# What is Traducianism...?



## Fly Caster (Dec 16, 2004)

I need some help with this one.

What is Traducianism... and how does it effect one's view of original sin?

For that matter, how does it line up with traditional Reformed Theology?


----------



## Contra_Mundum (Dec 16, 2004)

Traducianism and its counterpart creationism (not the "in-the-beginning kind) are inferences that relate to the origin of each individual human soul. Creationists think God creates individual souls at conception and imparts them; traducianists think that soul-creation is a product of human procreation just as much as the physical body is. A creationist might have a problem explaining a biological transmission of a "sin-taint." But the real issue with original sin is forensic, or legal. A traducianist has some problems explaining the relation of sin-transmission and the Incarnation.

Reformed people have held to both, perhaps more to the traducian line than the other, and some have rejected both as products of erroneous dualism. It is going just beyond the definite spiritual data available (verses can be elicited in favor of both directions), and verges on philosophical speculation, so we're best off not being too dogmatic about it. For further info, check out a systematic theology, or do a search on this site (or the web) for some other threads where this question has come up before.


----------



## JOwen (Dec 16, 2004)

The difficult thing about the creation of the soul is obvious on both sides of the debate. 
1.If tradutionism (the immediate creation of the soul) is correct and the soul is created by the copulation of mother and father, then how can spiritual matter come from a physical act? The Scriptures say that man and woman become "œone flesh", not one spirit.
2.If creationism (that God creates each soul upon conception) is correct, then how is the sin nature transmitted to the new soul? Does God create a sinful soul? Never! All He creates is perfect. So how can sin be transmitted postlapsarian?

I have thought long and hard about it and while I find traducianism most likely, I must admit that there is no clear cut answer on the subject. I am content in reading the greats on the subject and resting in the perfect knowledge of God, who has not seen fit to give man a clear answer on this subject.

Kind regards,

Jerrold


----------



## C. Matthew McMahon (Dec 16, 2004)

> then how is the sin nature transmitted to the new soul? Does God create a sinful soul? Never! All He creates is perfect. So how can sin be transmitted postlapsarian?



Right - sin is not transmitted by God creating a sinful soul. My take is that creationism is correct, and then by imputation, the soul inherits the original sin of the fathers. Tus, upon each act, the soul is created, and then imputed with Adam's sin.

Thoughts?


----------



## JOwen (Dec 16, 2004)

> Right - sin is not transmitted by God creating a sinful soul. My take is that creationism is correct, and then by imputation, the soul inherits the original sin of the fathers. Tus, upon each act, the soul is created, and then imputed with Adam's sin.
> 
> Thoughts?



Right, but a "direct imputation of sin" by God to the new soul makes him the "conduit" by which sin enters the soul, thus the author. See the problem? No doubt that Adam's sin was imputed to us, but imputed how? Rom 5:12 says that sin entered by Adam, not God.
Rom 5:12 Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned". 

Kind regards,

Jerrold


----------



## Authorised (Dec 16, 2004)

I think traducianism is the only logical option we have as Christians. 

If we exclude the unscriptural possibility of our souls pre-existing, then we must conclude that our souls are made by God. 

We know that God first made in Adam a perfectly righteous soul and that this became corrupt. The sin was imputed to the descendants of Adam. 

If God creates already wicked souls upon conception, then He is the author of sin.
If God creates souls which are righteous but then later become corrupted, that is pure pelagianism.


When God ceased to create on the seventh day, it really means that He ceased to create, souls included. The command to be fruitful and multiply applies to souls as well, so I think it is logical to say that when physical life begins, spiritual life does as well. 

Doesn't it seem silly to say that every time a sperm fertilizes an egg, God is obligated to make a soul, impute sin to it, and then plant it within the body?

Edit: And with regard to the Incarnation of Christ: Christ, although fully human and fully God, was not born of man, but of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, Christ is born without the stain of original sin. The entire point of being born of a virgin's womb was to negate that possibility, also meaning that it was an impossibility for Christ to sin.







[Edited on 16-12-2004 by Authorised]


----------



## JOwen (Dec 16, 2004)

> _Originally posted by Authorised_
> When God ceased to create on the seventh day, it really means that He ceased to create, souls included. The command to be fruitful and multiply applies to souls as well, so I think it is logical to say that when physical life begins, spiritual life does as well.
> 
> [Edited on 16-12-2004 by Authorised]



But this does not solve the problem of a physical act being the source of a soulish creation. Fine and well that we say "when physical life begins, spiritual life does as well", but *how*? Is the new soul a piece of the old soul of man and woman? Is the soul new or a split from the parents? How can a sperm and an egg "create" something that is spiritual when they are only physical? Or are you saying that the sperm of man and the egg of woman contain soulish properties? What does this say of sperm and eggs that are never used?
The problems are manifold.

Any thoughts?

Kind regards,

Jerrold


----------



## Authorised (Dec 16, 2004)

How could I possibly know "how" this happens? Not knowing how something happens does not exclude the possibility of knowing "what" happens. The question of how is completely reversible to a creationist.

You might as well ask how gravity came into existence. We can certainly describe how natural forces behave with mathematics, but does that really mean we know for sure why everything in the universe is attracted to everything else in the universe? 

If God, who is the source of all life, gave man the ability to reproduce in this manner, how should I delve into something which God has kept secret? We could make all sorts of questions like this to keep ourselves occupied:

We know that the atonement of Christ was definite, but do we know HOW it was? Was it because the reprobate weren't in the mind of Christ at that time? 

We know that Satan fell, but do we really understand HOW God, who is perfectly righteous and omnipotent, ordained or allowed his fall?

I know that Christ's atonement satisfied God's wrath against me, but I can't even begin to comprehend why. 

The same issue with souls applies here. Are there not many instances where a physical act has spiritual reprecussions?


----------



## C. Matthew McMahon (Dec 16, 2004)

Let's think this through.

1) Reformed theology taught creationism. Lutherans taught 
Traducianism.

2) Tertullian seems to be the author of Traducianism.

3) The most common opinion of this (because there are more than one), think the soul is propagated by the soul, not by a decision and partition of the paternal soul, but in a spiritual manner.

4) Turretin says the Reformed hold to creationism for three reasons: (1) from the law of creation; (2) from the testimony of Scripture; (3) from reasons.

Here is how Turretin deals with the three:

From the law of creation, because the origin of our souls _ought to be the same as of the soul of Adam_; not only because we ought to bear his image (1 Cor. 15:47, 48), but also because his creation (as the first individual of the whole species) is an example of the formation of all men (as the wedlock of our first parents was an example for the rest). But the soul of Adam was created immediately by God, since "he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7). Thus it is evident his soul was not produced from potent material, but came to him extrinsically through creation and was infused into the body by the breath of God himself. Nor ought it to be objected that we cannot argue from Adam to ourselves because the same thing might be said of the origin of the body (which nevertheless is not the case, since ours is generated from seed, while that of Adam was created from the dust of the earth). Although there may be a disparity by reason of the efficient cause on account of the diversity of the subjects (because as the body is elementary and material, it can be produced by man through generation; but the soul, being immaterial and simple, cannot spring from any other source than God by creation), yet with respect to the material cause a comparison may rightly be made. *For as the soul of Adam was created out of nothing, so also are the souls of his posterity*; and as his body was formed of the dust of the earth, so also our bodies from seed (which itself also is earthly and material). Therefore the mode of action with respect to Adam was also singular, yet the nature of the thing is the same in both cases. This is confirmed by the production of Eve herself whose origin as to the body is described as from a rib of Adam, but of the soul no mention is made. *Hence it is plainly gathered that the origin of her soul was not different from that of the soul of Adam because otherwise Moses would not have passed it over in silence (his purpose being to describe the origin of all things).* And Adam himself would have mentioned this origin, yea he would have declared it specially; he would have said not only "this is bone of my bones," but "soul of my soul" (Gen. 2-23). This would have set forth more strongly the bond of wedlock, which should be not only in the bodies, but also in the souls. Finally, if Adam's soul and ours had a different origin, they could not be said to be of the same species because his was from nothing. Ours, however, would be from some preexisting material wholly dissimilar.

Second Argument:

Second, from the testimony of Scripture, in which *God is spoken of as the author and Creator * of the soul in a peculiar manner distinct from the body: "œThen shall the dust return to the earth as it was: *and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it*." (Ecc. 12:7). Here a manifest difference is marked between the origin and the destruction of the body and the soul. The one is said to return to the dust (whence it was taken); the other, however, to return unto God (who gave it). Therefore since the body returns thither whence it had its origin, so also the soul. This is more clearly confirmed by the fact that God is said to "give the spirit" (which cannot be understood of the common giving by concourse with second causes). For he also gives the body itself no less than the soul because he is the first cause of both (nor would he well be said by antithesis [kat'antithesin] to have given the spirit). Rather this is understood concerning the proper and peculiar mode of origin (which does not belong to the body). Nor ought it to be said that this is to be referred to the first creation of Adam. The scope, the words and circumstances of the text prove that it treats of the ordinary birth and destruction of men. Accordingly their bodies return to the dust (i.e., to the earth) whence they were taken, while their spirits return unto God, the judge, who gave them (either for glory or for punishment). 

V. "The word of the Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and *formeth the spirit of man within him*" (Zech. 12:1). Whence a multiple argument is drawn for the creation against the birth of the soul (psychogonian). (1) He is said to form the spirit of man within him; therefore he ought to produce it immediately without the intervention of man. (2) The formation of the spirit is joined with the stretching out of the heavens and the founding of the earth, as of the same order and grade. Therefore since the former two are works of omnipotence, made immediately by God and without second causes, so the last ought to be also. Nor can this be referred to the mediate production of God because thus man would be admitted to a participation of causality, which the text does not allow (since it asserts the production of the soul as well as that of the heaven and earth to be peculiar to God). However, this is falsely restricted to the first production of man since it ought to be extended equally to all. Hence when it speaks of the production of the soul elsewhere, the Scripture does not use the singular (as if referring to the one soul of Adam), but the *plural * (Ps. 33:15; Is. 57:16). But man here is not taken individually for Adam, but specifically for any man. 

VI. "We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence:shall we not much rather be in subjection *unto the Father of spirits*, and live?" (Heb. 12:9). And Peter calls him in a peculiar manner a "faithful Creator of souls" (I Pet. 4:19). In Num. 16:22, God is called 'the God of the spirits of all flesh.' So too Is. 57:16: "For I will not contend forever, neither will I be always wroth: for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made.' Now why should God be called "the Father of spirits" in contradistinction to "the fathers of the flesh" unless the origin of each was different? And yet if souls are propagated, the parents of the body and the soul should be the same. Indeed "the flesh" here cannot signify the old man or inborn corruption because then it would not be opposed to spirits (pneuniasi) in the plural, but to spirit (pneumati) in the singular. Rather it designates the body, and they are called 'fathers of the flesh" who generate the flesh. So the word "spirit" ought not to be referred to spiritual gifts (which are not treated of here), but to the other part of man opposed to the body. Nor can the omission of the pronoun hamon (with respect to the flesh) be a hindrance because it is to be repeated apo koinou (since he speaks about the same according to the principles and origin of the diverse parts). Hence in Num. 16:22, he is called "*the father of the spirits of all flesh*" (i.e., of all men). Again he cannot be called "the Father of spirits" mediately, as he is called "the father of the rain" (job 38:28) because he is its author (although not immediately). Thus the antithesis between the fathers of the flesh and the father of spirits would not stand, and the force of the apostolic exhortation to afford greater obedience to God than to earthly fathers would fall. Nor if the concourse of God is not excluded from the production of the flesh (although attributed to earthly fathers because he is the universal first cause), ought the concourse of man in the production of the spirit to be excluded (because he is the particular second cause). 

Third Argument:

Third, the same thing is proved by arguments from reason. The soul is propagated by generation, either from both parents or from one only; either as to its totality or only as to a part. But neither can be said. Not the former because thus _two souls would coalesce into one and be mingled_. Not the latter, for if from one (either the father or the mother only) no reason can be given why it should be propagated by the one rather than by the other (since both parents are equally the principle of generation). If the whole is propagated, then the parents will be without it and so will be deprived of life. If a part, it will be divisible and consequently material and mortal. Nor can it be reasonably replied here that neither the whole soul nor a part of it is propagated, but a certain substance born of the soul and (as it were) an immortal seed of the soul. For it is taken for granted that there is a seed of the soul by which it either generates or is generated; yet such a seed cannot be granted (which does not fall from the soul), and therefore proves it to be material and divisible. 

VIII. Again, all modes of propagation are pressed by the most serious difficulties; nor can they be admitted without overthrowing the spirituality of the rational soul. Not the first, which is held by those who consider the soul to be produced from the power of seed so that it is begotten with the body. For the effect cannot (in the total genus) be more noble than its cause; nor can things corporeal and elementary be so elevated as to produce a spiritual and rational thing. If generated from seed, with the seed also it will be corrupted. Men and brutes would have the same origin and consequently the same destruction. Not the second, which is held by those who think the soul of the son to be from that of the father in a manner inscrutable and unknown by us. This entangles rather than unfolds the matter. For the father produces the son either from some preexistent matter or from none; not from none because he would thus create; not from some because either it would be the corporeal substance of a seed (which has just been proved to be false) or it would be a certain spiritual substance of the soul (which again cannot be said). This is true because that spiritual substance is made either from the whole soul of the father or from a part only. Not from the whole because thus the soul of the father would vanish and be converted into that spiritual seed. Not from a part because thus the soul of the father would be divisible into parts, and because that substance is corruptible and perishes in the very instant the soul is produced. But then it will no longer be a spiritual or incorruptible substance. Thus it would follow that there are two spirits in the begotten man: the soul of the son and the spiritual substance from which his soul was produced. Besides, it is repugnant to the nature of seed for it to remain after the generation of the thing (because it ought to be transmuted into what springs from the seed). 

IX. Not the third even though it may seem preferable to others. They hold that it is said to be propagated not by alienation, but by communication (as when light is kindled from light without any division of the other). (1) But the communication made of one and the same thing and without any alienation occurs only in an infinite and not in a finite essence (in which the same numerical essence cannot be communicated to another, but a similar only is produced). (2) The soul of the son cannot be produced from that of the father; neither terminatively (because the terminus a quo perishes, the terminus ad quem being produced), nor decisively (because the soul is without parts [ameristos]), nor constitutively (because the soul of the father is not a constitutive part of the soul of the son). (3) The similitude of the light does not apply. Besides the fact that the flame and candle are corporeal substances (while here the subject is a spiritual), it is certain that light is produced from the potency of the material. Nor can it be kindled without a decision of fiery particles transmitted from the lighted to the extinguished torch (which cannot be said of the soul). 

X. Since, therefore, the opinion of propagation labors under inextricable difficulties, and no reason drawn from any other source forces us to admit it, *we* deservedly embrace the option of creation as more consistent with Scripture and right reason. This was also evidently the opinion of most of the heathen philosophers themselves. Hence the following expression of Zoroaster according to Ficinum: "You must hasten to the sunlight and to the father's sunbeams: thence a soul will be sent to you fully enslaved to mind" (Chre speudein se pros to phaos, kai pros patros augas Enthen epemphthe soi psyche! polyn hessamenif noun, Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum 10 [1559], p. 160). Aristotle asserts that "the mind or intellect, and that alone enters from without, and is alone divine" (ton noun thyrathen epeisienai kai theion einai monon, Generation of Animals 2.3.27-28 [Loeb, 170-711). Cicero says, "No origin of the soul can be found upon earth for there is nothing in the soul mixed and concrete that seems to be or born from the earth and made.... Thus whatever that is which perceives, knows, wishes and flourishes, is heavenly and divine and on that account must necessarily be eternal" (Tusculan Disputations 1.66 [Loeb, 76-791). 

XI. God is said to have rested from all his work (Gen. 2:2), not by retiring from the administration of things, but by ceasing from the creation of new species or individuals (which might be the principles of new species). Thus he works even now (Jn. 5:17) by administering the instituted nature and multiplying whatever was; not, however, by instituting what was not. Now the souls which he creates every day are new individuals of species already created. 

XII. Although the soul is not propagated, the divine blessing given at first (Gen. 1:28) does not cease to exert its power in the generation of men. For God always cooperates with the generators and the generation, not only by preserving man's prolific power, but also by infusing the soul into the disposed body. 

XIII. It is not necessary in order that man may be said to generate man that he should generate all natures or essential parts of the compound. Otherwise, the blessed virgin did not beget true God and man. Rather it suffices that he prepares and works up the material and renders it fit for the introduction of form and attains the union of the soul with the body (by which man is constituted in his being as man and is made such a physical compound). For generation tends to the compound, not however to the production of both parts. As man is said to kill a man (who dissolves the union of the soul with the body although he does not even touch the soul), so man generates man because he joins together those parts from which man springs although not a soul-begetter (psychogonos). Nor ought he who generates the whole man to be forthwith the producer of the whole of man. 

XIV. Adam can be said to have begotten man after his own image, although he did not produce the soul. The cause of the similitude is not the propagation of the soul, but the production of bodies of the same temperament with the parents. For from the different temperament and humors of the body, different propensities and affections are also born in our souls. 

XV. When souls are said to have "gone out of the loins of Jacob" (Gen. 46:26), they are not understood properly, but synecdochically for the "persons" (a most usual manner of expression with the Scriptures). Moreover, there was no need that Jacob should contribute anything to the production of these souls. It suffices that he concurred to their conjunction or subsistence in the body mediately or immediately. Therefore they are said to have gone out, not as to being or substance simply, but as to subsistence in the body and union with it. 

XVI. Although Christ was no less in Abraham (according to the flesh) than Levi (who was tithed in his loins, Heb. 7:9-10*), it does not follow that Levi was in him according to his soul (so that the soul of Levi was propagated and that a distinction may be preserved). Rather Levi (with respect to person) was in Abraham according to seminal mode and the natural powers of the father and mother (from whom he was to be bom). But Christ was in him only as to the human nature with regard to the mother; not, however, as to his divine nature and person. Thus his person could not be tithed; but as a superior he tithed Abraham and blessed him in Melchizedek (his type), not as man, but as the Mediator, God-man (theanthropos), performing a kingly and priestly office. 

XVII. The propagation of original sin ought not to cause a denial of the creation of souls and the adoption of propagation because it can be sufficiently saved without this hypothesis (as will be demonstrated in its place). Although the soul is not materially from Adam (as to substance), yet it is originally from him as to subsistence. And as man is rightly said to beget man (although he does not beget the soul), so an impure progenerates an impure, especially (the just judgment of God intervening) that by which it was established that what he had bestowed upon the first man, he should at the same time have and lose for himself as well as his posterity. Now although it is curious to inquire and rash to define why God infuses a soul tainted with sin and joins it to an impure body, it is certainly evident that God did not will (on account of the sin of man) to abolish the first sanction concerning the propagation of the human race by generation. Thus the order of the universe and the conservation of human nature demanded it. 




I think he does a good job with this.


----------



## JOwen (Dec 16, 2004)

Wow, talk about a post!

I do not think he answers the fact that God stopped creating on the sixth day very well. Seems to me God stopped creating before he rested.

Kind regards,

Jerrold


----------



## cupotea (Dec 16, 2004)

To me it's very simple, but then, I am a very simpler person (too simple sometimes). I see no reason to except the generation of the human soul by normal procreation from that of any other human 'characteristic". In order for creationism to be compelling, this would have to be shown to me.

Also, traducianism dovetails perfectly with federal headship. It makes best sense of the idea that Levi was in Abraham's loins, for example (Heb. 7:10) and by inference, that the imputation of Adam's sin was not only due to a forensic declaration but an actual participation in that sin.


----------



## JOwen (Dec 16, 2004)

> _Originally posted by Steadfast_
> I see no reason to except the generation of the human soul by normal procreation from that of any other human 'characteristic".



Good point brother. Turriten says in his collusion, " And as man is rightly man is said to beget man (although he does not beget the soul)..." What is man without a soul? Man is body/soul, so if man is to beget man, it would need to be with a soul by pure definition. But how can matter communicate spirit? This is the problem I have, and recognize in the writings of W.G.T Shedd and Gordon Clark.

Kind regards,

Jerrold


----------



## JOwen (Dec 16, 2004)

BTW, nice Welsh flag. My wifes parents are from New Port.

Kind regards,

Jerrold


----------



## VanVos (Dec 16, 2004)

If one believes that man is a psychosomatic unity (i.e. Greg Bahnsen position) does that do away with the traducianism creationism debate? Thoughts?

[Edited on 17-12-2004 by VanVos]


----------



## Authorised (Dec 16, 2004)

What do you mean there by psychosomatic?


----------



## VanVos (Dec 16, 2004)

Here's a quote from Gilbert Sanchez writer for Chalcedon magazine:



> Psychosomatic Unity
> The third position is that of Psychosomatic Unity, the view that the constitution of man consists of a single or unitary constitution that cannot be separated into components. This single unity consists of two inseparable aspects, namely body and spirit, which eternally coincide in the nature of man. The strength of this argument is its faithfulness to systematic theology, linguistic analysis, and overall adherence to both the description and limitation of the Biblical position. The Scriptures describe the constitution of man as being a unit, however, no mechanical explanation is offered or viewed as necessary.
> 
> The most significant objection suggested against psychosomatic unity is that of the intermediate state. It is argued that since the Bible describes a period of time in which the spirit exists independent of the physical body, the spirit is properly viewed as a separate component. In response the following can be said: a.) Separation is the exception, not the rule. The constitution of man was created as a unity, in this life continues as a unity, and then after the resurrection will be a unity again. The general principle regarding the nature of man is unity. b.) Separation is a consequence of sin, not the normative for the human constitution. The reason for the separation is the result of the curse of God. Had mankind lived in harmonious obedience to the Lord, the constitution of man would never have experienced the consequence of separation either of the body or the various other results of the fall. This separation should be viewed as a deformity resulting from sin but not as the God given nature of man. c.) Separation will eternally cease. Although, a temporary separation does occur, it will come to a definite end on the day of resurrection when every individual great and small will stand before the throne of the risen Christ to be judged for every thought, word, and deed that has been done in the unity of their person. Then all notions of separation will cease for eternity. After millions of billion years on to infinity have passed away, the constitution of man can hardly be based upon a short deformation of the human nature.
> ...



Here's a quote from bahnsen (actually I think substantival monism is better description of the position I was asserting when I said "psychosomatic unity") 



> The alternative which I wish to pose for the official dogma of a ghost in a mechanism is, basically, that man is a substantival monism, a material body which is special for reason of its capabilities (not its added substantival ingredient). Historically, theologians have attributed a substantival soul to man in order to guard the teachings of man's dignity, immortality, moral responsibility, and personal identity; I propose that the ghost-machine dogma does not really guarantee these doctrines, and that while my alternative does not render human nature any less mysterious than the official dogma, it has the two-fold advantage of more properly locating the mystery and alleviating unnecessary philosophical problems which are set forth against the dual substance view in this day.



VanVos

P.S. I'm not saying that I am totally convinced that this is the right position. 


[Edited on 17-12-2004 by VanVos]


----------



## Ianterrell (Dec 16, 2004)

> _Originally posted by JOwen_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Authorised_
> ...



Bahnsen's answer to this was body-soul monism. He did not accept the traditional interpretation of the structure of a human being, whether Bipartite or Tripartite. It's an intersting theory though I'm not utterly convinced of the arguments I've heard for it thus far.

I'm rather nuetral on this issue; I haven't studied it much.


----------



## cupotea (Dec 16, 2004)

"Psychosomatic unity": 


> the view that the constitution of man consists of a single or unitary constitution that cannot be separated into components



How is this anything more than an anthropological underpinning for a traducianist theory regarding the generation of the soul?

The reason most traducianists are traducianist is because they posit, a priori, that the soul and body are, ultimately, inseparable.

All this seems to do is imply the fairly semantic point that the categories are or may be false.

As for the question Paul asked:

I think:

Traducianists would say that the body and soul are 'generated' simultaneously and naturally as a normal byproduct of human procreation.

I will not presume to speak for the creationist opinion.


----------



## cupotea (Dec 16, 2004)

You'll notice, i hope that I put it in quotes.



This is because I am not sure it's even the right word to use. It's just what I struck upon in answering. What I mean when I say that though is that just as the body of a tiny baby forms naturally when certain biological criteria are met, so also, at the same time the soul 'forms'. This would be because what is being formed is a human person, body _and_ soul.


----------



## cupotea (Dec 17, 2004)

Being a living human being means having and being a soul.



> Genesis 2:7 - And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.



Here God gives Adam, indeed, makes Adam a soul. He does not seem to do this in every subsequent case. This, along with it's consonance with federal headship and there being no good reason to except the soul from natural generation makes it, to me, if not absolutely compelling, at least more convincing than the alternative.

[Edited on 12-17-2004 by Steadfast]


----------



## cupotea (Dec 17, 2004)

Please note the use of the word "seem".

If it can be inferred from Scripture that He does in fact ensoul each individual person specially, or shown that He not only seems to do so but actually does so then I would be more than willing to change my opinion.



[Edited on 12-17-2004 by Steadfast]


----------



## cupotea (Dec 17, 2004)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> I'm asking why you draw the conclusion that He doesn't seem to do this anymore? What reasoning do you have for this? That is, why does it "seem" this way to you?



Because: 1) the Bible does not depict Him as doing so in any case other than that of Adam, and 2) it is nowhere else mentioned as normative and 3) [again] there is no reason for making an exception for the human soul as having been specially created when the rest of the human person is understood as being generally produced via natural processes...

Look, Paul, I've given my reasons for the opinion I hold...I really don't have to "prove" anything. In fact, if anything, the burden of proof is on the creationist to show that God does in fact specially create each soul whenever. 

Don't hate the player, hate the game.


----------



## cupotea (Dec 18, 2004)

Paul, I am pleased that you've taken to me so.

What I have done here is attempted to give, to the best of my ability, my reasons for presuming a traducian understanding of the generation and propagation of the soul. I admit it to be subjective. Your questions have led me to conclude that what you wanted from me, subsequently, was some grounding for and fleshing out of that subjective assessment. I tried to give you that.

And now you are taking me to task for not offering an exhaustive apologetic for the position. Please forgive me if I freely admit that I am inadequate to the task. Why you might have decided to place me under inquisition is unknown to me and I won't presume to judge your motive. I hope you can understand though, if I am unable to avoid harboring certain assumptions in this regard.

So, with that I'll leave you to struggle with Tertullian and Augustine and Gordon Clark on the matter, all of whom are smarter than me and better able to defend the opinion.

[Edited on 12-18-2004 by Steadfast]


----------



## cupotea (Dec 18, 2004)

Then, in that case, I hope you'll forgive me my testiness.


----------

