# Clarification on Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy Thread



## Afterthought (Jun 27, 2012)

So....anyone want to help me understand Dabney in his _The Sensualistic Philosophy_?

Dabney writes out an argument of a relativist: "The essential condition of all consciousness is the distinction of the 'Me' and the 'Not-Me.' Hence, all cognition is a relation: hence the conclusion of the relativity of all knowledge. Now, there is a sense in which this is, of course, true.... But the vicious sense put upon this almost truism is another thing, namely: that our knowledge is all _only a relation_; in such a sense that the modification of the nearer term, or pole thereof, namely, of the modes of consciousness of the 'Me,' would change the whole of the cognitions."(p.157 from NaphtaliPress edition) "Has my mind a true, spiritual, _seeing power_? or is it only a term, a pole, of a relation between the 'Me' and the 'Not-Me?'" (p.159-160)

What does he mean by "spiritual, seeing power"? And more importantly, what does he mean by "pole," and how does his argument flow, using that word (in case knowing what the word means isn't enough to understand his argument)?


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## VictorBravo (Jun 28, 2012)

Dabney is arguing for an innate, God-given, ability to discern and understand what is put before the created human.

If the fundamental essence of consciousness is the distinction of "me" and "not-me", where can meaning come from? Or maybe better said, "how can I know that the distinction of 'me' and 'not me' has any significance?"

And how can we know anything about "me" without innately being given that knowledge? If our only reference point is the "not-me" than "me" can be anything except the "not-me". If that is the case, our cognitions are dependent on independent variables and are basically meaningless.


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## VictorBravo (Jun 28, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> what does he mean by "pole,"



Sorry, I didn't address pole. 



> in such a sense that the modification of the nearer term, or pole thereof, namely, of the modes of consciousness of the 'Me,' would change the whole of the cognitions."



The subject is how "me" can have consciousness under this scenario. The pole refers to whatever it might be (in the minds of the relativist) that this consciousness centers upon, or revolves around. It would be like speaking of the core concept. Whatever that is, because it is not grounded in anything else, it can be modified. If so, all of cognition is modified.


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## jwright82 (Jun 28, 2012)

I have not read this but it seems to be some sort of discussion of the old subject-object distinction and its skeptical doubters. What is the relationship between the subject, the “knower”, and the object, the “known”? That is what separates us from the “thing-in-itself”? Sensationalistic thinkers tended to over emphasize the senses as the foundation for all of our subject-object relationship. This lead to skepticism because it was asked “how then can we trust our senses?” 

In contemporary philosophical thought there is a nice tool to defeat such skeptical questions in the form of a paradigm case argument. I will give you an example. How do you know that you are not a brain in a vat? That is how do you know that what you are experiencing is not some sort of matrix type experience that you only think is real? How does one answer this? The traditional philosophers sought various failed attempts to provide a foundation so secure for knowledge that it could not be doubted but this proved false each and every time. 

So what do we do in the face of such questions? Well we ask the skeptic to explain to us what the difference in our experience would be if we were a brain in a vat as opposed to being a bodily human being? The skeptic can provide no differences of experiences for us to compare our own experiences to see if we are truly a brain in a vat, because they have never experienced it either. So since we don’t even know what being a brain in a vat would be like as opposed to being real we have no reason to doubt our common-sense assumption that we are not a brain in vat. Until the skeptic can provide examples of what being a brain in vat is like for me to compare my own experiences to than I am under no obligation to answer their extreme skeptical questions “how do you know…?”


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## Afterthought (Jun 29, 2012)

Thank you both! I may have to take some time to think these things through, but for now, to further clarify to see if I understand (though I don't want the thread to get too sidetracked from Dabney, however hard it may be to do so given how interesting these topics are!)....



VictorBravo said:


> And how can we know anything about "me" without innately being given that knowledge? If our only reference point is the "not-me" than "me" can be anything except the "not-me". If that is the case, our cognitions are dependent on independent variables and are basically meaningless.


Perhaps someone could respond, "The 'me' is presupposed in the 'not-me;' whatever is not 'not-me' is the 'me;' because the 'not-me' is everything that is not 'me,' whatever is not 'not-me' must be 'me' and also 'me' uniquely (to borrow a mathematics term) since the 'not-me' does not change."? Also, if the cognitions are dependent on independent variables, how does that make them basically meaningless? Is it simply because they shift around from person to person?



VictorBravo said:


> The subject is how "me" can have consciousness under this scenario.


"Consciousness" means awareness of something or oneself, correct? So the question then is how 'me' can have awareness under the relativist scheme in which knowledge is only a relation. So the relation means there must be something besides the 'me' to relate too, hence the need for a "pole." But the "pole" in the relativist scheme is arbitrary, and so can be changed. Correct so far? But could not the 'me' center around itself and in that way not be arbitrary, or is that not a great enough distinction for knowledge? I'm not entirely sure how changing the centering point changes the cognitions, though it seems rather obvious on the surface.




jwright82 said:


> How do you know that you are not a brain in a vat?


Excellent response! However, what if it was objected that though this common sense assumption was necessary in practice, being a practical necessity it does not need to be the way/show us how reality is like? Similarly, how about the objection that evolution has limited our mental faculties (and so also our common sense assumptions) so that what we see need not be the way reality is actually like, but merely what we need to see and understand to have evolutionary advantages? (Although, I wonder if Dabney addresses this...it seems like it could be a fairly standard "Sensualist" objection)


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## jwright82 (Jul 3, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> Excellent response! However, what if it was objected that though this common sense assumption was necessary in practice, being a practical necessity it does not need to be the way/show us how reality is like? Similarly, how about the objection that evolution has limited our mental faculties (and so also our common sense assumptions) so that what we see need not be the way reality is actually like, but merely what we need to see and understand to have evolutionary advantages? (Although, I wonder if Dabney addresses this...it seems like it could be a fairly standard "Sensualist" objection)



That is the point of the Paradigm Case argument. I don’t even know what “not-really getting reality” would be like. I get being wrong about things but I don’t know what “not really getting reality is”. That is beyond a mere common-sense approach that would say “that is silly to doubt”. It is similar but it asks the skeptic to provide examples of what the experience “not really getting reality” would be like so that I might be able to compare my own with that.


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## Afterthought (Jul 20, 2012)

jwright82 said:


> That is the point of the Paradigm Case argument. I don’t even know what “not-really getting reality” would be like. I get being wrong about things but I don’t know what “not really getting reality is”. That is beyond a mere common-sense approach that would say “that is silly to doubt”. It is similar but it asks the skeptic to provide examples of what the experience “not really getting reality” would be like so that I might be able to compare my own with that.


I'm not sure that's all the common-sense approach would say. But anyway, it would seem that the person could then claim that what "not really getting reality" is like is exactly how it is? Because of evolution, our cognitive equipment is set for survival rather than getting actualy reality? Though, it seems to me that a sufficient response might actually be found over in this thread (correct me if I'm wrong): posts 16, 25, 27, and 30; basically, it seems that if one says that evolution keeps us from getting at reality, then there is no way to show evolution is actually reality.






VictorBravo said:


> The subject is how "me" can have consciousness under this scenario.





Afterthought said:


> "Consciousness" means awareness of something or oneself, correct? So the question then is how 'me' can have awareness under the relativist scheme in which knowledge is only a relation. So the relation means there must be something besides the 'me' to relate too, hence the need for a "pole." But the "pole" in the relativist scheme is arbitrary, and so can be changed. Correct so far? But could not the 'me' center around itself and in that way not be arbitrary, or is that not a great enough distinction for knowledge? I'm not entirely sure how changing the centering point changes the cognitions, though it seems rather obvious on the surface.


As I was reading that part of Dabney's work again, it appears he answers my above question: namely, if all we have is 'me', then there can be no judgments, since it cannot judge itself. So it would seem that is what would happen if we centered around the 'me.'


Incidentally, I had another clarification question or two to ask, which I'll post up as I get time (since it seems these ones are just about wrapped up).


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## Afterthought (Aug 13, 2012)

Just thinking some more: Couldn't the "me" gain knowledge of itself by hypothesizing and testing that against the external world? Perhaps that is confusing the method of discovery of innate knowledge with innate knowledge, but if so, how is the innate knowledge innate (i.e., known intuitively), since one is basing belief in the innate knowledge from the witness of the external world? (e.g., if one based self-consciousness on testimony from the external world, how can it be a primitive truth?)

And further, how does one know the difference between intuitive knowledge and inferred knowledge? By what means does one distinguish between them?

And finally, if the "me" cannot judge itself, doesn't that mean all knowledge of the "me" (the internal self) must be gathered from external facts?


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## jwright82 (Aug 14, 2012)

Afterthought said:


> I'm not sure that's all the common-sense approach would say. But anyway, it would seem that the person could then claim that what "not really getting reality" is like is exactly how it is? Because of evolution, our cognitive equipment is set for survival rather than getting actualy reality? Though, it seems to me that a sufficient response might actually be found over in this thread (correct me if I'm wrong): posts 16, 25, 27, and 30; basically, it seems that if one says that evolution keeps us from getting at reality, then there is no way to show evolution is actually reality.



You’re right that is a serious problem for evolution or even Dewey’s philosophy.


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## Afterthought (Aug 14, 2012)

Oh! Perhaps I don't understand the paradigm case sort of argument well enough yet, but couldn't someone say they have experienced non-reality while dreaming, and so while a wake, it could be that it is like a dream, in which one cannot tell that it is reality or non-reality unless one woke up?


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## Afterthought (Sep 13, 2012)

On p.177-178, Dabney addresses the issue of knowing we are created in God's image. He states, "If we can know nothing of Him, then we can know nothing of anything beneath Him, because we cannot know the validity of a single law of thought according to which cognition seems to take place, for the obvious reason that we cannot know whence those laws are." The problem is, that I'm not sure why such is an "obvious reason." Any help? It also seems that throughout this particular discussion, Dabney assumes that truth originally comes from God, rather than proving such. Perhaps I am missing something that (a) Dabney doesn't merely assume it or (b) why he is okay assuming such in this particular discussion?

Thank you.


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## Contra_Mundum (Sep 14, 2012)

If any man has no ultimate reference point outside himself, then there is no such thing as knowledge _in fact._ There is only conjecture. For how could any one man's mind know the truth of anything, since that man knows (!) this above all: that he does not know but the least part of everything there is to know. In such a world, there are no established truths.

Modern man has made one final attempt at this certainty, by predicating invariable, inviolable laws of physics (thus making materialism ultimate). But the development of quantum physics and its "rules" that contravene materialist principles, has given us "the uncertainty principle." Einstein gave us "relativity," but he still fought to the end for a unified field theory that would unite the field of physics once more. He (an atheist) famously said, "I cannot believe god plays dice with the universe."

But materialism is a failure, and moreso every day. Information science proves daily that what resides in the immaterial realm does not arise from the material, but gives rise to the material. This does not mean that men must necessarily believe in God, but it does mean that it is obviously rational to believe in him. It is most rational to believe that Ultimate rationality gives rise to the complexity of rational, organized thought. Materialism's experiment--wherein it is hypothesized that randomness and time conspired (without meaning to) to produce a rationally perceptible world--has produced empirical evidence sufficient to disprove the hypothesis to any but the most ardent, passionate, blind believer.

Dabney, a philosophically sophisticated (and religious) man, could see this was the case, even while the experiment had only just hit its stride. Today, it is faltering. Materialism cannot explain mathematics; it never could, but the idea of physical principles ruling the cosmos gave some men the illusion that raw existence (matter and motion) could give rise to explanations (in equations). Materialism, for all its eager followers, never had a good philosophical basis. And most materialists were (and are) dismissive of philosophy, as "impractical." As long as materialism seemed to produce an endless stream of "discoveries," such were claimed as the incontrovertible evidences of the validity of materialism.

But on closer inspection, materialism's utter inadequacy appears. Not least for which: at bottom, nothing in the universe appears to be "simple." Complexity doesn't just spiral outward; it spirals inward as well. Meanwhile, the lone mind cannot predicate meaning for other minds (when all such minds are on the same plane). Other minds do not automatically grant "lawgiver" status to the first claimant. Why isn't there some universal, physical principle that makes all minds agree with the mind that has the right idea? Or maybe there is no "right" idea, or at least no mind big enough to contain it? Materialism reduces to arrogant certainty, or radical skepticism.

Dabney says its "obvious" we can't know the validity of a so-called law, if we don't know the origin or source of it. If it is sourced in the mind of a man, then it is not universal, and has no authority over another man. Not even when the concept is shared, or even adopted universally. It's only strength is in an individual conviction; the rest is coercive power. If it is sourced in material (and accessed by the senses--hence, the _sensualistic _philosophy), then unless we access all material everywhere (have omniscience ourselves), we cannot validate the law. We may assume it, and enjoy success for a while; but in the end skepticism asks the unanswerable "why" question, and enjoyment gives way to fear.

But we do assume law-truths all the time, in diverse fields. We could not get along without such things. But what is our explanation? Why should we just enjoy them, because they "work" for a time? Why should we not fear the "corrective" of a truly random universe? Why do our rational thoughts continually map to an ordered universe? Shouldn't we be batting .500 at best? This is the kind of thinking that draws the rational mind back to Ultimate rationality. Because it would appear to be the only game in town.


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## Afterthought (Sep 14, 2012)

Thank you! I think you hit the nail on the head there. That certainly helps clear things up!


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