# Poll...Who utilizes what apologetic method?



## nicnap

Sorry...I don't know how to make a poll...so, just tell us what you are.

1. Evidentialist/Classical
2. Clarkian Presuppositionalist
3. Van Tillian Presuppositionalist
4. Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology
5. Other...if other, please explain.

So, to what do you hold? 

I, personally, was trained Clarkian, but have since, moved to the Van Tillian camp.


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## JonathanHunt

I preach the gospel.


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## nicnap

JonathanHunt said:


> I preach the gospel.



Ahh...I see, so you are Van Tillian too, eh?


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## Zenas

Not learned enough to know the differentiations in presuppositionalism, but I use it.


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## Backwoods Presbyterian

Van Tillian Presuppositionalist


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## JonathanHunt

nicnap said:


> JonathanHunt said:
> 
> 
> 
> I preach the gospel.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ahh...I see, so you are Van Tillian too, eh?
Click to expand...


If you say so! Some time ago I took time to work out what all these schools of thought taught and believed. Then I thought 'I still need to preach the gospel!' In fact, rather like the day I discovered that not all the world was amillennial, and I thought my brain might explode (when I was about 15) with all the jargon, schools of thought, and fine differences, so apologetical methods have similarly fried my mind 

Bottom line is, not one person in my church would understand any of what you wrote in the OP, and I have a rebellious streak a mile wide when it comes to making academica out of life-giving theology. I'm not anti-intellectual, just sympathetic. If we could have a show of hands, I am convinced that a lot of readers of the PB don't understand what you are asking.

Perhaps a one-line explanation next to each view? Okay, a paragraph. Then someone will disagree with your definition. And on we go.



-----Added 4/3/2009 at 07:33:59 EST-----

And to be precise, in theory I am #3 but in practice I waver between #1 and #3


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## Jimmy the Greek

nicnap said:


> I, personally, was trained Clarkian, but have since, moved to the Van Tillian camp.



In my early years I was evidentialist/classical. Now in my later years, I tend to be more presuppositional. 

Please give a little insight into your distinction between Clarkian and VanTillian presupp.


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## SolaScriptura

Whatever fits the particular situation and person to whom I'm talking in that context.


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## Semper Fidelis

I choose Other. I would choose Van Tillian except that there are some who would insist that I'd have to stick to TAG or the impossibility of the contrary. I don't claim to be a sophisticated philsopher but tend toward common sense realism. The way I see it, God's existence doesn't have to be proven. It is public knowledge, like gravity and air. I don't have a problem with evidences but they have to be grounded in a commitment that God exists and things are therefore logical and predictable.


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## jwithnell

Funny how many here reflected my thinking. If I had to produce an academic paper, it would likely reflect Mr. Van Til. When I'm talking with someone, I'll use whatever seems to best meet the need, although I do find all-out evidentialism to be rather distasteful; and I am convinced that no philosophy outside of Christianity can be internally self-consistent (although my husband claims he can do so mathematically; this was the basis for our first big argument together).


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## MMasztal

I subscribe to and teach presuppositional apologetics (PSA), but in practice can be eclectic (but mostly presup) depending on whom I am speaking to. In any case however, I do not make any attempt to find "common ground" with the unbeliever.

One reason I like PSA is that it gives the believer a method on which to defend the faith rather than a list of facts as the evidentialist would use. In my opinion, the evidentialist position tends to put God in the defendant chair, but as Rich rightly noted, God's existence doesn't have to be proven.


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## nicnap

Gomarus said:


> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> I, personally, was trained Clarkian, but have since, moved to the Van Tillian camp.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In my early years I was evidentialist/classical. Now in my later years, I tend to be more presuppositional.
> 
> Please give a little insight into your distinction between Clarkian and VanTillian presupp.
Click to expand...


The distinction "simplified" is (from my understanding): Van Til sees a Creator/creature distinction, God's knowledge full-orbed as the Creator, our knowledge is derivative. Clark sees logic as being outside of God, and God is bound to it, instead of God giving logic meaning.

-----Added 4/3/2009 at 09:08:07 EST-----



JonathanHunt said:


> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> JonathanHunt said:
> 
> 
> 
> I preach the gospel.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ahh...I see, so you are Van Tillian too, eh?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> If you say so! Some time ago I took time to work out what all these schools of thought taught and believed. Then I thought 'I still need to preach the gospel!' In fact, rather like the day I discovered that not all the world was amillennial, and I thought my brain might explode (when I was about 15) with all the jargon, schools of thought, and fine differences, so apologetical methods have similarly fried my mind
> 
> Bottom line is, not one person in my church would understand any of what you wrote in the OP, and I have a rebellious streak a mile wide when it comes to making academica out of life-giving theology. I'm not anti-intellectual, just sympathetic. If we could have a show of hands, I am convinced that a lot of readers of the PB don't understand what you are asking.
> 
> Perhaps a one-line explanation next to each view? Okay, a paragraph. Then someone will disagree with your definition. And on we go.
> 
> 
> 
> -----Added 4/3/2009 at 07:33:59 EST-----
> 
> And to be precise, in theory I am #3 but in practice I waver between #1 and #3
Click to expand...


I know that many of the members in our pews would not know the terms, that is fine, but as ministers we ought to in some way be relaying the truths of our apologetic, so that they may defend their faith. We don't have to say, "Well, this is the transcendental argument for God...or (on the classical side) this is the basic reliability of sense perception," but we do need to relay to them the necessity of taking *every* thought captive to the obedience of Christ, and we need to work through the ramifications of that with them. It is not academia, but is the whole counsel of God (not the terms, but the concepts).


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## louis_jp

What is "Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology"? You know, in 3 sentences or less.


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## nicnap

louis_jp said:


> What is "Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology"? You know, in 3 sentences or less.



Heading to class...will try to sum it up (if someone else doesn't) when I get off this afternoon/evening.


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## Skyler

I voted "other" because I mix classical with presuppositional, to at least some extent. I personally am better able to defend the cosmological argument--specifically William Lane Craig's Kalam variant--than the argument from logic, but I feel they can be used interchangeably.


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## Beth Ellen Nagle

I am Rational Presuppositionalist. See attached. 

http://westminsterfellowship.com/


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## Craig

nicnap said:


> Gomarus said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> I, personally, was trained Clarkian, but have since, moved to the Van Tillian camp.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In my early years I was evidentialist/classical. Now in my later years, I tend to be more presuppositional.
> 
> Please give a little insight into your distinction between Clarkian and VanTillian presupp.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> The distinction "simplified" is (from my understanding): Van Til sees a Creator/creature distinction, God's knowledge full-orbed as the Creator, our knowledge is derivative. Clark sees logic as being outside of God, and God is bound to it, instead of God giving logic meaning.
Click to expand...


Someone correct me if I'm wrong...but Clark said logic is identical to God...that our knowledge, if it is to be correct, is not analogical to God's, but identical.

Clark rejected the inductive method and believed all knowledge was revealed in God's word and logically deduced from it.

As for myself...I find that I tend to be Van Tillian...though I'm open to tweaking here and there. Like others have noted, I will use a hybrid approach with Joe on the street...otherwise, it seems like you end up arguing for a method rather than the Christian God.


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## Whitefield

nicnap said:


> Clark sees logic as being outside of God, and God is bound to it, instead of God giving logic meaning.



I question this statement based on this:

Clark, _Logic_ p. 114 -


> Similarly in all other varieties of truth, God must be accounted sovereign. It is his decree that makes one proposition true and another false. Whether the proposition be physical, psychological, moral or theological, it is God who made it that way. *A proposition is true because God thinks it so.*



Ibid. p. 116 -


> Not only do the followers of Bernard entertain suspicions about logic, but even more systematic theologians are wary of any proposal that would make and abstract principle superior to God. The present argument, in consonance with both Philo and Charnock, does not do so. *The law of contradiction is not to be taken as an axiom prior to or independent of God. The law is God thinking.*



Ibid. p. 117 -


> *Hence logic is to be considered as the activity of God's willing.*


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## steven-nemes

louis_jp said:


> What is "Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology"? You know, in 3 sentences or less.



Essentially, the idea that belief in God is perfectly rational even if accepted on no evidence whatsoever, and in fact _need not be_ accepted on evidence. Plantinga also proposes that belief in God can be warranted to the point of being called knowledge if it is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties in the proper circumstances for which those faculties were designed.

I would consider myself Reformed Epistemologist.


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## nicnap

Craig said:


> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Gomarus said:
> 
> 
> 
> In my early years I was evidentialist/classical. Now in my later years, I tend to be more presuppositional.
> 
> Please give a little insight into your distinction between Clarkian and VanTillian presupp.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The distinction "simplified" is (from my understanding): Van Til sees a Creator/creature distinction, God's knowledge full-orbed as the Creator, our knowledge is derivative. Clark sees logic as being outside of God, and God is bound to it, instead of God giving logic meaning.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Someone correct me if I'm wrong...but Clark said logic is identical to God...that our knowledge, if it is to be correct, is not analogical to God's, but identical.
> 
> Clark rejected the inductive method and believed all knowledge was revealed in God's word and logically deduced from it.
> 
> As for myself...I find that I tend to be Van Tillian...though I'm open to tweaking here and there. Like others have noted, I will use a hybrid approach with Joe on the street...otherwise, it seems like you end up arguing for a method rather than the Christian God.
Click to expand...


Clark would say that we know a rose as God knows a rose...Van Til would say he knows it as Creator (more fully) and we know it in a derivative fashion.

-----Added 4/3/2009 at 10:38:20 EST-----



Whitefield said:


> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> Clark sees logic as being outside of God, and God is bound to it, instead of God giving logic meaning.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I question this statement based on this:
> 
> Clark, _Logic_ p. 114 -
> 
> 
> 
> Similarly in all other varieties of truth, God must be accounted sovereign. It is his decree that makes one proposition true and another false. Whether the proposition be physical, psychological, moral or theological, it is God who made it that way. *A proposition is true because God thinks it so.*
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Ibid. p. 116 -
> 
> 
> 
> Not only do the followers of Bernard entertain suspicions about logic, but even more systematic theologians are wary of any proposal that would make and abstract principle superior to God. The present argument, in consonance with both Philo and Charnock, does not do so. *The law of contradiction is not to be taken as an axiom prior to or independent of God. The law is God thinking.*
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Ibid. p. 117 -
> 
> 
> 
> *Hence logic is to be considered as the activity of God's willing.*
> 
> Click to expand...
Click to expand...



Thanks for the clarification...apparently, I wasn't thinking as I was typing. I would, however, say the distinction lies in the type of knowlege the creature has.


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## tellville

I use them all except for Clark.


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## Marrow Man

steven-nemes said:


> louis_jp said:
> 
> 
> 
> What is "Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology"? You know, in 3 sentences or less.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Essentially, the idea that belief in God is perfectly rational even if accepted on no evidence whatsoever, and in fact _need not be_ accepted on evidence. Plantinga also proposes that belief in God can be warranted to the point of being called knowledge if it is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties in the proper circumstances for which those faculties were designed.
> 
> I would consider myself Reformed Epistemologist.
Click to expand...


That is an excellent summary. While I would consider myself to a VT presuppositionalist, there is something appealing about Plantinga's RE. However, there is also a question as to how seriously he takes the noetic effect of sin in developing his methodology.

Is it just me, or is there a presuppostional aspect to Plantinga's RE (perhaps more Clarkian)? That is, is there possibly an overlap in saying the belief in God is properly basic and saying that one must presuppose God in order to be rational?


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## Davidius

I use a mixture of classical and presuppositional apologetics, so I chose "other."


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## DMcFadden

My early years were in the classical/evidentialist camps. Classical arguments in philosophy and Josh McDowell/Montgomery style evidence dominated my thinking. In my old age (as I have become more and more Calvinistic), my thinking has become more presuppositionalist in the Rich sense.


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## Zenas

I use the heathen face-rocking method of apologetics.


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## Marrow Man

Zenas said:


> I use the heathen face-rocking method of apologetics.



Please describe this approach. I smell a book in the works.


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## Zenas

You'd have to be a heathen for me to tell you, lest ye be totally destroyed.


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## tellville

Zenas said:


> You'd have to be a heathen for me to tell you, lest ye be totally destroyed.



I feel its power.


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## DonP

I am a, "foolishness of preaching" apologist trusting God to convert whom He will from the gospel. 

I guess that makes me a presuppositionalist, but I think all reformed people have to be presuppositionalist 1st from the point we believe God ordained who will believe and that they will believe. 

Now what legitimate means we use for Him to work through after that given, I see some liberty. 

But formerly being a Mormon and JW basher, I no longer attack their error so much as point them to the gospel including God's sovereignty which they have never heard of before and they are humbled to see something they don't know. Usually more so than Arminains who get mad and say I wouldn't have a god like that. 



Marrow Man said:


> steven-nemes said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> louis_jp said:
> 
> 
> 
> What is "Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology"? You know, in 3 sentences or less.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Essentially, the idea that belief in God is perfectly rational even if accepted on no evidence whatsoever, and in fact _need not be_ accepted on evidence. Plantinga also proposes that belief in God can be warranted to the point of being called knowledge if it is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties in the proper circumstances for which those faculties were designed.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> That is an excellent summary. While I would consider myself to a VT presuppositionalist, there is something appealing about Plantinga's RE. However, there is also a question as to how seriously he takes the noetic effect of sin in developing his methodology.
> 
> Is it just me, or is there a presuppostional aspect to Plantinga's RE (perhaps more Clarkian)? That is, is there possibly an overlap in saying the belief in God is properly basic and saying that one must presuppose God in order to be rational?
Click to expand...


Yes I think Platinga is a presuppositionalist too. He presupposes that belief in God apart from evidence is rational to a fallen human mind. Rom 1 -2 

He may not be Van Tillian but I don't think VT has a monopoly on presupposition. 

So Starting with God's sovereignty we move on, Paul used the circumstance of the Statue and belief in The Unknown God as a place to get a hearing. How Genius. 

I think that would be Platinga, assume they have a belief in God and tell them who the real God is, and no need for evidence but I would not say it is wrong to offer evidence. In fact is it not evidence that we have within us an ability to believe in a God and maybe even a need to worship something or recognize a higher power. This evidences there is a Creator. Rom 1-2 

But I no longer start with arguing archaeology or other Aminian logical tactics to convince and satisfy the intellect of he hearer as I did when I was an Arminain in college. *I* "converted" too many who were still unregenerate with that false gospel of decisionalsim, and gave false assurance to them telling them never to doubt. The most wicked works of my life I repent of more than anything. I was a false prophet. Gal 1:7,8,9 and 
10 For *do I now persuade men*, or God? Or do I seek to please men? For if I still pleased men, I would not be a bondservant of Christ. NKJV

*Preacher of foolishness to dead people unable to respond. *

And apart from the breath of the Spirit in the hearer this is all any of it will be! Amen


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## steven-nemes

Marrow Man said:


> However, there is also a question as to how seriously he takes the noetic effect of sin in developing his methodology.



What do you mean to say?



> Is it just me, or is there a presuppostional aspect to Plantinga's RE (perhaps more Clarkian)? That is, is there possibly an overlap in saying the belief in God is properly basic and saying that one must presuppose God in order to be rational?




When RE argumentation is used perhaps along with his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, you can make quite a good case of theism being rational and atheism irrational, although he would hardly say that the only sense you can make of the universe is "presupposing God", I should think.


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## DonP

steven-nemes said:


> When RE argumentation is used perhaps along with his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, you can make quite a good case of theism being rational and atheism irrational, although he would hardly say that the only sense you can make of the universe is "presupposing God", I should think.



He may not say that but don't you think it is true? I mean there is some apparent rationality in working to eat and provide for your family but ultimately if we do not know God all was irrational since that was what we made for 
Ecclesiastes 12:8 "Vanity of vanities," says the Preacher,
*"All is vanity." *
NKJV


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## PresbyDane

Is there a website somewhere were I can find a disscription of the different types?


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## CharlieJ

nicnap said:


> Clark would say that we know a rose as God knows a rose...Van Til would say he knows it as Creator (more fully) and we know it in a derivative fashion.



I wouldn't put it at all like this. The difference between Van Til and Clark was whether our knowledge at any point intersects with God's. The question was "qualitative" not "quantitative." So, Clark would say that when I look at a rose and think, "This is a rose," there is an identical proposition somewhere in God's mind. Van Til would say that man and God share no identical propositions in common, but that all human knowledge is analagous to God's knowledge, which is simple rather than discursive.


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## Confessor

Besides the issue of the Van Til/Clark debate regarding analogicity and knowledge, I think this is the prime difference between the two schools: a Van Tillian epistemology is one which is _grounded_ on Scripture, while a Clarkian one is nothing more than Scripture. Or, to put it another way, Van Til believed that Scripture was a light that illuminated the rest of the universe to give us knowledge, while Clark believed that Scripture was the entirety of our knowledge.


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## Herald

JonathanHunt said:


> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> JonathanHunt said:
> 
> 
> 
> I preach the gospel.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ahh...I see, so you are Van Tillian too, eh?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> If you say so! Some time ago I took time to work out what all these schools of thought taught and believed. Then I thought 'I still need to preach the gospel!' In fact, rather like the day I discovered that not all the world was amillennial, and I thought my brain might explode (when I was about 15) with all the jargon, schools of thought, and fine differences, so apologetical methods have similarly fried my mind
> 
> Bottom line is, not one person in my church would understand any of what you wrote in the OP, and I have a rebellious streak a mile wide when it comes to making academica out of life-giving theology. I'm not anti-intellectual, just sympathetic. If we could have a show of hands, I am convinced that a lot of readers of the PB don't understand what you are asking.
> 
> Perhaps a one-line explanation next to each view? Okay, a paragraph. Then someone will disagree with your definition. And on we go.
> 
> 
> 
> -----Added 4/3/2009 at 07:33:59 EST-----
> 
> And to be precise, in theory I am #3 but in practice I waver between #1 and #3
Click to expand...


Jonathan, I hear you. If I was compelled to give an answer, I would probably be more comfortable being labeled as a Van Tillian Presuppositionalist. My question is whether we must be forced into an apologetical method named for men. Human understanding, even at its best, is flawed. 



> ...as ministers we ought to in some way be relaying the truths of our apologetic, so that they may defend their faith.



Nicholas, absolutely. No debate here. My contention is that our apologetic does not need to fit lock, stock and barrel into one apologetical method.


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## nicnap

CharlieJ said:


> nicnap said:
> 
> 
> 
> Clark would say that we know a rose as God knows a rose...Van Til would say he knows it as Creator (more fully) and we know it in a derivative fashion.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I wouldn't put it at all like this. The difference between Van Til and Clark was whether our knowledge at any point intersects with God's. The question was "qualitative" not "quantitative." So, Clark would say that when I look at a rose and think, "This is a rose," there is an identical proposition somewhere in God's mind. Van Til would say that man and God share no identical propositions in common, but that all human knowledge is analagous to God's knowledge, which is simple rather than discursive.
Click to expand...


This is what I was getting at in my one sentence summary. If the parenthesized more full seemed to indicate a quantitative difference, it wasn't meant to. I was aiming at analogous when I ued derivative.


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## ReformedChapin

I don't always use one methdology. I don't think people are logical nor consistant so it's not always helpful using one system. It's good to start out with one system but one might have to break away as one progresses and see's what can help an invidiual.


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## Marrow Man

steven-nemes said:


> Marrow Man said:
> 
> 
> 
> However, there is also a question as to how seriously he takes the noetic effect of sin in developing his methodology.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What do you mean to say?
Click to expand...


This has been a criticism leveled against Plantinga -- that he misuses Calvin's notion of the senus divinititas (or, perhaps, takes it too far) and perhaps fails to consider the effect of sin on the human mind in this area.

PM me and I'll supply the sources I'm thinking of here.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

Keep in mind that Plantinga argues against the classical doctrine of divine simplicity, claiming it reduces to the proposition that God is a property, thereby precluding that God is a person.

For more, see his _Does God Have A Nature?_ (Marquette: Marquette University Press; 1980).


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## ChristianTrader

Semper Fidelis said:


> I choose Other. I would choose Van Tillian except that there are some who would insist that I'd have to stick to TAG or the impossibility of the contrary. I don't claim to be a sophisticated philsopher but tend toward common sense realism. The way I see it, God's existence doesn't have to be proven. It is public knowledge, like gravity and air. I don't have a problem with evidences but they have to be grounded in a commitment that God exists and things are therefore logical and predictable.



But don't you have to put forth an argument that your version of God is the actual God and others are not.

CT


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## steven-nemes

Marrow Man said:


> This has been a criticism leveled against Plantinga -- that he misuses Calvin's notion of the senus divinititas (or, perhaps, takes it too far) and perhaps fails to consider the effect of sin on the human mind in this area..



Well, what specifically is the matter with the idea of you being born with a cognitive faculty that produces beliefs in you regarding things spiritual, eternal, etc.? And that this thing produces beliefs in false gods, etc., because of the effects of sin (though I don't know that Plantinga says this; but let's say for argument's sake that I say it)?

-----Added 4/6/2009 at 04:27:40 EST-----



ChristianTrader said:


> But don't you have to put forth an argument that your version of God is the actual God and others are not.



What sort of argument proves a trinitarian god?


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## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Marrow Man said:
> 
> 
> 
> This has been a criticism leveled against Plantinga -- that he misuses Calvin's notion of the senus divinititas (or, perhaps, takes it too far) and perhaps fails to consider the effect of sin on the human mind in this area..
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, what specifically is the matter with the idea of you being born with a cognitive faculty that produces beliefs in you regarding things spiritual, eternal, etc.? And that this thing produces beliefs in false gods, etc., because of the effects of sin (though I don't know that Plantinga says this; but let's say for argument's sake that I say it)?
Click to expand...


Because then there is no moral responsibility for such beliefs. Sinners *distort* the truth; they don't innocently receive untruth.

-----Added 4/6/2009 at 04:33:01 EST-----



ChristianTrader said:


> Semper Fidelis said:
> 
> 
> 
> I choose Other. I would choose Van Tillian except that there are some who would insist that I'd have to stick to TAG or the impossibility of the contrary. I don't claim to be a sophisticated philsopher but tend toward common sense realism. The way I see it, God's existence doesn't have to be proven. It is public knowledge, like gravity and air. I don't have a problem with evidences but they have to be grounded in a commitment that God exists and things are therefore logical and predictable.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But don't you have to put forth an argument that your version of God is the actual God and others are not.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


Whenever presuppositionalists talk about God not needing to be proven, or about God not needing evidence, what we mean is this: He is the basis and the root of an entire philosophy, not something that can be proven as an extension of some pre-existing philosophy.

Therefore to say that God is proven or unproven is a category error.

In other words, when we talk about the non-necessity of giving evidence for God, we mean it in the narrow sense (i.e. evidence sprouting from a pre-established philosophy that is not already rooted in God) and not in the broader sense (i.e. any types of reasons to believe whatsoever).


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## ChristianTrader

-----Added 4/6/2009 at 04:27:40 EST-----


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> But don't you have to put forth an argument that your version of God is the actual God and others are not.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What sort of argument proves a trinitarian god?
Click to expand...


Does Paul give someone an out for not believing in the trinitarian God? Do they have any excuse/apology?

CT

-----Added 4/6/2009 at 05:49:56 EST-----



Confessor said:


> -----Added 4/6/2009 at 04:33:01 EST-----
> 
> 
> 
> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Semper Fidelis said:
> 
> 
> 
> I choose Other. I would choose Van Tillian except that there are some who would insist that I'd have to stick to TAG or the impossibility of the contrary. I don't claim to be a sophisticated philsopher but tend toward common sense realism. The way I see it, God's existence doesn't have to be proven. It is public knowledge, like gravity and air. I don't have a problem with evidences but they have to be grounded in a commitment that God exists and things are therefore logical and predictable.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But don't you have to put forth an argument that your version of God is the actual God and others are not.
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Whenever presuppositionalists talk about God not needing to be proven, or about God not needing evidence, what we mean is this: He is the basis and the root of an entire philosophy, not something that can be proven as an extension of some pre-existing philosophy.
> 
> Therefore to say that God is proven or unproven is a category error.
> 
> In other words, when we talk about the non-necessity of giving evidence for God, we mean it in the narrow sense (i.e. evidence sprouting from a pre-established philosophy that is not already rooted in God) and not in the broader sense (i.e. any types of reasons to believe whatsoever).
Click to expand...


I'm simply saying that at some point, you have to spell out your God vs. the other competitors for the crown.

There is also the issue of having to point out how evidence not rooted in God runs aground, and evidence that is, does not.

CT


----------



## DonP

Then what does this mean?

Rom 1:19 because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. 20 For since the creation of the world H*is invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse*, 21 because, although they knew God, *they did not glorify Him as God,* nor were thankful, but became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Professing to be wise, they became fools, 23 and changed the glory of the incorruptible God *into an image made like corruptible man — and birds and four-footed animals and creeping things. *
NKJV

Seem like there was a knowledge of even the true God but they chose not to glorify Him and made images. 

So if this is speaking of non-covenantal heathen, then it seems the knowldge of god for sure was in them from the creation and possible the knowldge of the God.


----------



## steven-nemes

ChristianTrader said:


> Does Paul give someone an out for not believing in the trinitarian God? Do they have any excuse/apology?



Well it seems to me that Paul says that God's attributes are plainly seen and known and understood by the things made. Either his triune nature is known or it isn't.

If his triune nature is not known (and therefore people are not held accountable for not believing in the triune God), then a person might have an excuse for believing a God basically the same as Yahweh except unitarian, like Allah, or some other being.

Or, if his triune nature is known by the things that are made, then a person cannot have any excuse for believing in any other God but the triune God. 

But it seems to me that some say that, if God can be known by the things that are made, then his existence is capable of being proved by way of rational argumentation (how this follows, I still don't see). But this means, then, that his triune nature is also capable of being proved through argumentation, since it is clearly perceived. 

Either his triune nature is not known through nature (and it seems to me that from this follows the fact that Muslims or other monotheists have an excuse) or his triune nature is known through nature and capable of being proved through rational argumentation (which some seem to say, though I am doubtful there is any such argument).

If you notice a flaw in my reasoning, then let me know!

-----Added 4/6/2009 at 08:09:38 EST-----



Confessor said:


> Because then there is no moral responsibility for such beliefs. Sinners *distort* the truth; they don't innocently receive untruth.



Let's assume that is true; then the sensus divinitatis produces belief in God and the person himself willingly changes/acts against/distorts/etc his belief into belief X. Is that what happens?


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Either his triune nature is not known through nature (and it seems to me that from this follows the fact that Muslims or other monotheists have an excuse) or his triune nature is known through nature and capable of being proved through rational argumentation (which some seem to say, though I am doubtful there is any such argument).
> 
> If you notice a flaw in my reasoning, then let me know!



There is also the option of the Bible being obviously the revealed Word of God, and it being perspicuously foolish to reject it as God's Word. Therefore the triune nature is known through special revelation, yet all men are without excuse for their sin. This keeps people culpable for not believing in the triune God (unless they never receive a Bible), yet it does not attempt to say that trinitarian theology can somehow be approached _via_ natural theology.

Of course, it's not as if we are saved by belief in strict monotheism or trinitarian monotheism; we are saved by grace through the arm of faith in Christ. Therefore if someone doesn't believe in a triune God, they are damned for their own sin and not necessarily for their lack of belief in the triune God (this would apply to those tribes that never hear the Gospel).



steven-nemes said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Because then there is no moral responsibility for such beliefs. Sinners *distort* the truth; they don't innocently receive untruth.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Let's assume that is true; then the sensus divinitatis produces belief in God and the person himself willingly changes/acts against/distorts/etc his belief into belief X. Is that what happens?
Click to expand...


Um, assuming that is true, that is what happens.  

But seriously, that is what I believe.


----------



## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> There is also the option of the Bible being obviously the revealed Word of God, and it being perspicuously foolish to reject it as God's Word. Therefore the triune nature is known through special revelation, yet all men are without excuse for their sin. This keeps people culpable for not believing in the triune God (unless they never receive a Bible), yet it does not attempt to say that trinitarian theology can somehow be approached _via_ natural theology.



This wouldn't work because, firstly, it is not what Paul seems to me to be saying in Romans 1, and secondly, because it has nothing to say to the countless men and women who died, without excuse, prior to any Scriptures being written. They were without excuse before God, yet they did not have the revealed Word of God written on paper to convict them, so that cannot be what is the damning factor in natural revelation.



Confessor said:


> Um, assuming that is true, that is what happens.
> 
> But seriously, that is what I believe.



How does a person go about taking the belief in God produced in them and distorting it willfully? When, at what point in life, does this occur? 

And the objection that the sensus divinitatis producing false beliefs in them because of sin would be unfair, because they are not believing those things willfully, sounds like the objection that men can't be held responsible for sin because their physical state is such that they can't do otherwise. They are not given the "opportunity" to obey the law so they can't be held responsible. 

I am having a hard time expressing myself right now, I'm very tired, so sorry if my writing is also tired...


----------



## ChristianTrader

steven-nemes said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> There is also the option of the Bible being obviously the revealed Word of God, and it being perspicuously foolish to reject it as God's Word. Therefore the triune nature is known through special revelation, yet all men are without excuse for their sin. This keeps people culpable for not believing in the triune God (unless they never receive a Bible), yet it does not attempt to say that trinitarian theology can somehow be approached _via_ natural theology.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This wouldn't work because, firstly, it is not what Paul seems to me to be saying in Romans 1, and secondly, because it has nothing to say to the countless men and women who died, without excuse, prior to any Scriptures being written. They were without excuse before God, yet they did not have the revealed Word of God written on paper to convict them, so that cannot be what is the damning factor in natural revelation.
Click to expand...


Actually it would work, if one is able to find the deficiencies in the alternatives given up to that point. If a person died without ever hearing the good news of triune God given in the the gospel, there is nothing they could complain concerning.

CT


----------



## cih1355

PeaceMaker said:


> Then what does this mean?
> 
> Rom 1:19 because what may be known of God is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. 20 For since the creation of the world H*is invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse*, 21 because, although they knew God, *they did not glorify Him as God,* nor were thankful, but became futile in their thoughts, and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Professing to be wise, they became fools, 23 and changed the glory of the incorruptible God *into an image made like corruptible man — and birds and four-footed animals and creeping things. *
> NKJV
> 
> Seem like there was a knowledge of even the true God but they chose not to glorify Him and made images.
> 
> So if this is speaking of non-covenantal heathen, then it seems the knowldge of god for sure was in them from the creation and possible the knowldge of the God.



All people know God in some sense. God's attributes are known through His creation. 

I don't see how a person could arrive at the conclusion that God exists as a Trinity without the aid of special revelation.


----------



## steven-nemes

ChristianTrader said:


> Actually it would work, if one is able to find the deficiencies in the alternatives given up to that point. If a person died without ever hearing the good news of triune God given in the the gospel, there is nothing they could complain concerning.
> 
> CT



It seems to me you are asserting the following:

(1) The Bible can be plainly understood to be the Word of God and anyone who thinks otherwise has no excuse because, well, it is plain it is.
(2) As for those who lived prior to the coming of the written scriptures, those people can be held responsible for not believing in God because the proposed religions during those times were false, contradictory, etc., so tey are without excuse.

This seems to me to presuppose that any person throughout any point in history is capable of reasoning and finding by way of logical inference contradictions, etc., in any and all alternatives to belief in the existence of God as expressed in the Bible, which I think is plainly false. I think some people simply don't have the reasoning capabilities and strengths to find inconsistencies in, say, ancient Greek religions, and so they couldn't reason to the conclusion that those religions are false and therefore they are without excuse; I think they are still without excuse despite the fact that they are not perhaps smart enough or enough of analytic thinkers to find inconsistencies in their religions.

Also, it seems to presuppose that people have moral obligations to use reason critically and discover truth regarding the nature of the universe and God, etc. Where is this in Scripture? Nowhere, I should think.


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> This wouldn't work because, firstly, it is not what Paul seems to me to be saying in Romans 1



I never said that this was the content of Romans 1. I was providing an option which would make your statement above -- the one regarding God's triune nature, that either 1. non-Christian monotheists would have an excuse, or 2. trinitarianism can be definitively proven from nature -- a false dichotomy.



steven-nemes said:


> secondly, because it has nothing to say to the countless men and women who died, without excuse, prior to any Scriptures being written. They were without excuse before God, yet they did not have the revealed Word of God written on paper to convict them, so that cannot be what is the damning factor in natural revelation.



I never said that the revealed Word is what damns people. In fact, I provided an explicit example given the case of people who never receive the Word: "Therefore if someone doesn't believe in a triune God, they are damned for their own sin and not necessarily for their lack of belief in the triune God (this would apply to those tribes that never hear the Gospel)."

Also, I'm not sure what you mean when you say, "they did not have the revealed Word of God written on paper to convict them, so that cannot be what is the damning factor in natural revelation" -- you seem to be saying, If people did not have special revelation to convict them, then special revelation can't be the part of natural revelation that convicts them. But this does not make sense, for special revelation is not a subset of natural revelation. (I'm guessing this is not really an error at all in content, and that it is merely due to your fatigue as you noted at the end of your note, so you can leave this alone if you want.)

To smooth out the rough edges, I'll just state my position right here: people are without excuse and have some type of knowledge of God from mere natural revelation. The Bible is obviously God's Word and will be immediately accepted as His Word to any whose eyes God has opened; all who reject it are _prima facie_ wrong in their rejection of it. Therefore, all are damned who never hear the Gospel (because convicted through natural revelation), and those who have somewhat of a knowledge of the Bible (_viz._ enough to know that God is triune) are punished for their denial of the Trinity, because they should have accepted the Bible as authoritative and therefore the Trinity as solid doctrine. But those who do not hear the Word are still damned; however they are not punished for their non-trinitarianism -- since they never were aware it was in the Bible anyway.



steven-nemes said:


> How does a person go about taking the belief in God produced in them and distorting it willfully? When, at what point in life, does this occur?



That's a good question. I'm not sure of the mechanics of it, but I can tell you that all natural men "suppress the truth by their wickedness...what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them" (Romans 1:18-19).

And Bahnsen spends a long time in _Van Til's Apologetic_ outlining the awkwardness of this case. Chapter 6 is entitled "The Psychological Complexities of Unbelief," pp. 405-460. It's obviously not a very simple thing to discuss -- such as, When in life does this occur? Steven, I obviously do not know that, but neither is such a topic very crucial to the present discussion.



> And the objection that the sensus divinitatis producing false beliefs in them because of sin would be unfair, because they are not believing those things willfully, sounds like the objection that men can't be held responsible for sin because their physical state is such that they can't do otherwise. They are not given the "opportunity" to obey the law so they can't be held responsible.



It absolutely _can_ be a viable objection. There has to be _some_ sense of ability-to-do-otherwise that accompanies moral responsibility (not in the Pelagian/free will sense, of course -- I'm still an extremely staunch theological determinist); otherwise the analogies which are supposed to be arguments -- such as "God wouldn't punish a rock for falling; so also He wouldn't punish sinners for doing what they must do" -- would absolutely hold water.

By the way, I contend that this ability to do otherwise consists of the ability given a contrary desire, a counterfactual ability to do otherwise. I wrote a paper on this for my philosophy of religion class if you (or anyone reading) is interested.

Even if you would never grant any of the preceding two paragraphs, though, it is still clear that people cannot be held morally responsible for wrong beliefs if they did nothing to get them, or if they did not distort other beliefs that were actually good. Such people would be doing the best they can given their situation; they would be doing nothing wrong. People cannot be held morally responsible for things that they do not mistreat. That'd be like giving a child a broken toy and spanking him for breaking it.

You might counter that totally depraved sinners are doing the best they can and therefore cannot be punished for their necessary sin (to imply a _reductio ad absurdum_ of my argument), but I reply that it still within sinners' ability *in a sense* to be sinless -- namely, if they had godly desires and a new heart -- the same distinction I outlined above, one of counterfactual desire. (Of course, this never occurs this side of heaven, and there is no free will for sinners to choose this, but that's beside the point. The ability exists in a sense, which is crucial to the argument.)

And please, please, anyone reading this -- don't mistake what I wrote for Pelagianism or Wesleyan holiness.

I hope you recover on your sleep, Steven.


----------



## ChristianTrader

steven-nemes said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Actually it would work, if one is able to find the deficiencies in the alternatives given up to that point. If a person died without ever hearing the good news of triune God given in the the gospel, there is nothing they could complain concerning.
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It seems to me you are asserting the following:
> 
> (1) The Bible can be plainly understood to be the Word of God and anyone who thinks otherwise has no excuse because, well, it is plain it is.
> (2) As for those who lived prior to the coming of the written scriptures, those people can be held responsible for not believing in God because the proposed religions during those times were false, contradictory, etc., so tey are without excuse.
> 
> This seems to me to presuppose that any person throughout any point in history is capable of reasoning and finding by way of logical inference contradictions, etc., in any and all alternatives to belief in the existence of God as expressed in the Bible, which I think is plainly false. I think some people simply don't have the reasoning capabilities and strengths to find inconsistencies in, say, ancient Greek religions, and so they couldn't reason to the conclusion that those religions are false and therefore they are without excuse; I think they are still without excuse despite the fact that they are not perhaps smart enough or enough of analytic thinkers to find inconsistencies in their religions.
> 
> Also, it seems to presuppose that people have moral obligations to use reason critically and discover truth regarding the nature of the universe and God, etc. Where is this in Scripture? Nowhere, I should think.
Click to expand...


It would be cleaner if we handled the two claims separately. Let us start with 1; do you believe that such is true or false? Or put a different way, do you think it is clear to reason that the Bible is God's word?

CT


----------



## steven-nemes

ChristianTrader said:


> It would be cleaner if we handled the two claims separately. Let us start with 1; do you believe that such is true or false? Or put a different way, do you think it is clear to reason that the Bible is God's word?
> 
> CT



_(1) The Bible can be plainly understood to be the Word of God and anyone who thinks otherwise has no excuse because, well, it is plain it is._

I don't know what you mean by 'clear to reason'. Do I think that (1) is true in some sense? I wouldn't know; probably not. I think a person cannot hold the Bible as being the word of God unless he has been regenerated; man in his sinful state could not "reason" to the conclusion that the Bible is the word of God any more than he can submit to God's law by an act of the will.

-----Added 4/8/2009 at 09:32:07 EST-----



Confessor said:


> I never said that this was the content of Romans 1. I was providing an option which would make your statement above -- the one regarding God's triune nature, that either 1. non-Christian monotheists would have an excuse, or 2. trinitarianism can be definitively proven from nature -- a false dichotomy.



Alright, but the idea that God's nature is revealed in the created order is in scripture; where is the idea that my ESV bible is plainly his written word and it is plain to see it is?



> I never said that the revealed Word is what damns people. In fact, I provided an explicit example given the case of people who never receive the Word: "Therefore if someone doesn't believe in a triune God, they are damned for their own sin and not necessarily for their lack of belief in the triune God (this would apply to those tribes that never hear the Gospel)."



Alright, my mistake... I've been very sleepy lately and my mind is not at 100%.



> That's a good question. I'm not sure of the mechanics of it, but I can tell you that all natural men "suppress the truth by their wickedness...what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them" (Romans 1:18-19).
> 
> And Bahnsen spends a long time in _Van Til's Apologetic_ outlining the awkwardness of this case. Chapter 6 is entitled "The Psychological Complexities of Unbelief," pp. 405-460. It's obviously not a very simple thing to discuss -- such as, When in life does this occur? Steven, I obviously do not know that, but neither is such a topic very crucial to the present discussion.



Alright, I am only asking. Others hold the idea that belief in God is not immediately produced in a person, but that if a person were to apply his mind, reason, etc., he could come to the notion that God exists by what is made about him. You don't hold that, it seems to me; you seem to believe that belief in God at some point in a person's life is immediately produced in him but the person consciously ignores it or rationalizes it into another belief, etc.



> It absolutely _can_ be a viable objection. There has to be _some_ sense of ability-to-do-otherwise that accompanies moral responsibility (not in the Pelagian/free will sense, of course -- I'm still an extremely staunch theological determinist); otherwise the analogies which are supposed to be arguments -- such as "God wouldn't punish a rock for falling; so also He wouldn't punish sinners for doing what they must do" -- would absolutely hold water.
> 
> By the way, I contend that this ability to do otherwise consists of the ability given a contrary desire, a counterfactual ability to do otherwise. I wrote a paper on this for my philosophy of religion class if you (or anyone reading) is interested.



Would you say then that if a person's desires had been different at a given point in time, he would have acted differently and this is the "ability to do otherwise"?



> You might counter that totally depraved sinners are doing the best they can and therefore cannot be punished for their necessary sin (to imply a _reductio ad absurdum_ of my argument), but I reply that it still within sinners' ability *in a sense* to be sinless -- namely, if they had godly desires and a new heart -- the same distinction I outlined above, one of counterfactual desire. (Of course, this never occurs this side of heaven, and there is no free will for sinners to choose this, but that's beside the point. The ability exists in a sense, which is crucial to the argument.)



Let's say that the belief-producing faculties in a person, like the _sensus divinitatis_, are subject to the basic, fundamental desires of a hypothetical man just as his actions are subject to those desires. He "sees what he wants to see" in a sense, I suppose. And so, a person with sinful desires, upon analyzing the world or what have you, has false beliefs produced in him because of them. And in this sense the sensus divinitatis is "broken" just as the will of man is "broken". It is not functioning as it ought to.

This is just a hypothetical that I thought up in response. Would there be any problems with it? I think it could be a proper counter to the assertion that a belief-producing-faculty that comes up with false belief would not be just.


----------



## ChristianTrader

steven-nemes said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> It would be cleaner if we handled the two claims separately. Let us start with 1; do you believe that such is true or false? Or put a different way, do you think it is clear to reason that the Bible is God's word?
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _(1) The Bible can be plainly understood to be the Word of God and anyone who thinks otherwise has no excuse because, well, it is plain it is._
> 
> I don't know what you mean by 'clear to reason'. Do I think that (1) is true in some sense? I wouldn't know; probably not. I think a person cannot hold the Bible as being the word of God unless he has been regenerated; man in his sinful state could not "reason" to the conclusion that the Bible is the word of God any more than he can submit to God's law by an act of the will.
Click to expand...


Clear to reason just means, clear to someone who stopped to think about it.

Next, I am not making the claim about accepting the Bible as God word. It is a question of whether a person that stopped to think have to behave irrationally in order to reject the Bible as being true.

CT


----------



## steven-nemes

ChristianTrader said:


> Clear to reason just means, clear to someone who stopped to think about it.
> 
> Next, I am not making the claim about accepting the Bible as God word. It is a question of whether a person that stopped to think have to behave irrationally in order to reject the Bible as being true.
> 
> CT



I don't think that any person can stop to think and come to the conclusion, apart from the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit.


----------



## ChristianTrader

steven-nemes said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Clear to reason just means, clear to someone who stopped to think about it.
> 
> Next, I am not making the claim about accepting the Bible as God word. It is a question of whether a person that stopped to think have to behave irrationally in order to reject the Bible as being true.
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think that any person can stop to think and come to the conclusion, apart from the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit.
Click to expand...


Alright so what is your answer to the second part, the part about having to behave irrationally to reject the Bible as true?

CT


----------



## steven-nemes

ChristianTrader said:


> Alright so what is your answer to the second part, the part about having to behave irrationally to reject the Bible as true?
> 
> CT



I suppose I will respond with a question: what do you think would make a person irrational?


----------



## ChristianTrader

steven-nemes said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Alright so what is your answer to the second part, the part about having to behave irrationally to reject the Bible as true?
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I suppose I will respond with a question: what do you think would make a person irrational?
Click to expand...


We can get into motives etc. later, the question at hand are results. Whether or not it is clear to reason that the Bible is true or whether such a claim is false. If it is clear to reason then a person would have to behave "against reason/irrational" in order to reject the claims of the Bible.

Or are you asking what does an irrational decision look like? If such is the question that you are asking, then the above should answer that as well.

CT


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Alright, but the idea that God's nature is revealed in the created order is in scripture; where is the idea that my ESV bible is plainly his written word and it is plain to see it is?



That's a good question. For now please accept it as a possible third alternative -- since the (reasonably) possible viability of a third option is all that is needed to demonstrate a false dichotomy. Otherwise, I will do some reading to find out the Scriptural basis for this, if there be any.



steven-nemes said:


> Alright, my mistake... I've been very sleepy lately and my mind is not at 100%.



Not a problem. 



steven-nemes said:


> Alright, I am only asking. Others hold the idea that belief in God is not immediately produced in a person, but that if a person were to apply his mind, reason, etc., he could come to the notion that God exists by what is made about him. You don't hold that, it seems to me; you seem to believe that belief in God at some point in a person's life is immediately produced in him but the person consciously ignores it or rationalizes it into another belief, etc.



Yes, I would say that suppression of the truth presupposes possession of the truth; therefore people have to actually _have_ the belief in God in order to _suppress_ the truth in the first place. I'm curious to know how you interpret mankind's suppression of the truth differently from my interpretation. (I'm not trying to say there's no possible alternative; I'm just interested in hearing your interpretation of it.)



steven-nemes said:


> Would you say then that if a person's desires had been different at a given point in time, he would have acted differently and this is the "ability to do otherwise"?



Yes. However, I would not term it as an unqualified "ability to do otherwise," because of the connotations of free will.



steven-nemes said:


> Let's say that the belief-producing faculties in a person, like the _sensus divinitatis_, are subject to the basic, fundamental desires of a hypothetical man just as his actions are subject to those desires. He "sees what he wants to see" in a sense, I suppose. And so, a person with sinful desires, upon analyzing the world or what have you, has false beliefs produced in him because of them. And in this sense the sensus divinitatis is "broken" just as the will of man is "broken". It is not functioning as it ought to.
> 
> This is just a hypothetical that I thought up in response. Would there be any problems with it? I think it could be a proper counter to the assertion that a belief-producing-faculty that comes up with false belief would not be just.



I'd say that is a category mistake, for, to put it simply, beliefs are not a result of desires: we do not believe what we want to believe. Belief in propositions is a totally involuntary thing, although subsequently we can voluntarily embrace or voluntarily suppress that belief. Or, to put it another way, _intellectual_ assent to propositions happens automatically and involuntarily, whereas the _moral_ assent (embracing or suppressing) is voluntary.

However, if beliefs were completely matters of choice (an impossible stance as far as I see it), then yes, your rebuttal to my assertion would be completely valid. For in that case, the same structure would exist for a person making moral choices, which are necessary yet involving culpability, and a person believing certain things, which would be necessary but consequently also involving culpability (because there'd be no difference between the former and the latter).


----------



## BrianLanier

It should be noted that 'Reformed Epistemology' is not an apologetic _method_, but is a project in the epistemology of religious belief. While not constituting a school or method of apologetics, RE does utilitze philosophical arguments that are _useful_ to Christian apologetics of most stripes.

See this essay by Michael Sudduth:

Reformed Epistemology and Christian Apologetics


----------



## steven-nemes

ChristianTrader said:


> We can get into motives etc. later, the question at hand are results. Whether or not it is clear to reason that the Bible is true or whether such a claim is false. If it is clear to reason then a person would have to behave "against reason/irrational" in order to reject the claims of the Bible.
> 
> Or are you asking what does an irrational decision look like? If such is the question that you are asking, then the above should answer that as well.
> 
> CT



I would say that it is not clear to an unbeliever that the Bible is God's word because his thinking, governed by his sinful nature, doesn't comprehend it; the pieces don't fit together. Whether or not it is irrational, I wouldn't be able to answer right away, because there are differing views on what makes a belief or act irrational. I have not for myself decided what makes a belief irrational or not. I would say that disbelief in the Bible in conjunction with other beliefs (like, atheistic naturalism, for example) could be subject to undefeated defeaters and be self-defeating and irrational, I suppose, but whether or not disbelief in the Bible on its own is irrational, I am not able to answer at the moment. I have been saying that the Bible's being the word of God is not clear to the unbeliever, and yet I don't want to say that a man can be rational in disbelieving the Bible. I will have to get back to you,, unless you can suggest for me a criterion of rationality.



Confessor said:


> That's a good question. For now please accept it as a possible third alternative -- since the (reasonably) possible viability of a third option is all that is needed to demonstrate a false dichotomy. Otherwise, I will do some reading to find out the Scriptural basis for this, if there be any.



Good enough I suppose! 



> Yes, I would say that suppression of the truth presupposes possession of the truth; therefore people have to actually _have_ the belief in God in order to _suppress_ the truth in the first place. I'm curious to know how you interpret mankind's suppression of the truth differently from my interpretation. (I'm not trying to say there's no possible alternative; I'm just interested in hearing your interpretation of it.)



I wouldn't know if I interpret it differently than you or not. I don't have a set-in-stone opinion on the matter. I would find it hard, I'll say though, to believe that Friedrich Nietzsche or Daniel Dennet have some kind of belief in God deep down inside there somewhere; it seems to me that some people are quite convinced that this God person does not exist. I don't know. I would have to get back to you I suppose. 



> However, if beliefs were completely matters of choice (an impossible stance as far as I see it), then yes, your rebuttal to my assertion would be completely valid. For in that case, the same structure would exist for a person making moral choices, which are necessary yet involving culpability, and a person believing certain things, which would be necessary but consequently also involving culpability (because there'd be no difference between the former and the latter).



But let's say there is not a desire in a person to believe any _specific_ thing (like him willfully believing in Ares, for example), but only to believe anything but what he ought to believe (and given his circumstances, he comes to believe in Ares, maybe because he was born in 200 B.C. Athens and is told that Ares exists, perhaps). I don't think the sinful nature works in a person to do any _specific_ sin, but rather to do any sin it can at any point in time. And so likewise, just as a person doesn't want to obey God's law (while he might not want to commit any one specific sin but rather commit whatever sin is available to him given his circumstances), he also doesn't want to believe that God exists (while he might not want to believe any specific sinful belief, but whatever sinful belief is available to him given his circumstances). So, this way the misuse of the sensus divinitatis can still be by the will of that person, although he did not will any specific belief (which I would likewise agree is not possible, though I am somewhat leaning on the fence on the position). What would you think of that?


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> That's a good question. For now please accept it as a possible third alternative -- since the (reasonably) possible viability of a third option is all that is needed to demonstrate a false dichotomy. Otherwise, I will do some reading to find out the Scriptural basis for this, if there be any.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Good enough I suppose!
Click to expand...


I was thinking this over and I believe I may have settled on a good basis. (Don't hesitate to point out any _non sequiturs_, as most of it is based on established theological principles rather than explicit Bible verses.) Essentially, there are two things to look at: 1. how believers treat the Bible, and how a Christian worldview involves the absolute, preeminent authority of Scripture, and 2. that it is _wrong_ for people to reject the voice of their Creator, and thereby morally _obligatory_ to accept His self-attesting voice in the Bible.

1. Upon regeneration, a person completely submits himself to Christ and therefore to the Word of Christ. He completely embraces Scripture as the perfect, and perfectly authoritative, Word of God Himself. This is not viewed as merely a neutral act, or a morally indifferent shift; it is rather viewed as an awesomely _good_ change. And how can it be morally good to accept the Bible as authoritative if people are not _obliged_ to accept it as such in the first place? The moral goodness of an action by definition implies "ought" for that action.

2. From the creation of Adam, mankind has always been compelled to accept the voice of God immediately and without additional consideration. The Fall occurred ultimately because Adam and Eve denied God's absolute authority. And if we are supposed to hear and follow our Creator's voice when it is directly spoken to us in the Garden of Eden, why would we not be supposed to hear and follow His voice when it is through Scripture? Sure, there are counterfeits, but that doesn't deny the perfect and self-justifying nature of our Creator's voice.



steven-nemes said:


> I wouldn't know if I interpret it differently than you or not. I don't have a set-in-stone opinion on the matter. I would find it hard, I'll say though, to believe that Friedrich Nietzsche or Daniel Dennet have some kind of belief in God deep down inside there somewhere; it seems to me that some people are quite convinced that this God person does not exist. I don't know. I would have to get back to you I suppose.



It certainly is an awkward concept to espouse, that even the most ostensible atheists (such as the two you listed) have an actual _belief_ in God. But I think Bahnsen covers this very adequately both in the appropriate chapter in _Van Til's Apologetic_ and in this article on self-deception. (He seems to repeat himself in that article and add some superfluous historical information, so if you want the real essence of what self-deception is, I suggest you go near the very end to the summary. It contains all you need if you want to read that article.)



steven-nemes said:


> But let's say there is not a desire in a person to believe any _specific_ thing (like him willfully believing in Ares, for example), but only to believe anything but what he ought to believe (and given his circumstances, he comes to believe in Ares, maybe because he was born in 200 B.C. Athens and is told that Ares exists, perhaps). I don't think the sinful nature works in a person to do any _specific_ sin, but rather to do any sin it can at any point in time. And so likewise, just as a person doesn't want to obey God's law (while he might not want to commit any one specific sin but rather commit whatever sin is available to him given his circumstances), he also doesn't want to believe that God exists (while he might not want to believe any specific sinful belief, but whatever sinful belief is available to him given his circumstances). So, this way the misuse of the sensus divinitatis can still be by the will of that person, although he did not will any specific belief (which I would likewise agree is not possible, though I am somewhat leaning on the fence on the position). What would you think of that?



I would give the same rebuttal I did in the last post -- purely speaking, no one gets _any_ belief they have by choice. All beliefs are totally involuntary (although there can be a moral reaction to beliefs). Of course, there is still a sense in which beliefs are subject to desires -- e.g. a pagan twisting his _sensus divinitatis_ to worship idols -- but those aren't actual beliefs in the deepest sense of the term, for they are merely professed and not believed _in practice_. (This is the case because they would have no grounds to believe in logic, morality, etc. without belief in the living God; therefore He is believed _in practice_.) So, when you say that a faulty belief-forming faculty in someone can create sinful beliefs in them, and that it's _not_ a willful distortion of the already-possessed truth, you are saying that beliefs are chosen in the deepest sense -- i.e. both in profession and in practice -- which I would say is quite incorrect.

The preceding two paragraphs of mine were a repetition and fleshing out of what I already said in my earlier post, so now I'll respond more specifically to something I found interesting in your last paragraph.



steven-nemes said:


> I don't think the sinful nature works in a person to do any _specific_ sin, but rather to do any sin it can at any point in time.



In a paper I wrote for my philosophy of religion class, I attempted to construct a philosophy of the will that made determinism and moral responsibility necessarily intertwined. Without replicating the paper here, I just wanted to say that I think physical circumstances play a significant role (as you noted), but that a person's desires _in those specific circumstances_ would prompt him or her to carry out a very specific action. For otherwise, free will would ensue, but free will is philosophical impossible. There has to be a specific desire prompting a specific action (although the external circumstances and the physical capabilities of the agent play a role), or otherwise determinism would not be true and God could not be sovereign. *Although, none of what I just said is necessarily inconsistent with what you said.*

I would agree with you that specific antitheistic beliefs are not determined solely by our sinful nature. This should be obvious given that a large amount of unbelievers in a given area or time period will hold the _same_ unbelieving worldview, evincing some sociological factors at play. This probably has a lot to do with crowd mentality as Satan attempts to overthrow biblical thinking and philosophy.

Anyway, yeah, I wrote a lot, so I'm going to pipe down now. It's been very edifying discussing this with you.


----------



## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> 1. Upon regeneration, a person completely submits himself to Christ and therefore to the Word of Christ. He completely embraces Scripture as the perfect, and perfectly authoritative, Word of God Himself. This is not viewed as merely a neutral act, or a morally indifferent shift; it is rather viewed as an awesomely _good_ change. And how can it be morally good to accept the Bible as authoritative if people are not _obliged_ to accept it as such in the first place? The moral goodness of an action by definition implies "ought" for that action.



Perhaps having no other God before God would make the act of holding his Word as authoritative a moral imperative, although I wouldn't know for sure; this does not include the fact that the Bible is clearly his word, though...



> 2. From the creation of Adam, mankind has always been compelled to accept the voice of God immediately and without additional consideration. The Fall occurred ultimately because Adam and Eve denied God's absolute authority. And if we are supposed to hear and follow our Creator's voice when it is directly spoken to us in the Garden of Eden, why would we not be supposed to hear and follow His voice when it is through Scripture? Sure, there are counterfeits, but that doesn't deny the perfect and self-justifying nature of our Creator's voice.



Yes, it is true that it is good to listen to God, but that does not mean that the ESV on my desk is plainly and obviously his word, which it seems to me is what you are asserting.



> It certainly is an awkward concept to espouse, that even the most ostensible atheists (such as the two you listed) have an actual _belief_ in God. But I think Bahnsen covers this very adequately both in the appropriate chapter in _Van Til's Apologetic_ and in this article on self-deception. (He seems to repeat himself in that article and add some superfluous historical information, so if you want the real essence of what self-deception is, I suggest you go near the very end to the summary. It contains all you need if you want to read that article.)



I will have to read those! Thanks!



> I would give the same rebuttal I did in the last post -- purely speaking, no one gets _any_ belief they have by choice. All beliefs are totally involuntary (although there can be a moral reaction to beliefs). Of course, there is still a sense in which beliefs are subject to desires -- e.g. a pagan twisting his _sensus divinitatis_ to worship idols -- but those aren't actual beliefs in the deepest sense of the term, for they are merely professed and not believed _in practice_. (This is the case because they would have no grounds to believe in logic, morality, etc. without belief in the living God; therefore He is believed _in practice_.) So, when you say that a faulty belief-forming faculty in someone can create sinful beliefs in them, and that it's _not_ a willful distortion of the already-possessed truth, you are saying that beliefs are chosen in the deepest sense -- i.e. both in profession and in practice -- which I would say is quite incorrect.



Surely some beliefs come about by choice, though perhaps not directly; I should think it possible that a person might _want_ to believe certain things, like perhaps I'll want to believe in paedobaptism and accept it without much questioning on the basis of a psychological desire to distance myself as much as I can from my Baptist parents, say, out of rebellion. I might want to believe in paedobaptism, and read up on the topic, and soon become a convinced Presbyterian. Likewise, a sinful human might want to not believe in God out of a deep-down desire to rebel against God, and might want to believe anything but; and in this sense, he can twist the sensus divinitatis into producing false beliefs in himself.

Also, I suppose I have to disagree with your strict presuppositionalist approach; I don't think that anyone has proven that it requires belief in Yahweh to have grounds for logic, morality, etc. I am sure you have read critiques of presuppositionalism and perhaps can respond to them in a manner I might not be able to rebut, but that is the basis of your response, so, with much hesitation and anxiousness regarding your reply soon to follow, I will continue...

I understand you as saying essentially this: that a pagan who believes in false-god _x_ does not _actually_ believe in x, but on some subconscious level believes in Yahweh because his behavior is inconsistent with belief in _x_ and consistent with belief in Yahweh. I don't see how the fact that his behavior is inconsistent with his belief in _x_ means he does not actually believe in _x_. I should think I truly believe that God has commanded me to repent of my sins and live in newness of life, etc., but often times my behavior is inconsistent with the fact. Does that mean I do not really believe that God really commanded me to repent, etc.? I should think not. Likewise, that a pagan is inconsistent with his beliefs does not mean he actually does not believe them; just that he is not consistent.

Also, I think it possible that there might exist another worldview W out there that could properly account for laws of logic, morality, science, etc., that is simply undiscovered or undeveloped; or perhaps a worldview W2 that is identical to Christianity except different in some trivial detail, like being a quadrinity instead of a trinity. And in this way, the "impossibility of the contrary" does not prove the truthhood of Christianity as you and I espouse it.



> In a paper I wrote for my philosophy of religion class, I attempted to construct a philosophy of the will that made determinism and moral responsibility necessarily intertwined. Without replicating the paper here, I just wanted to say that I think physical circumstances play a significant role (as you noted), but that a person's desires _in those specific circumstances_ would prompt him or her to carry out a very specific action. For otherwise, free will would ensue, but free will is philosophical impossible. There has to be a specific desire prompting a specific action (although the external circumstances and the physical capabilities of the agent play a role), or otherwise determinism would not be true and God could not be sovereign. *Although, none of what I just said is necessarily inconsistent with what you said.*



But the circumstances are _prior_ and _determining_ of the sinful act to be committed, and not the other way around. I don't commit sin S1 in a situation in which sin S2 is the only one possible (say, I don't commit murder when I have sex with a woman outside of marriage). The circumstances are deciding of the sin to be committed, while the will simply responds and takes advantage of the situation. 

You can reply that it was the will's desire to bring a person in those particular circumstances; for example, a man's desire to commit adultery brought him into the situation in which he committed the sin. But likewise I should say his desire to commit adultery was determined by his circumstances at that point in time, as well: his being on the computer late at night watching p0rnography, or perhaps at a party where he notices another woman, or whatever. And this process can be continued back all the way to the birth of a person, in which he is put into a specific circumstance that will determine his desires from then on. So I will assert that it is the situation a person finds himself in that will determine his sin of choice, and so a person being in circumstances that would coerce him to desire to believe falsely in Shiva, for example, would believe so only because of his determining circumstances.

Perhaps what I have said is superfluous and there is no disagreement, but just to assert more clearly what I mean to say: a person may desire to believe in false-god 'x' (out of rebellion towards God, perhaps) and given his circumstances which dictated what specific sin-desire would be instantiated, he would thus abuse his sensus divinitatis into producing a false belief. So, his sinful desires to believe in something _other than God_ might have been brought about and awakened in a situation in which he can produce false belief in Shiva, for example.



I have this strange feeling that nothing I've written is relevant to the discussion...


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Perhaps having no other God before God would make the act of holding his Word as authoritative a moral imperative, although I wouldn't know for sure; this does not include the fact that the Bible is clearly his word, though...



But how can it be a moral imperative if the answer is hidden and unknown? This would seem to be contrary to the fact that God gives an outlet in every moral situation or tribulation (1 Cor. 10:13). If there is no ability to submit to God's revelation even when the desire is present and the Bible is right there in front of us, then how can we be held morally responsible for not doing so?

Furthermore, if upon being regenerated it becomes obvious to all children of God (i.e., their eyes are opened) that the Bible is truly God's Word, then does it not follow that it is obviously God's Word even to those whose eyes are sinfully closed? Regeneration is subjective, affecting us, and not objective, affecting the Bible's perspicuity.



steven-nemes said:


> Yes, it is true that it is good to listen to God, but that does not mean that the ESV on my desk is plainly and obviously his word, which it seems to me is what you are asserting.



Although I wasn't very clear about it, the point that I wanted to make is that if the Creator's voice was self-attesting in Eden, why wouldn't it also be self-attesting now through Scripture?



steven-nemes said:


> Surely some beliefs come about by choice, though perhaps not directly; I should think it possible that a person might _want_ to believe certain things, like perhaps I'll want to believe in paedobaptism and accept it without much questioning on the basis of a psychological desire to distance myself as much as I can from my Baptist parents, say, out of rebellion. I might want to believe in paedobaptism, and read up on the topic, and soon become a convinced Presbyterian. Likewise, a sinful human might want to not believe in God out of a deep-down desire to rebel against God, and might want to believe anything but; and in this sense, he can twist the sensus divinitatis into producing false beliefs in himself.



It is true that you can want to believe in something, but that will not effect an actual belief in the subject by itself. Your desire to be a paedobaptist could spark you to read into the topic and find persuasive arguments, but your desire itself could not create any belief. Although, I guess that if there were no contrary evidence in your mind, it could totally create a belief. Moreover, it could affect how you treat the evidence and counterarguments. Your desire to be a paedobaptist could make you much more willing to denounce any arguments you might see against it and embellish any arguments you see for it, when in reality the credobaptist arguments could be superior. In that sense, then, desires could totally effect belief. You are certainly right about that. But this does not show that our cognitive faculties can themselves _create_ a sinful belief--for in such situations (i.e., situations in which the evidence presented points to an obvious conclusion), the _correct_ belief is right before our eyes, and our faculties _distort_ that, thus going back to the point I was trying to establish from the beginning.

This is such a deep and interesting topic! So many distinctions have to be made, and so many examples have to be accounted for.

In the case of God, we have clear evidence before us, and an explicit suppression of the truth. "What may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities--his eternal power and divine nature--have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse" (Rom. 1:19-20). While many beliefs can be put into the same category as being a paedobaptist or choosing who is the best sports team--such that there may not be ample evidence in front of us to move one way on a topic, or there may not be any evidence possible to sway us--the belief in God is expressly set down in Scripture as being "clearly seen." The knowability (note: not comprehensibility) of God is a universal thing, and it confronts men at every juncture of life. The perspicuity of this can put a different spin on your example of paedobaptism:

Say that there is a passage in the Bible that says, "Never baptize an infant; a profession of faith is required for baptism," and this passage was very well known, not obscure at all, and clearly in favor of credobaptism. If you then desired to believe in paedobaptism, although you were very often confronted by the perspicuous truthfulness of credobaptism, it might be possible for your belief in paedobaptism to actually exist (i.e., belief both in profession and in practice). But it would be much more difficult to effect--and of course it would mark quite an obstinate sinfulness in you (hypothetically, not saying that you are obstinate by any means).

However, if God is as foundational as the Bible says He is, then there is _no possible way_ anyone could not believe in Him in practice. He would disallow it by His Spirit, restraining people's rebellion. *Thus, I would say that two factors are crucial in demonstrating that all men believe in God and that they distort his truth (rather than receiving sinful beliefs automatically). These two are the obviousness of God's authority and position as Creator-Judge, as revealed to men's minds through nature; and the impossibility of disbelieving in God in practice.*

-----

You hinted at this earlier: we are getting a ways off track. (Correct me if I'm wrong in the proceeding summary.) Originally, you said that you believe that our sinful cognitive faculties can themselves create sinful beliefs--that such beliefs are notably _not_ distortions of a preexisting belief in God, but initially and automatically sinful. I responded by saying that such would destroy moral responsibility and pointed out to the fact that there has to be some sort of ability to do otherwise, mentioning ability of desire, etc. You responded by saying that beliefs can be formed by our desires as well, and therefore choices and beliefs are structurally the same; therefore if we have cognitive faculties which produce initially-wrong beliefs, we are still responsible for them. As I noted above (but not in my earlier posts, where I took a (wrongly) more adamant stance), I agree that some beliefs can be ultimately effected by desires; such as a belief that the Braves are the best baseball team ever, or that a girl really _does_ like me; but there is still a great deal of our beliefs that are confronted by evidence. This shows that our desires can play a part in _crafting_ or _molding_ wrong beliefs when we are given evidence to support a particular proposition, and we either embrace or suppress that evidence (and therefore that proposition). But it does *not* establish that such faculties can _create_ beliefs.

Lastly, I don't think the fact that our desires can have a huge effect on our beliefs (as in paedobaptism, determining the best sports team, or in finding whether a girl likes a boy) really points to the fact that we can be responsible for beliefs that are initially sinful (i.e., not secondary; not distortions). What it does demonstrate is that we can mistreat the evidence in front of us and not take a rational approach to finding truth, and that some of our beliefs can therefore be immoral--because we arrived at it by a dishonest means. But what it does not mean is that we can be responsible for initially wrong beliefs. I think this _non sequitur_ is the result of our collective straying from the topic.

And I'll definitely take responsibility for moving the topic so much, seeing as I never know when to stop typing. 

So, as a quick summation of everything I just wrote:
Desires can affect our beliefs, but purely in a _reactionary_ sense.
Sometimes we are confronted with evidence that should make us believe in a specific proposition (e.g. if overwhelming evidence is given for paedobaptism); sometimes there is no evidence either way (e.g. determining which of two cars is better when they are equal).
In the first of the previous two, we are obliged to accept that proposition, but we can embrace or suppress it. In the second, I would say we are obliged to withhold judgment on the topic, but our desires can push us a single way (e.g. if a person with whom you want to agree picked one of the cars as better than the other).
There is an outrageous amount of evidence confronting men at every point, making it _obligatory_ for everyone to believe in Jehovah as the Creator of the universe.
Yet, this is sinfully repressed by man's sinful cognitive faculties -- _not created initially sinful_.

Phew. Sorry about the length Steven. This topic rules.



steven-nemes said:


> Also, I suppose I have to disagree with your strict presuppositionalist approach; I don't think that anyone has proven that it requires belief in Yahweh to have grounds for logic, morality, etc. I am sure you have read critiques of presuppositionalism and perhaps can respond to them in a manner I might not be able to rebut, but that is the basis of your response, so, with much hesitation and anxiousness regarding your reply soon to follow, I will continue...



I agree with you that much more work needs to be done in demonstrating the shortcomings of unbelieving philosophies (and the excellency of Christian philosophy) rather than assertions of these things. But for now, I'll appeal to you as a Christian brother: If God is sovereign over everything, then would He not also be sovereign over our very existence and reasoning and ethics? If logic truly is an outworking of His very character, then any rejection of Him _in practice_ would be a rejection of logic, which is impossible to carry out. And if this is true (again, regardless of its being convincingly demonstrated by apologists, based rather on Scripture), then is it not true that no one can disbelieve in Jehovah in practice and remain a functioning human being?



steven-nemes said:


> I understand you as saying essentially this: that a pagan who believes in false-god _x_ does not _actually_ believe in x, but on some subconscious level believes in Yahweh because his behavior is inconsistent with belief in _x_ and consistent with belief in Yahweh. I don't see how the fact that his behavior is inconsistent with his belief in _x_ means he does not actually believe in _x_. I should think I truly believe that God has commanded me to repent of my sins and live in newness of life, etc., but often times my behavior is inconsistent with the fact. Does that mean I do not really believe that God really commanded me to repent, etc.? I should think not. Likewise, that a pagan is inconsistent with his beliefs does not mean he actually does not believe them; just that he is not consistent.



It would still be accurate to say that the pagan believes in those deities, but it is still important to make the distinction so that it can be understood _in what senses_ they believe in God and in what senses they do not. But you are correct in saying that it would be wrong to say "Pagans believe in Christ" without significant qualifications.

(Also, as a bit of a sidenote, I would not say the belief is subconscious, for that tends to remove moral responsibility, but you still get the idea I'm getting at.)



steven-nemes said:


> Also, I think it possible that there might exist another worldview W out there that could properly account for laws of logic, morality, science, etc., that is simply undiscovered or undeveloped; or perhaps a worldview W2 that is identical to Christianity except different in some trivial detail, like being a quadrinity instead of a trinity. And in this way, the "impossibility of the contrary" does not prove the truthhood of Christianity as you and I espouse it.



This objection reminds me of many objections that I hear from a select few people on Facebook. I expect to in the future write myself a paper or Facebook note entitled, "Crushing Childish Objections to Presuppositionalism." I consider them childish because most of the people (not you) who espouse them do so very arrogantly, as if they understand the entirety of presuppositionalism and have just exposed a fatal flaw, and more importantly because such objections _by unbelievers_ replace any type of sincere effort for them to construct a real unbelieving philosophy--they lean on objections like, "I'll just believe in the Father, Son, Holy Ghost, and Dog" in order to justify their unbelief, when it does not do so by any means.



steven-nemes said:


> But the circumstances are _prior_ and _determining_ of the sinful act to be committed, and not the other way around. I don't commit sin S1 in a situation in which sin S2 is the only one possible (say, I don't commit murder when I have sex with a woman outside of marriage). The circumstances are deciding of the sin to be committed, while the will simply responds and takes advantage of the situation.



I think we are mostly in agreement here. I totally agree with you the significant role that circumstances play in sin; I just wanted to stress that given a specific situation, and given a specific moral character (i.e. a specific inclination or desire), only one possible sin will result. There has to be situations in which only one action is possible for humans; otherwise God could not be sovereign.



steven-nemes said:


> Perhaps what I have said is superfluous and there is no disagreement, but just to assert more clearly what I mean to say: a person may desire to believe in false-god 'x' (out of rebellion towards God, perhaps) and given his circumstances which dictated what specific sin-desire would be instantiated, he would thus abuse his sensus divinitatis into producing a false belief. So, his sinful desires to believe in something _other than God_ might have been brought about and awakened in a situation in which he can produce false belief in Shiva, for example.



I totally agree with this.  I just want it to be known that when the _sensus divinitatis_ is abused, it is a distortion of the already present evidence that God is sovereign and that Jehovah is Lord, and not a sinful anti-Christian belief made automatically.



steven-nemes said:


> I have this strange feeling that nothing I've written is relevant to the discussion...



I've committed the more grievous error of writing a ten-page paper in one post...


----------



## Turtle

"He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."


----------



## steven-nemes

I'll have to say, Ben, that I think we are mostly in agreement. I've perhaps added qualifications to my original assertion, but I think you and I think alike.

I will respond another time because I'm on my lunch break from work and won't have adequate time to respond in full.


----------



## Confessor

That sounds excellent.

I do have a question, though: why are you on lunch break at such a late hour? Are you not in Phoenix right now?


----------



## Brian Withnell

jwithnell said:


> Funny how many here reflected my thinking. If I had to produce an academic paper, it would likely reflect Mr. Van Til. When I'm talking with someone, I'll use whatever seems to best meet the need, although I do find all-out evidentialism to be rather distasteful; and I am convinced that no philosophy outside of Christianity can be internally self-consistent (although my husband claims he can do so mathematically; this was the basis for our first big argument together).



Yep. First argument ... I remember it well.

It is amazing how much trouble a mathematical mind can get you into when talking about theory vs. practice.

What is amazing, is that we both agree that a person would be a totally sociopath if they were consistent outside a Christian world view.

I find myself holding to a view of the world that starts with axioms that God exists, and is a rewarder of those that diligently seek him. Add to that what we know is subservient to what God knows ... a bow of the head to VT and heartfelt thanks to him as well. But I also know that axiom sets can be logically consistent, even if they are untenable from a life perspective. Math; you got to love it.


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## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> That sounds excellent.
> 
> I do have a question, though: why are you on lunch break at such a late hour? Are you not in Phoenix right now?



I'm working an afternoon shift, so it's "lunch"... 



Confessor said:


> But how can it be a moral imperative if the answer is hidden and unknown? This would seem to be contrary to the fact that God gives an outlet in every moral situation or tribulation (1 Cor. 10:13). If there is no ability to submit to God's revelation even when the desire is present and the Bible is right there in front of us, then how can we be held morally responsible for not doing so?



Does clarity imply ability? Is someone only "able" to submit to God's word if it is clear and plain that it is God's word? I should think not. It is not clear to Abraham why he should listen to God when he asks him to sacrifice his son, I should think, but yet he still ought to listen to him.



> Furthermore, if upon being regenerated it becomes obvious to all children of God (i.e., their eyes are opened) that the Bible is truly God's Word, then does it not follow that it is obviously God's Word even to those whose eyes are sinfully closed? Regeneration is subjective, affecting us, and not objective, affecting the Bible's perspicuity.



Here you might have a better point than above. It could be that the Bible is not clearly God's word to us because it's on a different "wavelength", I suppose you could say; it is an entirely different line of reasoning (folly to the Greeks, a stumbling block to the Jews...) and so despite the moral command to submit to it, it might not be clearly God's word to anyone because each person holds to different conceptions of what God is, and the God of the Bible does not resemble the false god they believe in. 



> Although I wasn't very clear about it, the point that I wanted to make is that if the Creator's voice was self-attesting in Eden, why wouldn't it also be self-attesting now through Scripture?



Because now it is not a voice coming from a person near to you, but writing that has been translated and put into the vocabulary and language of a specific community at a specific time in history. It might not be so clearly God's word that way.



> It is true that you can want to believe in something, but that will not effect an actual belief in the subject by itself. Your desire to be a paedobaptist could spark you to read into the topic and find persuasive arguments, but your desire itself could not create any belief. Although, I guess that if there were no contrary evidence in your mind, it could totally create a belief. Moreover, it could affect how you treat the evidence and counterarguments. Your desire to be a paedobaptist could make you much more willing to denounce any arguments you might see against it and embellish any arguments you see for it, when in reality the credobaptist arguments could be superior. In that sense, then, desires could totally effect belief. You are certainly right about that. But this does not show that our cognitive faculties can themselves _create_ a sinful belief--for in such situations (i.e., situations in which the evidence presented points to an obvious conclusion), the _correct_ belief is right before our eyes, and our faculties _distort_ that, thus going back to the point I was trying to establish from the beginning.



Perhaps it could be said that the desire to believe in anything but Yahweh might exist "below the surface", so to speak. I don't think that anyone, at the moment they sin, for the most part, is aware of the fact that they want to break God's law at that very moment. Perhaps all they want to do is to commit sin S1, unaware even that it might be a sin or that they are breaking God's law. Though of course they do commit the sin out of rebellion towards God, they might not be aware of the fact at the moment. Likewise, I think it possible that a person might desire to disbelieve in Yahweh and believe in Allah, for example, though not be aware of the fact, and in this sense, the belief in Allah just "was formed" in him, without his knowing that he wanted to believe it.



> In the case of God, we have clear evidence before us, and an explicit suppression of the truth. "What may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities--his eternal power and divine nature--have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse" (Rom. 1:19-20). While many beliefs can be put into the same category as being a paedobaptist or choosing who is the best sports team--such that there may not be ample evidence in front of us to move one way on a topic, or there may not be any evidence possible to sway us--the belief in God is expressly set down in Scripture as being "clearly seen." The knowability (note: not comprehensibility) of God is a universal thing, and it confronts men at every juncture of life. The perspicuity of this can put a different spin on your example of paedobaptism:
> 
> Say that there is a passage in the Bible that says, "Never baptize an infant; a profession of faith is required for baptism," and this passage was very well known, not obscure at all, and clearly in favor of credobaptism. If you then desired to believe in paedobaptism, although you were very often confronted by the perspicuous truthfulness of credobaptism, it might be possible for your belief in paedobaptism to actually exist (i.e., belief both in profession and in practice). But it would be much more difficult to effect--and of course it would mark quite an obstinate sinfulness in you (hypothetically, not saying that you are obstinate by any means).



Well likewise, disbelief in Yahweh could be exactly the sort of obstinate, absurdly stubborn disbelief as you outlined above in the paedobaptism example. But perhaps the desire to disbelieve in Yahweh, because of all the implications of believing in him, is much much stronger than the desire of this particularly rebellious fellow to believe in paedobaptism. And so it could appear more regularly and more intensely and perhaps more easily.



> So, as a quick summation of everything I just wrote:
> Desires can affect our beliefs, but purely in a _reactionary_ sense.
> Sometimes we are confronted with evidence that should make us believe in a specific proposition (e.g. if overwhelming evidence is given for paedobaptism); sometimes there is no evidence either way (e.g. determining which of two cars is better when they are equal).
> In the first of the previous two, we are obliged to accept that proposition, but we can embrace or suppress it. In the second, I would say we are obliged to withhold judgment on the topic, but our desires can push us a single way (e.g. if a person with whom you want to agree picked one of the cars as better than the other).
> There is an outrageous amount of evidence confronting men at every point, making it _obligatory_ for everyone to believe in Jehovah as the Creator of the universe.
> Yet, this is sinfully repressed by man's sinful cognitive faculties -- _not created initially sinful_.
> 
> Phew. Sorry about the length Steven. This topic rules.



Sounds good I suppose, I more or less agree. I will say again what I said above, though: it is possible that the desire to disbelieve in Yahweh might not be in the immediate consciousness of a person when put in the situation to disbelieve in him, and so it is possible that a person might say that the sensus divinitatis produced in him a belief in Allah or Shiva, or whatever.




As for the presuppositionalism discussion, we'll have that another time.


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## caddy

Van Tillian/Presuppositionalist


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## Confessor

First, thanks for (severely) reducing the length of your post compared to mine. 



steven-nemes said:


> Does clarity imply ability? Is someone only "able" to submit to God's word if it is clear and plain that it is God's word? I should think not. It is not clear to Abraham why he should listen to God when he asks him to sacrifice his son, I should think, but yet he still ought to listen to him.



Yes, clarity really would imply ability, and vice versa. If it is clear that the Bible is God's Word, then people would be _prima facie_ mistaken in not accepting it as such _immediately_. And as I said above, if there is no way to know which claimed revelation is God's (by the self-attesting marks of deity), then no one can be plausibly held responsible for not doing so--such would be equivalent to making a multiple-choice test question with no discernible answer and marking people wrong for choosing the wrong option.

The example of Abraham is not one in which he's being held responsible when he's not sure the message is from God. It does not fit into the category above. His example is one where the command is definitely from God, and he knows it, but he's not sure of its purpose. The "muddiness," so to speak, is not in _whether_ the revelation is truly from God (it obvious is, and Abraham knows it), but in the specific ethical obligation God gave him, namely to kill his son.



steven-nemes said:


> Here you might have a better point than above. It could be that the Bible is not clearly God's word to us because it's on a different "wavelength", I suppose you could say; it is an entirely different line of reasoning (folly to the Greeks, a stumbling block to the Jews...) and so despite the moral command to submit to it, it might not be clearly God's word to anyone because each person holds to different conceptions of what God is, and the God of the Bible does not resemble the false god they believe in.



That the Bible does not comport with the unregenerate hearer's worldview is indisputable. But I would not say that is a criterion for the obvious voice of our Creator coming through it. Those are simply two different spheres of discussion -- the different worldviews offered in Christianity and unbelief, and the obviously divine nature of the Bible.

So, to restate my position from above, if the only change in regeneration is our _personal_ inclinations towards Christ and His Word, then that would mean that unregenerates simply reject the obvious nature of the Bible, thus retaining that the Bible is still _obviously_ God's Word. It does not mean that the Bible is objectively not self-attesting to them, since no property of the Bible is affected by a sinner's personal regeneration.



steven-nemes said:


> Because now it is not a voice coming from a person near to you, but writing that has been translated and put into the vocabulary and language of a specific community at a specific time in history. It might not be so clearly God's word that way.



First (in case you're implying this counterargument), it's not the case that there could be no counterfeits for God's revelation when He spoke directly. Demons and perhaps Satan himself, I am sure, could be deceiving people into thinking they are hearing things from God. Therefore, in case a counterargument might be that spoken revelation is straightforward while written revelation has several false books, I would argue that God's personal voice still sticks out in either situation. It is self-attesting.

Second, just as you could recognize a good friend's handwriting and terminology over against a stranger's, so you could _easily_ recognize your infinite Creator's breathed words in Scripture. The disparity between God and any other counterfeit author (e.g. Joseph Smith or a demon) is more than enough to distinguish between an obvious revelation of God, with marks of deity, and a counterfeit.



steven-nemes said:


> Perhaps it could be said that the desire to believe in anything but Yahweh might exist "below the surface", so to speak. I don't think that anyone, at the moment they sin, for the most part, is aware of the fact that they want to break God's law at that very moment. Perhaps all they want to do is to commit sin S1, unaware even that it might be a sin or that they are breaking God's law. Though of course they do commit the sin out of rebellion towards God, they might not be aware of the fact at the moment. Likewise, I think it possible that a person might desire to disbelieve in Yahweh and believe in Allah, for example, though not be aware of the fact, and in this sense, the belief in Allah just "was formed" in him, without his knowing that he wanted to believe it.



Although I know very little about the whole debate, what you have brought up is a huge chunk of ethical philosophy, whether anyone does evil _knowing_ he is doing evil. Where I saw it mentioned, the Christian author vehemently rejected it, and it seems to go contrary to my personal experience, so I'm not the biggest fan of it.

However, in response, I would have to say that awareness must exist _in a sense_, because a sin that is completely subconscious and apart from any willed action of our own is simply not a sin. We do not necessarily have to be aware that an action of ours is a sin, but to be unaware that we're actually carrying out the action (e.g. your example of disbelieving in Yahweh), and still be held responsible for the action, is an impossibility. Therefore it would still be the case that a belief cannot form as "initially sinful" (i.e., not a distortion of the already-present truth), because it would have to be based off a subconscious or purely latent sin, but such a "sin" is impossible.



steven-nemes said:


> Well likewise, disbelief in Yahweh could be exactly the sort of obstinate, absurdly stubborn disbelief as you outlined above in the paedobaptism example. But perhaps the desire to disbelieve in Yahweh, because of all the implications of believing in him, is much much stronger than the desire of this particularly rebellious fellow to believe in paedobaptism. And so it could appear more regularly and more intensely and perhaps more easily.



And that's my point -- such obstinacy would have to be against a correct belief or correct proposition _of which the sinner is aware_.


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## steven-nemes

I won't bother quoting it, but I will say this regarding the discussion of the Bible being clearly God's word: it seems to me that the notion of "clarity" is an entirely viewer-relative concept. I think it possible that to the believer and to God, the Bible is clearly his word, and yet to the sinner it (seems to him) clearly is not, or perhaps it is not clear that it is by any means, because perhaps he only sees things through his sinful lenses. Yet I should think it true that such a person would be still be held responsible for disbelieving in the Bible's truth claims and ignoring its ethical commands.



> However, in response, I would have to say that awareness must exist _in a sense_, because a sin that is completely subconscious and apart from any willed action of our own is simply not a sin. We do not necessarily have to be aware that an action of ours is a sin, but to be unaware that we're actually carrying out the action (e.g. your example of disbelieving in Yahweh), and still be held responsible for the action, is an impossibility. Therefore it would still be the case that a belief cannot form as "initially sinful" (i.e., not a distortion of the already-present truth), because it would have to be based off a subconscious or purely latent sin, but such a "sin" is impossible.



So to be a sin, an action must be contrary to the commands of God as written in the Bible, and the person committing the sin might would need to have been able to do otherwise, and the person must be aware that he is committing the action, but not necessarily that the action is a sin? I would agree with that, and would say this: that a person can subconsciously cause himself to disbelieve in Yahweh, and in this sense, relative to himself, it would seem that the belief in any other false god was spontaneous or sudden or just produced in him by his cognitive faculties, and this would be a sin if he is aware that he is disbelieving in Yahweh and believing in any other false-god.



> And that's my point -- such obstinacy would have to be against a correct belief or correct proposition _of which the sinner is aware_.



But it might not seem to the person committing the sin of disbelief in the appropriate circumstances that it is clear that God exists given his circumstances. He simply finds himself observing complex underwater life systems and comes to the conclusion that they evolved some 13 trillion years ago, or whatever. The idea that God exists might never go through his mind, and yet I should think he is still responsible.


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## Michael Butterfield

JonathanHunt said:


> I preach the gospel.



Now this is the real answer!  Let the Lion loose!


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## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> I won't bother quoting it, but I will say this regarding the discussion of the Bible being clearly God's word: it seems to me that the notion of "clarity" is an entirely viewer-relative concept. I think it possible that to the believer and to God, the Bible is clearly his word, and yet to the sinner it (seems to him) clearly is not, or perhaps it is not clear that it is by any means, because perhaps he only sees things through his sinful lenses. Yet I should think it true that such a person would be still be held responsible for disbelieving in the Bible's truth claims and ignoring its ethical commands.



Well, if the sinner views things only through sinful (and therefore immorally self-imposed) lenses, then it seems pretty clear to me that the objective clarity of the Bible is being shut out. If there is a light and a person claims not to see it because he closes his eyes, the light is still _objectively_ shining.

You could again bring up the "different wavelength" aspect, but at that point you'd have to concede that the different wavelength is imposed upon the sinner's own sight, reverting back to the paragraph immediately above.



steven-nemes said:


> So to be a sin, an action must be contrary to the commands of God as written in the Bible, and the person committing the sin might would need to have been able to do otherwise, and the person must be aware that he is committing the action, but not necessarily that the action is a sin?



They would have had to do otherwise in the compatibilist sense, not the libertarian sense, yes. I really, really want to stress that I am not positing free will here.



steven-nemes said:


> I would agree with that, and would say this: that a person can subconsciously cause himself to disbelieve in Yahweh, and in this sense, relative to himself, it would seem that the belief in any other false god was spontaneous or sudden or just produced in him by his cognitive faculties, and this would be a sin if he is aware that he is disbelieving in Yahweh and believing in any other false-god.



I'm sorry; I'm not sure what you're telling me here. You say that the person is subconsciously causing himself to disbelieve in Yahweh, and that it would be a sin if he is aware that he is disbelieving in Yahweh. Are you attempting to set these two equal? Are you saying that the subconscious disbelief in Yahweh is free from moral responsibility? I apologize; I just don't get what you're saying.



steven-nemes said:


> But it might not seem to the person committing the sin of disbelief in the appropriate circumstances that it is clear that God exists given his circumstances. He simply finds himself observing complex underwater life systems and comes to the conclusion that they evolved some 13 trillion years ago, or whatever. The idea that God exists might never go through his mind, and yet I should think he is still responsible.



Interestingly enough, I would say that the proposition does come up but can be immediately suppressed. God's natural revelation perspicuously and adamantly reveals His status as Creator to all rational creatures, but it is extremely easy for sinners to suppress the truth in unrighteousness and deceive themselves. The atheist might say that it never comes into his mind, but his sinful cognitive faculties are always at work. If creation really does clearly reveal God's attributes, as I believe Romans 1 says it does, then it is the case that atheists are confronted by the existence of a sovereign Creator even when viewing underwater life, and that this proposition runs through their mind _in some sense that involves moral responsibility_. I would not say it's subconscious, but I would say that self-deception occurs. Atheists can make themselves believe they do not believe a specific proposition when they have already intellectually assented to it.


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## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> Well, if the sinner views things only through sinful (and therefore immorally self-imposed) lenses, then it seems pretty clear to me that the objective clarity of the Bible is being shut out. If there is a light and a person claims not to see it because he closes his eyes, the light is still _objectively_ shining.



I am doubtful that there is any sort of thing as "objective" clarity; clarity is relevant so long as there is an observer, and of course the clarity of an object is relative to that observer. For believers whose minds are being "rewired" if I may use that phrase, the Bible becomes clearly God's word because their minds are becoming more and more like Christ's. For an unbeliever, whose minds don't understand and comprehend the line of reasoning and such in the Bible, the reason of God, it is not clear at all that this should be the revealed written word of X, where X is their conception of what 'God' is like.



> I'm sorry; I'm not sure what you're telling me here. You say that the person is subconsciously causing himself to disbelieve in Yahweh, and that it would be a sin if he is aware that he is disbelieving in Yahweh. Are you attempting to set these two equal? Are you saying that the subconscious disbelief in Yahweh is free from moral responsibility? I apologize; I just don't get what you're saying.



I'm saying I think it possible that a person might not be aware that he is trying to disbelieve in Yahweh, but he may be aware of his belief in Shiva or Allah, and so it would be sin. And in this sense, he can say that the belief was simply produced in him, because he was not aware of his desire to believe in it and disbelieve in the Christian explanation.



> Interestingly enough, I would say that the proposition does come up but can be immediately suppressed. God's natural revelation perspicuously and adamantly reveals His status as Creator to all rational creatures, but it is extremely easy for sinners to suppress the truth in unrighteousness and deceive themselves. The atheist might say that it never comes into his mind, but his sinful cognitive faculties are always at work. If creation really does clearly reveal God's attributes, as I believe Romans 1 says it does, then it is the case that atheists are confronted by the existence of a sovereign Creator even when viewing underwater life, and that this proposition runs through their mind _in some sense that involves moral responsibility_. I would not say it's subconscious, but I would say that self-deception occurs. Atheists can make themselves believe they do not believe a specific proposition when they have already intellectually assented to it.



I find it hard to think that the proposition does come up in their mind. I am doubtful that it ever does. I would say that while they are not conscious of it, they are purposefully trying to disbelieve that Yahweh created the coral reef and purposefully believing in any other explanation Y. I am skeptical that an atheist is aware of his purposefully choosing to find any other explanation for the created order.


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## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> I am doubtful that there is any sort of thing as "objective" clarity; clarity is relevant so long as there is an observer, and of course the clarity of an object is relative to that observer.



Before looking at Romans 1 to see how the clearness of general revelation is mentioned, I just want to deal with this concept of clarity _per se_. I cannot dispute with your saying that the concept of clarity requires an observer -- for an illumination is always clear to someone -- and the clearness perceived by the observer depends on the observer to some extent -- for the observer can have his eyes opened or closed, or some other similar factor can be different. But I cannot help but think that this _necessarily_ depends upon a specific level of _objective_ clarity that must exist prior to the impartation on the observer.

Take a light bulb for example. It doesn't make sense to say that it shines at a specific luminosity without presupposing someone's perception of that illumination; a light bulb must shine _on_ or _to_ something or someone else. And, of course, two observers of the same light bulb can perceive varying amounts of illumination, for one can have his eyes closed and another his eyes open. But still, this luminosity can be measured objectively, by how much it illumines some specific, "ideal" observer (ignoring measurable wavelengths, etc. for the sake of argument). Likewise, the clarity of Scripture is how much a completely "ideal" observer, one who is seeing with his eyes open so to speak, will perceive and understand it. And the Bible is obviously God's Word in that respect. This, especially in conjunction with the doctrine of regeneration (which is only a subjective change), really seems to favor that the Bible is objectively perspicuous in its attestation as the very Word of God.



steven-nemes said:


> For believers whose minds are being "rewired" if I may use that phrase, the Bible becomes clearly God's word because their minds are becoming more and more like Christ's. For an unbeliever, whose minds don't understand and comprehend the line of reasoning and such in the Bible, the reason of God, it is not clear at all that this should be the revealed written word of X, where X is their conception of what 'God' is like.



If the original beliefs that unregenerates receive are not displaying the existence (and wrath) of Jehovah _qua_ Creator God, then again questions of moral responsibility arise. And this seems to run contrary to the suppression of the truth mentioned in Romans 1, as suppression presupposes possession.



steven-nemes said:


> I'm saying I think it possible that a person might not be aware that he is trying to disbelieve in Yahweh, but he may be aware of his belief in Shiva or Allah, and so it would be sin. And in this sense, he can say that the belief was simply produced in him, because he was not aware of his desire to believe in it and disbelieve in the Christian explanation.



While I realize many unbelievers hate this doctrine -- I remember one castigating a presuppositionalist for denying that even the most ostensible of atheists is a "true" atheist who lacks all belief in God -- I simply do not understand how one could say they _subconsciously_ disbelieve in Yahweh (if that's what you're trying to say). Subconscious activity is outside the realm of moral responsibility, and the suppression of the truth definitely indicates an active act of unrighteousness by unbelievers. Self-deception can play an inordinate role here, one that would make unbelievers _think_ that they actually do not believe in Yahweh, or even care about believing in Him. Self-deception therefore accounts for the apparently obvious evidence that unbelievers do not go about espousing their hatred of God and disbelief in Him.



steven-nemes said:


> I find it hard to think that the proposition does come up in their mind. I am doubtful that it ever does. I would say that while they are not conscious of it, they are purposefully trying to disbelieve that Yahweh created the coral reef and purposefully believing in any other explanation Y. I am skeptical that an atheist is aware of his purposefully choosing to find any other explanation for the created order.



I think what's important here is that we understand more about consciousness, subconsciousness, and moral responsibility. It is very possible for us to do things "without even thinking about them," yet still in a way that we are morally responsible, for example, looking lustfully at girls. (It is hard work to train one's eyes in the quest of sin-mortification!) We can do things automatically because we have conditioned ourselves to do so, and we therefore can commit these actions "under the radar," but _not subconsciously_, as that involves a complete absence of conscious activity. Likewise, atheists can simply have conditioned themselves to look over the perspicuous witness of God in natural revelation "without even thinking about it." They have learned how to deal with His face everywhere in such a way that it seems automatic to them, thereby making their suppression of the truth "under the radar" (therefore accounting for the experiential evidence), yet still in a morally responsible fashion (therefore accounting for the Scriptural evidence). 

So, I think we might actually have a good agreement here; I just need to be more clear in my terminology regarding consciousness and subconsciousness.


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## Pergamum

Interesting thread.....


In my experience I have never known an effective evangelist who purposely picked out one of these apolgetical methods and applied it in their witnesses. 

Perhaps, afterwards, we could say, "See, he is mainly using evidentialism like Josh McDowell...etc" but, sorry, I have never known anyone who was really big into apologetics that ever influenced large numbers of unbelievers into the faith. Mostly they strengthen those already in the faith (which also has its place and is also important).

Actually, in my experience, the most effective evangelists were not even the ones that "witnessed" or had any sort of conscious method at all...they just had a pragmatic zeal and loved people. There is a book out called "Stop Witnessing and Start Loving" and this summarizes my views of what American churches ought to be doing.

Also, these apologetical schools are all quite cerebral and I will strongly affirm that most folks who want to become Christ-followers do so because they are hurting - they become open to Christ and begin their journey of faith which culminates in the New Birth more often than not for non-cerebral reasons. 

They are not argued into the Kingdom - they are attracted by the beauty of Christ and by Christians as well. 

I will say it, again and again, most encounters where I have seen and I have known others to go from being unsaved to the point where the process begins where they become open and listening and attentive to the Gospel happened in the following situations: 
---(1) not in a church nor on a Sunday, 
---(2) During times of psychological stress and through someone who already has a relationship with the new "seeker" - not a cold contact or someone knocking on a door on a Tuesday Night, 
---(3) through personal compassion and even simple prayer for a person 

...................and then, only later - once the person was open - were intellectual answers introduced. I.e., relationship seemed to be THE key factor. 

---(4) Public preaching was not the main means, but dialogue and close and intimate discussion with the person 
---(5) Then, following this, many of these people became open to going to church and reading materials and making a profession and entering into the life of a church. The, these apologetical schools might be of help.


So, if we are doing an After Action Review, for the purpose of initial witness to the lost, it matters little which of these apologetical schools you use. Only later, when the person begins digging deeper this all might matter, but if we are talking about evangelism and not discipleship of those who are already saved and already willingly under the public preaching of the Word, then I would say the best approach is (1) caring relationship and (2) prayer.


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## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> Before looking at Romans 1 to see how the clearness of general revelation is mentioned, I just want to deal with this concept of clarity _per se_. I cannot dispute with your saying that the concept of clarity requires an observer -- for an illumination is always clear to someone -- and the clearness perceived by the observer depends on the observer to some extent -- for the observer can have his eyes opened or closed, or some other similar factor can be different. But I cannot help but think that this _necessarily_ depends upon a specific level of _objective_ clarity that must exist prior to the impartation on the observer.



What do we mean by objective clarity? Does it make much sense to say that something is objectively clear? How can it be that an object is clearly a(n) "X" even if no one is around to observe it as being so? These are interesting questions that would perhaps take a bit more than a few paragraphs to answer...



> Take a light bulb for example. It doesn't make sense to say that it shines at a specific luminosity without presupposing someone's perception of that illumination; a light bulb must shine _on_ or _to_ something or someone else. And, of course, two observers of the same light bulb can perceive varying amounts of illumination, for one can have his eyes closed and another his eyes open. But still, this luminosity can be measured objectively, by how much it illumines some specific, "ideal" observer (ignoring measurable wavelengths, etc. for the sake of argument). Likewise, the clarity of Scripture is how much a completely "ideal" observer, one who is seeing with his eyes open so to speak, will perceive and understand it. And the Bible is obviously God's Word in that respect. This, especially in conjunction with the doctrine of regeneration (which is only a subjective change), really seems to favor that the Bible is objectively perspicuous in its attestation as the very Word of God.



I would say that the notion of an ideal observer is entirely subjective; what would an ideal observer be except either (a) a person that sees it as we do, or (b) a person that sees it as it is really , or (b) a person that sees it as God sees it? In (a) and (c), it is still the subjective perception of a person; in the case of (b), how do we know that _we_ don't see it as it is really? How can we think that it is even possible to observe something as it is really, without any subjective element at all? That would involve observing it without any "worldview" framework with which to fit in into; is there such a person out there? If it is possible, how do I know I'm not observing it objectively?



> If the original beliefs that unregenerates receive are not displaying the existence (and wrath) of Jehovah _qua_ Creator God, then again questions of moral responsibility arise. And this seems to run contrary to the suppression of the truth mentioned in Romans 1, as suppression presupposes possession.



I wouldn't know at what point in life those beliefs come up, or when the proposition "Jehovah is the creator of the universe, and it displays his power, etc." comes up in an unbeliever's mind to be immediately suppressed; but I do know that "the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing", and that "the man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned". And so in this sense, it would not be clear to any unbeliever that the ESV I have is the word of God.



> While I realize many unbelievers hate this doctrine -- I remember one castigating a presuppositionalist for denying that even the most ostensible of atheists is a "true" atheist who lacks all belief in God -- I simply do not understand how one could say they _subconsciously_ disbelieve in Yahweh (if that's what you're trying to say). Subconscious activity is outside the realm of moral responsibility, and the suppression of the truth definitely indicates an active act of unrighteousness by unbelievers. Self-deception can play an inordinate role here, one that would make unbelievers _think_ that they actually do not believe in Yahweh, or even care about believing in Him. Self-deception therefore accounts for the apparently obvious evidence that unbelievers do not go about espousing their hatred of God and disbelief in Him.



I did not say men subconsciously disbelieve in Yahweh; sorry if I am not being clear!  I said that there desire to disbelieve in him and, positively, to belief in false-god X in certain circumstances in which that sin is the relevant one--they may not even be aware of that desire at all. They might simply find themselves believing in Shiva, unaware of the fact that they are lying to themselves.



> I think what's important here is that we understand more about consciousness, subconsciousness, and moral responsibility. It is very possible for us to do things "without even thinking about them," yet still in a way that we are morally responsible, for example, looking lustfully at girls. (It is hard work to train one's eyes in the quest of sin-mortification!) We can do things automatically because we have conditioned ourselves to do so, and we therefore can commit these actions "under the radar," but _not subconsciously_, as that involves a complete absence of conscious activity. Likewise, atheists can simply have conditioned themselves to look over the perspicuous witness of God in natural revelation "without even thinking about it." They have learned how to deal with His face everywhere in such a way that it seems automatic to them, thereby making their suppression of the truth "under the radar" (therefore accounting for the experiential evidence), yet still in a morally responsible fashion (therefore accounting for the Scriptural evidence).



Yes, this is what I was trying to describe above.


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## TheFleshProfitethNothing

I don't apologize for Christ I simpley; proclaim, declare, and contend for the faith.

Oh! almost forgot! I'm not used to apologetics with mere natural brute beasts, as if I had the ability to give them the understanding of that which is beyond their understanding. I simply preach the gospel, unless I get wrapped up in some battle of intellectual reasoning with those who cannot rationally understand that which is otherwise irrational, though (it's ironic) that the gospel is completely RATIONAL, but only to those who are .....what?

Take a wild guess...

Check back later for the answers given


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## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> What do we mean by objective clarity? Does it make much sense to say that something is objectively clear? How can it be that an object is clearly a(n) "X" even if no one is around to observe it as being so? These are interesting questions that would perhaps take a bit more than a few paragraphs to answer...



Obviously clarity presupposes an observer, but it doesn't follow that there is no standard of clarity that a rational observer ought to accept. And I would say that something is objectively clear or perspicuous if a rational observer can recognize it.



steven-nemes said:


> I would say that the notion of an ideal observer is entirely subjective; what would an ideal observer be except either (a) a person that sees it as we do, or (b) a person that sees it as it is really , or (b) a person that sees it as God sees it? In (a) and (c), it is still the subjective perception of a person; in the case of (b), how do we know that _we_ don't see it as it is really? How can we think that it is even possible to observe something as it is really, without any subjective element at all? That would involve observing it without any "worldview" framework with which to fit in into; is there such a person out there? If it is possible, how do I know I'm not observing it objectively?



Option (c) is what I would go with. And that's not subjective at all. In fact, it could not get any more objective than that. The new man, now regenerated, has the mind of Christ.

I'm not sure I follow your reasoning that "in (a) and (c), it is still the subjective perception of a person." I realize that God is a subject. But all I'm doing right now is establishing what an ideal/rational observer is, not the objective clarity of something.



steven-nemes said:


> I wouldn't know at what point in life those beliefs come up, or when the proposition "Jehovah is the creator of the universe, and it displays his power, etc." comes up in an unbeliever's mind to be immediately suppressed; but I do know that "the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing", and that "the man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned". And so in this sense, it would not be clear to any unbeliever that the ESV I have is the word of God.



First, I'd maintain that the fact that I do not know when exactly unbelievers would be confronted with those propositions is not disparaging to the point I'm trying to make.

Second, the cross would be foolishness because the unbeliever has already (sinfully) selected an autonomous presupposition and is already interpreting information he is given through his unbelieving worldview. It does not follow that he was never confronted by propositions of Jehovah's sovereignty or status as Creator.



steven-nemes said:


> I did not say men subconsciously disbelieve in Yahweh; sorry if I am not being clear!  I said that there desire to disbelieve in him and, positively, to belief in false-god X in certain circumstances in which that sin is the relevant one--they may not even be aware of that desire at all. They might simply find themselves believing in Shiva, unaware of the fact that they are lying to themselves.



So would you say that the desire to believe in a false god is more overt or prominent in their minds than the desire to disbelieve in Yahweh? And perhaps that the less prominent desire (the desire to disbelieve in Yahweh) would be an example of the "under the radar" but not subconscious actions of the unbeliever?

If so, I would say we are in agreement. 



steven-nemes said:


> I think what's important here is that we understand more about consciousness, subconsciousness, and moral responsibility. It is very possible for us to do things "without even thinking about them," yet still in a way that we are morally responsible, for example, looking lustfully at girls. (It is hard work to train one's eyes in the quest of sin-mortification!) We can do things automatically because we have conditioned ourselves to do so, and we therefore can commit these actions "under the radar," but _not subconsciously_, as that involves a complete absence of conscious activity. Likewise, atheists can simply have conditioned themselves to look over the perspicuous witness of God in natural revelation "without even thinking about it." They have learned how to deal with His face everywhere in such a way that it seems automatic to them, thereby making their suppression of the truth "under the radar" (therefore accounting for the experiential evidence), yet still in a morally responsible fashion (therefore accounting for the Scriptural evidence).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, this is what I was trying to describe above.
Click to expand...


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## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> Obviously clarity presupposes an observer, but it doesn't follow that there is no standard of clarity that a rational observer ought to accept. And I would say that something is objectively clear or perspicuous if a rational observer can recognize it.



I don't understand what you mean by a standard of clarity. I will just address this in the next paragraph.



> I would say that the notion of an ideal observer is entirely subjective; what would an ideal observer be except either (a) a person that sees it as we do, or (b) a person that sees it as it is really , or (c) a person that sees it as God sees it? In (a) and (c), it is still the subjective perception of a person; in the case of (b), how do we know that _we_ don't see it as it is really? How can we think that it is even possible to observe something as it is really, without any subjective element at all? That would involve observing it without any "worldview" framework with which to fit in into; is there such a person out there? If it is possible, how do I know I'm not observing it objectively?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Option (c) is what I would go with. And that's not subjective at all. In fact, it could not get any more objective than that. The new man, now regenerated, has the mind of Christ.
> 
> I'm not sure I follow your reasoning that "in (a) and (c), it is still the subjective perception of a person." I realize that God is a subject. But all I'm doing right now is establishing what an ideal/rational observer is, not the objective clarity of something.
Click to expand...


It would be fine if you would say that God's perception of an object X is the standard by which we judge clear perception of objects, but that doesn't mean that his perception is also not subjective. It can still be subjective (and I should think it is) but at the same time be our standard.

What would you say it means to say that a person observes something objectively? If you say observe it how God observes it, then either (a): God also observes things objectively, in which case the question has not really been answered, or (b) God's perception of a thing is the standard and his perception is constant and unchanging, but that doesn't exclude the notion that it is equally subjective.


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## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> It would be fine if you would say that God's perception of an object X is the standard by which we judge clear perception of objects, but that doesn't mean that his perception is also not subjective. It can still be subjective (and I should think it is) but at the same time be our standard.



I wouldn't say that the perception is subjective, but rather that whatever object God perceives -- or rather, some specific quality of an object -- would then be objectively perceptible. If God sees that the Bible is obviously His Word, then so should humans. If God perceives that the Bible is His Word, then the Bible must objectively possess some property such that any onlooker will undoubtedly notice that property. For if the object did not possess such a property, then God would be mistaken in perceiving such a property. And He cannot be mistaken.



steven-nemes said:


> What would you say it means to say that a person observes something objectively? If you say observe it how God observes it, then either (a): God also observes things objectively, in which case the question has not really been answered, or (b) God's perception of a thing is the standard and his perception is constant and unchanging, but that doesn't exclude the notion that it is equally subjective.



I think talking about a "person observing something objectively" can be misleading, as I am instead positing that some specific object has a property which is objectively perspicuous.

Thus I would go with (b). If I have not explained myself clearly in the first paragraph of this post that I wrote (or if there are any fallacies (obviously)), then please do not hesitate to say so.


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## steven-nemes

I had a long response worded out, but I went in a circle and ended up back in the discussion of self-imposed blindness and so on.

I suppose perhaps we can call it quits for this one


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## Confessor

That sounds good to me, Steven. I thoroughly enjoyed elaborating on my position as well as your helping me understand how our emotions and sinfulness play a role in what we believe.


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## Oecolampadius

It's good to see that Van Tillian Presup is winning the poll.


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