very entertaining duel.


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## Nicholas Perella

JimmyH said:


> Nicholas Perella said:
> 
> 
> 
> What is the profit or ill-profit?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From my limited perspective it has been a very entertaining duel.
Click to expand...


I agree. I am just trying to gain an understanding as to what is at stake. I think something is at stake and I think Pastor Winzer and Philip each know what is at stake, but I fail through my sinful ignorance to know what that is. I am seeking to be educated on the matter in a way that might help me understand.

I am wondering what Pastor Winzer thinks is of ill-profit concerning Philip's argument, and I am wondering what Philip thinks is of ill-profit concerning Pastor Winzer's argument. Thus what does Pastor Winzer soulfully think is of profit from his (Pastor Winzer's) own argument. And what does Philip soulfully think is of profit from his (Philip's) own argument. Thus what is at stake. I am hoping to encourage further dialogue by both for my sake in understanding and gaining clarity. Not that they have not been clear and do not provide understanding. It is a problem I am having, not them.


----------



## Philip

Nicholas Perella said:


> Why is this significant? For instance a sandstone rock sitting in a field is a sandstone rock, and when somebody picks it up to cement and pile on a chimney, yes it is part of a chimney, a sandstone rock chimney.



Right, but the point here is that the essence of the rock, even apart from a person's use of it, is still in a purpose. Since I believe in Divine Sovereignty, there are purposes in all objects. If I look at a mountain of sandstone and do not find it beautful or awe-inspiring, have I really seen it? Or have I missed a key element of its existence? There are no pointless things in the world. And I would even argue that a person who sees the rock and sees that it could be a chimney has also understood something important about it.


----------



## Nicholas Perella

Philip said:


> Nicholas Perella said:
> 
> 
> 
> Why is this significant? For instance a sandstone rock sitting in a field is a sandstone rock, and when somebody picks it up to cement and pile on a chimney, yes it is part of a chimney, a sandstone rock chimney.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Right, but the point here is that the essence of the rock, even apart from a person's use of it, is still in a purpose. Since I believe in Divine Sovereignty, there are purposes in all objects. If I look at a mountain of sandstone and do not find it beautful or awe-inspiring, have I really seen it? Or have I missed a key element of its existence? There are no pointless things in the world. And I would even argue that a person who sees the rock and sees that it could be a chimney has also understood something important about it.
Click to expand...


Do you think that Pastor Winzer is not understanding this from his (Pastor Winzer) realism? "This" would be what I think is the main idea you are putting across, which if I am correct, is that, to use this example, the rock has a purpose, apart from man, because the purpose is given from God.


----------



## MW

Nicholas Perella said:


> I am wondering what Pastor Winzer thinks is of ill-profit concerning Philip's argument,



So the question is, WHAT? Not, HOW? But, WHAT? It is not HOW I am using my thought, but WHAT I am thinking.

I think we are all realists, and our whole view of God, of ourselves, and of the world is inherently realist. We function with the belief of BEING as a fundamental of life. We can't explain it but it is there. It is a blessed fact of creation for which we are eternally indebted to the One who has His being in and of Himself and gives being to all things.

Philip himself is a realist because he keeps coming back to THINGS and WHAT they are. When he sought clarification he asked WHAT? He instinctively reverts back to a realist default setting. But there is a reluctance to admit it. Perhaps he has been influenced by non-creationist philosophies, such as the one which was reviewed in the first post of this thread. There are various philosophies which are basically irrational because they deny the irreducible complexity of being. They atomise everything, break it up into its parts, and assign it a function, not realising that the parts were created as a complete mechanism and cannot work on their own. These philosophers suppose, if they can give a definition or a description of HOW things work, then they have adequately explained BEING. By this means they imagine that they can escape the ultimate questions of life which can only be answered by God.


----------



## Nicholas Perella

MW said:


> Nicholas Perella said:
> 
> 
> 
> I am wondering what Pastor Winzer thinks is of ill-profit concerning Philip's argument,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So the question is, WHAT? Not, HOW? But, WHAT? It is not HOW I am using my thought, but WHAT I am thinking.
> 
> I think we are all realists, and our whole view of God, of ourselves, and of the world is inherently realist. We function with the belief of BEING as a fundamental of life. We can't explain it but it is there. It is a blessed fact of creation for which we are eternally indebted to the One who has His being in and of Himself and gives being to all things.
> 
> Philip himself is a realist because he keeps coming back to THINGS and WHAT they are. When he sought clarification he asked WHAT? He instinctively reverts back to a realist default setting. But there is a reluctance to admit it. Perhaps he has been influenced by non-creationist philosophies, such as the one which was reviewed in the first post of this thread. There are various philosophies which are basically irrational because they deny the irreducible complexity of being. They atomise everything, break it up into its parts, and assign it a function, not realising that the parts were created as a complete mechanism and cannot work on their own. These philosophers suppose, if they can give a definition or a description of HOW things work, then they have adequately explained BEING. By this means they imagine that they can escape the ultimate questions of life which can only be answered by God.
Click to expand...


So if I understand both of you (Philip and Pastor Winzer), then Philip is saying there is importance (has purpose) and Pastor Winzer you are able to say what is important.

Philip, when I type and think out how to relate to what you are trying to say, I get to the point where I want to not mention any 'nouns' or reference to things. For example, you say there is importance, but what has importance is difficult for me to say if I try your glove on so to speak (if I try to go along with your way of thinking). Yet you manage without any appearance of difficulty to talk about the sandstone in my example. I am being open about my difficulty with your way of thinking in order to show where I am having a problem grasping exactly what it is that makes your thinking distinct from Pastor Winzer. Pastor Winzer points out that you are focusing on 'how?' and are trying to avoid the 'what?'. Is this a fair representation of your thinking?

Lord willing for the sake of my interest in understanding, I do not desire to witness falsely which is why I keep asking for clarification. Pardon my ignorance. I hope I am demonstrating that I am learning and that I am not portraying myself as a skeptic.

I thank both of you.


----------



## Philip

Rev. Winzer and Nicholas, forgive my tardy response but I was rather preoccupied today and tomorrow is the Lord's Day so my response will have to be delayed until Monday.


----------

