# Are All Presuppositions A Priori?



## InSlaveryToChrist

So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?

When an Atheist, made in the image of God through Adam, knowing a priori the existence of God, his conscience being bound to God's moral law, logic and rationality, suppresses the truth in unrighteousness, changing the truth of God for a lie, is he really _pre_supposing the lie? I think not, unless God has put in him an a priori knowledge of that lie. In other words, when an Atheist is said to "presuppose" that the universe had its beginning by chance, he's not really _pre_supposing it, he's knowingly making it up.

What think ye? Am I right, or just misusing the terms "presuppose" and "a priori," or what?

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Bonus question: Do we know a priori, in addition to the existence of God, that God is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him? 

"But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." (Hebrews 11:6)


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## MW

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?



It depends which system is being discussed. In classical foundationalism our apriori equipment for knowing is itself knowledge, and hence form the presuppositions of all knowledge; so something which can be accounted for on the basis of common sense and consciousness but not logically demonstrated. In transcendental approaches, e.g., Van Tillian, the presuppositions are thought of as being something which human rationality depends upon but beyond human rationality itself; nothing but faith can stand on such presuppositions. In rationalistic systems like Clark's axiomatic approach logic is essentially the presupposition of human knowing but fallen man requires Scripture to justify true belief; so the propositional revelation of Scripture becomes the axiomatic presupposition of all knowledge. I regard foundationalism as the traditional reformed approach; the transcendental is an useful response to post-Kantian critiques of reason but not really necessary if one isn't moved by Kant. The axiomatic tends to deify logic and would be unacceptable to the reformed tradition on that account. In brief, presuppositions are certainly a priori in foundationalism, but not necessarily in the other systems.


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## jwright82

They "know" in a way, there is other meanings of that term. We might call this "unconscience" or "subconscience" in a way. Apriori is not the best way to state this knowledge, philosophically speaking. It is, you could say, both empirical and apriori at the same time. All of natural revelation in all its knowable ways immediatly reveals God to us. Here is a paper by Bahnsen on "self-deception": PA191.


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## InSlaveryToChrist

armourbearer said:


> InSlaveryToChrist said:
> 
> 
> 
> So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It depends which system is being discussed. In classical foundationalism our apriori equipment for knowing is itself knowledge, and hence form the presuppositions of all knowledge; so something which can be accounted for on the basis of common sense and consciousness but not logically demonstrated. In transcendental approaches, e.g., Van Tillian, the presuppositions are thought of as being something which human rationality depends upon but beyond human rationality itself; nothing but faith can stand on such presuppositions. In rationalistic systems like Clark's axiomatic approach logic is essentially the presupposition of human knowing but fallen man requires Scripture to justify true belief; so the propositional revelation of Scripture becomes the axiomatic presupposition of all knowledge. I regard foundationalism as the traditional reformed approach; the transcendental is an useful response to post-Kantian critiques of reason but not really necessary if one isn't moved by Kant. The axiomatic tends to deify logic and would be unacceptable to the reformed tradition on that account. In brief, presuppositions are certainly a priori in foundationalism, but not necessarily in the other systems.
Click to expand...


Thank you so much, Rev. Winzer! Foundationalism makes thinking more simple and, I think, is more Biblical and logical than the other systems. How would you go about answering the "bonus question?"


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## Philip

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?



No. Presuppositions are the propositional manifestations of attitudes and commitments which we have. They are not independent of our life or practice. Presuppositions are what Michael Polanyi called "tacit knowledge." We don't think about justifying them unless they are called into question and are, in fact, warranted because of the epistemic practices which they ground. Without them, these epistemic practices are useless, however, without the epistemic practices, these presuppositions do not make sense.


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## InSlaveryToChrist

P. F. Pugh said:


> InSlaveryToChrist said:
> 
> 
> 
> So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No. Presuppositions are the propositional manifestations of attitudes and commitments which we have. They are not independent of our life or practice. Presuppositions are what Michael Polanyi called "tacit knowledge." We don't think about justifying them unless they are called into question and are, in fact, warranted because of the epistemic practices which they ground. Without them, these epistemic practices are useless, however, without the epistemic practices, these presuppositions do not make sense.
Click to expand...


That does make verse much sense. Btw, Philip, are you a foundationalist?


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## Doulos 2

Rev. Winzer, how does Scipture as the axiom of Christian epistemology "deify logic?"

Thanks in advance for your reply.


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## jwright82

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> InSlaveryToChrist said:
> 
> 
> 
> So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It depends which system is being discussed. In classical foundationalism our apriori equipment for knowing is itself knowledge, and hence form the presuppositions of all knowledge; so something which can be accounted for on the basis of common sense and consciousness but not logically demonstrated. In transcendental approaches, e.g., Van Tillian, the presuppositions are thought of as being something which human rationality depends upon but beyond human rationality itself; nothing but faith can stand on such presuppositions. In rationalistic systems like Clark's axiomatic approach logic is essentially the presupposition of human knowing but fallen man requires Scripture to justify true belief; so the propositional revelation of Scripture becomes the axiomatic presupposition of all knowledge. I regard foundationalism as the traditional reformed approach; the transcendental is an useful response to post-Kantian critiques of reason but not really necessary if one isn't moved by Kant. The axiomatic tends to deify logic and would be unacceptable to the reformed tradition on that account. In brief, presuppositions are certainly a priori in foundationalism, but not necessarily in the other systems.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Thank you so much, Rev. Winzer! Foundationalism makes thinking more simple and, I think, is more Biblical and logical than the other systems. How would you go about answering the "bonus question?"
Click to expand...


Not to start anything here but there are serious logical and philosophical problems with Foundationalism. I would encourage you to look them up so that at least you know. A major objection raised by Alvin Plantinga is that the belief that "a basic belief is basic if it is self-evident or incorrigible (that is incapable of being corrected or ammended)" is not itself a basic belief. This is "self-referential incoherence" meaning that you have a non-basic belief about basic beleifs. That is this belief must be more basic than basic beliefs in order to work but it does not pass the test of what a basic belief is. This makes the whole thing circuler in a bad way. It is like the paradox that says "this sentence is false". 

Also Goerge Mardsen points out that not everyone agrees on what the criterion is to be basic or not, hence no agreement amongst groups of people. This leads to relatavism, my culture or group beleives this belief to be basic but your's does not. I would also direct your attention to part one of John Locke's book _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ where he critiques the idea of "innate ideas" or knowledge we all have prior to any experience, yes innate ideas are not the same as basic beliefs but you will find that the arguments work for that too. 

My own objection to Classical Foundationalism is when they (not all of them) rely on circuler reasoning to defend their view while ignoring, for the most part, any objection raised to their position. They say well without foundationalism you can't be sure of anything but that leads to skepticism and since that can't possibly be true you must be a Classical Foundationalist. That just avoids any serious attempt to deal with the issues and criticisms. That is why many are going to a "modest" Foundationalism that means that beliefs are only probably true or basic. This raises issues because in all forms of Foundationalism, except Plantinga's, belief in God is not a basic belief (I doubt that the Reformed Scholastics would agree with that). So either belief in God is based on Classical Foundationalism that is largely regected by philosophers (which calls into question our the certianty of our belief in God) or "modest" Foundationalism that makes our belief in God only probably true. 

I am not trying to discourage you only make you aware of these objections so you can work through them yourself. If Foundationalism "makes sense" to you than that is fine but here are some arguments that you can answer to make your position stronger. Also the logical form of a presuposition has been worked out by Strawson. It says this "if X is true than Y is either true or false, if X is false than Y is neither true nor false". That is explained here. 

The sentence "Jack loves his wife" is neither true nor false if Jack isn't married, the sentence is meaningless. No in Bertrand Russell's analysis you would declare both sentences "Jack loves his wife" and "Jack does not love his wife" as both being false because Jack is not married. Two different ways to analyze the same sentences.


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## ChristianTrader

P. F. Pugh said:


> InSlaveryToChrist said:
> 
> 
> 
> So, my question is, Are all presuppositions a priori, that is, independent of evidence and reason?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No. Presuppositions are the propositional manifestations of attitudes and commitments which we have. They are not independent of our life or practice. Presuppositions are what Michael Polanyi called "tacit knowledge." We don't think about justifying them unless they are called into question and are, in fact, warranted because of the epistemic practices which they ground. Without them, these epistemic practices are useless, however, without the epistemic practices, these presuppositions do not make sense.
Click to expand...


Um, what about pressupps that when questioned are not in fact justified? Are you saying they are still warranted?

CT


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## Philip

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> Btw, Philip, are you a foundationalist?



Depends on what is meant by that. Rev. Winzer is using the term rather broadly, so I probably fit into the category as he has defined it. I don't label myself that way, however.



ChristianTrader said:


> Um, what about pressupps that when questioned are not in fact justified? Are you saying they are still warranted?



Justified before whom? In all honesty, if one was to discover a disconnect between a "worldview" (which I think is what you are talking about with a "presupposition") and one's epistemic practices, one is forced to discard the worldview and search for the kinds of truths which actuallly undergird the practices.

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jwright82 said:


> The sentence "Jack loves his wife" is neither true nor false if Jack isn't married



No, it's just false. If the sentence is intelligible (ie: if a speaker of the lamguage would be capable of understanding it), then it is not meaningless.



jwright82 said:


> Also the logical form of a presuposition has been worked out by Strawson. It says this "if X is true than Y is either true or false, if X is false than Y is neither true nor false". That is explained here.



I would say that a presupposition comes in the form of "If X, then Y. If not X, then not Y." I don't think that presuppositions have a whole lot to do with the form of propositions or the philosophy of language, to be frank. They have more to do with the underpinnings of epistemic practices.


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## MW

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> How would you go about answering the "bonus question?"



I would answer in the affirmative. See, for example, WCF 21.1.


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## MW

Doulos 2 said:


> Rev. Winzer, how does Scipture as the axiom of Christian epistemology "deify logic?"



That is not the problem, although the language points to a problem. The problem is that in order to get to this position logic is first identified with the eternal Logos.


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## MW

jwright82 said:


> This is "self-referential incoherence" meaning that you have a non-basic belief about basic beleifs.



This is incorrect. The definition of consciousness and cognition might differ between foundationalists but they all agree that basic beliefs are strictly the sine qua non of consciousness and cognition. 



jwright82 said:


> Also Goerge Mardsen points out that not everyone agrees on what the criterion is to be basic or not, hence no agreement amongst groups of people.



Disagreement as to what constitutes basic Christianity does not nullify that there is a basic Christianity.



jwright82 said:


> My own objection to Classical Foundationalism is when they (not all of them) rely on circuler reasoning to defend their view while ignoring, for the most part, any objection raised to their position.



This charge is applicable to all presuppositional approaches. It is regularly made against the transcendental approach. In foundationalism, as the name suggests, there is a foundation with which one must begin before any building can take place. The foundation supports all other beliefs. To deny this is really to deny the limited nature of human rationality. Some kind of circularity is inevitable simply because man is limited and will eventually run full circle in all his attempts at definition. Some people try to make the circle bigger than others, and give the appearance that it is not a circle. When another person traces their reasoning with care it is soon discovered that circularity is still part of the reasoning process. A man who travels every day across an island will find himself travelling the same routes to and fro. Some people call that circularity but I call it common sense.


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## ChristianTrader

P. F. Pugh said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Um, what about pressupps that when questioned are not in fact justified? Are you saying they are still warranted?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Justified before whom? In all honesty, if one was to discover a disconnect between a "worldview" (which I think is what you are talking about with a "presupposition") and one's epistemic practices, one is forced to discard the worldview and search for the kinds of truths which actuallly undergird the practices.
Click to expand...



Justified before right reason. Also are you saying that one's epistemic practices are incorrigible?

CT


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> No, it's just false. If the sentence is intelligible (ie: if a speaker of the lamguage would be capable of understanding it), then it is not meaningless.



Thats quite a narrow view of meaningfullness. I would change the term to intelligable, that is any linguistically competant person can understand the words and there relations regardless of the propositions logical status. I have never read the term meaningfull being used in the way that you use it. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> I would say that a presupposition comes in the form of "If X, then Y. If not X, then not Y." I don't think that presuppositions have a whole lot to do with the form of propositions or the philosophy of language, to be frank. They have more to do with the underpinnings of epistemic practices.



That is one type of presuposition, to be sure, but since Strawson worked out the other one (that seems to be more aimed at transcendental arguments) it is an excepted logical form, even if people disagree with TA's. In fact he developed it in response to criticisms and paradoxs in Russell's analysis.

---------- Post added at 06:39 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:23 PM ----------




armourbearer said:


> This is incorrect. The definition of consciousness and cognition might differ between foundationalists but they all agree that basic beliefs are strictly the sine qua non of consciousness and cognition.



Well with all due respect Rev. Winzer it kind of is correct. This is one of the reasons why there are not any real Classical Foundationalists left. No one could save it from those criticisms. The problem is that it is circuler reasoning. You have to base that belief on basic beliefs but it is a belief about basic beliefs. If it is a basic belief itself than it must pass the test of being a basic belief, but it cannot. There are really no Classical foundationalists left, they all really argue for some "modest" Foundationalism, only in Evangelical Apologetics are there any real Classical Foundationalists. 




armourbearer said:


> Disagreement as to what constitutes basic Christianity does not nullify that there is a basic Christianity.



Than you are refering to a revelational epistemology, not Classical Foundationalism. Mardsen pointed out that historically no one could agree on what counted as a common-sense basic belief. And hence culteral relatavism. If you mean something other than Classical Foundationalism than just say so. 




armourbearer said:


> This charge is applicable to all presuppositional approaches. It is regularly made against the transcendental approach. In foundationalism, as the name suggests, there is a foundation with which one must begin before any building can take place. The foundation supports all other beliefs. To deny this is really to deny the limited nature of human rationality.



No they have two different logical forms hence two different types of arguments. Foundationalist arguments are direct deductive arguments, belief Y is based on the basic belief X (this is more the type of presuposition that Philip layed out in his last post). A TA on the other hand is indirect and has the logical form that I layed out before, hence a different type of argument. 




armourbearer said:


> Some kind of circularity is inevitable simply because man is limited and will eventually run full circle in all his attempts at definition. Some people try to make the circle bigger than others, and give the appearance that it is not a circle. When another person traces their reasoning with care it is soon discovered that circularity is still part of the reasoning process. A man who travels every day across an island will find himself travelling the same routes to and fro. Some people call that circularity but I call it common sense.



There are different types of circularity. The kind that I was refering to is the bad kind. They also commit the either/or fallacy in attempting to avoid the criticisms of non-foundationalists in the fact that they say you are either one of us Foundationalists or a skeptic and since skepticism is self refuting than you must be one of us. All that is needed is a third option to decemate this argument, Van Til and Plantinga both provided one. You are right that all reasoning involves circles but there are good circles and bad circles as you know. I mean really the worse thing for the Classical Foundationalist is that in defending it you really have an uphill battle.


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## MW

jwright82 said:


> Well with all due respect Rev. Winzer it kind of is correct. This is one of the reasons why there are not any real Classical Foundationalists left. No one could save it from those criticisms. The problem is that it is circuler reasoning. You have to base that belief on basic beliefs but it is a belief about basic beliefs. If it is a basic belief itself than it must pass the test of being a basic belief, but it cannot. There are really no Classical foundationalists left, they all really argue for some "modest" Foundationalism, only in Evangelical Apologetics are there any real Classical Foundationalists.



I see; you are getting hung up on the word "classical." For the incorporation of foundationalism in modern Reformed epistemology please consult Ronald Nash's "Life's Ultimate Questions," 275ff.



jwright82 said:


> Than you are refering to a revelational epistemology, not Classical Foundationalism.



No; I was providing a parallel in order to show Marsden's criticism is irrelevant.



jwright82 said:


> Foundationalist arguments are direct deductive arguments, belief Y is based on the basic belief X (this is more the type of presuposition that Philip layed out in his last post).



See Nash, as above. It seems to me that you are denying the distinctive presuppositional incorporation of foundationalism. You really should allow a position to speak for itself.



jwright82 said:


> There are different types of circularity. The kind that I was refering to is the bad kind.



If you mean "logical circularity," then I fail to see the relevance as I have not presented an argument in a logical form. It appear that you are reading things into my statements. May I suggest you give others an opportunity to present their own position in the future.


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## Philip

ChristianTrader said:


> Justified before right reason. Also are you saying that one's epistemic practices are incorrigible?



I said "whom" not what. I agree that right reason is the standard, but the question remains who is the arbiter of what that looks like. A standard is nothing without a judge.

Epistemic practices are not incorrigible, but must be considered very carefully. What we do not want is to destroy the credibility of legitimate practices. When you think of epistemic practices that are dubious, you think of something like phrenology or looking at the newspaper horoscope: pseudo-sciences or superstitions. However, these are only invalidated by a _reductio ad rism_ (point out that they are simply ridiculous), not by logical analysis. 



jwright82 said:


> Thats quite a narrow view of meaningfullness.



No, it's a very broad view. Meaning is a function of language ("in many cases, the meaning of a word is its use in the language" ~L. Wittgenstein). We ask "what exactly do you mean?" and we do not mean "to what are you referring?"



jwright82 said:


> That is one type of presuposition, to be sure, but since Strawson worked out the other one (that seems to be more aimed at transcendental arguments) it is an excepted logical form, even if people disagree with TA's. In fact he developed it in response to criticisms and paradoxs in Russell's analysis.



I just am not sure that it is a useful model. He isn't correct about presuppositions being a prerequisite for meaning---this has devastating effects in theology, as a matter of fact. I've been reading (for a long research project which I will be writing next semester) some postliberal theology which takes this very point as the starting point, taking doctrines as presuppositions.

Take the doctrine that God is triune: for a postliberal, the fact that this is a presupposition of Christian theology means that in Christian dialogue, saying God is not triune is meaningless. All well and good, right? Except that all you're doing is excluding something from the dialogue---you're not saying anything that is meaningful outside the Christian Church. See the problem? With this model, both Christianity and Islam could be true, _as systems_ because truth is a function of meaning and meaning is a function of presuppositions. A meaningless statement cannot be true. That's the danger I see in adopting Strawson's model of presuppositions: it changes the debate to one about language rather than one about truth.


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## InSlaveryToChrist

armourbearer said:


> InSlaveryToChrist said:
> 
> 
> 
> How would you go about answering the "bonus question?"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would answer in the affirmative. See, for example, WCF 21.1.
Click to expand...


Westminster Confession of Faith - Chapter 21.1
*The light of nature* showeth that there is a God, who hath lordship and sovereignty over all, is good, and doth good unto all, and is therefore to be feared, loved, praised, called upon, trusted in, and served, with all the heart, and with all the soul, and with all the might. But the acceptable way of worshipping the true God is instituted by himself, and so limited by his own revealed will, that he may not be worshiped according to the imaginations and devices of men, or the suggestions of Satan, under any visible representation, or any other way not prescribed in the holy Scripture.

The "light of nature" probably includes _a priori_ knowledge, am I right? What I do not see, however, is where it is implied that men know God is the rewarder of them who diligently seek Him. Could it be part of the lordship God has over us? Do we, then, know _a priori_ what lordship means and what its implications are?


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## MW

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> The "light of nature" probably includes _a priori_ knowledge, am I right? What I do not see, however, is where it is implied that men know God is the rewarder of them who diligently seek Him. Could it be part of the lordship God has over us? Do we, then, know _a priori_ what lordship means and what its implications are?



"Light of nature" is a technical term which refers to reason as a gift with which God has constituted man in creaturely dependence on Himself. The Confession teaches that the Sovereignty and Lordship of God is shown by the light of nature, which means that the very exercise of reason carries with it an accountability to God. It is this conviction of accountability which gives rise to man's moral obligations and causes him to labour under the belief that his deeds must be rewarded or punished.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> "Light of nature" is a technical term which refers to reason as a gift with which God has constituted man in creaturely dependence on Himself.



Would you include the proper use of all of man's faculties as being covered under "reason"?


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> "Light of nature" is a technical term which refers to reason as a gift with which God has constituted man in creaturely dependence on Himself.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Would you include the proper use of all of man's faculties as being covered under "reason"?
Click to expand...


Certainly. "Proper use" would include reason's creaturely dependence on God.


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## ChristianTrader

P. F. Pugh said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Justified before right reason. Also are you saying that one's epistemic practices are incorrigible?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I said "whom" not what. I agree that right reason is the standard, but the question remains who is the arbiter of what that looks like. A standard is nothing without a judge.
Click to expand...


Oh, so who justifies 1+1=2? I agree that right reason is the standard, but the question remains who is the arbiter of what that looks like. A standard is nothing without a judge.



> Epistemic practices are not incorrigible, but must be considered very carefully. What we do not want is to destroy the credibility of legitimate practices. When you think of epistemic practices that are dubious, you think of something like phrenology or looking at the newspaper horoscope: pseudo-sciences or superstitions. However, these are only invalidated by a _reductio ad rism_ (point out that they are simply ridiculous), not by logical analysis.



Part of the question is what are legitimate practices. Lastly, who/what gets to call something absurd? Common sense changes.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> Certainly. "Proper use" would include reason's creaturely dependence on God.



I think you missed what I was asking: would you subsume things like sense perception, inductive logic, and the like under this heading of "reason"?



ChristianTrader said:


> Oh, so who justifies 1+1=2?



Does it need justification? Who is attacking this proposition and why?



ChristianTrader said:


> Part of the question is what are legitimate practices. Lastly, who/what gets to call something absurd? Common sense changes.



Does it? Do I really need a logical argument to call something absurd? If I consider, say, phrenology to be absurd, attacking it with a logical argument is inconsistent: if I consider it absurd, arguing with it logically would suggest that I actually take it seriously, which I do not.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> I think you missed what I was asking: would you subsume things like sense perception, inductive logic, and the like under this heading of "reason"?



As a package, yes; but not as if these were individual "faculties" which work in isolation. And you may have missed the focus of my answer -- the creaturely dependence of reason -- to which things like sense perception and inductive logic would also be subject.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> As a package, yes; but not as if these were individual "faculties" which work in isolation. And you may have missed the focus of my answer -- the creaturely dependence of reason -- to which things like sense perception and inductive logic would also be subject.



I'm just trying to make sure we're not going Clarkian here. If I can think I have warrant for doubting that I have hands, then I've got problems.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm just trying to make sure we're not going Clarkian here. If I can think I have warrant for doubting that I have hands, then I've got problems.



I don't think I've said anything on this board which has hinted at Clarkianism. Quite the opposite. That really is a needless and disrespectful caution on your part.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> I don't think I've said anything on this board which has hinted at Clarkianism. Quite the opposite. That really is a needless and disrespectful caution on your part.



Your statement about "reason" confused me, which is why I asked for the clarification. In most cases, reason has been defined rather more narrowly than you have been using the term. Using "reason" as the meaning of "light of nature" seemed a Clarkian move, so I needed that clarified. I did not mean to insinuate or accuse.

What you call "reason" I would call "reasonability," but that's mostly a quibble about semantics.


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## ChristianTrader

P. F. Pugh said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Oh, so who justifies 1+1=2?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Does it need justification? Who is attacking this proposition and why?
Click to expand...


Either all standards need a judge or they do not. Above you stated that a standard is nothing without a judge. If you wish to say that some standards need a judge and some do not, then you need a criteria to differentiate besides, "I think that is a stupid question."



> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Part of the question is what are legitimate practices. Lastly, who/what gets to call something absurd? Common sense changes.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Does it? Do I really need a logical argument to call something absurd? If I consider, say, phrenology to be absurd, attacking it with a logical argument is inconsistent: if I consider it absurd, arguing with it logically would suggest that I actually take it seriously, which I do not.
Click to expand...



When you reject something, you are implying that the something in question fails a standard. Is the standard simply your personal prejudice? Or can you produce an answer where your opponent must give up their position or lose coherency? Producing a logical argument is the differentiation between prejudice and understanding.

CT


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## Philip

ChristianTrader said:


> Either all standards need a judge or they do not. Above you stated that a standard is nothing without a judge. If you wish to say that some standards need a judge and some do not, then you need a criteria to differentiate besides, "I think that is a stupid question."



I didn't say that standards need a judge, I said that a standard without a judge is useless. A standard may not be depersonalized: for a standard to be useful, there must be someone using it.



ChristianTrader said:


> When you reject something, you are implying that the something in question fails a standard.



Depends on what it is that I am rejecting. In some cases, yes. In others, I simply reject because I see no compelling reason to accept. Gottfried Leibniz' monadology is a fascinating exercise in self-referentially consistent deduction: I just see no reason why I should accept it. All that Leibniz has proved is that he is capable of coming up with a coherent system.



ChristianTrader said:


> Producing a logical argument is the differentiation between prejudice and understanding.



Not at all. I have few logical arguments against Marxism (certainly none that would convince a consistent Marxist). Nonetheless I understand it much better than many who think they have such arguments. You understand something when you understand the internal logic and the type of arguments that it would take to convince of that position. I understand more or less exactly where I would need to be in order to become a Marxist and I have few counterarguments. Nonetheless I reject Marxism.

I would say that prejudice (in the philosophic sense) and understanding are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, I would say that knowledge requires prejudice: it requires that one have certain pre-commitments and pre-judgments. Knowledge is a personal thing: it requires that one behave in certain ways and engage in certain practices which ground it and which will logically exclude some possible beliefs and systems. The arguments made, though, are rarely logical, in the strictest sense, but pragmatic.


----------



## ChristianTrader

P. F. Pugh said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Either all standards need a judge or they do not. Above you stated that a standard is nothing without a judge. If you wish to say that some standards need a judge and some do not, then you need a criteria to differentiate besides, "I think that is a stupid question."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I didn't say that standards need a judge, I said that a standard without a judge is useless. A standard may not be depersonalized: for a standard to be useful, there must be someone using it.
Click to expand...


Okay, so a standard is good or bad based on how many people use it?



> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> When you reject something, you are implying that the something in question fails a standard.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Depends on what it is that I am rejecting. In some cases, yes. In others, I simply reject because I see no compelling reason to accept. Gottfried Leibniz' monadology is a fascinating exercise in self-referentially consistent deduction: I just see no reason why I should accept it. All that Leibniz has proved is that he is capable of coming up with a coherent system.
Click to expand...


So you are rejecting it not based on a standard? It sure looks like a standard.



> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Producing a logical argument is the differentiation between prejudice and understanding.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Not at all. I have few logical arguments against Marxism (certainly none that would convince a consistent Marxist). Nonetheless I understand it much better than many who think they have such arguments. You understand something when you understand the internal logic and the type of arguments that it would take to convince of that position. I understand more or less exactly where I would need to be in order to become a Marxist and I have few counterarguments. Nonetheless I reject Marxism.
Click to expand...


It would seem that you reject Marxism because you fails to see how it is any better than your current system. In your current view the "tie" goes to some other system. I would have no problem calling your position, to some extent, prejudiced.



> I would say that prejudice (in the philosophic sense) and understanding are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, I would say that knowledge requires prejudice: it requires that one have certain pre-commitments and pre-judgments. Knowledge is a personal thing: it requires that one behave in certain ways and engage in certain practices which ground it and which will logically exclude some possible beliefs and systems. The arguments made, though, are rarely logical, in the strictest sense, but pragmatic.



I have no problem with the idea that knowledge requires pre-commitments etc. My only issue is that pre-commitments don't become into unexamined biases. 

CT


----------



## Philip

ChristianTrader said:


> Okay, so a standard is good or bad based on how many people use it?



Not necessarily. A standard without someone using it is just an abstraction---it does no one any good. Why should we accept it in logic when we don't accept it in practice?



ChristianTrader said:


> So you are rejecting it not based on a standard? It sure looks like a standard.



I reject it because accepting it isn't an option.



ChristianTrader said:


> It would seem that you reject Marxism because you fails to see how it is any better than your current system.



Actually, I reject it because it doesn't work. That's not an internal inconsistency, though.



ChristianTrader said:


> My only issue is that pre-commitments don't become into unexamined biases.



What exactly do you mean by unexamined?


----------



## jwright82

armourbearer said:


> I see; you are getting hung up on the word "classical." For the incorporation of foundationalism in modern Reformed epistemology please consult Ronald Nash's "Life's Ultimate Questions," 275ff.



Well in your first reply you used the term "classical foundationalism", that is why I assumed that that was what you meant by further uses of the term "foundationalism". Nash is good, he is a Clarkian (but that is no bad thing in itself, see Carl Henry), and favorable to Reformed Epistemology. Classical foundationalism is one thing, modest foundationalism another, and reformed espistemology yet a third thing. If you meant the last option than o.k. that clears things up. My apologezes for assuming but you were kind of unclear.




armourbearer said:


> See Nash, as above. It seems to me that you are denying the distinctive presuppositional incorporation of foundationalism. You really should allow a position to speak for itself.



From a philosophical p.o.v. foundationalism doesn't use presupositions in the same way that Van Til would. They have always used basic beliefs. Remember I am familer with this subject as a philosopher and there is a history of debate and discusion about foundationalism that may or may not have happened withen theological circles. I have not sought to understand how you, or Nash, use them so again my apologezes. 




armourbearer said:


> If you mean "logical circularity," then I fail to see the relevance as I have not presented an argument in a logical form. It appear that you are reading things into my statements. May I suggest you give others an opportunity to present their own position in the future.



Again my philosophical bias here may be the culprit of misunderstanding but because these are philosophical issues I imagine that that is a little understandable. As above my apologeze, I was not trying to be overbearing in my responses. Please then explain your position and we will go from there.

---------- Post added at 09:03 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:54 AM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> No, it's a very broad view. Meaning is a function of language ("in many cases, the meaning of a word is its use in the language" ~L. Wittgenstein). We ask "what exactly do you mean?" and we do not mean "to what are you referring?"



Granted but I am beginning to think that our disagreement here is merely semantical. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> I just am not sure that it is a useful model. He isn't correct about presuppositions being a prerequisite for meaning



Again I think you are wrapped up in semantics. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> this has devastating effects in theology, as a matter of fact. I've been reading (for a long research project which I will be writing next semester) some postliberal theology which takes this very point as the starting point, taking doctrines as presuppositions.



I am a little familer with postliberalism. But they are very different from Van Til or Reformed theology, see Micheal Horton on this (his book _Covenat and Eschatology_ deals with postliberalism I have read in other places). I would be interested in reading your work if that is o.k.?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Take the doctrine that God is triune: for a postliberal, the fact that this is a presupposition of Christian theology means that in Christian dialogue, saying God is not triune is meaningless. All well and good, right? Except that all you're doing is excluding something from the dialogue---you're not saying anything that is meaningful outside the Christian Church. See the problem? With this model, both Christianity and Islam could be true, as systems because truth is a function of meaning and meaning is a function of presuppositions. A meaningless statement cannot be true. That's the danger I see in adopting Strawson's model of presuppositions: it changes the debate to one about language rather than one about truth.



Your right but again I think you are hung up on semantics. Strawson and I define meaningful not by saying that a sentence can be understood by someone by by whether or not it can be true or false in the first place. That is different from what saying.

---------- Post added at 09:13 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:03 AM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> Not at all. I have few logical arguments against Marxism (certainly none that would convince a consistent Marxist).



You know Philip I have never quite understood your obsession, or apparent obsession, with an argument needing to convince someone. If I have, and I do, arguments against Marxism than I don't really care if they convince the Marxist or not only if he or she can answer them. For a Marxist to say "well I can't answer that but I am still a Marxist" doesn't affect me at all. I would say "o.k. come back and debate me when you can".


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> For a Marxist to say "well I can't answer that but I am still a Marxist" doesn't affect me at all. I would say "o.k. come back and debate me when you can".



But this is my whole point, because this is not how a Marxist would answer your argument. He would say, "That's a bourgeois argument." The terms of your argument are ruled out by definition.



jwright82 said:


> Your right but again I think you are hung up on semantics. Strawson and I define meaningful not by saying that a sentence can be understood by someone by by whether or not it can be true or false in the first place. That is different from what saying.



No disagreement from postliberalism on your definition there: that's exactly what they are saying. They would say that doctrinal statements are only possibly true or false in the context of a religious form of life.

Again, I would define meaning as use (in most cases). Words, not sentences, are meaningful.



jwright82 said:


> I am a little familer with postliberalism. But they are very different from Van Til or Reformed theology



No kidding. I'm really going to be going for post-Wittgensteinian theology in general (on the function of doctrinal statements) and trying to critique various folks on it.



jwright82 said:


> Granted but I am beginning to think that our disagreement here is merely semantical.



Actually no. Can I have a meaningful discussion about unicorns? Is "all unicorns have horns" a meaningful statement? How about "some unicorns have wings"?


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> But this is my whole point, because this is not how a Marxist would answer your argument. He would say, "That's a bourgeois argument." The terms of your argument are ruled out by definition.



But that is just the fallacy of absurdity. Why should be concerned with a position that uses logical fallacies as a defense?




P. F. Pugh said:


> No disagreement from postliberalism on your definition there: that's exactly what they are saying. They would say that doctrinal statements are only possibly true or false in the context of a religious form of life.
> 
> Again, I would define meaning as use (in most cases). Words, not sentences, are meaningful.



Yes for them it is only true or false withen a given cultural or religous context or community. If you assume that that is the only place a proposition can be true or false in than but you are criticizing them so I assume that you don't mean that. Strawson was saying that it isn't capable of being true or false for anyone, regardless of their cutural or religous community. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> No kidding. I'm really going to be going for post-Wittgensteinian theology in general (on the function of doctrinal statements) and trying to critique various folks on it.



Again I will be interested in reading it, if you do not mind?




P. F. Pugh said:


> Actually no. Can I have a meaningful discussion about unicorns? Is "all unicorns have horns" a meaningful statement? How about "some unicorns have wings"?



Yes but unicorns are an established thing. If Lewis had never written _The Cronicles of Narnia_, could we have any meaningful discussions of Aslan? Fictional things can be meanigfully talked about so long as there is some established "history and facts" about them.


----------



## J. Dean

I must say that, in reading this thread, my IQ has jumped five points! 

Back to the op, a presupposition by its very nature requires some sort of prior knowledge. You must have some sort of knowledge about "x" before making a presupposition about it. For example, if I say "I don't like chocolate" (a blasphemous statement, btw  ,) at the very least I have to acknowledge the existence of some sort of object or idea that has the name chocolate. 

Somebody is going to have to explain to me the concept of foundationalism, btw.


----------



## jwright82

J. Dean said:


> I must say that, in reading this thread, my IQ has jumped five points!
> 
> Back to the op, a presupposition by its very nature requires some sort of prior knowledge. You must have some sort of knowledge about "x" before making a presupposition about it. For example, if I say "I don't like chocolate" (a blasphemous statement, btw  ,) at the very least I have to acknowledge the existence of some sort of object or idea that has the name chocolate.
> 
> Somebody is going to have to explain to me the concept of foundationalism, btw.



Yes, not liking chocolate is blashphemous. Foundationalism is the idea that we have basic beliefs (like that I exist, my senses work fine, other people exist, etc...). On top of these basic beliefs it is beleived that we can build a certian, or nearly certian, foundation for all knowledge. Hence foundationalism. It is like building a building and the basic beliefs are the cement and rebar foundation, all other beliefs are built on top of this like the steel beams and such.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But that is just the fallacy of absurdity.



What fallacy is this, exactly?



jwright82 said:


> Strawson was saying that it isn't capable of being true or false for anyone, regardless of their cutural or religous community.



But that's exactly my point. Take the existence of God: for a postliberal, this question only makes sense in the context of religion and has no bearing whatsoever outside that form of life. Outside a Christian context it would make no sense, the argument goes.



jwright82 said:


> Again I will be interested in reading it, if you do not mind?



I'll get it to you when I write it (sometime next semester).



jwright82 said:


> Fictional things can be meanigfully talked about so long as there is some established "history and facts" about them.



But in this case we can talk meaningfully about whether Jack beats his wife, the follicle challenges of the present King of France, etc.



jwright82 said:


> Yes, not liking chocolate is blashphemous.



Indeed. It's the heresy of anti-Cacaoian party of the 16th century, which was condemned by Johannes Euphineas at the Synod of Cadbury in 1563. A similar position was also one of the lesser-known cannons of Trent.


----------



## MW

jwright82 said:


> Well in your first reply you used the term "classical foundationalism", that is why I assumed that that was what you meant by further uses of the term "foundationalism". Nash is good, he is a Clarkian (but that is no bad thing in itself, see Carl Henry), and favorable to Reformed Epistemology. Classical foundationalism is one thing, modest foundationalism another, and reformed espistemology yet a third thing. If you meant the last option than o.k. that clears things up. My apologezes for assuming but you were kind of unclear.



Your reading may have been unclear, but what I wrote was plain and straightforward. I stated, "In classical foundationalism our apriori equipment for knowing is itself knowledge." That is a fact. Dispute that fact if you please, but it is clearly stated. I then went on to say, "I regard foundationalism as the traditional reformed approach." Another fact that is clearly stated. Shifting blame for misunderstanding is not an admirable quality.



jwright82 said:


> From a philosophical p.o.v. foundationalism doesn't use presupositions in the same way that Van Til would.



This is precisely what I stated in my first post, where I distinguished foundational, Van Tillian, and Clarkian use of presuppositions.


----------



## InSlaveryToChrist

Are there good books on Classical Foundationalism you could recommend for a layman like me? Preferably from a Christian point of view, and even more preferably from a Reformed point of view.


----------



## Philip

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> Are there good books on Classical Foundationalism you could recommend for a layman like me? Preferably from a Christian point of view, and even more preferably from a Reformed point of view.



The best one out there is probably Alvin Plantinga's _Warranted Christian Belief_ (admittedly, Plantinga hasn't been a Calvinist for a while. Nonetheless, he is one of the leading advocates of reformed epistemology at present) where he argues for a moderated foundationalism (it's foundationalist---just not classically so, like Descartes). 

You might also try (if you can find it) Thomas Reid's classic _Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man_ (Reid was a Church of Scotland minister in the 18th Century who wrote in response to David Hume).


----------



## MW

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> Are there good books on Classical Foundationalism you could recommend for a layman like me? Preferably from a Christian point of view, and even more preferably from a Reformed point of view.



Many of the works are going to be rather technical. For something simple you might be better served by looking up "common sense realism" in an encyclopedia or even a dictionary of theology. In the Free Church tradition we have numerous apologetical lectures written from that perspective. Chalmers' Institutes, Cunningham's Theological Lectures, Buchanan's Faith in God and Modern Atheism, Hetherington's Apologetics. Coming in to the modern period two of the more important foundationalists are James McCosh and James Orr. These two had already moved foundationalism in an overtly presuppositional direction. Historical research might yet reveal the degree to which Van Til was indebted to Orr. Be careful to distinguish "evidentialism" from "foundationalism." The Ligonier apologetic which calls itself "classical apologetics" is a reaction away from presuppositionalism, and on that account loses the commitment to basic beliefs, even though it will share some of its evidences in common with foundationalism.


----------



## jwright82

armourbearer said:


> Your reading may have been unclear, but what I wrote was plain and straightforward. I stated, "In classical foundationalism our apriori equipment for knowing is itself knowledge." That is a fact. Dispute that fact if you please, but it is clearly stated. I then went on to say, "I regard foundationalism as the traditional reformed approach." Another fact that is clearly stated. Shifting blame for misunderstanding is not an admirable quality.



Well I must say it seems to me then that you are misunderstanding what "foundationalism" of any sort is. That is not really the best definition of it to begin with. You "clearly" used the term "classical foundationalism" so my "misunderstanding" was understandable. The confusion on my part is that you seem to be using terms and definitions differently from what they are traditionally defined. If that is so than please clear the confusion. Foundationalism as you defined it is not how it is traditionally defined. It has never been concerned with our "apriori equipment" but with types of beliefs (this is true going back all the way to Descarte). Kant was concerned with such things but never foundationalism. 






armourbearer said:


> This is precisely what I stated in my first post, where I distinguished foundational, Van Tillian, and Clarkian use of presuppositions.



Fair enough, but foundationalism as it has always been understood is not the traditional Reformed understanding because they have always believed in immediate knowledge of God (which is the opposite of what foundationalism, besides Plantinga, have always said).

---------- Post added at 10:16 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:57 AM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> What fallacy is this, exactly?



It is when someone declares, for whatever reason, that your premise or opinion is wrong or absurd without ever actually dealing with the substance of your argument. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> But that's exactly my point. Take the existence of God: for a postliberal, this question only makes sense in the context of religion and has no bearing whatsoever outside that form of life. Outside a Christian context it would make no sense, the argument goes.



Well I see your point but a trans-cultural idea is above and beyond any one culture or religion. On the other hand you are right, talk about the sacraments is only "meaningful" for christians so it is contexual in that sense. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> I'll get it to you when I write it (sometime next semester).



I appreciate it. When I finish community college and go to UNF I will return the favor on any paper I think will be interesting to you. 






P. F. Pugh said:


> But in this case we can talk meaningfully about whether Jack beats his wife, the follicle challenges of the present King of France, etc.



Of course, I think that the difference between Russell's analysis and Strawson's analysis may be more taste than anything. Despite how bald the "present king of France" is!




P. F. Pugh said:


> Indeed. It's the heresy of anti-Cacaoian party of the 16th century, which was condemned by Johannes Euphineas at the Synod of Cadbury in 1563. A similar position was also one of the lesser-known cannons of Trent.



That Synod didn't outlaw those Cadbury eggs did they? If so than I will gladly be a heretic.

---------- Post added at 10:19 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:16 AM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> InSlaveryToChrist said:
> 
> 
> 
> Are there good books on Classical Foundationalism you could recommend for a layman like me? Preferably from a Christian point of view, and even more preferably from a Reformed point of view.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The best one out there is probably Alvin Plantinga's _Warranted Christian Belief_ (admittedly, Plantinga hasn't been a Calvinist for a while. Nonetheless, he is one of the leading advocates of reformed epistemology at present) where he argues for a moderated foundationalism (it's foundationalist---just not classically so, like Descartes).
> 
> You might also try (if you can find it) Thomas Reid's classic _Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man_ (Reid was a Church of Scotland minister in the 18th Century who wrote in response to David Hume).
Click to expand...


I thought Plantinga regected classical foundationalism? I know that he is a foundationalist of a different, much better, sort.


----------



## InSlaveryToChrist

How do presuppositionalism and foundationalism differ from one another? Is there some overlap between the systems?


----------



## jwright82

InSlaveryToChrist said:


> How do presuppositionalism and foundationalism differ from one another? Is there some overlap between the systems?



For foundationalism you have roughly two different kinds of beliefs, basic and non-basic. Non-basic beliefs are built upon logical consequences of basic beliefs, which are basically beliefs that are self-evident. Imagine a building in which the foundation, or cement and rebar, are the basic beliefs and the whole structure built on top is non-basic beliefs. This gives a level of certianty to our beliefs, if successfully worked out. I know that the non-basic belief X is true because it is based on basic belief Y. Does that make sense?

A presupposition for Van Til is more a belief that we hold so deeply that it skews how we view the world. I live in Florida, it rains a lot here, and my belief that it will rain today can be disproven by it not raining today. That belief of mine is not very important in the grand scheme of things. That is that it being wrong won't affect my other beliefs at all. But my belief in God is a very dear and central belief for me, if I wrong about that than I it would change a lot of my most central beliefs. That is a presupposition, a belief that affects how we view the entire world. 

So a presupposition is not a basic-beliefs because we do not base our logical certianty of non-basic beliefs on our presuppositions. Foundationalism has to do with how we "prove" the logical certianty of our beliefs and presuppositions are about our most central beliefs that affect how we interpret the world around us.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> It is when someone declares, for whatever reason, that your premise or opinion is wrong or absurd without ever actually dealing with the substance of your argument.



So if Descartes questions the existence of my hands, I have to give him a logical argument for their existence? That's rather backwards, in my thinking.



jwright82 said:


> Well I see your point but a trans-cultural idea is above and beyond any one culture or religion.



Is the existence of God something unique to Christianity, or is God just an object among other objects? The postliberal would argue that the existence of God is a rule for Christian speech: a presupposition that makes sense in the larger context (it goes without saying that I dispute this). 

Here is the question, though: does the proposition "God exists" make sense outside a Christian context? Can an atheist understand what we mean when we say it?

The other question that I would ask you is this: how is it that presuppositions make sense? How are they meaningful?



jwright82 said:


> That Synod didn't outlaw those Cadbury eggs did they? If so than I will gladly be a heretic.



They divided on that score. The high-church party wanted the eating of Cadbury eggs restricted to the time of Lent, whereas the low-church party argued that eggs could be eaten at any time. The disagreement was such that instructions for eating of Cadbury eggs never made it into the revisions of the Book of Common Prayer.



jwright82 said:


> I thought Plantinga regected classical foundationalism? I know that he is a foundationalist of a different, much better, sort.



Correct---he would reject _classical_ foundationalism. I don't think that Rev Winzer is advocating the classical model of foundationalism (Leibniz, Descartes, Clark, etc).


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Correct---he would reject classical foundationalism. I don't think that Rev Winzer is advocating the classical model of foundationalism (Leibniz, Descartes, Clark, etc).



I don't think so either. I have nothing but respect for Rev Winzer and have been greatly edified by his comments on this board. Accusing me of engaging in acts that are not "admirable" when I only tried to be nice and correctly use historically defined terms seems a little below his normal charector. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> So if Descartes questions the existence of my hands, I have to give him a logical argument for their existence? That's rather backwards, in my thinking.



Have you found that Anscombe paper I recomended? If I could scan to computer I would but we'll see. If someone disregards a valid point in the context of a debate without ever adressing the argument than they are guilty of this fallacy. There are ways to deal with extreme skepticism like you are refering to that does not resort to this fallacy. You are absolutly correct to regect as "absurdity" such extreme Humian type questions. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Is the existence of God something unique to Christianity, or is God just an object among other objects? The postliberal would argue that the existence of God is a rule for Christian speech: a presupposition that makes sense in the larger context (it goes without saying that I dispute this).
> 
> Here is the question, though: does the proposition "God exists" make sense outside a Christian context? Can an atheist understand what we mean when we say it?
> 
> The other question that I would ask you is this: how is it that presuppositions make sense? How are they meaningful?



Yes but I think the question is can there be trans-cultural ideas like this? Presuppositions are merely the most central of beliefs in our "web of beliefs" (Quine). So they make sense in that context. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> They divided on that score. The high-church party wanted the eating of Cadbury eggs restricted to the time of Lent, whereas the low-church party argued that eggs could be eaten at any time. The disagreement was such that instructions for eating of Cadbury eggs never made it into the revisions of the Book of Common Prayer.



Well herectic or not those eggs are good. I didn't realize that christianity engaged in such central issues as this.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> If someone disregards a valid point in the context of a debate without ever adressing the argument than they are guilty of this fallacy.



And if I don't think the argument worth bothering with? If I believe an argument to be nonsense, then engaging it on a logical level compromises this position. 



jwright82 said:


> Presuppositions are merely the most central of beliefs in our "web of beliefs" (Quine). So they make sense in that context.



But they make sense only in that context. Out of context they should make no sense whatsoever, if Quine is right. I'm not exactly sure what a trans-cultural idea would look like in this framework. Even if you could have such an idea, its function in one context would be completely different from its function in another, such that their functions would be equivocal at best. For example, the Christian and the Deist mean very different things by the existence of God.

Again, my contention is that presuppositions aren't beliefs at all, but attitudes manifesting themselves propositionally such that one may maintain the same attitude in a different guise if the belief is challenged.


----------



## MW

jwright82 said:


> The confusion on my part is that you seem to be using terms and definitions differently from what they are traditionally defined. If that is so than please clear the confusion. Foundationalism as you defined it is not how it is traditionally defined. It has never been concerned with our "apriori equipment" but with types of beliefs (this is true going back all the way to Descarte). Kant was concerned with such things but never foundationalism.



I think you need to do a little more reading of historical texts.



jwright82 said:


> Fair enough, but foundationalism as it has always been understood is not the traditional Reformed understanding because they have always believed in immediate knowledge of God (which is the opposite of what foundationalism, besides Plantinga, have always said).



What reformed theological texts have you read to give you such confidence to make this ridiculous assertion?


----------



## jwright82

armourbearer said:


> I think you need to do a little more reading of historical texts.



With all due respect I have been studying philosophy for over 10 years. This is a philosophical term that we are discussing not a theological one. Foundationalism doesn not mean what you are saying but if you would like me to go to my library and post quote after quote after quote from various philosophical books than I will. You are entitled to define terms anyway you like but to knowingly or unknowingly depart from how they have been used and defined results in any misunderstanding being on you.




armourbearer said:


> What reformed theological texts have you read to give you such confidence to make this ridiculous assertion?



It is true that I am not as familer with the original authors, as you are, but I rely on others authority for this one. Again "immediate" knowledge of God is the very opposite of foundationalism as it has been historically understood in philosophical circles, which is where it originated. Again I can post these sources if you wish? I know you asked me to post these, and the philosophical sources as well, it is just that thi swould be a chore to gather up. I am more than happy to do so but I know for a fact what foundationalism means, so when I do post those philosophical sources it will vindecate my position and show that you were out of line in accusing me of not engaging in "admirable" actions becaus it is you unfortuanatly who is wrong on that issue at least. There is no need for that in mt opinion, I don't do that to people.


----------



## MW

jwright82 said:


> With all due respect I have been studying philosophy for over 10 years. This is a philosophical term that we are discussing not a theological one. Foundationalism doesn not mean what you are saying but if you would like me to go to my library and post quote after quote after quote from various philosophical books than I will. You are entitled to define terms anyway you like but to knowingly or unknowingly depart from how they have been used and defined results in any misunderstanding being on you.



I'm not sure why you keep saying "with all due respect" when you proceed to extend none at all. How old are you? If you have been reading philosophy for ten years I have been reading it for at least over twenty. Do you really want to make that the criteria for judging of the correctness of the statement?

You seem to be little concerned with the context of my statements in light of the original question that was posed. The OP was concerned with presuppositions and a priori knowledge. There is a distinct school of foundationalism which has developed a presuppositional approach. That is the school which I represent. You have obviously read nothing from that school. Given your attitude towards me in this thread you probably care nothing for that school of thought. So be it. The fact is, it exists. All I can say is, that if you choose to remain ignorant out of prejudice you will continue to come off less than admirably in discussion of this kind.



jwright82 said:


> It is true that I am not as familer with the original authors, as you are, but I rely on others authority for this one.



You may want to consider exchanging authorities because this one has led you terribly astray.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

jwright82 said:


> It is true that I am not as familer with the original authors, as you are, but I rely on others authority for this one.


Best that you seek out the references Rev. Winzer noted here.

AMR


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> There is a distinct school of foundationalism which has developed a presuppositional approach.



I would go so far as to say that "presupposition" language makes more sense in a foundationalist conception of knowledge than in a coherentist one.



armourbearer said:


> You may want to consider exchanging authorities because this one has led you terribly astray.



Actually, given current philosophical parlance, he is warranted in his assumption. Most Christian epistemologists today, even if they actually lean in a foundationalist direction, hesitate to apply the term to themselves given its associations with Logical Positivism and other forms of scientism. Your use of the term is correct historically, but is not the current usage.


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## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Actually, given current philosophical parlance, he is warranted in his assumption. Most Christian epistemologists today, even if they actually lean in a foundationalist direction, hesitate to apply the term to themselves given its associations with Logical Positivism and other forms of scientism. Your use of the term is correct historically, but is not the current usage.



In this specific part of the discussion, to which you are replying, the original claim was that "the traditional Reformed understanding ... have always believed in immediate knowledge of God." Given the reformed commitment to ectypal theology and revelation this claim is simply ridiculous.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> In this specific part of the discussion, to which you are replying



I misread---my reply was to the definition of foundationalism.



armourbearer said:


> "the traditional Reformed understanding ... have always believed in immediate knowledge of God." Given the reformed commitment to ectypal theology and revelation this claim is simply ridiculous.



That would be correct. God reveals Himself to us in a multifold manner. However, I would say that in some sense knowledge of God could be said to be immediate given the agency of the Holy Spirit in enlightening our minds to show us Christ and through Him the Father as He is revealed to us in Holy Scripture.


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## jwright82

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Best that you seek out the references Rev. Winzer noted here.
> 
> AMR



Ok I missed those, but as I read books and internet definitions for foundationslism I fail to see any corelation between the two. Here is just some source:

Foundationalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

I also consulted these books, all of which agree with me:

_Becoming Conversant With The Emerging Church_ By D.A. Carson.
The 2000 edition of the Penguin Reference _Dictionary of Philosophy_ edited by Thomas Mautner.
J.P. Moreland and Garrett De Weese's article "The Premature Demise of Foundationalism" in this book _Reclaiming The Center_, any of the essays in that book will only prove my definition of the terms. 
_Essays in the Philosophy of Religion_ edited by Christian Miller, these are all essays by Philip Quin. I am refering to his two essays on Reformed Epistemology. 
_Acceptable Premises_ by James Freeman, an new version of modest foundationalism.
Dr. Oiliphant's paper "Old-new Reformed Epistemology" in the book that he coedited _Revelation and Reason_.
And last but not least _Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers_ by Richard Rorty who is critical of all forms of foundationalism. 

James Orr looks very interesting to study but he died long before contemporary debates on this subject. 




armourbearer said:


> You seem to be little concerned with the context of my statements in light of the original question that was posed. The OP was concerned with presuppositions and a priori knowledge. There is a distinct school of foundationalism which has developed a presuppositional approach. That is the school which I represent. You have obviously read nothing from that school. Given your attitude towards me in this thread you probably care nothing for that school of thought. So be it. The fact is, it exists. All I can say is, that if you choose to remain ignorant out of prejudice you will continue to come off less than admirably in discussion of this kind.



I am not prejudece, I have been waiting for you to pin down your position a little better that distinguishes it from all other historical forms of this position. That makes more sense. As far as the OP goes we do want these schools of thought in their proper context? You appeared to be making your version of foundationalism as the monolithic view of the subject, but it is common knowledge that it is only version that has developed along very different lines. Foundationalists have always, except for your school of thought, regected circularity of anykind. You rightly defend the inevetability of some circularity. That is a pretty big, but good, departure from historical foundationalism of anykind. 

I believe that if anyone reading this discussion were to take your definitions of foundationalism into any philosophy class they would be out of accord with historical philosophical definitions of this term. I wasn't trying to be rude and if it came off that way than I apologize but you were using the terms to refer to a certian school of foundationalism without proper qualification and than accusing me of immoral behavior and being ignorant of history. The way your posts appeared was that that is what what all foundaionalists are, I can name off 6 or so that are different than your particuler school of thought you are refering, but you did say that your foundationalism was the historical view and that I should consult with the sources. 

Again since you are refering to this one school of thought and the 99% or so of foundationalists than in my opinion you probably should have been a little clearer. My references vindicate my insistance that the major schools of thought that have been known as foundationalism are exactly as I have defined them. I look forward to studying the school of thought that you are refering to. I have only asked for clarafication on your part but I could never get it until now. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> And if I don't think the argument worth bothering with? If I believe an argument to be nonsense, then engaging it on a logical level compromises this position.



Very true btu it is in the context of a debate, on onlooker can do whatever they want. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> But they make sense only in that context. Out of context they should make no sense whatsoever, if Quine is right. I'm not exactly sure what a trans-cultural idea would look like in this framework. Even if you could have such an idea, its function in one context would be completely different from its function in another, such that their functions would be equivocal at best. For example, the Christian and the Deist mean very different things by the existence of God.
> 
> Again, my contention is that presuppositions aren't beliefs at all, but attitudes manifesting themselves propositionally such that one may maintain the same attitude in a different guise if the belief is challenged.



You raise a good point. I also enjoy that you ascribe a level of depth to presuppositions that most poeple who criticize Van Til don't.


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## MW

jwright82 said:


> I am not prejudece, I have been waiting for you to pin down your position a little better that distinguishes it from all other historical forms of this position.



You have rejected the definitions I have provided without waiting for any explanation.



jwright82 said:


> You appeared to be making your version of foundationalism as the monolithic view of the subject, but it is common knowledge that it is only version that has developed along very different lines.



Have you done any study on the history of thought? Are you aware that modern broad foundationalism has revived the substance of Thomas Reid's thought concerning belief-forming mechanisms? This is not "my version," but an historically accredited school of thought.



jwright82 said:


> Foundationalists have always, except for your school of thought, regected circularity of anykind. You rightly defend the inevetability of some circularity. That is a pretty big, but good, departure from historical foundationalism of anykind.



I rejected your specific charge of circularity, which is nothing more than a charge of having a finite understanding. That is inevitable for all theories of knowledge, and fits in well with the explanation given by broad foundationalism. When you were answered you decided to change your tactics and claim the circularity related to the logical form of the argument, whereupon it was pointed out to you that no logical form was presented. Now you are reverting back to your original charge. Perhaps you should sit down and work out a strategy which you could stick with for more than one post.



jwright82 said:


> I believe that if anyone reading this discussion were to take your definitions of foundationalism into any philosophy class they would be out of accord with historical philosophical definitions of this term.



More study on the history of thought and some reading of historical texts would help you to bring some light to your darkened philosophy class room. McCosh's Scottish Philosophy might be a good place to start. Note, for example, the following characterisation of the Scottish school (pp. 6, 7):

"it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have there the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original, and necessary. Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as a priori forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles, or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them."


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## MW

jwright82 said:


> I also consulted these books, all of which agree with me:
> 
> _Becoming Conversant With The Emerging Church_ By D.A. Carson.
> The 2000 edition of the Penguin Reference _Dictionary of Philosophy_ edited by Thomas Mautner.
> J.P. Moreland and Garrett De Weese's article "The Premature Demise of Foundationalism" in this book _Reclaiming The Center_, any of the essays in that book will only prove my definition of the terms.
> _Essays in the Philosophy of Religion_ edited by Christian Miller, these are all essays by Philip Quin. I am refering to his two essays on Reformed Epistemology.
> _Acceptable Premises_ by James Freeman, an new version of modest foundationalism.
> Dr. Oiliphant's paper "Old-new Reformed Epistemology" in the book that he coedited _Revelation and Reason_.
> And last but not least _Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers_ by Richard Rorty who is critical of all forms of foundationalism.
> 
> James Orr looks very interesting to study but he died long before contemporary debates on this subject.



Beginning with the last first, James Orr, Christian View, pp. 104-105:

"If we analyse the act of knowledge, we find that in every form of it there are implied certain necessary and universal conditions, which, from the nature of the case, must be conditions of experience also, otherwise it could never be experience for us at all. Thus, any world we are capable of knowing with our present faculties must be a world in space and time, — a world subject to conditions of number and quantity, — a world apprehended in relations of substance and accident, cause and effect, etc. A world of any other kind — supposing it to exist — would be in relation to our thought or knowledge unthinkable. These conditions of knowledge, moreover, are not arbitrary and contingent, but universal and necessary. They spring from reason itself, and express its essential and immutable nature. Thus we feel sure that there is no world in space or time to which the laws of mathematics do not apply; no world possible in which events do not follow each other according to the law of cause and effect; no world in which the fundamental laws of thought and reasoning are different from what they are in our own.... For whence these laws of thought — these universal and necessary conditions of all truth and knowledge — which I discover in myself; which my own reason neither makes nor can unmake; which I recognise to be in me and yet not of me; which I know must belong to every rational being in every part of the universe? They are necessary and eternal in their nature, yet they have not the ground of their existence in my individual mind. Can I conclude otherwise than that they have their seat and ground in an eternal and absolute Reason — the absolute Prius of all that is, at once of thought and of existence?...

This argument, which has been called that of 'Rational Realism,' is one which in varied forms has been accepted by the deepest thinkers, and finds widespread acknowledgment in literature."

D. A Carson only examines a foundationalism which excludes God and makes man the centre of all things.

K Scott Oliphint, p. 213, states clearly, "Without spelling out the details of this structure," and then confines his comments and subsequent criticisms to basic beliefs. Such a statement takes for granted that there is more to foundationalism than "basic beliefs."

I strongly suggest you take up an independent study of the subject and use either original sources which speak from this point of view or secondary sources which attempt something like a detailed analysis.


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## jwright82

armourbearer said:


> You have rejected the definitions I have provided without waiting for any explanation.



No actually I presented what is the contemporary understanding of things. I merely asked for clarification of things.




armourbearer said:


> Have you done any study on the history of thought? Are you aware that modern broad foundationalism has revived the substance of Thomas Reid's thought concerning belief-forming mechanisms? This is not "my version," but an historically accredited school of thought.



Yes my references would prove that I done much study in this area. I am curious since you have not provided any theory of the criterion of proper basicality essential to any form of foundationalism, kindly provide your theory of proper basicality in its logical form so that we can place you withen the proper epistemological context so that we can move forward from this. You have provided no such theory so it is hard to place you without you be more clarifying.




armourbearer said:


> I rejected your specific charge of circularity, which is nothing more than a charge of having a finite understanding. That is inevitable for all theories of knowledge, and fits in well with the explanation given by broad foundationalism. When you were answered you decided to change your tactics and claim the circularity related to the logical form of the argument, whereupon it was pointed out to you that no logical form was presented. Now you are reverting back to your original charge. Perhaps you should sit down and work out a strategy which you could stick with for more than one post.



I did provide a logical form of presupposition and for foundationalism you refused to logically prove that the two were identical, which I challenged you on. You claim that circularity is part of foundationalism, well the internet references I provided refute that outright, not ot mention any philosophical text on the matter. Again we cannot get anywhere here if you insist that your view is the majority report, its not Rev. Winzer, as my references vindicate. No one, including me, is saying that you cannot claim the mantle of foundationalism only that contemporary foundationalism is not what you are talking about. I am trying to be cordial here, I really am. 

Those criticisms are standered criticisms for foundationalism in any philosophical work on the subject. Be my guest to consult the works I provided to better understand where I am coming from. 




armourbearer said:


> More study on the history of thought and some reading of historical texts would help you to bring some light to your darkened philosophy class room. McCosh's Scottish Philosophy might be a good place to start. Note, for example, the following characterisation of the Scottish school (pp. 6, 7):
> 
> "it resolutely maintains that we can discover principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have there the sanction of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently apprehended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses, and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural, original, and necessary. Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems to contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant, as a priori forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles, or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting independently of the philosophers' classification or explanation of them."



Rev. Winzer I am not disputing that these theologians that you quote agree with you. What I am doing is quoting philosophers who have taken this subject up in the last century or so. You have not quoted a single one of them nor refuted my definitions given. No one disagrees with you on these theologians, their opinions or their worth. But they are not contemporary philosophers dealing with this issue. You chose to use contemporary philosophical terms and I only played off of those. 




armourbearer said:


> Beginning with the last first, James Orr, Christian View, pp. 104-105



I believe it obvious that if he died long before contemporary debates about the history and theory of philosophical foundationalism took place that he would not know anything about these, right?




armourbearer said:


> "If we analyse the act of knowledge, we find that in every form of it there are implied certain necessary and universal conditions, which, from the nature of the case, must be conditions of experience also, otherwise it could never be experience for us at all. Thus, any world we are capable of knowing with our present faculties must be a world in space and time, — a world subject to conditions of number and quantity, — a world apprehended in relations of substance and accident, cause and effect, etc. A world of any other kind — supposing it to exist — would be in relation to our thought or knowledge unthinkable. These conditions of knowledge, moreover, are not arbitrary and contingent, but universal and necessary. They spring from reason itself, and express its essential and immutable nature. Thus we feel sure that there is no world in space or time to which the laws of mathematics do not apply; no world possible in which events do not follow each other according to the law of cause and effect; no world in which the fundamental laws of thought and reasoning are different from what they are in our own.... For whence these laws of thought — these universal and necessary conditions of all truth and knowledge — which I discover in myself; which my own reason neither makes nor can unmake; which I recognise to be in me and yet not of me; which I know must belong to every rational being in every part of the universe? They are necessary and eternal in their nature, yet they have not the ground of their existence in my individual mind. Can I conclude otherwise than that they have their seat and ground in an eternal and absolute Reason — the absolute Prius of all that is, at once of thought and of existence?...



Thank you for providing a wonderful example of a transcendental argument, it seems that maybe you confuse the two. That is a transcendental argument and not a form of foundationalism. 




armourbearer said:


> This argument, which has been called that of 'Rational Realism,' is one which in varied forms has been accepted by the deepest thinkers, and finds widespread acknowledgment in literature."
> 
> D. A Carson only examines a foundationalism which excludes God and makes man the centre of all things.
> 
> K Scott Oliphint, p. 213, states clearly, "Without spelling out the details of this structure," and then confines his comments and subsequent criticisms to basic beliefs. Such a statement takes for granted that there is more to foundationalism than "basic beliefs."
> 
> I strongly suggest you take up an independent study of the subject and use either original sources which speak from this point of view or secondary sources which attempt something like a detailed analysis.



That is all there is to foundationalism as my references prove, you are mixing different strains of thought together or something but honestly you are all over the map philosophically so it is hard to keep with you.


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## MW

jwright82 said:


> Yes my references would prove that I done much study in this area. I am curious since you have not provided any theory of the criterion of proper basicality essential to any form of foundationalism, kindly provide your theory of proper basicality in its logical form so that we can place you withen the proper epistemological context so that we can move forward from this. You have provided no such theory so it is hard to place you without you be more clarifying.



Your references show that you know how to pick and choose from random statements in a variety of books, that is all. I referenced the type of logical argument I would make earlier in the thread when I pointed you to Nash's work. The only reply I received pertained to his rationalism, in keeping with your dismissive tone throughout this thread. You seem oblivious to a whole range of contemporary discussion of foundationalism which has appropriated the earlier realism. I've quoted the "rational realist" arguments of McCosh and Orr, and you ignorantly claim Orr as making a transcendental argument. It is a foundationalist argument based upon the a priori mental equipment, which I referenced in my first post, and you rejected. I can see that no reasoning will convince you, and I certainly do not have any inclination to waste further time on you, so I leave you to your own devices. Feel free to have the last word.


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## jwright82

armourbearer said:


> Your references show that you know how to pick and choose from random statements in a variety of books, that is all. I referenced the type of logical argument I would make earlier in the thread when I pointed you to Nash's work. The only reply I received pertained to his rationalism, in keeping with your dismissive tone throughout this thread. You seem oblivious to a whole range of contemporary discussion of foundationalism which has appropriated the earlier realism. I've quoted the "rational realist" arguments of McCosh and Orr, and you ignorantly claim Orr as making a transcendental argument. It is a foundationalist argument based upon the a priori mental equipment, which I referenced in my first post, and you rejected. I can see that no reasoning will convince you, and I certainly do not have any inclination to waste further time on you, so I leave you to your own devices. Feel free to have the last word.



believe it or not I am beyond last words. I am sorry for being rude if that offended you so much. I took it as rude when you accused me of bad things. But I have no inlclination to carry on this debate for the reason that respect you, despite what you may think. I hope this does not come between us.


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## Philip

armourbearer said:


> I've quoted the "rational realist" arguments of McCosh and Orr, and you ignorantly claim Orr as making a transcendental argument. It is a foundationalist argument based upon the a priori mental equipment, which I referenced in my first post, and you rejected.



Rev Winzer, I see exactly why he would call this argument transcendental: it's an argument based on finding the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. It is most definitely post-Kantian in its direction. It may be foundationalist, but so was Kant---he was not a direct realist, but he was defnitely foundationalist rather than coherentist.

I think possibly that both you and James are talking past one another.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

P. F. Pugh said:


> Rev Winzer, I see exactly why he would call this argument transcendental: it's an argument based on finding the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. It is most definitely post-Kantian in its direction. It may be foundationalist, but so was Kant---he was not a direct realist, but he was defnitely foundationalist rather than coherentist.


I believe Kant rejected the a priori mental equipment Rev. Winzer discusses. Kant rejected all sorts of _preformation_ views in favor of psychological necessity, effectively reducing his views to skepticism, a logically self-defeating position in itself. But all of this is perhaps the stuff of separate threads.



> I think possibly that both you and James are talking past one another.


Again, the term here is "classical foundationalism".

Rev. Winzer's second post in this thread laid the pipe for his use of classical foundationalism. I don't find an honest attempt made to appreciate his position in what followed.

Rather than being met on the terms he set out, what followed were frequent unsolicited "correctives" attempting to school Rev. Winzer, some laced with not a little bit of indignation. Rev. Winzer even pointed to specific sources of his classical position, both old, and new (Nash) for deeper inquiry. Reason dictates that rather than continuing to lecture another about what he "really means" based upon one's own "many years of study", one would immediately seek the sources explicitly offered and turn a few of their pages beforehand. I'm just sayin'. 

AMR


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## NaphtaliPress

That seems a good place to shut this down. 


Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Rather than being met on the terms he set out, what followed were frequent unsolicited "correctives" attempting to school Rev. Winzer, some laced with not a little bit of indignation. Rev. Winzer even pointed to specific sources of his classical position, both old, and new (Nash) for deeper inquiry. Reason dictates that rather than continuing to lecture another about what he "really means" based upon one's own "many years of study", one would immediately seek the sources explicitly offered and turn a few of their pages beforehand. I'm just sayin'.


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