# Question re: Van Tillian presuppostionalism and contradictions



## Davidius

From my understanding of the Van Tillian approach to presuppositionalism, the unbeliever is to be shown the "impossibility of the contrary," that is, that every worldview except the Reformed Christian one leads to absurdity and contradictions. How does this square with the Van Tillian understanding of "apparent contradictions" in scripture? What I mean is, how can one's apologetic method be to show the absurdity, irrationality, and self-contradictory nature of another worldview while simultaneously embracing irreconcilable contradictions? Is this not self-defeating? It seems like the initial response would be "of course, the contradictions aren't _real_ contradictions; they merely _appear_ to be so." So why isn't the unbeliever allowed to turn this right back around on us and say "I know my worldview looks absurd, illogical, and self-contradictory, but it only _appears_ that way"?

NB: I'm not attacking Van Tillian presuppositionalism. This is all just a little new to me and I'm trying to learn.


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## JohnV

David:

If your goal is to show the arbitrariness or absurdity of someone else's views, and you manage to do that, then what you've done is to show them the arbitrariness or aburdity of their view. That's all. That doesn't mean that you yourself don't hold arbitrary or absurd views. Of course you do. If you can do that to others, in love, then it is only right that you hope that others will do that for you. 

This has nothing to do with Van Til's position about "apparent contradictions" in that way, as if you can put the one up against the other.


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## Cheshire Cat

Not all people who go under the label of ‘Van Tilian Presuppositonalism’ hold to the “impossibility of the contrary” claim. Van Til and Bahnsen did, but Frame doesn’t. 



CarolinaCalvinist said:


> What I mean is, how can one's apologetic method be to show the absurdity, irrationality, and self-contradictory nature of another worldview while simultaneously embracing irreconcilable contradictions?


Its not that we accept “irreconcilable contradictions”. Its that we accept that there are things in the bible that are, like you said, Apparently contradictory.

James Anderson I believe answers with a response from reformed epistemology: Amazon.com: Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, and Epistemic Status (Paternoster Theological Monographs): Books: James Anderson,David Fergusson

Its on my reading list for this summer.


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## Davidius

caleb_woodrow said:


> Its not that we accept “irreconcilable contradictions”. Its that we accept that there are things in the bible that are, like you said, Apparently contradictory.



Okay, but why can't the unbeliever also believe in things "apparently contradictory"?


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## Davidius

JohnV said:


> David:
> 
> If your goal is to show the arbitrariness or absurdity of someone else's views, and you manage to do that, then what you've done is to show them the arbitrariness or aburdity of their view. That's all. That doesn't mean that you yourself don't hold arbitrary or absurd views. Of course you do. If you can do that to others, in love, then it is only right that you hope that others will do that for you.
> 
> This has nothing to do with Van Til's position about "apparent contradictions" in that way, as if you can put the one up against the other.



I was following you until the last sentence. Why doesn't it have to do with Van Til's position on apparent contradictions? What good does it do to show the absurdity of everyone else's worldviews if we ourselves also embrace an "apparently" absurd (in this case, I mean "illogical" or "irrational," by "absurd") worldview?


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## JohnV

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> I was following you until the last sentence. Why doesn't it have to do with Van Til's position on apparent contradictions? What good does it do to show the absurdity of everyone else's worldviews if we ourselves also embrace an "apparently" absurd (in this case, I mean "illogical" or "irrational," by "absurd") worldview?



David:

First, I was answering according to the earlier Van Til, with which I can agree to quite an extent. I was not answering according to the later Van Til, with whom I cannot agree as much. 

As to your response, if you don't understand the last paragraph, then you didn't follow what I said in the first paragraph. Can you name me one person who can't be shown that he is illogical or irrational in some way? And yet he may still be one of those people chosen to convey the truth to people. We're all in the same boat when it comes to absurdities, were it not for the grace of God. To show someone their need to change their mind does not mean that we can have everything reasoned out. Nor does it mean that we do have all things reasoned out. There still are things that we can't explain.

In other words, our ability to show others' that their views lead to absurdity is not hampered by the fact that some things are, to us, seemingly contradictory.


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## panta dokimazete

the key is "seemingly" vs "absolutely" contradictory...


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## Davidius

jdlongmire said:


> the key is "seemingly" vs "absolutely" contrary...



I understand that _we_ would call the unbeliever's contradictions absolute and our own apparent, but what makes this intellectually honest? Why cannot the unbeliever just say "_my_ contradictions are apparent and _yours_ are absolute"?


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## JohnV

Well, that's what your job as an apologist is, to show him that difference. You have to take him beyond his own and your own presuppositions, to the objective truth of things. In doing so you will be showing him how he abuses reason in rationalizing his views. So you can't be guilty of the same thing, of course. It's not a contest between personal presuppositions. That's what the earlier Van Til was concerned about. 

JD, you're right. These things seem to be contradictory to us. Too often we're putting the finite against the infinite, and instead of seeing how the former fits into the latter, we make contradistinctions, and call them contradictions. Of course they're not. We just don't understand, that's all. 

We don't have to understand everything in order to understand some things.


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## panta dokimazete

John is correct - also - we shouldn't follow the path of the atheist and bump up against the limits of revealed knowledge, then assume since we can find apparent contradictions for one piece of the puzzle, the entire worldview is flawed. We know that there are things we may not understand and limits to human knowledge, since now we see in a mirror dimly. The atheist does not start from this presupposition, they believe everything can be discerned through evidence of the senses, logic and the scientific method, thus their tolerance for antinomy is limited - our is not so limited, because we trust in a greater knowledge than ourselves for ultimate resolution\revelation.


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## Semper Fidelis

David,

As I see it, the difference in the "contradictions" is also categorical.

The atheist posits a belief system that says X but then lives as Y. Hume even acknowledged that his skepticism was unlivable and he had to live a life completely contrary to his stated worldview.

It is one thing to have a coherent worldview in which the creature acknowledges the unrevealed nature of the Creator, it is another thing to have a completely incoherent worldview in which you state that truth does not exist but then you live as if it does.

In my worldview, the incomprehensible is accounted for in God's hidden knowledge. That is quite different than the atheist who lives and acts as if there is a God (in fact knows it) but then denies that Truth with an inane philosophy that he can't even live out.

Let's also say that, in the end, this answer is not acceptable to the atheist and he says: "Well, in the end, we both have elements we can't explain. I prefer my version of truth."

Guess what? I don't really care.

As I witnessed to a young woman recently, I don't change the declaration of the historical fact that Christ's death and resurrection or that He will come in glory to judge the living and the dead simply because His enemies don't like the facts of history. I frankly think we make too much of objections and worry too much about the argument that will finally convince the fool that he really is what God says about Him. If he sees that then he'll be on his knees because your declaration of the Gospel would have been attended by the power of the Holy Spirit.


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## Civbert

jdlongmire said:


> the key is "seemingly" vs "absolutely" contradictory...



But it worse than that. In Van Til's view, the "apparently contradictory" is irreconcilable to the "human" mind. To the mind of man, the "apparent" contradiction is just as strong as the "absolute" contradiction since neither is reconcilable as far as we are concerned.

I think this is one point (apparent verse real contradiction) in Van Til's system that should be abandoned. 

And one should keep in mind the definition of a contradiction. A contradiction is found where the truth of one proposition makes another proposition false. If A and B are a contradiction, then if A is true, then B is false, or if A is false, then B is true. The implication of this is that when one finds two contradictory propositions, then to believe both are true is irrational - for it is not possible for both to be true. So one can not rationally believe contradictory propositions.

It is also important to note that one can not resolve contradictory propositions by adding additional propositions. If A & B is a contradiction, then no additional propositions can change that. It is not rational to say we can resolve A and B by adding additional propositions. 

One must determine that either A or B is true, and the other is false. There is no middle state. You can not say (A & B) is false, but possible (A & B) & C, is true. So whether real or apparent, we can not excuse believing contradictory propositions with the excuse that our knowledge is limited, because no additional knowledge can resolve a contradiction. Rather, additional knowledge will only go towards helping us decided which of the contradictory propositions is true. In the mean time, it is still irrational to believe both A and B are true.


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## Civbert

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> From my understanding of the Van Tillian approach to presuppositionalism, the unbeliever is to be shown the "impossibility of the contrary," that is, that every worldview except the Reformed Christian one leads to absurdity and contradictions. How does this square with the Van Tillian understanding of "apparent contradictions" in scripture?



It doesn't square. Rather, it would show that Christianity is irrational too. I think Van Til's "apparent contradictions" is a point where VT's system is flawed. He never should have used the phrase "apparent contradictions". Rather, he should have said there are simply parts of the Bible we may not rightly understand. When he went so far as to say we must "embrace" these apparent contradictions, rather then trying to determine which of the two contradictory propositions is false, he pushed the Christian worldview into being irrational. 

The rational Christian view is that when we perceive an apparent contradiction, we either try to determine which is true and reject the other, or we admit we don't know which is correct. We certainly don't embrace both as true because "apparently" they can not both be true, and we, being created as rational being's being made in God's image, can not believe both are true at the same time. 

Also, if we believe in the inerrancy of Scripture, we know that both A and B can not be Scripture, because God certainly does not contradict himself. We may not know enough to determine which is Scripture, but certainly not both. God is neither irrational or absurd, and neither is His Word.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,

I actually had a conversation with John Frame over this issue of "apparent contradiction." David, your concerns are right on. The Van Tillian position of apparent contradiction is simply this:

*1.* There are some things taught in Scripture that appear to be contradictory.
*2.* Although, in our own finitude or in our current epistemic state we may not be able to or ever be able to resolve such apparent contradictions, we believe that ultimately there is no contradiction.
*3.* As such, our own rationality is subject to God.

This is problematic for the Van Tillian apologetic method. He appeals to "apparent contradiction" upon an internal critique of his worldview. He will not allow such an appeal from the competing worldview. Now, the Van Tillian may argue that he has an ontological basis, i.e. God, upon which this appeal is rational. That is to say, he may say that within his worldview, where God's revelation is supreme even over our own rationality, "apparent contradictions" are allowed. However, the trouble with this is that the Van Tillian undermines his own hermeneutical basis for such an appeal. Consider the issue of justification in the writings of James relative to Paul. If one accepts the concept of "apparent contradictions," then one can argue that the Bible teaches that we are justified by faith and by works and this seeming contradiction is only apparent and not actual. There would be no basis to deny this position if one allows "apprent contradictions."

*Final Thoughts:* The idea that there can be apparent contradictions based on my limitations seems right to me. I do not believe that there are actual contradictions, but I do believe that it is possible there may be some things I cannot reconcile due to my limitiations. There may be some things I may never be able to reconcile. So, in this sense I think Van Til is correct. 

Brian


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## Davidius

Brian Bosse said:


> *Final Thoughts:* The idea that there can be apparent contradictions based on my limitations seems right to me. I do not believe that there are actual contradictions, but I do believe that it is possible there may be some things I cannot reconcile due to my limitiations. There may be some things I may never be able to reconcile. So, in this sense I think Van Til is correct.
> 
> Brian



Would you predicate those things which you are unable to reconcile as _irreconcilable_? If I am correct, Van Til went further than merely saying that certain things were irreconcilable due to his limitations and said that certain things were unable to be reconciled by anyone.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello David,

No, I would not do so. I believe all things are reconcilable by God. I believe this was Van Til's position as well. If you do not think so, I would be interested in seeing your references.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Davidius

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello David,
> 
> No, I would not do so. I believe all things are reconcilable by God. I believe this was Van Til's position as well. If you do not think so, I would be interested in seeing your references.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian



Sorry, I supposed it to be understood that Van Til would see the concepts as being reconcilable by God, but not to any human. For example, it sounded like one of the objections raised against Clark's ordination was that he was a rationalist for proposing a solution to the quandary of divine sovereignty and human responsibility.


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## Davidius

Civbert said:


> It doesn't square. Rather, it would show that Christianity is irrational too. I think Van Til's "apparent contradictions" is a point where VT's system is flawed. He never should have used the phrase "apparent contradictions". Rather, he should have said there are simply parts of the Bible we may not rightly understand. When he went so far as to say we must "embrace" these apparent contradictions, rather then trying to determine which of the two contradictory propositions is false, he pushed the Christian worldview into being irrational.



Thanks for your input, Anthony. Did Van Til have any criteria to gauge which concepts were "apparently contradictory" other than his or others' inability to reconcile them? There are plenty of places in scripture which seem at the outset to contradict another place but can be reconciled. So who gets to decide when one is totally irreconcilable and must be embraced as an apparent contradiction?


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## Civbert

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> Thanks for your input, Anthony. Did Van Til have any criteria to gauge which concepts were "apparently contradictory" other than his or others' inability to reconcile them? There are plenty of places in scripture which seem at the outset to contradict another place but can be reconciled. So who gets to decide when one is totally irreconcilable and must be embraced as an apparent contradiction?



It's the "embracing" part that causes problems. If two propositions "appear" to be contradictory, then it would be irrational for me to embrace them as both true, because I've already determined that one of the two is "apparently" false. It would be irrational of me to try to believe both, or consider them both as Scriptural truths. What is "apparent" is they can not both be Scripture, even if I don't know for certain which one is false. 

I don't know how Van Til did this. He certainly reconciled the superficially apparent contradictions since he followed reformed doctrine. But he must have done this by rejecting some propositions that appeared at face-value to be Scripture but contradicted others that were more clearly Scripture. 

The reconciliation of contradictions requires the rejection of one or more propositions and replacing them with other (maybe similar) propositions that do not cause an apparent contradiction. And sometimes we can say that the solution is a possible, but not essential, part of a Christian worldview. In other words, we acknowledge that in some places, God's Word does no give us a clear answer. And in those places, we allow for some flexibility because the answer is not essential. We don't demand that everyone embrace those ideas as certain truth. And we should never demand someone believe a contradiction (apparent or otherwise). What is essential knowledge for us is clearly and univocally given in God's Word, without _any_ contradictions because Scripture _contains_ no contradictions.


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## Civbert

BTW. I don't know how heavily VT pushed the "embracing of apparent contradictions" in his worldview. Maybe someone who has read more VT can help with this. Was the idea of "embracing apparent contradictions" an essential point for VT's worldview that he wrote of frequently? Or was it just a position found in a few instances in his writings.


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## ChristianTrader

Brian Bosse said:


> However, the trouble with this is that the Van Tillian undermines his own hermeneutical basis for such an appeal. Consider the issue of justification in the writings of James relative to Paul. If one accepts the concept of "apparent contradictions," then one can argue that the Bible teaches that we are justified by faith and by works and this seeming contradiction is only apparent and not actual. There would be no basis to deny this position if one allows "apprent contradictions."
> Brian



Why would an apparent contradiction concerning the relationship between Paul and James be any more or less problematic than any apparent contradiction anywhere else?

CT


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> BTW. I don't know how heavily VT pushed the "embracing of apparent contradictions" in his worldview. Maybe someone who has read more VT can help with this. Was the idea of "embracing apparent contradictions" an essential point for VT's worldview that he wrote of frequently? Or was it just a position found in a few instances in his writings.



It is an essential part. I think he learned a lot from Bavinck, who wrote what is considered by many the greatest book on the Doctrine of God ever. Bavinck starts out with the idea that an essential aspect of theology is mystery.

CT


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## Theogenes

How does one tell the difference between an apparent contradiction and a real contradiction???


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Everyone,

I think Van Til is correct at a very fundamental level. When he speaks of "apparent contradictions" I believe his main concern is to maintain that mankind's own rationality is subject to God. We are not autonomous even in our thinking. The idea is that because of who God is, it is proper and rational to trust what He says even if we are not able to reconcile what He says withj our own minds. We humble ourselves and say something to the effect, "Even though I am not able to reconcile this in my understanding, I accept it as true and consistent because God has revealed it." The fact that God has revelaed X to me provides rational justification to believe that X is true even if in my own mind it is apprently contradictory. This, however, is problematic. It is difficult to know where (or even how) to draw the line where it is appropriate to say X is only apparently contradictory rather than actually contradictory. If you do not draw this line, then irrationality rules the day, and we end up not being able to know anything. 



CT said:


> Why would an apparent contradiction concerning the relationship between Paul and James be any more or less problematic than any apparent contradiction anywhere else?



I just used this as an example of issues that can arise when you allow for apparent contradictions. If apparent contradictions are allowed, and an appropriate line is not drawn, then anything goes. In this type of senario one would be justified in embracing justification by works of the law by statung that it is only apprently contradictory. This is the rub for me. Because of who God is, I need to submit my mind to Him even if I do not understand. This seems right to me. It also creates problems in terms of understanding Scripture. We use the law of non-contradiction as a rule to help guide us to truth. The Trinity is a great example of this. The reason the Trinity is formulated the way it is (one in being - three in persons) is because this is the only way to make the Scripture teachings consistent. If you allow for apparent inconsistencies, then you undermine this vital hermeneutical principle. For me, this is a dilemma.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Greg

Jim Snyder said:


> How does one tell the difference between an apparent contradiction and a real contradiction???



Besides the issue of Paul and James on justification as already mentioned, what are some of the other apparent contradictions that we have in Scripture? I've heard mention of these apparent contradictions before with regards to VTA, and was just curious to see specifically what they were.


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## Cheshire Cat

Greg said:


> Besides the issue of Paul and James on justification as already mentioned, what are some of the other apparent contradictions that we have in Scripture? I've heard mention of these apparent contradictions before with regards to VTA, and was just curious to see specifically what they were.


Two examples are the trinity and the incarnation. As far as the trinity goes, I don't think saying one God in one sense and 3 persons in another takes care of the problem. There is still that mystery there that it is hard (to say the least) to wrap one's mind around. I have used that defense before, but I'm just trying to be intellectually honest.


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## JohnV

I hold it as a general rule for myself that when I see two truths that seem to me to be irreconcileable, then it is me and my reasoning that is the problem, not truth or God or revelation. So to admit of "apparent contradictions" poses no problem to revelation for me. It is a call to raise myself up above the things that hinder me from understanding: knowing, of course, the limitations, the things that I ought not to pry into.


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## ChristianTrader

Here is a link to an article by Van Tillian James Anderson called: In Defense of Mystery, which is a defense of rationality of embracing apparent contradictions concerning the Trinity - 

http://www.proginosko.com/docs/InDefenceOfMystery.pdf

I think the same idea can be apply to anywhere one believes an biblical apparent contradiction exists.

CT


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## Civbert

For me the terms contradiction and Scripture are a contradiction. So when I find an "apparent" contradiction when I read the Bible, this tells me that I am _not_ understanding the God's Word. I will not embace both propositions because this implies that God's Word is self-contradictory and irrational. To assert A and B are both scriptural truth but they can not both be true is to say God's Word is irrational. Rather, I admit my understanding is wrong and I need to study and pray more. Whether I am able to determine which one is incorrect (or maybe both), I know that my understanding is wrong and I will not predecate them both as God's truth.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> For me the terms contradiction and Scripture are a contradiction. So when I find an "apparent" contradiction when I read the Bible, this tells me that I am _not_ understanding the God's Word. I will not embace both propositions because this implies that God's Word is self-contradictory and irrational. To assert A and B are both scriptural truth but they can not both be true is to say God's Word is irrational. Rather, I admit my understanding is wrong and I need to study and pray more. Whether I am able to determine which one is incorrect (or maybe both), I know that my understanding is wrong and I will not predecate them both as God's truth.



When someone asserts an apparent contradiction they are not embracing simply A and ~A. They are embrace A1 and A2. Which simply means that there is a equivocation but we are not certain how to exactly spell it out.

For example when Van Til wrote that God is one person and three persons, he was not asserting that God is one person and three persons in exactly the same way both time the term person is used. What he was saying is that I cannot spell out how the terms differ in use, just that there is an equivocation.

CT


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## Cheshire Cat

ChristianTrader said:


> http://www.proginosko.com/docs/InDefenceOfMystery.pdf
> 
> CT


Great link.


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## crhoades

If read judiciously, this thread will show this topic debated back and forth from various viewpoints.


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## RamistThomist

crhoades said:


> If read judiciously, this thread will show this topic debated back and forth from various viewpoints.



Great thread. Manata on "paradox" was very good.


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> When someone asserts an apparent contradiction they are not embracing simply A and ~A. They are embrace A1 and A2. Which simply means that there is a equivocation but we are not certain how to exactly spell it out.
> 
> For example when Van Til wrote that God is one person and three persons, he was not asserting that God is one person and three persons in exactly the same way both time the term person is used. What he was saying is that I cannot spell out how the terms differ in use, just that there is an equivocation.
> 
> CT



So the Bible is full of equivocations? 

It amounts to the same thing - Van Til says we are to embrace what appears (to us) to be contradictory. This amounts to Aquinas's implicit faith. It asks for belief in what we don't understand. 

If VT merely meant that God is three in a different sense that God is one, he could have said so. But then there would be no "apparent" contradiction. But he said that there was an apparent contradiction.


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Here is a link to an article by Van Tillian James Anderson called: In Defense of Mystery, which is a defense of rationality of embracing apparent contradictions concerning the Trinity -
> 
> http://www.proginosko.com/docs/InDefenceOfMystery.pdf
> 
> I think the same idea can be apply to anywhere one believes an biblical apparent contradiction exists.
> 
> CT



This is a quote from the end of the paper. 


> My proposal, by way of comparison, has the following virtues: it can accommodate all the relevant biblical data; it avoids violating any of the classical laws of logic; it explains how Trinitarian beliefs can be warranted despite the appearance of contradiction; it allows for the definition and exclusion of anti-Trinitarian heresies such as Sabellianism and Arianism; and it fits neatly with the traditional Christian doctrines of analogy and divine incomprehensibility. I suggest therefore that it is to be preferred.




Now I haven't looked at his solution, but what strikes be is his claim that "it avoids violating any of the classical laws of logic" and yet it there remains the "appearance of contradiction". This is a contradiction. There is no "appearance" of a contradiction if there is no violation of the classical laws of logic. So either there is an apparent violation of the laws of logic and an apparent contradiction, or there is no apparent violation of the laws of logic and no apparent contradiction.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> So the Bible is full of equivocations?


If you are asking if the Bible uses the same term in different ways in different places, then yes.

CT


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## MW

I don't have time or inclination to debate this point, but Witsius' Exercitations are available on Google Books for those who can read Latin. From p. 457ff. one will find Exercitatio XVII., De Usu et Abusu Rationis circa Mysteria Fidei [of the use and abuse of reason concerning mysteries of faith]. Below I provide a summation of Witsius' argument, and show that he comes to the conclusion (which is the orthodox reformed conclusion), that the mysteries of the faith are above reason but never contrary to right reason. It is in fact a Lutheran tenet to maintain that articles of faith might be received even when they are contrary to reason (see Turretin's Institutes, topic 1, question 9).



> In section 10, Witsius maintains, along with all reformed theologians, that reason, although corrupted, is still reason, and man is unable to know or judge anything except by use of it. He states, "si Divinae res, si mysteria religionis cognoscenda sint, non aliter id fieri potest nisi per rationem" (p. 462). Translation: "if divine things, if the mysteries of religion may be known, it can be no other way than by reason." He goes on to show that faith itself, considered as assent, is an operation of reason; and goes so far as to call him an irrational being who denies this fact.
> 
> Witsius turns his attention in section 11 to self-evident truths, or the axioms of reason, of which, he says, "neque possit homo a se impetrare ut assentiatur contrario" (ibid.). Translation: "nor is man able by himself to procure his assent to the contrary."
> 
> After speaking of the force of reason to deduce from these axiomatic principles certain inferences which he calls the dictates of "right reason" (sect. 12); and showing that God is the author of reason and uses it to teach men, so that the dictates of reason may be called "the dictates of God" (sect. 13); and after conceding that reason is subordinate to Scripture so far as the articles of faith are concerned (sect. 14), Witsius maintains in section 15 that self-evident truths or the dicates of reason cannot be violated. Truth cannot be contrary to truth, and neither can God be contrary to Himself. This he applies specifically to the supernatural revelation God makes of Himself: "consequens est, nunquam Deum supernaturali revelatione aliquid homini patefacere, quod repugnet veritatibus per se notis, sive rectae rationis dictamini" (p. 463). Translation: "it follows, God never discloses anything by supernatural revelation to man which is repugnant to truths well known by themselves, or the dictates of right reason." He then concludes with this _norma_ or rule: "ut nihil recipiatur tanquam a Deo revelatum, quod principiis natura cognitis revera contrarium sit" (ibid.). Translation: "that nothing is received as a revelation from God which may be contrary to the principles really known by nature."
> 
> For Witsius, therefore, the doctrines of Christianity are received as a supernatural revelation from God, and therefore may be above reason, that is, beyond the ability of reason to discover; but they are never contrary to right reason. Man is never required to believe what is naturally repugnant.



In relation to the last sentence of the fore-mentioned summation, the Westminster Confession of Faith alludes to this "norma" in its statement about liberty of conscience. The requiring of an implicit faith and an absolute and blind obedience is to destroy liberty of conscience, AND REASON ALSO (19:2). We are required to keep the faith with a good conscience, and it is destructive of a good conscience to require a man to embrace articles of faith which rationally conflict with one another.

At this point I could cut and paste numerous quotations from the Puritans to show that British reformed theologians maintained the same principle as the continental theologians, but I will forbear. Only I will provide an extended section from William Bates' Harmony of the Divine Attributes, where he exposes the unreasonableness of unbelief. I believe if he is taken seriously, it will be "self-evident" that no man can truly (i.e., believingly) receive an article of faith which requires him to maintain it in seeming contradiction with what he knows is true and right and good. Blessings!



> It is true, no article of faith is really repugnant to reason; for God is the author of natural as well as of supernatural light, and he cannot contradict himself: they are emanations from him, and though different, yet not destructive of each other. But we must distinguish between those things that are above reason and incomprehensible, and things that are against reason and utterly inconceivable. Some things are above reason, in regard of their transcendent excellency or distance from us. The divine essence, the eternal decrees, the hypostatical union, are such high and glorious objects that it is an impossible enterprise to comprehend them: the intellectual eye is dazzled with their overpowering light; we can have but an imperfect knowledge of them. And there is no just cause of wonder that supernatural revelation should speak incomprehensible things of God; for he is a singular and admirable Being, infinitely above the ordinary course of nature. The maxims of philosophy are not to be extended to him. We must adore what we cannot fully understand. But those things are against reason and utterly inconceivable, that involve a contradiction, and have a natural repugnancy to our understandings, which cannot conceive any thing that is formally impossible: and there is no such doctrine in the Christian religion.
> 
> We must distinguish between reason corrupted, and right reason. Since the fall, the clearness of the human understanding is lost, and the light that remains is eclipsed by the interposition of sensual lusts. The carnal mind cannot out of ignorance, and will not from pride and other malignant habits, receive things spiritual. And from hence arise many suspicions and doubts concerning supernatural verities, the shadows of darkened reason and of dying faith. If any divine mystery seems incredible, it is from the corruption of our reason not from reason itself; from its darkness, not its light. And as reason is obliged to correct the errors of sense, when it is deceived either by some vicious quality in the organ, or by the distance of the object, or by the falseness of the medium that corrupts the image in conveying it; so it is the office of faith to reform the judgment of reason, when, either from its own weakness, or the height of things spiritual, it is mistaken about them. For this end supernatural revelation was given, not to extinguish reason, but to redress it, and enrich it with the discovery of heavenly things.
> 
> Faith is called wisdom and knowledge: it doth not quench the vigour of the faculty wherein it is seated, but elevates it, and gives it a spiritual perception of those things that are most distant from its commerce. It doth not lead us through a mist to the inheritance of the saints in light. Faith is a rational light; for,
> 
> (1.) It arises from the consideration of those arguments which convince the mind that the scripture is a divine revelation. “I know,” saith the apostle, “whom I have believed,” 2 Tim. 1:12; and we are commanded always to be ready to give an account of the hope that is in us, 1 Peter 3:15. Those that owe their Christianity merely to the felicity of their birth, without a sight of that transcendent excellency in our religion which evidences that it came from heaven, are not true believers. He that absolves an innocent person for favour, without considering sufficient proofs offered, though his sentence is just, is an unjust judge; and the eye that is clouded with a suffusion, so that all things appear yellow to it, when it judges things to be yellow that are so, yet is erroneous, because its judgment proceeds not from the quality of the object, but from the jaundice that discolours the organs: so those who believe the doctrine of the gospel upon the account of its civil establishment in their country, are not right believers, because they assent to the word of truth upon a false principle. It is not judgment, but chance, that inclines them to embrace it. The Turks are zealous votaries of Mahomet, upon the same reason as they are disciples of Christ.
> 
> (2.) Faith makes use of reason to consider what doctrines are revealed in the scripture, and to deduce those consequences which have a clear connection with supernatural principles. Thus reason is an excellent instrument to distinguish those things which are of a divine original, from what is spurious and counterfeit; for sometimes that is pretended to be a mystery of religion, which is only the fruit of fancy; and that is defended by the sacred respect of faith that reason ought not to violate, which is but a groundless imagination; so that we remain in an error, by the sole apprehension of falling into one, as those that die for fear of death. The Bereans are commended for their searching the scriptures, whether the doctrines they heard were consentaneous to them, Acts 17:11. But it is a necessary duty, that reason, how stiff soever, should fully comply with God, where it appears reasonable that he hath spoken.


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## Semper Fidelis

Rev Winzer,

I'm not trying to defend Van Til on his statements about apparent contradictions.

I think sometime language is used that probably confuses the issue. I would not prefer to use terminology such as "apparent contradiction" and I don't really ever think, in my mind, that I'm holding together any contradiction in my faith.

I do, however, hold my questions at times where an unbeliever would not fear to tread.

When I think of the classic answer to the nature of God's sovereignty over Creation and who He permits calamity to fall upon, I think of the answer that God gives to Job: Who is it that darkens my counsel?

I also think of this: shall the thing created say to the Creator: "Why have you made me thus?"

Thus, for me, there are certain things that I do not understand as far as the counsel of the Almighty. At the points that He tells me His counsel is hidden, I would say it is _reasonable_ to place my hand over my mouth and not speculate.

I sometimes wonder if the need for "apparent contradiction" is because some want a license not for clear and necessary deduction but for speculation itself. What would have been reasonable (stopping where God's revelation does) becomes irrational.


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## MW

SemperFideles said:


> Thus, for me, there are certain things that I do not understand as far as the counsel of the Almighty. At the points that He tells me His counsel is hidden, I would say it is _reasonable_ to place my hand over my mouth and not speculate.
> 
> I sometimes wonder if the need for "apparent contradiction" is because some want a license not for clear and necessary deduction but for speculation itself. What would have been reasonable (stopping where God's revelation does) becomes irrational.



Rich, That shows a great deal of mature insight. The problem I have with "apparent contradiction" is that it is usually brought into the discussion at a point of speculation, where *inferences* are being drawn from the Word of God. Now "good and necessary" deductions are valid; but to make a deduction which requires reason, and then to appeal against reason to "apparent contradiction" is unreasonable; whereas refusal to speculate is, as you wisely say, very reasonable.


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> If you are asking if the Bible uses the same term in different ways in different places, then yes.
> 
> CT



That's not the meaning of equivocation. The same word can be used in different ways at different times and places, even by the same author, without any equivocation. An equivocation is a error of reason when a person uses the same term with different senses but as if it had the same sense in an argument to draw a conclusion. 

When Paul says we are _not_ saved by our works and James says we _are_ saved by our works, the terms are not being used in the same sense. Where Paul is speaking of our justification before God by faith alone in Christ, James is saying saying that genuine faith is demonstrated by good works in true Christians. While the terms being used are the same, this is not an equivocation because they occur in separate arguments. What's more two different authors and two different times are involved. Thus, the James vs. Paul is in no reasonable/logical sense an equivocation or "apparent contradiction".


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,

Consider the Trinity in light of the Hypostatic Union. You have one being made up of three persons. In addition to this, one of these persons is said to be fully God and fully man. This whole convoluted (do not take 'convoluted' in a prejorative sense) situation appears to be inconsistent. Now, I do not believe it is inconsistent because I think it is what Scripture teaches and I think whatever Scripture teaches will be consistent even if I cannot see it. I agree that my understanding is lacking, but it may be the case that because of my finitude I will never be able to understand some things such as the Hypostatic Union and the Trinity - especially taken together. In this sense, I can say that I am embracing an apparent contradiction. I do not believe it is an actual contradiction. But, I cannot adequately explain the situation so as to make things explicitly consistent. My guess is that everyone on this board is in the same situation as I am. In the end, we accept the Trinty and the Hypostatic Union with all the difficulties it presents our minds because we believe it to be taught by Scripture. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Cheshire Cat




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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Gentlemen,
> 
> Consider the Trinity in light of the Hypostatic Union. You have one being made up of three persons. In addition to this, one of these persons is said to be fully God and fully man. This whole convoluted (do not take 'convoluted' in a prejorative sense) situation appears to be inconsistent. Now, I do not believe it is inconsistent because I think it is what Scripture teaches and I think whatever Scripture teaches will be consistent even if I cannot see it. I agree that my understanding is lacking, but it may be the case that because of my finitude I will never be able to understand some things such as the Hypostatic Union and the Trinity - especially taken together. In this sense, I can say that I am embracing an apparent contradiction. I do not believe it is an actual contradiction. But, I cannot adequately explain the situation so as to make things explicitly consistent. My guess is that everyone on this board is in the same situation as I am. In the end, we accept the Trinity and the Hypostatic Union with all the difficulties it presents our minds because we believe it to be taught by Scripture.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian



Brian,

I can see that these doctrines are difficult, but what is the "apparent" contradiction in them. Nothing you said involves a contradiction (apparent or otherwise). 


Brian Bosse said:


> You have one being made up of three persons. In addition to this, one of these persons is said to be fully God and fully man.



It seems to me you have actually avoided the appearance of any contradiction. 

The Trinity: God is one in essence, and three in persons. 
Hypostatic Union: Jesus is both fully God and fully man. 

Now I haven't joined these two statements into a single argument because they are not using the same terms in the same sense. I did not say simply that "Jesus is God", but more specifically that "Jesus is _fully_ God". To me this means that Jesus is one person of the Trinity. He is also (according to the doctrine of the Trinity) one in essence with the Godhead. 

Contradictions may occur if we incorrectly define some of the terms used in the Doctrine of the Trinity and the Doctrine of Hypostatic Union. The apparent contradictions may occur when we speculate beyond what Scripture clearly reveals. 

We may not know for certain what the exact relationship is between the Trinity and Hypostatic Union, but we can say for certain that if we define the terms of the Trinity and Hypostatic Union in such a way as they cause a contradiction, then we are wrong. And we are not to embrace these contradictions. Rather, we should allow that our knowledge and understanding has it's limits, and we reject any thing that violates our reasoning. We may not fully understand the inter-workings of these doctrines, but neither can we put our faith into something that violates or reason because God does not contradict himself.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> I can see that these doctrines are difficult, but what is the "apparent" contradiction in them. Nothing you said involves a contradiction (apparent or otherwise).



I have purposefully avoided defining my terms because once I begin to do so then the trouble starts. In other words, I have purposefully left things vague to avoid trouble. If you look at how the Council of Chalcedon carefully spoke regarding the Hypostic Union, they did not get too specific. In fact, someone once said that if you go beyond the formulation, then pick your heresey. Essentially, they were saying that if you tried to clarify the doctrine beyond what was said in their statement, then you end up contradicting some other doctrine. 



> It seems to me you have actually avoided the appearance of any contradiction.
> 
> The Trinity: God is one in essence, and three in persons.
> Hypostatic Union: Jesus is both fully God and fully man.
> 
> Now I haven't joined these two statements into a single argument because they are not using the same terms in the same sense. I did not say simply that "Jesus is God", but more specifically that "Jesus is fully God". To me this means that Jesus is one person of the Trinity. He is also (according to the doctrine of the Trinity) one in essence with the Godhead.



Please define your terms explicitly. What do 'God,' 'essence,' and 'person' mean in the sentence "God is one in essence, and three in persons"? What does 'Jesus' 'God' and 'man' mean in the sentence "Jesus is both fully God and fully man"? What does the adjective 'fully' mean? What does 'Godhead' mean? 



> Contradictions may occur if we incorrectly define some of the terms used in the Doctrine of the Trinity and the Doctrine of Hypostatic Union. The apparent contradictions may occur when we speculate beyond what Scripture clearly reveals.



This is a good point. The trouble we encounter is that speculation is desired because the terms end up being underdefined. With these underdefined terms it may be the case that we are not able to go any further and still avoid a contradiction. This is an apparent contradiction. Theologians referred to this as mystery. 



> We may not know for certain what the exact relationship is between the Trinity and Hypostatic Union, but we can say for certain that if we define the terms of the Trinity and Hypostatic Union in such a way as they cause a contradiction, then we are wrong.



Anthony, we need to be precise here. There is a difference between my perception of a contradiction and there actually being a contradiction. Something may appear to be contradictory to me, and may actully not be contradictory. This happens all of the time in our experience. However, normally we are able to resolve these apparent contradictions with more information. So, apparent contradictions are not necessarily real contradictions. I am suggesting that in some cases we may never be able to resolve such apparent contradictions and that nevertheless they are not real contradictions. 



> Rather, we should allow that our knowledge and understanding has it's limits, and we reject any thing that violates our reasoning.



Here is the heart of the matter. Is our reasoning the final arbiter when confronted by things that may be beyond us? Or, do we acknowledge the limitations of even our own reasoning and embrace apparent contradiction on the basis of the one asking us to embrace it? In other words, if God said to you A and B are true, yet in your understanding B entailed ~A, would you humble your intellect to God's word? If so, then you agree with Van Til on this point. If not, then you place your own reasoning above God's word. Of this whole post (and thread), this last point is the key. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Davidius

Brian Bosse said:


> Here is the heart of the matter. Is our reasoning the final arbiter when confronted by things that may be beyond us? Or, do we acknowledge the limitations of even our own reasoning and embrace apparent contradiction on the basis of the one asking us to embrace it? In other words, if God said to you A and B are true, yet in your understanding B entailed ~A, would you humble your intellect to God's word? If so, then you agree with Van Til on this point. If not, then you place your own reasoning above God's word. Of this whole post (and thread), this last point is the key.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian



But what if, for person X, B does not entail ~A? I made mention of this earlier. Gordon Clark was labeled as a rationalist by the Van Tillians for proposing a logical solution to the problem of God's sovereignty and human responsibility. What you're saying about humbling ourselves before God's Word makes perfect sense as long as we live in a world in which everyone agrees that A and B lead to an "apparent contradiction." But what if it isn't a contradiction for someone? Why is the limit of Van Til's ability to reconcile something the final arbiter of what is and isn't possible to be reconciled? Why is the limit of Van Til's intellectual capacity the rule against which we will measure someone and call them either a humble individual who "just accepts God's Word" (if they accept the "apparent contradictions" popularly accepted) or an arrogant rationalist?


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## Cheshire Cat

Then person X should be able to explain how B does not entail ~A to other people. I highly doubt that the majority of people who find certain doctrines paradoxical just don’t “see” and “get” what person X does. Of course anybody can say some doctrine isn’t paradoxical to them, but it is an entirely different matter to demonstrate that is the case. 



CarolinaCalvinist said:


> Gordon Clark was labeled as a rationalist by the Van Tillians for proposing a logical solution to the problem of God's sovereignty and human responsibility.



Source? I’m willing to bet this isn’t what Van Tilians argue. Even Van Tilians argue for logical solutions to the problem of God’s sovereignty and human responsibility. Paul Manata-–a Van Tilian--was one of the most knowledgable members of this board when it comes to the compatibilist/libertarian debate. Of course there is much more to the problem than that debate, but it is part of answering the problem. 

Also, can you quote Gordon Clark and give his answer to the sovereignty/moral responsibility problem. I apologize if I come off bad in this post, because that is not my intent. I do really want to have Clarks answer to this problem summed up, as I have not seen it yet in other threads. Thanks, ~Caleb


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## ChristianTrader

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> But what if, for person X, B does not entail ~A? I made mention of this earlier. Gordon Clark was labeled as a rationalist by the Van Tillians for proposing a logical solution to the problem of God's sovereignty and human responsibility.



I pretty much doubt that account because no Van Tillian that I know of think that the problem is a logical problem. Or put another way, the problem/issue is not against logic.



> What you're saying about humbling ourselves before God's Word makes perfect sense as long as we live in a world in which everyone agrees that A and B lead to an "apparent contradiction." But what if it isn't a contradiction for someone? Why is the limit of Van Til's ability to reconcile something the final arbiter of what is and isn't possible to be reconciled? Why is the limit of Van Til's intellectual capacity the rule against which we will measure someone and call them either a humble individual who "just accepts God's Word" (if they accept the "apparent contradictions" popularly accepted) or an arrogant rationalist?



Who said anything about Van Til by himself? It is not like everyone was solving a certain problem then Van Til said, I just can't see it, and then everyone just started saying it was unsolvable. Mystery and Apparent contradiction etc. has been accepted for a long period of time in the church.

Next, lets say someone was able to "solve" a certain paradox, that before everyone else could not solve? What would have been gained? Until you solve every last one, you really have not gained that much.

CT


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## Davidius

caleb_woodrow said:


> Source? I’m willing to bet this isn’t what Van Tilians argue. Even Van Tilians argue for logical solutions to the problem of God’s sovereignty and human responsibility.



Here is the quote, taken from http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=220:


> Here then is a situation which is inadequately described as amazing. There is a problem which has baffled the greatest theologians in history. Not even Holy Scripture offers a solution. But Dr. Clark asserts unblushingly that for his thinking the problem has ceased to be a problem. Here is something phenomenal. What accounts for it? The most charitable, and no doubt the correct, explanation is that Dr. Clark has come under the spell of rationalism. It is difficult indeed to escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the scriptural teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each other and by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason Dr. Clark has fallen into the error of rationalism. To be sure, he is not a rationalist in the sense that he substitutes human reasoning for divine revelation as such. But, to say nothing of his finding the solution of the problem of the relation to each other of divine sovereignty and human responsibility in the teaching of pagan philosophers who were totally ignorant of the teaching of Holy Writ on either of these subjects, it is clear that Dr. Clark regards Scripture from the viewpoint of a system which to the mind of man must be harmonious in all its parts. The inevitable outcome is rationalism in the interpretation of Scripture. And that too is rationalism. Although Dr. Clark does not claim actually to possess at the present moment the solution of every scriptural paradox, yet his rationalism leaves room at best for only a temporary subjection of human reason to the divine Word....





> Also, can you quote Gordon Clark and give his answer to the sovereignty/moral responsibility problem. I apologize if I come off bad in this post, because that is not my intent. I do really want to have Clarks answer to this problem summed up, as I have not seen it yet in other threads. Thanks, ~Caleb



Determinism and Responsibility

There are some books which touch on the subject here.


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## Davidius

ChristianTrader said:


> Who said anything about Van Til by himself? It is not like everyone was solving a certain problem then Van Til said, I just can't see it, and then everyone just started saying it was unsolvable. Mystery and Apparent contradiction etc. has been accepted for a long period of time in the church.
> 
> Next, lets say someone was able to "solve" a certain paradox, that before everyone else could not solve? What would have been gained? Until you solve every last one, you really have not gained that much.
> 
> CT



What is the standard to say which quandaries (in the bible) are the ones we should spend our time trying to solve and which are "beyond us"? There is a _huge_ difference in saying "we don't have an answer yet" and saying "an answer is not possible and anyone who tries to produce one is in grave error." 

I suppose that one would say that if we can't solve every paradox now then we just need to wait, since the development of theology in general also didn't happen overnight. But telling everyone to just believe what they don't understand would slow the process down, don't you think? We have many less minds working diligently than we could.


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## VictorBravo

SemperFideles said:


> I sometimes wonder if the need for "apparent contradiction" is because some want a license not for clear and necessary deduction but for speculation itself. What would have been reasonable (stopping where God's revelation does) becomes irrational.



 Ha!! After reading Clark's _Thales to Dewey_, listening to Frame's lecture series on philosophy, and tackling Derrida (in French, by the way, what a job), this is exactly what I've been thinking these last three weeks. I've just been looking for the best way to express it. 

The funny thing I've seen after reading Clark, Frame, Van Til, and even some secular modern writers on philosophy, is that they all seem to agree on one thing: the quest for philosophical certainty outside of the Word of God is really a quest for self-autonomy. As Clark pointed out, every secular system has failed. I am coming to understand that this formerly dirty secret is something postmodernism is now starting to expose. Mayhaps God will use the general despair of relativism to turn his people back.

Thanks Rich, for the insight.


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> In other words, if God said to you A and B are true, yet in your understanding B entailed ~A, would you humble your intellect to God's word?


 If my understanding is that A and B entail a contradiction, then to believe them implicitly would be to impugn God as the author of a contradiction. For my understanding of A and B to entail a contradiction, I must believe that only one can be true, and the other must be false. That is what it means for A and B to appear entail a contradiction.

So it is impossible for me to believe both A and B are true if I also believe they entail a contradiction at the same time. I can not believe both A and ~A at the same time and the same sense without a violation of my conscience. This is not a matter of choice. I can not will myself to believe something I also believe entails a contradiction. So even if I acknowledge my understanding is limited and faulty, I still am unable to embrace apparent contradictions. 

Think about this. If something "appears" to you to be a contradiction - you are saying, that _as far as you understand_, they can not both be true. To believe implicitly what you believe is a contradiction is not simple irrational, it's impossible. It is immediately self defeating. It is to say I can believe in round squares when I also say I believe that round squares are a contradiction. 

Now I understand what Van Til is trying to say, that we can not always comprehend God. But this does not make it is necessary that God's word appears to be self contradictory to us. This is poor reasoning on Van Til's part. 

First: if (B implies ~A), then ~(A & B). In other words, by definition A & B can not be God's Word because nothing in God's word is false. I can not separate A and B from what I think A and B mean. To assert A is to assert what I understand is A, and ditto with B. 

Second: Let P = (p1 + p2 + p3 + p4...) be propositions of God's Word and are all true. Then no any combination of (p1, p2, p3, p4, ...) will cause a contradiction. Now let us say it is inevitable that I believe q1 is a member of P, but I am wrong. Maybe I'm thinking q1 is the same as p1. Regardless if q1 is true or false, it is not necessary that q1 imply ~P, a contradiction. I can have a false belief about what is a a member of P and it is not necessary that it entail a contradiction of P. Nothing demands the q1 -> ~P. 

Van Til believed that due to the limitations of man's ability to understand God's Word, (the "creature Creator distinction) that it is necessary that God's Word seem contradictory to man. But the very fact that God has not revealed the totality of truth in his Word that means that we can hold false beliefs without contradicting Gods' Word. It is only if all truth revealed through God's word either explicit or by implication, would any false belief necessarily entail a contradiction of God's Word. But God has kept some truths hidden from us. 

You also wrote:


Brian Bosse said:


> The trouble we encounter is that speculation is desired because the terms end up being underdefined. With these underdefined terms it may be the case that we are not able to go any further and still avoid a contradiction.


I disagree. It is not necessarily the case that further speculation of the meaning of the terms will lead to a contradiction. In fact, I think it is important for us to go further so as to make sure we are not making any assumptions which lead to contradictions. You see, one can only say that there is an apparent contradiction if one has consciously speculated some definition of the terms that lead to contradictions. If the doctrines of the Trinity and Hypostatic Union are truly implied by Scripture, then we can speculate regarding the definitions of the terms involved without necessarily coming to a contradiction. In fact, by doing this, we can eliminate possible definitions which are clearly not correct. We still may not know for certain what the perfectly correct definitions are, but we can a least determine which ones can not possibly be true at the same time. This is why we are to reason through the Word with prayer. We are to understand the Word as best we can, trusting in the Holy Spirit to guide us to truth. If we don't reason out the meaning of Scripture, then we will never grow spiritually in the knowledge of Christ.


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## Davidius

As a side note, all of the admonitions in the scripture to acquire understanding, the elevation of the value of true knowledge and wisdom, and the rejoicing of men like David (Ps 119 et al.) in the understanding found in God's word would seem misplaced. The hidden thoughts of God and the "mystery" of his (secret) will and his ways (providence) are often areas in which scripture requires silence on our behalf but where is God's _revealed word_ ever spoken of in such a way? The revealed things are for us and our children. Those that are not revealed are not for us to know. Truths such as the Trinity and sovereignty/responsibility _are_ revealed truths in scripture. They are descriptive, qualitative concepts which aren't the same as asking, like Job, "why is this happening to me?" God has not revealed to Job or to anyone else why providence looks the way it does. He has however, revealed things like I previously mentioned. So why should we act as if it's impossible to understand them, seeing that they are revealed?


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## ChristianTrader

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> The problem is that you have no standard to say which quandaries are the ones we should spend our time trying to solve and which are "beyond us." There is a _huge_ difference in saying "we don't have an answer yet" and saying "an answer is not possible and anyone who tries to produce one is in grave error."



And likewise you have no standard by which to say X is solvable and that Y is not. So one big question is what do I lose by not solving a solvable but difficult paradox? What is at stake? There is always a finite amount of time to spend on any issue. So why would I spend a great deal of time on a problem that may not have a solution.

On top of all this, the Bible does not every give anyone any indication that all mysteries can be solved, and it is Reformed orthodoxy that mystery is essential to Theology.



> I suppose that one would say that if we can't solve every paradox now then we just need to wait, since the development of theology in general also didn't happen overnight. But telling everyone to just believe what they don't understand would slow the process down, don't you think? We have many less minds working diligently than we could.



To be fair concerning the development of theology, there have been very few if any paradoxes solved. What has been done is the Biblical data has been clearly put together into a system. An interesting side effect is that as the picture becomes clearer, the mystery comes into better focus, or put another way, our limits become much more clearly defined.

CT


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## Davidius

ChristianTrader said:


> And likewise you have no standard by which to say X is solvable and that Y is not. So one big question is what do I lose by not solving a solvable but difficult paradox? What is at stake? There is always a finite amount of time to spend on any issue. So why would I spend a great deal of time on a problem that may not have a solution.



Well, in particular, to relate this particular discussion back to the OP, presuppositional apologetics is at stake. My question was how we can be intellectually honest by using a system of apologetics to point out inconsistencies and irrationality in other world views while embracing them in our own. It sounds self-defeating.


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## ChristianTrader

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> As a side note, all of the admonitions in the scripture to acquire understanding, the elevation of the value of true knowledge and wisdom, and the rejoicing of men like David (Ps 119 et al.) in the understanding found in God's word would seem misplaced. The hidden thoughts of God and the "mystery" of his (secret) will and his ways (providence) are often areas in which scripture requires silence on our behalf but where is God's _revealed word_ ever spoken of in such a way?



Where has anyone said when one runs into a paradox or mystery, then there is no understanding?

Also where does true knowledge etc exclude mystery? 

Lastly, if you are going to all God to have secret will and counsel then how are you going to be able to demand that God reveals enough that there is no mystery.



> The revealed things are for us and our children. Those that are not revealed are not for us to know. Truths such as the Trinity and sovereignty/responsibility _are_ revealed truths in scripture. They are descriptive, qualitative concepts which aren't the same as asking, like Job, "why is this happening to me?" God has not revealed to Job or to anyone else why providence looks the way it does. He has however, revealed things like I previously mentioned. So why should we act as if it's impossible to understand them, seeing that they are revealed?



Who said one cannot understand the Trinity? God is one in some fashion and three in another. There is still a ton of mystery, but that does not exclude understanding.

CT


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> On top of all this, the Bible does not every give anyone any indication that all mysteries can be solved, and it is Reformed orthodoxy that mystery is essential to Theology.


Actually, when Scripture uses the term mystery, it always speaks of what _was_ hidden, but is _now_ made known. Mystery in Scriptures are revealed knowledge. So you are correct: mystery, those things that were hidden in the past, but are now revealed in Christ, are essential to theology.





ChristianTrader said:


> To be fair concerning the development of theology, there have been very few if any paradoxes solved. What has been done is the Biblical data has been clearly put together into a system. An interesting side effect is that as the picture becomes clearer, the mystery comes into better focus, or put another way, our limits become much more clearly defined.


What are these paradoxes? There must by many you can list.


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## Cheshire Cat

First, you write:


CarolinaCalvinist said:


> Gordon Clark was labeled as a rationalist by the Van Tillians for proposing a logical solution to the problem of God's sovereignty and human responsibility”



Then you back this claim up with this quote: “It is difficult indeed to escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the scriptural teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each other and *by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason* Dr. Clark has fallen into the error of rationalism.”

Your claim doesn’t follow from this quote. I pointed out before that even Van Tilians propose solutions to the problem of God's sovereignty and human responsibility. The point is that Clark seems to think he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason. I think by saying fully reconciled, the author of this source means that there is no mystery. 



CarolinaCalvinist said:


> There is a _huge_ difference in saying "we don't have an answer yet" and saying "an answer is not possible and anyone who tries to produce one is in grave error."


Nobody is claiming that "anyone who tries to produce one is in grave error".


----------



## ChristianTrader

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> Well, in particular, to relate this particular discussion back to the OP, presuppositional apologetics is at stake. My question was how we can be intellectually honest by using a system of apologetics to point out inconsistencies and irrationality in other world views while embracing them in our own. It sounds self-defeating.



First off, who said mystery was the same as inconsistencies and irrationality?

Secondly, the reformed position is that an essential component of Theology is mystery. One cannot then apologize for your Theology using different assumptions (for example, mystery and all it entails is not allowed).

So at the core of the dispute between Clark and Van Til is what is Reformed Theology.

To sum some thing up: Mystery is a part of life for Christian and non-Christian. The Christian can handle that because they realize their limits and know that they have a place to appeal, The infinite God of scripture and His revealed Word. A key point of unbelief is that one does not want to acknowledge that they are limited and finite, so they fight against the limits. You cannot maintain a God like stance and appeal to mystery.

CT


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,



> If my understanding is that A and B entail a contradiction, then to believe them implicitly would be to impugn God as the author of a contradiction.



This does not necessarily follow. This is only the case if your own intellect is your highest authority. There is no issue if you submit your thinking to God’s word even though you cannot see how B does not entail ~A. I choose to believe A and B because God says A and B. I submit my intellect to this and assume that I am wrong to believe B entails ~A even though I do not understand how this is so. I do so on the basis that the all knowing, infallible Creator has revealed to me A and B. At this point I have not impugned God as the author of a contradiction. Rather, I have humbled myself by realizing my own limitations and submitting to someone who knows far more than me. 



> For my understanding of A and B to entail a contradiction, I must believe that only one can be true, and the other must be false. That is what it means for A and B to appear entail a contradiction.



Yup. So, what would you do if God said A and B? Would tell God He was wrong? Or, would you assume that somehow you have made a mistake even though you may never understand how? The former makes your intellect your highest authority; the latter makes God the highest authority. 



> If something "appears" to you to be a contradiction - you are saying, that as far as you understand, they can not both be true. To believe implicitly what you believe is a contradiction is not simple irrational, it's impossible. It is immediately self defeating. It is to say I can believe in round squares when I also say I believe that round squares are a contradiction.



Anthony, I need you to read this whole next section before firing off a response. Let’s say that you hold to two different beliefs…

*P:* All Gods are immortal.
*Q:* Apollo is a God.

Then one day you see Apollo die. That is to say, you know hold another belief…

*R:* Apollo is dead.

At this point, you now hold a set of inconsistent beliefs. You must give at least one of them up to avoid becoming irrational. For the sake of discussion, you are convinced that R is true. Which belief do you give up: P or Q? The answer is going to be the one that you hold to a lesser degree. Let’s say that is Q. You now believe ~Q and you remain rational. However, the basis for giving up Q is simply your commitment to R and P. Now, let’s begin to tie this illustration to the topic at hand. You believe…

*A:* X --> ~Y. 
*B:* God always tells the truth.

Then one day God tells you…

*C:* X ^ Y

Just like the illustration above, you are now holding to an inconsistent set of beliefs. Which belief do you give up? Well, for the sake of argument (as we did above), let’s assume we are convinced of C. What do we do now? I suggest the only rational thing to do is to give up the belief in A even if we do not understand how X does not imply ~Y. The rational basis to give up A is because we hold to our belief in B much stronger. But our giving up of A is not because we are able to reconcile the apparent contradiction, but rather because we trust God more that there is no contradiction even tough we cannot see it. 

The above is the situation we are talking about. If you agree with what I have said above, then you agree with me and Van Til. If there is something I have said above that is wrong, then please directly quote the section that is in error and comment on it. 



> But this does not make it is necessary that God's word appears to be self contradictory to us. This is poor reasoning on Van Til's part.



I do not think Van Til said that it was necessarily the case that God’s word appears to be self contradictory to us. If so, please provide the direct reference. He did say that there are things in God’s word that appear contradictory, and I agree with him. You may not, but you have yet to bring the Trinity and Hypostatic Union together in a coherent manner that is not under-defined. It’s easy to avoid the appearance of contradiction if you leave things vague. For instance, if I under-define X so as not to end up with the conclusion X --> ~Y, then I can hold to and under-defined X and Y and say there is no contradiction. However, if I begin to get clear on what X entails, then I might get myself into trouble. This is akin to what the Council of Chalcedon did in terms of its definitions by way of negation. 



> Second: Let P = (p1 + p2 + p3 + p4...) be propositions of God's Word and are all true. Then no any combination of (p1, p2, p3, p4, ...) will cause a contradiction.



Because we are finite creatures there are things about God we cannot ever know. If the resolution of some contradiction requires something belonging to this unknowable set of knowledge, then we are not able to resolve the contradiction. However, the contradiction is only apparent, but not actual. In God’s mind, there is no inconsistency. Is this situation possible? It seems so. The consistency of the Hypostatic Union and the Trinity are likely examples of this. 



> It is not necessarily the case that further speculation of the meaning of the terms will lead to a contradiction.



Anthony, please read me more carefully. I never said this was necessarily the case. Here is what I said, “With these underdefined terms* it may be the case* that we are not able to go any further and still avoid a contradiction.” I refer you to the second to last answer above. 



> If the doctrines of the Trinity and Hypostatic Union are truly implied by Scripture, then we can speculate regarding the definitions of the terms involved without necessarily coming to a contradiction.



Sure we can. However, in this case it seems the only way not to end up with inconsistency is to under-define terms. If you disagree, then go ahead and start defining the terms I asked you to define in my last post.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Semper Fidelis

Civbert said:


> Actually, when Scripture uses the term mystery, it always speaks of what _was_ hidden, but is _now_ made known. Mystery in Scriptures are revealed knowledge. So you are correct: mystery, those things that were hidden in the past, but are now revealed in Christ, are essential to theology.



_And_, Anthony, when the Bible uses the word *knowledge* it refers to more than justified true belief.

This is a great irony. I've been waiting for one of the Clarkians to jump on the use of the term mystery - which is, in fact, a criticism based on equivocation. CT was not using mystery in the sense that you are criticizing him of using.

Mystery can mean "hidden", "unknown", "not revealed" - whether the terms are used they are implied. The "Mystery" is certainly revealed but it does not mean that all hidden things that belong to the Lord are.

Why do you feel you have the right to restrict the use of words (mystery and knowledge). On the one hand, you restrict a believer in the use of an English Word in a way translators chose not but you take liberty on the other to reserve a definition of knowledge to yourself where the Scriptures use the word in ways beyond what you recognize. I will never be attracted to systems that must be so insistent to hold their center.


----------



## Davidius

SemperFideles said:


> Mystery can mean "hidden", "unknown", "not revealed" - whether the terms are used they are implied. The "Mystery" is certainly revealed but it does not mean that all hidden things that belong to the Lord are.



Everyone can agree that those things hidden and belonging to the lord are mystery. But Van Til's position is that things revealed in God's Word are mysteries and apparent contradictions. Why call something an inexplicable mystery that is part of revelation?


----------



## Davidius

caleb_woodrow said:


> First, you write:
> 
> Then you back this claim up with this quote: “It is difficult indeed to escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the scriptural teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each other and *by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason* Dr. Clark has fallen into the error of rationalism.”
> 
> Your claim doesn’t follow from this quote. I pointed out before that even Van Tilians propose solutions to the problem of God's sovereignty and human responsibility. The point is that Clark seems to think he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason. I think by saying fully reconciled, the author of this source means that there is no mystery.



Yes, that's what Clark said; there was no mystery for him. Why is it wrong for there to be no mystery for him? 



> Nobody is claiming that "anyone who tries to produce one is in grave error".



Ok, then change the quote to "anyone who claims to have actually produce one and is not 'caught up in the mystery'" is in grave error.


----------



## Semper Fidelis

David,

That's not the way in which CT was using it. Whether or not that's what Van Til means.

If you ask me: "Why did God elect you and not elect your Mother?"
I might say: "It's a mystery."

I'm not using the word as the Scriptures refer to the "Mystery" that has now been revealed.

Every time I've seen the term mystery used, and a person jump on its use, it's at the point of hidden knowledge. To start playing word police and point out that the Scriptures use it only in one way is the height of silliness for the same men turn around and then restrict the word "knowledge" in a way that _the Scriptures do NOT_. 

They can't have it both ways.


----------



## B.J.

Whats the difference between a Paradox and a Contradiction?

If I say:

"Jesus is God, and Jesus is not God."


That is a contradiction. A ~A


If I say:

"Jesus is God, and Jesus is man."

What I say here is "A -> B" and "A -> C"

Right? This seems to be a Paradox, and not a Contradiction.


----------



## Davidius

SemperFideles said:


> David,
> 
> That's not the way in which CT was using it. Whether or not that's what Van Til means.
> 
> If you ask me: "Why did God elect you and not elect your Mother?"
> I might say: "It's a mystery."
> 
> I'm not using the word as the Scriptures refer to the "Mystery" that has now been revealed.



I see what you're saying and totally agree.



> Every time I've seen the term mystery used, and a person jump on its use, it's at the point of hidden knowledge. To start playing word police and point out that the Scriptures use it only in one way is the height of silliness for the same men turn around and then restrict the word "knowledge" in a way that _the Scriptures do NOT_.
> 
> They can't have it both ways.



I'm still chewing on this and trying to understand fully.


----------



## Cheshire Cat

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> Why is it wrong for there to be no mystery for him?


He's not just claiming that there is no mystery for him. He's claiming that there is no mystery, and it is implied that if we too are smart enough, we would see that there is no mystery either. I've also commented on this line of thought in one of my posts in this thread. It is one thing to say that there is no mystery for me, and an entirely different thing to demonstrate that is the case.


----------



## ChristianTrader

CarolinaCalvinist said:


> Everyone can agree that those things hidden and belonging to the lord are mystery. But Van Til's position is that things revealed in God's Word are mysteries and apparent contradictions. Why call something an inexplicable mystery that is part of revelation?



You are making the assumption that the mystery is completely unrelated to the revealed. On what basis can you make the assumption that when you start to dig into the revealed that you will not at some point run into the hidden.

CT


----------



## Civbert

Hey Brian, 

I'll think I'll respond to you in two parts to keep my time on-line a little shorter.



Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> 
> 
> This does not necessarily follow. This is only the case if your own intellect is your highest authority. There is no issue if you submit your thinking to God’s word even though you *cannot see *how B does not entail ~A.



Your wording is a little trick here, but when you say "you cannot see how B does not entail ~A" then it seems inescapable that you _believe _B->~A. In other words, you believe that God has presented to you as truth something you also believe leads to a contradiction. That's impossible. You can not believe both if you also believe they lead to a contradiction. Either you believe A&B or you believe B->~A, but you can not believe both at the same time. And latter on you actually demonstrate this in your example. 



Brian Bosse said:


> I choose to believe A and B because God says A and B. I submit my intellect to this and assume that I am wrong to believe B entails ~A even though I do not understand how this is so.


And so you would be correct if you actually could do this. However, belief is not actually volitional. Sure, we work out our reasoning, and change our minds based on our reasons, but we can not decided to simply not believe something that we have reason to believe is false. So if you can not see how it is possible that it is _not_ the case that B->~A, then you believe the B->~A. You are in a bad spot. If you can not resolve this, then you can not believe both A and B because you believe that lead to a contradiction. 

The next part will be next.


----------



## Civbert

Your example below is excellent and goes to illustrate my point - that you will not believe something in violation of reason. 


Brian Bosse said:


> Anthony, I need you to read this whole next section before firing off a response. Let’s say that you hold to two different beliefs…
> 
> *P:* All Gods are immortal.
> *Q:* Apollo is a God.
> 
> Then one day you see Apollo die. That is to say, you know hold another belief…
> 
> *R:* Apollo is dead.
> 
> At this point, you now hold a set of inconsistent beliefs. You must give at least one of them up to avoid becoming irrational. For the sake of discussion, you are convinced that R is true. Which belief do you give up: P or Q? The answer is going to be the one that you hold to a lesser degree. Let’s say that is Q. You now believe ~Q and you remain rational. However, the basis for giving up Q is simply your commitment to R and P. Now, let’s begin to tie this illustration to the topic at hand. You believe…
> 
> *A:* X --> ~Y.
> *B:* God always tells the truth.
> 
> Then one day God tells you…
> 
> *C:* X ^ Y
> 
> Just like the illustration above, you are now holding to an inconsistent set of beliefs. Which belief do you give up? Well, for the sake of argument (as we did above), let’s assume we are convinced of C. What do we do now? I suggest the only rational thing to do is to give up the belief in A even if we do not understand how X does not imply ~Y. The rational basis to give up A is because we hold to our belief in B much stronger. But our giving up of A is not because we are able to reconcile the apparent contradiction, but rather because we trust God more that there is no contradiction even tough we cannot see it.



And here we have it. You are not embracing the "apparent contradiction", you are removing it by reason. The contradiction is two fold. One is X-->~Y, and the second is (X&Y) and (X-->~Y). Now for you to embrace an apparent contradiction, you'd have to maintain a belief that X-->~Y at the same time as (X&Y). But by rejecting (X-->~Y) you have removed all contradiction in your belief system. Buy definition, you no long embrace the apparent contradiction. 


But notice something here - you have not given any reason for believing X --> ~Y in the first place. Before, and still later in the post, you said you CANNOT see how it is NOT the case X--~Y. In other words, your reason tells you that the contradiction is unavoidable. It is not a simple statement that you have adopted implicitly. And here we have the problem with implicit faith.

If you believe A implicitly, then your belief is weak (if it exists at all). One clear reason against A will change your mind. It will be impossible to believe A implicitly against any reason that tells you A can not be the case. 

And one of the strongest reasons that will cause us to reject a belief is contradiction - if belief A contradicts B, to claim to believe them both is impossible. It is impossible to belief A and ~A at the same time. It is impossible to believe (A&B) and ~(A&B). Either you believe there is no contradiction and (A&B), or you believe that ~(A&B) because B-->~A. It's impossible to *embrace* apparent contradiction because that is a contradiction in itself. It is a claim to _believe _what you also say you _believe _to be false.

So any any understanding of A & B that leads to B-->~A means that that understanding of A & B is not God's Word. Do you agree? 

(I will continue).


----------



## Davidius

ChristianTrader said:


> You are making the assumption that the mystery is completely unrelated to the revealed. On what basis can you make the assumption that when you start to dig into the revealed that you will not at some point run into the hidden.
> 
> CT



I suppose the answer to this question would have to be given on a case-by-case basis. But there are some things in scripture which are clearly delineated as kept back from us by God. I'm thinking of things like the general outworking of providence.


----------



## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> You are making the assumption that the mystery is completely unrelated to the revealed. On what basis can you make the assumption that when you start to dig into the revealed that you will not at some point run into the hidden.
> 
> CT



Once you run into something, it's no longer hidden.


----------



## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> I do not think Van Til said that it was necessarily the case that God’s word appears to be self contradictory to us. If so, please provide the direct reference.


That is exactly his point. I believe he said all teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory and that we must embrace those paradoxes. If he only meant that we are faulty people and will make mistakes in theology then we can agree - but he said we are to embrace those things we also believe are contradictory. This is simply a contradiction on Van Til's part. And some many Vantilians push this concept is one of the sorry results of this.

http://www.reformed.org/apologetics/index.html?mainframe=/apologetics/frame_vtt.html


> Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical.52
> ... while we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory. 53
> All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.54



It is a concept that many Van Tillian apologist are really saying was a bad choice or language on VT's part. It's not what he really meant, and he was just exaggerating because he said elsewhere we are to eliminate contradiction in our Christian system, no embrace it. The problem is, some people took what VT said and ran with it. Instead of correcting the concept of " embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory", they are defending it as legitimate. So now we have intellectual pacifists who say that if something seems like a contradiction, then we should believe it anyway. But else where VT said if we find contradiction we should not rest until we have determined where we went wrong. We reject with passion any apparent contradiction. 

VT contradicted himself so the Vantilian should decide which path is correct. Do we embrace the apparent contradiction, or do we assert that God's Word is internally coherent and never violates the laws of logic. 



Brian Bosse said:


> He did say that there are things in God’s word that appear contradictory, and I agree with him. You may not, but you have yet to bring the Trinity and Hypostatic Union together in a coherent manner that is not under-defined. It’s easy to avoid the appearance of contradiction if you leave things vague. For instance, if I under-define X so as not to end up with the conclusion X --> ~Y, then I can hold to and under-defined X and Y and say there is no contradiction. However, if I begin to get clear on what X entails, then I might get myself into trouble. This is akin to what the Council of Chalcedon did in terms of its definitions by way of negation.


 And it is precisely that point where you know you are not understanding God's Word correctly - when your definition of X entails a contradiction of Y, then you have a wrong definition of X or Y. And if one claims there is an "apparent" contradiction, it demonstrates you have done just that. 




Brian Bosse said:


> Because we are finite creatures there are things about God we cannot ever know. If the resolution of some contradiction requires something belonging to this unknowable set of knowledge, then we are not able to resolve the contradiction.


 But it doesn't start with a contradiction. You have already gone wrong when you discover a contradiction. If you are starting with God's Word, contradictions are impossible by definition. You can not deduce a contradiction from true premises. The problem is not a lack of information, the problem is a false premise that is not God's Word to start with. This false premise is probably some definition you are assuming. And you also know it is logically impossible to remove a contradiction with _additional _premises. Rather, you most remove the false premise that lead to the contradiction in the first place. 



Brian Bosse said:


> However, the contradiction is only apparent, but not actual. In God’s mind, there is no inconsistency. Is this situation possible? It seems so. The consistency of the Hypostatic Union and the Trinity are likely examples of this.


 An example of logically coherent doctrine? Then there is not contradiction. An example of an apparent contradiction? Then you need to correct your assumptions of what the terms mean. 

VT however insisted in defining terms so as to make them contradictory: God is one person, and three persons. Read the Frame article and he shows how VT was always fleshing out his doctrine in "paradoxical ways". 



Brian Bosse said:


> Anthony, please read me more carefully. I never said this was necessarily the case. Here is what I said, “With these underdefined terms* it may be the case* that we are not able to go any further and still avoid a contradiction.” I refer you to the second to last answer above.


 And I say that if these doctrines are consistent with God's Word (and I believe they are), then it can _not_ be the case the "we are not able to go any further and still avoid a contradiction". This may only be the case if the error lies in the formulation of the Doctrines themselves. If they are correct, then there is a way to go further and avoid contradiction. That is logically necessary because true premises can never imply a contradiction. 




Brian Bosse said:


> Sure we can. However, in this case it seems the only way not to end up with inconsistency is to under-define terms. If you disagree, then go ahead and start defining the terms I asked you to define in my last post.
> 
> Sincerely,
> 
> Brian



I am not the one claiming there is a apparent contradiction here. And I've already presented both doctrines in a coherent manner. I'll go back and maybe paste it in here after I finish this post. In the mean time, you could show what make these doctrines appear contradictory.


This is what I wrote:


> The Trinity: God is one in essence, and three in persons.
> Hypostatic Union: Jesus is both fully God and fully man.
> 
> Now I haven't joined these two statements into a single argument because they are not using the same terms in the same sense. I did not say simply that "Jesus is God", but more specifically that "Jesus is fully God". To me this means that Jesus is one person of the Trinity. He is also (according to the doctrine of the Trinity) one in essence with the Godhead.



As you can see, I did go further when I said that Jesus is fully God means Jesus is one person of the Trinity. 

I suspect Brain that you will have a hard time presenting an explanation of the Trinity and Hypostatic Union that contains any contradictions and you also agree with. Unlike Van Til, you tend to avoid the appearance of contradiction.


----------



## Civbert

Another good post on VT's apologetics. Read the discussion too. 

http://www.reformationtheology.com/2006/06/van_til_his_logic_epistemology.php


----------



## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> Once you run into something, it's no longer hidden.



It is like running into a wall. You now know that it is there, but that does not imply that the wall disappears or that it can be climbed. It is still a wall.

CT


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,

I think I will take your lead and not try to deal with everything in one post. However, I would like you to respond to this post when you can. In other words, don’t wait for my other posts. This post is the essence of my position. 

Several times your use of the phrase “apparent contradiction” was different than mine. This is causing us difficulty. So, I will define it in as precise a manner as I can, and will you it consistently throughout this post and in all future posts. I will ask you to use it in the same sense as I define it. 

*Apparent Contradiction:* P and Q are _apparent contradictions_ to person A if and only if person A cannot see that it is not the case that P entails ~Q or that Q entails ~P. 

*Observation 1 (OB1):* If P and Q are _apparent contradictions_ to person A, then it is not necessarily the case that P and Q are _actual contradictions_. 

*Actual Contradiction:* P and Q are _actual contradictions_ if and only if P entails ~Q or Q entails ~P.

*Observation 2 (OB2):* Actual contradictions are objective and apparent contradictions are subjective. 

*Observation 3 (OB3):* Since apparent contradictions depend on the epistemic status of the subject, it is not necessarily the case that if P and Q are apparently contradictory to person A that P and Q are apparently contradictory to person B. 

Assume person A does not see that it is not the case that P entails ~Q. As such, P and Q are apparently contradictory to person A. Assume that the only way for person A to see that P does not entail ~Q was if person A knew R. Assume that person A cannot know R. As such, P and Q would always be apparently contradictory to person A. Assume person B knows R. Assume person B, because he knows R, can see that it is not the case that P entails ~Q. Assume that person A believes person B to be infallible and truthful. Person B tells person A that P and Q. Because person A believes person B, then person A believes P and Q even though P and Q are _apparently contradictory_ to person A. 

Anthony, I have laid out my position in a somewhat formal manner. The only way for you to dismiss this is to show that it is incoherent. If you cannot show that this is incoherent, then you have no rational basis to dismiss this. So, before we move forward to your previous posts, please comment on this one. 

Your Friend,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian Bosse said:


> *Observation 2 (OB2):* Actual contradictions are objective and apparent contradictions are subjective.



Hello Brian,

The problem here is that Van Til maintained "paradox" in relation to the objective revelation of God irrespective of the person's understanding of it. He adopted a methodology which requires the theologian to think paradoxically because the revelation of God is fitted to creaturely limitations. In his case, the objective becomes the basis for self-consciously thinking in terms of contradictions.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Matthew,



> The problem here is that Van Til maintained "paradox" in relation to the objective revelation of God irrespective of the person's understanding of it.



I am not sure what you mean by this. It would be my position that it is possible that God would reveal something that is apparently contradictory to us. However, we accept that it is not an actual contradiction based on who God is. An example of this would be the Hypostatic Union and the Trinity especially when taken together. I believe there is no actual contradiction. But I may never be able fully grasp this. Nothing in God's revelation is inconsistent. If Van Til said otherwise, then I disagree with him.



> He adopted a methodology which requires the theologian to think paradoxically because the revelation of God is fitted to creaturely limitations.



What do you mean by "to think paradoxically"? When I accept _apparent contradictions_, I am not accepting an actual contradiction. I trust God that propostions such as "one being can entail more than one person" are consistent even though I cannot see how it is not the case that "one being necessarily entails one person." 



> In his case, the objective becomes the basis for self-consciously thinking in terms of contradictions.



I think I need examples of what you mean by this. If my thinking that the proposition "one being can entail more than one person" is consistent is a representation of "self-consciously thinking in terms of contradictions," then I am cool. If you mean something else, then I probably disagree with Van Til.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## MW

Brian, It appears that you are in disagreement with VanTil's basic assumption that because man knows analogically he must reason paradoxically. Because that is the case please disregard my application of your consideration to Van Til's thought.

If the thread is permitted to move away from Van Til, I would be interested in learning how you arrive at two propositions which can appear contradictory. That is, given that the Bible does not teach these propositions in so many words, and you require some use of reason to arrive at the conclusion that the Bible teaches these propositions, how does a rational mind conclude that the Bible teaches each proposition in the form that requires an apparent conflict with what the rational mind already knows. Isn't it the case that an inference must be good as well as necessary? Blessings!


----------



## ChristianTrader

armourbearer said:


> Brian, It appears that you are in disagreement with VanTil's basic assumption that because man knows analogically he must reason paradoxically. Because that is the case please disregard my application of your consideration to Van Til's thought.



What does reason paradoxically mean?



> If the thread is permitted to move away from Van Til, I would be interested in learning how you arrive at two propositions which can appear contradictory. That is, given that the Bible does not teach these propositions in so many words,



I think the point being asserted is that the Bible does teach both propositions in at least some form. The problem is that we may not have the info on what that form is.



> and you require some use of reason to arrive at the conclusion that the Bible teaches these propositions, how does a rational mind conclude that the Bible teaches each proposition in the form that requires an apparent conflict with what the rational mind already knows. Isn't it the case that an inference must be good as well as necessary? Blessings!



An apparent conflict exists if you cannot fully expound why two things are not actual contradictions. I would point to the trinity being one. I'm thinking we may be using terms differently. Would you not call the doctrine of the trinity an apparent contradiction? If not, what would you call it?

CT


----------



## MW

ChristianTrader said:


> What does reason paradoxically mean?



That is a question to which one receives different answers from Van Tillians; but basically if the illustrations of Van Til are anything to go by, it means to think in terms of irreconcilable differences like God's sovereignty and human responsibility in recognition of human limitation. Something like Edwards' doctrine of philosophical necessity would then be ruled out as a means of explaining how the two function co-ordinately. That is, the idea of categorising the differences, or limiting their scope, so that they are not seen to be in conflict with each other in reality, would be regarded as out of the question. We must be content to say God ordains sin on the one hand, but yet is not the author of sin on the other hand, without alleviating the tension of those two statements, but use the tension as a means of insisting on the creature's dependence on the Creator.



ChristianTrader said:


> I think the point being asserted is that the Bible does teach both propositions in at least some form. The problem is that we may not have the info on what that form is.



Yes, but my question is, How do you *know* the Bible teaches both propositions? You have used reason to derive each proposition from the Bible. How then can reason be violated in maintaining two things which it considers contradictory.



ChristianTrader said:


> An apparent conflict exists if you cannot fully expound why two things are not actual contradictions. I would point to the trinity being one. I'm thinking we may be using terms differently. Would you not call the doctrine of the trinity an apparent contradiction? If not, what would you call it?



First, to answer the question -- there is nothing contradictory in the Trinity because we do not say there are three in the same sense as there are one. There are three persons, but one infinite, eternal, and unchangeable essence. Yes, there is something beyond reason in the Godhead's mode of existence, but there is nothing in the mind which recoils at the idea.

Second, to apply the doctrine of the Trinity to my initial query -- From where does the idea of the Trinity come? It is undoubtedly the case that the interpreter uses hermeneutical rules in order to arrive at the conclusion that there is one God. He uses the same rules in order to conclude that there are three persons who are called God in the Scriptures. But one of the hermeneutical rules he ought to be using is the principle that Scripture interprets Scripture, that is, it cannot contradict itself. If so, he could not possibly arrive at conclusions which require him to embrace a contradiction, apparent or otherwise. So the apostle Paul, in Gal. 3, shows clearly that the law could not serve to make a person righteous by appeal to the fact that Scripture hath concluded all under sin. It must be therefore that the law serves another purpose subordinate to the promise which God gave Abraham, that is, it is a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. At no point did the apostle consider that the two could exist in tension, but presupposes that there is a perfectly reasonable explanation, whereby the two ideas can be made to co-ordinate with one another.


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## ChristianTrader

armourbearer said:


> That is a question to which one receives different answers from Van Tillians;



Since various people interpret a number of historical figures differently, (for example Calvinists have a number of interpretations of Calvin on different issues), I think we should skip that.



> but basically if the illustrations of Van Til are anything to go by, it means to think in terms of irreconcilable differences like God's sovereignty and human responsibility in recognition of human limitation. Something like Edwards' doctrine of philosophical necessity would then be ruled out as a means of explaining how the two function co-ordinately.



You need to show why I would have to reject any view of Edwards in order to accept Van Til's view. The problem is that any explanation or solution basically just pushes the problem back a step, until one eventually just says, "God says so or God willed to do so".



> That is, the idea of categorising the differences, or limiting their scope, so that they are not seen to be in conflict with each other in reality, would be regarded as out of the question.



I dont see how you can ultimately limit the scope and maintain the validity of systematic theology. If one has a system with mystery then one cannot just say, "The mystery/apparent contradiction etc. only lives over there". It has to flow through throughout the system.

Because I maintain that an apparent contradiction exists someplace does not mean that I cannot live consistently with both sides of the apparent contradiction. For example with Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility. 
I can advocate executing murderers for their crime, and still pray that God will sanctify me to rest in divine providence, both shining and frowning. I cannot reconcile both sides but I can live with them both.



> We must be content to say God ordains sin on the one hand, but yet is not the author of sin on the other hand, without alleviating the tension of those two statements, but use the tension as a means of insisting on the creature's dependence on the Creator.



If you disagree that any solution ends at "Because God said so, or Because God wills to do so", then I would be happy to see it.



> Yes, but my question is, How do you *know* the Bible teaches both propositions? You have used reason to derive each proposition from the Bible. How then can reason be violated in maintaining two things which it considers contradictory.



I still do not see where reason is being violated, therefore I do not see how the rest follows.



> First, to answer the question -- there is nothing contradictory in the Trinity because we do not say there are three in the same sense as there are one.



I agree and so would Van Til.



> There are three persons, but one infinite, eternal, and unchangeable essence.



Alright which would work out the same as saying, The trinity is one person in one way and three persons in another. This is considered an apparent contradiction because one cannot fill out how the one is different from the three. Do you have any problem with what I have just written besides, your not liking the terminology?



> Yes, there is something beyond reason in the Godhead's mode of existence, but there is nothing in the mind which recoils at the idea.



Alright.



> Second, to apply the doctrine of the Trinity to my initial query -- From where does the idea of the Trinity come? It is undoubtedly the case that the interpreter uses hermeneutical rules in order to arrive at the conclusion that there is one God. He uses the same rules in order to conclude that there are three persons who are called God in the Scriptures. But one of the hermeneutical rules he ought to be using is the principle that Scripture interprets Scripture, that is, it cannot contradict itself.



One should and hopefully one does use such a rule. But using that rule would not change anything written to this point.



> If so, he could not possibly arrive at conclusions which require him to embrace a contradiction, apparent or otherwise.



At this point, it really seems that the entire argument is the terminology.



> So the apostle Paul, in Gal. 3, shows clearly that the law could not serve to make a person righteous by appeal to the fact that Scripture hath concluded all under sin. It must be therefore that the law serves another purpose subordinate to the promise which God gave Abraham, that is, it is a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. At no point did the apostle consider that the two could exist in tension, but presupposes that there is a perfectly reasonable explanation, whereby the two ideas can be made to co-ordinate with one another.



I might not say that the explanation is reasonable, I would however say that the explanation is not against reason.

CT


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> ... But one of the hermeneutical rules he ought to be using is the principle that Scripture interprets Scripture, that is, it cannot contradict itself. If so, he could not possibly arrive at conclusions which require him to embrace a contradiction, apparent or otherwise. .....


  and


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> First, to answer the question -- there is nothing contradictory in the Trinity because we do not say there are three in the same sense as there are one.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree and so would Van Til.
Click to expand...



Nope. That's where Van Til would strongly disagree. Van Til said very clearly that God was both one person and three persons and not in two sense but in the same sense. This was one of the points Van Til stressed to justify his on position that we must embracing "apparent contradictions". And notice there is nothing apparent in the contradiction - it is quite explicit and real.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> Nope. That's where Van Til would strongly disagree. Van Til said very clearly that God was both one person and three persons and not in two sense but in the same sense. This was one of the points Van Til stressed to justify his on position that we must embracing "apparent contradictions". And notice there is nothing apparent in the contradiction - it is quite explicit and real.



Where did he say it was in the same sense? You should be able to easily quote it.

CT


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## RamistThomist

ChristianTrader said:


> Where did he say it was in the same sense? You should be able to easily quote it.
> 
> CT



Agreed. Frame devotes a whole chapter in his book on this very topic.


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Where did he say it was in the same sense? You should be able to easily quote it.
> 
> CT



" Rather, "We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person."

Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 229.



> Let us look at some specific examples. With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, Van Til denies that the paradox of the three and one can be resolved by the formula "one in essence and three in person." Rather, "We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person."55 Van Til's doctrine, then, can be expressed "One person, three persons" -- an apparent contradiction
> 
> http://www.reformed.org/apologetics/index.html?mainframe=/apologetics/frame_vtt.html


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> " Rather, "We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person."
> 
> Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 229.



No problem here, and no problem in the Frame quote. So again a quote should be very easy. I am not asking for that much. Why are you making it so hard?

Something along the lines that God is one person and three persons in the same way and the same sense.

CT


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> No problem here, and no problem in the Frame quote. So again a quote should be very easy. I am not asking for that much. Why are you making it so hard?
> 
> Something along the lines that God is one person and three persons in the same way and the same sense.
> 
> CT



Just gave it CT. It wasn't hard, it was very easy.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> Just gave it CT. It wasn't hard, it was very easy.



Where did anyone say or imply, "in the same way and the same sense"?

Break it down for me.

CT


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Where did anyone say or imply, "in the same way and the same sense"?
> 
> Break it down for me.
> 
> CT



For more context (so you know I'm not taking things out of context):



> Even more perplexing is Van Til's attitude toward the logical consistency of Christian doctrines. We have seen earlier that Van Til affirms the "internal coherence" of the Christian system and attacks positions which introduce contradictions into that system. The natural assumption is that this coherence is a logical coherence. Doesn't he say that "The rules of formal logic must be followed in all our attempts at systematic exposition of God's revelation, whether general or special"?51 And yet at the same time Van Til teaches that the Christian system is full of "apparent contradictions":
> 
> Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical.52
> ... while we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory. 53
> All teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory.54​
> Let us look at some specific examples. With regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, Van Til denies that the paradox of the three and one can be resolved by the formula "one in essence and three in person." Rather, "We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person."55 Van Til's doctrine, then, can be expressed "One person, three persons" -- an apparent contradiction. This is a very bold theological move. Theologians are generally most reluctant to express the paradoxicality of this doctrine so blatantly. Why does Van Til insist on making things so difficult? In the context, he says he adopts this formula to "avoid the specter of brute fact." (Brute fact, in Van Til's terminology, is uninterpreted being. )
> 
> http://www.reformed.org/apologetics/index.html?mainframe=/apologetics/frame_vtt.html




Here's the break down:

"We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person." (VT) and the "one in essence and three in person" leads to what Van Til calls an "apparent contradiction" _if and only if _"three in person" and "God is one person" is in the same sense. If they are in any sense different then there is no contradiction, apparent of otherwise.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> Here's the break down:
> 
> "We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person." (VT) and the "one in essence and three in person" leads to what Van Til calls an "apparent contradiction" _if and only if _"three in person" and "God is one person" in the same sense. If they are in any sense different then there is no contradiction, apparent of otherwise.



Van Til denied that the paradox (aka apparent contradiction is avoided by 3 in person, 1 in essense). I agree (it just pushes the paradox back a step, nothing is resolved). One can maintain that God is one person and three persons and say that the sense of person is different and maintain that it is all an apparent contradiction.

The point of the term "apparent contradiction" is to say that two propositions are not contradictory, but I do not know how to spell them out so that they cease to look contradictory.

It really just seems that you do not know what the term "apparent contradiction" means or when it is supposed to be used.

CT


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Van Til denied that the paradox (aka apparent contradiction is avoided by 3 in person, 1 in essense). I agree (it just pushes the paradox back a step, nothing is resolved). One can maintain that God is one person and three persons and say that the sense of person is different and maintain that it is all an apparent contradiction.
> 
> The point of the term "apparent contradiction" is to say that two propositions are not contradictory, but I do not know how to spell them out so that they cease to look contradictory.
> 
> It really just seems that you do not know what the term "apparent contradiction" means or when it is supposed to be used.
> 
> CT



I think you missed the point. If it were as simply as "person" being used in different senses, then Van Til could not say there was an apparent contradiction. You have resolved any appearance of contradiction by saying (as Van Til clearly does not) that is simply a matter of different senses of the term "person". There has to be a sense in which "person" is used in the same sense for both God and the three persons of the Trinity at the same time. Otherwise there is no appearance of contradiction.

And you need to also account that the Doctrine of the Trinity is the product of Scriptural interpretation. If Scripture can not contradict itself, then, as Rev. Winzer pointed out, no correct Scriptural doctrine contradict itself. Van Til insisted in formulating the Doctrine of the Trinity in a explicitly contradictory manner. 

Also keep in mind the VT had another issue he was trying to resolve - the Greek problem of "the one and the many". This issue was central to VT's theology and was one of the reasons he insisted on the explicit contradiction of God being both three and one. 

VT's apparent contradictions are there because he believed that they could not be resolved. "Person" in different senses resolves the contradiction so it's not what VT was thinking.


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## ChristianTrader

Civbert said:


> I think you missed the point. If it were as simply as "person" being used in different senses, then Van Til could not say there was an apparent contradiction. You have resolved any appearance of contradiction by saying (as Van Til clearly does not) that is simply a matter of different senses of the term "person". There has to be a sense in which "person" is used in the same sense for both God and the three persons of the Trinity at the same time. Otherwise there is no appearance of contradiction.



Let me quote myself from above.

"One can maintain that God is one person and three persons and say that the sense of person is different and maintain that it is all an apparent contradiction." So the ball is in your court to show that such is a wrong application of the term apparent contradiction.

Go ahead and google the term, and show us what you come up with.



> And you need to also account that the Doctrine of the Trinity is the product of Scriptural interpretation.



Easily done.



> If Scripture can not contradict itself, then, as Rev. Winzer pointed out, no correct Scriptural doctrine contradict itself.



Agreed.



> Van Til insisted in formulating the Doctrine of the Trinity in a explicitly contradictory manner.



Nothing you have shown thus far has justified such a position.



> Also keep in mind the VT had another issue he was trying to resolve - the Greek problem of "the one and the many". This issue was central to VT's theology and was one of the reasons he insisted on the explicit contradiction of God being both three and one.



There is no explicit contradiction. This is really getting tiring. What is the difference between an apparent contradiction and a regular real contradiction.



> VT's apparent contradictions are there because he believed that they could not be resolved. "Person" in different senses resolves the contradiction so it's not what VT was thinking.



It does not resolve anything. It just pushes it back a step.

CT


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## Civbert

ChristianTrader said:


> Let me quote myself from above.
> 
> "One can maintain that God is one person and three persons and say that the sense of person is different and maintain that it is all an apparent contradiction." So the ball is in your court to show that such is a wrong application of the term apparent contradiction.


What is wrong with it....
...


ChristianTrader said:


> What is the difference between an apparent contradiction and a regular real contradiction.



The answer is in the fact that you had the ask what is the difference. And the answer is not that one is real and the other is not real. 

Tell me this, what makes the doctrine of the Trinity appear to be a contradiction? It only appears to be a contradiction if you formulate it as VT did, "God is one person and three persons." That's what Frame called Van Til's "apparent contradiction". Why? Why is that an apparent contradiction.

You said earlier


> One can maintain that God is one person and three persons and say that the sense of person is different and maintain that it is all an apparent contradiction.


 But how is this an apparent contradiction? Think about it. 

If I said that this apple is both red and green - this would be an apparent contradiction. Right? But the resolution of the contradiction is _easily _resolved. The apple has both colors but at _different places_ on it's skin. It is not both red and green in the same places (i.e. in the same sense). 

Now take Van Til's "God is one person and three persons". Same thing? God is one person and three persons, but not in the same sense. Right? ... Wrong. Because for Van Til, the apparent contradictions could not be resolved by the mind of man. Why, because God is three persons and one person in the same sense. Had Van Til simply said "but this is person in different senses", then he would not have conflicted with Gordon Clark. The "different senses" is the Clarkian solution. Van Til rejected your definition of "apparent contradiction" because you have given a _rational_ and easily comprehended resolution -- you have given the _Clarkian _solution. Van Til did not allow for your solution.


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## Civbert

Brian Bosse said:


> Hello Anthony,
> 
> *Apparent Contradiction:* P and Q are _apparent contradictions_ to person A if and only if person A cannot see that it is not the case that P entails ~Q or that Q entails ~P.



Brian,

It doesn't make sense for person A to not be able to see the P does not entail ~Q unless he first sees how it does. You definition would make more sense if it were:


*Apparent Contradiction:* P and Q are _apparent contradictions_ to person A if and only if person A sees that it is the case that P entails ~Q or that Q entails ~P. 

The term "sees" in in the definition is too vague. What does "sees" mean? And how is it that person A does _not_ see how something does _not _lead to a contradiction. It only makes sense if he believes that it does lead to a contradiction. 

And for Van Til, an apparent contradiction was not a matter of person A not being able to see how P might not entails ~Q, but that person a CAN NOT see how P might not entails ~Q. For VT, there is no humanly achievable answer to the "apparent contradiction" of the Trinity. It was not resolvable to the mind of man - so we have to embrace both P and Q with passion.


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## RamistThomist

(HT: Paul)

Clark was only able to "resolve" any paradox in the trinity by putting forth a form of modalism. He did the same with the hypostatic union - he put forth a neo-nestorainism (Crist was two persons). So, anyone can "resolve" logical tensions by denying orthodoxy. Case in point: Open theists and their denial of sovereignty.

The problem isn't resolving contradictions, the problem is resolving them *while mainaining orthodoxy.*

"Therefore, since God is Truth, we shall define person…as a composite of truths…theologians will complain that this reduces the Trinity to one person…This objection is based on a blindness toward certain definite Scriptural information…I am referring to the complex of truths that form the Three Persons. Though they are equally omniscient, they do not all know the same truths. Neither the complex of truths we call the Father nor those we call the Spirit, has the proposition, “I was incarnated.” …The Father cannot say, “I walked from Jerusalem to Jericho."

G. Clark, The Incarnation (The Trinity Foundation 1988), 54-55."

Steve Hays points out about that quote:

"Notice how, according to this framework, the individuating principle which differentiates one person of the Godhead from another consists in existential propositions concerning the economic Trinity. And that conduces straight to modalism. On such a view, the Trinitarian relations are contingent rather than necessary."

And, let's note that *Scripture* is paradoxical since it frequently refers to "God" as a "person," while not designating *which* person is being referred to. The only way to get past that is to go *beyond* the Scriptural data and import *extra-biblical* information just so you can "resolve" logical tensions. Therefore the Clarkian's victory is merely the victory of a child who constantly rigs the rules of four-square so he can finally "win" the game. And, according to his rules, extra-biblical information doesn't count. Besides, you may want to inquire how Clark knew all that. I mean, where does Scripture define a "person" as a "composite of truths?" And, that's a bunch of propositions. So, our great God is a bunch of propositions.


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## Civbert

Draught Horse said:


> The problem isn't resolving contradictions, the problem is resolving them *while mainaining orthodoxy.*


Very interesting. Why would that be the case?

And what is this contradiction that needs to be resolved. There is not contradiction in "one in essence and three in person". Nor is there a contradiction in "Jesus was both fully man and fully God". So where is the contradiction in the first place?


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## RamistThomist

Civbert said:


> Very interesting. Why would that be the case?
> 
> And what is this contradiction that needs to be resolved. There is not contradiction in "one in essence and three in person". Nor is there a contradiction in "Jesus was both fully man and fully God". So where is the contradiction in the first place?



Probably not one. I don't see CVT's system as contradictory. But there are places in the Bible where the Bible refers to God (Father, Son or Holy Spirit?) as "Person."


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Anthony,

I think my time here at PB is going to become very limited. As such, I will not be able to carry on this discussion too much longer. I will have a little more time at our site.



> You definition would make more sense if it were…:



My definition makes perfect sense, and I would like to stay with it because it captures that particular instance I am concerned about. Since your objection does not concern logical validity, I do not feel the need to adjust my definition. You will see in a moment how it fits well with particular concrete issues. 



> The term "sees" in in the definition is too vague. What does "sees" mean? And how is it that person A does not see how something does not lead to a contradiction. It only makes sense if he believes that it does lead to a contradiction.



I would be more than happy to clarify what I mean by ‘see.’ In my definition, you can equate ‘see’ with ‘understand.’ Abstractly, I may not understand how it is not the case that P --> ~Q, but still rationally believe that it is not the case that P --> ~Q. (Notice, understanding and belief are distinct. There are a lot of things I do not understand, but yet believe.) If I do not _understand_ how it is not the case that P --> ~Q, but for some reason believe P and Q, then by my definition I hold to an apparent contradiction. A concrete example if this is the Trinity. I do not understand how it is not the case that one being (P) does not necessarily entail one person (~Q). Yet, I believe that God is one being (P) and that God is three persons (Q). By definition, I hold to an apparent contradiction…and so do you. 

As for Van Til, I am more concerned with the concept of apparent contradiction that I have provided. You have challenged my concept, and I think my concept is sound. 



> There is not contradiction in "one in essence and three in person". Nor is there a contradiction in "Jesus was both fully man and fully God". So where is the contradiction in the first place?



Two things here: *(1)* "one in essence (P)" and "three in persons (Q)" are apparent contradictions if you do not understand how it is not the case that "one in essence" does not necessarily entail "one in person." If you say, I do not understand why it is not the case, but because of revelation I believe it is not the case, then you hold to an apparent contradiction. This also applies to the the Hypostatic union: "one in person" and "two in nature" versus "one person entails one nature." *(2)* The issue becomes even more convoluted (again not in a prejorative sense) when you add the Hypostatic Union to the Trinity. We have one God in essence (being) made up of three persons, one of which has two natures. If one of the natures is God, then what is this God? Is this the same God when we say Jesus is one person in the being God? Or, when we say Jesus is 100% God and 100% man, is Jesus being God different in this sense than Jesus being God in being? Is Jesus one being, two beings or three beings? I have asked you to dive into this. So far you have not done so. I think if you would dive into this, then my definition of apparent contradiction would become even more apparent to you. 

Your Friend,

Brian


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## RamistThomist

Civbert said:


> There is not contradiction in "one in essence and three in person".



And CVT agreed with that. Frame does thorough analysis on this point in his CVT book. But CVT (and Frame) are trying to answer tough questions.

when you break it down and explain yourself the problems arise.

Is "God" a personal being? If there's one God does this imply that there's one person? Or, if there are three numerically distinct persons, each fully divine, does this imply that there are three Gods? Is the idenity between the persons generic idenity or numeric idenity? Church history has seen each type of identity beset with problems. Is the "essence" impersonal? Is it tri-personal? So the essence is personal and the persons are personal?


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## RamistThomist

Robert Reymond gives a nice little summary of what Van Tillians mean when talking about paradoxes. Gary Crampton praises Reymond's dislike for "apparent contradictions" but in the quote below it looks as if we have our own "apparent contradiction: in either Reymond himself, or Crampton's review of Reymond! Says Reymond,
*
"Everywhere we look in Holy Scripture*, we find both destiny and contingency. We are well-used to the age old problem created by the competing emphasis of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, predestination and free will, election and covenant. *But in whatever terms we describe this biblical plarity, there can be no question that these dialectical emphases lie face up and side by side on virtually every page of holy Scripture. * The integration of these two themes is the problem of Christian soteriology. *Numerous attempts have been made* to provide an account of the Bible's theology of salvation in which they are reconciled, but in all such attempts one truth invariably suffers at the expense of the other. ... H*oly Scripture presents us with interacting ideas that, at least to finite minds, seem to be in conflict with one another, or at the very least seem impossible to harmonize."* - Robert Reymond, "Parental Conditions and the Promise of Grace to the Children of Believers (orignially prinited in 1996)," in "To You And Your Children: Examining The Biblical Doctrine of Covenant Succession," ed. Benjamin K. Wikner, 2005, p.3, emphasis mine.

If a Van Tillian had said something like that the Clarkians would call for his spiritual execution! He would be called "irrational," and "neo-modern." Now, where are the Clarkians in response to Robert Reymond? Is he too a "heretic?" Is he too the "root of Auburn Avenue Theology?" Is he an "irrationalist?"


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## Civbert

Draught Horse said:


> And CVT agreed with that. Frame does thorough analysis on this point in his CVT book. But CVT (and Frame) are trying to answer tough questions.


 How tough?


Draught Horse said:


> when you break it down and explain yourself the problems arise.
> 
> Is "God" a personal being?


 Depends on what you mean by "God" and personal being. God "the Father" is a person. What does "being" mean? 


Draught Horse said:


> If there's one God does this imply that there's one person?


 No. There are three persons. That is clear according to the reformed formulation of the Trinity. 


Draught Horse said:


> Or, if there are three numerically distinct persons, each fully divine, does this imply that there are three Gods?


 No. There is only one true God, who is one in essence, and three in persons. 


Draught Horse said:


> Is the identity between the persons generic identity or numeric identity?


 What's the difference?


Draught Horse said:


> Church history has seen each type of identity beset with problems. Is the "essence" impersonal?


 Maybe. Does it matter? It is not a "person". But since God is three in person, isn't God personal. What do you mean by impersonal?


Draught Horse said:


> Is it tri-personal?


 God is three in person. I don't know what "tri-personal" means. 


Draught Horse said:


> So the essence is personal and the persons are personal?


 So? That does not mean the essence is a person and the three are persons. There are three persons. 
[bible]Mat 3:16-17[/bible] Not one person, but three persons. 

I don't see these as difficult questions so much as speculative ones. I think the problem is a matter of understanding the point of the Scriptures claim that there is only "one God". It isn't a metaphysical or mystical claim, it merely a point of fact that all other "gods" are false. The Hebrews were not worried about the "oneness" of God, but the fact that the God of Abraham, Issac, and Moses, is the only true God. They already knew there was a plurality of persons in God from Genesis. [bible]gen 1:26[/bible]

The "one and the many" issue is a Greek metaphysical problem because they had trouble describing the nature of reality: (There are many cats, but what is the essence of cat that makes all cats cats. Is there a single universal true definition of cat that is the reality that defines cats? Do universal propositions exist? Yadda, yadda, yadda. ) But for the Hebrews, this is not an issue. Reality (as far as we have it) is the simply product of the Creator of all things. They did not have to explain reality by solving the "one and the many" paradox. The paradox is foreign to Judaism and Christianity. And the imposition of the "one and the many" on the Christian worldview has lead to this need for a "one and many" divine answer. 

So this speculation regarding the "essence" (other than one substance, power, and eternity WCF 2:3)) of one God, or how can God be both one and three is really a Greek worldview paradigm being imposed on Christianity. God is three in person, one in substance, power and eternity. There is no contradiction here, and any speculation that produces a contradiction is in error. Any speculation that does not lead to a contradiction is still speculative.

http://www.spaceandmotion.com/Metaphysics-One-Many-Infinite-Finite.htm


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## Davidius

*Edited by author*


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## Civbert

Draught Horse said:


> Robert Reymond :
> 
> 
> 
> ... Numerous attempts have been made to provide an account of the Bible's theology of salvation in which they are reconciled, but in all such attempts one truth invariably suffers at the expense of the other.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ... Now, where are the Clarkians in response to Robert Reymond? Is he too a "heretic?" Is he too the "root of Auburn Avenue Theology?" Is he an "irrationalist?"
Click to expand...


Nah. He just had a VT moment. Nobody's perfect. He's redeemed himself elsewhere.


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