# Gordon H. Clark on Logic in Man



## Whitefield

Gordon H. Clark, _Logic_, pp. 122-124



> _Logic in Man_
> 
> With this understanding of God’s mind, the next step is the creation of man in God’s image. The non-rational animals were not created in his image; but God breathed his spirit into the earthly form, and Adam became a type of soul superior to the animals.
> 
> To be precise, one should not speak of the image of God in man. Man is not something in which somewhere God’s image can be found along with other things. Man _is_ the image. This, of course, does not refer to man’s body. The body is an instrument or tool man uses. He himself is God’s breath, the spirit God breathed into the clay, the mind, the thinking ego. Therefore, man is rational in the likeness of God’s rationality. His mind is structured as Aristotelian logic described it. That is why we believe that spaniels have teeth.
> 
> In addition to the well-known verses in chapter one, Genesis 5:1 and 9:6 both repeat the idea. 1 Corinthians 11:7 says, "man ... is the image and glory of God." See also Colossians 3:10 and James 3:9. Other verses, not so explicit, nonetheless add to our information. Compare Hebrews 1:3, Hebrews 2:6-8, and Psalm 8. But the conclusive consideration is that throughout the Bible as a whole the rational God gives man an intelligible message.
> 
> It is strange that anyone who thinks he is a Christian should deprecate logic. Such a person does not of course intend to deprecate the mind of God; but he thinks that logic in man is sinful, even more sinful than other parts of man’s fallen nature. This, however, makes no sense. The law of contradiction cannot be sinful. Quite the contrary, it is our violations of the law of contradiction that are sinful. Yet the strictures which some devotional writers place on "merely human" logic are amazing. Can such pious stupidity really mean that a syllogism that is valid for us is invalid for God? If two plus two is four in our arithmetic, does God have a different arithmetic in which two and two makes three or perhaps five?
> 
> The fact that the Son of God is God’s reason—for Christ is the wisdom of God as well as the power of God—plus the fact that the image in man is so-called "human reason," suffices to show that this so-called "human reason" is not so much human as divine.
> 
> Of course, the Scripture says that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts and his ways are not our ways. But is it good exegesis to say that this means his logic, his arithmetic, his truth are not ours? If this were so, what would the consequences be? It would mean not only that our additions and subtractions are all wrong, but also that all our thoughts—in history as well as in arithmetic—are all wrong. If for example, we think that David was King of Israel, and God’s thoughts are not ours, then it follows that God does not think David was King of Israel. David in God’s mind was perchance prime minister of Babylon.
> 
> To avoid this irrationalism, which of course is a denial of the divine image, we must insist that truth is the same for God and man. Naturally, we may not know the truth about some matters. But if we know anything at all, what we must know must be identical with what God knows. God knows all truth, and unless we know something God knows, our ideas are untrue. It is absolutely essential therefore to insist that there is an area of coincidence between God’s mind and our mind.


----------



## MW

Whitefield said:


> To avoid this irrationalism, which of course is a denial of the divine image, we must insist that truth is the same for God and man.
Click to expand...


Given the incomprehensibility of God, the possibility of man knowing what God knows can only be predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. Any denial of this fact involves man in rational idolatry.


----------



## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> To avoid this irrationalism, which of course is a denial of the divine image, we must insist that truth is the same for God and man.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Given the incomprehensibility of God, the possibility of man knowing what God knows can only be predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. Any denial of this fact involves man in rational idolatry.
Click to expand...


Would this imply a qualitative difference in the propositions that man and God know?

Would 1+1=2 mean something different to man than to God? If so, how, and how does that not entail skepticism?

I guess I'm just not seeing the distinction you're making here. It is fairly clear that, in some sense, the proposition we have in our mind must be present somewhere in God's mind for us to know it.


----------



## VictorBravo

Confessor said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Given the incomprehensibility of God, the possibility of man knowing what God knows can only be predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. Any denial of this fact involves man in rational idolatry.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Would this imply a qualitative difference in the propositions that man and God know?
> 
> Would 1+1=2 mean something different to man than to God? If so, how, and how does that not entail skepticism?
> 
> I guess I'm just not seeing the distinction you're making here. It is fairly clear that, in some sense, the proposition we have in our mind must be present somewhere in God's mind for us to know it.
Click to expand...



Ben, note Matthew's careful phrasing: "predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. . . ."

1 + 1 = 2 means exactly what God would have us to understand it means. The concept is the same to God and to Man, but God's understanding of everything entailed in that expression is far more vast than ours. In the realm of counting, 1 + 1 = 2, but in the realm of marriage, for example, God tells us that 1 + 1 = 1. 

In other words, the concept of unity and addition have greater depth and consequences than our finite minds can conceive on their own, yet what we do conceive, if true, comports with the truth as God would have us understand it.


----------



## Confessor

victorbravo said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> Given the incomprehensibility of God, the possibility of man knowing what God knows can only be predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. Any denial of this fact involves man in rational idolatry.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Would this imply a qualitative difference in the propositions that man and God know?
> 
> Would 1+1=2 mean something different to man than to God? If so, how, and how does that not entail skepticism?
> 
> I guess I'm just not seeing the distinction you're making here. It is fairly clear that, in some sense, the proposition we have in our mind must be present somewhere in God's mind for us to know it.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> Ben, note Matthew's careful phrasing: "predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. . . ."
> 
> 1 + 1 = 2 means exactly what God would have us to understand it means. The concept is the same to God and to Man, but God's understanding of everything entailed in that expression is far more vast than ours. In the realm of counting, 1 + 1 = 2, but in the realm of marriage, for example, God tells us that 1 + 1 = 1.
> 
> In other words, the concept of unity and addition have greater depth and consequences than our finite minds can conceive on their own, yet what we do conceive, if true, comports with the truth as God would have us understand it.
Click to expand...


Okay, that's what I was hoping to hear.

To reiterate: are you saying that since God knows 1+1=2 in the context of every other proposition in the world, it follows that He has a _qualitatively deeper_ knowledge of that proposition than man?


----------



## rbcbob

Clark v/s Van Til all over again!


----------



## sealdaSupralapsarian

armourbearer said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> To avoid this irrationalism, which of course is a denial of the divine image, we must insist that truth is the same for God and man.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Given the incomprehensibility of God, the possibility of man knowing what God knows can only be predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. Any denial of this fact involves man in rational idolatry.
Click to expand...


*Clark has a good critique of Rationalism you may want to listen to if you are gathering from that quote that he means anything you are asserting. If God's comprehension is different than ours then that leads to irrational idolatry. There would be no need for confessions, creeds, nor scripture for our Comprehension is not capable of understanding that of God's. *

Grace and Peace,
seal

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 02:52:23 EST-----



Confessor said:


> victorbravo said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would this imply a qualitative difference in the propositions that man and God know?
> 
> Would 1+1=2 mean something different to man than to God? If so, how, and how does that not entail skepticism?
> 
> I guess I'm just not seeing the distinction you're making here. It is fairly clear that, in some sense, the proposition we have in our mind must be present somewhere in God's mind for us to know it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ben, note Matthew's careful phrasing: "predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. . . ."
> 
> 1 + 1 = 2 means exactly what God would have us to understand it means. The concept is the same to God and to Man, but God's understanding of everything entailed in that expression is far more vast than ours. In the realm of counting, 1 + 1 = 2, but in the realm of marriage, for example, God tells us that 1 + 1 = 1.
> 
> In other words, the concept of unity and addition have greater depth and consequences than our finite minds can conceive on their own, yet what we do conceive, if true, comports with the truth as God would have us understand it.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Okay, that's what I was hoping to hear.
> 
> To reiterate: are you saying that since God knows 1+1=2 in the context of every other proposition in the world, it follows that He has a _qualitatively deeper_ knowledge of that proposition than man?
Click to expand...


*What??? How do you suppose that it's Qualitative? Are we to think three friends who agree on everything are 1 since the Trinity is 1???...LOL... What God gives there in scripture of a man and woman being one is a proposition. Not him showing how more Qualitative his mind than our when it comes to math...LOL...We can all comprehend and understand completely what God means by a man and woman being One.

God's knowledge is infinitely more in quantity.*

Grace and Peace,
seal


----------



## Confessor

sealdaSupralapsarian said:


> *What??? How do you suppose that it's Qualitative? Are we to think three friends who agree on everything are 1 since the Trinity is 1???...LOL... What God gives there in scripture of a man and woman being one is a proposition. Not him showing how more Qualitative his mind than our when it comes to math...LOL...We can all comprehend and understand completely what God means by a man and woman being One.
> 
> God's knowledge is infinitely more in quantity.*
> 
> Grace and Peace,
> seal



I'm not sure exactly what you're trying to prove with your examples of three friends agreeing and marriage, but for the record, I don't see a distinction between God's having a qualitatively deeper knowledge (in the sense I mentioned) and His having a quantitative difference in knowledge. I was going to make that point if I understood what Victor was saying.


----------



## VictorBravo

Confessor said:


> victorbravo said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would this imply a qualitative difference in the propositions that man and God know?
> 
> Would 1+1=2 mean something different to man than to God? If so, how, and how does that not entail skepticism?
> 
> I guess I'm just not seeing the distinction you're making here. It is fairly clear that, in some sense, the proposition we have in our mind must be present somewhere in God's mind for us to know it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ben, note Matthew's careful phrasing: "predicated on the understanding that the truth has been accommodated so as to be knowable by human capacity. . . ."
> 
> 1 + 1 = 2 means exactly what God would have us to understand it means. The concept is the same to God and to Man, but God's understanding of everything entailed in that expression is far more vast than ours. In the realm of counting, 1 + 1 = 2, but in the realm of marriage, for example, God tells us that 1 + 1 = 1.
> 
> In other words, the concept of unity and addition have greater depth and consequences than our finite minds can conceive on their own, yet what we do conceive, if true, comports with the truth as God would have us understand it.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Okay, that's what I was hoping to hear.
> 
> To reiterate: are you saying that since God knows 1+1=2 in the context of every other proposition in the world, it follows that He has a _qualitatively deeper_ knowledge of that proposition than man?
Click to expand...


I'm having a bit of trouble with "qualitative." I could just as easily describe it as quantitative.

Maybe an analogy might help with what I mean: A child can learn 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples. The child then learns that this applies to oranges as well. This is an abstraction that is earth-shaking for thought. The child then can apply the principle to counting any number of things.

But still, the child doesn't really understand what else is implied by 1 + 1 = 2. For instance, it will be a while before the child can understand that a series of 1 + 1s put into a mathematical expression, and then divided by the same series plus yet another "1" defines a powerful limit function. The mathematician who uses limit functions every day uses the basic addition proposition in ways that can boggle the mind.

In a similar fashion, God understands the full expression of 1 + 1 = 2, in all of its combinations and permutations, in the created universe without having to do any calculations at all. He set these things forth. So, yes, in that sense, his qualitative understanding of the proposition is much deeper. But in the sense of whether 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples, in a particular location, I don't see how there could be any qualitative difference.

Maybe I'm missing your question. I do think that there is a qualitative difference in how we understand propositions, but not in the propositions themselves. For example: God created us with an intuitive and innate capacity to abstract from observation: we add two items together and get a sum. We cannot, however, do that for every item in the universe. We must remain content with the knowledge that this is a universal truth that we cannot verify for ourselves in every case.

But God doesn't have to be content with this understanding. He knows of every item in the created universe and he can account for them without abstraction. So his understanding of the proposition is from the perspective of creating an order in which the proposition is true, whereas our understanding is derivitive of (1) observation of that order and (2) revelation.


----------



## sealdaSupralapsarian

Confessor said:


> sealdaSupralapsarian said:
> 
> 
> 
> *What??? How do you suppose that it's Qualitative? Are we to think three friends who agree on everything are 1 since the Trinity is 1???...LOL... What God gives there in scripture of a man and woman being one is a proposition. Not him showing how more Qualitative his mind than our when it comes to math...LOL...We can all comprehend and understand completely what God means by a man and woman being One.
> 
> God's knowledge is infinitely more in quantity.*
> 
> Grace and Peace,
> seal
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure exactly what you're trying to prove with your examples of three friends agreeing and marriage, but for the record, I don't see a distinction between God's having a qualitatively deeper knowledge (in the sense I mentioned) and His having a quantitative difference in knowledge. I was going to make that point if I understood what Victor was saying.
Click to expand...



*Samething I was thinking. What is confessor trying to prove with marriage and the qualitative knowledge of God? A bit incompatible.

There is a clear difference and distinction between qualitative and quantitative knowledge. You can't say God has both and mean the samething for both definition can you?*


Grace and Peace,
seal


----------



## Confessor

Victor, 

If you already agree that the "how" is qualitatively different whereas the "what" is only quantitatively different, then why would Clark be accused of rational idolatry?

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 03:14:33 EST-----



sealdaSupralapsarian said:


> *Samething I was thinking. What is confessor trying to prove with marriage and the qualitative knowledge of God? A bit incompatible.
> 
> There is a clear difference and distinction between qualitative and quantitative knowledge. You can't say God has both and mean the samething for both definition can you?*
> 
> Grace and Peace,
> seal



First, you can call me Ben. 

Second, I didn't make the point about marriage.

Third, I agree that the objects of God's knowledge differs from man's only quantitatively. I am a Van Tillian, but I do not take everything CVT said as gospel.


----------



## sealdaSupralapsarian

Confessor said:


> First, you can call me Ben.
> 
> Second, I didn't make the point about marriage.
> 
> Third, I agree that the objects of God's knowledge differs from man's only quantitatively. I am a Van Tillian, but I do not take everything CVT said as gospel.



*Hmmmm...... Okay Ben, thanks. I thought you did but I may be mistaken again... Also, I didn't know you didn't take anything CVT said as Gospel. You're one of the first ones I've ran into to say it and still live....LOL....seriously though. Down here whenever I do visit a Presbyterian church I keep my Clarkianism to myself or risk being called a rationalist or Black Guy who thinks he's smart...LOL....*

Grace and Peace,
seal


----------



## VictorBravo

Confessor said:


> Victor,
> 
> If you already agree that the "how" is qualitatively different whereas the "what" is only quantitatively different, then why would Clark be accused of rational idolatry?



I didn't think he was being accused of rational idolatry, but rather that a cautious qualification should be observed. 

I don't want to replay the old debate, because I think it got bogged down in turf-battles over definitions, but I can't recall where, if anywhere, Clark addressed the question of how God's decree of propositional truth is from a different perspective than ours, ie. he is the source and we are the recipient.


----------



## Confessor

sealdaSupralapsarian said:


> *Also, I didn't know you didn't take anything CVT said as Gospel. You're one of the first ones I've ran into to say it and still live....LOL....seriously though. Down here whenever I do visit a Presbyterian church I keep my Clarkianism to myself or risk being called a rationalist or Black Guy who thinks he's smart...LOL....*



"Black Guy who thinks he's smart" 

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 03:27:00 EST-----



victorbravo said:


> I didn't think he was being accused of rational idolatry, but rather that a cautious qualification should be observed.
> 
> I don't want to replay the old debate, because I think it got bogged down in turf-battles over definitions, but I can't recall where, if anywhere, Clark addressed the question of how God's decree of propositional truth is from a different perspective than ours, ie. he is the source and we are the recipient.



I was referring to Rev. Winzer's mention above regarding "rational idolatry."

So was the charge against Clark in the "Complaint" that he didn't make the analogical nature of knowledge (God creates it and man discovers it, etc.) explicit enough?

I don't know, this seems to be a rather obvious thing that he would have believed. Was the problem that he didn't explicitly mention it?


----------



## chbrooking

At the obvious risk of a pile-on, since even Ben differs with me here, I would argue that, because of God's simplicity, if our knowledge coincided with his at any one point, then our knowledge would coincide with his at every point, and since our knowledge would coincide with God's -- again because of his simplicity -- we would be God.

We don't know things with the knowledge of the creator and source. We know derivatively and by reflection.


----------



## Confessor

I think that argument from God's simplicity would follow only if divine simplicity entailed that God knows only one proposition.

Keep in mind also that the "quantitative difference" advocates are pulling for a quantitative difference only regarding the _objects_ of knowledge, not the entire _process_ of knowledge, the "what" and not the "how."


----------



## Whitefield

chbrooking said:


> At the obvious risk of a pile-on, since even Ben differs with me here, I would argue that, because of God's simplicity, if our knowledge coincided with his at any one point, then our knowledge would coincide with his at every point, and since our knowledge would coincide with God's -- again because of his simplicity -- we would be God.
> 
> We don't know things with the knowledge of the creator and source. We know derivatively and by reflection.



Here is what I'm thinking on this matter. If I know my toe hurts, doesn't God also know my toe hurts. At that point don't we both know the same thing, i.e., my toe hurts. This doesn't mean I know everything God knows, but on that one point we both know my toe hurts. God's knowledge is more extensive, because He also knows why my toe hurts and how the pain will be resolved. Things I do not know. But isn't there at least one thing we both know in common - my toe hurts. Am I missing something here?


----------



## chbrooking

Confessor said:


> I think that argument from God's simplicity would follow only if divine simplicity entailed that God knows only one proposition.
> 
> Keep in mind also that the "quantitative difference" advocates are pulling for a quantitative difference only regarding the objects of knowledge, not the entire process of knowledge, the "what" and not the "how."



Your statement assumes that multiple propositions are independent and do not find unity in the knowledge of God.


----------



## Confessor

Yes, Lance, I would say that is it. In a sense, God's knowledge is qualitatively deeper regarding the fact that your toe hurts, but nonetheless this "qualitative" difference is nothing else than a quantitatively "thicker" knowledge of all the propositions relating to the pain of your toe.

Thus I'd think it'd be a misnomer to say that the objects of God's knowledge are qualitatively different from the objects of man's knowledge.

-----

Clark,

That propositions find unity in God does not mean that we can't know part of that unity.

If we say that we can know a single proposition _with as much depth as God knows it_, then we would have to know the entire system and thereby claim to be God. But we're not claiming that. Knowing a proposition to some extent does not entail knowing it exhaustively, and we would have to know it exhaustively to know it in the context of God's unified knowledge -- but that doesn't mean we can know propositions non-exhaustively.


----------



## Craig

chbrooking said:


> At the obvious risk of a pile-on, since even Ben differs with me here, I would argue that, because of God's simplicity, if our knowledge coincided with his at any one point, then our knowledge would coincide with his at every point, and since our knowledge would coincide with God's -- again because of his simplicity -- we would be God.
> 
> We don't know things with the knowledge of the creator and source. We know derivatively and by reflection.



Interesting.

I got into it a bit with some Clarkians at my church (smart white dudes, not black dudes  ) and they insisted that God's knowledge and man's knowledge coincide and are qualitatively the same though quantitatively different.

It would seem the Creator/creature distinction would be pretty much obliterated if this were the case.


----------



## Confessor

Craig said:


> Interesting.
> 
> I got into it a bit with some Clarkians at my church (smart white dudes, not black dudes  ) and they insisted that God's knowledge and man's knowledge coincide and are qualitatively the same though quantitatively different.
> 
> It would seem the Creator/creature distinction would be pretty much obliterated if this were the case.



In order for you to see why I am so vehemently defending a quantitative difference only, I'll have you look at this:

If God knows that 1+1=2, and if God's knowledge coincides at no point with man's knowledge (i.e. it is qualitatively distinct), then it follows that man cannot know that 1+1=2.

In other words, how does positing a qualitative difference in the objects of knowledge not imply skepticism? The concept of analogy must imply correspondence at some point. If man's knowledge does not correspond to God concerning the _referent_ of knowledge, then where does it correspond?


----------



## chbrooking

Whitefield said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> At the obvious risk of a pile-on, since even Ben differs with me here, I would argue that, because of God's simplicity, if our knowledge coincided with his at any one point, then our knowledge would coincide with his at every point, and since our knowledge would coincide with God's -- again because of his simplicity -- we would be God.
> 
> We don't know things with the knowledge of the creator and source. We know derivatively and by reflection.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Here is what I'm thinking on this matter. If I know my toe hurts, doesn't God also know my toe hurts. At that point don't we both know the same thing, i.e., my toe hurts. This doesn't mean I know everything God knows, but on that one point we both know my toe hurts. God's knowledge is more extensive, because He also knows why my toe hurts and how the pain will be resolved. Things I do not know. But isn't there at least one thing we both know in common - my toe hurts. Am I missing something here?
Click to expand...


Not being a philosopher, perhaps the following will be droll at least:

A good historian does not simply report facts, but traces those facts back to their causes and such. I may know that my toe hurts. But I don't know why (other than a sequencing of events). I don't know the ultimate cause (the decree of God) because it is incomprehensible to me. I may be able to string together some of the events that led to it, but I certainly cannot know the purpose for which my toe was stubbed or my nail grew inwards. Nor can I know any but the sensation of pain -- unless perhaps I'm a neurologist and can know some of the nervous explanation. But God knows my toe, me, my pain and its causes and ends in a wholly different manner than I do. And this is not divisible into propositions, but as the confession notes, his decree is singular (though, admittedly, the catechism wavers on this -- something by which I've always been intrigued).

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 04:40:43 EST-----



Confessor said:


> Craig said:
> 
> 
> 
> Interesting.
> 
> I got into it a bit with some Clarkians at my church (smart white dudes, not black dudes  ) and they insisted that God's knowledge and man's knowledge coincide and are qualitatively the same though quantitatively different.
> 
> It would seem the Creator/creature distinction would be pretty much obliterated if this were the case.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In order for you to see why I am so vehemently defending a quantitative difference only, I'll have you look at this:
> 
> If God knows that 1+1=2, and if God's knowledge coincides at no point with man's knowledge (i.e. it is qualitatively distinct), then it follows that man cannot know that 1+1=2.
> 
> In other words, how does positing a qualitative difference in the objects of knowledge not imply skepticism? The concept of analogy must imply correspondence at some point. If man's knowledge does not correspond to God concerning the _referent_ of knowledge, then where does it correspond?
Click to expand...


If the standard to evade skepticism is God's comprehensibility, then it does imply skepticism. But that's not my standard.


----------



## Whitefield

Craig said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> At the obvious risk of a pile-on, since even Ben differs with me here, I would argue that, because of God's simplicity, if our knowledge coincided with his at any one point, then our knowledge would coincide with his at every point, and since our knowledge would coincide with God's -- again because of his simplicity -- we would be God.
> 
> We don't know things with the knowledge of the creator and source. We know derivatively and by reflection.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Interesting.
> 
> I got into it a bit with some Clarkians at my church (smart white dudes, not black dudes  ) and they insisted that God's knowledge and man's knowledge coincide and are qualitatively the same though quantitatively different.
> 
> It would seem the Creator/creature distinction would be pretty much obliterated if this were the case.
Click to expand...


Yes there is a distinction between Creator/creature. But what can we say about the intersection of _Deus_/_imago dei_, which GHC would want to inject into the discussion?


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> I may know that my toe hurts. But I don't know why (other than a sequencing of events). I don't know the ultimate cause (the decree of God) because it is incomprehensible to me. I may be able to string together some of the events that led to it, but I certainly cannot know the purpose for which my toe was stubbed or my nail grew inwards. Nor can I know any but the sensation of pain -- unless perhaps I'm a neurologist and can know some of the nervous explanation. But God knows my toe, me, my pain and its causes and ends in a wholly different manner than I do. And this is not divisible into propositions, but as the confession notes, his decree is singular (though, admittedly, the catechism wavers on this -- something by which I've always been intrigued).



Notice that in your describing the qualitative difference of God's knowledge, you are listing off (quantitatively) different facts that God knows in relation to the specific fact of toe pain. The allegedly qualitative difference is nothing more than a quantitatively "thicker" knowledge.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 04:43:28 EST-----



chbrooking said:


> If the standard to evade skepticism is God's comprehensibility, then it does imply skepticism. But that's not my standard.



Clark, you know that's not what i was saying. If God knows everything, and if man's knowledge coincides with God's at no point, then how can man know anything?

Note I did not attempt to establish the conditional proposition, "If God is comprehensible, then non-skepticism."

------

To all,

Let me reiterate the point I touched on earlier: _Analogy presupposes a measure of some correspondence and a measure of some discorrespondence._ It is an amalgamation. Just as there are some attributes that are communicable from God to man, so also it is not _prima facie_ destructive of the Creator-creature distinction to say that their difference in terms of objects of knowledge is only quantitative. Man knows the actual truth when he knows things, not an analogy of the truth (as Bahnsen himself said in _Van Til's Apologetic_).


----------



## Whitefield

chbrooking said:


> Not being a philosopher, perhaps the following will be droll at least:
> 
> A good historian does not simply report facts, but traces those facts back to their causes and such. I may know that my toe hurts. But I don't know why (other than a sequencing of events). I don't know the ultimate cause (the decree of God) because it is incomprehensible to me. I may be able to string together some of the events that led to it, but I certainly cannot know the purpose for which my toe was stubbed or my nail grew inwards. Nor can I know any but the sensation of pain -- unless perhaps I'm a neurologist and can know some of the nervous explanation. But God knows my toe, me, my pain and its causes and ends in a wholly different manner than I do. And this is not divisible into propositions, but as the confession notes, his decree is singular (though, admittedly, the catechism wavers on this -- something by which I've always been intrigued).



Ok. But I know my toe hurts and God knows my toe hurts; do we know the same thing? (I've already acknowledged the issues of extensiveness).


----------



## chbrooking

Again, I'm not the philosopher that you are. But I may know every single event of the civil war. Yet I cannot fathom why it arose. I may be able to give some explanation in a limited context, but I cannot give you the purpose beyond the war. I may even be able to tell you positive and negative results that have happened since. But I could never tell you for what purpose Sherman burned Atlanta. The ultimate purpose of that is in the incomprehensible and singular counsel of God. If Romans 8:28ff teaches us anything, it ought to teach us humility with respect to the decree. The very idea that one act of evil can come about for the blessing of some and cursing of others -- all of which actions and their results are custom tailored -- is beyond the human imagination. And yet we are told it is so. For the want of a shoe the entire kingdom crumbles, and we may be able to string together some explanation, but the purpose lies beyond us.



Confessor said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> I may know that my toe hurts. But I don't know why (other than a sequencing of events). I don't know the ultimate cause (the decree of God) because it is incomprehensible to me. I may be able to string together some of the events that led to it, but I certainly cannot know the purpose for which my toe was stubbed or my nail grew inwards. Nor can I know any but the sensation of pain -- unless perhaps I'm a neurologist and can know some of the nervous explanation. But God knows my toe, me, my pain and its causes and ends in a wholly different manner than I do. And this is not divisible into propositions, but as the confession notes, his decree is singular (though, admittedly, the catechism wavers on this -- something by which I've always been intrigued).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Notice that in your describing the qualitative difference of God's knowledge, you are listing off (quantitatively) different facts that God knows in relation to the specific fact of toe pain. The allegedly qualitative difference is nothing more than a quantitatively "thicker" knowledge.
Click to expand...


----------



## VictorBravo

Confessor said:


> victorbravo said:
> 
> 
> 
> I didn't think he was being accused of rational idolatry, but rather that a cautious qualification should be observed.
> 
> I don't want to replay the old debate, because I think it got bogged down in turf-battles over definitions, but I can't recall where, if anywhere, Clark addressed the question of how God's decree of propositional truth is from a different perspective than ours, ie. he is the source and we are the recipient.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I was referring to Rev. Winzer's mention above regarding "rational idolatry."
> 
> So was the charge against Clark in the "Complaint" that he didn't make the analogical nature of knowledge (God creates it and man discovers it, etc.) explicit enough?
> 
> I don't know, this seems to be a rather obvious thing that he would have believed. Was the problem that he didn't explicitly mention it?
Click to expand...


There's a lot more there than I can deal with right now, not even counting my hazy recollection of the controversy. I would have to say that Clark was a bit extreme on the notion that man could discover truth. He would routinely say that man could not know truth without revelation, period, even going so far as to say that there was no learning of truth through observation.

Yet, he would freely admit that empirical endeavors, like engineeing and science, did discover things that work. So, when you are dealing with Clark, there is always that difficulty of dealing with his peculiar view of truth and knowledge.

For instance: one might say that he knows that water bubbling on a hot stove will burn you if you stick your hand in it. Clark might say, no, you can't know that for certain, unless scripture teaches it. 

Contrast that with one who would say that we were created to undestand that the created universe is subject to physical laws that we can discover and apply. The laws as we describe them are not _a priori_ but, instead, are summarizations of observation of an ordered universe. He would say that prior experience in the realm of touching boiling water leads to useful knowledge.

My take on Clark would be that he'd say, yes, the understanding of avoiding boiling water is useful, but it is not true knowledge. OK, fair enough for a technical argument, but is such a statement itself useful? My guess is that Clark would then say he had no use for usefullness as a criterion in discerning truth. 

I have great appreciation for Clark when he is battling the irrationalists. I cringe a little, though, at his method of conducting his side of the debate. Having listened to a lot of lectures, I sometimes wonder if half the time he was being humorously impish in his provocative statements.


----------



## chbrooking

I can see why a pile-on is difficult now; I'm having trouble quoting and responding. So let me say this:

I'm not willing to put the ultimate cause, purpose, telos, or whatever you want to call it -- which is the singular decree of God, into the category of thickness or quantity. It is knowledge of a whole different order. It's the difference between why and what. Surely why is not a function of what.


----------



## Confessor

Clark,

You're making good points about the limited extent of our knowledge-capacity, and I think that nicely demonstrates how God is incomprehensible.

But what I want to protect is the fact that some proposition X can mean the same thing to both God and man. Certainly God knows whatever man apprehends from it _and more_, but what I'm protecting is that man's knowledge is true (not analogous to truth) _as far as it goes._

In other words, I'm trying to make sure we do not impinge on the Creator-creature distinction and make God's incomprehensibility null, yet we do not want to result in skepticism. We are searching for an appropriate middle ground.



chbrooking said:


> I'm not willing to put the ultimate cause, purpose, telos, or whatever you want to call it -- which is the singular decree of God, into the category of thickness or quantity. It is knowledge of a whole different order. It's the difference between why and what. Surely why is not a function of what.



This makes for an interesting discussion: is there a certain class of propositions which no man can ever find out? I think this is a very good point, but let's also keep in mind that this would imply there is another class of propositions (the "non-why") that man can know truly without knowing exhaustively.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 05:03:13 EST-----

Victor,

I don't subscribe to Clark's Scripturalism. I think he makes some serious errors with that; hence I am a Van Tillian.

However, I think he was correct regarding the impossibility of a pure qualitative difference in all the objects of man's and God's knowledge. His basic argument goes: "If God knows everything and if man's knowledge never coincides with God at any point, then man can know nothing." And of course skepticism is antithetical to Christianity and our God of knowledge.


----------



## chbrooking

Though it's only an analogy (pun not exactly intended, but appreciated), seeing me in a mirror, would you say that you saw me? Sure you would. But you really only saw a reflection of me. You didn't see me directly. You would have true knowledge about me -- as mediated through the 2D medium of the mirror. Similarly, I'm not saying that knowledge of a painful toe is not true. Nor am I saying that God does not know that my toe hurts. But God knows my toe hurts in an entirely different way. He understands it in all its relations. Now you might call that a quantitative difference, but I would argue that infinity is not a quantity at all.


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> Though it's only an analogy (pun not exactly intended, but appreciated), seeing me in a mirror, would you say that you saw me? Sure you would. But you really only saw a reflection of me. You didn't see me directly. You would have true knowledge about me -- as mediated through the 2D medium of the mirror. Similarly, I'm not saying that knowledge of a painful toe is not true. Nor am I saying that God does not know that my toe hurts. But God knows my toe hurts in an entirely different way. He understands it in all its relations. Now you might call that a quantitative difference, but I would argue that infinity is not a quantity at all.



Would you say a doctor has a different qualitative knowledge about an illiterate man's toe pain than the illiterate? He know it in more relations than the illiterate would.


----------



## chbrooking

Even in the why category, we can know truly without knowing exhaustively. I know why Jesus died on a cross -- though my knowledge of this is true, it is not exhaustive. But even my knowledge of this why is not coterminus with God's knowledge of the why. Likewise, God knows that I ate a waffle this morning, and I know that I ate a waffle this morning (that rather than why). But the that knowledge of waffle-eating is not divisible from the why knowledge of waffle eating in the mind of God (because of simplicity), as it necessarily is in ours. His knowledge of my waffle-eating is infinite in scope. Mine is not. This is not a quantitative distinction.

Yes, there are things we will never know. We will never comprehend the trinity, the incarnation, etc. Once we delve into the infinite, it is beyond us. I guess I'm just trying to maintain a distinction between infinity and quantity. 



Confessor said:


> Clark,
> 
> You're making good points about the limited extent of our knowledge-capacity, and I think that nicely demonstrates how God is incomprehensible.
> 
> But what I want to protect is the fact that some proposition X can mean the same thing to both God and man. Certainly God knows whatever man apprehends from it _and more_, but what I'm protecting is that man's knowledge is true (not analogous to truth) _as far as it goes._
> 
> In other words, I'm trying to make sure we do not impinge on the Creator-creature distinction and make God's incomprehensibility null, yet we do not want to result in skepticism. We are searching for an appropriate middle ground.
> 
> 
> 
> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not willing to put the ultimate cause, purpose, telos, or whatever you want to call it -- which is the singular decree of God, into the category of thickness or quantity. It is knowledge of a whole different order. It's the difference between why and what. Surely why is not a function of what.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This makes for an interesting discussion: is there a certain class of propositions which no man can ever find out? I think this is a very good point, but let's also keep in mind that this would imply there is another class of propositions (the "non-why") that man can know truly without knowing exhaustively.
> 
> -----Added 6/15/2009 at 05:03:13 EST-----
> 
> Victor,
> 
> I don't subscribe to Clark's Scripturalism. I think he makes some serious errors with that; hence I am a Van Tillian.
> 
> However, I think he was correct regarding the impossibility of a pure qualitative difference in all the objects of man's and God's knowledge. His basic argument goes: "If God knows everything and if man's knowledge never coincides with God at any point, then man can know nothing." And of course skepticism is antithetical to Christianity and our God of knowledge.
Click to expand...


-----Added 6/15/2009 at 05:11:18 EST-----

No, it's one more extensive knowledge when compared with another. That's quanitative. But infinite is not quantitative. It's qualitative.


I keep editing my yes and no here. Yes, it's qualitatively different. Yes it's quantitatively different. But even as qualitatively different as it is, it does not compare with the qualitative difference of God's knowledge of it.




Confessor said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> Though it's only an analogy (pun not exactly intended, but appreciated), seeing me in a mirror, would you say that you saw me? Sure you would. But you really only saw a reflection of me. You didn't see me directly. You would have true knowledge about me -- as mediated through the 2D medium of the mirror. Similarly, I'm not saying that knowledge of a painful toe is not true. Nor am I saying that God does not know that my toe hurts. But God knows my toe hurts in an entirely different way. He understands it in all its relations. Now you might call that a quantitative difference, but I would argue that infinity is not a quantity at all.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Would you say a doctor has a different qualitative knowledge about an illiterate man's toe pain than the illiterate? He know it in more relations than the illiterate would.
Click to expand...


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> Even in the why category, we can know truly without knowing exhaustively. I know why Jesus died on a cross -- though my knowledge of this is true, it is not exhaustive. But even my knowledge of this why is not coterminus with God's knowledge of the why. Likewise, God knows that I ate a waffle this morning, and I know that I ate a waffle this morning (that rather than why). But the that knowledge of waffle-eating is not divisible from the why knowledge of waffle eating in the mind of God (because of simplicity), as it necessarily is in ours. His knowledge of my waffle-eating is infinite in scope. Mine is not. This is not a quantitative distinction.



Alright, we're just going back and forth on this.

I think if you'll just see what I asked about the doctor and the illiterate, we can be getting near a stopping point.

EDIT - Just saw that you did. I would say that infinity is actually the _perfect concept_ in this case. It allows for God's incomprehensibility (because man is finite), yet retains that the difference is only quantitative. You have said that infinity implies a qualitative difference, but I don't think that is a tenable view. Infinity is used in math all the time as a quantity without having to resort to a separate qualitative "level."


----------



## chbrooking

whew . . . good.


----------



## VictorBravo

Confessor said:


> EDIT - Just saw that you did. I would say that infinity is actually the _perfect concept_ in this case. It allows for God's incomprehensibility (because man is finite), yet retains that the difference is only quantitative. You have said that infinity implies a qualitative difference, but I don't think that is a tenable view. Infinity is used in math all the time as a quantity without having to resort to a separate qualitative "level."



I'd really like to discuss this more, but I've got other things going on too.

But one thing that strikes me about this conversation is the absence of considering time. I suspect that is where the real qualitative difference is.

God's thoughts are eternal, consistent, comprehensive, whereas ours are sequential. His revelation to us is also sequential, that would be what I think Matthew would call accomodation.

We can't think two separate thoughts at the same time--we have to consider one, then the other, and then back to the first. God's understanding is immediate. It is a difference in quality in that respect, not just quantity.



Just as an aside, Ben, I think your use of infinity as an abstract mathematical concept is not the same thing as the infinite aspect of God. Infinity is definable and reducable in mathematics, but, in a finite created universe, it has no actual analog. In other words, it is an imaginary shortcut for dealing with big numbers, just as calculus is a shortcut for dealing with what is observed in the physical world. (e.g. you can use integrals to figure out the area of a circle, but a real true-to-life circle will not have exactly the same area as one derived by infinitesimal integration because, at some point, particles making up the circle cannot be further divided--it will always be a polygon rather than a perfect circle). But that is all merely an aside.


----------



## chbrooking

Yes, I was including the matter of time in my initial posts about events. The why not only points backward but forward as well. And as God's knowledge of these events includes more than a higher number of events in its purview, but actually includes purpose, I would regard it as a qualitatively different knowledge. And, as infinity (or eternity in both directions as the human mind can only try to approximate) is no more a quantity of time than infinity is a quantity of number, again, it is a qualitatively different matter.

And yes, you've put your finger right on the matter of infinity as I was trying to push it. Thank you.



victorbravo said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> EDIT - Just saw that you did. I would say that infinity is actually the _perfect concept_ in this case. It allows for God's incomprehensibility (because man is finite), yet retains that the difference is only quantitative. You have said that infinity implies a qualitative difference, but I don't think that is a tenable view. Infinity is used in math all the time as a quantity without having to resort to a separate qualitative "level."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'd really like to discuss this more, but I've got other things going on too.
> 
> But one thing that strikes me about this conversation is the absence of considering time. I suspect that is where the real qualitative difference is.
> 
> God's thoughts are eternal, consistent, comprehensive, whereas ours are sequential. His revelation to us is also sequential, that would be what I think Matthew would call accomodation.
> 
> We can't think two separate thoughts at the same time--we have to consider one, then the other, and then back to the first. God's understanding is immediate. It is a difference in quality in that respect, not just quantity.
> 
> 
> 
> Just as an aside, Ben, I think your use of infinity as an abstract mathematical concept is not the same thing as the infinite aspect of God. Infinity is definable and reducable in mathematics, but, in a finite created universe, it has no actual analog. In other words, it is an imaginary shortcut for dealing with big numbers, just as calculus is a shortcut for dealing with what is observed in the physical world. (e.g. you can use integrals to figure out the area of a circle, but a real true-to-life circle will not have exactly the same area as one derived by infinitesimal integration because, at some point, particles making up the circle cannot be further divided--it will always be a polygon rather than a perfect circle). But that is all merely an aside.
Click to expand...


----------



## Confessor

Good point about math.

Regarding the qualitative difference, I would point to what I said earlier: "But what I want to protect is the fact that some proposition X can mean the same thing to both God and man. Certainly God knows whatever man apprehends from it and more, but what I'm protecting is that man's knowledge is true (not analogous to truth) as far as it goes."

Yes, God knows in a different _way_ than we do (intuitively rather than discursively), but we are discussing merely the _objects_ of knowledge.

Keep in mind throughout this entire discussion, however, that there has to be _some_ aspect of correspondence (and therefore some matter of quantity rather than quality) between man's and God's knowledge. Otherwise there would be no analogy, and skepticism would ensue.



victorbravo said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> EDIT - Just saw that you did. I would say that infinity is actually the _perfect concept_ in this case. It allows for God's incomprehensibility (because man is finite), yet retains that the difference is only quantitative. You have said that infinity implies a qualitative difference, but I don't think that is a tenable view. Infinity is used in math all the time as a quantity without having to resort to a separate qualitative "level."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'd really like to discuss this more, but I've got other things going on too.
> 
> But one thing that strikes me about this conversation is the absence of considering time. I suspect that is where the real qualitative difference is.
> 
> God's thoughts are eternal, consistent, comprehensive, whereas ours are sequential. His revelation to us is also sequential, that would be what I think Matthew would call accomodation.
> 
> We can't think two separate thoughts at the same time--we have to consider one, then the other, and then back to the first. God's understanding is immediate. It is a difference in quality in that respect, not just quantity.
> 
> 
> 
> Just as an aside, Ben, I think your use of infinity as an abstract mathematical concept is not the same thing as the infinite aspect of God. Infinity is definable and reducable in mathematics, but, in a finite created universe, it has no actual analog. In other words, it is an imaginary shortcut for dealing with big numbers, just as calculus is a shortcut for dealing with what is observed in the physical world. (e.g. you can use integrals to figure out the area of a circle, but a real true-to-life circle will not have exactly the same area as one derived by infinitesimal integration because, at some point, particles making up the circle cannot be further divided--it will always be a polygon rather than a perfect circle). But that is all merely an aside.
Click to expand...


----------



## chbrooking

Infinity is a good place to look for that correspondence to be seen in its proper light. We know what infinity is in one sense. But we can only conceive of it and speak of it as endless quantity. But that's not really what it is. God, on the other hand, knows infinity as it really is. Does that mean that our knowledge of infinity is untrue? No. Inadequate (for humanity)? No. Our limitations are appropriate to the creature. It is true because it corresponds to God's truth as condescended, adapted to the creature. Were we to try to claim to understand infinity as God understands infinity, then we would be making idolatrous claims.


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> Were we to try to claim to understand infinity as God understands infinity, then we would be making idolatrous claims.



Would we understand whatever limited knowledge we have of infinity as God understands that limited aspect?


----------



## chbrooking

We are running in circles a bit, aren't we. You know my answer to that.

Is that not akin to "can God build a rock too big for him to move?" God does not have a limited perspective. Now if you run to the incarnation, we're all going to be in a pickle. How can the infinite lay aside the prerogatives of deity? How can the omniscient one not know the times and seasons the Father has appointed? I can't answer these questions, because the incarnation, like the trinity, is beyond our finite understanding.

No we don't understand it the same. God does not have a limited subset of his limitless knowledge. Again, that would be to grasp infinity by way of the finite -- which is, the best we can do, of course. But therein lies the difference.


----------



## Confessor

Clark,

That's not forcing God into a limited perspective as much as it is saying that different aspects of His knowledge can be _distinguished_, namely the smaller scope versus the larger scope. And certainly God is capable of doing that. For instance, say I know the proposition X. God's knowledge is different from my knowledge in two ways: (1) He knows all other propositions, and (2) He knows X in the context of all other propositions.

(1) taken as it is implies only a quantitative difference. This is indisputable.
(2) implies that He knows X in a fuller sense, but this does not necessarily provide a *full* _qualitative_ difference. If we give a "knowledge rating" which measures how exhaustively someone knows a proposition, we could say that the smartest man on Earth knows X with a rating of 10 while God would know X with a rating of infinity. This would still show a correspondence between man and God, namely over the first ten integers on that scale.

Thus, while God's knowledge is deeper (and therefore, when taken as a whole, is qualitatively different), this is *at root* a quantitative difference. And since God always has a "knowledge rating" of infinity that man can never attain (with respect to every proposition), it follows that man cannot _possibly_ know any proposition as fully as God does -- though what he does know is true as far as his knowledge goes. Therefore the concept of God's infinity protects us from divine comprehensibility and skepticism.


----------



## py3ak

I don't desire to get drawn into an epistemological debate, so I intend to do a drive-by posting.

What I don't see being emphasized much on the thread is that God's knowledge is distinguished from human and angelic knowledge among other points, in that God knows all things perfectly "because he knows all things by himself or by his essence (not by forms abstracted from things--as is the case with creatures--both because these are only in time with the things themselves, but the knowledge of God is eternal, and because he can have no cause out of himself)." (Turretin, _Institutes_ T.III, Q.XII, P.II. It might be profitable to consult all of questions 12 and 13.)


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> Would this imply a qualitative difference in the propositions that man and God know?
> 
> Would 1+1=2 mean something different to man than to God? If so, how, and how does that not entail skepticism?



Ben, Vic has answered this well, and the thread has progressed too far to give an in-depth answer which does not overlook what everyone else has said, so I will just give a couple of simple answers and you can explore further if it suits.

Because you have referred to knowledge as "propositional," no, there can be no qualitative difference in the propositional statement or in the truth value of it. 1+1=2 for God and man, and in order to be true it must be according to reality. But then we have to raise the issue of "perspective" and "relation," which opens the door to the "personal" side of knowledge, and this personal side cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God and man are absolutely different. God's perspective is infinite and eternal and He stands related to the truth as the Creator and Revealer. Man's persepctive is finite and temporal, and he stands related to the truth as created and receiver.

Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.


----------



## chbrooking

I can tell we will continue to disagree on this. I do not believe integers 1-10 are on a scale where infinity can also be found. Vic spoke to that above. And just as I do not believe these finite integers are on some continuum where infinity might be found, so I do not believe that finite knowledge at any point intersects with, blends or continues into infinite knowledge. 




Confessor said:


> Clark,
> 
> That's not forcing God into a limited perspective as much as it is saying that different aspects of His knowledge can be _distinguished_, namely the smaller scope versus the larger scope. And certainly God is capable of doing that. For instance, say I know the proposition X. God's knowledge is different from my knowledge in two ways: (1) He knows all other propositions, and (2) He knows X in the context of all other propositions.
> 
> (1) taken as it is implies only a quantitative difference. This is indisputable.
> (2) implies that He knows X in a fuller sense, but this does not necessarily provide a *full* _qualitative_ difference. If we give a "knowledge rating" which measures how exhaustively someone knows a proposition, we could say that the smartest man on Earth knows X with a rating of 10 while God would know X with a rating of infinity. This would still show a correspondence between man and God, namely over the first ten integers on that scale.
> 
> Thus, while God's knowledge is deeper (and therefore, when taken as a whole, is qualitatively different), this is *at root* a quantitative difference. And since God always has a "knowledge rating" of infinity that man can never attain (with respect to every proposition), it follows that man cannot _possibly_ know any proposition as fully as God does -- though what he does know is true as far as his knowledge goes. Therefore the concept of God's infinity protects us from divine comprehensibility and skepticism.


----------



## CharlieJ

armourbearer said:


> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.



I agree.


Ben, I don't know if you've read John Frame's _The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_, but Frame discusses this issue and resolves it in a very satisfactory way. The book coincides with many of your interests.


----------



## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.



To ensure I understand you, are you saying that since God intuits all knowledge simultaneously, then He does not know anything as fragmentized propositions (He rather knows everything _in toto_), and therefore He only divides it in order to condescend to man?

And thanks for the recommendation, Charlie.


----------



## johnowen

"I don't subscribe to Clark's Scripturalism. I think he makes some serious errors with that; hence I am a Van Tillian."

What is seriously wrong with Scripturalism? 
PS: If you agree on some points with Clark and disagree on others, you don't have to become "VanTillian." You can call yourself semi-Clarkian (it that's possible).

Thanks Ben


----------



## Confessor

johnowen said:


> "I don't subscribe to Clark's Scripturalism. I think he makes some serious errors with that; hence I am a Van Tillian."
> 
> What is seriously wrong with Scripturalism?
> PS: If you agree on some points with Clark and disagree on others, you don't have to become "VanTillian." You can call yourself semi-Clarkian (it that's possible).
> 
> Thanks Ben



When I said I am not Clarkian and therefore am a Van Tillian, I was saying with the assumption that I am a presuppositionalist and that those are the two main schools of it. I actually would not consider myself an "orthodox" presuppositionalist now, but that's another story. Anyway, to the more serious question of yours: Scripturalism is in error in my opinion because it reduces the entire body of knowledge to God's revelation, in which case it is a revelation of nothing. The Bible is a revelation of God and has bearing on this world, and therefore if we know nothing but that revelation, then it's pretty useless.

Also, given Scripturalism, words in the Bible can be defined only with respect to other words, in which case there can be nothing that points to an immediate sensory picture or innate idea of ours. Words are defined by other words, which are defined by other words, etc., etc. Given Scripturalism and given its concomitant repudiation of all knowledge outside Scriptural propositions (and ones deduced therefrom), we cannot know what any Bible verse means in the first place.

It denies that we possess knowledge of sensory experience! If any Scripturalist were to attempt to critique this post of mine, he would be _ipso facto_ contradicting his own beliefs. This is an _ad hominem_ criticism of Scripturalism, but seeing as it applies to all sane Scripturalists, I think it is valid. For instance, John Robbins co-authored a book that critiqued the FV, yet on his own principles he could not know what the FV consisted of and therefore he would be behaving irresponsibly (and contradictorily) in acting as if he knows it.

Lastly, one must read the Bible in order to know Biblical propositions. Clark's defenses of this common criticism were simply false. He argued that one must possess a full-fledged empiricism in order to make the criticism, in which case he confused a polemic of Scripturalism with a positive case for empiricism.


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> To ensure I understand you, are you saying that since God intuits all knowledge simultaneously, then He does not know anything as fragmentized propositions (He rather knows everything _in toto_), and therefore He only divides it in order to condescend to man?



Yes; the "propositional knowledge" is the result of a process of accommodating the truth to the finite mind of man.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



> Yes; the "propositional knowledge" is the result of a process of accommodating to the truth to the finite mind of man.



Matthew has pointed out that God's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of an infinite creator; whereas, man's is from the standpoint of a finite creature. He then goes onto say...



armourbearer said:


> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.



I fail to see the so-called "obviousness" of this, and can say definitively that the conclusion reached by Matthew does not validly follow simply from "God's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of an infinite creator" _and_ "man's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of a finite creature." 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## rbcbob

*... and there was no peace ...*

Yes my son, in the great wars of old in ye olde Realm of Epistemology the sons of Clark and the sons of Van Til bludgeoned one another day and night for generations. Thus to this day there is war and never shall there be peace between Clarkians and VanTillians. Yes my son, this is the truth, the whole truth, the propositional truth, the analogous truth, but say ye not the relative truth lest I send thee off to the battles your self .


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Bob,

All I did was merely point out that Matthew's conclusion did not follow from his "given". If that is to disturb the peace, then I humbly... 

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> I fail to see the so-called "obviousness" of this, and can say definitively that the conclusion reached by Matthew does not validly follow simply from "God's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of an infinite creator" _and_ "man's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of a finite creature."



What is a proposition? A finite form of words consisting in subject and predicate.


----------



## TeachingTulip

armourbearer said:


> Brian Bosse said:
> 
> 
> 
> I fail to see the so-called "obviousness" of this, and can say definitively that the conclusion reached by Matthew does not validly follow simply from "God's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of an infinite creator" _and_ "man's perspective regarding knowledge is from the standpoint of a finite creature."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What is a proposition? A finite form of words consisting in subject and predicate.
Click to expand...


Does this definition of a proposition differ from a Covenant promise from God? How?


----------



## MW

TeachingTulip said:


> Does this definition of a proposition differ from a Covenant promise from God? How?



A promise assumes a propositional form, so no, there is no difference.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> What is a proposition? A finite form of words consisting in subject and predicate.



It is always good to define terms. I think many disagreements arise simply because people understand and use terms differently. Allow me to make a distinction between the _meaning_ conveyed by a "finite form of words consisting of a subject and a predicate" and the finite form of words in and of themselves. Consider the following sentences...

*(1)* The creator of the universe is benevolent. 
*(2)* Dios es bueno.
*(3)* ο πατηρ του κυριου ημων Ιησου Χριστου εστιν αγαθος.

These are three _different_ "finite forms of words consisting of subjects and predicates"; yet, they all express the same meaning. Here are two sentences that have the exact same finite form, but they express opposite meanings...

*(4)* I am one bad exegete! (in the sense of not being very good)
*(5)* I am one bad exegete! (in the sense of being very good)

There is a difference between a sentence, and the _meaning_ conveyed by that sentence. I understand propositions to be the meaning our finite forms of words (sentences) are meant to express, and I believe this is a common understanding amongst philosophers of logic and language. Do you agree with this? If so, how does this change the discussion? 

On a different note, I would like to point out that your use of 'finite' in the quote above seems to indicate finitude in terms of numerical cardinality (maybe not?). If so, it seems you are using the word 'finite' in a different sense than what is meant when we speak of God not being finite, i.e., Him being infinite. With all of that said, your argument still is not valid.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## rbcbob

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Matthew,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What is a proposition? A finite form of words consisting in subject and predicate.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It is always good to define terms. I think many disagreements arise simply because people understand and use terms differently. Allow me to make a distinction between the _meaning_ conveyed by a "finite form of words consisting of a subject and a predicate" and the finite form of words in and of themselves. Consider the following sentences...
> 
> *(1)* The creator of the universe is benevolent.
> *(2)* Dios es bueno.
> *(3)* ο πατηρ του κυριου ημων Ιησου Χριστου εστιν αγαθος.
> 
> These are three _different_ "finite forms of words consisting of subjects and predicates"; yet, *they all express the same meaning*. Here are two sentences that have the exact same finite form, but they express opposite meanings...
> 
> *(4)* I am one bad exegete! (in the sense of not being very good)
> *(5)* I am one bad exegete! (in the sense of being very good)
> 
> There is a difference between a sentence, and the _meaning_ conveyed by that sentence. I understand propositions to be the meaning our finite forms of words (sentences) are meant to express (and I would guess this would be the common understanding amongst philosophers of logic and of language). I would also like to point out that your use of 'finite' in the quote above seems to indicate finitude in terms of numerical cardinality. If so, it seems you are using the word 'finite' in a different sense than what is meant when we speak of God not being finite, i.e., Him being infinite. With all of that said, your argument still is invalid based on your "given".
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian
Click to expand...


Brian, I agree with (1), (2), (3), and (4)!

I like your effort though. Hang in there brother!


----------



## Brian Bosse

Bob,

Someday, I hope sentence (5) expresses a true proposition! 

Brian


----------



## rbcbob

Brian Bosse said:


> Bob,
> 
> Someday, I hope sentence (5) expresses a true proposition!
> 
> Brian




(1) God is love
(2) Dios es amor
(3) Ο Θεος αγαπη εστιν

*These* are three different "finite forms of words consisting of subjects and predicates"; yet, they all express the same meaning. *Because they are all the same proposition.
*


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> There is a difference between a sentence, and the _meaning_ conveyed by that sentence. I understand propositions to be the meaning our finite forms of words (sentences) are meant to express, and I believe this is a common understanding amongst philosophers of logic and language.



So do you believe a finite form of words can express an infinite meaning? If not, your dichotomy is useless. I stand by what I have stated -- the proposition is a finite form of words. I will leave it to the sophists to try and make that sound like it means something other than what it says.


----------



## rbcbob

Brian Bosse said:


> Bob,
> 
> Someday, I hope sentence (5) expresses a true proposition!
> 
> Brian




Brian I may or may not understand the recent point that you were laboring to make. I think you have a good grasp of propositions at any rate.

Regarding Clark and Van Til:

Van Til erred on the side of our having only an analogical knowledge of God.

Clark erred on the side of our having nothing but propositional knowledge of God.

I appreciate both men. But in any case I must say that we know some things just as God knows them because He has graciously revealed them to us (Deut. 29:29). The following declaration, though in five human languages, are but one proposition. They are all true of God; and that not merely analogously.

(1) I AM."
(2) εγω ειμι
(3) ego sum
(4) yo soy
(5) bin ich

We are not shut up in a Kantian lightless cellar ignorant of Das Ding an sich relative to the Self Revealing God.

Matthew 4:4 But He answered and said, "It is written, 'Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every *ρηματι* word that proceeds from the mouth of God.' "

Jeremiah 9:24 But let him who glories glory in this, That he *understands* and *knows* Me, That I am the LORD, exercising lovingkindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth. For in these I delight," says the LORD

1 Thessalonians 2:13 For this reason we also thank God without ceasing, because when you received the word of God which you heard from us, you welcomed it not as the word of men, *but as it is in truth, the word of God*, which also effectively works in you who believe.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Rob said:


> These are three different "finite forms of words consisting of subjects and predicates"; yet, they all express the same meaning. Because they are all the same proposition.



Exactly!  You do have a good grasp of the point I was laboring to make. This is why Matthew’s definition is inadequate. His definition deals with sentences and not the meaning of those sentences. In fact, it seems as if he missed this distinction altogether or chose to simply ignore it.  The _meaning_ of a sentence is properly called a proposition. As such, there is a difference between a proposition and a sentence.



Matthew said:


> So do you believe a finite form of words can express an infinite meaning?



There are some issues with this question. *(1)* The first issue is that it is not at all clear what this has to do with your argument. You are asking vague questions when you should be clarifying your position. *(2)* The second issue has to do with what you mean by “an infinite meaning”. I really have no idea what it is for someone to say that something has infinite meaning. Perhaps, all you are saying is that as finite creatures there are things we cannot know about God? I would agree with this. However, this does not lead to the conclusion you are seeking. 



Matthew said:


> I stand by what I have stated -- the proposition is a finite form of words.



It is interesting that in the previous quote above you speak of a finite form of words expressing some meaning. I define propositions to be the meaning expressed by these finite forms of words; yet, you say they are the words themselves. As such, we are talking about two different things. You ignore this, and as such, it seems that understanding is not paramount in this thread.  Let's go with your definition of proposition for the sake of the discussion. 

You have claimed that because of God’s perspective and relation to truth “God and man are absolutely different” and you draw the conclusion from this that God does not conceive of truth in “finite forms of words” expect to accommodate men. Here are the problems with this…

*Problem 1:* If God and man were _absolutely_ different, then there could be no point of contact between the two. This is contradicted by you when you say that God does conceive of truth in propositional form as a way to accommodate man. Also, I think Genesis 1:26 contradicts the claim to “absolute difference”. Perhaps, you were using the term loosely to simply say that there are some things about God man can never know?

*Problem 2:* The argument is not valid. 

*________________________*

*Premise 1:* There are things about God and His existence that we can never know due to our finitude.​*Premise 2:* God communicates to us _via_ “finite forms of words” to facilitate “covenantal relationship.”​*Conclusion:* Apart from God’s communication with man God does not conceive of truth in “finite forms of words”.​*________________________*



I am sure it is the case that we cannot fully know the way God's mind works in and of Himself outside of creation. However, this is **not** the same thing as saying that God’s knowledge is not propositional as He exists outside of creation. As creatures we simply would have no way of knowing this kind of thing apart from God explicitly revealing it to us (which to my knowledge He has not). Your "argument" ends up not being an argument at all, but mere assertion. If you feel the Bible teaches that God's knowledge is not propositional (apart from His communicating with creation), then please share your exegesis. (Keep in mind that I am one "bad" exegete! ) 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> I really have no idea what it is for someone to say that something has infinite meaning. Perhaps, all you are saying is that as finite creatures there are things we cannot know about God? I would agree with this. However, this does not lead to the conclusion you are seeking.



Do you believe God knows Socrates is mortal through the syllogism which starts with all men are mortal? If not, then you know very well what is meant by infinite meaning. God knows all things at once. Man's knowledge by means of propositional truth is partial. I don't think this is as hard for you to comprehend as you are suggesting.



Brian Bosse said:


> *Problem 1:* If God and man were _absolutely_ different, then there could be no point of contact between the two. This is contradicted by you when you say that God does conceive of truth in propositional form as a way to accommodate man. Also, I think Genesis 1:26 contradicts the claim to “absolute difference”. Perhaps, you were using the term loosely to simply say that there are some things about God man can never know?



Please pay attention to terms of reference. The absolute differences were pointed out. It was stated from the outset that the subject knowing is Infinite Creator. If you don't agree that is an absolute difference then you have a theological problem. One should not appeal to God's immanence to deny His transcendence.



Brian Bosse said:


> *Problem 2:* The argument is not valid.



I haven't presented a formal argument so you have no formal logic to criticise. Sorry to spoil your party.


----------



## py3ak

With some trepidation, I venture this suggestion.

All our propositions do express a _finite meaning_. Take our propositions about God, for instance, as contained in WSC 4. The fact is, there are many of them. They are true (they are ectypal theology, after all), but if any of them had infinite meaning, wouldn't it be the only statement we'd need to make? Our minds are not capable of infinite propositions anymore than they are capable of any other sort of infinity. So when God formulates theology for us, He necessarily puts it into the form of true, but finite propositions.

At least, that is what I glean from Mr. Winzer's remarks, though I may be misunderstanding something (don't laugh - it could happen).


----------



## MW

py3ak said:


> Take our propositions about God, for instance, as contained in WSC 4. The fact is, there are many of them. They are true (they are ectypal theology, after all), but if any of them had infinite meaning, wouldn't it be the only statement we'd need to make?



Brilliant observation!


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> Do you believe God knows Socrates is mortal through the syllogism which starts with all men are mortal? If not, then you know very well what is meant by infinite meaning. God knows all things at once. Man's knowledge by means of propositional truth is partial. I don't think this is as hard for you to comprehend as you are suggesting.


 
First off, I am not sure what you mean by that last sentence. I have tried to be genuine and sincere in this conversation. I hope you are not suggesting otherwise.  

Secondly, it seems as if you are talking about _how_ God knows the meaning of the sentence “Socrates is mortal” rather than His knowing the meaning of the sentence itself. It sounds as if you are saying that given any proposition X, the _way_ God knows X is different than the _way_ mankind knows X. Mankind might know X at the end of a syllogism, but God knows X immediately in the sense that it is ever present to Him; however, it does not necessarily follow from this that God’s knowledge of X in and of itself is altogether different than man’s knowledge of X - and it certainly does not clarify what you mean by "infinite meaning". Consider the following two arguments…

*Premise 1:* All men are mortal.
*Premise 2:* Socrates is a man.
*Conclusion:* Socrates is mortal.

*Premise 1:* If Socrates is not mortal, then Socrates did not die.
*Premise 2:* Socrates did die.
*Conclusion:* Socrates is mortal. 

These are two different ways a person can come to the knowledge that “Socrates is mortal”; yet, it seems reasonable to think that the content conveyed by the conclusion is the same in each syllogism. So, even if God knows the meaning of the sentence “Socrates is mortal” immediately and in context with all other true propositions, this in itself does not entail that God’s knowledge of the proposition is utterly dissimilar to ours. Does God know with infinite meaning the meaning of "Socrates is mortal"?



> Please pay attention to terms of reference. The absolute differences were pointed out. It was stated from the outset that the subject knowing is Infinite Creator. If you don't agree that is an absolute difference then you have a theological problem. One should not appeal to God's immanence to deny His transcendence.



It sounds as if you are admonishing me to pay closer attention. In an effort to accept your admonishment, allow me to go back to the quote under question. Here is the first part...



> …we have to raise the issue of "perspective" and "relation," which opens the door to the "personal" side of knowledge, and this personal side cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God and man are absolutely different.



You are trying to explain from the personal side of knowledge why man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge cannot “in any sense be the same.” The reason for this is because “God and man are absolutely different.” Here is the rest of the paragraph…



> God's perspective is infinite and eternal and He stands related to the truth as the Creator and Revealer. Man's persepctive is finite and temporal, and he stands related to the truth as created and receiver.



It sounds like you are saying that “God and man are absolutely different” in the sense that “God’s perspective is infinite and stands in relation to truth as the creator, while man’s perspective is finite and stands in relation to truth as the created.” If this is so, then you are saying… 

*“The personal side of knowledge cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God’s perspective is infinite and stands in relation to truth as the creator, while man’s perspective is finite and stands in relation to truth as the created.”​*Here is your argument…

*Premise 1:* God’s perspective is infinite and stands in relation to truth as the creator.
*Premise 2:* Man’s perspective is finite and stands in relation to truth as the created.
*Conclusion:* God’s knowledge of truth cannot in any sense be the same as man's.

This argument is not valid. You immediately went on to say…



> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.



This is like saying, “Given premise 1, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.” I have two thoughts about this: *(1)* This, too, is an invalid argument, and as such is not so obvious. *(2)* Given your exception clause, apparently in some sense God does conceive of truth in propositional form. But this seems to contradict the conclusion of your argument above. I appreciate your admonition to pay closer attention, but maybe the issue of my misunderstanding has less to do with my lack of attention and more to do with your communication? Just a thought. 



> I haven't presented a formal argument so you have no formal logic to criticise. Sorry to spoil your party.



An argument does not need to be a formal argument for it to be invalid. All kinds of implicit arguments are made in discussions like these. This lack of explicitness becomes the seedbed to all kinds of fallacious thinking. 

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> Secondly, it seems as if you are talking about _how_ God knows the meaning of the sentence “Socrates is mortal” rather than His knowing the meaning of the sentence itself. It sounds as if you are saying that given any proposition X, the _way_ God knows X is different than the _way_ mankind knows X.



Why make it a question of "mode" when I have clearly stated it is a question of "subject." The very idea of "mode" is a creaturely limitation.



Brian Bosse said:


> Does God know with infinite meaning the meaning of "Socrates is mortal"?



It is not about God knowing a proposition and importing His infinite knowledge into it. He knows without partition and process. The proposition itself is a part of the whole and requires a process of reasoning from universals to particulars to arrive at it. When God presents truth to man, He does so in parcels and through process; but it is folly to suppose that God Himself conceives of truth in this way. Just as it is folly to suppose a parent crawls everywhere simply because he crawls on the ground when playing with his toddler.



> You are trying to explain from the personal side of knowledge why man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge cannot “in any sense be the same.” The reason for this is because “God and man are absolutely different.”



Don't forget the qualification where I have already agreed that the object of knowledge is the same for God and man. My statement only pertains to the subject of knowledge. It appears to me that your arguments are fitted more as a criticism of Van Til than of what I have presented.



> An argument does not need to be a formal argument for it to be invalid.



It does if you are going to criticise the form of it. As it stands you have made up your own form, imputed it to me, and called it invalid.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> Why make it a question of "mode" when I have clearly stated it is a question of "subject." The very idea of "mode" is a creaturely limitation.



Words are rarely, if ever, univocal. (I suppose there could be some very precise techincal term that is univocal.) As such, I do not know precisely what you mean by ‘mode’ or ‘subject’. I suppose whay you are asking is “Why make it a question of ‘how’?” My answer is because you seemed to ask a question about “how God knows” when you asked if God knows that “Socrates is mortal” as a result of it being at the end syllogism. This sounds to me like a question of ‘how’. As such, if this is not what you meant, then please clarify.



> He (God) knows without partition and process. The proposition itself is a part of the whole and requires a process of reasoning from universals to particulars to arrive at it. When God presents truth to man, He does so in parcels and through process; but it is folly to suppose that God Himself conceives of truth in this way.



Consider the following argument where I get the premises from what you said above as indicated by the parenthetical quotes next to the premises…

*Premise 1:* If person A knows particular proposition X, then person A used a process of reasoning from universals to particulars. (“The proposition itself is a part of the whole and requires a process of reasoning from universals to particulars to arrive at it.”)
*Premise 2:* It is not the case that God uses a process of reasoning from universals to particulars. (“He (God) knows without partition and process.”)
*Conclusion:* It is not the case that God knows particular proposition X. 

The conclusion seems to follow from what you said above. Are you really saying that God cannot know particulars? If not, then it seems one of the premises is wrong. If so, then does God know that He cannot know particulars? If so, then it is not the case that knowledge “cannot be in any sense the same for God and man” as you seem to claim. If not, then what is the basis to say that the conclusion is true? In fact, you imply that we can know particulars because we can use a process that reasons from universals to particulars. This seems to mean that there are some things we know that God does not know – but this is absurd. 

Notwithstanding what was said above, I think the conclusion is false because premise 1 is false. Consider the sentence “I feel pain.” When we are in pain, many philosophers would say that we know the meaning conveyed by this sentence, and that it is a properly basic belief. That is to say, it is a belief that is both true and its truth was not determined by some chain of inference. If this is true (and I see no reason to think it is not), then premise 1 is false. Also, I grant that God knows all truth immediately in the sense it is ever-present to Him. This, too, provides a counter-example to premise 1.

Since this argument came directly from my understanding of what you said above, either I misunderstood what you said, or what you said was mistaken. If the former is the case, then would you show me the courtesy of explaining which of my premises was incorrect, and why it was incorrect based on what you said in the quote above? If the latter is the case, then can you make whatever corrections are needed to make your position understandable? 



> Don't forget the qualification where I have already agreed that the object of knowledge is the same for God and man. My statement only pertains to the subject of knowledge. It appears to me that your arguments are fitted more as a criticism of Van Til than of what I have presented.



This is helpful for me. Two things right off of the bat: *(1)* I am not versed in what Van Til has said, or the intricacies of the debate between him and Clark over these matters. My participation in this thread has strictly to do with your claims made in post #43. It is my position that your conclusions are not “obvious” or arrived at in any valid sense. As such, my arguments are not geared towards Van Til, but rather they are geared towards you. It is possible that I am misconstruing things you are saying that might look like I am interpreting you in light of Van Til. If this is the case, then I assure you it is unintentional. *(2)* You understand a distinction between the object of knowledge and the subject of knowledge. One might consider propositions, or Plato’s Forms or “what is” to be the objects of knowledge. One might consider the one doing the knowing to be the subject of knowledge, or perhaps that subject of knowledge is simply some particular field of knowledge? Can you make explicit the distinction you mean to be drawing? 



> It (an argument) does if you are going to criticise the form of it. As it stands you have made up your own form, imputed it to me, and called it invalid.



All implicit arguments entail formal arguments. As such, all implicit arguments can be criticized on their form from the basis of the formal argument they entail. All I was trying to do was to tease out the arguments entailed by you. I grant that I may have misunderstood your argument, and as such ask you to fix any of the incorrect premises. The more explicit we get the clearer the issues become, and the less chance we have of falling into fallacious thinking. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> This sounds to me like a question of ‘how’. As such, if this is not what you meant, then please clarify.



OK, I will clarify again. There is no "how" in the knowledge of God. He just knows. He doesn't come to know.



Brian Bosse said:


> Are you really saying that God cannot know particulars?



No, I haven't even hinted at it. I said, "The proposition itself is a part of the whole and requires a process of reasoning from universals to particulars to arrive at it." It seems to me that your freedom to create logical forms of argument on behalf of others enables you to make them say anything you please.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> It seems to me that your freedom to create logical forms of argument on behalf of others enables you to make them say anything you please.



Whatever arguments I have formed have come from my understanding of your position. Now, I may have misunderstood you, and as a result constructed arguments not representing your position. But this was done from misunderstanding rather than from intentionality as you seem to indicate when you say “you…make them say anything you please”. I have already told you that my interaction with you is sincere and genuine. This is twice now that you have brought my sincerity into question. I assume you are trying to be sincere and genuine in our discussion. Please show me the same courtesy by not questioning my intentions. It hurts my feelings and adds nothing to our discussion.  



> OK, I will clarify again. There is no "how" in the knowledge of God. He just knows. He doesn't come to know.



I understand you to be saying that God knows all truths immediately in the sense that all truths are ever-present to Him. 



Brian said:


> Are you really saying that God cannot know particulars?
> 
> 
> Matthew said:
> 
> 
> 
> No, I haven't even hinted at it. I said, "The proposition itself is a part of the whole and requires a process of reasoning from universals to particulars to arrive at it."
Click to expand...


OK, it is your position that God knows particular propositions. He knows them immediately; whereas, we know them through a reasoning process starting with universals and concluding to particulars. This is how I understand your position at this point. Is my understanding accurate? I want to bring in a little context regarding this. I have been attempting to clarify what you meant when you said...



> ...we have to raise the issue of "perspective" and "relation," which opens the door to the "personal" side of knowledge, and this personal side cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God and man are absolutely different. God's perspective is infinite and eternal and He stands related to the truth as the Creator and Revealer. Man's persepctive is finite and temporal, and he stands related to the truth as created and receiver.



So, based on my current understanding of your position I now understand this paragraph to say…
_________________________


*God’s knowledge is not in any sense the same as man’s because:*

*(1)* God is omniscient.
*(2)* All of God’s knowledge is immediate.
*(3)* God is the creator
*(4)* No man is omniscient.
*(5)* Some of man’s knowledge is not immediate.
*(6)* Man is the created.​_________________________

If this is not what you mean, then please clarify. For now, I am going to assume that (1)-(6) is what you mean and continue. Your conclusion based on (1)-(6) is…



> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth (i.e., (1)-(6)), it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.



Given (1)-(6), I do not see how the conclusion you give in this quote is ‘obvious’. It certainly does not immediately follow from (1)-(6). So, how do you get from (1)-(6) to the conclusion: God does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship? Can you make the argument explicit?

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> This is twice now that you have brought my sincerity into question. I assume you are trying to be sincere and genuine in our discussion. Please show me the same courtesy by not questioning my intentions. It hurts my feelings and adds nothing to our discussion.



At no point have I said anything about your sincerity. You are inflicting self-hurt by reading this into my words.

If you are going to have beneficial discussions with people you will need to stop shadow boxing with their statements. Not all arguments move from premise to conclusion. I don't know too many people who will be interested in discussing things with a person who transforms every statement into a syllogism and proceeds to criticise them for an invalid formal logic they never even adopted.


----------



## Philip

On logic:

I think it should be remembered that inductive logic is always invalid, yet is still useful. In addition, premises are often assumed rather than explicitly stated. Just because an argument is invalid does not mean it is not useful--that's a medieval-enlightenment assumption that I, for one, am trying to get away from.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gents,



Matthew said:


> At no point have I said anything about your sincerity. You are inflicting self-hurt by reading this into my words.



Ok. This is good enough for me. I apologize for reading into your words. Please forgive me. 



Matthew said:


> If you are going to have beneficial discussions with people you will need to stop shadow boxing with their statements. Not all arguments move from premise to conclusion. I don't know too many people who will be interested in discussing things with a person who transforms every statement into a syllogism and proceeds to criticise them for an invalid formal logic they never even adopted.



It is easy to go about making philosophical/theological claims using vague, equivocal terms and sloppy arguments. In fact, some hide behind such tactics because they know their arguments are fallacious. All informal arguments can be put into formal terms. Let me say that again, **ALL** informal arguments can be put into formal terms. Making an argument explicit does three things: *(1)* It allows one to clearly see the form of the argument so as to be able to judge the validity of the argument, *(2)* it allows the soundness of the argument to be more accurately determined because the premises are clear, and *(3)* it exposes those sophists who like to hide behind vague, equivocal terms and sloppy argumentation. Now, you made an argument that clearly had a conclusion. Here was your conclusion (the bolded part)…



Matthew said:


> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, *it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship*.



This so-called "obvious" conclusion is based on a given (your words, not mine) that was explained in the prior paragraph from which I gathered this quote. That means you reasoned from premises to a conclusion. So, please do not lecture me about the flow of arguments. You went from some type of premise to a conclusion. Yet, you seem to be either unable or unwilling to make your argument explicit. My guess is the issue is not ignorance, but unwillingness. If I were to guess why you are unwilling it is because you know deep down that your argument is invalid. 



Philip said:


> I think it should be remembered that inductive logic is always invalid, yet is still useful.



We are not talking about induction here. Matthew was not making his case _via_ an inductive argument. 



Philip said:


> In addition, premises are often assumed rather than explicitly stated.



This is true. I am just asking Matthew to make everything explicit, but he does not seem to want to do these things. I suspect he does not like being called out like this, and I suspect he knows his argument is invalid. 



Philip said:


> Just because an argument is invalid does not mean it is not useful--that's a medieval-enlightenment assumption that I, for one, am trying to get away from.



I am not sure what you mean by this. I agree that inductive arguments can be very useful. The context of this discussion is not inductive argumentation. All valid arguments with assumed premises can be made formally valid by making explicit the assumed premises. If arguments with assumed premises cannot be put into valid form, then they are **not** useful arguments – except as illustrations of fallacious argumentation.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> It is easy to go about making philosophical/theological claims using vague, equivocal terms and sloppy arguments. In fact, some hide behind such tactics because they know their arguments are fallacious. All informal arguments can be put into formal terms. Let me say that again, **ALL** informal arguments can be put into formal terms.



Obviously it can, if the person making the argument decides it is best to specify terms and link them in the logical chain required to argue fom premise to conclusion. If he doesn't, it is not competent to someone else to formally state the argument for him, and it is simply poor form when that other person has it in view to criticise the logic of the argument that has never been presented logically.



Brian Bosse said:


> I suspect he does not like being called out like this, and I suspect he knows his argument is invalid.



You suspect wrongly. I simply see no benefit in debating with a person who doesn't agree with the underlying principle of transcendence that I have espoused. To put it in the logical language you are obviously chained to, there is no point explicating a minor premise when one's interlocutor will not even accept the major.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> I simply see no benefit in debating with a person who doesn't agree with the underlying principle of transcendence that I have espoused. To put it in the logical language you are obviously chained to, there is no point explicating a minor premise when one's interlocutor will not even accept the major.



My criticisms had to do with the validity of your argument in post #43. This means that whether or not I accepted your major premise is completely irrelevant. As far as disagreeing with your "underlying principle of transendence," I simply would not know. I have yet to even figure our what this underlying principle of yours is. Was it the six points I laid out in post #70? If so, I agree with all six of those points. 

I have claimed your argument in post #43 is not obvious, which I think I have reasonably established at this point, and I have claimed that it was not valid. So, why not make explicit for us both your major and minor premise as found in post #43 that leads us to the conclusion found in post #43? Whether or not I think the premises are true is irrelevant to the issue at hand.

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> This means that whether or not I accepted your major premise is completely irrelevant.



My argument amounts to this -- "If A, then B." You reject A -- God's transcendent knowledge. That being the case, there is no point in showing "then B." Besides, you would refuse any minor premise I might provide because you have rejected my statement that a finite proposition contains a finite meaning. We obviously have no common ground in this "discussion," and I find you to be too interested in debate for the mere sake of it; such circumstances are not congenial to a beneficial discussion of the holy things of God.


----------



## PuritanCovenanter

Reverend Winzer,

I am not as able as you guys to discuss this kind of argumentation, so please bear with me as I impose on you what I am seeing and where I am having a disconnect with understanding your discussion with Brian. 

It seems you both are agreeing with transendence. Maybe it is a matter of degree that you are seeing a difference in. But I see both of you saying that the creature / creator distinction is so wide that it can not be fathomed. Nor can this transcendence be understood because of the natures between Creator and creature are so different. But when immanence is being discussed concerning knowledge there is a void or disconnect between the two of you. You seem to be neglecting that factor when Brian is trying to discuss things on that level. I am only an observer and not as equipped on speaking about this as you guys are. So please forgive me if I am intruding on the discussion in an improper way. 

In the immanent realm of life where God by logos communicates to man can truth be solid and factual both between God and man? Is truth the same at that level as in let your yes be yes and your no be no?


----------



## rbcbob

PuritanCovenanter said:


> Reverend Winzer,
> 
> I am not as able as you guys to discuss this kind of argumentation, so please bear with me as I impose on you what I am seeing and where I am having a disconnect with understanding your discussion with Brian.
> 
> It seems you both are agreeing with transendence. Maybe it is a matter of degree that you are seeing a difference in. But I see both of you saying that the creature / creator distinction is so wide that it can not be fathomed. Nor can this transcendence be understood because of the natures between Creator and creature are so different. But when immanence is being discussed concerning knowledge there is a void or disconnect between the two of you. You seem to be neglecting that factor when Brian is trying to discuss things on that level. I am only an observer and not as equipped on speaking about this as you guys are. So please forgive me if I am intruding on the discussion in an improper way.
> 
> In the immanent realm of life where God by logos communicates to man can truth be solid and factual both between God and man? Is truth the same at that level as in let your yes be yes and your no be no?




Randy, I too have been (with but few exceptions) been watching from the sidelines as Matthew and Brian debate the issue of our knowledge and God’s knowledge.

I am concerned because an old Achilles Heel is returning to threaten the Church which was thought to have been cured last century. *G. K. Beale*, who will soon take up teaching at Westminster, has a new book coming out called “The Erosion of Inerrancy in Evangelicalism: Responding to New Challenges to Biblical Authority”.

When we posit that God has not communicated His mind to humanity BECAUSE such is not possible (transcendence, incomprehensibility, infinitude, etc) then we open ourselves up to any number of rabbit trails and theological dead ends. Alas Barth is receiving new appreciation among men in erstwhile solid seminaries and schools.

Carl Henry wrote:
“The Word of God is personal and rational, and the truth of God, whether given in general or in special disclosure, including the climactic revelation of the Logos in Jesus of Nazareth, can be propositionally formulated. All divine revelation mediated to man is incarnational, inasmuch as it is given in human history, concepts and language. Even the supreme personal revelation historically manifested by the incarnate Christ shares in this verbal and propositional expressibility.

John the evangelist did not begin his gospel by declaring that Agape (love) became flesh, or that Dunamis (power) became flesh, or that Dikaios (righteousness) became flesh__as indeed they did in the incarnate Christ__but rather that the Logos (word) became flesh.” GRA III.173

*John 1:18 No one has seen God at any time. The only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared [εξηγησατο ] Him.*

“Revelation is that activity of the supernatural God whereby he communicates information essential for man’s present and future destiny. In revelation God, whose thoughts are not our thoughts, shares his thoughts with man; *in this self-disclosure God unveils his very own mind*; he communicates not only the truth about himself and his intentions, but also that concerning man’s present plight and future prospects.” GRA III.457


----------



## MW

PuritanCovenanter said:


> It seems you both are agreeing with transendence.



Randy,

Brian says, "I really have no idea what it is for someone to say that something has infinite meaning. Perhaps, all you are saying is that as finite creatures there are things we cannot know about God? I would agree with this."

We do not agree on God's transcendence. I teach that God's thoughts are above our thoughts, that we cannot by searching find out God, that God's love passeth knowledge, that there is a joy unspeakable and a peace that passeth understanding.



PuritanCovenanter said:


> But when immanence is being discussed concerning knowledge there is a void or disconnect between the two of you. You seem to be neglecting that factor when Brian is trying to discuss things on that level.



I do not use the teaching of God's immanence to modify the teaching on transcendence. As I noted, seeing a parent crawl on the ground to interact with his children does not indicate that he can only crawl.



PuritanCovenanter said:


> In the immanent realm of life where God by logos communicates to man can truth be solid and factual both between God and man? Is truth the same at that level as in let your yes be yes and your no be no?



Yes; I have affirmed this against Van Tillian paradox over and again. The object of knowledge is the same for God and man. The qualities of truth, including non contradiction, should be a given of ectypal theology.


----------



## MW

rbcbob said:


> Carl Henry wrote:
> “The Word of God is personal and rational, and the truth of God, whether given in general or in special disclosure, including the climactic revelation of the Logos in Jesus of Nazareth, can be propositionally formulated. All divine revelation mediated to man is incarnational, inasmuch as it is given in human history, concepts and language. Even the supreme personal revelation historically manifested by the incarnate Christ shares in this verbal and propositional expressibility.



This reaches the heart of the discussion. We affirm the propositional nature of God's revelation, but we cannot say it is only propositional. It is also personal.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello PB Members,



Matthew Winzer said:


> We affirm the propositional nature of God's revelation, but we cannot say it is only propositional. It is also personal.



I have three things to say about this:

*(1)* What is the referent of ‘it’ in these two sentences? It would seem to me that the referent of ‘it’ is either: (A) the “propositional nature of God’s revelation,” or simply (B) “God’s revelation.” If A is the case, then Matthew is saying, “We cannot say the propositional nature of God's revelation is only propositional.” But it is absurd to speak of the propositional nature of anything being something other than propositional. If B is the case, then Matthew is saying, “We cannot say the nature of God's revelation is only propositional.” Now, I am not sure what this means. If all Matthew is saying is that there is more to revelation than special revelation, then no one is arguing this. We all affirm general revelation. Another problem deals with his use of the term ‘proposition’. Matthew fails to understand the distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the sentence itself. It is common amongst philosophers of language and logicians to understand the meaning conveyed by sentences to be propositions. Matthew refuses to acknowledge this and thereby confuses propositions with sentences that express propositions. Lastly, I do not think Matthew meant A or B at all. I think he intended the referent of ‘it’ to be “God’s knowledge.” If so, this is just another illustration of his lack of precision in this thread.

*(2)* Assuming Matthew is indeed speaking of God's knowledge, it sound as if Matthew may have changed his position (maybe not?) regarding the claim he made in post #43. To say, “We cannot say God’s knowledge is only propositional” is a much smaller claim than saying, “It is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.” Now, I agree that we, as finite creatures, cannot make such dogmatic claims like “God’s knowledge is only propositional.” We would have no way of knowing this apart from God explicitly revealing this to us. But for the very same reason, we cannot make such dogmatic claims like “It is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.” Matthew does not know this - much less that the conclusion is “obvious”! 

*(3)* Matthew speaks of God’s knowledge as being “personal.” But as hard as I have tried, he still will not make explicit what he means by this. In post #70, I gave six statements trying to clarify what he means by this based on what he said in his post #43. In addition, I asked him that if I was not accurate in my representation that he clarify things. Rather than taking the opportunity to clarify things he simply chose to ignore it altogether! It should be noted that Matthew’s conclusion in post #43 does not follow from these six statements in my post #70. 

All in all, after repeated attempts to ask Matthew to make explicit his argument, and clarify his terms, he has chosen for not to do so. Either he is unable to do so, or he is afraid to do so. I think he is afraid to do so because when all of the obfuscation is removed one will find that Matthew has merely asserted his conclusion – a conclusion that he himself does not know and cannot know as a finite creature unless God has revealed it to us. I am unaware of anywhere in the Scriptures stating that "God does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship."  

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> If B is the case, then Matthew is saying, “We cannot say the nature of God's revelation is only propositional.” Now, I am not sure what this means.



Of course my meaning is B -- the revelation is more than propositional. Brian's inability to understand what I mean by this lies at the heart of his criticism of my overall position. He simply cannot understand what is meant by personal or non-propositional revelation. He knows not what is meant by a love that passeth knowledge, a peace that transcends our understanding, and a joy unspeakable. In short, he knows not how to thank God for His unspeakable gift, which is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh. Brian needs to believe the gospel of Jesus Christ rather than the false rationalist version he has been following.



Brian Bosse said:


> I think he is afraid to do so



When Brian believes the true gospel and turns from his rationalist perversion of it he will know what Paul means by the statement, Unto the pure all things are pure.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Matthew, 

To make it clear, we are talking about the nature of God's knowledge and not revelation. The conclusion that "God does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship," does not follow from the reasons you gave for it in post #43 or anything you said since then. Not only that, as a finite creature you cannot know this. 



Matthew said:


> Brian needs to believe the gospel of Jesus Christ rather than the false rationalist version he has been following. When Brian believes the true gospel and turns from his rationalist perversion of it he will know what Paul means by the statement, Unto the pure all things are pure.



Resorting to this type of rhetoric is a beautiful thing. It simply shows the bankruptcy of your position and the quality of your character. I trust the PB will see this for what is.

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> Resorting to this type of rhetoric is a beautiful thing. It simply shows the bankruptcy of your position and the quality of your character. I trust the PB will see this for what is.



So Brian thinks calling upon a person to believe the gospel of Jesus Christ shows the bankruptcy of one's position. I'm sure that will certainly indicate to PB members what Brian thinks of ministers of the gospel and the message that they are commissioned by the Head of the church to preach.


----------



## MW

dr_parsley said:


> There's not nearly enough clarity in this thread for Matthew to accuse Brian of not being a Christian, so perhaps it is a "high-context discussion" and I don't know the context?



2 Cor. 9:15, "Thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift." All Christians can give thanks in this manner. Can Brian? You will have to ask him.


----------



## OPC'n

armourbearer said:


> Brian Bosse said:
> 
> 
> 
> If B is the case, then Matthew is saying, “We cannot say the nature of God's revelation is only propositional.” Now, I am not sure what this means.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course my meaning is B -- the revelation is more than propositional. Brian's inability to understand what I mean by this lies at the heart of his criticism of my overall position. He simply cannot understand what is meant by personal or non-propositional revelation. He knows not what is meant by a love that passeth knowledge, a peace that transcends our understanding, and a joy unspeakable. In short, he knows not how to thank God for His unspeakable gift, which is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh. Brian needs to believe the gospel of Jesus Christ rather than the false rationalist version he has been following.
Click to expand...


Perhaps Brian doesn't know what is meant by a love that passeth knowledge, and a joy unspeakable bc those are God's attributes....they are who He is and you said we don't posses them. Therefore, it wouldn't be surprising for me to find that Brian believes only in propositional revelation. How could it be personal revelation if one cannot possess God's attributes of love and joy? He cannot believe in personal revelation that would be blasphemy. He has to believe that propositional revelation is all that mankind can endeavor to hold in his hand.....thank goodness for paper and ink!


----------



## MW

OPC'n said:


> How could it be personal revelation if one cannot possess God's attributes of love and joy?



"The Word became flesh and dwelt amongs us."

"I know WHOM I have believed."


----------



## PuritanCovenanter

The point Rev. Winzer is stating is that all truth can't be propositional. There are truths that are not propositions. When a non propositional truth is presented, such as the ones Rev. Winzer has presented, a person who claims that all truth is propositional can not believe in those truths that he claims are only propositional. Thus that makes him an unbeliever because his rationalism can't take him to accept those truths. Sometimes absurdity reveals the absurd. Also, I will note that Rev. Winzer does not fall into the Van-Tillian error concerning paradoxes. 



armourbearer said:


> PuritanCovenanter said:
> 
> 
> 
> In the immanent realm of life where God by logos communicates to man can truth be solid and factual both between God and man? Is truth the same at that level as in let your yes be yes and your no be no?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yes; I have affirmed this against Van Tillian paradox over and again. The object of knowledge is the same for God and man. The qualities of truth, including non contradiction, should be a given of ectypal theology.
Click to expand...


I have not communicated with Rev. Winzer outside of this thread. I have only read what he has written here in dealing with Brian. Brian has called out Reverend Winzer very harshly and attacked his character concerning avoiding certain questions. I think Reverend Winzer has actually answered his questions in various posts. 

When Rev. Winzer acknowledged that he wouldn't answer Brian in some parts it was because Brian wasn't listening to him and thus not interracting with Rev. Winzer. It would be like me getting into a debate with someone who wanted to rabbit trail down paths of straw men and me not being willing to give answers because of the hypothetical set ups that would clearly be misunderstood because of the faulty premises and conclusions that should be lead to because of the the faulty premises. We see this happen a lot in the Calvinism / pelagian debate. It happens in many other kinds of senerios also. 

Behind the immanent realm their is always the transendant realm that is the reality. And Matthew will not divorce the one from the other. It is wrong to do so.

I will be gone the rest of the day so please understand that Rev. Winzer is not unjustifiably addressing Brian the way he did. He is taking Brian's conclusions to their end. Brian has called Rev. Winzer out, so to speak. Rev. Winzer has, in my opinion, addressed the issues that Brian has accused him of. Rev. Winzer has taken Brian to where his conclusions lead him. 

Rev. Winzer is in a different time zone and will not be on the board most likely till Monday. He is a very Godly Pastor who tends to the Sabbath and his flock. 

Be Encouraged,
Randy


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> Of course my meaning is B -- the revelation is more than propositional. Brian's inability to understand what I mean by this lies at the heart of his criticism of my overall position. He simply cannot understand what is meant by personal or non-propositional revelation. He knows not what is meant by a love that passeth knowledge, a peace that transcends our understanding, and a joy unspeakable. In short, he knows not how to thank God for His unspeakable gift, which is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh.



I had to highlight this as, in my opinion, this type of acknowledgement guards, at the same time, against the twin errors of rationalism (Clark) and irrationalism (Barth). Both ultimately lead to nonsense and neither leads to God. In the end, both the orthodox and neo-orthodox are right--and therefore both are wrong: God's revelation is propositional and personal at the same time.


----------



## dr_parsley

PuritanCovenanter said:


> The point Rev. Winzer is stating is that all truth can't be propositional. There are truths that are not propositions. When a non propositional truth is presented, such as the ones Rev. Winzer has presented, a person who claims that all truth is propositional can not believe in those truths that he claims are only propositional. Thus that makes him an unbeliever because his rationalism can't take him to accept those truths.



Randy, I defer to your greater analysis of the discussion. If Brian does indeed hold to the position alleged, then no, he can't be a Christian. In which case why is he on the board? I would just say that Brian and Matthew seem to disagree significantly on the very definition of a proposition. On such a basis, to say that the other party is not a Christian because, for some function f, f(propositions)|Brian=false seems foolhardy at best. On the other side, Brian simply seems determined to prove Matthew wrong. If I was a moderator I'd consider deleting all the posts involved for the edification of all.


----------



## rbcbob

*Attempting to Mediate between Clark and Van Til ...*

While not pretending to be able to bring all of the followers of these two great thinkers to the table allow me to propose something to PBers of both camps something which may be mutually acceptable.

Without encroaching upon God's transcendence may we not say that God has communicated to Man making use of propositional revelation? And how is it that man, lower than the angels, comprehends the propositions of the Almighty?

Several contributing factors:

*1* Man is the _imago dei_ and as the image of God he has been designed to think God's thoughts after him.

*2* God, to whom nothing is impossible, is able to cause man to understand Him and His gracious revelation.

*3* Christ, the _Theanthropos_ mediates between God and man thus correctly exegeting *εξηγεομαι* Him to us (John 1:18)

Carl Henry wrote:



> “All man needs in order to know God as he truly is, is God’s intelligible disclosure and rational concepts that qualify man__on the basis of the imago Dei__to comprehend the content of God’s logically ordered revelation. Unless mankind has epistemological means adequate for factual truth about God as he truly is, the inevitable outcome of the quest for religious knowledge is equivocation and skepticism.” GRA IV.119



and



> “The Word of God is personal and rational, and the truth of God, whether given in general or in special disclosure, including the climactic revelation of the Logos in Jesus of Nazareth, can be propositionally formulated. All divine revelation mediated to man is incarnational, inasmuch as it is given in human history, concepts and language. Even the supreme personal revelation historically manifested by the incarnate Christ shares in this verbal and propositional expressibility.
> John the evangelist did not begin his gospel by declaring that Agape (love) became flesh, or that Dunamis (power) became flesh, or that Dikaios (righteousness) became flesh__as indeed they did in the incarnate Christ__but rather that the Logos (word) became flesh.” GRA III.173


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew, dr_parsley, et. al.,



dr_parsley said:


> On the other side, Brian simply seems determined to prove Matthew wrong. If I was a moderator I'd consider deleting all the posts involved for the edification of all.



Please forgive me for my interactions in this thread. I do think Matthew is wrong, but the attitude of my heart regarding this has not been right. As such, I have sinned. Matthew, please forgive me for accusing you of being afraid. That was wrong. Also, I ask the board members to forgive me for my unedifying interaction in this thread.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Semper Fidelis

armourbearer said:


> I do not use the teaching of God's immanence to modify the teaching on transcendence. As I noted, seeing a parent crawl on the ground to interact with his children does not indicate that he can only crawl.
> 
> 
> 
> PuritanCovenanter said:
> 
> 
> 
> In the immanent realm of life where God by logos communicates to man can truth be solid and factual both between God and man? Is truth the same at that level as in let your yes be yes and your no be no?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yes; I have affirmed this against Van Tillian paradox over and again. The object of knowledge is the same for God and man. The qualities of truth, including non contradiction, should be a given of ectypal theology.
Click to expand...


Excerpts from Muller on the Archetypal/Ectypal distinction in theology:



> 5.2 Archetypal and Ectypal Theology
> 
> A. The Paradigm: Forms of the Knowledge of God from the Divine Self-Knowledge to the Accommodated Knowing of Fallen Creatures
> The Reformed orthodox generally agree concerning the importance of distinguishing between archetypal and ectypal theology. Their agreement is particularly strong in the identification of true human theology as an ectype or reflection resting on but not commensurate with the divine self-knowledge.





> The archetype, as Turretin noted, is not in any sense equivalent to our theology: the human mind cannot know the archetype, as such, and the term “theology” cannot be predicated univocally of our theology and of the divine archetype.33 Nonetheless, as the early orthodox dogmaticians point out, the fact of the divine archetype is crucial to the existence of true yet finite human theology: “Archetypal theology is the divine Wisdom concerning divine things: this we truly adore, but we do not inquire into it.”34 This, adds Junius, is not a definition but rather a description by analogy with things known to us, by the application of our terms to divine things. Wisdom (sapientia) is predicated univocally only of God inasmuch as God alone is truly wise—and therefore is predicated equivocally of human beings. Therefore, when predicated of God, wisdom does not indicate a genus of wise things of which God is one. The divine sapientia is a proper attribute of God: it is divine wisdom in the sense of being identical with the divine essence in its utter simplicity and its freedom from all composition. The theologia archetypa, then, is God himself, the identity of self and self-knowledge in the absolutely and essentially wise God.35
> Polanus thus remarks that the division of theology into the categories of archetypal and ectypal is by analogy. Primarily and principally, theologia is theologia archetypa and only secondarily and by similitude is it theologia ectypa. This must be the case since all wisdom, goodness, righteousness, power, and other creaturely qualities in rational creatures are from God in whom they find their archetype—their imago.36 That there is theology in God appears from the fact that God has wisdom concerning rerum divinarum and from the fact that all perfections “that are in us, are also in God,” but on an exalted level. Thus, “archetypal theology is the wisdom of divine things that is resident in God, essential to him and uncreated.”37 This might also be called theologia prototypa or, as the scholastics termed it, theologia Dei or “exemplary theology, to which as to an immutable, primary and primordial idea and exemplar, all created theology is conformed as a likeness, such divine theology we adore but do not search into.”38 This language draws directly upon that of Junius, with some amplification of definition.
> Since, moreover, this “divine knowledge concerning divine things” is uncreated (increata), identical with the form or essence of God (formalis), absolute, infinite, utterly simple or incomplex (simplicissima), and utterly simultaneous (tota simul), that is, without either temporal or logical sequence, it must also be incommunicable (incommunicabilis), as indeed are all the divine attributes when defined strictly or univocally. All that can be naturally communicated to created things of such an ultimate wisdom are but faint images or vestiges (imagines aut etiam vestigia). There is no analogical path from the divine imprint upon the created order to a full knowledge of God.39 It is therefore God himself who is the source, origin and efficient cause of what we know in this life as true theology.40 The nature of this archetype and its function as the source of all that finite creatures know about God poses a final paradox in the Protestant scholastic discussion of the “attributes” of archetypal theology: it is both incommunicable (incommunicabilis) and communicative (communicativa). The identity of theologia archetypa with the infinite essence of God renders it incapable of communication to creatures. Nonetheless, God’s infinite self-knowledge is transmitted to things in the created order. In creation, all things receive the imprint of the divine and the ability of finite creatures to apprehend revelation, to have theology, rests upon the image of God according to which they have been created.





> These considerations bring us, finally, to the Reformed orthodox definition of ectypal theology:
> Ectypal theology considered either simply, as they say, or in relation to its various kinds, is the wisdom of divine things given conceptual form by God, on the basis of the archetypal image of himself through the communication of Grace for his own glory. And so, indeed, theology simply so called, is the entire Wisdom concerning divine things capable of being communicated to created things by [any] manner of communication.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello PB Board (and Matthew),

I am going to approach this discussion in a little different fashion in an effort to move the discussion forward in a more God honoring manner. To get started, let me say upfront that I have _not_ taken a position regarding the nature of God’s knowledge other than to admit a sort of agnosticism. I have, however, taken a strong position regarding the argument put forth by Matthew in his post #43. I have claimed that the argument as stated is not valid, but I also have stated that Matthew as a finite creature cannot know the conclusion. Here is the conclusion he reaches taken directly from post #43…



Matthew said:


> …it is obvious that He (God) does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.



Matthew says two things: *(1)* the conclusion is ‘obvious’, and *(2)* the conclusions is that apart from God accommodating us, He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form. So, what is the basis for Matthew's conclusion? What information does he have that allows him to make such a universal conclusion about the very nature of God’s knowledge? He did begin the quote above with…



Matthew said:


> Given God's perspective and relation to the truth…



So, the basis for Matthew's conclusion is God’s perspective and relation to the truth. Matthew has called this God’s personal knowledge. When one considers what exactly this “personal knowledge” of God is, can one validly conclude that apart from accommodating us, God does not conceive of the truth in propositional form? Let’s look at his explication of what God’s personal knowledge entails - again, taken from post #43.



Matthew said:


> But then we have to raise the issue of "perspective" and "relation," which opens the door to the "personal" side of knowledge, and this personal side cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God and man are absolutely different. God's perspective is infinite and eternal and He stands related to the truth as the Creator and Revealer. Man's persepctive is finite and temporal, and he stands related to the truth as created and receiver.



He argues that because God and man are absolutely different the personal side of knowledge cannot in any sense be the same as man’s personal side of knowledge. He further clarifies what this difference entails with the last two sentences of this quote. Here they are laid out in eight propositions…

*(1)* God’s perspective is infinite.
*(2)* God’s perspective is eternal.
*(3)* God’s perspective is as the creator.
*(4)* God’s perspective is as the revealer.
*(5)* Man’s perspective is finite.
*(6)* Man’s perspective is temporal.
*(7)* Man’s perspective is as the created.
*(8)* Man’s perspective is as the receiver. 

Matthew explicitly tells us (see the second quote above) that his conclusion is based on “God’s perspective and relation to truth” (as it differs from men). These eight propositions represent God’s perspective ((1)-(4)) and man’s perspective to truth ((5)-(8)). So, how do propositions (1)-(8) logically entail the conclusion that “God does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship”? Notice, there is no term ‘propositional form’ in propositions (1)-(8). So, where did this term come from for it to be in the conclusion? As I have consistently stated throughout this thread, Matthew’s argument is not valid. Not only that, as a finite creature he cannot fully know the nature of God’s knowledge relative to propositions. This is what I meant in the first paragraph when I said that admitted to a sort of agnosticism regarding the nature of God’s knowledge. Matthew has claimed more than he can possibly know. 

In an effort to represent Matthew evenly, he has said in this thread that “we cannot say it (God’s knowledge) is only propositional.” I agree with him for the very same reason I gave above. Because of our finitude, we cannot make these kinds of absolute claims with any kind of certainty, and as such these assertions (in the end, that is all they are) cannot properly be said to be knowledge. Just like we cannot say, “God’s knowledge is only propositional,” we cannot say, “God does not conceive of truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.”

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Ask Mr. Religion

Brian Bosse said:


> we cannot say, “God does not conceive of truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.”


Given the transcendance of God, I am hard pressed to understand why we cannot make this statement.

You cannot reduce God to a series of propositional statements.

AMR


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> In an effort to represent Matthew evenly, he has said in this thread that “we cannot say it (God’s knowledge) is only propositional.”



Hello Brian,

Thankyou for your apology, which I humbly accept. Thankyou also for trying to represent me evenly. But here again you show that you haven't understood what I have stated. I stated we cannot say that God's revelation is only propositional. The fact that you equate God's revelation with God's knowledge indicates to me that you are not aware of some fundamental distinctions which are necessary for discussing this subject. May I ask you to please take into consideration Rich's quotation of Muller, and see if you can tell the difference between archetypal and ectypal theology? Please compare it with Matthew 11:27, which emphasises that man's knowledge of God is mediated through the God-man. I also highly recommend Patrick's pointed statement which warns against the danger of reducing God. This merits deep reflection. Many blessings!


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello AMR and Armourbearer,



AMR said:


> Given the transcendance of God, I am hard pressed to understand why we cannot make this statement. You cannot reduce God to a series of propositional statements.



I have two points regarding this: *(1)* You certainly can make the statement, but it is mere supposition. *(2)* My claim that as created finite beings we do not know that God's knowledge is not propositional does not reduce God to a series of propositional statements. Our agnosticism regarding the nature of God's knowledge does not reduce God to anything. It is simply a comment on the limits of our knowledge. I believe Matthew has made assertions about the nature of God's knowledge that he does not know - they are mere assertions.



Matthew said:


> I stated we cannot say that God's revelation is only propositional.



My mistake. As such, I retract it. But just to be clear, you did make a claim about the nature of God's knowledge - not His revelation - in your post #43. That is the issue I am trying to address in this thread. 



Matthew said:


> May I ask you to please take into consideration Rich's quotation of Muller, and see if you can tell the difference between archetypal and ectypal theology?



I have carefully read Rich's post. It seems to be similar to what you where saying regarding the distinction between the personal side of God's and man's knowledge in your post #43. In my last post I came up with eight propositions from your post #43 that came from your explanation of what you meant when you spoke of God's personal knowledge. As such, I have three (two) questions for you that I would like you to answer for me...

*(1)* Do my eight propositions derived from your post #43 accurately represent what you said in post #43 regarding God's personal knowledge?
*(2)* If the answer to question (1) is 'no', would you tell me how I misconstrued what you said in post #43? 
*(3)* If the answer to question (1) is 'yes', then do my eight propositions derived from your post #43 validly lead to the conclusion you made in your post #43?

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> *(1)* Do my eight propositions derived from your post #43 accurately represent what you said in post #43 regarding God's personal knowledge?



Yes.



Brian Bosse said:


> *(3)* If the answer to question (1) is 'yes', then do my eight propositions derived from your post #43 validly lead to the conclusion you made in your post #43?



They are an explanation of the leading premise that the subject of knowledge is different. Implicit in the acceptance of this difference is the fact that God is not bound to a finite form of knowledge. As noted, a minor premise would need to be added to the effect that propositions are by nature finite.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,

I still am going to need more clarification, but I know see the outline of the argument you are making. 



> Implicit in the acceptance of this difference is the fact that God is not bound to a finite form of knowledge. As noted, a minor premise would need to be added to the effect that propositions are by nature finite.



Would you explain what you mean by "a finite form of knowledge"? Also, what do you mean when you say "propositions are by nature finite"? 

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> Would you explain what you mean by "a finite form of knowledge"? Also, what do you mean when you say "propositions are by nature finite"?



If I look up the word "finite" in a dictionary it tells me the meaning is bounded, limited, not infinite. I could then look up those terms, and it would tell me that a "bound" is a limit, a "limit" is a bounding line, and "infinite" means boundless. What have I learned? Not only that man's knowledge has bounds and limits, but also that man reasons within a circle and eventually winds up explaining terms by terms he has already used. Some men try to disguise the fact that they reason in a circle by widening the circle they use; but they never cease reasoning in a circle because man is bounded, limited, not infinite.

A "proposition" is a form of words consisting of subject and predicate. One can look at the collection of words or one can look at the correlation of subject and predicate, but in either case there is always an accumulation of particulars which are bound by the limitations of relation.


----------



## Ask Mr. Religion

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello AMR and Armourbearer,
> 
> 
> 
> AMR said:
> 
> 
> 
> Given the transcendance of God, I am hard pressed to understand why we cannot make this statement. You cannot reduce God to a series of propositional statements.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have two points regarding this: *(1)* You certainly can make the statement, but it is mere supposition. *(2)* My claim that as created finite beings we do not know that God's knowledge is not propositional does not reduce God to a series of propositional statements.
Click to expand...

Yet you have went to great lengths to form propositions about this very matter. In attempting to defend matters of the faith, you are primarily engaging God's revelation from vantage point that appeals to finite human reason. While you are correctly allowing a spot for intelligence and reason within faith, you simultaneously are suppressing the very substance of the faith you are seeking to defend.

The underlying premise of what you are attempting to appears to be based on the notion that God’s revelatory "speech" (Hebrews 1:1) is handily assimilated to a series of propositions. Such an approach lacks an appreciation of the Scriptural view of revelation, and hence its truths as personal encounter, as event, as history, as promises, or as dialogical encounter. Such a generous self-disclosure of God's vision of creation and history is lost with propositional attempts.

You claim I am making mere assertion, while I argue this is a Spirit-borne fact. Indeed, our own experience, enabled by the Spirit's illumination, screams that God's knowledge, all truth, cannot merely propositional, lest we dare to reduce Jesus Christ (John 14:6) to a propositional series.

AMR


----------



## rbcbob

It is indeed too much to say that *all* of God’s revelation is propositional. How much of it is propositional and how much not would likely be an unanswerable question. However we can say something of God’s use of the propositional form of revealing Himself.

Inasmuch as “propositional truth” designates truth that is expressed in propositional form, and further, all that God thinks is truth, the question may be asked “_does God think in propositional form?_”

Propositional truth concerns itself with the “_is-ness_” of things. That is to say that truth, when expressed propositionally, will _predicate something_ of some other thing or person.

For example to say that_ situational ethicists are harmful to Christian morals_ predicates the committing of harm to Christian morals by those who are situational ethicists. 

God too declares the “_is-ness_” of things.

*Genesis 2:18* And the LORD God said, “It is not good that man should be alone …”

*Matthew 3:17* And suddenly a voice came from heaven, saying, "This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

Our Lord Jesus alludes to inter-trinitarian propositional conversation:

John 17:8 "For I have given to them the words [*ρηματα*] which You have given Me; and they have received them, and have known surely that I came forth from You; and they have believed that You sent Me


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



armourbearer said:


> Not only that man's knowledge has bounds and limits, but also that man reasons within a circle and eventually winds up explaining terms by terms he has already used.



This was said in response to my request for you to explain what you meant by “a finite form of knowledge.” So, when you say “God is not bound to a finite form of knowledge,” then are you simply saying that God’s knowledge is not limited and bounded like our knowledge is limited and bounded? If so, how is this different from the (1)-(8) propositions listed in my post #94?



armourbearer said:


> A "proposition" is a form of words consisting of subject and predicate.



You and I have discussed this somewhat already. I do not agree with your understanding of the term ‘proposition’ in that your definition is not how philosophers of language or logicians would understand the term. But nevertheless, I can adapt. You seem to define ‘proposition’ the way these philosophers and logicians would define a declarative sentence. Given your understanding of the term ‘proposition,’ are propositions and declarative sentences the same thing? Do you agree that there is a distinction between declarative sentences and the meaning of those sentences? 



armourbearer said:


> One can look at the collection of words or one can look at the correlation of subject and predicate, but in either case there is always an accumulation of particulars which are bound by the limitations of relation.



I do not know what you mean by “accumulation of particulars...bound by the limitations of relation.” Can you make this more concrete?



AMR said:


> Yet you have went to great lengths to form propositions about this very matter.



I have gone to great lengths to form sentences that convey meaning – this is how communication on this board works. You, too, are doing the same thing.



AMR said:


> While you are correctly allowing a spot for intelligence and reason within faith, you simultaneously are suppressing the very substance of the faith you are seeking to defend.



All I am saying is that as finite creatures we do not know enough about the nature of God’s knowledge to be able to make the kinds of absolute claims Matthew has made. This does not seem to be a suppression of the substance of faith unless the object of faith is Matthew! 



AMR said:


> The underlying premise of what you are attempting to appears to be based on the notion that God’s revelatory "speech" (Hebrews 1:1) is handily assimilated to a series of propositions. Such an approach lacks an appreciation of the Scriptural view of revelation, and hence its truths as personal encounter, as event, as history, as promises, or as dialogical encounter. Such a generous self-disclosure of God's vision of creation and history is lost with propositional attempts.



I do not know what you think I am “attempting.” I have simply argued that Matthew’s argument in post #43 is not valid, and that he does not know the conclusion. No more, no less. 



AMR said:


> You claim I am making mere assertion, while I argue this is a Spirit-borne fact. Indeed, our own experience, enabled by the Spirit's illumination, screams that God's knowledge, all truth, cannot merely propositional, lest we dare to reduce Jesus Christ (John 14:6) to a propositional series.



I have **never** claimed that God’s knowledge is merely propositional. You seem to have read more into what I have written, than what I actually did write. I have simply claimed that Matthew does not know the conclusion he reached in post #43. In that post, he claims something much stronger than the claim that God’s knowledge is not merely propositional. He claims that in and of Himself the nature of God’s knowledge is not propositional at all! He does not know this. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> If so, how is this different from the (1)-(8) propositions listed in my post #94?



It's not; and I never claimed that it was.



Brian Bosse said:


> You and I have discussed this somewhat already. I do not agree with your understanding of the term ‘proposition’ in that your definition is not how philosophers of language or logicians would understand the term.



(1.) Your disagreement with the premise could not affect its formal validity if it was made the minor premise of a formal argument. The term "finite" simply needs to be used univocally. (2.) You have not presented any reference from any philosopher or logician to establish that what you allege is true. I'm not inclined to take your word for it.



Brian Bosse said:


> Do you agree that there is a distinction between declarative sentences and the meaning of those sentences?



Not in terms of the finitude of them. Words, sentences, paragraphs, sections, chapters, books, libraries, all convey limited meaning.



Brian Bosse said:


> I do not know what you mean by “accumulation of particulars...bound by the limitations of relation.” Can you make this more concrete?



A subject is a particular person or thing. What is predicated of the subject is a particular state of being or action. The relation between the subject and predicate is a limited relation. If you are acquainted enough with the philosopy of language to call my view of "proposition" into question then this should not need explanation.



Brian Bosse said:


> He claims that in and of Himself the nature of God’s knowledge is not propositional at all!



Once again I find it necessary to draw your attention to the qualifications that have been made because you fail to reproduce them in your analysis. God's knowledge is not propositional because it does not involve process or parcels of information. However, in conveying the knowledge of Himself to man, God has made use of propositional revelation.


----------



## Ask Mr. Religion

Brian Bosse said:


> I have simply claimed that Matthew does not know the conclusion he reached in post #43. In that post, he claims something much stronger than the claim that God’s knowledge is not merely propositional. He claims that in and of Himself the nature of God’s knowledge is not propositional at all! He does know this.


I won't claim to speak for Rev. Winzer, but it would seem to me that the _extent_ of God's knowledge is of all true propositions, yet the _mode_ of God's knowledge has been traditionally argued to be non-propositional, as He possesses a single and undivided intuition of reality. Propositions are used by us, as _finite_ knowers, to break up individual bits of information, hence, what we can claim to know is but a finite number of said propositions.

AMR


----------



## Philip

To interject here: Brian, Rev Winzer is correct that propositions must be finite in order to have meaning.

1) Proposition a) is unlimited
2) An unlimited proposition can mean anything
3) That which can mean anything can mean nothing
4) That which can mean nothing is, by definition, meaningless
5) Proposition a) is meaningless


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



armourbearer said:


> You have not presented any reference from any philosopher or logician to establish that what you allege is true. I'm not inclined to take your word for it.



I am happy to oblige with a small sampling. In Roger Scruton’s _Modern Philosophy_ he writes…



> The proposition is the meaning of the sentence (pg.16)…proposition – the abstract entity which captures what is _said_ by a sentence, what is _believed_ by a believer, what is _stated_ by a statement, and so on (pg. 99).



In Noah Lemos’ _An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge_ he write on page 2…



> It is important to distinguish between sentences and propositions. Consider two people, Paul and Pierre. Let’s say that each believes the sky is blue. Paul, however, speaks only English and Pierre speaks only French. In expressing his belief, Paul would say, “The sky is blue,” and Pierre would saym “Le ciel est bleu.” Though each expresses his belief by a _different_ sentence, each believes the _same_ proposition.



I would like to point out that Lemos argues rather convincingly that propositional knowledge is not the only type of knowledge. He speaks of “know-how knowledge” and “acquaintance knowledge” in addition to “propositional knowledge.” Expressing the same thought as Lemos, John Frame in his _Cornelius Van Til – An Analysis of His Thought_ says on pages 98-99 in regards to the Van Til/Clark debate…



> A proposition is a thought that can be used to make a factual assertion. It is “proposed” for consideration as to its factuality. The sentence “The window is open” asserts a proposition…the propositions is not the sentence itself, but the thought behind it: “The window is open” and “La fenetre est ouverte” express the same proposition.



Greg Bahsen in his “Van Til’s Apologetic” discusses the three types of knowing mentioned by Lemos. On page 159, Bahnsen says this about propositions…



> The word ‘proposition’ is used here (in the sense of “knowing propositions”) in its strict sense as _that which is expressed_ by an indicative sentence in a natural language…thus, if we say that all (verbally competent) people have a knowledge of God, this does not mean that they all believe certain sentences in a certain language. Rather, it means that they all believe certain claims that are expressed by various ways in various languages.



In Moreland and Craig’s _ Philosophical Foundations For a Christian Worldview_ on page 136 we read…



> So far, our study of truth-bearers has led to this conclusion: In the basic sense, it is the content of declarative sentences/statements and thoughts/beliefs that is true or false. Such a content is called a proposition and it represents the third candidate for the truth-bearer…A proposition…is not identical to the linguistic entities that may be used to express it…



I did not quote any of my mathematical logical texts, but rest assured this distinction is found there as well. 



armourbearer said:


> Words, sentences, paragraphs, sections, chapters, books, libraries, all convey limited meaning.



This is not what I asked. I simply asked you if you understood the distinction between words, sentences, paragraphs, etc…and the meanings conveyed by words, sentences, paragraphs, etc...



armourbearer said:


> If you are acquainted enough with the philosopy of language to call my view of "proposition" into question then this should not need explanation.



What do you mean by this? Why even say something like this? It certainly does not move the discussion forward. This kind of rhetoric is not helpful or necessary. 



armourbearer said:


> A subject is a particular person or thing. What is predicated of the subject is a particular state of being or action. The relation between the subject and predicate is a limited relation.



So, is the universal affirmative statement “Socrates is mortal” a limited relation in the sense that Socrates is more than just mortal, i.e., he is a man, he is a created being of God, he is a philosopher, he is a sinner, etc…? 



armourbearer said:


> God's knowledge is not propositional because it does not involve process or parcels of information.



Alas, we finally have the argument. It goes as follows…

*Premise 1:* All knowledge that does not involve process or parcels of information is not propositional. (Major Premise – necessarily assumed.)
*Premise 2:* All God’s knowledge is knowledge that does not involve process or parcels of information. (Minor Premise – “…it (Gods’ knowledge) does not involve process or parcels of information.”)
*Conclusion:* All God’s knowledge is not propositional. (Conclusion – “God’s knowledge is not propositional.”)

I have two things I want to say: *(1)* This is a valid argument. *(2)* Premise 1 and Premise 2 are not stated in your argument in post #43. Before I comment on the soundness of this argument, is this the argument you are actually making?

Brian


----------



## Ask Mr. Religion

Maybe it's just me, Brian, but in a discussion wherein one group expresses reservation about the use of propositional forms on the matter at hand, yet has to continually be subjected to the use of propositional forms of said decriers' statements about matter at hand, it is very unlikely that the discussion will move forward. 

AMR


----------



## discipulo

A very personal opinion, looking from outside, it seems Brian on his last post made a very good effort to clarify his definitions, and surely this rather difficult subject has been good and edifying to read and ponder to most of us, I would say...


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> I am happy to oblige with a small sampling.



Very nice, but none of these prove your allegation that "your definition is not how philosophers of language or logicians would understand the term." In fact, there is a "form of words" and a "what" in every definition you have provided; and this is precisely what I have defined the proposition as. Insofar as the "what" always includes a subject and predicate, there is nothing in all these definitions which contradicts my definition.



Brian Bosse said:


> In Roger Scruton’s _Modern Philosophy_ he writes…



Yes, he is discussing the correspondence theory of truth, and makes no point which contradicts what I have said.



Brian Bosse said:


> In Noah Lemos’ _An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge_ he write on page 2…



And surprisingly, the example he provides is a form of words consisting of subject and predicate. Furthermore, he goes on to state:



> We may also think of propositional knowledge as *a relation between a subject and a proposition*. More precisely, propositional knowledge is a relation between a subject and a true proposition.



I can't imagine you will find one reference work which does not utilise a form of words consisting of subject and predicate in the presentation of propositions.



Brian Bosse said:


> This is not what I asked. I simply asked you if you understood the distinction between words, sentences, paragraphs, etc…and the meanings conveyed by words, sentences, paragraphs, etc...



Actually you asked, "Do you agree that there is a distinction between declarative sentences and the meaning of those sentences?" If I am being asked the philosophical question of the relationship between propositions to the truth, then of course there is a difference. But that is irrelevant to a discussion as to whether a proposition is always by nature finite regardless of whether the form of words or the meaning is the referent.



Brian Bosse said:


> What do you mean by this? Why even say something like this? It certainly does not move the discussion forward. This kind of rhetoric is not helpful or necessary.



It will prove helpful if you stop asking questions which can be answered by a reference to a dictionary.



Brian Bosse said:


> So, is the universal affirmative statement “Socrates is mortal” a limited relation in the sense that Socrates is more than just mortal, i.e., he is a man, he is a created being of God, he is a philosopher, he is a sinner, etc…?



The limitation is in the subject, "Socrates," in distinction from "Plato;" in the predicate, "is mortal," in contrast to being "immortal;" and in the relation between them, "Socrates is mortal" instead of "Plato is immortal."



Brian Bosse said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> God's knowledge is not propositional because it does not involve process or parcels of information.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Alas, we finally have the argument.
Click to expand...


That is not an argument, and what you make of it is certainly not required by the syntax of the sentence. Any grammarian (and logician?) knows that "because" can provide numerous causal relationships.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,

I choose to no longer participate in discussions with you. You continue to make unhelpful and indirectly cutting comments like...



> If you are acquainted enough with the philosopy of language to call my view of "proposition" into question then this should not need explanation...It will prove helpful if you stop asking questions which can be answered by a reference to a dictionary.



You continue to refuse to clairfy your arguments when in good faith I am simply trying to understand what your actual argument is. Case in point, rather than clarify the syllogism based on the very words you used, you simply made some remark that 'because' can mean many things. If the 'because' you used did not mark a conclusion based on what was said before, then there is no reason to move forward with you. For whatever reason, you refuse to make your arguments formally explicit. 

Lastly, I have consistently said that _propositions_ are commonly thought of as being the meaning of sentences and not the sentences themselves. You have said that propositions are "a finite form of words consisting in subject and predicate." Every one of the quotes I provided contradicts this - every one! Every quote I provided states that propositions are the _meaning_ of finite forms of words - not the finite form of words themselves. And your quoting Lemos stating that a proposition is a "relation between predicate and subject" is **not** the same as your assertion that a proposition is "a finite form of words consisting in subject and predicate." Lemos' statement came right after he said, "It is important to distinguish between sentences and propositions." Your definition for proposition fits that of a declaretive sentence. Yet, you are not even willing to acknowledge such an obvious point. As such, I deem discussions with you to be unfruitful. I am content to let the interaction in this thread speak for itself.

Brian


----------



## Semper Fidelis

In my estimation, this thread has proved useful for me to underline in my own mind why I find sterile, philosophical approaches to theology so impious.

Theology is to be approached in a spirit of worship as we approach a Holy God and seek to apprehend what He has revealed to us. Truth is not discovered by atomizing the Word into tiny bits in the assumption that our minds will serve as the organ to filter them and make them coherent. Rather, it is approached humbly with full understanding that, without illumination, we would have no eyes to see the noonday sun that blazes forth.

Theology brings me to doxology. Just the other day I was meditating on the glory of God. We were discussing it in Church and exposited how the glory of God was unapproachable such that even Moses had to leave the Tabernacle when God's glory filled it. Someone then remarked that it must be a different kind of glory spoken of in the NT because Christ was that glory.

It suddenly dawned on me in a way I had not meditated on before. It suddenly struck me with great wonder how powerful is the statement in Hebrews that we enter boldly into the presence of God through the veil of Christ's flesh.

Such things are too wondrous for me. They are unspeakably glorious. I stop at a point of understanding the propositions and apprehend to a point and then I simply get down on my knees and worship.


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> You continue to refuse to clairfy your arguments when in good faith I am simply trying to understand what your actual argument is.



Actually, no; you continue to line up my statements with a view to formal debate in an informal discussion forum.

I'm sorry, but I just refuse to fall down and worship the rational God of Logic. This idea of turning every statement into a formal argument to be tested for its validity is nonsense. The best lesson you could learn right now is the fact that logic is a mere tool for thinking and communicating; it does not in and of itself lead to truth. A person can have a perfectly valid logical argument and be completely wrong. You are using that tool to tear down rather than build up. This is a confessional discussion board. I am not here so you can display your skill as a logician. I am here "for the truth's sake." When you are here "for the truth's sake," then I am sure as fellow Christians we will have much to talk about.


----------

