# Is mathematics an eternal truth?



## Gesetveemet

Please excuse my ignorance on this subject.

My question is is 3+3=6 an eternal truth?


Thank you, 


.


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## TimV

I've read it is because there are places in the Bible that say things like so and so reigned in such and such a place for 33 years and another place for 7 years, therefore so and so reigned for 40 years.


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## Phil D.

Gesetveemet said:


> Is three plus three an eternal truth?



Hmmm... Good question. However, Three equals One definitely is!


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## BobVigneault

I guess I need to ask you what you mean by eternal. Is 3 + 3 = 6 a True truth? Is is true outside of space and time? Is it true within the mind of God? Is there a sense or world in which it is not true? 

My answer would be that 3 + 3 = 6 is true, according to the laws of logic and that logic is an essential property of God. In that God is transcendent and eternal, this truth is also eternal.


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## BobVigneault

William, if these things fascinate you then you might enjoy listening to Ronald Nash teach on Christian Apologetics. He's a lot of fun to listen to with a winsome sense of humor. I sure miss him. You can link to his lectures here.


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## Pergamum

Was there ever a time when 1+1 did not equal 2?


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## TimV

> 1 Kings 2:10-12
> So David slept with his fathers, and was buried in the city of David. And the days that David reigned over Israel were 40 years: 7 years reigned he in Hebron, and 33 years reigned he in Jerusalem.



It would seem it would always be the same, from a debate I followed (without completely understanding) some years ago.


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## BobVigneault

Trevor, in the last 55 years I don't remember a time when it didn't but then again, I was sleeping for about a fourth of the time (55/4 = 13.75)


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## TimV

6 hours of unconscious per day is impressive!

---------- Post added at 07:41 AM ---------- Previous post was at 07:40 AM ----------

edit: 24 divided by 4 is 6. We should do like McArthur and always give proof texts and calculations.


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## BobVigneault

I don't need a lot of sleep Tim. If I get more than that, it deprives me of my normal stupor. (Hey, I'm gonna go use that for my update today. Don't tell anyone.)


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## Marrow Man

The numbers in the equation are only symbolic representations of the abstract entities and there are assumptions in the operation (i.e., the properties of addition are axiomatic; equality is also an assumption and can have different meanings in different contexts).

There are also limits to mathematics -- not necessarily because numerical principles are flawed, but because our understanding of them is limited and incomplete. We have a difficult time comprehending infinity, for instance. The existence of irrational numbers is difficult for some.

Or try to wrap your brain around this one: 0.9 as a repeating decimal (that would be 0.9 with a line over the nine, but I don't know how to represent that on here) approaches 1 in value, but it does not equal one. Yet consider the following equations:

First, an easy one: N = .3 (non-repeating)

Then, by multiplication, 10N = 3.0

By subtraction:

10N = 3.0
N = 0.3

Making 9N = 2.7
Thus (by division), N = 2.7/9 or 27/90, which equals 3/10.

We have just shown that 0.3 = 3/10.

Now try N = 0.3 (this time, a repeating decimal).

10N = 3.3 (still repeating)
N = 0.3 (repeating)

Making 9N = 3

So N = 3/9 or 1/3

We have just shown that 0.3 (repeating) = 1/3. So far, so good.

Now consider N = 0.9 (repeating)

10N = 9.9
N = 0.9

If we subtract, we get:

9N = 9

Thus, N = 1.

So we started with N = 0.9 (repeating) and ended with N = 1. Thus, 0.9 (repeating) = 1.


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## Pergamum

My question is that if half the number in the world are odd and half even, and you add two odds you get an even and you add two evens and you get an even..it appears that evens outnumber odds by at least 2 to 1.


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## TimV

Or, as Bilbo said

"I don't know half of you half as well as I should like; and I like less than half of you half as well as you deserve.”


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## Phil D.

Three men went to get a hotel room, and were told it would be a total of $30.00 for all of them - or, $10 apiece. Later the clerk decided that he would would give the guys a break, and refund a total of $5. The bellhop was on his way to their room to deliver the refund, but realized he didn't have the proper change to give an equal amount to each man. So he decided to give each one $1 and to keep $2 for himself (Yes, that would be a violation of the 8th Commandment, but this is only a mental exercise, people...) So, the men spent $9 each for the room ($10 initially <-> $1 refund = $9), and the bellhop kept $2. But then where is the "other" dollar ($9 X 3 = $27 + $2 = $29)?


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## GulfCoast Presbyterian

Phil D. said:


> Three men went to get a hotel room, and were told it would be a total of $30.00 for all of them - or, $10 apiece. Later the clerk decided that he would would give the guys a break, and refund a total of $5. The bellhop was on his way to their room to deliver the refund, but realized he didn't have the proper change to give an equal amount to each man. So he decided to give each one $1 and to keep $2 for himself (Yes, that would be a violation of the 8th Commandment, but this is only a mental exercise, people...) So, the men spent $9 each for the room ($10 initially <-> $1 refund = $9), and the bellhop kept $2. But then where is the "other" dollar ($9 X 3 = $27 + $2 = $29)?



I don't think that there is an "other dollar." This wording just sets up a logical fallacy. Break down the math:

$30.00 was originally given to the hotel owner 
Correct price of the room = $25 
Each man receives $1 dollar refund = $3 
The bellhop receives a $2 "theft bonus" 
$25 for room + $2 for the bellhop= $27

$30 - $27 = $3 which is how much the men collectively receive back as a refund.

At least I think that is right.


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## Phil D.

Exactly, Mark! 

The proper question to address in a situation like this is "where are each of the $30 now?" 

Answer:
The clerk has $25
The bellhop has $2
Each of the 3 guys has $1
$25 + $2 + $1 + $1 + $1 = $30

Still, you'd be surprised how many people get freaked out trying to solve the "dilemma"!

A similar fallacy with the same situation would be to say that the room cost $27, the bellhop has $2, and yet each of the 3 men has $1 - so, where did the "extra" $2 come from ($27 + $2 + $1 + $1 + $1 = $32)?

It's all a matter of asking the right question - or, rather, asking the question right!


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## Backwoods Presbyterian

Marrow Man said:


> The numbers in the equation are only symbolic representations of the abstract entities and there are assumptions in the operation (i.e., the properties of addition are axiomatic; equality is also an assumption and can have different meanings in different contexts).
> 
> There are also limits to mathematics -- not necessarily because numerical principles are flawed, but because our understanding of them is limited and incomplete. We have a difficult time comprehending infinity, for instance. The existence of irrational numbers is difficult for some.
> 
> Or try to wrap your brain around this one: 0.9 as a repeating decimal (that would be 0.9 with a line over the nine, but I don't know how to represent that on here) approaches 1 in value, but it does not equal one. Yet consider the following equations:
> 
> First, an easy one: N = .3 (non-repeating)
> 
> Then, by multiplication, 10N = 3.0
> 
> By subtraction:
> 
> 10N = 3.0
> N = 0.3
> 
> Making 9N = 2.7
> Thus (by division), N = 2.7/9 or 27/90, which equals 3/10.
> 
> We have just shown that 0.3 = 3/10.
> 
> Now try N = 0.3 (this time, a repeating decimal).
> 
> 10N = 3.3 (still repeating)
> N = 0.3 (repeating)
> 
> Making 9N = 3
> 
> So N = 3/9 or 1/3
> 
> We have just shown that 0.3 (repeating) = 1/3. So far, so good.
> 
> Now consider N = 0.9 (repeating)
> 
> 10N = 9.9
> N = 0.9
> 
> If we subtract, we get:
> 
> 9N = 9
> 
> Thus, N = 1.
> 
> So we started with N = 0.9 (repeating) and ended with N = 1. Thus, 0.9 (repeating) = 1.




Someone get the exorcism kit ready...Marrow Man is speaking in tongues!!!


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## BobVigneault

Pastor Ben, speaking in tongues does not necessarily mean he has a "familiar" spirit. It could just mean he's reading a bit too much Grudem. Either way, throw some holy water on him if you see Pastor Tim coming near.


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## GulfCoast Presbyterian

Who gonna interpret all that, anyhow!!!


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## Philip

To the original question, I would ask whether God could create the world such that 2+2 does not equal 4.


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## Marrow Man

BobVigneault said:


> Pastor Ben, speaking in tongues does not necessarily mean he has a "familiar" spirit. It could just mean he's reading a bit too much Grudem. Either way, throw some holy water on him if you see Pastor Tim coming near.



Mr. Vice President, now that you have seen my math skills at work, you know balance the federal gov't will not be a problem.



P. F. Pugh said:


> To the original question, I would ask whether God could create the world such that 2+2 does not equal 4.



Does this then become another way of stating the "can God create a rock so big He can't move it" fallacy?


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## Philip

Marrow Man said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> 
> To the original question, I would ask whether God could create the world such that 2+2 does not equal 4.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Does this then become another way of stating the "can God create a rock so big He can't move it" fallacy?
Click to expand...


More or less, since a world where 2+2 does not equal 4 is just as logically absurd as a world that contains a rock too big for an omnipotent being to lift.


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## VictorBravo

As Tim pointed out, the rules of math are axiomatic. So 3 + 3 = 6 is a defined truth.

Given that these math rules are based upon axioms, I think it is indeed possible for a reality in which 2 + 2 does not equal 4.

All that is required is a different definition. If "+" means combine the terms and replicate one of them too, rather than merely "combine" the terms, then 2 + 2 = 6.

Of course, that is equivocation, but that is the point I'm trying to make. We recognize relationships and then come up with equations as short hand to represent them. That is where empiricism has a use--it reminds us of the law of identity: one apple, another apple, we call it two apples. They are never the same apple and they are never more than the two apples. We intuitively understand that this relationship applies to anything we can think of, be it oranges, stars, or multivariate functions.

So the real question is whether the law of identity is fundamental. If you have one thing and another separate thing, and consider them together, do you always have a group of separate things that you can designate as amounting to "2"? If not, then there is no such thing as identity.

If no identity, then all we have is absurdity and might as well just play backgammon.


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## Marrow Man

P. F. Pugh said:


> More or less, since a world where 2+2 does not equal 4 is just as logically absurd as a world that contains a rock too big for an omnipotent being to lift.



Agreed. God can do whatever is consistent with His nature. There are things He cannot do (e.g., He cannot lie -- Titus 1:2; Hebrews 6:18). Hence, it is a logical absurdity to claim that God should be able to do all things, which is part of the problem with those kinds of arguments. I would say that it is also impossible for God to commit a logical fallacy and, in keeping with the discussion in the OP, it would be impossible for God to commit a mathematical error.


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## Marrow Man

VictorBravo said:


> Given that these math rules are based upon axioms, I think it is indeed possible for a reality in which 2 + 2 does not equal 4.
> 
> All that is required is a different definition. If "+" means combine the terms and replicate one of them too, rather than merely "combine" the terms, then 2 + 2 = 6.



A different symbolic notation of the numerals could also generate this. "2" is merely a symbol for "two-ness." If "4" were a symbol for "three-ness," then you could have a situation where 2 + 2 does not equal 4. But all you done is redefined things. The concept of "two-ness" added to "two-ness" is still equivalent to "four-ness" (if we are going with the accepted axiom of addition ).


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## VictorBravo

Marrow Man said:


> VictorBravo said:
> 
> 
> 
> Given that these math rules are based upon axioms, I think it is indeed possible for a reality in which 2 + 2 does not equal 4.
> 
> All that is required is a different definition. If "+" means combine the terms and replicate one of them too, rather than merely "combine" the terms, then 2 + 2 = 6.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A different symbolic notation of the numerals could also generate this. "2" is merely a symbol for "two-ness." If "4" were a symbol for "three-ness," then you could have a situation where 2 + 2 does not equal 4. But all you done is redefined things. The concept of "two-ness" added to "two-ness" is still equivalent to "four-ness" (if we are going with the accepted axiom of addition ).
Click to expand...


Well, yes, I agree. I thought I admitted that by calling it an equivocation.


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## Marrow Man

VictorBravo said:


> Well, yes, I agree. I thought I admitted that by calling it an equivocation.



I thought that was just lawyer-speak.


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## Philip

Marrow Man said:


> I would say that it is also impossible for God to commit a logical fallacy



Careful there---there are all kinds of persuasive arguments that involve formal falllacies. Appeal to authority, for instance, is a formal fallacy, even though it can be a very useful type of argument.


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## TimV

> If no identity, then all we have is absurdity and might as well just play backgammon.



I knew kids in High School who would have said "heavy, dude" after that. Me, I'll just tattoo it in three colors on the lower part of my back


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## jwright82

Marrow Man said:


> Agreed. God can do whatever is consistent with His nature. There are things He cannot do (e.g., He cannot lie -- Titus 1:2; Hebrews 6:18). Hence, it is a logical absurdity to claim that God should be able to do all things, which is part of the problem with those kinds of arguments. I would say that it is also impossible for God to commit a logical fallacy and, in keeping with the discussion in the OP, it would be impossible for God to commit a mathematical error.



I think we need to follow Van Til here and point out that dealing with God's nature in an ordered and abritrary fashion leads to bounding God in ways that he has not revealed to us. God can do whatever he wants to do, no matter what. All we need to know is that for us 2+2=4, that is all that needs to be known. There is the creator, who is beyond all human comprehension outside of his revealation, and the creature, who can only understand things as creatures.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I think we need to follow Van Til here and point out that dealing with God's nature in an ordered and abritrary fashion leads to bounding God in ways that he has not revealed to us.



One cannot deal with anything in an ordered and arbitrary fashion. To be ordered is precisely not to be arbitrary.

Logic and mathematics are, I believe, part and parcel of what God has revealed to us of Himself. I think Van Til would agree.


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## Marrow Man

P. F. Pugh said:


> Marrow Man said:
> 
> 
> 
> I would say that it is also impossible for God to commit a logical fallacy
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Careful there---there are all kinds of persuasive arguments that involve formal falllacies. Appeal to authority, for instance, is a formal fallacy, even though it can be a very useful type of argument.
Click to expand...


It might be more precise to say that God cannot make an error in logic.



jwright82 said:


> God can do whatever he wants to do, no matter what.



I think this is a problematic statement, as stated. God cannot lie, and we know this because it has been revealed to us. Would it be correct to say that God could sin or God could cease to exist if He simply wanted to? I don't think so.


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## TimV

Van Til's point was that our understanding of 1 + 1 = 2 can never equal God's understanding of the same thing. That was the debate I referred to above. The other guy said that there are (I think the word was) coincidences of knowledge at times between God and man, and that was one example, that our understanding of 1 + 1 = 2 is equal to God's understanding, and Van Til said no way. And that made sense to me because (among other reasons) we never really have union with God except through Christ's humanity, so He truly is "wholly other".


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> One cannot deal with anything in an ordered and arbitrary fashion. To be ordered is precisely not to be arbitrary.
> 
> Logic and mathematics are, I believe, part and parcel of what God has revealed to us of Himself. I think Van Til would agree.



Well said on the ordered and abritrary thing. You are correct but remeber Van Til would insist that that revealation is analogical meaning that when God makes a promise to mankind it is not the case that he is bounded by some abstract logical principle but bounded covenantaly in his promise.

---------- Post added at 07:26 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:22 PM ----------




Marrow Man said:


> I think this is a problematic statement, as stated. God cannot lie, and we know this because it has been revealed to us. Would it be correct to say that God could sin or God could cease to exist if He simply wanted to? I don't think so.



Is God bounded than by some abstract idea of his nature or some morality outside of himself? No, he covenantaly binds himself to humanity in certian ways, this includes creation. Can God flood the earth again? Yes, but he covenantaly binds himself to not do so. So he can do whatever he wants but he has covenantaly bound himself in certian ways. I believe that is traditional Reformed theology.

---------- Post added at 07:27 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:26 PM ----------




TimV said:


> Van Til's point was that our understanding of 1 + 1 = 2 can never equal God's understanding of the same thing. That was the debate I referred to above. The other guy said that there are (I think the word was) coincidences of knowledge at times between God and man, and that was one example, that our understanding of 1 + 1 = 2 is equal to God's understanding, and Van Til said no way. And that made sense to me because (among other reasons) we never really have union with God except through Christ's humanity, so He truly is "wholly other".



I completly agree Tim, thank you.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Well said on the ordered and abritrary thing. You are correct but remeber Van Til would insist that that revealation is analogical meaning that when God makes a promise to mankind it is not the case that he is bounded by some abstract logical principle but bounded covenantaly in his promise.



Correct---but nonetheless, from that, we can infer that God is indeed bounded by His promises. Likewise, the possibility of revelation presupposes that God's thought is reasonable---else it could not be communicated at all in language.


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## Marrow Man

jwright82 said:


> Is God bounded than by some abstract idea of his nature or some morality outside of himself? No, he covenantaly binds himself to humanity in certian ways, this includes creation.



I don't believe that anyone has said that God is bound by some morality outside of Himself, and I certainly don't believe that. Can God lie? Is it possible for Him to lie? Hebrews 6:18 seems to say otherwise -- it is impossible for Him to do so and this is something which cannot change. The way you have stated it, it sounds as if it is possible for God to lie; He simply choose chooses not to and binds Himself not to.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Correct---but nonetheless, from that, we can infer that God is indeed bounded by His promises. Likewise, the possibility of revelation presupposes that God's thought is reasonable---else it could not be communicated at all in language.



Yes but it is creaturly understandable and rational from a creaturly point of view.

---------- Post added at 08:03 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:50 PM ----------




Marrow Man said:


> I don't believe that anyone has said that God is bound by some morality outside of Himself, and I certainly don't believe that. Can God lie? Is it possible for Him to lie? Hebrews 6:18 seems to say otherwise -- it is impossible for Him to do so and this is something which cannot change. The way you have stated it, it sounds as if it is possible for God to lie; He simply choose chooses not to and binds Himself not to.



One of the biggest problems with understanding Van Til comes from his criticisms. He would say that a particuler group or persen was saying something that they explicitly denied. Van Til because of his philosophical training knew that sometimes what we say has logical consequences that we may not agree with but must accept if we are to affirm what we have previously affirmed. So when I say what I said what I meant was that you can make no rational sense without affirming these things too, which you rightly deny. 

All revealation is anthropomorphic. God has chosen certian ways of speaking to tell us things about himself. So when we equate said revealation with concrete one-to-one knolwedge of who he is than we err on that point. This is why the confession use the term "condescension" to refer to revealation because we can never coprehend God as he is but only creaturly understand his revealation of himself.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Yes but it is creaturly understandable and rational from a creaturly point of view.



And from a Divine POV as well.



jwright82 said:


> This is why the confession use the term "condescension" to refer to revealation because we can never coprehend God as he is but only creaturly understand his revealation of himself.



I think we also have to be careful to make sure and remember the incarnation, in which God was most fully and perfectly revealed.


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## Marrow Man

jwright82 said:


> One of the biggest problems with understanding Van Til comes from his criticisms. He would say that a particuler group or persen was saying something that they explicitly denied. Van Til because of his philosophical training knew that sometimes what we say has logical consequences that we may not agree with but must accept if we are to affirm what we have previously affirmed. So when I say what I said what I meant was that you can make no rational sense without affirming these things too, which you rightly deny.
> 
> All revealation is anthropomorphic. God has chosen certian ways of speaking to tell us things about himself. So when we equate said revealation with concrete one-to-one knolwedge of who he is than we err on that point. This is why the confession use the term "condescension" to refer to revealation because we can never coprehend God as he is but only creaturly understand his revealation of himself.



_All_ revelation is anthropomorphic? I don't think you're using that word correctly. There are, for instance, propositionally true statements in Scripture that do not use anthropomorphic language. Incidentally, unless I am forgetting something, the Confession uses "condescension" to refer to God's covenants, not revelation (7:1). Not that I would disagree that His revelation is a kind condescension to us, and He communicates things to us on our level so that we can understand them, to use Calvin's nanny analogy.

But can God lie? Is it possible for Him to do so? You earlier complained about using abstract ideas of God's nature or notions of morality existing outside of God that would bind Him, and rightly so. But you cannot exalt a philosophical system over the clear teaching of Scripture either.

I am not, btw, a Clarkian (or a rationalist), and I tend to agree with much I understand Van Til as saying. But if what you are saying (and please correct me if I am misinterpreting -- this is why I keep asking the question) is that God can lie, that it is in His nature to lie, that He simply chooses not to lie and binds Himself in this way, and that Scripture is not clear when it says that He cannot lie and that it really means something else, then I have a huge problem with that.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> And from a Divine POV as well.
> ...I think we also have to be careful to make sure and remember the incarnation, in which God was most fully and perfectly revealed.



Yes but that we cannot know God in a univocal manner.

---------- Post added at 09:32 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:24 PM ----------




Marrow Man said:


> _All_ revelation is anthropomorphic? I don't think you're using that word correctly. There are, for instance, propositionally true statements in Scripture that do not use anthropomorphic language. Incidentally, unless I am forgetting something, the Confession uses "condescension" to refer to God's covenants, not revelation (7:1). Not that I would disagree that His revelation is a kind condescension to us, and He communicates things to us on our level so that we can understand them, to use Calvin's nanny analogy.
> 
> But can God lie? Is it possible for Him to do so? You earlier complained about using abstract ideas of God's nature or notions of morality existing outside of God that would bind Him, and rightly so. But you cannot exalt a philosophical system over the clear teaching of Scripture either.
> 
> I am not, btw, a Clarkian (or a rationalist), and I tend to agree with much I understand Van Til as saying. But if what you are saying (and please correct me if I am misinterpreting -- this is why I keep asking the question) is that God can lie, that it is in His nature to lie, that He simply chooses not to lie and binds Himself in this way, and that Scripture is not clear when it says that He cannot lie and that it really means something else, then I have a huge problem with that.



Can God lie? No, but is this because of his being binded by some abstract morality that God cannot violate? Well no, has he reavealed to us that his nature is the foundation for our ethics? Yes, but we cannot take the Platonic view that morals are immutable and they are attached to God's charector as some sort of metaphysical partner with God. God can flood the earth again but he has *covenantaly* binded himself to promise this. Remember this covenantaly orientation of Van Til in all discussions of almost anykind.

---------- Post added at 09:35 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:32 PM ----------

I have read many Reformed thinkers say that all revealation is anthropomorphic in the sense that God "condescends" to our concepts and ideas to reveal info about himself, which in turn would make this anthropomorphic.


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## CharlieJ

In volume 2 of McGrath's Scientific Theology, around page 29, he shows that all three systems of foundationalist mathematics - formalism, intuitionism and logicism - have managed to undercut their own foundational principles and prove themselves unjustified. I don't remember the details now.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Yes but that we cannot know God in a univocal manner.



Correct, but the term "analogical" is almost as misleading because it implies that theology does not, strictly speaking, describe God correctly. I would rather get away from that terminology (and the detritus of the Clark-Van Til debate that goes with it) and instead say:

1) The characteristics of God are always more and never less than what have been revealed to us (in general revelation, and the various forms of special revelation).

2) However, we must never speculate beyond what is revealed and the good and necessary consequences thereof.


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## Marrow Man

jwright82 said:


> I have read many Reformed thinkers say that all revealation is anthropomorphic in the sense that God "condescends" to our concepts and ideas to reveal info about himself, which in turn would make this anthropomorphic.



Then that's an odd/a-typical use of anthropomorphic.

*Anthropomorphic*

1. Attributing human motivation, characteristics, or behavior to inanimate objects, animals, or natural phenomena.
2. resembling the human form

Also, I don't think that morals are "metaphysically attached" or are "partners" with God's character or nature. God cannot lie because He is God. His nature is holy. If He were a lying god, He would not be a holy god. Can God be unholy? No. Can God lie? No. These things would be true if no human being existed for Him to "covenantally bind" Himself to or to make promises to. But I think we are at an impasse and have strayed far from the OP.


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## py3ak

I quoted this on another thread, but it seems almost as to the point here. Besides, it's not like it doesn't bear being quoted multiple times.



> If at any time thoughts of this kind come into the minds of the pious, they will be sufficiently armed to repress them, by considering how sinful it is to insist on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself, and justly ought to be, the cause of all that exists. For if his will has any cause, there must be something antecedent to it, and to which it is annexed; this it were impious to imagine. The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found. Let human temerity then be quiet, and cease to inquire after what exists not, lest perhaps it fails to find what does exist.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Correct, but the term "analogical" is almost as misleading because it implies that theology does not, strictly speaking, describe God correctly. I would rather get away from that terminology (and the detritus of the Clark-Van Til debate that goes with it) and instead say:
> 
> 1) The characteristics of God are always more and never less than what have been revealed to us (in general revelation, and the various forms of special revelation).
> 
> 2) However, we must never speculate beyond what is revealed and the good and necessary consequences thereof.



I can agree but this ironicaly goes back to the Clark/Van Til contraversy. Analogical knowledge is good because of the features of language that the later Wittgenetein pointed out. We use wods in different ways. Clark was very critical of the later Wittgenstein and I wonder if he had understood him correctly would he not have repented of his philosophical sins. 

When we use words in a conversation we have both understanding, similarety, and misunderstanding, dissimilarety, at the same time. We use words for different reasons, the same words but for different reasons. So when a wife says to her husband "you don't take me out enough", she is not using those terms neccessaraly in a factual way but to convey her feelings, different uses hence slightly different meanings. That is all analogical knowledge is. We have some knowledge of God but we don't have comopletly similiar, univocal, or completly disimilar, equivocal, knowledge but analogical knowledge.

---------- Post added at 08:54 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:47 AM ----------




Marrow Man said:


> Then that's an odd/a-typical use of anthropomorphic.
> 
> *Anthropomorphic*
> 
> 1. Attributing human motivation, characteristics, or behavior to inanimate objects, animals, or natural phenomena.
> 2. resembling the human form
> 
> Also, I don't think that morals are "metaphysically attached" or are "partners" with God's character or nature. God cannot lie because He is God. His nature is holy. If He were a lying god, He would not be a holy god. Can God be unholy? No. Can God lie? No. These things would be true if no human being existed for Him to "covenantally bind" Himself to or to make promises to. But I think we are at an impasse and have strayed far from the OP.



Well if God "voluntaraly condescends" to us in his revealation than that revealation is anthropomorphic in the sense that he is beyond human comprehension so he takes on human charectoristics to give us analogical knowledge of himself. So when we say that God cannot lie are we expressing that he has covenantly revealed to us that he will not lie or are we saying that because of some metaphysical reason he cannot lie? Would God ever lie even if there was no person to lie too? Well no but is this something that we can understand about his nature as it actually is or is it his "condescension" to us to reveal in an anological sense something about himself that we understand on a creaturly level only?

---------- Post added at 08:54 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:54 AM ----------




py3ak said:


> I quoted this on another thread, but it seems almost as to the point here. Besides, it's not like it doesn't bear being quoted multiple times.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If at any time thoughts of this kind come into the minds of the pious, they will be sufficiently armed to repress them, by considering how sinful it is to insist on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself, and justly ought to be, the cause of all that exists. For if his will has any cause, there must be something antecedent to it, and to which it is annexed; this it were impious to imagine. The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found. Let human temerity then be quiet, and cease to inquire after what exists not, lest perhaps it fails to find what does exist.
Click to expand...


Again I completly agree!!!!!


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Analogical knowledge is good because of the features of language that the later Wittgenetein pointed out. We use wods in different ways.



Careful here---Wittgenstein would not say that this is analogous at all. He would say that the meaning of the word is its use. Thus, if both God and Solomon are wise, then our definition of wisdom has to cover the use of the term in both cases.

I just don't like the word "analogical" here because it does connote that human knowledge is not true knowledge. We might instead qualitative difference or some such.


----------



## a mere housewife

If I've understood some things I've read, saying that God 'cannot' lie is really a statement about His perfect ability, by way of negation. The Divine Essence is complete -- fully realised and actualised -- and can only 'not' do what would result from deficiency or inability (like being false). Our way of apprehending this is necessarily limited and creaturely; but it is a statement about God essentially. This statement seems categorically different than a statement about whether He can in using, possibly bend, the tools of finite minds (like mathematics); the very terms of the second statement seem like the result of a deficiency in our conception of His ability (as if asking whether God could use a popcorn maker to make it snow, when He isn't dependent on that kind of machinery).

I don't have the commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism with me, but I think Ursinus addresses the statement about God not being able to lie in there.


----------



## sevenzedek

The logic of math is inherent in the Trinity. 1+1+1 has always equaled three from eternity. The logic of math is eternal. However, I would say that the means of communicating that logic is not eternal.

---------- Post added at 01:44 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:38 PM ----------




py3ak said:


> I quoted this on another thread, but it seems almost as to the point here. Besides, it's not like it doesn't bear being quoted multiple times.
> 
> If at any time thoughts of this kind come into the minds of the pious, they will be sufficiently armed to repress them, by considering how sinful it is to insist on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself, and justly ought to be, the cause of all that exists. For if his will has any cause, there must be something antecedent to it, and to which it is annexed; this it were impious to imagine. The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found. Let human temerity then be quiet, and cease to inquire after what exists not, lest perhaps it fails to find what does exist.



I never heard it put so well. God really is Most High.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Careful here---Wittgenstein would not say that this is analogous at all. He would say that the meaning of the word is its use. Thus, if both God and Solomon are wise, then our definition of wisdom has to cover the use of the term in both cases.
> 
> I just don't like the word "analogical" here because it does connote that human knowledge is not true knowledge. We might instead qualitative difference or some such.



Actually if you read Van Til he defines analogical in somewhat the same way as Wittgentstein would describe language. If there is similarety in how we use language than there is also disimalarety in how we use langugae, hence analogical usre of language. Also saying that we have definant knowledge of God seems to mean that we understand him as he actually is but I don't think that is right at all. It seems to me that only if we start with an enlightenment type view of things are we forced to choose between univocal or equivocal.

---------- Post added at 02:14 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:05 PM ----------

I would like to say that I am not suggesting that God can lie. Only that we are usually presented this question in two ways" either he can lie or he cannot lie because of some abstract logical reason that binds his abilities. I am simply suggesting a third way to understand why that incorperates the best of both ideas without any undue speculation into God's being, which we could never ubderstand as it actually is.


----------



## py3ak

sevenzedek said:


> I never heard it put so well.



Calvin has a knack for doing that. The whole section is quite illuminating.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> If there is similarety in how we use language than there is also disimalarety in how we use langugae



How so? Simply because any term describes a family resemblance doesn't mean that there is necessarily a dissimilarity in its use for any two objects.



jwright82 said:


> Also saying that we have definant knowledge of God seems to mean that we understand him as he actually is



But we do---that's the point of revelation, particularly God's self-revelation in Jesus.



jwright82 said:


> either he can lie or he cannot lie because of some abstract logical reason that binds his abilities. I am simply suggesting a third way to understand why that incorperates the best of both ideas without any undue speculation into God's being, which we could never ubderstand as it actually is.



But we can understand it as He has revealed it to us. God cannot lie because His nature is Holy---lying would contradict His nature and therefore He cannot lie. This isn't speculation.


----------



## Marrow Man

P. F. Pugh said:


> But we can understand it as He has revealed it to us. God cannot lie because His nature is Holy---lying would contradict His nature and therefore He cannot lie. This isn't speculation.



Exactly.


----------



## py3ak

P. F. Pugh said:


> God cannot lie because His nature is Holy---lying would contradict His nature and therefore He cannot lie. This isn't speculation.



I think whether it's speculation or not depends on whether you are trying to posit a distinction between nature and will, such that nature grounds and determines will; if you are, then that falls under Calvin's warning that we must not seek for anything higher than the will of God.


----------



## Philip

py3ak said:


> I think whether it's speculation or not depends on whether you are trying to posit a distinction between nature and will, such that nature grounds and determines will



A distinction to that degree would contradict Divine Simplicity, so I agree.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> How so? Simply because any term describes a family resemblance doesn't mean that there is necessarily a dissimilarity in its use for any two objects.



My example of the difference in ways that me nand women sometimes use language for differrent purposes. I am not saying all the time nor am I trying to make any sexist comments. But sometimes women will employ phrases to express feelings primaraly and men try understand them as statments of facts. That leads to her feeling like she is not being understood and him feeling like she is not making sense. That is not true at all, she is using the phrases to express something different than facts and her husband needs to understand that this is how she "feels". Read the book _Men Are From Mars and Women Are From Venus_, it oddly enough illustrates this point about the difference in use of language between men and women. And of course I am not trying to offend anyone here, men and women use language in the same ways all the time too.




P. F. Pugh said:


> But we do---that's the point of revelation, particularly God's self-revelation in Jesus.



Yes but what we know is God's revealation only. That is not say that he can say one thing and in truth it is another. Analogy doesn't mean that equivication does. Your stuck in the same place that Clark was, that there is only two categories univocal and equivical. But there is a third category and that is analogical. Think when the bible tells us that God repented of something did he actually change at all? No this is an analogical way of revealing something to us, repent cannot mean the same thing for God and us only similier things. It is this univocal understanding of revealation that led to open theism in my opinion. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> [But we can understand it as He has revealed it to us. God cannot lie because His nature is Holy---lying would contradict His nature and therefore He cannot lie. This isn't speculation.



Yes but what does it mean to say that his nature is holy? Luther had a wonderful distinction between God as he is and God as he has revealed himself to be. Your right in emphasing the "truth" of those statments but you are In my humble opinion overemphasing them. Analogy keeps the balance.

---------- Post added at 09:41 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:39 AM ----------




py3ak said:


> I think whether it's speculation or not depends on whether you are trying to posit a distinction between nature and will, such that nature grounds and determines will; if you are, then that falls under Calvin's warning that we must not seek for anything higher than the will of God.



Good point, your caution reminds me of Paul Tillich's heretical idea of God being the ground of all being, including his own nature. He made a similier division between being and attributes.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> My example of the difference in ways that me nand women sometimes use language for differrent purposes.



I don't deny the possibility of difference, merely that the differences between language used to describe God and that used to describe men are as different as you think. Again, I think "analogical" to be a very misleading term.



jwright82 said:


> Yes but what we know is God's revealation only.



Careful here. Language is itself a Divine invention. At the very least you need to say that the language about God is the closest to the Divine nature that a human could possibly get short of the Divine encounter.



jwright82 said:


> Analogy keeps the balance.



And it's incredibly misleading---look at how Clark took it!



jwright82 said:


> Yes but what does it mean to say that his nature is holy?



That it is set apart---other than ours, perfect, simple.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I don't deny the possibility of difference, merely that the differences between language used to describe God and that used to describe men are as different as you think. Again, I think "analogical" to be a very misleading term.



Which term would you prefer? I will be the first one to admit that analogy can be confusing but the only other terms I know of are archtypal verses ectypal, or the Creator/creature distinction, which both seem to me to be more confusing.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Careful here. Language is itself a Divine invention. At the very least you need to say that the language about God is the closest to the Divine nature that a human could possibly get short of the Divine encounter.



Ok but what is meant is what the confession calls a "voluntary condencsion" on God's part. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> And it's incredibly misleading---look at how Clark took it!



Clark went into wierd directions, later into his life so I am told. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> That it is set apart---other than ours, perfect, simple.



Sure but is that a one to one univocal understanding of God as he really his.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Which term would you prefer?



Family resemblance?



jwright82 said:


> Clark went into wierd directions, later into his life so I am told.



And I would say that much of this is due to his misunderstanding of Van Til on this point.



jwright82 said:


> Sure but is that a one to one univocal understanding of God as he really his.



I would certainly say that it's close. Consider Divine simplicity: a doctrine which is simple yet mind-blowing in its implications. God has no parts. Similarly with the otherness of God.



jwright82 said:


> Ok but what is meant is what the confession calls a "voluntary condencsion" on God's part.



Condescension is probably the better word, in terms of revelation.


----------



## Peairtach

Gesetveemet said:


> Please excuse my ignorance on this subject.
> 
> My question is is 3+3=6 an eternal truth?
> 
> 
> Thank you,
> 
> 
> .



Can God make a square circle and all that malarkey?

I think not, otherwise we might as well all give up.


----------



## MW

William Ames (The Substance of Christian Religion, 67):



> there is nothing in the world that hath a necessary connexion with the divine essence; and so nothing external comes from God by any necessity of his nature, but from his wisdom and free-will.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Family resemblance?



Yeah that might work as long as we emphasis that words do have in some ways different meanings when applied to us than they do to God. Like "good" God is not good in the same way that we are. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> And I would say that much of this is due to his misunderstanding of Van Til on this point.



Thats true. I would add that he also didn't seem to be as distanced from an Enlightment/Modernist understanding of things. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> I would certainly say that it's close. Consider Divine simplicity: a doctrine which is simple yet mind-blowing in its implications. God has no parts. Similarly with the otherness of God.



What is the saying, close is no cigar? Yes but these implications are beyond our comprehension. One to one means exact understanding, like simplicity. One to one means exact understanding of what it means. How can we exactly understand what this means. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Condescension is probably the better word, in terms of revelation.



What do we know about God apart from revealation? And my spelling is horrible, I am trying to do better so bare with me.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> How can we exactly understand what this means.



Easily---I say that God is simple in the sense that He is without parts or components. You understand what I mean by this---where's the misunderstanding here?



jwright82 said:


> What do we know about God apart from revealation?



Nothing, given that revelation covers just about everything.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Easily---I say that God is simple in the sense that He is without parts or components. You understand what I mean by this---where's the misunderstanding here?



Can you explain the exact way that God is simple? How can he have attributes and be simple at the same time? Are you just elevating one attribute above others? You see that an analogical view does not make this sort of mistake beause it says that we inderstand God as only creatures receiving revealation can.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Nothing, given that revelation covers just about everything.



So God is wholly revealed in his self disclosed revealation? That is Barth's view.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Can you explain the exact way that God is simple?



By not having components or parts.



jwright82 said:


> How can he have attributes and be simple at the same time?



Very easily.



jwright82 said:


> Are you just elevating one attribute above others?



No. I am exploring an attribute.



jwright82 said:


> You see that an analogical view does not make this sort of mistake beause it says that we inderstand God as only creatures receiving revealation can.



I don't dispute that we know in a creaturely way. I simply dispute that theological language is entirely analogical. I would also dispute that theological language is entirely univocal.



jwright82 said:


> So God is wholly revealed in his self disclosed revealation?



Obviously not, given that we are not privy to the Divine mind. I think I was unclear here: I meant that revelation covers about every human means of knowing.


----------



## BertMulder

Phil D. said:


> Three men went to get a hotel room, and were told it would be a total of $30.00 for all of them - or, $10 apiece. Later the clerk decided that he would would give the guys a break, and refund a total of $5. The bellhop was on his way to their room to deliver the refund, but realized he didn't have the proper change to give an equal amount to each man. So he decided to give each one $1 and to keep $2 for himself (Yes, that would be a violation of the 8th Commandment, but this is only a mental exercise, people...) So, the men spent $9 each for the room ($10 initially <-> $1 refund = $9), and the bellhop kept $2. But then where is the "other" dollar ($9 X 3 = $27 + $2 = $29)?



tell me where to get a room for 30 bucks...


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> By not having components or parts.


Well now it seems you are just going in circles. What does that mean? If you treat as a common sense idea than you have greatly undermined God.



P. F. Pugh said:


> No. I am exploring an attribute.



At the exspense of the Creator/creature distinction and I must say with no offense intended in a somewhat common sense way, as if it is so obvious to understand God you just circle back and forth with definitions and this describes him in his majesty as he really is. As if we creatures can actually comprehend him, I am not saying that we can't comprehend his revealation but that we can just know him as he is and it is just that easy. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> I don't dispute that we know in a creaturely way. I simply dispute that theological language is entirely analogical. I would also dispute that theological language is entirely univocal.



Fair enough, would you mind elaborating to me what you mean by analogical so that I understand it the way you do?



P. F. Pugh said:


> Obviously not, given that we are not privy to the Divine mind. I think I was unclear here: I meant that revelation covers about every human means of knowing.



Fair enough, I believe that I can completly agree with you here with the caveat of Van Til's idea of the limits of creaturley reason.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> If you treat as a common sense idea than you have greatly undermined God.



How so? Seems fairly straightforward. Is it easy to reconcile with God's having attributes? No, but that's where the mystery comes in.



jwright82 said:


> I am not saying that we can't comprehend his revealation but that we can just know him as he is and it is just that easy.



But there's a difference, I think between saying a) we know Him as He is b) some language about Him is univocal.



jwright82 said:


> Fair enough, would you mind elaborating to me what you mean by analogical so that I understand it the way you do?



I'm using it the way you use it.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> How so? Seems fairly straightforward. Is it easy to reconcile with God's having attributes? No, but that's where the mystery comes in.



Well invoking mystery is a good point, I don't know that I would use the phrase "straightforward". We understand as creatures what God has revealed of himself not as the creator, which would be univocal knowledge.




P. F. Pugh said:


> But there's a difference, I think between saying a) we know Him as He is b) some language about Him is univocal.



If we use the phrase univocal than we are saying that he is just like us, that happens to be the theological implications of that term. That we have everything in common with him it is just that there are quantitativly more to him than us. I am not so sure that any reformed person can affirm that. And I don't believe that you believe that either it is just an implication of the term univocal. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm using it the way you use it.



Fair enough, I will remeber that thank you.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> We understand as creatures what God has revealed of himself not as the creator, which would be univocal knowledge.



I think applying "univocal" and "analogical" to knowledge is a category mistake. The terms are used to apply to language, not to knowledge. I think this may be the source of our disagreement.



jwright82 said:


> If we use the phrase univocal than we are saying that he is just like us



Not at all. To say "That deer has a brown coat" and "My brother has brown eyes" in no way implies that the two belong in the same category. My brother is a human and the deer is a deer, yet "brown" means the same thing in both sentences.



jwright82 said:


> And I don't believe that you believe that either it is just an implication of the term univocal.



Again, I think you're making a category mistake here.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I think applying "univocal" and "analogical" to knowledge is a category mistake. The terms are used to apply to language, not to knowledge. I think this may be the source of our disagreement.



You are familer with Aquina's views of language here right? Knowledge is expressed in language, which is why I use them interchangability here but you may be on to something because not all properties of knowledge belong to language and vice versa. But in the historical Clark/Van Til contraversy they used these terms in this way. Perhaps you can come up with better words to use. That may clear this up but I do think these two men meant two different things. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Not at all. To say "That deer has a brown coat" and "My brother has brown eyes" in no way implies that the two belong in the same category. My brother is a human and the deer is a deer, yet "brown" means the same thing in both sentences.



You are correct but do we mean exactly the same thing when we say that a person is good and God is good? Are the two words meant in exactly the same way?


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But in the historical Clark/Van Til contraversy they used these terms in this way.



Hence why I disagree with both of them.



jwright82 said:


> You are correct but do we mean exactly the same thing when we say that a person is good and God is good?



No we don't---but this is a case where theological language is being used analogically. Let me describe the three senses of theological language:

1) Univocal language ("God is a metaphysical simple")
2) Metaphorical language ("God is our Father")
3) Simile ("The Lord is my Shepherd")


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Hence why I disagree with both of them.



Fair enough but I havn't seen you use anyother different ideas for language of God.




P. F. Pugh said:


> No we don't---but this is a case where theological language is being used analogically. Let me describe the three senses of theological language:
> 
> 1) Univocal language ("God is a metaphysical simple")
> 2) Metaphorical language ("God is our Father")
> 3) Simile ("The Lord is my Shepherd")



But in each case we are not describing God in a way that can be understood by creatures at a one to one ratio. It is only by analogy that we understand these three senses. It actually seems, thanks to Richard Muller's work, that Van Til was right on par with historic reformed thinking on this matter (even they both used different words to describe it). They used the terms archtypal and ectypal, as you know, to describe the different ways in which the Creator and creature know things. God knows everything as the Creator and we know what we know as creatures. 

I mean we both affirm that God is simple but explain to me what a being is that has no parts without going in circles saying either he has no parts or he is simple. You see that is my point, if those two statments are the only two statments that we can say about God's simplicity than we are understanding his revealation rightly as creatures, with creaturly limitations.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Fair enough but I havn't seen you use anyother different ideas for language of God.



I've said that I think some language univocal and some analogical. Hence my disagreement with both.



jwright82 said:


> But in each case we are not describing God in a way that can be understood by creatures at a one to one ratio.



In the first case, yes we are. It's just that we understand the proposition univocally as creatures. 



jwright82 said:


> I mean we both affirm that God is simple but explain to me what a being is that has no parts without going in circles saying either he has no parts or he is simple. You see that is my point, if those two statments are the only two statments that we can say about God's simplicity than we are understanding his revealation rightly as creatures, with creaturly limitations.



All definitions are circular---this is non-unique. 

Let's take an analogical phrase: "God the Father." Now, we affirm that God is Father, and we list attributes of this aspect of God. What we will also do here though is be careful not to apply to God the aspects of fatherhood that aren't accurate (fill in the blanks). I can't see any aspect of metaphysical simplicity that doesn't apply unequivocally to God.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I've said that I think some language univocal and some analogical. Hence my disagreement with both.



Yeah but univocal mean sexactly the same. So if two things are univocaly simple than there is absolutly no difference between them. Any difference makes it a analogical relation. I just like to follow the Dutch Reformed tradition's way of handling this by discussing what cannot be said or understand by us and than using that framework to understand what we mean when we talk about God or understand his revealation. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> In the first case, yes we are. It's just that we understand the proposition univocally as creatures.



I don't know if it makes sense to argue that making sense of it "univocaly as creatutres" at the end of the day would be much different than just saying analogical?




P. F. Pugh said:


> All definitions are circular---this is non-unique.
> 
> Let's take an analogical phrase: "God the Father." Now, we affirm that God is Father, and we list attributes of this aspect of God. What we will also do here though is be careful not to apply to God the aspects of fatherhood that aren't accurate (fill in the blanks). I can't see any aspect of metaphysical simplicity that doesn't apply unequivocally to God.



But if God posses "metaphysical simplicity" than he is not simple. This is the trouble of invoking a univocal understanding of knowledge here, which led to open theism. If your saying that he has revealed this about himself than we understand it only as creatures, which makes it's complete comprehension beyond our ability. We understand as only pilgrim's in this world can.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> So if two things are univocaly simple than there is absolutly no difference between them.



So can you name another things that is a metaphysical simple?



jwright82 said:


> I don't know if it makes sense to argue that making sense of it "univocaly as creatutres" at the end of the day would be much different than just saying analogical?



Because analogical refers to language, not knowledge. I can't know something analogically versus univocally because those terms (when used in contrast like this) refer to language and propositions.



jwright82 said:


> But if God posses "metaphysical simplicity" than he is not simple.



Sure He is---metaphysical simplicity is a property of God's nature. Properties are not parts, unless we want to be Scotists (like Clark).



jwright82 said:


> This is the trouble of invoking a univocal understanding of knowledge here, which led to open theism.



Again, I'm distinguishing between the ways in which language about God is used and the ways in which we understand that lamguage. If Divine simplicity is an analogy, where does it break down? What aspect of metaphysical simplicity is inaccurate to say of God?


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> So can you name another things that is a metaphysical simple?



Absolutly not. I already thought about that. Nor can I name another thing that any of the other incommunicable attributes of God. But I mean his simplicitly can only be talked about in two phrases "he is simple in his being" and "he is without parts in his being". That tells me how beyond our comprehension it is because we can say no more. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Because analogical refers to language, not knowledge. I can't know something analogically versus univocally because those terms (when used in contrast like this) refer to language and propositions.



How many thoughts do you have that are not in a language? Are not at least many of our thoughts composed of knowledge? Also knowing something analogically just means that we don't have absolute autonomous God's-eye-view knowledge of something or complete skepticism. Only that we know as creatures. Yes a statement about seeing a tree is true but all the other types of things that can be known or are beyond our comprehension about the tree means that there will always be similarity and disimilarity in my understanding of the tree. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Sure He is---metaphysical simplicity is a property of God's nature. Properties are not parts, unless we want to be Scotists (like Clark).



His attributes are him in exaustive oneness so as to be irrelevant from one point of view to even consider seperatly. This is why the Dutch Reformed made it clear that when we use the term properties or attributes this is not God as he is but our attempt to understand his revealation given to us about himself. We choose these concepts to humbly seek as much knowledge of him that we can as creatures gain through his revealation.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, I'm distinguishing between the ways in which language about God is used and the ways in which we understand that lamguage. If Divine simplicity is an analogy, where does it break down? What aspect of metaphysical simplicity is inaccurate to say of God?



Because it is a concept that we have come up to make as much sense of his revealation as we can. We can only choose concepts that are humble conformity to his self-disclosed revealation. But our concepts are human concepts not divine concepts. So yes we are correct in saying that we can apply this concept to him but it is to him as he has revealed himself to us not that we have penertrated heaven with our reason and deduced this from studying him as he actually is. he is condescending to us remember. We can freely call his being simple so long as we do it in this qualified way.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Absolutly not. I already thought about that. Nor can I name another thing that any of the other incommunicable attributes of God. But I mean his simplicitly can only be talked about in two phrases "he is simple in his being" and "he is without parts in his being". That tells me how beyond our comprehension it is because we can say no more.



In which case the term is univocal by default because it only applies to one thing---there's no analogy that can be made for these attributes.



jwright82 said:


> How many thoughts do you have that are not in a language?



Quite a few (mental images). In addition, I have friends who I know pretty well. But knowledge of persons is a rather different beast from knowledge of propositions. In the same way, knowledge of propositions, even about the same subject, may be qualitatively different.



jwright82 said:


> His attributes are him in exaustive oneness so as to be irrelevant from one point of view to even consider seperatly. This is why the Dutch Reformed made it clear that when we use the term properties or attributes this is not God as he is but our attempt to understand his revealation given to us about himself. We choose these concepts to humbly seek as much knowledge of him that we can as creatures gain through his revealation.



But at the same time, this way of talking about theological language depends upon a proper understanding of Divine simplicity. Similarly with Divine incomprehensibility.



jwright82 said:


> But our concepts are human concepts not divine concepts.



If they are received by means of revelation, then they are Divine in origin. God is Lord of language too.

The question is this: does God ever reveal Himself to us as He is?


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## MW

"Simplicity" is itself an accommodated term. It is not what God is in Himself; but what He has revealed Himself to be. It is only necessary as a concept because of the diversity of qualities by which God has been pleased to reveal Himself. Without revelation there is no diversity, and no requirement to emphasise simplicity.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> "Simplicity" is itself an accommodated term. It is not what God is in Himself



You're right: Divine simplicity describes not what God is but what He is not.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> In which case the term is univocal by default because it only applies to one thing---there's no analogy that can be made for these attributes.



But univocal is absolute in its understanding. That means that we can lay out exactly in exaustive detail what something like simplicity means. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Quite a few (mental images). In addition, I have friends who I know pretty well. But knowledge of persons is a rather different beast from knowledge of propositions. In the same way, knowledge of propositions, even about the same subject, may be qualitatively different.



Well I agree with the last sentence. I think that Wittgenstein would object to the first. That, it seems for one reason, is why he never again took up the issue of the relation of language to the world. We are raised in a linguistic community. I don't know if you have kids but reading the _Philosophical Investigations_ and teaching a child to talk at the same time will convince you of his basic correctness in his viewpoints but it sounds that you are already are.




P. F. Pugh said:


> But at the same time, this way of talking about theological language depends upon a proper understanding of Divine simplicity. Similarly with Divine incomprehensibility.



If you mean a prior understanding of any of his attributes to say something like this, than no. We hit the limit of our creaturlely understanding at his revealation. But it is an interesting point, how do we know we can't know, right?




P. F. Pugh said:


> If they are received by means of revelation, then they are Divine in origin. God is Lord of language too.
> 
> The question is this: does God ever reveal Himself to us as He is?



I would rephrase the question as this, can we as creatures understand him as he is? When he condescends to us that revealation is in fact truthful to his revealation but we cannot penetrate through that limit and know him as he is.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But univocal is absolute in its understanding. That means that we can lay out exactly in exaustive detail what something like simplicity means.



We do. Simplicity means that God has no parts. That exhausts the subject (though not its implications when other doctrines are involved).




jwright82 said:


> I think that Wittgenstein would object to the first. That, it seems for one reason, is why he never again took up the issue of the relation of language to the world. We are raised in a linguistic community. I don't know if you have kids but reading the Philosophical Investigations and teaching a child to talk at the same time will convince you of his basic correctness in his viewpoints but it sounds that you are already are.



No---one can think apart from language. My major beef with Wittgenstein is that he leaves us still in Plato's cave. The relation of language to reality is vastly important here. I agree with his analysis of meaning, but that doesn't entail that I accept his view wholesale.



jwright82 said:


> But it is an interesting point, how do we know we can't know, right?



Exactly: at some point religious language touches the religious subject (I'm preparing to write a two-semester thesis on this subject).



jwright82 said:


> I would rephrase the question as this, can we as creatures understand him as he is?



Here's the problem, though: starting from man is the wrong place, otherwise theology becomes anthropology. God reveals _Himself_ first and foremost.


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## Eoghan

They paid $10 each got a $1 refund and tipped the bellhop $1


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## black_rose

My opinion is with Marrow Man on this one. Mathematical values are human-made concepts, really. A number is only a representation because, honestly, what is two? Other than "a number", you can't really say. Many people would believe science is an eternal truth as well, most likely, but it is constantly being proven wrong and added on to and such, so we obviously haven't got that right yet.
~shrugs~


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## Eoghan

After enduring the recession of the 30's a horse trader finally went out of business. Unfortunately by this time he had encouraged his friends to buy into the business. When he ceased trading he had 17 horses a prime number which could not be divided. They too the problem to the Pastor explaining that Graham was owed two thirds, Hamish a sixth and Dougal a ninth. They could see no way to divide the prime number 17 without dismembering the horse at which point the value would automatically go down.

The Pastor asked them to come back in the morning and he would visit the field with them.

He prayed all night and eventually fell asleep in the wee hours of the morning. He met with them and rode out to the paddock. Once there he counted the horses to see there were indeed seventeen a prime number. Leading his horse into the middle of the field he said he would give his horse into the herd if it helped, he then divided up the herd of eighteen as follows. He gave Graham twelve horses, Hamish three and Dougal two. Then he took the last horse (his own) and he rode home, leaving the three friends wondering why they had gone to the Pastor in the first place.

PM me when you figure it out


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> We do. Simplicity means that God has no parts. That exhausts the subject (though not its implications when other doctrines are involved).



This is a quote from Herman Bavinck, it is from the book _Our Reasonable Faith_, that is exactly my view on this subject:



> The knowledge which we get of God by way of His revelation is therefore a knowledge of faith. It is not adequate, in the sense that it is not equivalent to the being of God, for God is infinitely exalted above all His creatures. Such knowledge is not purely symbolical either-that is to say, couched in expressions which we have arbitrarily formed and which do not correspond to any reality; instead this knowledge is ectypal (ectype: an impression, as in painting) or analogical (analogy: correspondence or similarity in form) because it is based on the likeness and relationship which, notwithstanding God’s absolute majesty, nevertheless exists between God and all the works of His hand. The knowledge which God grants us of Himself in nature and in Scripture is limited, finite, fragmentary, but is nevertheless true and pure. Such is God as He has revealed Himself in His word and specifically in and through Christ; and He is such as our hearts require



Do you agree with this or not? That way we don't keep going in circles if we are essentially saying the same things from different perspectives. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> No---one can think apart from language. My major beef with Wittgenstein is that he leaves us still in Plato's cave. The relation of language to reality is vastly important here. I agree with his analysis of meaning, but that doesn't entail that I accept his view wholesale.



Fair enough, I wouldn't go to the mat for all his views. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Exactly: at some point religious language touches the religious subject (I'm preparing to write a two-semester thesis on this subject).



I would look forward to reading it if you don't mind?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Here's the problem, though: starting from man is the wrong place, otherwise theology becomes anthropology. God reveals Himself first and foremost.



I think I already know your answer to the real question I was asking. I believe that you do not agree that we can gain knowledge of God apart from His revelation, that is by pealing back heaven with reason and searching the depths of His being.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I believe that you do not agree that we can gain knowledge of God apart from His revelation, that is by pealing back heaven with reason and searching the depths of His being.



Naturally not---but the trouble here is that when we remove revelation from the picture, there's nothing left---not even reason.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> I believe that you do not agree that we can gain knowledge of God apart from His revelation, that is by pealing back heaven with reason and searching the depths of His being.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Naturally not---but the trouble here is that when we remove revelation from the picture, there's nothing left---not even reason.
Click to expand...


Completly agreed, what did you think about the Bavinck quote?


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Completly agreed, what did you think about the Bavinck quote?



I think the language of ectype is much more helpful than that of analogy, simply because the language of analogy is much more likely to result in the Clarkian strawman understanding. I also find it helpful that Bavinck is speaking of knowledge rather than of language.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I think the language of ectype is much more helpful than that of analogy, simply because the language of analogy is much more likely to result in the Clarkian strawman understanding. I also find it helpful that Bavinck is speaking of knowledge rather than of language.



Yeah I thought the same thing after reading it. I think it is like a painting of a field. God's knowledge is the original field that we can't see (archetypal knowledge) and our knowledge is looking at the painting (echtypal knowledge) of the field. Bahnsen lamented over Van Til's use of analogy, you can see from this quote where he got the word from, for pedegological reasons.


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