# Know and Knowledge



## Theological Books (Aug 10, 2005)

For those great epistemologists out there, I have a question or two and a scenario.

I am a "credobaptist." I makes claims such as, "I believe credobaptism to be true." Or, "I know credobaptism is true." However, let us assume/grant paedobaptism is an *absolute truth* (this won't be much of a stretch for most of you fellahs). And let us grant I have studied the issue of paedobaptism, the arguments, the critiques (good and bad), the evidence, and the conclusion. While not all arguments may be identical, I have studied sufficiently to know all the major premises and conclusions.

Would you say, regardless of what I say I believe about my position of credobaptism, I actually *KNOW* the truth of paedobaptism, having studied the absolute truth, yet deny it, anyway? Do I *KNOW* the truth and practice otherwise? Or, must I identify with the absolute truth and acknowledge the absolute truth to be absolutly true in order for me to *KNOW* the absolute truth?


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## Scott Bushey (Aug 10, 2005)

Yes


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## Theological Books (Aug 10, 2005)

Hmmmm... "yes." Does "yes" apply to all three questions:



> Would you say, regardless of what I say I believe about my position of credobaptism, I actually *KNOW* the truth of paedobaptism, having studied the absolute truth, yet deny it, anyway*?* Do I *KNOW* the truth and practice otherwise*?* Or, must I identify with the absolute truth and acknowledge the absolute truth to be absolutly true in order for me to *KNOW* the absolute truth*?*



If it does, I'm confused how you can reconcile question three with questions one and two?


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 10, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> Hmmmm... "yes." Does "yes" apply to all three questions:
> 
> 
> ...



If you don't believe it, you cannot know it. Knowledge presupposes belief. However if credobaptism is wrong, you cannot know it.

Now you could know the truth of something and yet deny it verbally and mentally yet live as if the truth that you deny is true. I think this is getting into the issue of self deception. 

I think an example would be you arguing for credobaptism and proclaiming your agreement with the position but then going and having your child baptized.

However if you deny something and live consistent with that denial, I do not see how anyone could say that you know what you deny.

CT


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## Scott Bushey (Aug 10, 2005)

yea; what he said..........


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## RamistThomist (Aug 10, 2005)

I would define knowledge as "justified, true belief." So, how that would apply to your question...


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## Theological Books (Aug 10, 2005)

> If you don't believe it, you cannot know it. Knowledge presupposes belief. However if credobaptism is wrong, you cannot know it.



What do you mean by "believe"? For instance, what if I'm arguing with my wife about an actress in movie "A", which we are watching. I claim I know she is in movie "B", but my wife says, no, "I know she is not in movie "B"." We both mount cases supporting our arguments (i.e. how old the movie we're watching is, how old the actress is in another film, etc.). Without either of us verifying our claims from an outside source, which will determine who is correct about who knows what (i.e. searching BlockBuster's list of actors in movie "B"), we have to assume only one of us is correct. Both of our claims cannot be true because they are mutually exclusive. Let us say my wife was correct, though I don't know she is correct, and I still believe I am correct.

Regardless of what I "believe" I know, I am wrong. Regardless of what my wife "believes" she knows, she is correct. I, who deny the truth of my wife's knowledge, still KNOW what the truth is, even though I deny it. While I may not be convinced of my wife's justification for her knowledge, her knowledge is still true, and mine is false. And regardless of the justification of her knowledge, as well as my denial of her justification, I still "know" (from being told) the true answer. I simply do not acknowledge it.

If we then check an outside, objective, reliable source, and I find out I was indeed wrong, I still "knew" the correct answer, but I denied it for whatever reasons. Regardless of those reasons, I am still responsible for rejecting what was true knowledge, and I knew what was true, even though I didn't acknowledge it as true. The knowledge I had, yet did not acknolwedge as correct, is verified when we check our sources, which compells me to acknowledge what I actually knew, but denied.

Yes? No?


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## Theological Books (Aug 10, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> I would define knowledge as "justified, true belief." So, how that would apply to your question...



I've been thinking about that. It depends on what you claim "believe" is. Obviously, if paedobatism is true, then credobaptism cannot be justified and should not be believed. However, how objective is knowledge? Can we know it and still believe otherwise?


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## PuritanCovenanter (Aug 10, 2005)

Can someone know something is totally wack and know it?

Could someone have tasted something and turned from it because it was wrong? Thus they know it.

If an acceptance of something is the only way of knowing something is correct, than why are we commanded to test the spirits and fruits?



[Edited on 8-10-2005 by puritancovenanter]


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 10, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> I would define knowledge as "justified, true belief." So, how that would apply to your question...



I think that such a definition does not go far enough. To see why go here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 10, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> 
> 
> > If you don't believe it, you cannot know it. Knowledge presupposes belief. However if credobaptism is wrong, you cannot know it.
> ...



Honestly think something is the case aka. true.



> For instance, what if I'm arguing with my wife about an actress in movie "A", which we are watching. I claim I know she is in movie "B", but my wife says, no, "I know she is not in movie "B"." We both mount cases supporting our arguments (i.e. how old the movie we're watching is, how old the actress is in another film, etc.). Without either of us verifying our claims from an outside source, which will determine who is correct about who knows what (i.e. searching BlockBuster's list of actors in movie "B"), we have to assume only one of us is correct. Both of our claims cannot be true because they are mutually exclusive. Let us say my wife was correct, though I don't know she is correct, and I still believe I am correct.
> 
> Regardless of what I "believe" I know, I am wrong. Regardless of what my wife "believes" she knows, she is correct. I, who deny the truth of my wife's knowledge, still KNOW what the truth is, even though I deny it.



If you believe (honestly think) that the actress was in this movie, then you cannot know the opposite. You could gain that knowledge at a later time though (after looking at the blockbuster list).



> While I may not be convinced of my wife's justification for her knowledge, her knowledge is still true, and mine is false. And regardless of the justification of her knowledge, as well as my denial of her justification, I still "know" (from being told) the true answer. I simply do not acknowledge it.
> 
> You do not know it until you at least accept (believe) it as being the case.
> 
> ...


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 10, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> ...



A person can justifiable believe something that is false. They however cannot know something that is false.

For example, lets say a friend calls you to tell you that they are having car problems and will miss church. Lets say that they really did not have car problems and just didnt not want to go for whatever reason. You could justifiable believe that they had car problems, but you could not know such because it is false.


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 10, 2005)

> _Originally posted by puritancovenanter_
> Can someone know something is totally wack and know it?
> 
> Could someone have tasted something and turned from it because it was wrong? Thus they know it.
> ...



One thing to keep in mind is that when we investigate a situation to see the true or falseness of it, we do this while retaining all the previous knowledge that we have gained.

For example, we believe and know that the Bible is God's infallible Word etc. When we go to test things, we test them against what we already know. If it conflicts then we either throw out some of our previous knowledge or we reject the "potential" knowledge claims that we are testing.

If I didnt phrase that well enough, I will attempt to clarify any problems that you have next time.


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## Theological Books (Aug 11, 2005)

How can you believe something to be true, justifiably, yet not know it (i.e. if that which I believe is actually false)? For instance, I believe credobaptism is correct. I have justified true belief (knowledge) of the position of credobaptism. However, let us grant I am wrong, even though I believe I am correct. You stated, "However if credobaptism is wrong, you cannot know it."

Therefore, a paedobaptist who stands against my position must say, "You do not know credobaptism to be true. You merely believe it to be true, but it is false and you cannot know what is false." Right?

*Why don't you put this in syllogism for me if you have the time.*

You also stated, "If you believe (honestly think) that the actress was in this movie, then you cannot know the opposite. You could gain that knowledge at a later time though (after looking at the blockbuster list)."

Actually, I gained that knowledge prior to looking at the blockkbuster list. I was told by someone, yet I did not believe that someone. I did not gain more knowledge than what was previously stated to me. I simply did not believe the source who said the exact same thing the other source told me. I still had the knowledge of the truth, even though I denied it. So, while denying the knowledge I had, I did know the truth. The only difference is that I believed the knowledge to be true by one authority, but not another, even though both authorities told me the same, identical truths.

Again, your sceanrio: "For example, let say that there is a math test and the class is reviewing the correct answers. Let say one student thinks question 1's answer is 5 while another student thinks that it is 17. They discuss it but cannot come to a consensus. The teacher gives the answer to be 17. The student who said the answer was 5 did not know the answer was 17."

The person who believed the answer was 5 did not learn anything new, nor was there new knowledge received. The person was told the correct answer, and therefore had knowledge of the correct answer, and knew what the correct answer was, but for irrational reasons, denied it to be so. When the teacher tells the student the answer is 17, the student is not learning anything new. He is merely now believing/trusting one authority regarding the knowledge he previously had, but denied.

Why must I agree something is true in order for it to be knowledge? For instance, I can teach paedobaptism to someone, and they can know it, but they do not believe it at first. They still know what paedobaptism is, but they deny it. When they are finally convinced of paedobaptism (through examining all that was taught for some period of time), it isn't that they know something else or something new, but they now believe what they already knew.

Maybe you are finessing defitions a bit more than I realize, or I am equivocating "know" and "knowledge." Help me out, here.


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## Theological Books (Aug 11, 2005)

Paul,

I'm glad to see you chime in (and I'm happy everyone else is chiming in, too). Must one believe the proposition to be true in order to know it? If we can say one can believe [A] ([A] being mutually exclusive to * where [A] is objectively and ultimately false and  is objectively and ultimately true) to be true and know [A], yet, ultimately, they do not know [A] because it turns out [A] is false, which means [A] cannot be known at all. Why can't we say one knows , which is a true proposition, yet does not believe , but believes [A]. The person still knows , since  is true and can only be known because [A] cannot be known. It seems to me, somehow, "knowing" in the JTB account is not objective enough.

If the person knows both propositions [A] and , but believes [A], how can we say the person does not know  even though he does not believe  to be correct? When the person is convinced  is correct, he is not learning anything new, nor is any new knowledge being added to the person. He simply shifts belief from proposition [A] because it is actually false and cannot be believed, and now believes that which he already knew, propositon , yet previously denied (for whatever reasons). So, while the person believed [A], he did not actually know [A] because [A] is false, but did know , which is true and only truth can be known, but did not believe  to be true.

Personally, I do not think I like defining knowledge as "justified true belief." However, maybe it is the way I am using "know" and "knowledge." It seems to me one can know the true proposition, yet affirm and believe in a false proposition while knowing the true proposition.

[Edited on 8-11-2005 by Theological Books]*


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## JohnV (Aug 11, 2005)

TB:

Are you talking about truth, or about knowledge, or about the baptism issue? Maybe I can be of some help too.


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## Theological Books (Aug 11, 2005)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> TB:
> 
> Are you talking about truth, or about knowledge, or about the baptism issue? Maybe I can be of some help too.



lol... baptism is merely an example. I simply think it is one to which we can all relate given the dynamic of this board. I am neither trying to debate the issue of baptism, nor make or mount an argument for either position. This issue can regard other a posteriori (derived/deduced) knowledge of truths. In talking about truth I am also talking about knowledge, given that knowledge cannot be false in order for it to be knowledge. And just to reiterate, this is not a theological issue I'm trying to raise regarding the practice and doctrine of baptism. It's merely an exercise in epistemology, or so I would like it to be, specifically regarding what constitutes "knowledge" and "knowing."

So, please, look over this thread and help me out to the best of your ability and the freedom from other constraints on your time.

Simply put, I am questioning the notion that knowledge, or knowing something that is true, requires one believing it to be true. In the baptism issue, assume I believe credobaptism to be true. However, regardless of my beliefs about baptism, my knowledge is not knowledge at all because paedobaptism is true. [For the record, I am a "credobaptist."] As a credobaptist, and as a seminary student or aspiring minister, I have studied the issue of baptism, both the credobaptist and paedobaptist position. I know both propositions and arguments, as well as the conclusion. However, my knowledge of one proposition (credobaptism), regardless of my belief in the proposition, is false. And my knowledge of another proposition (paedobaptism), regardless of my disbelief in the proposition, is true.

We all grant I know the proposition of paedobaptism, since I have studied it, understand the arguments, know the definitions of the words, etc. Yet, for some reason that which I presume to justify my belief in the knowledge of credobaptism is no real/true justification at all, but is faulty, for surely non-faulty reasoning--moral and intellectual in spite of or because of the affect of sin--cannot properly justify a position; and a position that is false, or cannot be known, must be the result of something faulty in my presuppositions, foundations, and reasoning in some level (where ever it may be).

So, how can I know something that is true, yet disbelieve it, if knowledge is justified true belief? I do not believe the proposition to be true in spite of the truth of its justification to necessitate belief. I still know the truth of the proposition but deny it (for faulty reasons, assuming the argumentation with which I am familiar is proper justification for true belief in the true proposition of paedobaptism).

Does that make it clearer?


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## JohnV (Aug 11, 2005)

> Simply put, I am questioning the notion that knowledge, or knowing something that is true, requires one believing it to be true. In the baptism issue, assume I believe credobaptism to be true. However, regardless of my beliefs about baptism, my knowledge is not knowledge at all because paedobaptism is true. [For the record, I am a "credobaptist."] As a credobaptist, and as a seminary student or aspiring minister, I have studied the issue of baptism, both the credobaptist and paedobaptist position. I know both propositions and arguments, as well as the conclusion. However, my knowledge of one proposition (credobaptism), regardless of my belief in the proposition, is false. And my knowledge of another proposition (paedobaptism), regardless of my disbelief in the proposition, is true.
> 
> We all grant I know the proposition of paedobaptism, since I have studied it, understand the arguments, know the definitions of the words, etc. Yet, for some reason that which I presume to justify my belief in the knowledge of credobaptism is no real/true justification at all, but is faulty, for surely non-faulty reasoning--moral and intellectual in spite of or because of the affect of sin--cannot properly justify a position; and a position that is false, or cannot be known, must be the result of something faulty in my presuppositions, foundations, and reasoning in some level (where ever it may be).
> 
> So, how can I know something that is true, yet disbelieve it, if knowledge is justified true belief? I do not believe the proposition to be true in spite of the truth of its justification to necessitate belief. I still know the truth of the proposition but deny it (for faulty reasons, assuming the argumentation with which I am familiar is proper justification for true belief in the true proposition of paedobaptism).


Its still a bit confusing, but maybe I can help to dissolve some of the difficulties. 

Some things you can know, and some things you know because you know other things. We know that God is, because we have the witness of it in our hearts and in the Word. We have inward and outward evidence. But we know that certain doctrines are true because we know God to be true and that the Bible is His testimony to us. If God says so, then it is so, not because we can prove it by other means. 

We know that the testimony of the apostles is true because we have the stamp of God upon them, and we know that God is true. We know that we have fellowship with God if we have in our hearts the love that He commands. And love includes the embracing of truth, for that is the character of the One we love. The first epistle of John gives us numerous tests whereby we can know things to be true. We could almost subtitle that book "By These Things We Know." But you'll notice that they are all secondarily known, they are not direct. We know that we know by such and such a test. They are not always direct, but through other direct things. 

You can present an iron-clad proof of God's existence, of which there are many, but that does not mean that the person to whom you are proving it will acknowledge the proof. If he will not believe, even in spite of the proofs, it is not because the proofs are lacking but because he is not willing. He knows, and it can be that you know that he knows, but yet he will refuse to acknowledge. But what that is a refusal to submit, and thereby a denial that he knows. He does indeed know, but refuses even to admit it to himself. 

So there can be a wide disparity between what one knows and what one believes. It is possible that you refuse to believe in the "other" view of baptism, even though you know the arguments for them, and even though it may be that they are convincing, simply because you don't want to. In such a case you would be saying that you know something, but you don't really know it. In fact, it may well be that you really know the other to be the case, but you have yourself believing that you know what you do not in fact know. 

There are also cases of people who claim to know a lot more than they actually do, people who claim to know a lot less than they actually do, and people who can't contain all that they know so as to make sense of it, as well as many other categories. But all these will claim a belief of some sort. Some things you know because you believe, and some things you believe because you know. 

I know God's Word to be true by several means. I've been taught it from birth; I've studied its teachings under teachers and administrators; I've tested it many times over; but mostly I have been personally addressed by the Holy Spirit. In other words, I now believe it because I know God, whereas I used to believe it because it was consistently reliable and trustworthy, and before that because it was taught with integrity. I haven't diminished the former ways of believing in any way, but they are greatly enhanced by the knowledge of God that I now have after many years of conversing with Him through prayer and in diligently seeking His answers. So for me the tests in 1 John are of great value, and are very real tests of assurance and certainty. 

As far as the question of baptism is concerned, though, I know the paedo view to be true because of its consistency with the Scriptures. But I can't claim to know everything there is to know about it. Even if I knew thoroughly everything that has ever been written or studied on the matter, it would only be a thorough knowledge of what man has written and studied; it doesn't follow that I know everything. And the Bible doesn't give such an exhaustive defence of the practice of baptism. From what I know I believe the paedo view to be true. Arguments to the contrary have not dissuaded me. However, what would work better than very well made arguments would be a good character. If you can show me that you are only after God's way, with all your heart, and I can see it in your willingness to submit to truth, and that you are persuaded of the credo view, then I will certainly give a good and responsible looking over whatever you have to say on it, looking much deeper than just your arguments. If, on the other hand, you expect me to cave in to arguments that appear sound to you, but you lack godly character, then I will look only at the arguments. But I know the limitations of such things, and have learned to question even sound arguments, being assured that soundness will not fall under closer scrutiny. That way I am not fooled by good sounding arguments that are not true in the end, after they have done their damage. 

So what I am saying is that there has to be a hierarchy of knowledge and belief. I believe the paedo view to be true, but I know that God has also blessed, and is with, some who hold to the credo view. I will not know better than God. I just won't do that on purpose. So I know and believe, but still take a back seat on something God has trumped my knowledge and belief on. In other words, there is more to it than a clear answer to the baptism question.


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## Theological Books (Aug 11, 2005)

JohnV,

That may be helpful, but allow me to be a bit more simple. Let us assume I am a credobaptist, but that paedobaptism is true.

That which justifies my beliefs in credobaptism cannot be consistent with the truth, for true justification does not lend itself to a contradictory conclusion.

Regardless, for whatever reasons, my I perceive my justification as true and valid, which lends me to believe the proposition of credobaptism. I have not come across any reasoning or arguments that can disprove my justification for believing credobaptism, though there are necessarily arguments present if my justification and knowledge is invalid and false (respectively).

Let us say I have studied the arguments and justification for paedobaptism from several leading scholars and genuine authorities (i.e. John Murray, Meredith Kline, Robert Strimple, John Calvin, John Owen, William Ames, Louis Berkhof, Herman Bavink, Charles Hodge, Robert Reymond, etc.).

Do I *KNOW* the proposition of credobaptism, or is my knowledge about credobaptism still false (because I cannot know what is not true)? Or, vice versa, do I actually *KNOW* the proposition of paedobaptism, since it is true, and therefore know the truth even though (for whatever rational or irrational reasons--i.e. there is yet to be written in the resources I've studied and read a rational objection to the justification of credobaptism) I disbelieve and do not accept paedobaptism?

If the proposition paedobaptism is objectively and absolutely true, and I know the proposition of paedobaptism, yet I neither agree with the justification of it (for rational or irrational reasons), nor accept the proposition as true (for rational or irrational reasons), do I still *KNOW* the truth?

The reason I speak of paedobaptism, as opposed to one's knowledge of God (his existence and his moral will), is because paedobaptism is something known a posteriori (or as deduced/induced from special revelation, or from an outside source). Correct? While knowledge of the proposition of God (i.e. his existence and that which constitutes his moral will) is a priori, or that which is known without experience. Correct?

So, I'm not trying to speak of "knowledge" regarding things a priori (God and his existence), but that which is "knowledge" regarding things a posteriori.

Is one knowing something contingent upon the acceptance or denial of what valid justification (which is necessary to truly believe a proposition)? Or, regardless of one's acceptance of the justification (opting to believe in other justifications for a particular belief for either rational or irrational reasons), do can they truly know that which they do not truly believe to be true?

Seriously, people, am I spinning my wheels here? I know I'm repeating myself over and over, but that's only because I cannot see my "questions" actually being addressed. If my questions are being (or have been) addressed, please, point that out to me and explain how they have been addressed. I may just be looking for an answer and I don't know what it looks like.

[Edited on 8-11-2005 by Theological Books]


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 11, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> JohnV,
> 
> That may be helpful, but allow me to be a bit more simple. Let us assume I am a credobaptist, but that paedobaptism is true.
> ...



I think you need to think in term of justified and not justified. I think the phrase "true justification" is just confusing things. You can be justified in believing something false.



> Regardless, for whatever reasons, my I perceive my justification as true and valid, which lends me to believe the proposition of credobaptism. I have not come across any reasoning or arguments that can disprove my justification for believing credobaptism, though there are necessarily arguments present if my justification and knowledge is invalid and false (respectively).



False arguments in your knowledge is getting kinda sketchy. If it is false then you cannot know it. And I am not sure how false arguments can support a true conclusion.



> Let us say I have studied the arguments and justification for paedobaptism from several leading scholars and genuine authorities (i.e. John Murray, Meredith Kline, Robert Strimple, John Calvin, John Owen, William Ames, Louis Berkhof, Herman Bavink, Charles Hodge, Robert Reymond, etc.).
> 
> Do I *KNOW* the proposition of credobaptism, or is my knowledge about credobaptism still false (because I cannot know what is not true)?



If credobaptism is true (taught in scripture), then you can know it is true but if it is not taught in scripture (it being wrong) then you cannot know what is not true.



> Or, vice versa, do I actually *KNOW* the proposition of paedobaptism, since it is true, and therefore know the truth even though (for whatever rational or irrational reasons--i.e. there is yet to be written in the resources I've studied and read a rational objection to the justification of credobaptism) I disbelieve and do not accept paedobaptism?



If you dont accept it (believe it)then you cannot know it to be true.



> If the proposition paedobaptism is objectively and absolutely true, and I know the proposition of paedobaptism, yet I neither agree with the justification of it (for rational or irrational reasons), nor accept the proposition as true (for rational or irrational reasons), do I still *KNOW* the truth?



If you do not believe it, then you cannot know it. It does not matter the truth of the proposition, if you do not believe it, then you cannot know it.
It does not matter why you do not believe it, if you do not believe it you cannot know it. 

Im not trying to be mean or anything but I am kinda confused as to why we seem to be talking past each other?



> The reason I speak of paedobaptism, as opposed to one's knowledge of God (his existence and his moral will), is because paedobaptism is something known a posteriori (or as deduced/induced from special revelation, or from an outside source). Correct? While knowledge of the proposition of God (i.e. his existence and that which constitutes his moral will) is a priori, or that which is known without experience. Correct?



Sounds alright.



> So, I'm not trying to speak of "knowledge" regarding things a priori (God and his existence), but that which is "knowledge" regarding things a posteriori.
> 
> Is one knowing something contingent upon the acceptance or denial of what valid justification (which is necessary to truly believe a proposition)? Or, regardless of one's acceptance of the justification (opting to believe in other justifications for a particular belief for either rational or irrational reasons), do can they truly know that which they do not truly believe to be true?



You cant know what you do not believe to be true. (As an aside, some view justification as not necessary for knowledge, but that is a whole other can of worms)



> Seriously, people, am I spinning my wheels here? I know I'm repeating myself over and over, but that's only because I cannot see my "questions" actually being addressed. If my questions are being (or have been) addressed, please, point that out to me and explain how they have been addressed. I may just be looking for an answer and I don't know what it looks like.
> 
> [Edited on 8-11-2005 by Theological Books]



Im just as confused as you are as to why we are not on the same page.


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## Robin (Aug 12, 2005)

I'm enjoying the sidelines, guys...but the suspense is killing me....

How does *deception* interact in all of this? Especially as it relates to pride - how the pride of knowledge "puffs up" and obscures the perception of truth? Any thoughts on the impact of these elements?

(Back to the sideline.....)

Robin


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## Theological Books (Aug 12, 2005)

So, while paedobaptism is necessarily "justified true belief" (assuming it is objectively true--see above) and I have intimate knowledge of it, but do not adhere to it/believe it (for whatever reasons), you cannot say I know it because I, personally, do not believe it to be true?

Let us say while thinking over the propositional truths of paedobaptism, which I know intimately, I come to personally "believe" it to be true, rather than false (as before). Do I now *know* something different than before?


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## ChristianTrader (Aug 12, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> So, while paedobaptism is necessarily "justified true belief" (assuming it is objectively true--see above) and I have intimate knowledge of it, but do not adhere to it/believe it (for whatever reasons), you cannot say I know it because I, personally, do not believe it to be true?
> 
> Let us say while thinking over the propositional truths of paedobaptism, which I know intimately, I come to personally "believe" it to be true, rather than false (as before). Do I now *know* something different than before?



Yes, because know is more than understanding the proposition. It is at least the extra step of saying "Yes, I believe this proposition is correct".

Since I am from a track background, let me use a track example. Lets say that I tell you that I am the fastest man alive. You disbelieve me (At this point, you do not know that I am the fastest man alive). Lets say that I go to the nearest track and run faster than the world record in the 100m. (At this point, you can say that you now know that I am the fastest man alive). Before you did not know, now you do. 

But I had told you at the beginning that I was the fastest man alive, correct? It does not matter because you did not believe me (not saying that true belief is all there is to knowledge).


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## Evan Tomlin (Aug 12, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> In talking about truth I am also talking about knowledge, given that knowledge cannot be false in order for it to be knowledge.



This is an equivocation that needs to be justified (forgive the pun) before any meaningful dialogue can continue in regards to this issue. As several people have suggested, we need to first define knowledge, and then clearly relate it to our perception of objective truth before "œjustified true belief" serves as a starting point. Furthermore, (without sounding tautological) we must take inventory of what we "œbelieve" to be objective truth and compare this to our criterion for true knowledge. Allow me to alter your analogy slightly here. If you, after long and honest study of Scripture believe paedobaptism to be an a posteriori truth, your belief could be defined as "œjustified true belief." 
1)	You believe that Scripture is the infallible revelation of God.
2)	You believe that teaching supporting paedobaptism is clearly deduced from Scripture.
3)	Because of the previous points, you choose to believe this as objective truth.

*altering the intentional disbelief element of your analogy here*

Five years later your fall under convincing teaching in favor of credobaptism and you change your belief. It is difficult to see how your belief five years earlier (at that time) could not be described as "œjustified true belief." Nevertheless, five years later your belief has been falsified by new teaching and you subscribe to credobaptism for the same three reasons above (all of which add up to JTB both now and then). Obviously, this example hinges on those three points adding up to our working definition of JTB. My analogy is rough, but with some imaginative tweaking, I think we can see that in this situation (all intentional disbelief being put aside) we would honestly admit that your initial belief in paedobaptism is "œjustified true belief."
Hence, my concern over our definition of knowledge (of the objective) as justified true belief. As a thought experiment, take inventory of your personal theological flux over the years"¦"¦ Is there anyone here who has not at one time held to a theological position that they viewed as objective truth but were later swayed because of obvious ambiguity or differing teaching? It is my conviction that these beliefs could easily be defined as "œjustified true belief" at the time, but at this time in our journey they have been falsified and we now hold differing beliefs as objective truth. All issues of intentional disbelief and self-deception not withstanding, our definition of knowledge as JTB needs further development lest we dare dancing on a house of cards. 



> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> must be the result of something faulty in my presuppositions, foundations, and reasoning in some level (where ever it may be).



Take into consideration my analogy above. It is probably overstating the case in your analogy to use your turning away from extant knowledge of the objective as a clear example of how JTB is a questionable definition of knowledge. I say this for two reasons:

1) Your perception of the objective as the true objective in the infallible revelation of God has yet to be demonstrated. I am not trying to debate baptism here, I am debating whether your analogy is sufficient in showing that in this particular issue one can justifiably say that they have objective knowledge. They might believe a position to be the objective truth, but their knowledge of it as the objective truth is subject to potential change. I am not denying that we can know objective truth, I am simply stating that your analogy using objective in a rather wide way and I think it best to narrow our knowledge of the objective (if assuming JTB) only to the existence of God and his indisputable revelations that seperate out faith from other beliefs and supply the necessary pre-conditions for intelligiblity. The existent of our present theological continuum restricts us (if assuming JTB) from using a heavily debated issue like baptism to construct an example of the objective. I believe it can be said that we "œknow" a certain baptismal position, but that means we must further develop our definition of knowledge past what we have been discussing in this thread. Simply put, the hypothesis of "œknowing" a nuanced theological distinctive under the strict objective qualifications of JTB is not even workable in analogical form.

2) Many times our theological re-positioning is not necessarily due to a "foundational" (please define this in relation to a priori/posteriori) change. Rather, a compelling exposition of a passage might induce you to re-consider your a posteriori belief. In that case, new information has convinced you that you now "know" the objective teaching of Scripture. But this new belief is also subject to a sort of infinite regressing of theological flux. Impose JTB on this situation and many difficulties arise........

I am with you in your concern over JTB. But there needs to be a better working definition of knowledge that can be related to our set wide of "objective" theological beliefs that are subject to change. 

*Addendum*

I am not positing that there is not such a thing as objective truth in the baptism debate. Nor am I positing that we are unable to know the objective truth about baptism. I am simply arguing that the JTB definition of knowledge makes it difficult for us to (even analogically) speak of _knowing_ (honestly or dishonestly/my analogy or W.B.'s analogy) a nuanced theological distinctive. My suggestion is a further development of our definition of knowledge, not a rejection of the possibility of objective knowledge. As a presuppositionalist, the latter option would be philosophical suicide so you must know that is NOT what I am positing. 










[Edited on 8-12-2005 by Evan Tomlin]


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## crhoades (Aug 12, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Robin_
> I'm enjoying the sidelines, guys...but the suspense is killing me....
> 
> How does *deception* interact in all of this? Especially as it relates to pride - how the pride of knowledge "puffs up" and obscures the perception of truth? Any thoughts on the impact of these elements?
> ...



The Crucial Concept of Self-Deception in Presuppositional Apologetics - Greg Bahnsen

If you haven't read this yet, it is a great intro to your question. If you have more time on your hands than you know what to do with, go to WSC and check out Bahnsen's PHD dissertation from USC on Self-Deception.


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## JohnV (Aug 12, 2005)

TB:
I hear you. I think I know what you're struggling with. But it could be that you are still confusing what you want to believe, claiming to know, with the truth. 

Again, let me say that we do not know that much about the whole baptism issue to draw the kinds of conclusions you wish to draw. Yes, we can know enough to be convinced, but we do not know all there is to know. You may be confusing sufficient knowledge with exhaustive knowledge. 

Let me show you where this is confusing:



> _Originally posted by Theological Books_
> JohnV,
> 
> That may be helpful, but allow me to be a bit more simple. Let us assume I am a credobaptist, but that paedobaptism is true.
> ...


You have this right. And I must also admit that, were credo baptism true, then my paedo conviction would be false. Though we know each of our views to be true, yet one of us is wrong. So one of us "knows" what he cannot possibly know, because you cannot know to be true what is not true. 



> Regardless, for whatever reasons, my I perceive my justification as true and valid, which lends me to believe the proposition of credobaptism. I have not come across any reasoning or arguments that can disprove my justification for believing credobaptism, though there are necessarily arguments present if my justification and knowledge is invalid and false (respectively).


OK, so now we are talking about perception, not knowledge. What we perceive may not always be true. It may be that we are not perceiving the whole vista, but think ourselves to be perceiving what is merely an extrapolation of what we do actually perceive. 



> Let us say I have studied the arguments and justification for paedobaptism from several leading scholars and genuine authorities (i.e. John Murray, Meredith Kline, Robert Strimple, John Calvin, John Owen, William Ames, Louis Berkhof, Herman Bavink, Charles Hodge, Robert Reymond, etc.).
> 
> Do I *KNOW* the proposition of credobaptism, or is my knowledge about credobaptism still false (because I cannot know what is not true)? Or, vice versa, do I actually *KNOW* the proposition of paedobaptism, since it is true, and therefore know the truth even though (for whatever rational or irrational reasons--i.e. there is yet to be written in the resources I've studied and read a rational objection to the justification of credobaptism) I disbelieve and do not accept paedobaptism?


But now you are talking about knowing the positions of men. By this you do not necessarily know either of the views. It takes a lot more than that. I've read numerous objections to a view that I held once, and they were to me as mere triflings with the subject. But later, after I matured, those same objections were more persuasive. My own understanding had to grow in order to truly understand what was being told me long before. In other words, your own understanding may not be ready for the truth yet. It takes humility too to understand truth. 



> If the proposition paedobaptism is objectively and absolutely true, and I know the proposition of paedobaptism, yet I neither agree with the justification of it (for rational or irrational reasons), nor accept the proposition as true (for rational or irrational reasons), do I still *KNOW* the truth?


Yes, you can know it and not yet perceive it. We have a euphemism for that, when "the lights (finally) come on."



> The reason I speak of paedobaptism, as opposed to one's knowledge of God (his existence and his moral will), is because paedobaptism is something known a posteriori (or as deduced/induced from special revelation, or from an outside source). Correct? While knowledge of the proposition of God (i.e. his existence and that which constitutes his moral will) is a priori, or that which is known without experience. Correct?


This may be the problem. I wrote what I wrote before because a person can still deny objective truth if he wants to, and claim to know other than is the truth, and even other than he really knows. Everyone knows of God, but the great majority of men still deny Him. But my point was that I do know God by experience, and is not merely an assent to a proposition or a philosophical position. I would further say that my certainty about everything I claim to know is based upon that prior knowledge. I cannot know which baptism position is true if I don't first have a firm hold on the knowledge of God. I have to know and love His character in order to know what He is teaching me. 

No matter how strong the philosophical arguments we are presented with, our intellect is only limited to what we know, and our knowledge is not exhaustive, even if we know exhaustively everything that men have written about it. 



> So, I'm not trying to speak of "knowledge" regarding things a priori (God and his existence), but that which is "knowledge" regarding things a posteriori.


Perhaps you can now see why this is confusing to me. How can you claim to know what you cannot possibly know? You are making a claim to being able to put together a whole puzzle when we all know that we do not have all the pieces to do that. But we do have all the pieces we need to put together the puzzle of God's existence. We will find that we have a lot left over when we're done. The picture is complete long before all the pieces are in place. 

So I am talking about knowledge in a different way. I would not equate the word "knowledge" with knowing everything, because none of us are up to that; yet we can have a sure knowledge.



> Is one knowing something contingent upon the acceptance or denial of what valid justification (which is necessary to truly believe a proposition)? Or, regardless of one's acceptance of the justification (opting to believe in other justifications for a particular belief for either rational or irrational reasons), do can they truly know that which they do not truly believe to be true?


If you can accept that what appears as a valid justification for belief may later not be sufficient to justify belief, then you will know better the place of faith in belief. Do you believe because of the philosophical justifications? Or do you believe because you want to trust your God with all your heart, and are following truth in love for Him? Do you trust His leading? For you cannot possible know on your own what you would need to know in order to make the decision one way or the other. Honestly speaking, we do not know enough. But if we know His character, and folllow His Word, trusting fully in the Spirit's illuminating work, then we can know. 



> Seriously, people, am I spinning my wheels here? I know I'm repeating myself over and over, but that's only because I cannot see my "questions" actually being addressed. If my questions are being (or have been) addressed, please, point that out to me and explain how they have been addressed. I may just be looking for an answer and I don't know what it looks like.



This spinning of wheels is common to all of us. This is what we go through as we examine ourselves for being faithful to the truth that God is leading us in. This is the kind of introspection that eventually leads to trusting in God's hand, not in our own. The questions you are asking are being answered in bits and pieces. Your desire to have one of us come up with the one answer that will satisfy your need is commendable. But most often the answers do not come that way, as the most basic problem is not that we do not know but that we will not yet understand. Augustine calls that the weight upon the soul, resulting from original sin. It is still there even after we are redeemed, and slowly lifting that weight off is what we call sanctification. 

I know this doesn't answer all your questions, but be assured that I know well the struggle. I've struggled with this all my life, from the time I first saw my father reprove a Jehovah's Witness with firm confidence in what he was saying. I want to know that confidence too. But I found that it was not in me knowing, but in me believing. For many things I already knew, I found, but just had them in disarray in my own mind. There was a lot I needed to learn, but mostly it was a matter of putting things I already knew in the right order. In other words, knowing is more of a submission than it is a conquering of philosophical propositions through intellectual prowess. 

I hope this helps you.

[Edited on 8-12-2005 by JohnV]


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## Evan Tomlin (Aug 18, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Bradford,
> 
> Dr. Michael Sudduth sent me a brief response to your queries:
> ...



Paul,

Let me see if I understand this correctly (given Dr. Sudduth's response),

I can "know" that rejection of Christ is possible in the Arminian system of doctrine (as a second order proposition) without "knowing" that this possibility is true (as a first order proposition). In the case of second order propositions, am I warranted in using terms such as "believe," "understand," or even "know" long as I give the qualifier *about* rather then *of*? If this is true, is there any remaining qualitative difference in the word "know" if it were used in contrasting cases of acceptance and denial of a certain proposition of Arminian theology? Is the difference only found in the use of the qualifier *about* or *of* in the general context of my assent to or dissent from the conclusion of a certain doctrine? Dr. Sudduth seems to say that a Myers conflates understanding and knowledge with first order propositions but one could rightly use "know" as a synonym with "œunderstand" regarding second order propositions. 

The reason I have raised these questions is that it seems that JTB constricts "know" as something that could only be said about a first order proposition. Or is there a contingency (about, of) in the JTB definition that I am missing? My original post expressed my confusion and consternation over the definition and use of JTB (if only in analogical form) in this thread. Dr. Sudduth's reply is very helpful, but I would consider myself a lucky man if someone could bail me out of my ignorance regarding a workable definition of JTB that is useable with first and second order propositions.

*My questions are not meant to be condescending or point-driven; I am honestly seeking more knowledge concerning this issue. Thanks for your help!*






[Edited on 8-18-2005 by Evan Tomlin]


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## Evan Tomlin (Aug 19, 2005)

Thank you Dr. Sudduth and Paul,

Clearly (as Paul pointed out), I was trying to advance the discussion far behind its scope by concerning myself with the individual definitions of the tripartite breakdown of JTB. My misunderstanding of JTB as a whole led to my confusion on how it can be equally related to both first and second order propositions as propositional objects. I inferred from the B of JTB that you must believe *what* the proposition is stating and I overlooked the fact that you can just as easily believe something *about* the proposition without agreeing with its conclusion. This is definitely a sub-sophmoric  mistake and I apologize for wasting time. 

Furthermore, I want to clarify that I was never arguing against the validity of JTB I was just expressing some concern over the manner in which Myers used JTB within his analogies. Again, the phrase "JTB in analogical form" is very misguided and incorrect and I apologize for the confusion.  

Thank you both for your helpful comments. This is all somewhat new to me and I appreciate you tolerating my questions and concerns.

Yours,

Evan

*wishing he had discovered philosophy earlier so he wouldn't embarrass himself*





[Edited on 8-19-2005 by Evan Tomlin]


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## JohnV (Aug 19, 2005)

Welcome to the Board, Dr. Sudduth. I'm sure there are many readers as well who are glad of your presence.


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## Civbert (Dec 20, 2005)

Here's something to consider. If knowledge is justified true belief, does that mean a proposition must be both justified, and true, and believed to be knowledge? Or does it mean that what we "know" is what we believe is justified true. I think the latter better explains what people commonly think of as knowledge - things we believe we know. And so I would say it is false to say a proposition must be true (in a absolute or real sense) in order for us to say it as something we know. In this sense, knowledge is simply the opinion that what we say we know, is justified true. That is, we hold the opinion that a proposition can be accounted for, and is therefor something we know.

The problem I have with Gettier problem. His "justification" is faulty. 

One example I read was if you look into a room and see someone you recognize. You would believe that your friend Bob is in the room. And Gettier would call that a justified true belief. But what you saw was a dummy that looked like Bob. However, (and this is the clincher) Bob was indeed in the room, hiding out of site. So it is true that Bob was in the room. But did you actually know this? - was this a justified true belief. I think not. 

Bob was in the room (true). But the you believed that the dummy you saw was the Bob (false). You did not merely believe the Bob was in the room, but that your perception was a reliable means of knowing Bob was in the room. And is a mere perception a justification for the truth of a belief? Again it appears not. So I'd argue that the Gettier problem is not a problem since a perception is not a solid justification of the truth. Gettier really illustrated that knowledge based on perceptions is not justified, even if it happens to be true.

[Edited on 12-21-2005 by Civbert]

[Edited on 12-21-2005 by Civbert]

[Edited on 12-21-2005 by Civbert]


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