# Causality and Divine Fiat by Drake



## Drake (Dec 19, 2010)

Divine Fiat

by Drake Shelton

An article concerning the agent of the Godhead as the sole cause of all things and a denial of Aristotelian causality. 


_Col 1:16 For by Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities all things have been created through Him and for Him. 17 He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together. _

Aquinas, Summa, 1.2.14.13 Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things? [http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q14_A13.html]

"Objection 1:
It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above (A[8]). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things... 
On the contrary,
It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things... 

Reply to Objection 1:
Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary." 


I reject this because the works of men are not contingent by reason of proximate contingent cause. As it is written, Acts 15:18 Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world. KJV There is no such thing as a fallible cause. God causes everything. Dr. Clark in his Lord God of Truth [Hobbs, New Mexico: The Trinity Foundation Hobbs, 1986, 2nd ed. 1994] says,

"Experience at best teaches us that one event follows another. It never shows that one causes the other. Experience at best gives sequence not causality. (pg. 24)...First of all causality is a relative term: That is, there can be no causes unless there is an effect. We say X causes Y. Omit either one of them and there is left neither cause nor effect (pg. 25)...a cause must be an event that guarantees the effect...There must be because the cause must produce its result. If in the time interval something happens, or even could happen, to prevent the effect, there is no cause...two objections. First, but illogically, he will say, 'But I mean X cause Y if nothing intervenes.' Stated thus baldly the fallacy is flagrant. However, it can be stated more covertly. Food nourishes us, if we do not get seasick, and if the stomach finishes its function, and if the juices are absorbed into the blood, and if the blood is brought to the muscles. But note well: We no longer have two event, X and Y. We have the definition of nourishment; and surely it is logical to insist that if we are nourished, it follows logically but not temoporally, that we are nourished." (pg. 26) 

The context of this last section is the "spatio temporal" world of the empiricists and the Aristotelians. This view of God we reject. They will say that God causes all things because he is the first mover. This is not what a Scripturalist means when he says that God causes all things, because the Aristotelian view assumes that the subsequent motions are proximate causes. This Clark just refuted. Dr. Clark says, 

"We now concur with the Islamic anti-aristotelian Al Gazali: God and God alone is the cause, for only God can guarantee occurrence of Y, and indeed of X as well. Even the Westminster divines timidly agree, for after asserting that God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes...' What they called second causes, Malebranche called occasions. But an occasion is neither a fiat lux nor a differential equation." (pg. 27)


W​hen God said "let their be light" His command or divine fiat is a true cause of the light. This is what Clark means by a fiat lux. Nothing could have intervened and prohibited the light and in this is the true definition of causality. Does water or oxygen cause the germination of a plant? No. Water and oxygen do not cause life, God causes life. The water and the oxygen are occasions wherein God causes life.


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## Philip (Dec 20, 2010)

Ah, so when I ask you (the detective) how the man was murdered, you say that God murdered the man and that the dagger only happened to enter his body at the same time.


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## Drake (Dec 20, 2010)

No, the man is the immediate agent but yes ultimately, God is the cause. The man and the dagger are the occasion, God is the cause. Isa 45:7 I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things.


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## Philip (Dec 20, 2010)

Drake said:


> No, the man is the immediate agent but yes ultimately, God is the cause. The man and the dagger are the occasion, God is the cause. Isa 45:7 I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things.


 
I hope you don't mean to say that God is the author of moral (as opposed to natural) evil. God allows evil, but we cannot ascribe its origin to God or else we blaspheme.

The verse is referring to natural evil (the curse) not moral evil.


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## Drake (Dec 21, 2010)

"I hope you don't mean to say that God is the author of moral (as opposed to natural) evil. God allows evil, but we cannot ascribe its origin to God or else we blaspheme."

“Author” is what the word immediate agent means. When we say that God is not the author of sin what we are saying is that he is not the immediate agent. I just affirmed this. The man and the dagger are the immediate agent not God.

Could you show me any Puritan author that discusses the relationship of the agency of God to evil that distinguished between moral and natural evil in this context?

The verse in Isa 45:7 says nothing of the curse man. The context is post fall, in the regular actions of men. Where are you getting this stuff from?


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## Philip (Dec 21, 2010)

Drake said:


> When we say that God is not the author of sin what we are saying is that he is not the immediate agent.



Ok, so consider this scenario:

An unscrupulous psychologist constructs a machine that can alter one's will (call it the Volition-Machine or VM). The psychologist then (unbeknownst to the subject) places Jones under the influence of this machine. Now, the psychologist alters Jones' volitions such that he robs a store. Who is to blame?



Drake said:


> The verse in Isa 45:7 says nothing of the curse man. The context is post fall, in the regular actions of men. Where are you getting this stuff from?



My translation translates the word as "calamity" so the evil referred to is natural evil, not moral evil.



Drake said:


> Could you show me any Puritan author that discusses the relationship of the agency of God to evil that distinguished between moral and natural evil in this context?



Just because a Puritan said it does not make it right, any more than it being said by a church father or Augustine does. Let's not go canonizing the Puritans and making them into little popes.

However, I need to go back and read Edwards on this issue.


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## Drake (Dec 21, 2010)

“An unscrupulous psychologist constructs a machine that can alter one's will (call it the Volition-Machine or VM).”
False premise. Free agency denies that physical influences can alter the will. 


Pro 16:4 The LORD hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil. 
I think this verse shows the distinction.


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