# Philosophy and Covenant Theology.



## jwright82 (Sep 16, 2011)

I have read both Micheal Horton and K. Scott Oliphint saying that we can as christians provide better solutions to philosophical problems by dealing with them in a covenantal context. I find that idea absolutly fascinating. I am taking their lead and going with it. But I wanted to hear what ya'll think on the subject. If you want specific proposals on this idea than I will provide them as best I can.


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## ZackF (Sep 21, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> I have read both Micheal Horton and K. Scott Oliphint saying that we can as christians provide better solutions to philosophical problems by dealing with them in a covenantal context. I find that idea absolutly fascinating. I am taking their lead and going with it. But I wanted to hear what ya'll think on the subject. If you want specific proposals on this idea than I will provide them as best I can.


 
From my most meager knowledge of the matter it sounds Van Tillian to the core. Didn't Van Til go right through the jugular from the get go. No generic God business nor "mere Christianity" but right to the Sovereign God of the bible!!


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## Philip (Sep 21, 2011)

James, what I find is that while in some cases, a scriptural worldview helps us in terms of providing answers, it also raises new problems, and muddies certain waters that without revelation would seem to be clear. In addition, Christian philosophers often have a very different set of concerns than their unbelieving counterparts.


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## athanatos (Sep 21, 2011)

I am taking a course on it, taught by the good doctor. I'll let you know when I'm more qualified to speak!


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## jwright82 (Sep 21, 2011)

KS_Presby said:


> From my most meager knowledge of the matter it sounds Van Tillian to the core. Didn't Van Til go right through the jugular from the get go. No generic God business nor "mere Christianity" but right to the Sovereign God of the bible!!



I would say so.




P. F. Pugh said:


> James, what I find is that while in some cases, a scriptural worldview helps us in terms of providing answers, it also raises new problems, and muddies certain waters that without revelation would seem to be clear. In addition, Christian philosophers often have a very different set of concerns than their unbelieving counterparts.



You know all in all I can't disagree with you. But does looking at things from a covenantal P.O.V. raise less problems or more? That would be my first question in this thread


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## jandrusk (Sep 22, 2011)

I tend to tackle it more from an prepositional worldview than a covenant one. Don't see what the correlation would be with the non-believer who would not be able to relate to a covenant relationship since they typically think they are center of their universe. Depends upon which philosophical system you are talking about since they vary so greatly.


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## Philip (Sep 22, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> But does looking at things from a covenantal P.O.V. raise less problems or more?



Can you give me an example of one which it solves?


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## jwright82 (Sep 25, 2011)

jandrusk said:


> I tend to tackle it more from an prepositional worldview than a covenant one. Don't see what the correlation would be with the non-believer who would not be able to relate to a covenant relationship since they typically think they are center of their universe. Depends upon which philosophical system you are talking about since they vary so greatly.



Yeah but I think the question should be raised of whether or not our covenant theology can provide a better framework for dealing with these questions than a more abstract one?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Can you give me an example of one which it solves?



Yes but understand I have no specifics here and cannot argue in specifics over these things. So keep that in mind. The Reformed apologists that I refered to generaly wished to avoid uneeded abstarctions, like relating human responsibiblity to divine soveirghnty. Horton seems to be suggesting that covenant theology might provide a better alternative than human abstractions. The way I see it, in very humble fashion mind you, is that a covenant is a very concrete thing so the old problem of relating an abstract idea to concrete ones is, in a sense, resolved when you bring a concrete framework like the covenant into the mix. I can't give you specifics here but I can explore these options with anyone willing to dicuss them.


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## MW (Sep 25, 2011)

I generally think of philosophy as descriptive and theology as prescriptive. Philosophy raises questions and theology answers them. Hence I would prefer if they were kept distinct. The conflation would only serve to raise the other disciplines to the dignity of theology and thereby challenge her distinctive place as the queen of the sciences.


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## jwright82 (Sep 25, 2011)

armourbearer said:


> I generally think of philosophy as descriptive and theology as prescriptive. Philosophy raises questions and theology answers them. Hence I would prefer if they were kept distinct. The conflation would only serve to raise the other disciplines to the dignity of theology and thereby challenge her distinctive place as the queen of the sciences.



I definantly see your point but look at it this way. Theology is theology, and there philosophical consequences to that theology. So we tease out those consequences and from that basis work out a theological/philosophical answer to maybe the good old problems of philosophy, that have managed to not disapear for these years.


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## Philip (Sep 25, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> the old problem of relating an abstract idea to concrete ones is, in a sense, resolved when you bring a concrete framework like the covenant into the mix.



What philosophers have written on this one?



armourbearer said:


> Philosophy raises questions and theology answers them.



Theology, I find, raises more questions than it answers (see also: Trinitarian theology). This isn't bad, mind you.


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## MW (Sep 25, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Theology, I find, raises more questions than it answers


 
Then it is not theologia vera.


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## MW (Sep 25, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> Theology is theology, and there philosophical consequences to that theology.



Philosophy is the handmaid. If there are philosophical consequences to theology, it is for philosophy to work those out, not theology.


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## Philip (Sep 25, 2011)

armourbearer said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> > Theology, I find, raises more questions than it answers
> ...



Sure it is. Just because the trinity raises more questions than it answers doesn't make it untrue---it just means that I've possibly reached my limit.


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## MW (Sep 25, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> > P. F. Pugh said:
> ...


 
No, it means you are exceeding your limit -- a limit which can only be defined by true theology.


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

armourbearer said:


> No, it means you are exceeding your limit -- a limit which can only be defined by true theology.



So if I still have logical questions about trinitarian doctrine, I've exceeded my limit?


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## Semper Fidelis (Sep 26, 2011)

Getting back to the OP, the problem that I have with the statement is that it sort of makes the assumption that systematic theology is grounded in philosophy and covenant theology is grounded in revelation. It's sort of an unstated assumption but I think undergirds it.

Reformed systematic theology has always worked backward from revelation and then used logic (philosophy if you like) to try to determine by GNC what may be known from what is revealed. Because, it is organized and systematic it sort of takes on the air of extra-Biblical to some but good systematic theology is trying to be fair to what is revealed and not moving beyond that point.

The concern I have with modern attempts to recast systematics according to covenant theology is that I see folks claiming a "Biblical" approach for themselves while claiming that the older forms are philosophical.

Where this also seems to go is that some have this "Suzerein treaty" grid overlaid on top of Covenant theology that is clashing with some older systematics. Consequently, Biblical="suzerein treaty ideas" and all the older stuff that doesn't have those ideas are seen as not Biblical but philosophical.

Now, at the end of the day, maybe there were mistakes made in the formation of systematics and we ought to be constantly searching the Scriptures for ways we might tighten up our understanding of things. That said, let's not claim that older sytematics are philosophical simply because the starting point of early Systematizers was not a Klinean understanding of revelation.

Thus, I think the issue is better seen as newer thinkers disagreeing with earlier views of the Scriptures. If the Klinean view is established as true Theology then Systematics ought to naturally proceed from there. Let's not make it a matter, however, of philosophy vs. covenant theology but one view of revelation in the past vs a new view today.


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## jwright82 (Sep 26, 2011)

armourbearer said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> > Theology is theology, and there philosophical consequences to that theology.
> ...



Only I completly agree. Your absolutly right theology should not seek to answer these questions philosophy should. But I guess I would say that I start, presuposse, with my theology and work out, using the methods and ideas of philosophy, an answer (or possible answer) to these questions. One essential piece of my theology is covenant theology. I think that the point Horton is making is that it is abstract speculation that has been problimatic in the past to relating the abstract to the concrete (the historical problem of universals). I never said that this idea was absolutly right only a fascinating idea. I fo rone am going to explore it myself but, alas, at the end of the day it could be wrong.




P. F. Pugh said:


> What philosophers have written on this one?



None that I know of. Oliphint said that anyone doing this kind of philosophy would "be virtualy alone" in the field. They have, as far as I know, provided only very rough frameworks for this (more like passing comments). Here is the talk that he gave that got me thinking about it Christian Essentialism - ReformedForum.org. I started this thread to explore the idea with fellow reformed christians to get a feel for it and try it out. 




Semper Fidelis said:


> Getting back to the OP, the problem that I have with the statement is that it sort of makes the assumption that systematic theology is grounded in philosophy and covenant theology is grounded in revelation. It's sort of an unstated assumption but I think undergirds it.
> 
> Reformed systematic theology has always worked backward from revelation and then used logic (philosophy if you like) to try to determine by GNC what may be known from what is revealed. Because, it is organized and systematic it sort of takes on the air of extra-Biblical to some but good systematic theology is trying to be fair to what is revealed and not moving beyond that point.
> 
> ...



I agree that we shouldn't recast older Systematic Theology to be more "philosophical". But doesn't Horton and Oliphint get their cue from Muller and his work? Are they not seeking to reapply those old ways of thinking? If what we are doing is essentially the VanTillian notion of "I do not leave my theology at the door" when doing philosophy (or anyother body of knowledge)? I am not the expert on classical Reformed Dogmatics that you and armourbearer are but that line of thought seems to be right to me. If this is all so than I can start from a theology of the covenant to work out a philosophy, using the methods of philosophy, of whatever?


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## Semper Fidelis (Sep 26, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> I agree that we shouldn't recast older Systematic Theology to be more "philosophical". But doesn't Horton and Oliphint get their cue from Muller and his work? Are they not seeking to reapply those old ways of thinking? If what we are doing is essentially the VanTillian notion of "I do not leave my theology at the door" when doing philosophy (or anyother body of knowledge)? I am not the expert on classical Reformed Dogmatics that you and armourbearer are but that line of thought seems to be right to me. If this is all so than I can start from a theology of the covenant to work out a philosophy, using the methods of philosophy, of whatever?


I think you need to read what I wrote more carefully. I'm not an expert in classical Reformed Dogmatics but simply a student of it.

My point was not that it is an issue of whether one starts from a theology of the covenant but whether or not that theology of the covenant is what is revealed. In other words, it's a debate on whether some of the recent developments of Covenant theology are Scriptural. If the starting point is in question then the Systematics will be questionable. It's hardly a settled point that the new understandings of the Covenant are the basis upon which to proceed to systematics.


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## jwright82 (Sep 26, 2011)

Semper Fidelis said:


> I think you need to read what I wrote more carefully. I'm not an expert in classical Reformed Dogmatics but simply a student of it.
> 
> My point was not that it is an issue of whether one starts from a theology of the covenant but whether or not that theology of the covenant is what is revealed. In other words, it's a debate on whether some of the recent developments of Covenant theology are Scriptural. If the starting point is in question then the Systematics will be questionable. It's hardly a settled point that the new understandings of the Covenant are the basis upon which to proceed to systematics.



I got you, I thought you were refering to Kline and Horton on the whole "Suzerein treaty" thing. I to had kind of a problem with Horton casting that version of "recent developments" as "Covenant Theology" itself, along with the whole Neo-2K and republication of the C.O.W. stuff in his book _The God of Promise_. I mean it is o.k. to believe that your version is the biblical one but to knowingly cast it as the Reformed view is a little underhanded in my mind knowing that there is disagreement amaongst Reformed beleivers. 

I mean I believe that VanTillian Apologetics is Reformed Apologetics but i don't like to refer to it as that because there is healthy disagreement amongst honest Reformed thinkers on this issue to make it unfair to slant terms like that, so I refrain. I don't adopt Horton more extreme views and I do not believe that Oliphint does either, but I could be wrong. 

I used the term "expert" to respectfully show my humility in recognizing that you and armourbearer know more about it than I do. So I would rather learn from you on what is classical or not and not tell you what is classical or not.


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> None that I know of. Oliphint said that anyone doing this kind of philosophy would "be virtualy alone" in the field.



You see, the problem is that I can't really think of any philosophical questions that theology would solve without raising more questions. The other thing is that theology gives Christian philosophers a peculiar set of concerns that make their work such that they are not necessarily going to be concerned with the same things as their secular counterparts. A Christian philosopher will have theological concerns.

At any rate, I can't think of how covenant theology in particular is going to be relevant to philosophy (except possibly in the theory of contract law---which is mostly interesting to lawyers).

As a Christian in philosophy, I've found that my faith means that I have to live with a ton of ambiguity---the issues of Christ and culture for me aren't theoretical, but a reality that I have to wrestle with most days.


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## jwright82 (Sep 26, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> You see, the problem is that I can't really think of any philosophical questions that theology would solve without raising more questions. The other thing is that theology gives Christian philosophers a peculiar set of concerns that make their work such that they are not necessarily going to be concerned with the same things as their secular counterparts. A Christian philosopher will have theological concerns.
> 
> At any rate, I can't think of how covenant theology in particular is going to be relevant to philosophy (except possibly in the theory of contract law---which is mostly interesting to lawyers).
> 
> As a Christian in philosophy, I've found that my faith means that I have to live with a ton of ambiguity---the issues of Christ and culture for me aren't theoretical, but a reality that I have to wrestle with most days.



Well now wait a minute lets explore the whole freedom issue. Now abstractions of "divine sovierghnty" and "human freedom" have, as you said, raised more problems than they have solved. But here is Horton on this:



> Similarly, covenant theology provides a broader biblical context for relating divine and human agency. A covenant involves two parties, so if we begin with the covenant rather than with abstract philosophical questions, the whole discussion changes significantly.
> 
> It is often supposed that Calvinism highlights a set of biblical passages on God’s sovereignty, while Arminians emphasize other passages that teach human responsibility. Thus, this rivalry is simply the consequence of not teaching both with the correct scriptural balance. There certainly is a hyper-Calvinism that fits this description, preoccupied with a distorted concept of God’s sovereignty that then pushes everything else to the periphery. Here we do encounter that deductive approach of a central dogma criticized above. But hyper-Calvinism is not Calvinism. When Reformed theology hears Scripture teaching both divine sovereignty and human responsibility, divine election and the universal offer of the gospel, it affirms both even though it confesses that it does not know quite how God coordinates them behind the scenes.
> 
> ...



Pages 18-20 in his book _God of Promise_. I think he nicley in theory avoids the uneccessary abstractions that traditional formulations of this problem seem to fall into. Again it is receptive in the sense that we sit and receive revelation from God about this much and do not speculate beyond that. I do believe that we can answer some, or most of, the traditional problems of this issue starting from this framework.


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

James, the fact is that it simply doesn't do this: the covenant interactions of God with creation only serve to highlight the ambiguity. It's clear that we have to hold both together---but that doesn't resolve things: it means that we can't resolve them by going to extremes. There's more to wrestle with, not less.


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## jwright82 (Sep 26, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> James, the fact is that it simply doesn't do this: the covenant interactions of God with creation only serve to highlight the ambiguity.



In what way? The issue is not abstract and speculative but concrete and historical. Doe sit answer every question? No but it avoids traditional problems with abstract and speculative formulations, which are to be avoided.

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P. F. Pugh said:


> it means that we can't resolve them by going to extremes. There's more to wrestle with, not less.



How is there more to wrestle with and not less?


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> No but it avoids traditional problems with abstract and speculative formulations, which are to be avoided.



In what way, exactly? The problem of trying to account for God's sovereignty and human responsibility is still present. How can we hold the two without contradiction? That's the question.

The only thing that it solves is something of an existential problem.



jwright82 said:


> How is there more to wrestle with and not less?



Because we have, on the one hand, the absolute sovereignty of God, and on the other, the absolute responsibility of man. The history of the covenant makes this clearer: it doesn't resolve the dilemma. The problem isn't which side to take seriously: it's the fact that we have to take both seriously.


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## jwright82 (Sep 26, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> In what way, exactly? The problem of trying to account for God's sovereignty and human responsibility is still present. How can we hold the two without contradiction? That's the question.
> 
> The only thing that it solves is something of an existential problem.



Well withen the covenant we have freedom, limited creaturley freedom. You get a contradiction when you describe it as absolute sovereignty and absolute freedom, abstract ways of looking at it. 





P. F. Pugh said:


> Because we have, on the one hand, the absolute sovereignty of God, and on the other, the absolute responsibility of man. The history of the covenant makes this clearer: it doesn't resolve the dilemma. The problem isn't which side to take seriously: it's the fact that we have to take both seriously.



But you are assuming that this issue can be completly resolved, it cannot. The question is can bare human reason with the use of abstractions penetrate the mind of God and resolve this?


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> Well withen the covenant we have freedom, limited creaturley freedom. You get a contradiction when you describe it as absolute sovereignty and absolute freedom, abstract ways of looking at it.



I said absolute responsibility, not absolute freedom. Secondly, covenant highlights the distinction---I don't see how it resolves the problem.



jwright82 said:


> But you are assuming that this issue can be completly resolved, it cannot. The question is can bare human reason with the use of abstractions penetrate the mind of God and resolve this?



I'm not saying it does: I'm saying that putting things in the context of Covenant only makes things more complicated, not less. I'm currently involved in a discussion over the law, and I'll tell you right now that some of the things God tells the people to do and holds them responsible for don't make a whole lot of sense to me. I believe them because they're true, but holding them to be true means that I have to live with a lot of ambiguity.


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## mvdm (Sep 26, 2011)

Semper Fidelis said:


> The concern I have with modern attempts to recast systematics according to covenant theology is that I see folks claiming a "Biblical" approach for themselves while claiming that the older forms are philosophical.



That's what I was thinking. If it's Horton's covenant theology that is the lens by which he advocates interpreting philosophy, then one needs to reconsider the utility of such an idea.


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## MW (Sep 26, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> So if I still have logical questions about trinitarian doctrine, I've exceeded my limit?


 
The only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him. Your questions are not theology. Theology answers your questions.


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

armourbearer said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> > So if I still have logical questions about trinitarian doctrine, I've exceeded my limit?
> ...



So what are my questions, if not theological? If theology answers my questions, why do I still have them? If theology is supposed to answer all questions, then why so much mystery?


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## MW (Sep 26, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> So what are my questions, if not theological? If theology answers my questions, why do I still have them? If theology is supposed to answer all questions, then why so much mystery?



Theology has never claimed to answer all questions. It specifically rejects the notion that all questions can be answered; and in rejecting that notion, it has declared the illegitimacy of such questions. So it is a pertinent question you ask, Why do you still have such questions?


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## Philip (Sep 26, 2011)

Ah, so once the dogma has been stated, further questions must cease? No attempt to probe the matter may be entertained? Somehow, this doesn't seem to square with the way in which the Church has historically done theology. There seems to have been too much wrestling with this stuff for this to be the case (I'm primarily thinking of the reading in Athanasius I was doing earlier today).


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## Semper Fidelis (Sep 27, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Ah, so once the dogma has been stated, further questions must cease?


You're failing to understand the idea of "true theology" as Matthew is presenting it. Here is an excerpt from a paper I wrote that draws from Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics and The Infallible Word:


> True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, is knowledge that stands beyond doubt in contrast to the depraved opinion of false theology. Archetypal theology is that theology which God knows “in se” (in Himself) while ectypal theology is true theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding. True theology is one in its essence, whether it is found in God himself or understood by his creatures. The divisions of this theology into archetypal and ectypal respects the fact that there is not a single species of theology understood by degrees. In other words, God’s understanding and man’s understanding do not merely differ by degree of the same knowledge. Rather, this singular theology is understood absolutely and infinitely by the Creator (archetypal) while finitely and relatively by the creature (ectypal).
> 
> Finite truth is grounded in the one, all-encompassing truth of God’s mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks to divine knowledge as its source and goal. The archetype is theology in the truest sense, while all ectypal forms only bear a similitude to the archetype. Theology is in intelligent creatures as an image of the Creator. Theology is in God formally and eminently as His essential wisdom. He does not learn things by examining them or reasoning discursively about facts outside Himself but His is a simple intelligence to which all others can only be related by analogy. God knows things in Himself because it is in His essence to know. Creatures must discursively reason knowledge only insofar as they can analogically understand it but can never have knowledge as God has.
> 
> ...


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## Philip (Sep 27, 2011)

Rich, I'm not denying what you write. I'm asking whether faith can seek understanding. I'm asking whether, if after coming up with a doctrinal statement I still have questions, I'm just supposed to play the mystery card and go no further, or whether you would say it's appropriate to continue to probe the doctrine further.


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## Semper Fidelis (Sep 27, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Rich, I'm not denying what you write. I'm asking whether faith can seek understanding. I'm asking whether, if after coming up with a doctrinal statement I still have questions, I'm just supposed to play the mystery card and go no further, or whether you would say it's appropriate to continue to probe the doctrine further.


I won't speak for Matthew but what he is saying is that true theology reveals only some things. Philosophy can be used as a handmaiden or tool for the person who can seek to understand what has been revealed but it can't get any further then what theology reveals as defined above. That is to say that God has not chosen to reveal all things and the creature who stands under God's authority should not be in a posture of putting his hand on his hips and declaring that he refuses to be bound to true theology.

Now, that said, there is certainly a sense in which the Reformed have always maintained that our apprehension of true theology is always imperfect. We ought to be seeking greater understanding and I certainly believe that a Christian man can refine prior understandings to get at a clearer apprehension of true theology.

I guess the idea of "probing further" depends upon the stance of the person attempting to probe. Is the person a worshiper of God who desires to understand true theology more deeply or is he one that is fundamentally dissatisfied with the limits that God has placed on what has been revealed? If, for instance, true theology leaves certain questions unanswered, it is inappropriate for the creature to autonomously decide that further questions must me insisted upon. If, however, there is a dependence upon revelation and he believes earlier formulations of true theology do not accord with true theology then that may be an entirely different matter.

The point Matthew made to begin with, which I agree with, is that true theology does not raise questions but it reveals what is true. We have no knowledge without true theology because it encompasses everything that God has revealed by special and general revelation.


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## Philip (Sep 27, 2011)

Semper Fidelis said:


> The point Matthew made to begin with, which I agree with, is that true theology does not raise questions but it reveals what is true. We have no knowledge without true theology because it encompasses everything that God has revealed by special and general revelation.



I guess that I find that whenever I read theology, I come away with more questions than I started with. What is revealed puzzles me more than it did when it was hidden.


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## Semper Fidelis (Sep 27, 2011)

Philip,

You're equivocating now. You stated that you agreed with what I wrote above. True theology is archetypal and ectypal. The latter is _all_ truth that has been revealed by God, which is accomodated to creaturely capacity.

You are redefining theology as the stuff you have read. That is not the same thing. A book with theology in it is not, by definition, all that is meant by true theology. A book written by Rob Bell, for instance, has lots of theology but very little of it is true. Even the most exhaustive book on theology, written by the godliest saint this side of glory, will never be coextensive with true theology as defined above.

I would also note that true theology _is_ revealed by God and our lack of apprehension is not a defect in the revelation itself but in the man whose mind is not yet completely sanctified.


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## Philip (Sep 27, 2011)

But even after reading the Scriptures, I always have more questions: there is more to be discovered. Even truths that I know (like the Trinity) leave me with questions---I still wrestle. I'm not saying that this makes revelation imperfect---I am merely suggesting that it does not answer all possible questions---indeed, it raises many questions. The theology is true, but it isn't easy. I speak mainly for myself when I say that I would have far fewer questions and far less ambiguity did I not have Scripture guiding my questioning.


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## jwright82 (Sep 28, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm not saying it does: I'm saying that putting things in the context of Covenant only makes things more complicated, not less. I'm currently involved in a discussion over the law, and I'll tell you right now that some of the things God tells the people to do and holds them responsible for don't make a whole lot of sense to me. I believe them because they're true, but holding them to be true means that I have to live with a lot of ambiguity.



I see your point. Yes there is a lot of mystery that we cannot comprehend but the point is looking at this avoids specific problems that result from looking at it in abstract terms. There is much more that needs to be explained here but it is a good start in the right direction, I think.

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P. F. Pugh said:


> I said absolute responsibility, not absolute freedom. Secondly, covenant highlights the distinction---I don't see how it resolves the problem.



Well your rigth it doesn't resolve th eproblem per se but it provides a more concrete context to work this out as much as we can. You know as well as I do that philosophy has always wrestled with trying to connect the abstract with the concrete. This seems to be a way to connect those. But you are right there is much philosophical work that needs to be done and if I do any in this area I will shhot it your way. Do you see any problems with this method not connecting the abstract with the concrete issues? I'm asking for your opinion not trying to start a debate with you. You understand philosophy better than most so you might be able see things that I havn't, thats why I ask. Thanks for input.

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mvdm said:


> Semper Fidelis said:
> 
> 
> > The concern I have with modern attempts to recast systematics according to covenant theology is that I see folks claiming a "Biblical" approach for themselves while claiming that the older forms are philosophical.
> ...



Good point but I do not think that Oliphint is on board with him and he advocates the same thing.

---------- Post added at 11:28 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:05 AM ----------




Semper Fidelis said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> > Rich, I'm not denying what you write. I'm asking whether faith can seek understanding. I'm asking whether, if after coming up with a doctrinal statement I still have questions, I'm just supposed to play the mystery card and go no further, or whether you would say it's appropriate to continue to probe the doctrine further.
> ...



Philip does raise a good point about mystery though. I agree with you and I liked your paper to. But there is in philosophy certian logical fallacies that can be raised against simply throwing the "mystery card" up, which would seem to indicate a misues of logic and reason. I have read Calvin, Berkhof, Bavinck, and Turretin all argue for exactly the same thing that you and Matthew are arguing for but I know of nowhere where someone lays out a theology and/or philosophy of mystery to distinguish between legitimate mystery and illigitimate mystery. Do either one of you (or anyone else) know of a resource to help resolve that problem?


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## Semper Fidelis (Sep 28, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> Do either one of you (or anyone else) know of a resource to help resolve that problem?


I do not. The example for me that immediately comes to mind is the hypostatic union in the Person of Christ. Special revelation that deals with the full humanity and full deity of Christ is not great and this limits how far we can penetrate into the truth. The definition of Chalcedon, for instance, defines the relationship by negation as much as it defines it by positive statements and there's not much more that can be attained through logical inference. In this example, are we willing to submit to the amount of revelation God has given us and infer by GNC what He has given us or are we dissatisifed by what we can infer from the Scriptures and decide to strike out on our own through speculation and using our reason in an autonomous fashion? I believe that, where revelation stops, the pious puts his hand over his mouth. 

That is not to say that it is perhaps possible to infer more from special revelation than has been inferred to date but I do believe that even when we attain to the perfect apprehension of the truth on this subject in glory we will still be left with some of the same creaturely limitations. That's the difference between piety and rationalism, which says that the limits of revealed truth are contradictions because the autonomous human mind cannot reconcile what has been revealed. Whenever I listen to JW, Islamic, or other cults attack the idea I see them failing to bow the knew to true theology and it's futile to argue them into the point by philosophy which depends on human authority for its validity. Our starting point is true theology that begins with God's revelation and we reason from there. Their starting point is false theology, which begins in idolatry.


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## Philip (Sep 28, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> is looking at this avoids specific problems that result from looking at it in abstract terms.



Such as? We haven't solved anything except (possibly) an existential concern. The tension is still there---we haven't explained it away.



jwright82 said:


> Do you see any problems with this method not connecting the abstract with the concrete issues?



Honestly, the only places where I've seen this tension have been in addressing problems that weren't really terribly interesting anyway (the problem of wholes and parts, for instance: interesting logically, sure, but no practical use, so why bother?). The problem of responsibility and sovereignty was already pretty practical and concrete to begin with.



Semper Fidelis said:


> In this example, are we willing to submit to the amount of revelation God has given us and infer by GNC what He has given us or are we dissatisifed by what we can infer from the Scriptures and decide to strike out on our own through speculation and using our reason in an autonomous fashion?



I suppose you and I have been (possibly) talking at cross-purposes here, if this is all that you mean. I'm merely speaking of probing what has been revealed further.


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## jwright82 (Sep 30, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Such as? We haven't solved anything except (possibly) an existential concern. The tension is still there---we haven't explained it away.



Well when we look at this issue from purely abstract ways we have a problem with connecting it to concrete reality. Is this issue best resolved by libertarianism or determinism? Or some mixture of the two? And how do these relate to our concrete experience? 

The manifold problems associated with these viewpoints are well known to both of us in the history of philosophy. So does viewing things covenantly escape these problems? I would say yes, if we must relate the abstract and the concrete to make sense of things than philosophy has failed. But it is in within the covenant of creation that we are allowed creaturly freedom under and in submission to creatorly freedom. God has bounded himself covenantly to us, he can flood the world anytime he likes but he has pledged not to do so in covenant to us. We are creatures who excersize historical levels of freedoin a covenant with God. So my freedom than is realized in my own history, concretely speaking. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Honestly, the only places where I've seen this tension have been in addressing problems that weren't really terribly interesting anyway (the problem of wholes and parts, for instance: interesting logically, sure, but no practical use, so why bother?). The problem of responsibility and sovereignty was already pretty practical and concrete to begin with.



If it was so common sense than we would have never raised the problem to begin with. Wittgenstien's problem was demonstrated twice in his life with his two periods of philosophy. Twice he sought to resolve the problems of philosophy by showing them to be in essence foolish and twice he was shown to be wrong by philosophers using his "end of philosophy" philosophy to pursue philosophical problems. If anyone starts out on the logical analysis, unless logic is stupid in making sense of reality (which would imply reason as well), they will end up exactly where philosophers are today.


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## Philip (Sep 30, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> Well when we look at this issue from purely abstract ways we have a problem with connecting it to concrete reality. Is this issue best resolved by libertarianism or determinism? Or some mixture of the two? And how do these relate to our concrete experience?



They relate in very obvious ways---indeed, so obvious as to make libertarianism and hard determinism clearly absurd. I just don't see this tension, frankly, so your solution seems extraneous.



jwright82 said:


> The manifold problems associated with these viewpoints are well known to both of us in the history of philosophy.



The problems come when you take one and not the other of the horns of the dilemma. That's all there is to it.



jwright82 said:


> If it was so common sense than we would have never raised the problem to begin with.



On the contrary: we have two common-sense intuitions that seem as if they should conflict. The problem arises _from_ common sense, not from a lack of it. The parcticality of the problem is plain.


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## jwright82 (Sep 30, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> They relate in very obvious ways---indeed, so obvious as to make libertarianism and hard determinism clearly absurd. I just don't see this tension, frankly, so your solution seems extraneous.



Than common sensecly resolve them rather than just assert the whole question ridiculous upfront (without ever providing any answer).




P. F. Pugh said:


> The problems come when you take one and not the other of the horns of the dilemma. That's all there is to it.



Than abstractly show a middle ground that relates it to the concrete reality?




P. F. Pugh said:


> On the contrary: we have two common-sense intuitions that seem as if they should conflict. The problem arises from common sense, not from a lack of it. The parcticality of the problem is plain.



Than resolve them, if you can do better than me than do so?


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## Philip (Sep 30, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> Than common sensecly resolve them rather than just assert the whole question ridiculous upfront (without ever providing any answer).



I'm not sure that this is possible. As I said before: Covenant theology leaves the answer just as ambiguous as anything else does.



jwright82 said:


> Than abstractly show a middle ground that relates it to the concrete reality



As I said, both horns of the dilemma are rooted in reality: one has to hold them together. Am I entirely sure how to resolve it? No.

I think you are asking Covenant theology to do something it was never meant to do.


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## jwright82 (Oct 1, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm not sure that this is possible. As I said before: Covenant theology leaves the answer just as ambiguous as anything else does.



Well completly resolvable, no. But able to avoid the problems of complete abstraction, yes. The line of mystery for me is God's revelation, does he reveal to us exactly how they relate? No, but the idea of covenant alows us to relate them historicaly. We have creaturly freedom that is limited. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> As I said, both horns of the dilemma are rooted in reality: one has to hold them together.



How? Where are they rooted?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Am I entirely sure how to resolve it? No.
> 
> I think you are asking Covenant theology to do something it was never meant to do.



Well the sort faith reason dualism you are suggesting is more trouble than its worth. Theology is primarary to our understanding of the rest of reality. If our very existance is covenantal than that is primarary. Theology does matter to the rest of the sciences.


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## Philip (Oct 1, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> No, but the idea of covenant alows us to relate them historicaly. We have creaturly freedom that is limited.



Ok, fine---not a terribly interesting solution, though: I already knew this.



jwright82 said:


> How?



Implications: determinism or freedom, if taken alone, will lead to obviously absurd conclusions. Granted, this hasn't kept philosophers from doing this.



jwright82 said:


> Well the sort faith reason dualism you are suggesting is more trouble than its worth.



I'm not suggesting faith-reason dualism, simply pointing out that the problem of sovereignty and responsibility is beside the point of covenant theology. Indeed, I would argue that covenant theology makes the relationship between the two much more complex.


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## jwright82 (Oct 3, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Ok, fine---not a terribly interesting solution, though: I already knew this.



But ho wdo you relate them historically without the covenant?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Implications: determinism or freedom, if taken alone, will lead to obviously absurd conclusions. Granted, this hasn't kept philosophers from doing this.



Exactally, they have used abstract notions to describe the relationship and arived at nothing as a result. Lets try a more theological starting point and see where we go.




P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm not suggesting faith-reason dualism, simply pointing out that the problem of sovereignty and responsibility is beside the point of covenant theology. Indeed, I would argue that covenant theology makes the relationship between the two much more complex.



It makes it more complex only if theology isn't true. It is only within a faith/reason distinction that such a failing argument can be made. The reason I say that is this. In the faith/reason distinction there are things true of faith that are unrelated to things true of reason. So the fact that every single human is in some covenant relationship with God is absolutly irrelivant to everyday human experience because theology by its nature can have no bearing on the world of reason, or the distinction goes away. But Van Til correctly pointed out that this is false because it makes theology pointless to everyday life because it is of the faith part. But if theology is true than it affects every aspect of reality. 

I mean why would the matters of faith not matter to everyday life? Well if they do than you are in hot water with your distinction. What we believe in religion orients our entire theoretical lives.


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## Brandon1 (Oct 3, 2011)

Well I understand that this thread has moved on, but there are very important questions about the philosophical nature of covenant theology. Every textbook I've read on the Reformation indicates that the philosophical school of Nominalism (most notably Scotus) was essential to the development of the Reformation. I think if we want to do philosophical inquiry into the philosophical moorings of covenant theology, we should explore its relation to nominalism.


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## Philip (Oct 3, 2011)

Brandon1 said:


> Every textbook I've read on the Reformation indicates that the philosophical school of Nominalism (most notably Scotus) was essential to the development of the Reformation.



I think you're thinking William of Ockham (or Occam). Johannes Duns Scotus is known for realism about universals (not a terribly interesting problem, in any case).



jwright82 said:


> But ho wdo you relate them historically without the covenant?



Why do we need to?



jwright82 said:


> Exactally, they have used abstract notions to describe the relationship and arived at nothing as a result. Lets try a more theological starting point and see where we go.



But we can do this with any concrete scenario, not just with covenant. We can talk about freedom and determinism in terms of what I had for breakfast this morning. You can't get much more concrete than my breakfast.



jwright82 said:


> It makes it more complex only if theology isn't true. It is only within a faith/reason distinction that such a failing argument can be made.



Not at all: if theology is true, then it means that there are more factors to be considered, more considerations that we will have. It makes the situation much more complex.



jwright82 said:


> But if theology is true than it affects every aspect of reality.



Yes indeed: it makes it so much more complex and uncomfortable. This is exactly the point that I am making: with theology in the picture, we have much more ambiguity to live with.


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## jwright82 (Oct 7, 2011)

Brandon1 said:


> Well I understand that this thread has moved on, but there are very important questions about the philosophical nature of covenant theology. Every textbook I've read on the Reformation indicates that the philosophical school of Nominalism (most notably Scotus) was essential to the development of the Reformation. I think if we want to do philosophical inquiry into the philosophical moorings of covenant theology, we should explore its relation to nominalism.



I know that nominalism influenced Luther but I don't know about Calvin? But if Covenant Theology is essentially biblical than how would nominalism relate to that?

---------- Post added at 09:32 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:18 AM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> Why do we need to?



Well we certainly cannot ultimatly relate them. But a bare historical understanding of human freedom and divine soviergnty tells us nothing because there is no way to look into history alone and settle the issue. But the idea of the covenant makes a personal relation between the two parties involved rather than a merely abstract relation bewteen two entities. Hyper-Calvinism and Arminianism are both wrong because they use abstract ideas to make sense out of this relation.




P. F. Pugh said:


> But we can do this with any concrete scenario, not just with covenant. We can talk about freedom and determinism in terms of what I had for breakfast this morning. You can't get much more concrete than my breakfast.



How in the world would that even make sense out of it? The divine isn't even present except in an abstract way.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Not at all: if theology is true, then it means that there are more factors to be considered, more considerations that we will have. It makes the situation much more complex.



Theology is not just some section of reality, like God has his little section in the church and that is it. Theology is primary because we live in creation, it can be no other way. This world is not nuetral but creation. So our theology primes the rest of our search for knowledge and understanding the world. If you regect this than you regect the fact that creation is creation, it seems to me.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Yes indeed: it makes it so much more complex and uncomfortable. This is exactly the point that I am making: with theology in the picture, we have much more ambiguity to live with.



Certianly but only those areas that God has not revealed himself to us but only autonomous reason would take offence to that. But you cannot just set theology aside and hope to do a better job at answering the questions of creation.


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## Philip (Oct 7, 2011)

jwright82 said:


> But the idea of the covenant makes a personal relation between the two parties involved rather than a merely abstract relation bewteen two entities.



Implications? This isn't a terribly interesting observation, I'm afraid.



jwright82 said:


> How in the world would that even make sense out of it?



Very simply: we can talk about the processes through which I came to eat grits rather than eggs: we can talk about limitation of options, we can talk about all of my tastes and rational beliefs that went into the decision.



jwright82 said:


> Theology is primary because we live in creation, it can be no other way. This world is not nuetral but creation. So our theology primes the rest of our search for knowledge and understanding the world. If you regect this than you regect the fact that creation is creation, it seems to me.



I'm not rejecting this: I'm affirming it. I'm saying that because I have to acknowledge creation as creation, it means that stuff's more complicated.



jwright82 said:


> Certianly but only those areas that God has not revealed himself to us but only autonomous reason would take offence to that. But you cannot just set theology aside and hope to do a better job at answering the questions of creation.



But this is the point I'm making: the God who is revealed is more mysterious than one who is concealed. The more I know of God the less I understand, and the more I understand, the less I realize I know. As I said, revelation makes things more complicated, not less. I'm not advocating autonomy at all.


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## jwright82 (Oct 11, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Implications? This isn't a terribly interesting observation, I'm afraid.



It has the implication of saying that we avoid the problem of trying to get to a personal understanding from an impersonal abstract source. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Very simply: we can talk about the processes through which I came to eat grits rather than eggs: we can talk about limitation of options, we can talk about all of my tastes and rational beliefs that went into the decision.



Sure but you will just keep begging the bigger questions of the ultimate relation of these two ideas.




P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm not rejecting this: I'm affirming it. I'm saying that because I have to acknowledge creation as creation, it means that stuff's more complicated.



Fair enough but it is problimatic in a different way. There is mystery there but it is a good mystery. The problems for the non theological understanding is that it is false and not therefore a good mystery. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> But this is the point I'm making: the God who is revealed is more mysterious than one who is concealed. The more I know of God the less I understand, and the more I understand, the less I realize I know. As I said, revelation makes things more complicated, not less. I'm not advocating autonomy at all.



Fair enough, I agree with you here.


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