# Hypostatic Union



## BibleCyst (Jul 9, 2013)

I'm not sure whether this is the correct section to post this in, but...

I have a question regarding the hypostatic union. Can Christ's two natures penetrate into each other? Or, are they both forever independent of each other; existing as one, but two none the less? In other words, could Christ's divine nature cause his human nature to be omnipresent? Or, to put it milder than that, when Jesus walked on water (which is something his human nature could not have done), was it only his divine nature that was walking on top of the waves? Or was it "the whole Jesus?"

According to the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD), his two natures could penetrate each other; even though they are fully independent of each other. Lutheran's still hold this view today. (Not sure about other denominations.) The Council of Chalcedon took place when the church was the Roman Catholic Church, so I was thinking there has to be a Reformed objection to this. Any insight?


----------



## Andres (Jul 9, 2013)

Here is what the WCF has to say about the nature of Christ: 



> WCF 8.2. The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance and equal with the Father, did, when the fullness of time was come, take upon him man's nature, with all the essential properties, and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin; being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and *distinct natures*, the Godhead and the manhood, were *inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion*. Which person is very God, and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man.


----------



## RamistThomist (Jul 9, 2013)

Depends on what you mean by "penetrate." If by penetrate you mean that the natures take upon themselves the hypostatic characteristics of the other nature, then no, we don't mean that. If Lutherans (and, ironically, Eastern Orthodox) aren't careful they end up with that. You can see it in their doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's human nature.

I have no problem saying the two natures "commune" with each other, though I probably can't exhaust the term "communion."



> when Jesus walked on water (which is something his human nature could not have done), was it only his divine nature that was walking on top of the waves? Or was it "the whole Jesus?"



It was the _Person_ who walked on water, not this or that human nature. We believe that the attributes of one nature are predicated to the whole person, and not to the other nature (WCF chapter 8, section something).


----------



## a mere housewife (Jul 9, 2013)

A good book to read on this topic, and many other questions relating to the doctrine of Christ:

A Christian’s Pocket Guide about Jesus Christ: Mark Jones: 9781845509514: Amazon.com: Books

 (Déjà vu)


----------



## Jack K (Jul 9, 2013)

Cameronian said:


> > when Jesus walked on water (which is something his human nature could not have done), was it only his divine nature that was walking on top of the waves? Or was it "the whole Jesus?"
> 
> 
> It was the Person who walked on water, not this or that human nature. We believe that the attributes of one nature are predicated to the whole person, and not to the other nature (WCF chapter 8, section something).



Quite right. Jesus the whole person walked on water.

Let's also add this: Who says a human cannot walk on water? Peter did it, for a while, by faith. So, everytime we read of Jesus performing a miracle, we don't have to say "that was the divine nature, not the human one." Jesus the man lived among us as a prophet from God, ushering in a new age, exercising perfect faith and relying on the power of the Spirit. Shouldn't we except miracles from such a man? While many of his miracles do seem to attest to his divinity, we should not just push his humanity into the background at those points.


----------



## BibleCyst (Jul 9, 2013)

Cameronian said:


> Depends on what you mean by "penetrate." If by penetrate you mean that the natures take upon themselves the hypostatic characteristics of the other nature, then no, we don't mean that. If Lutherans (and, ironically, Eastern Orthodox) aren't careful they end up with that. You can see it in their doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's human nature.
> 
> I have no problem saying the two natures "commune" with each other, though I probably can't exhaust the term "communion."
> 
> ...



I confess that penetrate is probably not the best word for what I'm referring to, but it was the only one I could think of. I think you're right: referring to the two natures of Christ as being in communion with each other seems a lot more reasonable then saying that the two natures can share characteristics between them. Just to make sure I'm getting this straight, a Reformed person would say that the two natures of Christ are autonomous, but at the same time joined together in the same person? And, that either nature can manifest through that person? This is a confusing topic... I'm beginning to wish I hadn't "went there." Haha!

Thank you for clearing that particular example up about the walking on water.


----------



## BibleCyst (Jul 9, 2013)

Here is the article that sparked my curiosity on this. It was written by a guy named Jordan Cooper, who is a Pastor who went from PCA to LCMS. I think you guys touched on the Reformed contrast to this pretty well, but I still feel sort of in the dark. Is there an easy way to refute this? I feel like it's easy to argue with it on a rational level, but I haven't been able to find very much scripture to back it up. Just and Sinner: A Defense of the Omnipresence of Christ's Human Nature


----------



## py3ak (Jul 9, 2013)

Richie, it can be bit of a confusing topic, probably in large measure because we can't _imagine_ what the hypostatic union is like, and our theological terms modestly affirm something without explanation, lest heretics take advantage of silence to teach error. But the Westminster Confession summarizes these matters about as cogently as is possible.

Chapter 8, Paragraphs 2,3,7:

II. The Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance and equal with the Father, did, when the fullness of time was come, take upon Him man's nature, with all the essential properties, and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin; being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God, and very man, yet one Christ, the only Mediator between God and man.

III. The Lord Jesus, in His human nature thus united to the divine, was sanctified, and anointed with the Holy Spirit, above measure, having in Him all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; in whom it pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell; to the end that, being holy, harmless, undefiled, and full of grace and truth, He might be thoroughly furnished to execute the office of a Mediator and Surety. Which office He took not unto Himself, but was thereunto called by His Father, who put all power and judgment into His hand, and gave Him commandment to execute the same.

VII. Christ, in the work of mediation, acts according to both natures, by each nature doing that which is proper to itself; yet, by reason of the unity of the person, that which is proper to one nature is sometimes in Scripture attributed to the person denominated by the other nature.​
The divine and human natures are united only in the person of Christ. Hence there is no _conversion, composition, or confusion._ Thus the divine nature is always itself, always distinct from the human nature, and of course, independent.
But speaking of the human nature as "independent" might lead to the wrong conclusion. The human nature is anhypostatic - its personality _is_ the person of the Son. Calling it "independent" might suggest that there is a human person. But while the human nature that Christ assumed is complete and entire in every part, it is a nature, not a person, an individual.

Anyway, in what the WCF says there are a couple of points that seem particularly germane to your inquiry.

Section 7 tells you that the Son does according to each nature what is proper to it; thus it is actually _as man_ that he walks on the water; God doesn't walk. But because the one who does these things (whether sleeping or dying, or fulfilling prophecy and judging) is God and man, he can be spoken of in names drawn from either nature - even if the action being described belongs to the other nature.

Section 3 tells you a very important point for Reformed Christology: it is the fullness of the Spirit poured out on Jesus' human nature. The hypostatic union had very real effects - Christ was impeccable even in his human nature because of it, for instance. But it didn't make Jesus into a man with magical powers; his miracles, whether of wisdom or might, old creation or new, were performed by the power of the Holy Spirit.

Section 2 tells you that each nature is truly itself, and can't be changed into something else. So no, Christ according to his humanity can never be omnipresent - that is a violation of what it means to be a creature. 

I hope you will not be discouraged from pursuing the topic: understanding the genuine humanity of Christ is an enormous help in our struggles and trials - it was meant to be, per Hebrews 2, 4, and 5. In the Psalms we can see the heart and mind of Christ in his earthly pilgrimage, and they make it quite plain that learning obedience by the things that he suffered was no easy process.


----------



## Afterthought (Jul 9, 2013)

py3ak said:


> But speaking of the human nature as "independent" might lead to the wrong conclusion. The human nature is anhypostatic - its personality is the person of the Son. Calling it "independent" might suggest that there is a human person. But while the human nature that Christ assumed is complete and entire in every part, it is a nature, not a person, an individual.


To check my own understanding as I've been following this thread... Would it be correct to say the man Christ Jesus is the second person of the Trinity, the eternal Son of God? That the person of the human nature is divine? That Jesus is not a human person but a divine person and only a divine person? My own mind has been going in that direction as I've been contemplating the Shorter Catechism's statement, but I'd love to make sure this is correct since the topic is right here.

How about when we say, "Jesus is God" or "Jesus is man"? It seems what we really mean is "Jesus has a divine nature" and "Jesus has a human nature"? Though in the former, it is vague enough that "God" could be referring to the person of Jesus, while in the latter "man" can in no way refer to the person of Jesus but must always refer to the nature of the person Jesus? I hope I've worded that properly, but I may have slipped a bit...


----------



## py3ak (Jul 9, 2013)

Raymond, the orthodox have typically spoken of Christ as a _theanthropic_ person, because the Logos is truly human and truly divine, yet only one person. So it's not quite correct to say that he is _not_ a human person. He is, because he is a person who exists in human nature. But the human nature he assumed was impersonal, because the person was pre-existent. 

Yes, Jesus is the second person of the Trinity: there is no one else for him to be, if you see what I mean. In a way, this is the value of the _theotokos_ controversy. Why do we call Mary the mother of God? Because it was the Logos who assumed human nature of her substance and to whom she gave birth.

That's certainly part of what we mean; but of course you don't want to give the impression that the person somehow exists outside of the concrete natures. In the case of the humanity, of course the person was first, which isn't how it normally works (human nature existed before you and I were instantiations of it); but you couldn't have a person with no nature at all.


----------



## RamistThomist (Jul 10, 2013)

Afterthought said:


> py3ak said:
> 
> 
> > But speaking of the human nature as "independent" might lead to the wrong conclusion. The human nature is anhypostatic - its personality is the person of the Son. Calling it "independent" might suggest that there is a human person. But while the human nature that Christ assumed is complete and entire in every part, it is a nature, not a person, an individual.
> ...



It is more accurate to say that the divine person existed before the union. The human nature of Christ had no concrete existence before the union. Dr Scott Clark has a helpful page on this. Clark says,



> The Reformed doctrine of the communication of the properties (communicatio idiomatum) is this: What can be said of the two natures can be said of the person but what can be said of the person cannot ipso facto be said of the two natures


----------



## Afterthought (Jul 10, 2013)

Thank you, Ruben and Jacob! That's very helpful. It seems one difficulty with this subject is using language carefully. "Human person" must mean "a person that has a human nature"; "divine person" could mean "a person that has a divine nature" or it could mean "that particular divine person" (of which there are only three). I'm even tempted to say that, since the Son of God assumed nature and since Jesus remains the Son of God still, the person did not change once the union was made. But even that seems it needs qualification, since the person did change with respect to nature; but even that needs to be qualified, since the nature of the person did not change but rather the person took on an additional nature!

It seems "something" remains before and after the union and that is that the person before and after the union is the Son of God, correct? Or does this tend to separate "person" from "nature"? (Perhaps the statement needs to be that the Son of God remained the same divine person? Though I'm not entirely sure that is the correct way to put it either!) What is the correct way to word this, or is there no other way but to speak in terms of "The Son of God assumed an impersonal human nature" (i.e., in an "incarnational" past tense)? William Cunningham in his Historical theology writes: "It is enough ... to remember that it was the person of the Son, the eternal Word, who,* retaining His own proper personality*, assumed, not a human person, but human nature, into union with the divine." Perhaps that gives a way to speak of what does not change? That the person--with respect to personality--is the same before and after the incarnation?


----------



## py3ak (Jul 10, 2013)

Raymond, the question of how to describe this is always going to be a bit difficult - it could hardly be otherwise. We all lisp and falter with these things, and I think you will find some differences of opinion over the best way of explaining them.

Here is A.A. Hodge:



> The same Person is called God because of his divinity, while it is affirmed that he shed his human blood for his Church. Again: while standing among his disciples on the earth, he says. “The Son of man, which is in heaven.” Here the same Person, who is called Son of man because of his humanity, is declared to be omnipresent — that is, at the same time on earth and in heaven — as to his divine nature. This, of course, implies absolute singleness of Person, including at once divine and human attributes.
> Again: the Scriptures teach us that this amazing personality does not centre in his humanity, and that it is not a composite one originated by the power of the Spirit when he brought the two natures together in the womb of the Virgin Mary. It was not made by adding manhood to Godhead. The Trinity is eternal and unchangeable. A new Person is not substituted for the second Person of the Trinity, neither is a fourth Person added to the Trinity. But the Person of Christ is just the one eternal Word, the second Person of the Trinity, which in time, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the instrumentality of the womb of the Virgin, took a human nature (not a man, but the seed of man, humanity in the germ) into personal union with himself. The Person is eternal and divine. The humanity is introduced into it. The centre of the personality always continues in the eternal personal Word or Son of God.
> Let me illustrate this by your personality and mine. We consist of soul and body, two distinct substances, but one person. This personality, however, is not composed of the union of soul and body at birth. The personality from the first to the last centres in the soul, and is only shared in by the body. By soul we mean only one thing — that is, an incarnate spirit, a spirit with a body. Thus we never speak of the souls of angels. They are pure spirits, having no bodies. Put a spirit in a body, and the spirit becomes a soul, and the body is quickened into life and becomes a part of the person of the soul. Separate soul and body, as death does, and the soul becomes a ghost and the body becomes a corpse. When death takes place the body passes out of the personality, is called “it,” and is placed in the grave; while the soul, still continuing the person, goes at once to be judged of God. At the resurrection the same personal soul will return and take up the same body once discarded, and, receiving it again into its personality, will stand before God a complete man.
> So the divine Word, which from eternity was the second Person of the Trinity, did eighteen hundred years ago take, not a human person, but a human nature into his eternal personality, which ever continues, not a human person nor a divine-human person, but the eternal second Person of the Trinity, with a human nature embraced in it as its personal organ.



Christ is the same person before and after the incarnation - there is continuity of personal identity, as there could hardly fail to be in an eternal and unchangeable person. And yet there is something new, because after the incarnation we can speak of the theanthropos, and we could not before. Here is Aquinas:



> The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person [e.g., by John of Damascus], insomuch as one being subsists in two.



It is the Logos who is now the theanthropos. If you look at it from the standpoint of continuity, Hodge's statement is true; if you look at it from the standpoint of the fact that the Logos genuinely is the only subsistence of a human, John of Damascus makes sense. The Logos is the man Jesus, without ceasing to be God the Son. It is perhaps the most amazing miracle of the Incarnation that there is this grace of personal union, that God the Son is personally man.


----------



## Afterthought (Jul 11, 2013)

py3ak said:


> It is perhaps the most amazing miracle of the Incarnation that there is this grace of personal union, that God the Son is personally man.


It sure is. Thank you for the help! On another topic, with respect to the Confession's paragraph about sometimes attributing things belonging to one nature to the Person denominated by the other nature, I also found Cunningham's caution useful: namely, that should not be overdone and be kept to the Scriptural examples of this manner of speaking. That is something I wasn't consciously thinking of before.


----------



## py3ak (Jul 11, 2013)

I'll have to look for that in Cunningham. Depending on how strongly he means that, he might not be in step with large parts of church history. I tend to think that Scripture usually does not give us an exhaustive list but rather representative samples of appropriate manners of speaking.


----------



## Afterthought (Jul 13, 2013)

Interesting. Here is the quotation. It's from his _Historical Theology_ again, near the end of the section on the Nestorian controversy. Going by the bare words, it seems he means it quite strongly, but going by his concerns (the "minute and elaborate"), he may have intended it less strongly. But of course, I wouldn't know whether he is aligned with church history on this.

"The second part of the statement just quoted from the Confession is a mere assertion of a fact in regard to a certain scriptural usage of language, and its accuracy is proved by such texts as this — "Hereby perceive we the love of God, because He laid down His life for us." Dying is, of course, proper to the human nature ; yet it is here attributed to God — the person denominated by the divine nature ; and the ground or reason of the attribution is, that that person who laid down His life, and did so as man, was also God. *The Confession, in making this statement, merely notices a fact, or points out an actual scriptural usage of language; but is not to be understood as laying down any general principle by which we may be guided in our use of language. We ought to make no such attributions of what is proper to one nature to the person denominated by the other, except only when the Scripture has gone before us, and sanctioned it. *Some persons, upon the ground that instances of this usage of language occur in Scripture, have thought themselves warranted to indulge in minute and elaborate attributions of what was proper to the one nature, to the person denominated by the other, and thus to form an elaborate series of startling and prima facie contradictory or irreconcilable positions, — declaring of Christ's human nature, or at least of Christ as man, what was true only of the divine, or of Christ as God, and vice versa, — a practice which I cannot but regard as inconsistent with the awe and reverence with which the great mystery of godliness — God manifest in the flesh — ought ever to be contemplated."


----------



## py3ak (Jul 14, 2013)

To those making allusions to "some persons" in published works: please include a footnote with a sample or two so subsequent generations can pin down more easily what you are talking about.

At a guess, I'd say Cunningham probably has the _theotokos_ in mind, or at least that this was what suggested the observation to him, given that this occurs in the context of the Nestorian controversy. Something like Charles Wesley's, "...the immortal dies" is a nearer example. 

Augustine (Sermon 170) gives what might be called a paradoxical list:


> Maker of the sun, He is made under the sun. In the Father He remains, from His mother He goes forth. Creator of heaven and earth, He was born on earth under heaven. Unspeakably wise, He is wisely speechless. Filling the world, He lies in a manger. Ruler of the stars, He nurses at His mother’s bosom. He is both great in the nature of God, and small in the form of a servant.



A better example might be Leo's Sermon 22:


> Therefore, when the time came, dearly beloved, which had been fore-ordained for men’s redemption, there enters these lower parts of the world, the Son of God, descending from His heavenly throne and yet not quitting His Father’s glory, begotten in a new order, by a new nativity. In a new order, because being invisible in His own nature He became visible in ours, and He whom nothing could contain, was content to be contained: abiding before all time He began to be in time: the LORD of all things, He obscured His immeasurable majesty and took on Him the form of a servant: being GOD, that cannot suffer, He did not disdain to be man that can, and immortal as He is, to subject Himself to the laws of death.



Spurgeon also does something similar, though he calls it scarcely paradoxical:


> How complex is the person of our Lord Jesus Christ! Almost in the same breath the prophet calls him a “child,” and a “counselor,” a “son,” and “the everlasting Father.” This is no contradiction, and to us scarcely a paradox, but it is a mighty marvel that he who was an infant should at the same time be infinite, he who was the Man of Sorrows should also be God over all, blessed for ever; and that he who is in the Divine Trinity always called the Son, should nevertheless be correctly called “the everlasting Father.”



These are certainly not perfect examples of what Cunningham objected to, but they might suggest the lines along which you could make statements which would have received his disapprobation.


----------



## Ask Mr. Religion (Jul 14, 2013)

From the Chalcedonian Definition, one can best understand this _hypostatic union_ (together united in one subsistence and in one single person) by examining what it is not, thus from the process of elimination determine what it must be.

The hypostatic union is not:

1. a denial that Christ was truly God (*Ebionites, Elkasites, Arians*);
2. a dissimilar or different substance (_anomoios_) with the Father (*semi-Arianism*);
3. a denial that Christ had a genuine human soul (*Apollinarians*);
4. a denial of a distinct person in the Trinity (*Dynamic Monarchianism*);
5. God acting merely in the forms of the Son and Spirit (*Modalistic Monarchianism/Sabellianism/United Pentecostal Church*);
6. a mixture or change when the two natures were united (*Eutychianism/Monophysitism*);
7. two distinct persons (*Nestorianism*);
8. a denial of the true humanity of Christ (*docetism*);
9. a view that God the Son laid aside all or some of His divine attributes (*kenoticism*);
10. a view that there was a communication of the attributes between the divine and human natures (*Lutheranism, with respect to the Lord's Supper*); and
11. a view that Jesus existed independently as a human before God entered His body (*Adoptionism*).


----------



## Afterthought (Jul 15, 2013)

Thank you. Seems like a fair enough analysis, given the lack of information on Cunningham's part.


----------



## BibleCyst (Jul 24, 2013)

Thank you all for the amazing insight!


----------

