# Best books on universals?



## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

What are the best texts defending universals? I've read Moreland's work by the same title.


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## yeutter (Oct 24, 2015)

What has Nicholas Wolterstorff written on the subject?


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## timfost (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


> What are the best texts defending universals? I've read Moreland's work by the same title.



Pardon my ignorance on the subject, but is this purely philosophical or does it apply to theology? If the latter, how so?

Thanks in advance!


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

yeutter said:


> What has Nicholas Wolterstorff written on the subject?



A book by the same title. It's fairly inexpensive. I haven't read it, though.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

timfost said:


> ReformedReidian said:
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> > What are the best texts defending universals? I've read Moreland's work by the same title.
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It applies to theology:

1. Is truth real, or is it something we simply give a name to?
2. Is there a universal called "humanity" and if so did the Logos assume it?
3. When Gregory of Nyssa wrote _On Not Three Gods_ he employed concepts like "humanity" in order to prove his point. 

And here is a hard one which I am undecided on:

4. Is "deity" a universal?


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## Reformed Fox (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian, what is Moreland's method / angle in this work? I am curious.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


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If deity is a universal, then there is a god that stands behind God himself, which I think is ridiculous. I think that's actually one of the main problems with social trinitarian models which also deny the classical view of divine simplicity; when we say Jesus is God, do we mean that he is essentially such, or does he merely participate in a universal of divinity?


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

Maybe not what you're looking for, but this looks interesting: http://www.amazon.com/Five-Texts-Mediaeval-Problem-Universals/dp/0872202496


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


> Maybe not what you're looking for, but this looks interesting: http://www.amazon.com/Five-Texts-Mediaeval-Problem-Universals/dp/0872202496



I am almost finished with it. The sections on Scotus and Occam were too long. They should have dropped Abelard and brought in Eriugena.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


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That is my criticism of (4)


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Reformed Fox said:


> ReformedReidian, what is Moreland's method / angle in this work? I am curious.



Moreland says reality is "cut at the joints," meaning reality lends itself to natural groupings. He defines a universal as something which can be instantiated in multiple places at the same time.

"Qualities are universals and not particulars and quality instances--like red are complex entities with at least three constituents in them--a universal, an individuator, and a tie of predication” (Moreland 192; page numbers are from the 1985 University of America edition). Moreland then argues that the main rival to this ontology--trope nominalism--fails to give a coherent alternative.

A problem for the realist: how can Socrates’ redness and Plato’s redness be the same if they are in different locations, or if one is round and the other square. Realist response: we can hold that the “f-of-a” is a state of affairs. This is the having of a quality by a particular. It is a particular and a universal standing in a relation of exemplification. The universal is different from the having the universal.

A trope is an individuation of concrete particulars. These particulars are not themselves a transcendental universal. The tropist will challenge the realist along these lines: A problem for the realist: how can Socrates’ redness and Plato’s redness be the same if they are in different locations, or if one is round and the other square. Realist response: we can hold that the “f-of-a” is a state of affairs. This is the having of a quality by a particular. It is a particular and a universal standing in a relation of exemplification. The universal is different from the having the universal.

Problems for trope nominalism:
* how does it account for grounding numerical differences between two entities that share all their pure properties in common? What is it that grounds the “thisness” of Socrates and the “thatness” of Plato? If red₁ and red₂ are two exactly similar tropes, then how are they not the same thing?
** the trope view cannot account for individuation because its criterion of existence is independent existence. It makes the trope’s nature identical to a place. We have nothing then but bare particulars.
***trope nominalists use the argument of “exact similarity” to avoid the realist construction. By contrast, the realist argues that cases of exact similarity (ES) are grounded in universals (110).


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

Jacob, my problem with realism (I'm a conceptualist) is that it doesn't seem compatible with divine simplicity. Most modern philosophers who give up divine simplicity I don't think understand many of the implications of rejecting it.

Also, the existence of subsisting universals seems to deny God's aseity.


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## timfost (Oct 24, 2015)

Jacob,

You lost me.  If you find it helpful our intellectually stimulating, kudos.

I may be off on this statement because I don't follow the reasoning, but humor me!



> For Jews request a sign, and *Greeks seek after wisdom*; but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block and to the *Greeks foolishness*, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. *Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men*, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. (1 Cor. 1:22-25)



It seems to me that if Paul promoted God being above the wisdom of the Greeks, why would we try to fathom God through Greek/Western philosophy? 

If Evan is correct concerning divine simplicity (with which I heartily agree), and that simplicity is far more complex than my finite mind can fathom, is there any real benefit to trying to fathom God (or aspects of God) through universals?


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

timfost said:


> Jacob,
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> You lost me.  If you find it helpful our intellectually stimulating, kudos.
> 
> ...


 I don't think Jacob is trying to put God in a box, as it were. Rather he is trying to understand the world that God has made.

By the way, Jacob could correct me if I'm wrong, but Greek philosophy (e.g., Plato) already had a conception of divine simplicity before Christianity came on the scene.


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## timfost (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


> I don't think Jacob is trying to put God in a box, as it were. Rather he is trying to understand the world that God has made.



Agreed. We should use reasoning to the extent that we can and should, and stop when appropriate. Where is the line in the context of this conversation? Perhaps if I understood the content I'd be able to answer. 

Again, kudos!  I'll enjoy watching from the sidelines.


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## Philip (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


> Also, the existence of subsisting universals seems to deny God's aseity.



It's the reason why Thomas Aquinas doesn't hold to subsisting universals except for universals which are exemplified in the Divine nature (i.e. Goodness, Justice, Mercy, etc are all subsisting because they are identical with the being of God).

He has a much harder time, however, with things like redness. On the one hand, he doesn't want to say that redness as a universal has conceptual existence in the mind of God because God knows things immediately rather than by means of concepts. However, I would, in that case, simply reject Thomas's empiricist definition of concepts, argue that the term "concept" is analogical when applied to the objects of Divine thought, and go on my merry way.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

Philip said:


> Justified said:
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Strictly speaking, do Goodness, Mercy, Justice, etc. really subsist? Then this would seem to follow: Goodness=Mercy=Justice. While these are certainly not incompatible with one another, they aren't identical

It seems that the attributes of God are ways that we speak of God _erga nos_, not who he is _in se_. For my own part, I deny any univocal knowledge of God's essence.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

timfost said:


> Jacob,
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> You lost me.  If you find it helpful our intellectually stimulating, kudos.
> 
> ...



Do you hold to Nicea? Chalcedon? They use a whole lot of Greek terminology. I kind of figured erring on those was pretty serious, so I thought studying the terms and conceptions that underlie these creeds was important.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


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A lot of Fathers (and apparently Aquinas and Augustine in some passages) held to such an identity thesis of the attributes. Simplicity means God isn't made up of parts, which usually entails God's incorporeality. I reject later Thomistic models of simplicity. If pressed at the moment I would go with Plantinga's model.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


> Justified said:
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And I accept Thomas' view of divine simplicity, which is why I reject realism  A rejection of the identity thesis creates things accidental in God. Those who reject Thomas' view of divine simplicity have difficulty evading the Euthyphro Dilemma.


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## Philip (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


> Strictly speaking, do Goodness, Mercy, Justice, etc. really subsist? Then this would seem to follow: Goodness=Mercy=Justice. While these are certainly not incompatible with one another, they aren't identical
> 
> It seems that the attributes of God are ways that we speak of God erga nos, not who he is in se. For my own part, I deny any univocal knowledge of God's essence.



I would say that the distinctions between them are merely human distinctions. I would deny univocal knowledge of God as well (depending on what we mean by univocity) but would still maintain that God has revealed Himself as He is. I think one can both affirm Rahner's rule and deny univocity. In fact I think Rahner's rule without analogical knowledge (though I have problems with that term) leads inevitably to social trinitarianism rather than orthodoxy.

One case in point would be love and wrath. Being on the wrong side of God's love is called God's wrath. But once one has been justified, one finds only love where once was wrath. Yet it is not God who has changed. It is He who has changed the sinner.



ReformedReidian said:


> I reject later Thomistic models of simplicity. If pressed at the moment I would go with Plantinga's model.



Have you read Stump and Kretzmann?


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

Philip said:


> Justified said:
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> > Strictly speaking, do Goodness, Mercy, Justice, etc. really subsist? Then this would seem to follow: Goodness=Mercy=Justice. While these are certainly not incompatible with one another, they aren't identical
> ...


 Then we're in agreement if it's just a human distinction.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Philip said:


> Have you read Stump and Kretzmann?



Just essays by them.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


> Philip said:
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I think he's referring to this specific essay: http://philpapers.org/rec/STUAS-2


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

I read it five years ago. I don't deny that some models of realism are problematic with a strong simplicity. I also believe that there is more than one model of divine simplicity. Andrew Radde-Galwitz explores as much in his monograph on Basil.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


> I read it five years ago. I don't deny that some models of realism are problematic with a strong simplicity. I also believe that there is more than one model of divine simplicity. Andrew Radde-Galwitz explores as much in his monograph on Basil.


What's the upshot of realism as opposed to a conceptualist (or even nominalist position)?


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


> ReformedReidian said:
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> > I read it five years ago. I don't deny that some models of realism are problematic with a strong simplicity. I also believe that there is more than one model of divine simplicity. Andrew Radde-Galwitz explores as much in his monograph on Basil.
> ...



I don't see conceptualism as a hard break with realism. Your criticisms of realism seemed to imply a stronger, Platonic realism--which is susceptible to critiques like the "3rd Man Argument."

I don't hold to positions for their cash-value effect. But if we want to find one, I would say, for example, that realism lets me hold to the doctrine of angels: immaterial intelligences which have functioned similar to forms.


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## Philip (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


> I think he's referring to this specific essay: http://philpapers.org/rec/STUAS-2



That's correct. 



ReformedReidian said:


> I don't deny that some models of realism are problematic with a strong simplicity. I also believe that there is more than one model of divine simplicity.



The trouble is that most of the models of realism that I find do one of a couple things: a) conflict with Divine simplicity (Plato, Burley) b) involve a needlessly complicated ontology (Scotus) c) make arbitrary distinctions that ultimately reduce to a kind of conceptualism (Thomas, Aristotle).


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

Phillip, I find B to be a strong criticism. I've never really understood the need for as complicated ontology as realism presents.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


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Interesting point regarding angels. I once heard a MLJ sermon in which he argued from scripture that angels have spiritual bodies (I don't remember the exegetical case he gave).

While you're right to an extent about not taking positions for their cash value, I think that a rejecting rejection of the identity thesis has consequences that I'm not comfortable with.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


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And there could be something to the consequences of rejecting I-T. I'm still trying to read the relevant literature on universals. 

Would you disagree with the following:

P1: There is a ready-made external world that falls into natural groupings and categories, independent of the mind's knowing.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

Justified said:


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For what it's worth, I believe aliens are demons. If you compare "alien encounters" with patristic and medieval literature on demons, you will see a lot of similarities. I get laughed at for that, but my thesis (which isn't original to me) makes sense of the alien encounters without committing me to silly things like "ET exists."


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


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I'd have to think about it. I'm inclined to say yes, but I'd qualify that by saying that they exist as non-subsisting entities in the divine mind. Then again I have no capacity to understand the inner workings of the Divine mind, so perhaps what I just said is meaningless.

In short, I'd deny the existence of any and all subsisting forms. If such forms exist, they exist in the divine mind and don't have subsistence. Was that clear? (Sorry, I'm still an amateur philosopher)


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## RamistThomist (Oct 24, 2015)

It's mostly clear. I don't understand how something could "be" (exist?) in the divine Mind without subsisting in the divine mind. Of course, I am using subsisting as more or less synonymous with "participating" in the Platonic and neo-Platonic sense.

Thank you for your contributions to this conversation. they really challenged me to rethink some things.


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## Justified (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


> It's mostly clear. I don't understand how something could "be" (exist?) in the divine Mind without subsisting in the divine mind. Of course, I am using subsisting as more or less synonymous with "participating" in the Platonic and neo-Platonic sense.
> 
> Thank you for your contributions to this conversation. they really challenged me to rethink some things.


One last consideration: think about how denying the IT can allow one to be challenged by the Euthyphro Dilemma (I mean the modern argument inspired by the ED). If one accepts IT, and if it's coherent, then the ED is null-- in fact the argument becomes incoherent.


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## Philip (Oct 24, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


> I don't understand how something could "be" (exist?) in the divine Mind without subsisting in the divine mind. Of course, I am using subsisting as more or less synonymous with "participating" in the Platonic and neo-Platonic sense.



To subsist here would be to have Being. i.e. to be a Thing. If a universal subsists, this means not only that it participates in the Divine mind, but entails that it is identical with the Divine mind. This works for, say, universals which are aspects of the character of God, but not for universals which apply only tp created things (i.e. redness) as these entail material distinction.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 25, 2015)

Justified said:


> ReformedReidian said:
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I am familiar with Plato's version. What's the modern one?


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## RamistThomist (Oct 25, 2015)

Let me try this. Would the modern philosophical distinction between types and tokens prove universals?

a type is a general sort of thing. A type is close to a universal.
a token is a particular instance


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## Justified (Oct 25, 2015)

ReformedReidian said:


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The modern dilemma goes something like this:

P1: Either actions are to be judged in terms of a moral standard that is independent of God's will or command [or nature, as I believe is the safer position], or they are not.

P2: If they are to be judged by a standard that is independent of God's will or command [or nature], then Divine Command [or Nature] Theory is false.

P3: IF the moral standard is dependent upon God's will [or nature], then God could have authored a different moral code.

P4: Absurd consequences would follow: God could've willed that torture of children is permitted.

The neo-classical theist (Plantinga, Craig, and most modern philosophers) have a difficulty evading the objection leveled against (particularly P3) them when they place God in time and reject the IT of divine simplicity.

Here is my rough argument against the above (if you assume God is timelessly eternal and accept the IT):

(1) God is the greatest possible being, and as such he exists in all possible worlds (he exists of necessity).

(2) God's essence is identical with his existence (IT)

(2a) By this I mean that there is nothing accidental in God; everything he is he is essentially.

(3) The moral law is grounded in God's nature.

(3a) This nature cannot be conceived as something distinct in God strictly speaking, per (2).

(4) We can conceive of God willing a different moral code than he has in this world.

~(4) This is impossible, for if God willed a different moral code, he would cease to be God, since the moral law is grounded in a necessary being, all of whose properties are identical with his essence.

(5) The ED is a false dilemma.

Now, if you put God in time or allow distinctions in God, strictly speaking, you have a difficulty evading the ED. If God is liable to change in his being, or if there is something in God which is not essential to his being, then the charges leveled against Divine Command (or Nature) Theory are difficult to avoid.

If we want any clarification on any of my premises, I'd be glad to discuss. The argument is in a sort of rough or crude form at the moment.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 25, 2015)

Thanks. I still don't hold to I-T, but I don't see a problem with accepting your argument. I'll try to flesh it out later.


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## Justified (Oct 25, 2015)

Even if they argument doesn't necessitate the IT (though I think it does, but I'm having a hard time articulating it), I certainly think it's incompatible with a god who is temporal.


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## RamistThomist (Oct 25, 2015)

Back to an earlier note: here is a pictorial representation of Moreland's view of universals. I made it on MS Paint. It is taken from Paul Gould's essay in _Loving God with Your Mind_. If it looks choppy it's because it's my first time to mess with Paint.


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## MW (Oct 26, 2015)

A conceptualist makes an universal of the power to conceive, does he not? Moreover, does he not suppose the power to conceive is real, not merely conceptual?


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## Philip (Oct 26, 2015)

MW said:


> A conceptualist makes an universal of the power to conceive, does he not?



That would be an equivocation on the term "universal."


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## MW (Oct 26, 2015)

Philip said:


> MW said:
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How so? The "concept" must be regarded as a proper universal in order for the conceptualist to think that he has satisfied the difficulties raised by realists against nominalism.


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