# Euthyphro's dilemma



## christianyouth (Dec 5, 2008)

Hey guys, how would you answer this dilemma?



> Euthyphro's dilemma can be expressed with the following question:"Is what is moral commanded by God because it's moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?" It's a dilemma for the theist because which ever option turns out to be correct, the result seems unsatisfactory. If what is moral is commanded by God because it's moral, then it means that there is an absolute standard of morality that exists independently of God. And that god is not necessary as a source of morality. On the other hand if things are moral simply because they are commanded by god, then theistic morality has a completely arbitrary foundation. If he had happened to command that killing your mother was good, it would be good in an absolute sense to kill your mother.The theist often tries to avoid the dilemma by claiming that God doesn't simply make random commandments, but that morality and goodness are a part of God's nature and his commandments are a reflection of that nature. But the theist is mistaken in thinking that he's avoided the dilemma by locating 'goodness' in gods nature instead of in his commandments. Euthyphro's question, with a slight modification can be applied again: "Is what is moral part of God's nature because it's moral, or is it moral because it's part of God's nature?"Is it true that God's nature is good by definition? in other words, whatever God's nature had been, it would have been good--and the commandments he gave would reflect that. If this was the case then if gods nature had been different, a different set of actions would be morally good. Rape could be good for instance, or killing your mother. In other words , if God's nature is good by definition, and this is where the absolute standard of morality comes from, then morality is totally arbitrary, it's an accident. It seems to me that most Christians would be uncomfortable to accept that the distinction between good and bad is ultimately arbitrary. The alternative is that God's nature _could never have been such_ that the moral principles following from it would include a sanction of things like rape and killing your mother. But if this is the case we are saying that God's character is limited by an external standard of right and wrong; a standard that we apparently already have access to, and one that would exist whether or not God existed. I don't think most theists would accept that either of these cases is true, but one of them must be if it is true that God exists and that there is an absolute moral standard.


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## Prufrock (Dec 5, 2008)

I think Euthyphro's dilemma ceases to be one when we start with the idea that our God is all- or self-sufficient. That he needs nothing outside of himself and is wholly self-sustaining makes what he is, "good," and thus the fact that holiness or morality stems from his nature is not problematic.

-----Added 12/5/2008 at 10:00:29 EST-----

It is indeed a dilemma when speaking of the gods of the Greeks; but not when speaking of YHWH.


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## panta dokimazete (Dec 6, 2008)

> In other words , if God's nature is good by definition, and this is where the absolute standard of morality comes from, then morality is totally arbitrary, it's an accident.


 This is _non sequitur_.

The problem begins when you concede the "what if" - I don't debate "what if" - I debate "what *is*" and since God *is* good and morality is a byproduct of His absolute goodness, then there is an absolute source and knowable, practical model for human morality, God. It seems tautological, but there is nothing illogical or accidental about a perfect closed system. As mentioned above - God *is* - completely self-sufficient and completely good - that does not mean that "not of God" is not allowable, since it is outside the closed system, and completely subordinate to the ultimate purposes of God.

-----Added 12/6/2008 at 12:20:13 EST-----

So then one must define what God's good purposes are - Scripturally, He will glorify the Son through the good and merciful redemption of a people for Himself and glorify Himself in the good exercise of His justice.


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## Confessor (Dec 6, 2008)

I would say that it is a false dilemma. An objective moral standard is not above or below God's character or actions; it _is_ God's character or actions.

The only reason nonbelievers would say that Christian morality is arbitrary is because they desire to bring God down to a creaturely level, violating the Creator-creature distinction. They believe that even He must be subject to something greater.

Of course, in doing so, they are proposing an absurd solution: whence comes this higher external standard? From some being greater than God? Would he have to be subject to some greater standard in order to avoid an arbitrary morality as well? _Ad infinitum_. The atheist does not offer a dilemma for the Christian at all; he creates one for himself by assigning arbitrary criteria to what must be the case for objective standards.


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## turmeric (Dec 6, 2008)

It seems that if God is good, He cannot but decree what is good -so His decrees are good because He is good.


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## TimV (Dec 6, 2008)

I'm with Meg, and I'll expand on it.



> Is what is moral commanded by God because it's moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?"



Moral isn't some sort of metaphysical absolute that never changes. Something is good simply because God says so.

We've discussed the issue here recently with the laws against incest. Adam and Eve's kids, Abraham and Sarah committed what God later told Moses was incest. But it became immoral only when God said it was wrong.

Also the Canaanite genocide. God said killing a child for the sins of the father is wrong, so it's wrong. In the specific case of the Canaanite genocide God told His people to kill small children, so in that specific instance killing a child for the sins of the father became good.

Something is good or bad because God say it is good or bad. There isn't any standard of morality that stands independent of God.

Edit: Ben I see you addressed this as well
_Of course, in doing so, they are proposing an absurd solution: whence comes this higher external standard? From some being greater than God? Would he have to be subject to some greater standard in order to avoid an arbitrary morality as well? _


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## Confessor (Dec 6, 2008)

TimV said:


> I'm with Meg, and I'll expand on it.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



But are not God's laws a reflection of His moral character? While I do not deny that morality is what God prescribes, I do deny that He changes actual moral standards. He is immutable.

I would say that God never changes any moral rule, but there is a difference of facts in the application of moral rules. In the Canaanite genocide, were the kids being slaughtered solely for the sins of the father, or was not their slaughter also permitted by the fact that children are still sinners by nature and thus subject to God's wrath? If God said that children should not be punished for the sins of their fathers, and then said that children should be killed explicitly because of the sins of their fathers, then He would be contradicting Himself.

In the case of incest, there might be a difference in prescription due to the fact that the physical maladies of incest did not exist until a significant amount of in-breeding since Adam and Eve's "very good" bodies existed in Eden. I am not sure about this, though.


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## TimV (Dec 6, 2008)

Hi Ben


> In the Canaanite genocide, were the kids being slaughtered solely for the sins of the father, or was not their slaughter also permitted by the fact that children are still sinners by nature and thus subject to God's wrath?


Deut. 24:6 says



> Fathers shall not be put to death because of their children, nor shall children be put to death because of their fathers. Each one shall be put to death for his own sin.



So no, God specifically forbade killing children just because of their fallen nature. That's one of the reasons we orthodox Christians disagree with abortion. If you were to kill one of my kids just because of their fallen nature, you would be sinning.



> If God said that children should not be punished for the sins of their fathers, and then said that children should be killed explicitly because of the sins of their fathers, then He would be contradicting Himself.



I think upon reflection you will have to agree that God did indeed say that we can't kill kids for the sins of their fathers. I think you will also agree that God ordered His people to kill kids that were not subject to death under the current law, the law of Moses. But look at 1 Sam 15, which took place during "Sinai"



> 1And Samuel said to Saul,(A) "The LORD sent me to anoint you king over his people Israel; now therefore listen to the words of the LORD. 2Thus says the LORD of hosts, 'I have noted what Amalek did to Israel(B) in opposing them on the way when they came up out of Egypt. 3Now go and strike Amalek and(C) devote to destruction[a] all that they have. Do not spare them,(D) but kill both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.'"



So you could look at is as a contradiction, but to my mind it would be more reasonable to just say that good and evil are simply what ever God says is good and evil. I like what you said



> Of course, in doing so, they are proposing an absurd solution: whence comes this higher external standard? From some being greater than God?



There just isn't any other standard other than God. He's the center, and He defines good and evil. 
Best
Tim


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## Confessor (Dec 6, 2008)

TimV said:


> So no, God specifically forbade killing children just because of their fallen nature. That's one of the reasons we orthodox Christians disagree with abortion. If you were to kill one of my kids just because of their fallen nature, you would be sinning.



Oh no, I meant merely as a reason that God could punish them, possibly through us. I was never trying to say that we are permitted to kill people due to their sinful nature. That would be quite hypocritical.



> So you could look at is as a contradiction, but to my mind it would be more reasonable to just say that good and evil are simply what ever God says is good and evil. I like what you said



First off, thanks for pointing out the 1 Sam. 15 chapter. I just have a question regarding what exactly God forbade in Deut. 24:6, because I see a slight difference between the two passages that would imply that God does not change His moral rule, but it again is a difference in facts.

When God said that we should not punish children for the sins of our fathers, didn't He mean that absolutely speaking? That is, "Don't decide for yourselves that it is permissible to kill children based on their fathers' sins." This would only imply that _man_ is morally proscribed from killing people for others' sins. Then, in the 1 Sam. 15 passage, humans are killing people for others' sins, but only as a tool of God; i.e. it would be tantamount to a natural disaster or something, since it happened explicitly by God's permission.

So, the two moral precepts would be different: Deut. 24:6 teaches that man may not kill people for others' sins, while 1 Sam. 15 teaches a different principle, that the Amalekites actually had sin of their own which they chose not to repent for. Their sin was viewed as belong to their nation, and it was unaccounted for, warranting their destruction. It was not purely because of someone else's sin. Here is part of David Guzik's commentary on 1 Sam. 15:3:



> But all this had happened more than four hundred years before! Why did God hold it against the Amalekites? This shows us an important principle: time does not erase sin before God. Before man, time should erase sin. The years should make us forgiving to one another. But before God, time cannot atone for sin. Only the blood of Jesus Christ can erase sin, not time. In fact, the time was time that the Amalekites were mercifully given opportunity to repent. And they did not repent! The hundreds of years of hardened unrepentant hearts made them more guilty, not less guilty! "Though it be four hundred years since, and I may seem to have forgotten it. It is ill angering the Ancient of Days; his forbearance is no quittance." (Trapp)


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## Joe Keysor (Dec 17, 2008)

If someone brings up the question in the opening post out of hostility, as is often the case, trying to prove that Christian concepts are inconsistent and impossible, it can be helpful to ask them the same question:

Where do you get your ethical ideas? If they come from your self, they are arbitrary. If there is some higher moral standard that exists independently, then it is higher than you. What is it?


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## Confessor (Dec 18, 2008)

Joe Keysor said:


> If someone brings up the question in the opening post out of hostility, as is often the case, trying to prove that Christian concepts are inconsistent and impossible, it can be helpful to ask them the same question:
> 
> Where do you get your ethical ideas? If they come from your self, they are arbitrary. If there is some higher moral standard that exists independently, then it is higher than you. What is it?



And then of course, whatever they say it is, you can ask them why _that_ has the authority to issue moral precepts without receiving the charge of arbitrariness that is imposed upon God Himself by them.

The most common answer to our question would be "reason" but that simply pushes the question back further as the unbeliever usually presupposes that pleasure is good and suffering is bad. When confronted about that, the answer to that is usually rooted in personal preference (e.g. "I prefer pleasure to pain"), which of course reduces to moral subjectivism, an easily destroyable concept.


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## Joe Keysor (Dec 25, 2008)

On the human level, the Euthyphro dilemma works perfectly. If we get our ethics or beliefs from ourselves, they are arbitrary. If they come from some outside source, then we are beneath it.

On the divine level, it doesn't work because God can issue moral judgments from himself without being arbitrary. This is because his innate perfection eliminates the error and subjectivity that make "arbitrary" such a negative word.

The problem is confusing the human with the divine.


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## Puritan Sailor (Dec 25, 2008)

TimV said:


> Hi Ben
> 
> 
> > In the Canaanite genocide, were the kids being slaughtered solely for the sins of the father, or was not their slaughter also permitted by the fact that children are still sinners by nature and thus subject to God's wrath?
> ...



I think you need to remember that the Canaanite "genocide" was an act of divine judgment. Their wrath had been stored up. God was destroying them, using the Israelites as his instruments. God was executing his just judgment against them as the judge of all men. So even children could be judged because they were guilty in Adam (Rom 5:12-21). 

It's the same with capital punishment. It is God's judgment upon the offender, mediated through an appointed intrument, the civil authority. The average Joe cannot act in this capacity. 

So there is no moral dilemma for God in the instances you cited. He was executing justice against sinners consistenly with his own holy and righteous character, through his appointed instrument. The question we need to ask is why aren't we slaughtered too....


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## TimV (Dec 25, 2008)

> I think you need to remember that the Canaanite "genocide" was an act of divine judgment. Their wrath had been stored up. God was destroying them, using the Israelites as his instruments. God was executing his just judgment against them as the judge of all men. So even children could be judged because they were guilty in Adam (Rom 5:12-21).


Everything you say is true, but doesn't take away from the point. The magistrate may not punish a kid because of Adam. Period. The State is forbidden to.



> It's the same with capital punishment.


But with capital punishment the magistrate is allowed to, and commanded to under certain circumstances.

_ It is God's judgment upon the offender, mediated through an appointed intrument, the civil authority. The average Joe cannot act in this capacity._ 
True.

_So there is no moral dilemma for God in the instances you cited._ 
I think we may be on the same page. Sorry if I was unclear in that I sounded like I was saying God betrayed His own moral code. My point was that God is His own moral code. So, under no circumstances may the magistrate commit or order or turn a blind eye to genocide, since God said it's immoral. In the case of the Canaanite genocide, it became moral simply because God ordered it as a one time action.
Regards
Tim


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## cih1355 (Dec 25, 2008)

According to the OP, Euthyphro's dilemma can be expressed with the following question:"Is what is moral commanded by God because it's moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?" 

My response is that Euthyphro’s dilemma is a false dilemma. God does not arbitrarily decide what is moral or immoral. Moreover, there is no moral standard that is higher than God. God’s good character is the foundation and standard for morality. God is good and He is the standard of goodness. Something is moral if it reflects God’s character. Something is immoral if it is contrary to God’s character. 

Some people will push Euthyphro's dilemma further by asking, "Is the character of God good because it is God's character or is it God's character because it is good?".

I have two responses to those people who would ask that question:

1. The people who ask that question cannot escape a similar dilemma. Are moral values good because they are good or because they conform to an independent standard of goodness?

2. There has to be a self-sufficient, self-explanatory stopping point or else the process of giving explanations will never come to an end. If you think that God’s good character is an arbitrary stopping point, would the fact that moral values are good because they are good be an arbitrary stopping point as well?


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## Puritan Sailor (Dec 25, 2008)

cih1355 said:


> According to the OP, Euthyphro's dilemma can be expressed with the following question:"Is what is moral commanded by God because it's moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?"
> 
> My response is that Euthyphro’s dilemma is a false dilemma. God does not arbitrarily decide what is moral or immoral. Moreover, there is no moral standard that is higher than God. God’s good character is the foundation and standard for morality. God is good and He is the standard of goodness. Something is moral if it reflects God’s character. Something is immoral if it is contrary to God’s character.
> 
> ...



The problem really comes down to our limitations as creatures to know the answer. God has to tell us what he is like because we can't discern it on our own with our fallen finite minds. Either we believe what God says about himself, or we do not and end in all the moral chaos.


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