# Berkhof on Christology



## spicedparrot (Mar 5, 2007)

In reading Berkhof's Manual of Christian Doctrine he outlines his Christological position.

However, when outlining the Natures of Christ, in Section B(3) he outlines "The effects of the union of the Two Natures in One Person." He then proceeds to state there is a threefold communication:

a) A Communication of Attributes or Properties.
b) A communication of Operations.
c) A communication of Graces.

This puzzles me because I thought reformed theology denied any communication of attributes between the human and the divine. And yes, I do understand that the two natures are united into one person. 

I'll quote from 3(a): "This means that, after the incarnation, the properties of both the human and divine natures are the properties of the person and are therefore ascribed to the person. The person can be said to be almighty, omniscient, OMNIPRESENT, and so on..."

I'm interested what those on the board have to say about this. 

Chad Hamilton
Peace with Christ LCMS
Fort Collins, Colorado


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## Casey (Mar 5, 2007)

The communication of properties is to the Person of Christ, and not from one nature to the other.

So, the Person of Christ is both omnipresent and not omnipresent -- omniscient and not omniscient -- etc.

Christ's human nature never becomes omnipresent or omniscient, just as his Divine nature never loses omnipresence or omniscience.

Perhaps this is the distinction that's confusing you?


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## spicedparrot (Mar 5, 2007)

*Ahhh...I see*

Ahh, I see. That distinction is helpful.

However, if the two natures are united into one person, and the divine attributed are communicated to the person, how is it that we can say that the divine attributes then are not by consequence communicated to the human. And vice-versa of course.

I'm not expecting to fully understand the mystery of the hypostatic union, but I would like to understand Berkhof's logic.

Chad Hamilton
Peace With Christ (LCMS)
Fort Collins, Colorado


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## Casey (Mar 5, 2007)

spicedparrot said:


> Ahh, I see. That distinction is helpful.
> 
> However, if the two natures are united into one person, and the divine attributed are communicated to the person, how is it that we can say that the divine attributes then are not by consequence communicated to the human. And vice-versa of course.


Jesus is one Person in two natures -- the two natures are always distinguished even in their attributes, though the attributes of each nature are possessed by the one Person at the same time (which is beyond our capacity to understand!).

So, the Divine attributes are not communicated to (or "possessed" by) the human nature because they are always to be distinguished -- "recognized in two natures, *without confusion*, without change, without division, without separation" (Council of Chalcedon).


> I'm not expecting to fully understand the mystery of the hypostatic union, but I would like to understand Berkhof's logic.


Berkhof is just summarizing the standard Reformed understanding -- here are some statements from Reformed confessions that might help:

*Belgic Confession
Article 19: The Two Natures of Christ*

We believe that by being thus conceived the person of the Son has been inseparably united and joined together with human nature, in such a way that there are not two Sons of God, nor two persons, but two natures united in a single person, with each nature retaining its own distinct properties.

Thus his divine nature has always remained uncreated, without beginning of days or end of life,^44 filling heaven and earth.

His human nature has not lost its properties but continues to have those of a creature-- it has a beginning of days; it is of a finite nature and retains all that belongs to a real body. And even though he, by his resurrection, gave it immortality, that nonetheless did not change the reality of his human nature; for our salvation and resurrection depend also on the reality of his body.

But these two natures are so united together in one person that they are not even separated by his death.

So then, what he committed to his Father when he died was a real human spirit which left his body. But meanwhile his divine nature remained united with his human nature even when he was lying in the grave; and his deity never ceased to be in him, just as it was in him when he was a little child, though for a while it did not show itself as such.

These are the reasons why we confess him to be true God and true man-- true God in order to conquer death by his power, and true man that he might die for us in the weakness of his flesh.

^44 Heb. 7:3

*Westminster Confession of Faith
CHAPTER 8
Of Christ the Mediator*

2. The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance and equal with the Father, did, when the fullness of time was come, take upon him man's nature, with all the essential properties, and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin; being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God, and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man.​Does this help?  I could be misunderstanding your question . .


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## Contra_Mundum (Mar 5, 2007)

Here's some more from WCF 8:

para 7. Christ, in the work of mediation, acts according to both natures, by each nature doing that which is proper to itself;1 yet, by reason of the unity of the *person*, that which is proper to one nature is sometimes in Scripture attributed to the person denominated by the other nature.2

proofs:
1. Heb. 9:14; 1 Pet. 3:18
2. Acts 20:28; Jn. 3:13; 1 Jn. 3:16


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## spicedparrot (Mar 5, 2007)

*Distinctions*

So then, is a distinction made between the division of the natures, but not the division of the persons? How does this avoid the charge of Nestorianism? It sounds to me like one nature does one thing, but another nature does another. But scripture attributes one to the other only semantically. 

If that is the case it seems to me that one shouldn't be able to call Mary "the Mother of God" as Calvin did. 

I realize of course that the error on the other side is "confusing" the two natures. 

Doubly so for helping me understand the presbyterian position. Also, from what was quoted it doesn't sound to me like what I read in Berkhof is consistent with the Westminster standards.


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## Contra_Mundum (Mar 6, 2007)

Division of what personS? There is only the one Person, who has two distinct natures. What is expressed in the Reformed confessions is really nothing more than reaffirmation of Chalcedonian Christology. On the other side, one could ask whether the Lutherans can avoid the charge of monophysticism.

Chalcedon refuted two errors: monophysticism (Eutychianism), and Nestorianism. The first error held that there was only one single nature (theanthropic), and the other that two natures demanded two persons. Their answer was (in the Chalcedonian terms) that Christ was "without" mixture or confusion (1st error); and "without" separation or division (2nd error).

Do you, as a Lutheran, hold that each nature shares fully the attributes of the other--as in the ubiquity of Christ's physical body? Calvin (for the Reformed) taught _finitum non capax infinitum_, the finite cannot contain the infinite. The Lutheran divines called that the "extra Calvinisticum," some extra thing Calvinism taught, one reason they do not consider most Reformed churches as sisters.

Calvin: Where he used such a phrase as "Mother of God," it certainly would have been within strict credal parameters. It's not a biblical phrase. And it certainly doesn't mean that Mary was the mother of God in the same sense of her having bore the human _man,_ Jesus. As the divine Creator, He was her originator!

Calvin may have used the term, but it has passed out of common usage among us, and probably for good reason. It may have been coined for the purpose of enhancing the Incarnational vocabulary, to help people recall that even the fetus of the Lord was still _the divine Lord!_ But so far as it served to overvalue the person of Mary, it was an unfortunate term.

As for Berkhof, I don't really see any divergence between his Dutch (3FU) presentation and the Westministerian. Communication, which we acknowledge, is not the same as a full sharing of attributes. For example, Jesus' divine nature occasionally shared certain facts only accessible to an omniscient mind with the human mind ("Jesus, perceiving in his spirit that they so reasoned *within themselves*..." (Mk. 2:8)). Other times he remained ignorant in his humanity (But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, ... not even *the Son*" (Mk. 13:32)). So the communication is real and willful, but not an involuntary or total sharing.

Hope this clarifies.


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## py3ak (Mar 6, 2007)

As far as the _theotokos_ title goes, I was commenting to my wife the other day that they could have made the same point by saying that James was the brother of God. In other words, it was a Christological point: and I am quite comfortable using it as such. I don't think we should let Rome take the historical high ground on this one.

Cunningham has a good discussion on the communication of attributes in his _Historical Theology_


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## spicedparrot (Mar 6, 2007)

I didn't speak clearly enough, of course there is no division of persons. I was asking how we can claim to not be Nestorian by saying there is a division of natures (with which I agree) but not a division of persons (also agree). I realize that this is the classical formula of Chalcedon, but how do we distinguish the separation of natures from the separation of persons? It seems to me to be some metaphysical gymnastics. 

As I understand Nestorius his comments were that there was unity in the person but the person will manifest attributes of either the Logos or the Human depending on the situation (or something like that). In otherwords, Nestorius was arguing on the importance of semantics and not saying things like the "Mother of God" because at that moment it was the Man that was manifest - or something like that (I'm not going to pretend to be a scholar).

Regarding ubiquity: If the Divine attributes are communicated to the person (as Berkhof says) then presumably one of those attributes is ominpresence. Would this lead to some conclusion of ubiquity? If not, are we saying that attribute wasn't communicated to the person? If so, how do we distinguish between which attributes are communicated and which are not? 

I understand the claim that if one does hold to ubiquity than Christ is no longer "human" (hence the monophysite charge) - But - Christ in his resurrected, pre-ascension state doesn't strike me as very human either (walking through walls, appearing and disappearing into thin air, etc.)

Also, as to the charge of monophysticism, I've been reading the Lutheran confessions and they seem to me to say the same thing that you are saying here. Namely, that the two natures are distinct and not to be confused, the properties of one nature cannot be transmitted to the other, but they are both united in the one person. How is that different from Berkhof (See Book of Concord, Solid Declaration on "Christ and his Person")? Of course some Lutheran dogmaticians may say something different but their confessions seem quite clear. 

Also - if the allegation of Monphysticism is that Christ is just in one substance a God fitted with the vestiges of humanity (i.e. one nature) it seems there is also an error made on the other side that Jesus is just a human fitted with the vestiges of divinity. If the charge against Lutherans is that in spite of their confessions they are in practicality "monphysits" how do we avoid the charge that in spite of our confessions we are not "monphysits" from the other perspective? 

My other thought is that part of this confusion seems to be stemming from the idea of "nature" as a category and "human" and "divine" as subcategory. I don't think that is what Chalcedon was trying to communicate, but rather that Christ was wholly divine, and wholly human (not just one or the other). This seems to me to be as difficult to apprehend as the trinity. In otherwords, I wonder if some of these issues are resolved when we keep in mind God's transcendence and "otherness". 


Thanks for your time. 

P.S. I picked up the Mother of God thing from the White Horse Inn Basic Doctrine Quiz: "This statement is not suggesting that Mary created God, but was originally intended as a way of supporting the divinity of Jesus Christ. Mary was indeed the mother of God incarnate." Do you consider this an accurate statement, albeit perhaps incomplete?


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## Contra_Mundum (Mar 6, 2007)

Hi Chad,

I wouldn't class myself as a "scholar" either. I just have a calling that requires that I have spent (and still must expend) extra time thinking and writing on these kinds of subjects. So, maybe I can be useful to the church and not deadweight.

As a person, you are more than just your nature. The nature _in toto_ makes you the *kind* of thing you are, but it does not exhaustively describe you.

Nestorius the man may sometimes get a worse rap than he deserves. But I think even the description of his theology you offer above (assuming it hits close to accurate) will have to face serious challenges and offer qualifications to fit the Johannine Christology of John 1. God's revelation simply doesn't carve up neatly into one or the other nature-manifestations. But I still think he was probably correct to resist the _theotokos_ language. I do think the WHI assessment is probably on-target.

Regarding communication: just bear in mind the distinction between "person" and "nature." LB says the divine and human _natures_ communicate their qualities or attributes to the _Person_. The divine nature *has* the attribute of omnipresence, because that's something that follows from deity. Thus, given that this is a communication "upward," the Person also *has* that undiminished attribute.

But it does not follow to say that what the one nature has, and communicates "upward" is automatically recommunicated "downward" to the other nature. Personhood is conceptually higher than nature. Understand that I'm not putting the two natures on a kind of metaphysical par beneath the personal identity of Christ. Divinity and humanity are vastly distinguishable ontologically.

Which fact just mentioned actually can speak, then, to another query you made, asking how we know what aspects relative to one nature are communicated or appreciated by the other. Some things a human nature _cannot do,_ and still be a human nature. Ubiquity ( I argue) would be one of those things. A human nature that is everywhere at once has ceased to be a human nature, but Jesus will be fully human (and fully divine) forevermore.

Regarding Jesus resurrected humanity, what we need to do is not judge Jesus' humanity (or loss/change) thereof by what makes US human, but adjust our definition of human nature in its perfected state by the qualities that Jesus possessed in his glorified body. And Paul's 1 Cor. 15:35ff discussion is probably a passage meant to be meditated on at length in this department. The butterfly is vastly different from the caterpillar, but it doesn't require a reclassification before and after the chrysalis stage.

So, what is communicated to the other nature is mediated and controlled by whatever makes the Person the Person. And its also true that the divine nature stands in a superior ontological relation relative to the human nature. All the while remembering that "being" is not an overarching category that contains human being and divine being (which puts us back in Aristotelianism, and a chain-of-being). Human existence is a fundamentally different sort of existence from Divine existence. Creator v. creature. Self-existence v. derived existence. Jesus' human nature is a completely created nature, including a beginning. And yet, the Person of Christ unites both these natures.

Re. the Lutherans, their confessions, and their dogmaticians: I only hope someday we can actually agree on some form of doctrine that brings us all into true unity. But I'm not holding my breath. They are all still pounding on the table hollering "This ... is ... my ... body!" Luther is supposed to have admitted at some point late in life to acknowledging a Calvinistic (not Zwinglian) view of the Supper as being orthodox. But, we're still "crafty sacramentarians" to the Formula defenders.

I'm fairly certain I have the Chalcedonian intent correct. They were less interested in positive statements about what Christ WAS, than apophatic statments about what he WAS NOT, statements that set up limits beyond which were the heresies.

At the end of the day, once we have received the Biblical data, accepted it, made our best efforts to reconcile all aspects of the truth, not to the prejudice of truth and non-contradiction, we inevitably reach a stopping point. It's *ultimately* more than we can handle. God gives us his revelation "accomodated" (_Calvin_) to our frail capcities, and bids us acknowledge our limitations. On this we seem to be of one mind.

Peace.


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## spicedparrot (Mar 6, 2007)

*Thank you and final questions*

Your discussion above is most helpful and interesting. I appreciate your time, this is a difficult subject to grasp. 

Based upon what you say above, is it fair to say that:

Where ever Christ is present in his person he is present in both his humanity and divinity?

Or , if he is present in his humanity, he has to be present in his divinity and thus is also present in his person?

Or finally, to put it a third way, if he is present in his humanity or divinity he will also be present in his person? 

I'm assuming the answer to all of the three would have to be "yes" otherwise would be separating the natures, right? Am I missing something here? 

Finally, here is a quote from the Epitome of the Book of Concord on the presence of Christ in the supper. This seems to me to be saying that Christ is not in fact present in the supper according to the human nature - which would seem to me to discount the allegation of ubiquity of his human nature. Am I missing something?

"VIII. 12- Hence He also is able and it is very easy for Him to impart, as one who is present, His true body and blood in the Holy Supper, not according to the mode or property of the human nature, but according to the mode and property of the right hand of God, as Dr. Luther says in accordance with our Christian faith for children, which presence (of Christ in the Holy Supper] is not [physical or] earthly, nor Capernaitic; nevertheless it is true and substantial, as the words of His testament read: This is, is, is My body, etc."

BTW, I do agree with you that often there is something less than charitable about the discourse between Lutheran and Reformed. I regret that both sides haven't spent more time trying to understand the other. If they did I think there were would be some surprises at how much there is in common (albeit not everything of course). 

Thank you again for your time.


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## Contra_Mundum (Mar 7, 2007)

I'll just briefly analyze the three propositions above, but I've got to call it a night, and tomorrow is a busy day, so I don't know when I'll get back. Maybe someone else will chime in

Thesis 1: I don't think this statement follows from the points I've made. Humanly Jesus is not on earth but in heaven. Divinely Jesus is everywhere. So Jesus the God-Man is specially present in heaven, according to his one nature. By his Spirit (3rd person of the Trinity) he is specially present wherever his church is gathered for duty ("where 2 or 3..."). Divinely, God is both everywhere the same, but specially "present" when in time and space he reveals himself. So, unless Jesus left heaven and manifested himself bodily, specially, on earth, his Person is "present" elsewhere (than heaven) and everywhere only by means of the divine nature which has that attribute.

This does not constitue "separation" of the natures. The natures aren't separated because the divine nature is _also_ present where the _body_ of Jesus is located. He is FULLY present in Person in both natures where his humanity happens to be. And he's not leaving heaven bodily until his 2nd Advent, according to Scripture.

Theses 2 & 3: I would agree with both.

As for the presence in the Supper, I don't think you will find a modern Lutheran minister anywhere who will say, "Jesus is NOT *bodily* present with us, and you do NOT take his *body* in your mouth, however mystically." I think he might lose his license.

We as Reformed speak only of bread in the mouth (and "Christ in the heart"--John Calvin). It is sacramental, a sign and seal of the Covenant of Grace. Christ, by his Spirit brings heaven to earth and earth to heaven. He sets in his ladder or stair (see Gen. 28:12, Jn 1:51) and we commune with him; he "sets the table" and we have a meal with him, by faith (Ex. 24:11; Mt. 26:29).

Believe me, we want the Lutherans to like us. We've tried rappaprochment for centuries now. But we aren't going to budge from our view of the Supper. We still think we are within an orthodoxy shared with the Lutherans. But they also will not budge, and usually don't extend the same view toward the Reformed. [shrug] What's left to say? It reminds me of the occasional exclusive Psalmody debate. My view which accepts a wider complement of song includes E-P. But a strict E-P would see me as defending the indefensible.

But in heaven, all our theology will get straightened.

Good night.


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