# Two Reformed Views of God's Sovereignty



## Neogillist (Feb 16, 2009)

I found an interesting discussion on the following blog by a professor of philosophical theology in the UK Helm's Deep. I usually don't read blogs because most are put up by ignorant people who think they know a lot, but this one I find really good. 

Read the following: Helm's Deep: Analysis 12 - Twisse's Twist

Afterwards, you may read John Owen's view of God's sovereignty here: Helm's Deep: Analysis 13 - Owen's Option

Personally, I agree with Twisse, Perkin and Rutherford. God's will is primary, although it does not contradict His nature. I have been studying the book of Job lately, and in view of what Job suffered as an innocent and upright man, Twisse is right, that God can rightfully inflict pain on his creatures for his own glory just as when we put our beasts to work for our own use.


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## MW (Feb 16, 2009)

I think it would be safe to say that Owen came to reject the reformed voluntarist tradition because of his desire to better safeguard the nature of the atonement by grounding it in the inflexible justice of God. The problem is, he depended on the voluntarist tradition to refute the Arminian concept that God must show love to every man. Eventually the necessitarian tradition won out in the 19th century.


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## Neogillist (Feb 17, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> I think it would be safe to say that Owen came to reject the reformed voluntarist tradition because of his desire to better safeguard the nature of the atonement by grounding it in the inflexible justice of God. The problem is, he depended on the voluntarist tradition to refute the Arminian concept that God must show love to every man. Eventually the necessitarian tradition won out in the 19th century.



Very interesting, indeed. That must explain why R. C. Sproul wrote in his little book entitled "The Truth of the Cross" saying "it couldn't have happened any other way." I think John Piper also wrote a book in which he claims that God could not have saved us any other way, so that the necessitarian view is mainstream among today's Reformed theologians. I personally prefer the voluntarist position because it answers the question more simply, that we are to believe in Christ because he is the way the Father has appointed for us to be saved. The necessitarian position requires a whole lot more logic to be added in order to support its cause, and many aspects of the atonement as being necessary for the satisfaction of God's justice appear to be purely arbitrary to me; such as whether Christ had to actually die on a cross rather than on an altar; or that he had to suffer the torments of hell for three hours, rather than eternally, etc.

I had a missionary friend once who was asked by a Buddhist why God is so selfish as to require that there be only one way to be saved. While my friend (an arminian) sought to respond by explaining that God is not selfish, I would have probably told the guy that if God were not selfish, He would not be God, since that would imply that there is a being greater and more glorious than Himself.


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## Confessor (Feb 17, 2009)

Thanks for bringing this topic up. I was unaware of the distinction.


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## Confessor (Feb 17, 2009)

It looks like there is a distinction that can be made within the voluntarist position: God can inflict pain as He wants to upon His creatures whether they deserve it or not, but if they do deserve it, then...

1. some type of punishment is due (either on Christ or on the sinners directly in hell). There are different means to go about this, but some debt is due. *OR*

2. God can choose to forgive them freely, merely by His decree.

#1 looks like a _weak voluntarism_. while #2 a _strong voluntarism_.

Is this an accurate distinction?

It seems as if there _have_ to be certain logical restrictions on God. For instance, if He has purposed to do something, He cannot go back on it, for He has already decreed that He will not do so. Moreover, Jean-David said that His will _cannot_ contradict His nature -- meaning there are logical restraints on what He can do. (This topic has a strong tie to God's omnipotence and logical possibilities.)

From this, it looks correct to label Jehovah with weak voluntarism, while (e.g.) Allah would receive the label of strong voluntarism, as Muslims are usually afraid even to apply logic to him. Would the guys more experienced in these fields tell me if this is correct?


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## Neogillist (Feb 18, 2009)

Confessor said:


> It looks like there is a distinction that can be made within the voluntarist position: God can inflict pain as He wants to upon His creatures whether they deserve it or not, but if they do deserve it, then...
> 
> 1. some type of punishment is due (either on Christ or on the sinners directly in hell). There are different means to go about this, but some debt is due. *OR*
> 
> ...



I don't know enough about Islamic theology to argue whether or not Muslims have a voluntarist view of Allah's sovereignty. What I do know is that they tend to view their god as a Tyrant (that is what they occasionally call Allah), and that He is occasionally cruel, (and thus also condones certain cruel acts to be committed by his servants). This view is obviously not biblical, since we are defining evil according to our own human intuition and ascribing it to Allah's will.

The Reformed position is that if God wills it, then it must be good because God is good and so He cannot contradict Himself. I think the following paragraph from the article explains it well:

"Twisse makes a substantive distinction between God's essential nature and his will in respect of his wisdom and justice. God, unlike men and women, does not have an obligation to his moral attributes. (Riches of God’s Love, II.112) He had no obligation to create the universe, nevertheless the manner in which he creates must be just in that it is an exercise of God’s lawful power as Creator (Riches II.153). He is the Lord of life, to grant it or not, to prolong it or to end it. As Twisse puts the point in his Riches of God’s Love."

I think the main distinction between the voluntarist and the necessitarian position is that in the voluntarist, God's will is logically first and so goodness and justice must be defined according to what is God's will, while according to the necessitarian, God's goodness and justice are first, and His will is subordinate to His attributes.

There was a hyper-Calvinist named James Well in 19th century England (a contemporary and friend of C. H. Spurgeon) who was controversial for teaching that God's nature is determined by His will, rather than his will being determined by his nature. Now, I am not totally sure what is implied by that. If he implied that God can act against his moral attributes, that would be blasphemy as pointed out earlier, but if he simply meant that God's will is logically first as the voluntarist argues, that would be the same as Twisse's view.

As for your distinction, I don't know if it is a correct representation of the position because looking at Samuel Rutherford's quotation, He would seem to classify as a "strong voluntarist."

"God, if we speak of his absolute power, without respect to his free decree, could have pardoned sin without a ransom, and gifted all mankind and fallen angels with heaven, without any satisfaction of either the sinner, or his surety"
– Samuel Rutherford


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## Scott1 (Feb 18, 2009)

> Neogillist
> 
> The Reformed position is that if God wills it, then it must be good because God is good and so He cannot contradict Himself. I think the following paragraph from the article explains it well:



I'm not familiar with the views mentioned here.

This quote, seems, could be explained in this way. God is "good" and He defines what "good" is because He is, by definition "good." 

As His created creatures, we have no right to arbitrate "goodness" and impute our imagination of whether God is in fact good or not to Him, in the general or in the particular.

God defines what "good" is, whatever He does, whatever He is, that is GOOD.


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## Dieter Schneider (Feb 18, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> I think it would be safe to say that Owen came to reject the reformed voluntarist tradition because of his desire to better safeguard the nature of the atonement by grounding it in the inflexible justice of God. The problem is, he depended on the voluntarist tradition to refute the Arminian concept that God must show love to every man. Eventually the necessitarian tradition won out in the 19th century.



The believer is commanded to '"love one's neighbor'" (divine imperative - MUST). Are we to be more loving than God (divine indicative)?


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## MW (Feb 18, 2009)

Dieter Schneider said:


> The believer is commanded to '"love one's neighbor'" (divine imperative - MUST). Are we to be more loving than God (divine indicative)?



First, God has no neighbours. Second, a believer is not the Judge of the world. Third, love can be defined in terms of commitment to another's well being; God's voluntary commitment to His creation is expressed in His opposition to all that threatens its well being. Psalm 136. God is clearly more loving than all creation put together.


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## Dieter Schneider (Feb 20, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> Dieter Schneider said:
> 
> 
> > The believer is commanded to '"love one's neighbor'" (divine imperative - MUST). Are we to be more loving than God (divine indicative)?
> ...



Thanks for your comments.


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## Confessor (Feb 22, 2009)

I was thinking about necessitarianism and voluntarism, and here are the propositions I came up with:

1. Whatever God does is good, just, beautiful, etc., but it doesn't follow that He can do _anything_. In other words, He is in fact the standard of these qualities, and everything He does is these things, but it does not follow that any action is _a priori_ possible for Him to choose. For instance, we can say that God would never prescribe murder (or any sin) as a general precept, since He has already proscribed such things. We can also say that God would never choose not to exist, as it is impossible for a self-existent being to choose to do so. This is not to place limitations of power on God, for we are merely saying that God cannot do the illogical.

2. God's attributes are defined by His actions in Scripture; we cannot impose our own definitions of love, justice, beauty, etc. onto Him. We cannot take the Arminian approach and say, "It makes sense that an omnibenevolent being love everybody; therefore God loves everybody." We must get our premises from Scripture and from _valid_ deductions elsewhere (i.e., the light of nature), and of course we must always check these deductions through the scope of Scripture which "judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart" (Heb. 4:12).

3. While God is certainly allowed to inflict pain on His creatures at any point in time for His glory, it doesn't follow that strong voluntarism is true. That is, although God may inflict pain regardless of creaturely culpability, it does not follow that the presence of creaturely culpability does not _necessitate_ divine retribution. Therefore the book of Job does not prove strong voluntarism.

4. Justice by its very nature (i.e., the communicable attribute of God in humans), and as put forth in the Bible, does not seem to be coherent with strong voluntarism. The Bible says that the wages of sin is death (Rom. 6:23), the Bible establishes laws of God that are built on a causal relationship, crime ==> punishment (e.g. Gen. 9:6), the Old Testament is built upon the fact that sin _requires_ an atoning blood sacrifice, and the Bible says nothing about God's ability to ignore sin or to brush it aside. While such verses may not absolutely negate the possibility of strong voluntarism, I nonetheless do not see a _positive_ case for it from Scripture.

5. Sin always leaves a debt to be paid by _somebody_. Even in the most ordinary situations on the earth, this is the case: imagine that a friend of yours has just stolen from you, and in an attempt to pay you back for the sin he committed he gives you back what he stole. However, there still remains a debt, a hole, because of this sin. The actual moment when he completely disregarded your status as an owner of property and decided to steal from you still affected and affects you. And this debt cannot be removed unless forgiveness occur or retribution occur. If the former, then you shoulder the debt yourself, as forgiveness is painful; if the latter, the culprit shoulders the debt, which can be in the form of any appropriate retributive punishment. Regardless of the means of this debt-removal, however, it is clear that some debt _must_ be repaid, _necessarily_ speaking. This is the nature of sin, justice, and forgiveness, and it seems improper to view it as substantively different in God's actions, especially without a positive warrant from Scripture.

In fact, this is absolutely consistent with the atonement: God's forgiving us of our sins necessitated that He shoulder the debt Himself, which is necessarily painful, as seen in the cross. Someone may object that He did not take the pain Himself, but rather imputed it to Christ, but that may be easily resolved by appealing to the mystery of the Trinity. As for the objection that God cannot feel legitimate pain because He is eternally blessed, I point to the mystery of the Incarnation as an answer.

6. Although I am of the position that justice (including divine justice) necessitates retribution -- i.e. God cannot choose to forgive sin "willy-nilly" -- I am not of the position that whatever means of justice God chooses are the only possible means. While I do believe that sin must be atoned for, and while I cannot imagine another means than the sacrifice of Christ, I do not believe that His sacrifice is the only possible logical means of reconciling the elect to God. Therefore any polemic which imputes this onto the necessitarian position is a straw man.

------

Therefore, I would consider myself a necessitarian in regards to divine justice, because that is what God has revealed of Himself in special and general revelation -- therefore I am not committing the Arminian error of extra-biblical speculation. I do not believe that the cross is the only possible means of propitiation, but I do believe that justice necessitates action from God, for to do otherwise (i.e., to ignore sin) would be unjust of God, and therefore a choice of God to ignore sin altogether or to pretend as if some real debt does not need to be repaid is a logical impossibility.


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## moral necessity (Feb 22, 2009)

After reading that article, I would tend to disagree with Twisse, if that is a true representation of what he believed. If God has no obligation to his own nature, then all assurance of his covenantal promises towards us vanish, as God could arbitrarily choose to violate his word at any time. We could have no hope founded on anything sure and certain, but only on promises that he may choose to not keep after all.


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## py3ak (Feb 22, 2009)

Charles, what if you look at it like this?

God is not bound by nature, so that rather than being a necessity of nature, His sovereign purpose has all the glorious liberty and unconditionedness of a truly free choice. That means that His purpose of grace is truly grace -not a reflex of His "nature", but a decision of His will.

However, that does not in the least mitigate our assurance. For one thing, God's purpose is unchangeable: His will is constant. Does it not seem like a lack of confidence to say, "If God doesn't _have_ to do this I can't know that He will?" To illustrate a great thing by a small, Heidi may not _have_ to make my dinner; it is within her power to refuse to do so; but I nonetheless trust that she will not.

And finally, God has bound Himself, which I think is greater than any necessity. And He did it in order to confirm more abundantly the immutability of His counsel. So He took an oath which renders His free decision to save His people as certain as His own existence (see Hugh Martin on Hebrews 6 in, _Christ for Us_.


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## MW (Feb 22, 2009)

moral necessity said:


> If God has no obligation to his own nature, then all assurance of his covenantal promises towards us vanish, as God could arbitrarily choose to violate his word at any time.



What is this "nature" that God is obliged to respect? It sounds like a second God to me. At the very least it argues against the traditional view of God's simplicity.

The oft used phrase of Scripture, "for His name's sake," is sufficient guarantee that God will keep His Word -- nothing less than His own sovereign reputation is at stake.


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## MW (Feb 22, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Therefore the book of Job does not prove strong voluntarism.



Surely at the very least the book of Job teaches us that we cannot by searching find out the Almighty unto perfection; or, as the apostle to the Gentiles stated it, "how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out." What man in his right mind would assume to know what is and is not just for God to do? It is for infinite wisdom alone to discover the way in which mercy can be extended to the sinner so as to maintain the claims of justice. If it were something which could be contrived by human wisdom, then the divine origin of the Christian faith would become questionable. Let us rest in the certain knowledge that what God does is always most wise, most holy, most just, most merciful, and therefore He made sufficient and effectual provision for the salvation of sinners in the atonement of Jesus Christ. We ought not to limit the Most High by confining His actions to a "nature" in which humans can contain Him.


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## Confessor (Feb 22, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> We ought not to limit the Most High by confining His actions to a "nature" in which humans can contain Him.



Please note that this is not my position. I am trying to cling as closely as possible to the biblical account; hence I reject strong voluntarism, positing rather that God's justice demands a necessary punishment/debt for any wrongdoing.


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## MW (Feb 22, 2009)

Confessor said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> > We ought not to limit the Most High by confining His actions to a "nature" in which humans can contain Him.
> ...



I can't say that I understand your distinction between strong and weak since you equate strong voluntarism with Islamic fatalism, which is denied by all Christian theologians; but to say that God's justice demands a specific course of action is to deny voluntarism of any kind.


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## Prufrock (Feb 22, 2009)

Confessor said:


> I am trying to cling as closely as possible to the biblical account; hence I reject strong voluntarism, positing rather that God's justice demands a necessary punishment/debt for any wrongdoing.



In our following the biblical account, we must keep in mind distinctions between the _absolute_ and the _ordained_. In the ordained order, man must eat to survive.


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## Confessor (Feb 22, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> I can't say that I understand you distinction between strong and weak since you equate strong volunatism with Islamic fatalism, which is denied by all Christian theologians; but to say that God's justice demands a specific course of action is to deny volunatarism of any kind.



I will try to work on some better distinctions and labels and get back to you on this. Thank you for making the clear-cut distinction about justice and voluntarism: "to say that God's justice demands a specific course of action is to deny voluntarism of any kind."


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## moral necessity (Feb 22, 2009)

py3ak said:


> Charles, what if you look at it like this?
> 
> God is not bound by nature, so that rather than being a necessity of nature, His sovereign purpose has all the glorious liberty and unconditionedness of a truly free choice. That means that His purpose of grace is truly grace -not a reflex of His "nature", but a decision of His will.
> 
> ...



Thanks, Ruben. I seem to have a hard time following this way of seeing it, I suppose. To me, the phrase "will of God" sort of automatically constrains the term "will" anyway, to be the "will" that belongs to and is a servant of something, namely "God". It is "God's will", and therefore must be forced to be constrained to always act in accordance with the nature or character of it's owner, namely God. For it to have an ability to act outside of the character of God seems to me to give an unwarranted amount of power to something, that now makes that something seem to be more almighty than God himself even is. Then, the question could be asked, "Could God do evil?", with the answer being "yes." For, what would constrain him not to do evil, if it were not his nature or character?

Thanks for your thoughts Ruben, and for the book reference. As always, I highly respect your words and your opinions.

Blessings, brother!

-----Added 2/22/2009 at 11:00:23 EST-----

Perhaps I have misunderstood the point Twisse was trying to make. I'll re-read it again, and re-evaluate my thoughts. Please disregard my posts if they seemed to misunderstand his point.

Blessings!


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## jogri17 (Feb 22, 2009)

aww supralasparians....


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## Prufrock (Feb 22, 2009)

jogri17 said:


> ]Jesus is our peace. The God of the Supra. is one of cold determinism and fatalism that the person ignores the truth about the freedom of the will (htough in bondage).



*?* 

I think this is normally the charge laid against Calvinists period. Doesn't make it true.

Not to take this thread off-topic, but perhaps you'd be interested in starting a thread about supralapsarianism so as to have some misunderstandings cleared up? 

As it is, however, a theological voluntarist can hold either lapsarian position.


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## py3ak (Mar 1, 2009)

moral necessity said:


> Thanks, Ruben. I seem to have a hard time following this way of seeing it, I suppose. To me, the phrase "will of God" sort of automatically constrains the term "will" anyway, to be the "will" that belongs to and is a servant of something, namely "God". It is "God's will", and therefore must be forced to be constrained to always act in accordance with the nature or character of it's owner, namely God. For it to have an ability to act outside of the character of God seems to me to give an unwarranted amount of power to something, that now makes that something seem to be more almighty than God himself even is. Then, the question could be asked, "Could God do evil?", with the answer being "yes." For, what would constrain him not to do evil, if it were not his nature or character?
> 
> Thanks for your thoughts Ruben, and for the book reference. As always, I highly respect your words and your opinions.
> 
> Blessings, brother!



Charles, I'm sorry I didn't see this until today. Here is a quote from Heppe's _Reformed Dogmatics_ which I think answers the objection you raised:

"Since God's will is not a blind urge but an _appetitus intelligen_s, it must indeed be distinguished from scientia. Yet it coincides with it in such a way, that it may be conceived as just the obverse of it, i.e., God wills precisely because He wills it: the divine willing is the divine nature itself."

Or this from Calvin: (Institutes III.23.2) 


> The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found. Let human temerity then be quiet, and cease to inquire after what exists not, lest perhaps it fails to find what does exist.


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## moral necessity (Mar 2, 2009)

py3ak said:


> Charles, I'm sorry I didn't see this until today. Here is a quote from Heppe's _Reformed Dogmatics_ which I think answers the objection you raised:
> 
> "Since God's will is not a blind urge but an _appetitus intelligen_s, it must indeed be distinguished from scientia. Yet it coincides with it in such a way, that it may be conceived as just the obverse of it, i.e., God wills precisely because He wills it: the divine willing is the divine nature itself."
> 
> ...



Thanks, Ruben, for your reply!

I agree w/ both of your quotes here very well. I don't understand Latin very well, however, and so I speculate that I understand your first quote in it's entirety, when I perhaps may not. But anyway, I printed off the papers from the original OP, and will read them w/ more strictness this week, and reply soon. After re-reading the posts again today, I seem to understand and agree very well w/ the points that Confessor brought up in several posts. I see a distinction between the "nature" and the "will", that perhaps others do not see such a scruple over. It very well could be that I am wrong....as you and others are very well more experienced in the language and theology than I am. But, I have an "image" in my mind that seems to work for how all of that fit's together.......and, right now.....it just doesn't seem to fit if the "will" is equal to the "nature". I'll try to think through things within the conglomeration of my own mind for a few days, and see if I can come up w/ a simple way of explaining why it's a dilemmna to me. But, until that time, I wanted to let you know that I am dwelling on what you've said, and will filter it in as best as I can. 

Blessings!

-----Added 3/2/2009 at 02:14:14 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> moral necessity said:
> 
> 
> > If God has no obligation to his own nature, then all assurance of his covenantal promises towards us vanish, as God could arbitrarily choose to violate his word at any time.
> ...



Blessings, Rev. Winzer!

Thank you for spending time on my post! I truly desire to see clearly and learn from the wisdom of others who God has gifted for certain purposes. 

I guess I equate the term "nature" with the somewhat similar idea of "personality" or "quality" or "essence" or "person" of God. And so, I would not grant God to be able to "will" outside of his "nature" or "person", b/c, for example, he could not will himself to do evil. His "will" is owned by his own "person"....and so,......what does that mean? His own person govern's his will. His will is not a phantom that runs beyond the realms of his proper character.....and so.....that was all I was trying to defend. 

I agree...that his will is not "bound" to have only done this certain plan of redemption b/c his nature dictated it. His nature does not dictate such specifics, in my opinion. Rather, it only dictates the need for a specific. There are a mass of optional choices to which he can make to redeem man........and perhaps our unlimited minds can only perceive of one.....which is fine with me.....but.....anyway.....I still see the "will" as something subservient to the "character" of God, which I think you will very well defend. Perhaps my language seemed to oppose such.....and so, I am sorry if it did. 

So, when I use the word "nature", it is not to represent a 2nd god, but rather the "character" or "personality" of the 1st God. Please continue to pick apart my thoughts and my words, as I am blessed by your doing so. I want to be accurate in my expressions, as well as in my thoughts. Thanks, Rev. Winzer!!!

Blessings and prayers!!!


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## py3ak (Mar 6, 2009)

Mark Jones discusses this disagreement in reference to the atonement.


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