# Meno's paradox and Socrates' recollection



## Claudiu (Feb 18, 2012)

Given Meno's paradox*, how does Socrates' argument from recollection address the paradox? How is this connected with his view of definition?

*A man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know. He cannot search for what he knows–since he knows it, there is no need to search–nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. (_Meno_ 80e)


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 19, 2012)

It seems that Meno is saying that what a man knows, he knows exhaustively, while what he does not know, he has absolutely no clue concerning. That just seems to be every kind of false. Sorry I do not know Socrates' anything about Socrates' argument from paradox or his view of definition.


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## athanatos (Feb 19, 2012)

Well, it is in part about exhaustiveness, but really, how do we learn? How is new knowledge _gained_? How can gaining knowledge even make sense? We see something we have never seen before, yet somehow we know things about it: from whence comes that knowledge? Do I see similar things and generalize? But how do I know to generalize those things and apply them to this? It all seems like for me to know how to do it (having the criteria by which to judge an example), I must already have the idea (having the exemplar by which I judge criteria).


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## Philip (Feb 19, 2012)

Socrates thinks that recollection solves the problem because when one remembers, one is simply calling to mind what one already knew, so if learning is simply recollection, then there's no problem. It solves the problem by taking one of the horns of the dilemma.

However, the problem itself rests on a false dichotomy---it assumes that if one does not know something, that therefore it is a _tabula rasa_ (blank slate) with regard to it. However, the mind simply is not a _tabula rasa_: we have faculties and tools for discovery, powers of observation, and the like. There are ways in which our minds are designed to work. You can search for what you do not know because you understand what an answer might look like.


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## Claudiu (Feb 21, 2012)

Let's use an example, say "justice." (I'll use justice instead of virtue). We are inquiring about the definition of justice and think we have come to understand what it is. When we get to this understanding, how will we know for sure that we have is the correct understanding of justice? I think that as humans, in our fallen nature, we cannot come to the true knowledge of justice on our own. Instead, it must be revealed to us by God (i.e. the Scriptures). If God doesn't reveal it to us, can we really say that we understand justice? At the most we can say we have a partial understanding of what justice is. A way around this might be to posit something like the natural law. We can come to the correct understanding of justice because it is found in nature. On this view it is still God revealing justice to us, but not necessarily by means of the Scripture. However, revelation by Scripture seems stronger to me than revelation by "nature" since in Scripture we see clearer examples of what God's justice looks like. 

Back to the _Meno_, Socrates and Meno are inquiring about the definition of virtue. It takes the form of the other Socratic questions ("what is x") by asking "what is virtue?". The paradox would truly pose a problem for Socrates if it wasn't for his theory of recollection. If we don't allow for the theory of recollection, then how is inquiry into non-empirical matters possible? Working with the idea that we have a method of inquiry*, how do we expand on that and show how we can come to a real understanding of "x" in the "what is x" question? 

*method of inquiry: although we might not know the object of our inquiry, we have methods of inquiry which are necessary for us to even begin the quest of inquiry. (We need some innate way of comprehending our experiences.)

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P. F. Pugh said:


> However, the problem itself rests on a false dichotomy---it assumes that if one does not know something, that therefore it is a _tabula rasa_ (blank slate) with regard to it. *However, the mind simply is not a tabula rasa: we have faculties and tools for discovery, powers of observation, and the like*. There are ways in which our minds are designed to work. You can search for what you do not know because you understand what an answer might look like.



How do we build upon that to show how it works in non-empirical matters (where observation doesn't seem as strong)?


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## Philip (Feb 21, 2012)

Claudiu said:


> How do we build upon that to show how it works in non-empirical matters (where observation doesn't seem as strong)?



Examine the concepts involved.


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