# Methodology in proving mind/body dualism



## Claudiu

I am interested in what a successful argument for mind/body would have to look like. That is, what is the correct method? Note, I am not interested in an argument for mind/body dualism. 

A common critique against Cartestian Dualism is that Descartes jumps from epistemological claims to metaphysical ones. His argument can be restated as follows: 

1. I know for certain that I exist as a thinking thing.
2. I do not know for certain that I have a body.
(implicit assumption: If I know for certain that some entity E has property A, but do not know for certain that E has property B, then A is essential to E, while B is not).
3. Therefore, mind and body are metaphysically different/separate kinds of things. ​
The charge against Descartes here is that he is assuming that what we know (epistemology) has implications on the way things are (metaphysics). Many people find this jump problematic. In short, there is a problem with his argument, and methodology. Keeping in mind the validity and soundness required for an argument, what would be some necessary features of an argument for mind/body dualism? Again, please note, I am not interested in actually arguing for mind/body dualism. Rather, I am taking a step back and seeking some fundamental requirements of what a possible argument would even look like (what are some necessary features?).


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## Claudiu

On the flip side, what kind of argument would, in principle, suffice (i.e. what kind of argumentative strategy would have to be employed) to produce an argument that would (if successful) show that dualism is false?


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## jwright82

He also violates the law of parsimony- “that entities are not to be posited unless it is necessary to do so….” (Penguin Reference Dictionary of Philosophy, 2000). This states that basically I do not need to posit a whole different “substance” or “mind” unless it is necessary to do so. Also this could be applied to the sock Goblin, who is always stealing my socks from the dryer. It seems unnecessary to posit this entity when simpler ways of explaining this phenomenon will suffice. 

Also dual substance theories of mind suffer from the fact that the relationship in how the two different substances interact with one another has never been satisfactory explained by its proponents. How does my mind substance interact with my body substance? No ever could explain this. 

Now the alternative Materialist positions suffer from different problems (there are 3 main theories that are different but I will lump them altogether here for space). They claim in various ways that our mental phenomenon (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) are explainable by appeal to our physical brain alone. They suffer on one level in that they require us to mean different things than our commonsense assumptions would have us believe. 

Take “love” for example when I say “I love my daughter” I do not mean the same thing as “I love ice cream”. I wouldn’t take a bullet for ice cream but I would for my daughter. But they would have to say that at most I really mean that both ice cream and my daughter stimulate some part of brain, at most my daughter may stimulate more parts but in essence they are same meaning. So they cannot explain why I mean two different things by these two statements but they “insist” that I in essence do. 

There ideas are also empirically unverifiable. This is the key to their theory because if they say that “love” for ice cream and family is essentially the same thing than they claim that eventually science will explain this. But how could you ever empirically verify that my entire mental phenomenon is explainable in purely physical terms? You can’t.

My own alternative to these is basically a transcendental method but also leaves much mystery involved in not providing an alternative metaphysical theory. All I can say is that both “soul-talk” and “brain-talk” are both perfectly legitimate ways of explaining the same phenomenon without either side exhaustively explaining the phenomenon. This it seemed to me is the error of both Dualists and Materialists. They try to exhaustively explain the same phenomenon and fail. I know this is very complicated because I had to gloss over a lot but if you would like me, or anyone else, to elaborate on anything I will try. It is hard for me to sum up these issues in a space suitable for this website in one fail swoop.


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## Claudiu

Thank you for your response, James. 

I was reading my professors book the other day and came upon a sentence that perfectly sums up the problem with some presuppositions in the materialist view. Professor Flanagan, in _The Science of the Mind_, put it well when he said that “an agent cannot know with certainty that he exists as a nonphysical thing, because there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things” (p. 15). I think it ultimately boils down to this. The dualist is trying to prove that we are part body (material) and part soul (immaterial). He claims to be able to do this, in part, because we have knowledge of the immaterial. But the materialist does not grant this. The materialist already assumes that there is no knowledge of the immaterial (e.g. Flanagan's quote). So the dualist is already doomed from the start.


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## Philip

An argument for dualism would have to show that there are a) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to matter (materialism) b) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to mind (idealism). The objective would be to show that mind and matter are both necessary ways of speaking, meaning that dualism does not violate Occam's Razor. If dualism does not violate Occam's Razor, then it should be taken as true unless there are phenomena to be explained that fall into neither of the two categories in question.



Claudiu said:


> On the flip side, what kind of argument would, in principle, suffice (i.e. what kind of argumentative strategy would have to be employed) to produce an argument that would (if successful) show that dualism is false?



What would a successful argument for either materialism or idealism look like?


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## py3ak

jwright82 said:


> Also this could be applied to the sock Goblin, who is always stealing my socks from the dryer. It seems unnecessary to posit this entity when simpler ways of explaining this phenomenon will suffice.



Indeed. Once in a while, the dryer donates a free sock to your cause. Because it is a little cheap, it only donates one at a time.


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## jwright82

py3ak said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also this could be applied to the sock Goblin, who is always stealing my socks from the dryer. It seems unnecessary to posit this entity when simpler ways of explaining this phenomenon will suffice.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Indeed. Once in a while, the dryer donates a free sock to your cause. Because it is a little cheap, it only donates one at a time.
Click to expand...


The jury is still out for me on the sock goblin. I have only seen blury pictures and heard fuzzy audio so I am not convinced but Bigfoot told me he beleives in him so thats something. At least, if it exists, it donates something.


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## jwright82

Claudiu said:


> Thank you for your response, James.
> 
> I was reading my professors book the other day and came upon a sentence that perfectly sums up the problem with some presuppositions in the materialist view. Professor Flanagan, in _The Science of the Mind_, put it well when he said that “an agent cannot know with certainty that he exists as a nonphysical thing, because there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things” (p. 15). I think it ultimately boils down to this. The dualist is trying to prove that we are part body (material) and part soul (immaterial). He claims to be able to do this be, in part, because we have knowledge of the immaterial. But the materialist does not grant this. The materialist already assumes that there is no knowledge of the immaterial (e.g. Flanagan's quote). So the dualist is already doomed from the start.



Right, that is basically C. S. Lewis’ argument from reason against Materialism. But you’re right about Dualism as well. I think both sides are trying to prove too much and that is the killer for both extremes. You’ll notice how modest my proposal is, it is a very humble explanation of things not a heavy duty metaphysical theory.


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## Claudiu

Philip said:


> What would a successful argument for either materialism or idealism look like?



I guess the materialist would say that if we could prove that everything is material, then that rules out anything immaterial.


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## Claudiu

jwright82 said:


> Now the alternative Materialist positions suffer from different problems (there are 3 main theories that are different but I will lump them altogether here for space). They claim in various ways that our mental phenomenon (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) are explainable by appeal to our physical brain alone. They suffer on one level in that they require us to mean different things than our commonsense assumptions would have us believe.
> 
> Take “love” for example when I say “I love my daughter” I do not mean the same thing as “I love ice cream”. I wouldn’t take a bullet for ice cream but I would for my daughter. But they would have to say that at most I really mean that both ice cream and my daughter stimulate some part of brain, at most my daughter may stimulate more parts but in essence they are same meaning. So they cannot explain why I mean two different things by these two statements but they “insist” that I in essence do.
> 
> There ideas are also empirically unverifiable. This is the key to their theory because if they say that “love” for ice cream and family is essentially the same thing than they claim that eventually science will explain this. But how could you ever empirically verify that my entire mental phenomenon is explainable in purely physical terms? You can’t.



The materialist claims that we can reduce everything to the brain, including mental phenomena (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.), just as science has reduced other "folk" talk to science. For example, they will say that in folk talk we say "water", but in science we say "H2O". Similarly, we now say things like "love" in "folk psychology", but really it can be reduced to the brain. And if you say that you use "love" differently, well then it is just a different neuron that fires for the love of your daughter vs. the love of ice cream. In the water example we would still say "there is water" even though there are other molecules besides water (like sodium, etc.) because it looks like water. At the lower level, though, there is more than just H2O in the water. So, we use the word "water" even though there is a difference at the lower level. The materialist would say that this is how it works for "love" too. We use "love" even though there might be a difference at the lower level.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Right, that is basically C. S. Lewis’ argument from reason against Materialism. But you’re right about Dualism as well. I think both sides are trying to prove too much and that is the killer for both extremes. You’ll notice how modest my proposal is, it is a very humble explanation of things not a heavy duty metaphysical theory.



James, I'm in agreement with your position except for the part where you say that you are not a dualist. I humbly submit that if you are neither a materialist nor a subjective idealist, you are left with dualism of some kind. It may not be substance dualism, but it is dualism because you are positing 1) that mind and matter are two different sorts of thing 2) that the human being includes both. How is that not a sort of dualism?



Claudiu said:


> In short, there is a problem with his argument, and methodology.



The problem with Descartes' argument is that premise 3) is one of two possibilities. The possibility remains that the body is a projection of the mind. Descartes' argument could also be turned into an argument for subjective idealism.


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## jwright82

Claudiu said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Now the alternative Materialist positions suffer from different problems (there are 3 main theories that are different but I will lump them altogether here for space). They claim in various ways that our mental phenomenon (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) are explainable by appeal to our physical brain alone. They suffer on one level in that they require us to mean different things than our commonsense assumptions would have us believe.
> 
> Take “love” for example when I say “I love my daughter” I do not mean the same thing as “I love ice cream”. I wouldn’t take a bullet for ice cream but I would for my daughter. But they would have to say that at most I really mean that both ice cream and my daughter stimulate some part of brain, at most my daughter may stimulate more parts but in essence they are same meaning. So they cannot explain why I mean two different things by these two statements but they “insist” that I in essence do.
> 
> There ideas are also empirically unverifiable. This is the key to their theory because if they say that “love” for ice cream and family is essentially the same thing than they claim that eventually science will explain this. But how could you ever empirically verify that my entire mental phenomenon is explainable in purely physical terms? You can’t.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The materialist claims that we can reduce everything to the brain, including mental phenomena (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.), just as science has reduced other "folk" talk to science. For example, they will say that in folk talk we say "water", but in science we say "H2O". Similarly, we now say things like "love" in "folk psychology", but really it can be reduced to the brain. And if you say that you use "love" differently, well then it is just a different neuron that fires for the love of your daughter vs. the love of ice cream. In the water example we would still say "there is water" even though there are other molecules besides water (like sodium, etc.) because it looks like water. At the lower level, though, there is more than just H2O in the water. So, we use the word "water" even though there is a difference at the lower level. The materialist would say that this is how it works for "love" too. We use "love" even though there might be a difference at the lower level.
Click to expand...


Yeah I have a problem all forms of Materialism because at the end of the day they all seem to rest upon analogies of some kind. And analogies are useful in explaining what their getting at but can never proves their theories. Just because Dennett can compare his theory to a computer model is like o.k. so what, now prove that the mind is just a computer. But how would one go about proving that the mind is just brain processes? Lets just assume that one day they do map out all the corresponding brain processes with mental events (beliefs, pains, experiences, love, etc.) what would that prove? 

1. Scientists have mapped all brain processes with mental events. This proves the Materialist view
2. Since science exhaustively explored the brain and found no evidence of any immaterial aspect or substance to the brain we must abandon the idea.
3. But the immaterial is by definition beyond the scope of science it can never be proven wrong by science.
4. Therefore the materialist argument falls short in its supposed “proof” and all that is proven is that some brain process corresponds to some mental event. 

I don’t see how they can get around this. Logically they have proven that some versions of the immaterial are absurd but they have not proven that all versions of it are absurd. I also see another problem with in the heap paradox. I don’t if you are familiar with it but I’ll explain it to anyone isn’t. You take a single grain of sand and place it on a plate, is it a heap of sand? No it isn’t. So you continue to place grains of sand one at a time on the plate until you determine it is indeed a heap of sand. The question is at what number or quantity of grains is it to be considered a heap of sand and why is that the magic number? At 29,999 grains it is not a heap but magically 30,000 grains become a heap, why is that? Well we can dispense with this paradox by pointing out that the word heap is ordinarily not used to refer to an exact amount but is a rough subjective amount unique to everyone. 

But the problem here is an interesting one I think in that it asks when does a change in quantity (number of grains of sand) become a change in quality or kind (non-heap vs. heap)? It is a fact that I love ice cream and my daughter in two different kinds (qualities) of love. So the Materialist must at the end of the day explain how a change in the number of brain processes involved becomes a change in the kind of love I am referring to. 




Philip said:


> James, I'm in agreement with your position except for the part where you say that you are not a dualist. I humbly submit that if you are neither a materialist nor a subjective idealist, you are left with dualism of some kind. It may not be substance dualism, but it is dualism because you are positing 1) that mind and matter are two different sorts of thing 2) that the human being includes both. How is that not a sort of dualism?



Yes I would make a distinction between Dualism and dualistic. Dualism separates things while looking at it dualistically only makes distinctions among two things that are essentially unified.


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## jwright82

Here is a good paper on this. PA143


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Dualism separates things while looking at it dualistically only makes distinctions among two things that are essentially unified.



Not necessarily. Just because one is a dualist does not mean that one denies the unity of the human person. In addition, as a Christian, I have to affirm some sort of dualism, given my belief in the intermediate state.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Dualism separates things while looking at it dualistically only makes distinctions among two things that are essentially unified.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Not necessarily. Just because one is a dualist does not mean that one denies the unity of the human person. In addition, as a Christian, I have to affirm some sort of dualism, given my belief in the intermediate state.
Click to expand...


That is a good point, I guess what I am against (and most arguments are too) is substantial dualism of Cartisian kinds. Ones that seperate off the mind and body metaphysically.


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## jwright82

Oh that discussion I posted in the Apologetic Methods has Plantinga in it so you might like to check it out.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I guess what I am against (and most arguments are too) is substantial dualism of Cartisian kinds. Ones that seperate off the mind and body metaphysically.



But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.



Because such dualisms bifurcate the person ontologically speaking, this is unnecessary to do. How do these two, entirely different, substances interact and why assume such a separate substance to begin with? Making a logical, or linguistic even, distinction never bifurcates the person at all, it is simply referring to two different aspects (with two different language games) of the unified thing. In the case of Christ we are dealing with a unique person. 

Because they could never develop a coherent theory of interaction the person remained, in theory, a bifurcated being on the ontological level. I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.


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## No Name #5

jwright82 said:


> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Because such dualisms bifurcate the person ontologically speaking, this is unnecessary to do. How do these two, entirely different, substances interact and why assume such a separate substance to begin with? Making a logical, or linguistic even, distinction never bifurcates the person at all, it is simply referring to two different aspects (with two different language games) of the unified thing. In the case of Christ we are dealing with a unique person.
> 
> Because they could never develop a coherent theory of interaction the person remained, in theory, a bifurcated being on the ontological level. I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.
Click to expand...

I just wanted to compliment you on how wonderfully you put this, James.  People like you are a real benefit to this community.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.



Might we, though, say that a person is _composed_ of two different substances? In physics, there are molecules, composed of different kinds of atoms, why not persons composed of different substances in metaphysics?


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## jwright82

No Name #5 said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> But why would that, exactly, deny the unity of mind and body in the human person. After all, God is a different sort of substance than human, and yet Christ was essentially unified as one person.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Because such dualisms bifurcate the person ontologically speaking, this is unnecessary to do. How do these two, entirely different, substances interact and why assume such a separate substance to begin with? Making a logical, or linguistic even, distinction never bifurcates the person at all, it is simply referring to two different aspects (with two different language games) of the unified thing. In the case of Christ we are dealing with a unique person.
> 
> Because they could never develop a coherent theory of interaction the person remained, in theory, a bifurcated being on the ontological level. I guess in theory one day someone might resurrect this theory and solve it but until that time it remains the case that separating a person on an ontological level leaves you with a bifurcated being.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> I just wanted to compliment you on how wonderfully you put this, James.  People like you are a real benefit to this community.
Click to expand...


Well thank you, I am very flattered. God bless.


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## JohnGill

Claudiu said:


> Thank you for your response, James.
> 
> I was reading my professors book the other day and came upon a sentence that perfectly sums up the problem with some presuppositions in the materialist view. Professor Flanagan, in _The Science of the Mind_, put it well when he said that “an agent cannot know with certainty that he exists as a nonphysical thing, because there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things” (p. 15). I think it ultimately boils down to this. The dualist is trying to prove that we are part body (material) and part soul (immaterial). He claims to be able to do this be, in part, because we have knowledge of the immaterial. But the materialist does not grant this. The materialist already assumes that there is no knowledge of the immaterial (e.g. Flanagan's quote). So the dualist is already doomed from the start.



In answer to your OP, I would challenge the materialist on his assumptions. I think a necessary feature would be first to show the impossibility of the materialist claim that "there is no such thing as knowledge of nonphysical things.” Or to put it another way, the argument would be an indirect argument.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> Might we, though, say that a person is composed of two different substances? In physics, there are molecules, composed of different kinds of atoms, why not persons composed of different substances in metaphysics?



I think I have mentioned to you before, I can’t remember, my absolute aversion to substance metaphysics. I agree with Berkley that we should just abandon it. Two different substances must intreract in some way. It is like the cell, the different parts of the cell interact with one another but are different physical substances. In the same way we cannot speak of the person as two different substances but rather as being composed of different aspects of a unified thing. 

The substance view fails as it has been traditionally formulated as unable to show how the two substances interact. If there is a view out there that avoids the traditional problems than I am all ears but I doubt it. My view is less an explanation as it is the result of my perceived failure all the other views and what the consequences are of those failures. Throw in Wittgenstein and Dooyeweerd and there you go, my view.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> In the same way we cannot speak of the person as two different substances but rather as being composed of different aspects of a unified thing.



Something can't be "composed of" aspects. We talk about "aspects" only when we want to avoid the language of composition altogether. We talk about God having "aspects" because we never want to say that God is anything other than one. God is not composed, but is a metaphysical simple.

Put another way: are your mind and your body two different kinds of thing?



jwright82 said:


> The substance view fails as it has been traditionally formulated as unable to show how the two substances interact.



Why is this a failure unless it is claiming to show how? The claim is a claim _that_ not a claim _how_. You are assuming that one or two forms of substance dualism that try. All that you have to claim to be a substance dualist is that the human being is composed of mind and body and that the two are different kinds of thing.

How did the two natures of Christ interact? Does your inability to provide such an account mean that we should throw out hypostatic union?



jwright82 said:


> Throw in Wittgenstein and Dooyeweerd and there you go, my view.



Careful with Wittgenstein here: there are certain forms of physicalism that he's going to be perfectly happy with. As long as the _language_ of mind is preserved, he doesn't care if we throw out the substance (pun intended). Because for him, reality is determined by language.



jwright82 said:


> I think I have mentioned to you before, I can’t remember, my absolute aversion to substance metaphysics. I agree with Berkley that we should just abandon it. Two different substances must intreract in some way.



First, what's the big problem with substance metaphysics in general? Berkeley isn't on our side because he's a subjective idealist: he reduces everything, including matter, to mind. It's a fun philosophy, to be sure, but not terribly helpful.

I agree that the two substances interact in some way, no question. What's the problem? I don't see why, in order to hold to substance dualism, I have to provide an account of how the interaction takes place---I just have to believe _that_ it takes place.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> Something can't be "composed of" aspects. We talk about "aspects" only when we want to avoid the language of composition altogether. We talk about God having "aspects" because we never want to say that God is anything other than one. God is not composed, but is a metaphysical simple.



Exactly my point.




Philip said:


> Put another way: are your mind and your body two different kinds of thing?



I would say that they are referring to two different legitimate language games about the same phenomenon. 




Philip said:


> Why is this a failure unless it is claiming to show how? The claim is a claim that not a claim how. You are assuming that one or two forms of substance dualism that try. All that you have to claim to be a substance dualist is that the human being is composed of mind and body and that the two are different kinds of thing.



Because of the illogical nature of it, that has been pointed out before. 




Philip said:


> How did the two natures of Christ interact? Does your inability to provide such an account mean that we should throw out hypostatic union?



Beyond the Athanasian creed I cannot comment on Christ's natures. 




Philip said:


> Careful with Wittgenstein here: there are certain forms of physicalism that he's going to be perfectly happy with. As long as the language of mind is preserved, he doesn't care if we throw out the substance (pun intended). Because for him, reality is determined by language.



That is why I brought Dooyeweerd into it. I think he solves the problems in Wittgenstein and I think that Wittgenstein solves the problems in Dooyeweerd. 




Philip said:


> First, what's the big problem with substance metaphysics in general? Berkeley isn't on our side because he's a subjective idealist: he reduces everything, including matter, to mind. It's a fun philosophy, to be sure, but not terribly helpful.



Well what I meant was that Berkley rejected matter, substance, because you cannot sense it or experience it in anyway. It makes no difference about the accidents of a thing whatsoever. It plays no part whatsoever in our knowledge of things so why not discard it? Nietzsche wonderfully put it in his paper on titled something like “how the real world finally became a myth” (I’ll look it up tomorrow and post it for any interested parties). Substance metaphysics failed in part because it made itself irrelevant to everything. If Kant had read Berkley closer I wonder how different his work might have been.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I would say that they are referring to two different legitimate language games about the same phenomenon.



So you're a physicalist, then? What about the intermediate state? Are persons metaphysical simples?



jwright82 said:


> Because of the illogical nature of it, that has been pointed out before.



Where does the contradiction lie, exactly?



jwright82 said:


> Well what I meant was that Berkley rejected matter, substance, because you cannot sense it or experience it in anyway. It makes no difference about the accidents of a thing whatsoever. It plays no part whatsoever in our knowledge of things so why not discard it?



Except that we recognize that there is a difference between mind and matter. We naturally understand that there are aspects of our being that are not material. If we say that they are two aspects of the same thing, then we end up conflating them, becoming monistic reductionists who are merely hiding behind language pretending not to be. The language of substance is there because we recognize that things like mind and matter are metaphysically different, not just linguistically different. The different language-games arise because we are talking about two different things. However, this does not have to undermine the essential unity of the human person at all, any more than the two natures of Christ undermined His essential unity.



jwright82 said:


> Substance metaphysics failed in part because it made itself irrelevant to everything.



But did it have to develop on that path?



jwright82 said:


> Beyond the Athanasian creed I cannot comment on Christ's natures.



And yet you believe that Christ had a Divine _ousia_ (substance) and a human _ousia_. All of the Church fathers and the Christological and trinitarian formulations that they made, and which constitute orthodoxy, depend on substance metaphysics.


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## Claudiu

jwright82 said:


> Here is a good paper on this. PA143



I find Bahnsen's position problematic. He doesn't want to advocate the monistic, materialistic, physicalist position on the one hand, or the dualist (whatever version) on the other. He just doesn't seem to be arguing for anything really. He uses dualistic language to describe some monistic metaphysical conception of what a person is.


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## Claudiu

By the way, thank you Phillip and James for your interaction thus far.


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## Claudiu

Philip said:


> An argument for dualism would have to show that there are a) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to matter (materialism) b) phenomena that cannot be exhaustively explained by reference to mind (idealism). The objective would be to show that mind and matter are both necessary ways of speaking, meaning that dualism does not violate Occam's Razor. If dualism does not violate Occam's Razor, then it should be taken as true unless there are phenomena to be explained that fall into neither of the two categories in question.



Looking back ... Very well put! I think that get's to the heart of it.


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> So you're a physicalist, then? What about the intermediate state? Are persons metaphysical simples?



I am not a physicalist because they say that all mind stuff is purely physical stuff. I say that yes we have “material” and “immaterial” aspects, not differing substances, to us but in everyday life these aspects are so unified that no discernable difference can be made. From a theoretical perspective though we can study the different aspects of a thing in theory but that implies no metaphysical separation at all. I can say ponder about the chemical aspect, how it was made, of a bottle of wine and then ponder the economic aspect of it but while I’m standing in line to buy it those aspects are one and the same in everyday experience. 




Philip said:


> Where does the contradiction lie, exactly?



The contradiction lies in the referential fallacy, that is (to those who may not know this) that a word must refer to some object to be meaningful, that it commits because it assumes that mind language must refer to some substance to be meaningful. Also it assumes that the two substances of mind and body interact in some way that cannot be demonstrated.




Philip said:


> Except that we recognize that there is a difference between mind and matter. We naturally understand that there are aspects of our being that are not material. If we say that they are two aspects of the same thing, then we end up conflating them, becoming monistic reductionists who are merely hiding behind language pretending not to be. The language of substance is there because we recognize that things like mind and matter are metaphysically different, not just linguistically different. The different language-games arise because we are talking about two different things. However, this does not have to undermine the essential unity of the human person at all, any more than the two natures of Christ undermined His essential unity.



Actually that is my point exactly. We are composed of a “material” and “immaterial” nature but that they are so unified that we can only make a linguistic distinction between them that is two different language games. By this I mean that my friend can use one language game and consoled me while my arm is in pain but a neurosurgeon can use a totally different language game to describe my pain that is totally different from my friends words but never the less true. 




Philip said:


> But did it have to develop on that path?



I guess not but it did develop along that path. So using it brings bad associations along with it. You know as well as I do that philosophers have abandoned this way of thinking.




Philip said:


> And yet you believe that Christ had a Divine ousia (substance) and a human ousia. All of the Church fathers and the Christological and trinitarian formulations that they made, and which constitute orthodoxy, depend on substance metaphysics.



Again I think that the mystery of the incarnation prevents us from drawing any conclusions here.




Claudiu said:


> I find Bahnsen's position problematic. He doesn't want to advocate the monistic, materialistic, physicalist position on the one hand, or the dualist (whatever version) on the other. He just doesn't seem to be arguing for anything really. He uses dualistic language to describe some monistic metaphysical conception of what a person is.



Yeah I think that Bahnsen can be confusing here too, I mean what does “materiality” even mean when describing what we are? But his criticisms are spot on.




Claudiu said:


> By the way, thank you Phillip and James for your interaction thus far.



No problem I enjoy edifying the body of Christ and talking philosophy. 

And here is that Nietzsche quote I promised, with commentary by myself. 



> HISTORY OF AN ERROR
> .
> The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man — he dwells in it, he is it.
> (Oldest convincing form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition ‘I, Plato, am the truth.’)
> 
> (James- this is Nietzsche’s diatribe against Greek thought in general but their metaphysics as well, which was substance metaphysics. They believed that only philosophers could attain “real” knowledge of “reality”. Aristotle introduced in many ways the idea of substance that was supposed to be ultimate reality for the world. All the sensible qualities of an object (color, size, feelingl, etc…) were hitched to the substance or essence like a wagon.)
> 
> The real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man (‘to the sinner who repents’).
> (Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more incomprehensible — it becomes a woman, it becomes Christian . . .)
> 
> (James- Nietzsche is saying that previous philosophies failed in what they set out to do and Christianity came along and placed ultimate reality or purpose outside of the world both metaphysically and meaning of life wise. In his mind it was a last ditch effort to maintain what philosophers were trying to do.)
> 
> The real world, unattainable, undemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative.
> 
> (Fundamentally the same old sun, but shining through mist and scepticism; the idea grown sublime, pale, northerly, Königsbergian.)
> 
> (James- This is Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant (Konigsbergian). If the “real” world is unknowable than why presuppose it? You know it is Kant because he uses the word “imperative” which is referring to Kant’s categorical imperative in ethics, for Nietzsche there is no difference metaphysics and ethics or knowledge.)
> 
> The real world — unattainable? Unattained, at any rate. And if unattained also unknown. Consequently also no consolation, no redemption, no duty: how could we have a duty towards something unknown?
> (The grey of dawn. First yawnings of reason. ****-crow of positivism.)
> 
> (James- this is the last step towards Nihilism, we just don’t know any better. With positivism the world of our sense is all that is that is left, no “real” world or ethics or emotion. Nietzsche is saying that despite its efforts positivism failed to do what it wanted.)
> 
> The ‘real world’ — an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer — an idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it!
> (Broad daylight; breakfast; return of cheerfulness and bons sens; Plato blushes for shame; all free spirits run riot.)
> We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent world
> 
> (James- this is Nietzsche’s way out of nihilism, abandon our previous notions that led us towards nihilism in the first place. Freedom from those ideas, which should make Plato blush for even conceiving of, is freedom from the nothingness they lead us to.)
> 
> (Mid-day; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; zenith of mankind; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA)
> – Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols



My words begin with my name James.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I say that yes we have “material” and “immaterial” aspects, not differing substances, to us but in everyday life these aspects are so unified that no discernable difference can be made. From a theoretical perspective though we can study the different aspects of a thing in theory but that implies no metaphysical separation at all. I can say ponder about the chemical aspect, how it was made, of a bottle of wine and then ponder the economic aspect of it but while I’m standing in line to buy it those aspects are one and the same in everyday experience.



No they aren't. My consideration when purchasing a bottle of wine is whether the chemical/aesthetic value outweighs the economic value (the price tag). Of course I'm making that distinction in ordinary life!

The same goes for mind/body. I can make the distinction between my mental state and my physical state quite easily in ordinary life and do so all the time. When I talk about, for instance, my spiritual state and relationship to God, I am obviously not talking about physical things. Similarly, prayer is obviously not a physical act, though at times it may include physical actions such as speaking or kneeling. There are, after alll, mental actions.

I'm sorry, but the law of the excluded middle rather limits your options here: you end up being one of three things, a metaphysical reductionist (materialism/physicalism, or subjective idealism), a dualist (of one sort or another), or else a linguistic reductionist (Wittgenstein). And I submit that reducing everything to language is simply wishing the problem away and pretending that it doesn't exist.



jwright82 said:


> The contradiction lies in the referential fallacy, that is (to those who may not know this) that a word must refer to some object to be meaningful, that it commits because it assumes that mind language must refer to some substance to be meaningful.



I'm not a referentialist about language. I simply think that it this case, the kind of language-games we are playing are referential in nature and involve two different referents. Where's the contradiction? I'm not going to go down the path of linguistic reductionism here.



jwright82 said:


> We are composed of a “material” and “immaterial” nature but that they are so unified that we can only make a linguistic distinction between them that is two different language games.



But it isn't merely a linguistic distinction: it's a real distinction. The two natures (_ousia_ or _substantiae_ in Latin) are two different kinds of thing, not merely two different language-games for the same thing. 



jwright82 said:


> You know as well as I do that philosophers have abandoned this way of thinking.



Some philosophers, but not all in the post-Quine post-Wittgenstein era.



jwright82 said:


> Again I think that the mystery of the incarnation prevents us from drawing any conclusions here.



Didn't stop the Church Fathers. Mystery or not, we have to wrestle with it. I would suggest also that the interaction of mind and body may turn out to be a mystery. 



jwright82 said:


> And here is that Nietzsche quote I promised, with commentary by myself.



I wouldn't call the problem he is addressing "mind/body," nor do I think his critique is even of substance metaphysics, but of the Platonic Cave. But the Platonic Cave is not necessary to substance metaphysics. Further, with language-games (and linguistic reductionism), Wittgenstein simply offers us a (community) tour of Plato's cave and claims that he's described reality.


----------



## jwright82

Philip said:


> No they aren't. My consideration when purchasing a bottle of wine is whether the chemical/aesthetic value outweighs the economic value (the price tag). Of course I'm making that distinction in ordinary life!



Well that is a good point that Frame made against Dooyeweerd as well. You are right that a sharp contrast cannot be made with these two. But Dooyeweerd seems to mean that the special theoretical study of economics is distinct from the special theoretical study of chemistry. But both are merely studying different aspects of the bottle of wine. So don’t look at this as a hard and fast separation of naïve verses theoretical reflection, or Husserl put it (I believe before Dooyeweerd did) pre-theoretical verses theoretical reflection. 

An interesting side note, I read one time that when Heidegger was Husserl’s assistant he wrote in the margin of Husserl’s book the _Logical Investigations_, I believe that was it, something like “yeah and isn’t the pre-theoretical experience the more important one” (as you point out), just a little F.Y.I. 




Philip said:


> The same goes for mind/body. I can make the distinction between my mental state and my physical state quite easily in ordinary life and do so all the time. When I talk about, for instance, my spiritual state and relationship to God, I am obviously not talking about physical things. Similarly, prayer is obviously not a physical act, though at times it may include physical actions such as speaking or kneeling. There are, after alll, mental actions.
> 
> I'm sorry, but the law of the excluded middle rather limits your options here: you end up being one of three things, a metaphysical reductionist (materialism/physicalism, or subjective idealism), a dualist (of one sort or another), or else a linguistic reductionist (Wittgenstein). And I submit that reducing everything to language is simply wishing the problem away and pretending that it doesn't exist.



My point exactly, when you talk about your spiritual relationship with God you are talking about a real thing. That is that your language refers to some aspect of yourself without committing the referential fallacy by saying that your language must refer to some substance that is distinct from your body. We can only make a distinction theoretically speaking in talking about one aspect over another. 

This view is dualistic in that it recognizes that we have immaterial aspects to our self along side our material aspects. But it isn’t a substantial dualism that claims that we are made up of two different sorts of metaphysical stuff. So this seems to avoid your 3 different positions. I reject the notion of linguistic reductionism that seems perfected by Daniel Dennett when he describes our mental phenomenon as being “real” but fictional in nature, it is like describing the world of Sherlock Holmes. 






Philip said:


> I'm not a referentialist about language. I simply think that it this case, the kind of language-games we are playing are referential in nature and involve two different referents. Where's the contradiction? I'm not going to go down the path of linguistic reductionism here.



Well remember that I am referring to the Cartesian type of substantial dualism here. You seem to be saying exactly what I am just in different language, no pun intended. Yes when we use soul-talk we are referring to a soul but that does not mean that our soul is an absolutely separate substance from our bodies. Our soul and our bodies are in reality so united to be only dinstinguishable by our being forced to develop differing language games to describe the same thing. 

I follow Strawson in that the fact we must, and I don’t if he would agree with me here but this me using his ideas, say that because we can’t help but describe ourselves in non-material language means that we are in some aspect immaterial.




Philip said:


> But it isn't merely a linguistic distinction: it's a real distinction. The two natures (ousia or substantiae in Latin) are two different kinds of thing, not merely two different language-games for the same thing.



If you mean that theoretically we are composed of two different natures, immaterial and material, that are united in reality but can be studied separately than yes I agree but if you mean that metaphysically speaking we are composed of two different substances that are in fact separate than I disagree. 




Philip said:


> Some philosophers, but not all in the post-Quine post-Wittgenstein era.



True and most philosophers are apparently materialist. 




Philip said:


> Didn't stop the Church Fathers. Mystery or not, we have to wrestle with it. I would suggest also that the interaction of mind and body may turn out to be a mystery.



I agree but the incarnation is too unique to be absolutly relevant. I can see what your saying that our language "seems" attached to substance metaphysics but I think this is only a surface feature of our creeds and not an essential feature of it. 




Philip said:


> I wouldn't call the problem he is addressing "mind/body," nor do I think his critique is even of substance metaphysics, but of the Platonic Cave. But the Platonic Cave is not necessary to substance metaphysics. Further, with language-games (and linguistic reductionism), Wittgenstein simply offers us a (community) tour of Plato's cave and claims that he's described reality.



Well I think that he is critiquing all of western thinking. But substance metaphysics is among that. His distinction between the “real” world and the “apparent” world is reminiscent of substance metaphysics.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But Dooyeweerd seems to mean that the special theoretical study of economics is distinct from the special theoretical study of chemistry. But both are merely studying different aspects of the bottle of wine.



But consider, in the case of a human, that with the mind, we are studying something that is obviously _not_ the body. It's not simply that it is a different aspect, but that it is a different kind of thing. The mind is not physical. Quite obviously, then, it is another kind of substance. What exactly is the problem here with acknowledging the conditional unity of mind and body? How, in your view, would you explain the intermediate state?



jwright82 said:


> when you talk about your spiritual relationship with God you are talking about a real thing. That is that your language refers to some aspect of yourself without committing the referential fallacy by saying that your language must refer to some substance that is distinct from your body. We can only make a distinction theoretically speaking in talking about one aspect over another.



So it's not a real distinction, then?



jwright82 said:


> This view is dualistic in that it recognizes that we have immaterial aspects to our self along side our material aspects. But it isn’t a substantial dualism that claims that we are made up of two different sorts of metaphysical stuff.



All right, so what is the different between matter and mind if not a difference of substance? It seems to me that you are quibbling unnecessarily over the term substance as if advocating an older way of thinking was somehow bad. Personally, I'm quite willing to adopt older ways of thinking if I find them accurate. I follow a pre-modern religion, so I expect that my views will end up sounding strange to postmodern ears.



jwright82 said:


> Well remember that I am referring to the Cartesian type of substantial dualism here.



And I'm talking about substance dualism in general. I really have no quibble with the way that, for instance, Occam and Duns Scotus use the terms.



jwright82 said:


> Yes when we use soul-talk we are referring to a soul but that does not mean that our soul is an absolutely separate substance from our bodies. Our soul and our bodies are in reality so united to be only dinstinguishable by our being forced to develop differing language games to describe the same thing.



Here again you take away with one hand what you grant with the other. This is linguistic reductionism. Either mind and body are the same or they are not, but let's not go pretending that we can have our cake and eat it too through linguistic gymnastics. If we are describing the same thing, then we are reductionists. If not, then we are going to have to adopt some form of substance dualism. There's really no way around this one.



jwright82 said:


> if you mean that metaphysically speaking we are composed of two different substances that are in fact separate than I disagree.



What's the problem, exactly? If I don't acknowledge the metaphysical distinction between mind and body, then I've become a linguistic reductionist. Remember that even saying that two things are different language-games implies a metaphysical story of what lies behind it. You're positing a _noumena_ behind the _phenomena_.



jwright82 said:


> I can see what your saying that our language "seems" attached to substance metaphysics but I think this is only a surface feature of our creeds and not an essential feature of it.



Really? So why, then, were the Church Fathers so willing to go to the mat of these distinctions? Why did the Westminster Divines see fit to include the language of substance in the confessions? 



jwright82 said:


> Well I think that he is critiquing all of western thinking. But substance metaphysics is among that. His distinction between the “real” world and the “apparent” world is reminiscent of substance metaphysics.



How so? I'm not sure I follow. I've never heard mention of "real" vs "apparent" substance. It seems to me that substance metaphysics is rather common-sense stuff.


----------



## jwright82

Philip said:


> But consider, in the case of a human, that with the mind, we are studying something that is obviously not the body. It's not simply that it is a different aspect, but that it is a different kind of thing. The mind is not physical. Quite obviously, then, it is another kind of substance. What exactly is the problem here with acknowledging the conditional unity of mind and body? How, in your view, would you explain the intermediate state?



Since I do not have to make any distinction metahphysically between the immaterial and the material I can't say what the intermediate will be like except that perhaps the Lord will provide us with a physical body to be in.




Philip said:


> So it's not a real distinction, then?



It is a real distinction it just doesn't involve part of you, it involves all of you. 




Philip said:


> All right, so what is the different between matter and mind if not a difference of substance? It seems to me that you are quibbling unnecessarily over the term substance as if advocating an older way of thinking was somehow bad. Personally, I'm quite willing to adopt older ways of thinking if I find them accurate. I follow a pre-modern religion, so I expect that my views will end up sounding strange to postmodern ears.



Well since I have seen no good theory of interaction between the different substances I choose to reject it it total. If there is a good theory for reconciling the two than I am all ears but there doesn’t seem to be. 




Philip said:


> And I'm talking about substance dualism in general. I really have no quibble with the way that, for instance, Occam and Duns Scotus use the terms.



Well I am not aware of any substance dualism in general, if you could explain how they different from Descarte than I would be interested in that. They are nominalists right? Perhaps what your suggesting is different from what I am critiquing in which case my criticisms don't apply but you need to explain to me how they are different. 




Philip said:


> Here again you take away with one hand what you grant with the other. This is linguistic reductionism. Either mind and body are the same or they are not, but let's not go pretending that we can have our cake and eat it too through linguistic gymnastics. If we are describing the same thing, then we are reductionists. If not, then we are going to have to adopt some form of substance dualism. There's really no way around this one.



Well it may seem that way but that is not what I am suggesting. What I am saying is that soul-talk refers to a soul, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense, and body talk is refering to body, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense. 




Philip said:


> What's the problem, exactly? If I don't acknowledge the metaphysical distinction between mind and body, then I've become a linguistic reductionist. Remember that even saying that two things are different language-games implies a metaphysical story of what lies behind it. You're positing a noumena behind the phenomena.



No saying that I can describe the same event from different perspective only implies that my differing language-games refer to different aspects of the same thing.




Philip said:


> Really? So why, then, were the Church Fathers so willing to go to the mat of these distinctions? Why did the Westminster Divines see fit to include the language of substance in the confessions?



Point well taken, I think we should reconsider our meaning here. In the same way that we do not have to accept all the theological opinions of the Divines to accept the WCF I would argue that we are equally not obligated to accept all the theological opinions of the church fathers.




Philip said:


> How so? I'm not sure I follow. I've never heard mention of "real" vs "apparent" substance. It seems to me that substance metaphysics is rather common-sense stuff.



The substance of a thing became unknowable in any real sense, Kant’s revolution. Berkeley worked it out before him but it endured and was abandoned by post-Kantian thinkers.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Since I do not have to make any distinction metahphysically between the immaterial and the material I can't say what the intermediate will be like except that perhaps the Lord will provide us with a physical body to be in.



That's a rather bizarre piece of speculation (and I'm not sure that Scripture supports it). And even so there would have to be a non-physical part of you to go into another body and which would then be put into a resurrected body.



jwright82 said:


> It is a real distinction it just doesn't involve part of you, it involves all of you.



Explain how a physical account of the human being could involve all of you.



jwright82 said:


> Well since I have seen no good theory of interaction between the different substances I choose to reject it it total.



That's like saying that because I'm unsatisfied with string theory and its alternatives, I refuse to believe in subatomic particles. Sorry, but all you need is a good reason to believe in the substances---you don't need an account of their interaction.



jwright82 said:


> Well I am not aware of any substance dualism in general, if you could explain how they different from Descarte than I would be interested in that. They are nominalists right?



Substance dualism:

a) Mind is a type of substance
b) Body is a type of substance
c) Mind and body are not the same type of substance.

Neither Occam nor Duns Scotus were nominalists. Scotus has his own (very interesting) view of universals and particulars, while Occam is a conceptualist (though nominalists like to claim him). What you think that has to do with the pre-modern understanding of the mind's relationship to the body, I'm not sure.



jwright82 said:


> What I am saying is that soul-talk refers to a soul, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense, and body talk is refering to body, not a different substance in the Cartesian sense.



I'm talking substance in the ordinary metaphysical sense. I don't particularly care how Descartes uses or misuses the term. 

Substance _(n)_: stuff, type of stuff.

The body is physical stuff and the mind is non-physical stuff.



jwright82 said:


> No saying that I can describe the same event from different perspective only implies that my differing language-games refer to different aspects of the same thing.



But you are arguing that ultimately it is the same thing, which makes you a reductionist.



jwright82 said:


> In the same way that we do not have to accept all the theological opinions of the Divines to accept the WCF I would argue that we are equally not obligated to accept all the theological opinions of the church fathers.



No---but we do have to subscribe. And the language of the WCF includes substance metaphysics, as do the creeds. The doctrine of hypostatic union is a doctrine that involves substance metaphysics.



jwright82 said:


> The substance of a thing became unknowable in any real sense, Kant’s revolution. Berkeley worked it out before him but it endured and was abandoned by post-Kantian thinkers.



But why should I listen to Kant and Berkeley, when my positions are pre-modern to begin with? You are assuming that Kant and Berkeley are to be somehow taken for granted. You are assuming that the wrong turn began with Aristotle, whereas I say that it began with Descartes and his abuse of substance metaphysics and that the solution to Descartes was in Reid rather than in Kant. I simply don't agree with your reading of the history of philosophy, particularly of Scholastic substance metaphysics. Wittgenstein thought all metaphysics was confused, but to argue that, he ends up falling into metaphysics himself.


----------



## jwright82

Philip said:


> That's a rather bizarre piece of speculation (and I'm not sure that Scripture supports it). And even so there would have to be a non-physical part of you to go into another body and which would then be put into a resurrected body.



It is speculation but it’s not inconceivable. I don’t know what the intermediate state will be like. But I don’t see why we must accept substance metaphysics to make sense of things. I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.




Philip said:


> Explain how a physical account of the human being could involve all of you.



It can’t, that’s my point you are forced by the failure materialism to except that we are not entirely material in nature. But that doesn’t mean that we are to run into the arms the substance thinkers either. Aspectual thinking allows you to say yes to both parties. In the sense that we can account for our behavior in immaterial terms as well as material terms but both language-games are describing the same thing not two different things. 




Philip said:


> That's like saying that because I'm unsatisfied with string theory and its alternatives, I refuse to believe in subatomic particles. Sorry, but all you need is a good reason to believe in the substances---you don't need an account of their interaction.



Fair enough. But my way seems to make more sense to me. It doesn’t seem to have the same metaphysical burdens that the opposing other parties have. 




Philip said:


> Substance dualism:
> 
> a) Mind is a type of substance
> b) Body is a type of substance
> c) Mind and body are not the same type of substance.



See I agree with this in a way but it seems leave open the problem of specific elements being tied to one or the other substance. A thought or feeling occurs in the mind substance. A brain process occurs in the body substance. But we know that neither of those statements is entirely true. So how do the two substances interact, say when I see red? We don’t know. In my scheme the question itself is irrelevant. 




Philip said:


> Neither Occam nor Duns Scotus were nominalists. Scotus has his own (very interesting) view of universals and particulars, while Occam is a conceptualist (though nominalists like to claim him). What you think that has to do with the pre-modern understanding of the mind's relationship to the body, I'm not sure.



It was just a question not relevant to our discussion. You seem more knowledgeable of scholastic philosophy than me. 




Philip said:


> But you are arguing that ultimately it is the same thing, which makes you a reductionist.



I would say that that actually makes a holist. 




Philip said:


> No---but we do have to subscribe. And the language of the WCF includes substance metaphysics, as do the creeds. The doctrine of hypostatic union is a doctrine that involves substance metaphysics.



Well subscription doesn’t necessarily imply a philosophy though. They used concepts to explain what they meant without, in my mind, subscribing to the actual metaphysics itself. 




Philip said:


> But why should I listen to Kant and Berkeley, when my positions are pre-modern to begin with? You are assuming that Kant and Berkeley are to be somehow taken for granted. You are assuming that the wrong turn began with Aristotle, whereas I say that it began with Descartes and his abuse of substance metaphysics and that the solution to Descartes was in Reid rather than in Kant. I simply don't agree with your reading of the history of philosophy, particularly of Scholastic substance metaphysics. Wittgenstein thought all metaphysics was confused, but to argue that, he ends up falling into metaphysics himself.



We do disagree on the history of philosophy here. I view in the continental sense. It is one grand struggle to work out the contradictions within itself. And to me Berkeley simply pointed out what was wrong with the whole thing. Kant really is the end result of that idea. It was once philosophers abandoned it that progress was made in a sense but they had their own problems to deal with.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.



But the point is that there _is_ an immaterial part of us. Since the soul is not a material substance, then it is an immaterial one. Or are you going to argue that the soul is insubstantial? The only way I can see this working is if you end up subscribing to an occasionalist view of the human person, but even this is more readily associated with subjective idealism.



jwright82 said:


> Aspectual thinking allows you to say yes to both parties. In the sense that we can account for our behavior in immaterial terms as well as material terms but both language-games are describing the same thing not two different things.



Of course they aren't. Is your mind your body? Yes or no. What you are essentially positing is a _tertium quid_ beyond the mind and the body that each language-game only partially describes. But, you are also then claiming that the language-game of language games allows us to see behind the ordinary language to the _ding-an-sich_. See the problem?



jwright82 said:


> It doesn’t seem to have the same metaphysical burdens that the opposing other parties have.



Most certainly it does because of the _tertium quid_ you seem to be proposing.



jwright82 said:


> A thought or feeling occurs in the mind substance. A brain process occurs in the body substance. But we know that neither of those statements is entirely true. So how do the two substances interact, say when I see red? We don’t know. In my scheme the question itself is irrelevant.



No, the question is still there, it's just a question of semantics. You solve the problem by playing the language card and thereby wishing it away. All you've done is to reduce it to grammar, and I'm not convinced that the question is grammatical in nature. Not all problems can be wished away in this manner.

And again, lack of an adequate theory of interaction is no point against substance dualism if the evidence is sufficient to suggest that mind and body are different substances. Substance dualists have various explanations and theories, but none of them are essential to the underlying theory. 



jwright82 said:


> Well subscription doesn’t necessarily imply a philosophy though. They used concepts to explain what they meant without, in my mind, subscribing to the actual metaphysics itself.



Of course they did. The bound variables they used do entail certain kinds of metaphysics. I recommend Quine's _On What There Is_ for a fuller discussion of implied ontologies.



jwright82 said:


> We do disagree on the history of philosophy here. I view in the continental sense.



I would not. I would say that the Cartesian attempt to rebuild the medieval synthesis on rationalistic grounds was wrongheaded and unnecessary. Kant is certainly the end result, but he's the end result of a project that was misguided to begin with, and which was challenged by Reid's reformulation of traditional philosophy. In the end I'm a philosophical conservative who would rather not reinvent the wheel (unlike, say, Heidegger, Husserl, and Wittgenstein).


----------



## Afterthought

jwright82 said:


> It is speculation but it’s not inconceivable. I don’t know what the intermediate state will be like. But I don’t see why we must accept substance metaphysics to make sense of things. I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.


Just wondering: How do you affirm WCF XXXII while affirming the above? It seems rather tricky to me for one to deny that there is a different kind of stuff than the body that is separated from it at death, considering that the "body" and the "soul" have different properties from each other and different subsistences, neither of which can be predicated of the other. Also, I think there's a difference between heaven the intermediate state and heaven the new heavens and earth? And that material descriptions of spiritual things do not necessarily mean the spiritual things are material (e.g., prayer described as offering incense does not mean prayer is material)?

"1. The bodies of men, after death, return to dust and see corruption: but their souls (which neither die nor sleep) having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them: the souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies. And the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Beside these two places, for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none. 

2. At the last day, such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed: and all the dead shall be raised up, with the selfsame bodies and none other, although with different qualities, which shall be united again to their souls forever. 

3. The bodies of the unjust shall, by the power of Christ, be raised to dishonour: the bodies of the just, by His Spirit, unto honour; and be made conformable to His own glorious body."


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## John Bunyan

Isn't the the question "How does the immaterial mind moves the material body" misdirected? Immaterial minds are not bound by scientific laws, so of course we can't explain in material terms how the mind moves the body. And we can't answer it in immaterial terms either, for we don't know how an immaterial mind works - we don't have "immaterial natural laws". So we will never be able to explain how the mind moves the body, for the mind is not bound by the same laws that the body. We, however, know that immaterial beings can interact with material ones, isn't God an immaterial being? And doesn't God interact with material things? We don't know how, but appealing to human ignorance does nothing to disprove the possibility of material-immaterial interactions - why would they be impossible? We do know that minds affect bodies, and bodies affect minds, and minds don't seem to be material, and there are probably good arguments for this. Also, I don't understand how can one affirm that minds are material and not identical with the brain at the same time.


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## Peairtach

Do we have to presuppose dualism for Man and the world to make sense, and do materialists show evidence of this?


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## jwright82

Philip said:


> But the point is that there is an immaterial part of us. Since the soul is not a material substance, then it is an immaterial one. Or are you going to argue that the soul is insubstantial? The only way I can see this working is if you end up subscribing to an occasionalist view of the human person, but even this is more readily associated with subjective idealism.



Yes there is an immaterial part to us. The “soul” as a word is equivalent to that immaterial part. What I am abandoning is a vocabulary to describe this “soul” and its relation to the body. One of the most fascinating things to me, that I we disagree on, about continental philosophy is that its massive critique or deconstruction of western metaphysics is not that it was destroying metaphysics but only a vocabulary of metaphysics, or a way of thinking about metaphysics. And some of them sought new ways of conceiving of metaphysics. The Existentialists are one example of this. So it is a way of describing what we are that I am rejecting not the intuition that we are material and immaterial in the same way.




Philip said:


> Of course they aren't. Is your mind your body? Yes or no. What you are essentially positing is a tertium quid beyond the mind and the body that each language-game only partially describes. But, you are also then claiming that the language-game of language games allows us to see behind the ordinary language to the ding-an-sich. See the problem?



Yes my mind is both mind and body at the same time. That is you pose a false dichotomy between mind and body. My mind doesn’t have to either essentially be material or essentially be immaterial it can essentially both. It is only within a substance framework that you must be either/or, reject that framework and you don’t have a problem. Psychology is an excellent example of this. 

Does the psychologist study the mind or the body? They study both but they seem to get along just fine without substantial dualism. The substantial dualist is faced with now having to divide up all the truths of psychology into either the mind camp or the body camp but the age old problem crops up as to what must go into which camp how do you decide? Also I think that question must be answered as to the fact that psychology gets along just fine without this viewpoint, it would seem that if substantial dualism is correct than psychology is the one science that would have to assume it just to get along. 




Philip said:


> Most certainly it does because of the tertium quid you seem to be proposing.



Well it is not “some third” but a different way of describing things that don’t have the same burdens that materialists, idealists, and substantial dualists have. 




Philip said:


> No, the question is still there, it's just a question of semantics. You solve the problem by playing the language card and thereby wishing it away. All you've done is to reduce it to grammar, and I'm not convinced that the question is grammatical in nature. Not all problems can be wished away in this manner.
> 
> And again, lack of an adequate theory of interaction is no point against substance dualism if the evidence is sufficient to suggest that mind and body are different substances. Substance dualists have various explanations and theories, but none of them are essential to the underlying theory.



What actual evidence is there? Only that we are composed of material and immaterial parts not they are totally different substances. You are exaggerating the evidence. But I think that the problem will still come up. When you start to have to classify things and explain brain traumas and such you are logically forced to come up with some theory.




Philip said:


> Of course they did. The bound variables they used do entail certain kinds of metaphysics. I recommend Quine's On What There Is for a fuller discussion of implied ontologies.



When we are forced to take up philosophical concepts to understand biblical revelation, we must take up the minimal amount of ontological commitments that a general theory of metaphysics has. Just because our confessions use the terms substance or soul doesn’t mean that we must all of substance metaphysics, that’s a false assumption.




Philip said:


> I would not. I would say that the Cartesian attempt to rebuild the medieval synthesis on rationalistic grounds was wrongheaded and unnecessary. Kant is certainly the end result, but he's the end result of a project that was misguided to begin with, and which was challenged by Reid's reformulation of traditional philosophy. In the end I'm a philosophical conservative who would rather not reinvent the wheel (unlike, say, Heidegger, Husserl, and Wittgenstein).



Yeah but without dealing with the devastating critique of western metaphysics by those philosophers you leave yourself open to their criticisms. By assuming that Greek metaphysics is metaphysics is to shackle yourself to that boat, and Christianity by implication, if it sinks you go with it.


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## jwright82

Afterthought said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> It is speculation but it’s not inconceivable. I don’t know what the intermediate state will be like. But I don’t see why we must accept substance metaphysics to make sense of things. I get the arguments that there must be some immaterial stuff that lives on in a separate form but I think that that is an unnecessary conclusion given that every image of heaven in scripture is highly material in nature. Is there some immaterial part of us that goes somewhere after we die, sure there is but where and in what form I for one can’t say.
> 
> 
> 
> Just wondering: How do you affirm WCF XXXII while affirming the above? It seems rather tricky to me for one to deny that there is a different kind of stuff than the body that is separated from it at death, considering that the "body" and the "soul" have different properties from each other and different subsistences, neither of which can be predicated of the other. Also, I think there's a difference between heaven the intermediate state and heaven the new heavens and earth? And that material descriptions of spiritual things do not necessarily mean the spiritual things are material (e.g., prayer described as offering incense does not mean prayer is material)?
> 
> "1. The bodies of men, after death, return to dust and see corruption: but their souls (which neither die nor sleep) having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them: the souls of the righteous, being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God, in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies. And the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Beside these two places, for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.
> 
> 2. At the last day, such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed: and all the dead shall be raised up, with the selfsame bodies and none other, although with different qualities, which shall be united again to their souls forever.
> 
> 3. The bodies of the unjust shall, by the power of Christ, be raised to dishonour: the bodies of the just, by His Spirit, unto honour; and be made conformable to His own glorious body."
Click to expand...


Since I am not affirming materialism there is no problem. There is an immaterial aspect that does survive away from our body after death but in this time our immaterial and material aspects are essentially one. Not one substance, material or immaterial, but essentially one.


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## jwright82

John Bunyan said:


> Isn't the the question "How does the immaterial mind moves the material body" misdirected? Immaterial minds are not bound by scientific laws, so of course we can't explain in material terms how the mind moves the body. And we can't answer it in immaterial terms either, for we don't know how an immaterial mind works - we don't have "immaterial natural laws". So we will never be able to explain how the mind moves the body, for the mind is not bound by the same laws that the body. We, however, know that immaterial beings can interact with material ones, isn't God an immaterial being? And doesn't God interact with material things? We don't know how, but appealing to human ignorance does nothing to disprove the possibility of material-immaterial interactions - why would they be impossible? We do know that minds affect bodies, and bodies affect minds, and minds don't seem to be material, and there are probably good arguments for this. Also, I don't understand how can one affirm that minds are material and not identical with the brain at the same time.



Well you are right that we cannot use material language to describe immaterial things but this drives a dialectical wedge in the theory. Now we have given the materialist the upper hand because you must have some way to describe to make it a meaningful concept. And if it is beyond human description than it is unnecessary to propose that this immaterial thing exists.


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## John Bunyan

jwright82 said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Isn't the the question "How does the immaterial mind moves the material body" misdirected? Immaterial minds are not bound by scientific laws, so of course we can't explain in material terms how the mind moves the body. And we can't answer it in immaterial terms either, for we don't know how an immaterial mind works - we don't have "immaterial natural laws". So we will never be able to explain how the mind moves the body, for the mind is not bound by the same laws that the body. We, however, know that immaterial beings can interact with material ones, isn't God an immaterial being? And doesn't God interact with material things? We don't know how, but appealing to human ignorance does nothing to disprove the possibility of material-immaterial interactions - why would they be impossible? We do know that minds affect bodies, and bodies affect minds, and minds don't seem to be material, and there are probably good arguments for this. Also, I don't understand how can one affirm that minds are material and not identical with the brain at the same time.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well you are right that we cannot use material language to describe immaterial things but this drives a dialectical wedge in the theory. Now we have given the materialist the upper hand because you must have some way to describe to make it a meaningful concept. And if it is beyond human description than it is unnecessary to propose that this immaterial thing exists.
Click to expand...


If we can show that the mind is affected and affects the brain but it is not equal with it, then the immateriality of the mind can still be argued for. If there are great difficulties in explaining minds in merely material terms, I don't see why not to postulate that the mind is immaterial. I see no problem with being unable to talk about minds in physical terms, philosopher David Chalmers, for example, has argued that we should simply accept consciousness, as we accept matter and energy, as an irreducible element of reality, something with it's own laws and properties that could not be explained in terms of something else.
Is all this discussion only about how we speak of minds and bodies or do you disagree that minds are not material?


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## jwright82

Peairtach said:


> Do we have to presuppose dualism for Man and the world to make sense, and do materialists show evidence of this?




Yes, a curious feature of our language is that we just can’t seem to even conceive of things in purely materialistic terms. That is we inevitably think of things in both material and immaterial terms and there is a general failure of materialism to explain this. The fact that a lot of contemporary thinkers accept materialism, at least as far as philosophy of mind, doesn’t mean much because I think it is due more to the current cultural obsession with science. Science gives them a cop out in essence. They say well we affirm that all mind activity is just brain processes, this is highly simplistic, and one day science will hopefully figure it all out. This is just a way to dodge hard questions.


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## jwright82

> Is all this discussion only about how we speak of minds and bodies or do you disagree that minds are not material?



Exactly! I do think that minds are not material in the sense that all the minds activities are substantially material. But we know that brain trauma affects our minds. So yes we must assume that part of our mind is immaterial but why must we assume that it substantially a different thing altogether? What is irrational about assuming that the immaterial and the material can be different things but essentially united in ourselves and the world? 



> If we can show that the mind is affected and affects the brain but it is not equal with it, then the immateriality of the mind can still be argued for. If there are great difficulties in explaining minds in merely material terms, I don't see why not to postulate that the mind is immaterial. I see no problem with being unable to talk about minds in physical terms, philosopher David Chalmers, for example, has argued that we should simply accept consciousness, as we accept matter and energy, as an irreducible element of reality, something with it's own laws and properties that could not be explained in terms of something else.



I can agree with this except that many words we use presuppose that they are in part immaterial. We must legitimize our immaterial language. Do you believe that the immaterial is indescribable or unexplainable in a mysterious sense?


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## John Bunyan

jwright82 said:


> Is all this discussion only about how we speak of minds and bodies or do you disagree that minds are not material?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Exactly! I do think that minds are not material in the sense that all the minds activities are substantially material. But we know that brain trauma affects our minds. So yes we must assume that part of our mind is immaterial but why must we assume that it substantially a different thing altogether? What is irrational about assuming that the immaterial and the material can be different things but essentially united in ourselves and the world?
Click to expand...

I don't see it as irrational, but I don't really see the point of assuming this. We're just pushing the problem with dualism a step further, from "how can the immaterial mind interact with the material body?" to "how can the immaterial part of the mind interact with it's material one?". I know material and immaterial can interact (God and angels can interact with the universe), but I sincerely have no clue as to how. I'm starting to think the problem here might be about the boundaries of reason.



> If we can show that the mind is affected and affects the brain but it is not equal with it, then the immateriality of the mind can still be argued for. If there are great difficulties in explaining minds in merely material terms, I don't see why not to postulate that the mind is immaterial. I see no problem with being unable to talk about minds in physical terms, philosopher David Chalmers, for example, has argued that we should simply accept consciousness, as we accept matter and energy, as an irreducible element of reality, something with it's own laws and properties that could not be explained in terms of something else.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I can agree with this except that many words we use presuppose that they are in part immaterial. We must legitimize our immaterial language.
Click to expand...

Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.


> Do you believe that the immaterial is indescribable or unexplainable in a mysterious sense?


I really want to answer "no", and in fact I think God can explain and describe the immaterial quite well, but I cannot think of a way in which to talk completely about the immaterial aspect of creation. I mean, I understand aspects of immaterial things, like the differences between material and immaterial and properties of immaterial things, but I don't see how we can describe non-material interactions, either immaterial-immaterial or material-immaterial ones.


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## jwright82

> I don't see it as irrational, but I don't really see the point of assuming this. We're just pushing the problem with dualism a step further, from "how can the immaterial mind interact with the material body?" to "how can the immaterial part of the mind interact with it's material one?". I know material and immaterial can interact (God and angels can interact with the universe), but I sincerely have no clue as to how. I'm starting to think the problem here might be about the boundaries of reason.



Well the point is that you are posing is a dualism between the immaterial and the material. We need to stop thinking in such dualisms to resolve these problems. Being essentially one means that the immaterial and the material in practice are one but in theory we can conceive of each separately. 



> Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.



Values, laws of logic, morals, etc. 



> I really want to answer "no", and in fact I think God can explain and describe the immaterial quite well, but I cannot think of a way in which to talk completely about the immaterial aspect of creation. I mean, I understand aspects of immaterial things, like the differences between material and immaterial and properties of immaterial things, but I don't see how we can describe non-material interactions, either immaterial-immaterial or material-immaterial ones.



Do immaterial and material things have to interact if they are essentially one? You see it is only when you separate things metaphysically that you run into this problem. If you say that we can separate them theoretically in our investigations of who we are than that is different.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> What I am abandoning is a vocabulary to describe this “soul” and its relation to the body.



But it's the vocabulary of the church.



jwright82 said:


> Well it is not “some third” but a different way of describing things that don’t have the same burdens that materialists, idealists, and substantial dualists have.



It's a nebulous linguistic reductionist. If it's a new vocabulary, how would you translate it?



jwright82 said:


> When you start to have to classify things and explain brain traumas and such you are logically forced to come up with some theory.



Not necessarily---a _via negativa_ is a perfectly reasonable option.



jwright82 said:


> Just because our confessions use the terms substance or soul doesn’t mean that we must all of substance metaphysics, that’s a false assumption.



No, but we must use some form of substance metaphysics.



jwright82 said:


> Yeah but without dealing with the devastating critique of western metaphysics by those philosophers you leave yourself open to their criticisms. By assuming that Greek metaphysics is metaphysics is to shackle yourself to that boat, and Christianity by implication, if it sinks you go with it.



I've read the critiques and agree in part but believe that too often they throw the baby out with the bathwater. The scorched-earth methodology employed by these thinkers leaves many of their conclusions suspect. They never turn the methodology on itself and therein lies the problem.



jwright82 said:


> There is an immaterial aspect that does survive away from our body after death but in this time our immaterial and material aspects are essentially one. Not one substance, material or immaterial, but essentially one.



Nothing in this contradicts substance metaphysics.



jwright82 said:


> Do immaterial and material things have to interact if they are essentially one?



Yes, because substance and essence are not the same thing.

EDIT: to clarify things, here are some questions so that I can clearly understand what you mean:

What are mind and matter, if not different substances and how are they distinguished? You seem to want to say that the distinction is not merely linguistic but picks out a feature of reality. 

What would you propose to replace the vocabulary of substance? It seems to me that you have to have some theory of stuff.

Finally, why is getting rid of the problem of interaction so important here? A problem like this merely means that one hasn't thought of a good explanation and problems like this will arise in any theory because of our finitude. I really don't see how your thus-far-nebulous position is any more satisfying than the saner forms of substance metaphysics.


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## John Bunyan

jwright82 said:


> Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Values, laws of logic, morals, etc.
Click to expand...

Aren't values, laws of logic and morals, if they all exist, one hundred percent immaterial?


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## jwright82

> But it's the vocabulary of the church.



And it is fine to continue using it. 



> It's a nebulous linguistic reductionist. If it's a new vocabulary, how would you translate it?



It’s more Dooyeweerdian. A thing for him functions within all the various law spheres of creation that give creation meaning. So it is not that the biological law sphere is metaphysically separate from the others it only has its own theoretical science that investigates only it in abstract. He had a strange and mystical view of human beings but adopting this framework we can view the body and soul in this way. It is not that the soul and the body are separate but essentially one but our thinking about each one separately is perfectly legitimate. 



> Not necessarily---a via negativa is a perfectly reasonable option.



I don’t see how this would work. A person that is essentially one explains this phenomenon without problem. 



> No, but we must use some form of substance metaphysics.



But why is substance metaphysics the only framework that we can speak of these things?



> I've read the critiques and agree in part but believe that too often they throw the baby out with the bathwater. The scorched-earth methodology employed by these thinkers leaves many of their conclusions suspect. They never turn the methodology on itself and therein lies the problem.



I view this the way that Dooyeweerd did as an example of scholasticism for him. That is that we must use Greek metaphysics or use nothing at all. I don’t see many contemporary theologians that shackled to Greek metaphysics. 



> Nothing in this contradicts substance metaphysics.



Yes but substance metaphysics says that we are composed of two different substances. I am not saying that. 



> EDIT: to clarify things, here are some questions so that I can clearly understand what you mean:
> 
> What are mind and matter, if not different substances and how are they distinguished? You seem to want to say that the distinction is not merely linguistic but picks out a feature of reality.
> 
> What would you propose to replace the vocabulary of substance? It seems to me that you have to have some theory of stuff.



In the Dooyeewerdian sense I laid out before. I can elaborate if you want.



> Finally, why is getting rid of the problem of interaction so important here? A problem like this merely means that one hasn't thought of a good explanation and problems like this will arise in any theory because of our finitude. I really don't see how your thus-far-nebulous position is any more satisfying than the saner forms of substance metaphysics.



Because there are no separate substances that must interact with each other in some way or another. How would you address Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of this idea? 

Ghost in the machine - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## jwright82

John Bunyan said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Values, laws of logic, morals, etc.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Aren't values, laws of logic and morals, if they all exist, one hundred percent immaterial?
Click to expand...


If by that you mean that there is no place in material reality that I can and point at numbers than sure. But why must we think of them in terms of material and immaterial?


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## John Bunyan

jwright82 said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Could you give examples? I ask because I'm very ignorant on this topic of philosophy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Values, laws of logic, morals, etc.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Aren't values, laws of logic and morals, if they all exist, one hundred percent immaterial?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> If by that you mean that there is no place in material reality that I can and point at numbers than sure. But why must we think of them in terms of material and immaterial?
Click to expand...


How are we to think of them, then? That's way people have been talking about them in a long time . (and it seems to be a good way)


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> It is not that the soul and the body are separate but essentially one but our thinking about each one separately is perfectly legitimate.



But they aren't essentially one, given that they are separable. The person is essentially one, but the soul and body are two different things.



jwright82 said:


> A person that is essentially one explains this phenomenon without problem.



But a person is neither a soul nor a body---he is a composite of soul and body. A thing may be composite and still essentially one. The person is the principle of interaction.



jwright82 said:


> But why is substance metaphysics the only framework that we can speak of these things?



Because it's the framework of the confessions.



jwright82 said:


> I don’t see many contemporary theologians that shackled to Greek metaphysics.



Indeed---why have most contemporary theologians conceded their ground to Tillich and Heidegger?



jwright82 said:


> How would you address Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of this idea?



1) The description given of dualism describes the Christian doctrine of the intermediate state, so if you're going to sign onto Ryle's critique of the dogma, then you deny the intermediate state.

2) The mind-body distinction is not a category mistake because it is distinguishing two categories. It is not necssarily asserting them as opposites on a spectrum, but as two different kinds of thing.

3) I am perfectly willing to take issue with Descartes on the principle of interaction. Instead, I would assert that the principle of interaction between mind and body is the human person.

4) Ryle's critique, on the other hand, is reductionistic.



jwright82 said:


> But why must we think of them in terms of material and immaterial?



Because of the law of the excluded middle.


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## John Bunyan

Sincere doubt right now: James, when you say that mind and body are not different substances, do you mean to say that there is no real distinction (except on a linguistic level) between a mind and a body? Could you clarify your position?


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## Loopie

As a third party listening (or reading) this discussion, I think I am able to understand where both sides are coming from. Of course, If I am wrong about my thoughts or conclusions, please correct me as quickly as possible.

It seems that James does not like using the term 'substance' when it comes to differentiating between body and mind. I think I understand (and in a way, sympathize) with his concern. The reason for this is that obiviously the term 'substance' SEEMS to imply something material. Here is a quick dictionary definition of 'substance':

1. that of which a thing consists; physical matter or material: form and substance. 

2. a species of matter of definite chemical composition: a chalky substance. 

3. controlled substance. 

4. the subject matter of thought, discourse, study, etc. 

5. the actual matter of a thing, as opposed to the appearance or shadow; reality. 

Now obviously this does not mean that EVERY use of the term 'substance' must imply a material-like thing. I think that this is what Philip implies when he uses the term 'substance', because he makes a good point when he talks about the discussion amongst the early church fathers of _homoousios_. 

No one on this board should come to the conclusion that the early church fathers believed that the Father was made up of some sort of 'material' substance. Their use of the idea 'of the same substance' regarding the Father and the Son was simply the best way they could express and clarify their understanding of the nature of God. 

Personally I have no problem using the term 'substance' in the way that others (like the church fathers) did. I know that the term does not have to refer to 'material' or 'physical' things. I also know that our ability to accurately describe the very nature of God is going to be limited (we are not omnisicient or eternal, and we live and think within space/time). With that said, I see no other by which we can best describe something such as the Trinity, and so that is why 'substance' is probably the best word that we have to use. What else could we use (other than perhaps the word 'thing')?

Is my analysis of the discussion so far relatively accurate? Please correct me if I am wrong.


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## jwright82

> But they aren't essentially one, given that they are separable. The person is essentially one, but the soul and body are two different things.



But if that true than you cannot attribute the same things to each substance. This is essentially Augustine’s problem with the senses. Each thing has its own attributes that make it unique that the other thing that does not have. But we can attribute the same thing to body and mind. When I reason in some way my soul is acting but at the same time a very distinct part of my brain is acting also. This means that the attribute is true of both things implying an identity greater than two separate things. 



> But a person is neither a soul nor a body---he is a composite of soul and body. A thing may be composite and still essentially one. The person is the principle of interaction.



But you still have a dialectic at work in which how does the person become the bridge between this dialectic?



> Because it's the framework of the confessions.



I think you are assuming too much. To say that the creeds use these ideas does not imply that we must accept the entire house of substance metaphysics. Just because two things have one thing in common does not mean that they have all things in common.



> Indeed---why have most contemporary theologians conceded their ground to Tillich and Heidegger?



I meant reformed theologians. I know of no contemporary reformed theologian debating how accidents adhere to substances or any other problem that substance metaphysicians dealt with. I could be wrong here but that is the way it appears to me. That is not to say that these ideas as logical categories are not useful and essential to how we make sense of things only that in our philosophical pursuits we are not strapped to Greek metaphysics simply because we use some of the same terms. 



> 1) The description given of dualism describes the Christian doctrine of the intermediate state, so if you're going to sign onto Ryle's critique of the dogma, then you deny the intermediate state.
> 
> 2) The mind-body distinction is not a category mistake because it is distinguishing two categories. It is not necssarily asserting them as opposites on a spectrum, but as two different kinds of thing.
> 
> 3) I am perfectly willing to take issue with Descartes on the principle of interaction. Instead, I would assert that the principle of interaction between mind and body is the human person.
> 
> 4) Ryle's critique, on the other hand, is reductionistic.



Well I don’t know that by accepting Ryle’s critique means that you reject the intermediate state. You are assuming that the only way to make sense of this mysterious doctrine is through Greek philosophy. It is mysterious after all. 

Also his critique rightly points out that we assume too much when we attribute more to a person’s behavior than we have reason to do so. This doesn’t mean that his positive position is correct only that we face a deeper problem that must be solved. I know what it means to reason but the only way I know that someone is “reasoning” is through different behaviors I see the person exhibiting. Those behaviors don’t necessarily presuppose a mind that contains “reason”, although this may be true only that previous ideas on this are flawed. 



> Because of the law of the excluded middle.



Only if you assume the two as mutually exclusive.


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## jwright82

John Bunyan said:


> Sincere doubt right now: James, when you say that mind and body are not different substances, do you mean to say that there is no real distinction (except on a linguistic level) between a mind and a body? Could you clarify your position?



No think of the distinction as theoretical instead. I can explore the neurological aspect of pain and the social aspect of pain but at the same time it is the same pain that we are discussing not two different pains.


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## jwright82

> As a third party listening (or reading) this discussion, I think I am able to understand where both sides are coming from. Of course, If I am wrong about my thoughts or conclusions, please correct me as quickly as possible.
> 
> It seems that James does not like using the term 'substance' when it comes to differentiating between body and mind. I think I understand (and in a way, sympathize) with his concern. The reason for this is that obiviously the term 'substance' SEEMS to imply something material. Here is a quick dictionary definition of 'substance':
> 
> 1. that of which a thing consists; physical matter or material: form and substance.
> 
> 2. a species of matter of definite chemical composition: a chalky substance.
> 
> 3. controlled substance.
> 
> 4. the subject matter of thought, discourse, study, etc.
> 
> 5. the actual matter of a thing, as opposed to the appearance or shadow; reality.



Yes but I would add that I think that we are not shackled to substance metaphysics as the only way to solve metaphysical problems.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> When I reason in some way my soul is acting but at the same time a very distinct part of my brain is acting also. This means that the attribute is true of both things implying an identity greater than two separate things.



Indeed---the person is the principle of interaction.



jwright82 said:


> But you still have a dialectic at work in which how does the person become the bridge between this dialectic?



I'm not sure I understand your meaning. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts here. The dialectic remains, it is true, but it may be that we have to embrace the tension here. It may be that the person is the synthesis between the thesis and antithesis of mind and matter (if I may be permitted to continue your reference to Hegel).



jwright82 said:


> To say that the creeds use these ideas does not imply that we must accept the entire house of substance metaphysics.



Again, you assume that there is but one house.



jwright82 said:


> I know of no contemporary reformed theologian debating how accidents adhere to substances or any other problem that substance metaphysicians dealt with. I could be wrong here but that is the way it appears to me.



That may simply be because none of them find that particular problem to be particularly interesting. I don't see what's at stake in that particular problem.

(side note: I don't think that accidents are the kind of thing that could "adhere" given that they are not components or independent things in their own right. If they had their own being, they wouldn't be accidents, but substances in their own right. Accidents are merely the properties of individual objects as distinguished from the properties of substances generally. Again, to draw analogy from chemistry, the properties of atoms generally (having mass, taking up space, etc.) could be seen as the properties of substance while the properties of molecules could be seen as the properties of individual objects. i.e. accidents.)



jwright82 said:


> I meant reformed theologians.



I repeat my original question as to why we should concede this ground to Tillich and Heidegger.



jwright82 said:


> Well I don’t know that by accepting Ryle’s critique means that you reject the intermediate state.



It would---to accept the intermediate state is to accept some sort of dualism, which means that Ryle's critique is wrong. Scriptural data means that certain critiques are necessarily wrong.



jwright82 said:


> Also his critique rightly points out that we assume too much when we attribute more to a person’s behavior than we have reason to do so. This doesn’t mean that his positive position is correct only that we face a deeper problem that must be solved. I know what it means to reason but the only way I know that someone is “reasoning” is through different behaviors I see the person exhibiting. Those behaviors don’t necessarily presuppose a mind that contains “reason”, although this may be true only that previous ideas on this are flawed.



So you're wondering why we believe in other minds? To me this is a fairly basic common-sense assumption---that other human beings are rational creatures. To be rational means to be capable of some level of mental reasoning. The existence of other minds seems to me to be a fairly basic assumption. Ryle is assuming strict methodological empiricism here, an assumption which may be fine for him, but which flies in the face of common sense. He needs to show why rational behaviour is not sufficient evidence of rational thought-processes similar to my own. I don't see a good reason to be skeptical here.



jwright82 said:


> Only if you assume the two as mutually exclusive.



Ok, let's translate these categories into logical terms:

Material: A.
Immaterial: Non-A.

Don't see how A and non-A are not mutually exclusive.



jwright82 said:


> No think of the distinction as theoretical instead. I can explore the neurological aspect of pain and the social aspect of pain but at the same time it is the same pain that we are discussing not two different pains.



It is the same pain, but it may be that this pain functions at several different metaphysical levels due to the human as a metaphysical amphibian.



jwright82 said:


> Yes but I would add that I think that we are not shackled to substance metaphysics as the only way to solve metaphysical problems.



But of course not, given that not all metaphysical problems are a) solveable by human reason b) concerned with substances. For example, I don't know that freedom and determinism would have anything to do with substances---a substance-metaphysical account of this problem would be a category mistake.


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