# Is the ontological argument irrelevant?



## John Bunyan

The ontological argument goes as follows:
1- It is possible that God exists
2- If it's possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.
4- If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
5- Therefore, God exists.

Know the good thing in this argument is that it puts the burden of proof on the atheist, whom have to prove that it is not possible that God exists - meaning, that the concept of God is self-contradictory or impossible.

Now, I do not know of any sucessful argument to show that the very idea of God is absurd and impossible, so it seems that God does, matter fact, exist.

We could create an ontological argument against God's existence, however, which would go as follows:
1- It is possible that God doees not exist.
2- If its possible that God does not exist, then God does not exist in some possible world.
3- If God does not exist in some possible world, than God does not exist in all possible worlds.
4- If God does not exist in all possible worlds, than God does not exist in the possible world.
5- Therefore, it is possible that God does not exist.

The argument is coherent, so we need only to judge it's premises.
As a theist, it's my job to deny 1, and affirm that it is not possible that God does not exist, but how can this by done? Seems to me that to prove that God's existense is necessary in all possible worlds is an impossible task. How can I prove that something is impossible in all possible worlds? Seems to me that there is no way to prove that God must exist in all possible worlds without using steps 2 to 5 in the ontological argument to prove that God is a necessary being.

So, what is really important in the whole argument is wheter God's non-existence is possible in some world. But how can this be proven without other argument for God's existence?

The only way to prove God's existence is not impossible positively (for the lack of good arguments showing that the concept God is a incoherent one does not prove that it's not) is to prove that God does exist in some possible world, and to do this we must prove God's existence in the actual world (how can we prove that it is possible that God exists in any other possible world without reasoning in circles?), and to do this we need to use some other argument for God's existence, like the Moral Argument or the Teleological Argument.

What is the Ontological argument worth for, then, if it's crucial premiss cannot be proven without recurring to other arguments for God? Isn't the ontological argument better as a argument for God's aseity? Or am I just bad at thinking?


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## Claudiu

When talking about "possible worlds", what you're saying is that "x" is logically possible, or consistent. For example, I can say that "in a possible world, all objects are such that they are red". There is no logical contradiction. However, if a were to say that "in a possible world all objects are such that they are red and not red", then I have committed a logical contradiction. There are some atheists who say that God existing in any possible world is impossible because it is not logically possible, or consistent. 

Also, there are other "Ontological Arguments", such as Anselm's and Descartes.


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## Loopie

Also, there are several other issues that we must address in the Ontological Argument (as you have stated it). I have heard it stated in many different ways, but I will simply respond to how you have stated it here.

First of all, you would have to define what you mean by 'God'. If you are presenting this ontological argument to a Muslim, a Christian, a Deist, and a Mormon, each of them will have a different idea of who God is. It does not at all say anything about the Triune God of Scripture.

Secondly, why is it the case that if God exists in some possible world, that he must exist in all possible worlds? We must go deeper in analyzing Statement 3 in order to see if such a conclusion is warranted.

Finally, this argument will never get you to the Triune God of Scripture. This does not meant that this argument is without merit. For instance, I wholeheartedly believe that God is the uncaused first cause, and so I consider the Cosmological Argument to have merit. But I also recognize that such an argument cannot go any further. It cannot specify that a 'particular' God exists. The Christian, the Deist, and the Muslim CAN all nod their heads and applaud the Cosmological Argument (as well as the Ontological Argument). 

These are things you must keep in mind when presenting these arguments to someone, because this is exactly how they will respond to you.


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## moral necessity

John Bunyan said:


> The ontological argument goes as follows:
> 1- It is possible that God exists
> 2- If it's possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
> 3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.
> 4- If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
> 5- Therefore, God exists.
> 
> What is the Ontological argument worth for, then, if it's crucial premiss cannot be proven without recurring to other arguments for God? Isn't the ontological argument better as a argument for God's aseity? Or am I just bad at thinking?



I wouldn't use this argument. To me, Point 1 is the best point, because it shows that you cannot say emphatically that God does not exist. 

I think Point 2 is the flaw: "If it is possible that God exists...then God exists...." 
It goes from _possibility _to _absolute_.

At best, it should say, 
2. "If it is possible that God exists...then God possibly exists in some possible world."
3. ...etc... (insert possibly)
4. ...etc... (insert possibly)
5. and you're back to the same point you started with..."Therefore God possibly exists."


Otherwise, any possibility is a reality somewhere:
1. It is possible that 3-headed monsters exist.
2. If it is possible that 3-headed monsters exist...then they exist in some possible world...


Blessings!


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## John Bunyan

Claudiu said:


> When talking about "possible worlds", what you're saying is that "x" is logically possible, or consistent. For example, I can say that "in a possible world, all objects are such that they are red". There is no logical contradiction. However, is a were to say that "in a possible world all objects are such that they are red and not red", then I have committed a logical contradiction. There are some atheists who say that God existing in any possible is impossible because it is not logically possible, or consistent.
> 
> Also, there are other "Ontological Arguments", such as Anselm's and Descartes.


So to answer the "inverse" ontological argument (against God) I would have to prove that given any propositions in a possible world imagined by the atheist, it is impossible that God does not exist? How can I do that? That's my problem, the only way to prove that it's impossible that God does not exist is by proving that God exists in some possible world, and the only world for which I know how to argue in favor of God's existence is the real world. So why bother about the ontological argument at all? It all comes down to wheter it's possible that God exists or not (meaning, "Does God exist in some possible world?"), and we can't argue about that with consistency without using other arguments for God's existence in the real world.
The only way to respond to the argument against God is to say "Well, no, God exists in the real world, so he exists in all worlds". IS there other way to prove the proposition "It is possible that God does not exist" false?


Loopie said:


> Also, there are several other issues that we must address in the Ontological Argument (as you have stated it). I have heard it stated in many different ways, but I will simply respond to how you have stated it here.
> 
> First of all, you would have to define what you mean by 'God'. If you are presenting this ontological argument to a Muslim, a Christian, a Deist, and a Mormon, each of them will have a different idea of who God is. It does not at all say anything about the Triune God of Scripture.


I wouldn't use the argument without defining 'God' first, but I was too lazy to write a better definition before posting my question .



> Secondly, why is it the case that if God exists in some possible world, that he must exist in all possible worlds? We must go deeper in analyzing Statement 3 in order to see if such a conclusion is warranted.


I believe this proposition is true, for if God exists in a possible world, being "Necessary Existence" a property of God, and being God the "maximally great being", or the "greatest imaginable being", it follows that God must exist in all possible worlds (in other worlds: God's inexistence is impossible). After all, it's greater to exist in all possible worlds than in just one.


> Finally, this argument will never get you to the Triune God of Scripture. This does not meant that this argument is without merit. For instance, I wholeheartedly believe that God is the uncaused first cause, and so I consider the Cosmological Argument to have merit. But I also recognize that such an argument cannot go any further. It cannot specify that a 'particular' God exists. The Christian, the Deist, and the Muslim CAN all nod their hands and applaud the Cosmological Argument (as well as the Ontological Argument).


I know, and that's where I believe natural theology stops being useful. We cannot, I believe, believe that God is a trinitarian being through reason alone, we need revelation.



moral necessity said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> The ontological argument goes as follows:
> 1- It is possible that God exists
> 2- If it's possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
> 3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.
> 4- If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
> 5- Therefore, God exists.
> 
> What is the Ontological argument worth for, then, if it's crucial premiss cannot be proven without recurring to other arguments for God? Isn't the ontological argument better as a argument for God's aseity? Or am I just bad at thinking?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I wouldn't use this argument. To me, Point 1 is the best point, because it shows that you cannot say emphatically that God does not exist.
> 
> I think Point 2 is the flaw: "If it is possible that God exists...then God exists...."
> It goes from _possibility _to _absolute_.
> 
> At best, it should say,
> 2. "If it is possible that God exists...then God possibly exists in some possible world."
> 3. ...etc... (insert possibly)
> 4. ...etc... (insert possibly)
> 5. and you're back to the same point you started with..."Therefore God possibly exists."
> 
> 
> Otherwise, any possibility is a reality somewhere:
> 1. It is possible that 3-headed monsters exist.
> 2. If it is possible that 3-headed monsters exist...then they exist in some possible world...
> 
> 
> Blessings!
Click to expand...


Aren't propositions 1 and 2 semantically identical? Saying "it is possible that God exists" or "God exists in some possible world" is equivalent. After all, if a possible world is some description of reality, and something is possible, then in some description of reality, that something exists (meaning, for a proposition A to be possible, there must be some description of reality in which this proposition is true). So, if we say "It is possible that John Bunyan is the president of the US" is to say "In some description of reality, John Bunyan is the president of the US". So yeah, I agree, it is possible that a 3-headed monster exist in a possible world. Imagine a possible world in which genetic engineering has been perfected and some crazy dictator assembled an army of 3-headed monsters. Isn't this world logically possible?


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## moral necessity

John Bunyan said:


> moral necessity said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> The ontological argument goes as follows:
> 1- It is possible that God exists
> 2- If it's possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
> 3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.
> 4- If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
> 5- Therefore, God exists.
> 
> What is the Ontological argument worth for, then, if it's crucial premiss cannot be proven without recurring to other arguments for God? Isn't the ontological argument better as a argument for God's aseity? Or am I just bad at thinking?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I wouldn't use this argument. To me, Point 1 is the best point, because it shows that you cannot say emphatically that God does not exist.
> 
> I think Point 2 is the flaw: "If it is possible that God exists...then God exists...."
> It goes from _possibility _to _absolute_.
> 
> At best, it should say,
> 2. "If it is possible that God exists...then God possibly exists in some possible world."
> 3. ...etc... (insert possibly)
> 4. ...etc... (insert possibly)
> 5. and you're back to the same point you started with..."Therefore God possibly exists."
> 
> 
> Otherwise, any possibility is a reality somewhere:
> 1. It is possible that 3-headed monsters exist.
> 2. If it is possible that 3-headed monsters exist...then they exist in some possible world...
> 
> 
> Blessings!
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Aren't propositions 1 and 2 semantically identical? Saying "it is possible that God exists" or "God exists in some possible world" is equivalent. After all, if a possible world is some description of reality, and something is possible, then in some description of reality, that something exists (meaning, for a proposition A to be possible, there must be some description of reality in which this proposition is true). So, if we say "It is possible that John Bunyan is the president of the US" is to say "In some description of reality, John Bunyan is the president of the US". So yeah, I agree, it is possible that a 3-headed monster exist in a possible world. Imagine a possible world in which genetic engineering has been perfected and some crazy dictator assembled an army of 3-headed monsters. Isn't this world logically possible?
Click to expand...


I don't know...in my mind, they are not equivocal statements. I guess I am seeing the something being "possible" includes an acknowledgment that it might not actually exist. 

I would think it would read better like this...
1. God exists
2. If God exists, then he exists in some possible world...

The "if statement" in 2 has to include the entirety of the proposition in 1. That seems more tight to me.

The other way concludes that a reality must exist somewhere from a possibility of it existing. I guess that seems like a great leap to me. Do all possibilities require an actual reality of their existence somewhere? or just the possibility of their existence somewhere?

Blessings and prayers in your studies...


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## OPC'n

I say skip all possible points and get to the point


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## Claudiu

John Bunyan said:


> Claudiu said:
> 
> 
> 
> When talking about "possible worlds", what you're saying is that "x" is logically possible, or consistent. For example, I can say that "in a possible world, all objects are such that they are red". There is no logical contradiction. However, is a were to say that "in a possible world all objects are such that they are red and not red", then I have committed a logical contradiction. There are some atheists who say that God existing in any possible is impossible because it is not logically possible, or consistent.
> 
> Also, there are other "Ontological Arguments", such as Anselm's and Descartes.
> 
> 
> 
> So to answer the "inverse" ontological argument (against God) I would have to prove that given any propositions in a possible world imagined by the atheist, it is impossible that God does not exist? How can I do that? That's my problem, the only way to prove that it's impossible that God does not exist is by proving that God exists in some possible world, and the only world for which I know how to argue in favor of God's existence is the real world. So why bother about the ontological argument at all? It all comes down to wheter it's possible that God exists or not (meaning, "Does God exist in some possible world?"), and we can't argue about that with consistency without using other arguments for God's existence in the real world.
> The only way to respond to the argument against God is to say "Well, no, God exists in the real world, so he exists in all worlds". IS there other way to prove the proposition "It is possible that God does not exist" false?
Click to expand...


I'm having a hard time following what your worry is exactly. The Ontological Argument is an a priori argument that reasons its way to the necessary existence of God. The problem with the atheist is that he does not believe you can prove God. Note, proof, in philosophy, is different from everyday, ordinary usage. At the same time, some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, also believe that one can not prove the nonexistence of God.


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## moral necessity

OPC'n said:


> I say skip all possible points and get to the point



Otherwise...it's pointless, right?


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## Afterthought

moral necessity said:


> Do all possibilities require an actual reality of their existence somewhere? or just the possibility of their existence somewhere?


I thought that the language of possible worlds means that if something is possible, it exists in a possible world? But the way you put it does seem more tight, anyway.




> 3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.


I'm not familiar with this ontological argument, but it seems here there is a hidden premise? Namely, one that allows one to conclude existence in some possible world to all possible worlds? I have seen a "possible world" ontological argument similar to this, but it reasons existence in some to existence in all possible worlds by stating that God existing in some possible world is not as great as existing in all possible worlds, so the greatest being imagined isn't the God that exists only in some possible world.




John Bunyan said:


> So to answer the "inverse" ontological argument (against God) I would have to prove that given any propositions in a possible world imagined by the atheist, it is impossible that God does not exist? How can I do that?


Since possibility is a logical possibility, it seems you would only have to show that God existing in some world does not bring a logical contradiction?

Edit:


John Bunyan said:


> I believe this proposition is true, for if God exists in a possible world, being "Necessary Existence" a property of God, and being God the "maximally great being", or the "greatest imaginable being", it follows that God must exist in all possible worlds (in other worlds: God's inexistence is impossible). After all, it's greater to exist in all possible worlds than in just one.


Just noticed this, so my comment about the hidden premise is already acknowledged. If that's the case then, perhaps another way to get around the inverse is noting that a maximally great being that exists in some possible world is greater than one that doesn't exist in any possible world? Or maybe....



> 2- If its possible that God does not exist, then God does not exist in some possible world.
> 3- If God does not exist in some possible world, than God does not exist in all possible worlds.


....note that "not exist[ing] in all possible worlds" does not exclude God "existing in some possible world," and then a maximally great being would exist in all possible worlds, and so the the inverse argument then behaves like a reductio? Of course, this hinges on God's existence being logically possible, and so perhaps reverts back to what was said at first. Unless a being that has logically possible existence is greater than one that does not (which then reverts back to what I just said above).


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## Loopie

John Bunyan said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Secondly, why is it the case that if God exists in some possible world, that he must exist in all possible worlds? We must go deeper in analyzing Statement 3 in order to see if such a conclusion is warranted.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I believe this proposition is true, for if God exists in a possible world, being "Necessary Existence" a property of God, and being God the "maximally great being", or the "greatest imaginable being", it follows that God must exist in all possible worlds (in other worlds: God's inexistence is impossible). After all, it's greater to exist in all possible worlds than in just one.
Click to expand...


I think I see the one weakness or presupposition in statement number 3. Allow me to explain what I mean:

1) You agree that "God exists in some possible world"

2) You define 'God' as 'having necessary existence'

3) But if God, by your definition, has necessary existence, then it isn't just 'possible' that God exists; he MUST exist (in ALL worlds). 

So do you see here how your presupposition (your definition of God as having necessary existence) automatically means that God MUST exist in ALL possible worlds? Based on your definition of God as "a being whose existence is necessary", let us take a look at your version of the Ontological Argument:

1- It is possible that "a being whose existence is necessary" exists. *(*technically, it wouldn't be merely 'possible' for "a being whose existence is necessary" to exist, it would be necessary)*
2- If it's possible that "a being whose existence is necessary" exists, then "a being whose existence is necessary" exists in some possible world.
3- If "a being whose existence is necessary" exists in some possible world, then "a being whose existence is necessary" exists in all possible worlds.
4- If "a being whose existence is necessary" exists in all possible worlds, then "a being whose existence is necessary" exists in the actual world.
5- Therefore, "a being whose existence is necessary" exists.

In the end, all you have done is 'proven' your assumption. You have assumed that God's existence (by definition) is necessary, and so your conclusion is: God must necessarily exist. Have you really accomplished anything?


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## Loopie

I would like to add that it seems the Ontological Argument is 'inaccurate' in its very first premise. Here is the premise:

1) It is possible that God exists. 

Another version of this premise is from Plantinga: "It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness."

Yet if we are indeed talking about God in this premise, we are therefore talking about a God whose existence is necessary. By definition, God is a being whose existence is necessary.

So it would be inaccurate to say that "it is possible that God (a necessary being) exists". If we continue to define God as a being whose existence is necessary, then it is not merely 'possible' for him to exist, it would be NECESSARY. To say that it is possible for a necessary being to exist is to make a rather sillly statement, because BY DEFINITION such a being MUST exist (it is inaccurate to attach the word 'possible' to a being who by definition must exist). Rather, it is impossible for God NOT to exist. 

This is the heart of the problem of the ontological argument (as it is presented in this discussion), because it essentially starts off with the assumption that God is a being who necessarily exists, downgrades him to 'possibly' existing, and then from there concludes its own assumption (that God necessarily exists). There may be other forms of the Ontological Argument that avoid this, but I do not know of any off the top of my head.


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## Philip

John Bunyan said:


> The only way to prove God's existence is not impossible positively (for the lack of good arguments showing that the concept God is a incoherent one does not prove that it's not) is to prove that God does exist in some possible world



Except that the burden of proof here is on the atheist to prove that He is not.



Loopie said:


> First of all, you would have to define what you mean by 'God'.



The greatest of all possible beings. Here's a different form of the argument:

1) God is the greatest of all possible beings.
2) Possible beings either have necessary or contingent existence.
3) God exists necessarily.
4) Therefore God exists.

Proof for premise 3)

5) Assume that God exists contingently.
6) Necessary existence is an absolute great-making property.
7) There is a possible being exactly like God with necessary existence.
8) But in this case, there is a possible being greater than God.
9) But there can be no being greater than God (1) therefore premise (5) is false.
10) Therefore God has necessary existence.

The major flaw in the argument, in my view, is that when presented to one already unconvinced of the existence of God, it usually comes across as either semantic or logical sleight-of-hand. I don't think there's a flaw in the argument itself as a logical one---the problem is that it has little rhetorical force. To present a good argument, you have to have logic, credibility, and a heart appeal, and the problem is that the OA always lacks the last.


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## Bill The Baptist

This is not neccesarily a bad argument, I just don't think it is very convincing when presented to atheists. I prefer the cosmological argument, which goes something like this:

1.Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2.The Universe began to exist.
3.Therefore, the Universe had a cause

If we extrapolate this even further, we can reason that everything we observe around us had a cause. If we see a building or a machine, we know that someone somewhere designed and constructed it. Why should it be any different for living things?


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> I would like to add that it seems the Ontological Argument is 'inaccurate' in its very first premise. Here is the premise:
> 
> 1) It is possible that God exists.



It isn't inaccurate, merely an understatement. Further, since the goal is to show that God _must_ be a ncessary being, such an understatement is called for.



Loopie said:


> This is the heart of the problem of the ontological argument (as it is presented in this discussion), because it essentially starts off with the assumption that God is a being who necessarily exists, downgrades him to 'possibly' existing, and then from there concludes its own assumption (that God necessarily exists).



First off, in which of the premises is this stated or assumed? All we've done is to begin with the definition of God as the greatest of all possible beings ("that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-conceived" to use Anselm's term) and unpack that definition further.

If all that you mean by this is that the argument is circular, you are correct: all definitions are circular. All that the argument does is to unpack a definition---a definition that, in my view, is Scriptural. The whole point of the argument is that if we have a proper understanding of what we mean by the word "God" then we have to conclude that He is there.


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## ChristianTrader

Bill The Baptist said:


> This is not neccesarily a bad argument, I just don't think it is very convincing when presented to atheists. I prefer the cosmological argument, which goes something like this:
> 
> 1.Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
> 2.The Universe began to exist.
> 3.Therefore, the Universe had a cause
> 
> If we extrapolate this even further, we can reason that everything we observe around us had a cause. If we see a building or a machine, we know that someone somewhere designed and constructed it. Why should it be any different for living things?



I think the cosmo argument is built on the onto argument. We have to defend the position that not everything is contingent (has a cause). That which is not contingent is necessary and eternal. That necessary being is God. Such is defended along the lines of "Something coming from nothing is incoherent and false." Therefore there is a necessary, eternal being. That being is what we call God.

The whole game is then identifying what meets the criteria of being eternal.

CT


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## Bill The Baptist

ChristianTrader said:


> Bill The Baptist said:
> 
> 
> 
> This is not neccesarily a bad argument, I just don't think it is very convincing when presented to atheists. I prefer the cosmological argument, which goes something like this:
> 
> 1.Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
> 2.The Universe began to exist.
> 3.Therefore, the Universe had a cause
> 
> If we extrapolate this even further, we can reason that everything we observe around us had a cause. If we see a building or a machine, we know that someone somewhere designed and constructed it. Why should it be any different for living things?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think the cosmo argument is built on the onto argument. We have to defend the position that not everything is contingent (has a cause). That which is not contingent is necessary and eternal. That necessary being is God. Such is defended along the lines of "Something coming from nothing is incoherent and false." Therefore there is a necessary, eternal being. That being is what we call God.
> 
> The whole game is then identifying what meets the criteria of being eternal.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


No matter what you believe, something must neccesarily be self-existent. Christians believe that God is self-existent, while atheists believe matter or energy or whatever is self-existent.


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## Loopie

Phil,

The very first premise: "It is possible that God exists", has in mind the definition of God as "a being whose existence is necessary". That is where the assumption is. By the way, I completely agree with what you have said about the weakness of the ontological argument, and that it is only correct in so far as a person has a correct understanding and definition of God. But let me also address the way you presented the OA:

The greatest of all possible beings. Here's a different form of the argument:

1) God is the greatest of all possible beings. *(what does it mean to be 'great'?)*
2) Possible beings either have necessary or contingent existence. *(but a 'necessary' being isn't simply 'possible', it would be 'necessary')* 
3) God exists necessarily. *(an assumption, which is correct if you already believe in the Bible, but incorrect if you believe in Greek pagan gods)*
4) Therefore God exists.

Proof for premise 3)

5) Assume that God exists contingently. 
6) Necessary existence is an absolute great-making property. *(why is this the case, unless you assume that the Bible is true about how it presents God?)*
7) There is a possible being exactly like God with necessary existence. *(it wouldn't be possible, it would be necessary; having necessary existence means that you necessarily exist, not that you 'might' or 'possibly' exist)* 
8) But in this case, there is a possible being greater than God. *(depends on definition of 'great')*
9) But there can be no being greater than God (1) therefore premise (5) is false. *(depends on definition of 'great')*
10) Therefore God has necessary existence. *(this is merely asserting what has already been assumed earlier, that God, by definition, is a being that necessarily exists)*

Please understand Phil that I am not trying to completely discard the OA. Like I said before, I honestly believe that the OA and the Cosmological Argument are both useful, so long as they are based upon an understanding of the Triune God of Scripture. They can be used to point out to the unbeliever that 'something' is there, but you will then have to show them why that 'something' is the God of the Bible, and not the God of the Quran or the Book of Mormon.

I completely agree with your definition of God, and it is indeed scriptural. But it just goes to show that one must presuppose the God of scripture in order for arguments like the OA to make sense, or to hold water.


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## ChristianTrader

Bill The Baptist said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Bill The Baptist said:
> 
> 
> 
> This is not neccesarily a bad argument, I just don't think it is very convincing when presented to atheists. I prefer the cosmological argument, which goes something like this:
> 
> 1.Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
> 2.The Universe began to exist.
> 3.Therefore, the Universe had a cause
> 
> If we extrapolate this even further, we can reason that everything we observe around us had a cause. If we see a building or a machine, we know that someone somewhere designed and constructed it. Why should it be any different for living things?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think the cosmo argument is built on the onto argument. We have to defend the position that not everything is contingent (has a cause). That which is not contingent is necessary and eternal. That necessary being is God. Such is defended along the lines of "Something coming from nothing is incoherent and false." Therefore there is a necessary, eternal being. That being is what we call God.
> 
> The whole game is then identifying what meets the criteria of being eternal.
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> No matter what you believe, something must neccesarily be self-existent. Christians believe that God is self-existent, while atheists believe matter or energy or whatever is self-existent.
Click to expand...


You are correct, to maintain coherency, one must believe that something is self-existent. The issue is can all claims be equally well defended. If the answer is yes, then one must defend such a claim. If the answer is no, then one needs to defend their view of what is eternal from attack from others with different views.

CT


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> what does it mean to be 'great'?



Greatness here has to do with inherent worship-worthiness.



Loopie said:


> The very first premise: "It is possible that God exists", has in mind the definition of God as "a being whose existence is necessary".



How so? The first premise is that God is the greatest of all possible beings---that is the definition. If you mean that this definition assumes the conclusion, you are correct---it's a deductive argument from that definition, after all. Maximal greatness logically entails necessary existence---that's the whole point of the argument. Attacking it on this point is like complaining that Starbucks serves too much coffee.



Loopie said:


> why is this the case, unless you assume that the Bible is true about how it presents God?



What are the properties that a maximally great being would have? In this case, would a maximally great being be contingent or necessary?



Loopie said:


> it wouldn't be possible, it would be necessary; having necessary existence means that you necessarily exist, not that you 'might' or 'possibly' exist



Missing the point here: necessity entails possibility.



Loopie said:


> They can be used to point out to the unbeliever that 'something' is there, but you will then have to show them why that 'something' is the God of the Bible, and not the God of the Quran or the Book of Mormon.



a) I haven't met many atheists who would take Islam or Mormonism seriously.

b) I am not trying to suggest that this is a convincing argument, merely that it is valid and sound.


----------



## Loopie

Philip said:


> How so? The first premise is that God is the greatest of all possible beings---that is the definition. If you mean that this definition assumes the conclusion, you are correct---it's a deductive argument from that definition, after all. Maximal greatness logically entails necessary existence---that's the whole point of the argument. Attacking it on this point is like complaining that Starbucks serves too much coffee.



Why does maximal greatness logically entail necessary existence? Why must necessary existence be required in order to be maximally great? Mormonism teaches that God did not use to be God, and so God is not eternal (but they would no doubt believe him to be maximally great). 

All I am saying is that different people will have a different view of what it means to be 'maximally great'. 

I understand that the argument is deductive. It is rather similar to proving that all bachelors are men. Being a bachelor logically entails being a man. So even though the argument may be valid and sound, that is only if all parties agree on the same definition of 'bachelor' (or in the case of the OA, the same meaning of 'maximal greatness'). It doesn't prove that a bachelor exists, but it does show that IF a bachelor existed, it must necessarily be a man.



Philip said:


> What are the properties that a maximally great being would have? In this case, would a maximally great being be contingent or necessary?



Depends on who you ask.



Philip said:


> Missing the point here: necessity entails possibility.



It would seem though that necessity entails necessity. If something possibly exists, than that same thing possibly does not exist. Yet if something is necessary, then it is impossible for it not to exist. It must exist, and the opposite (it's non-existence) cannot be true. Possibility implies uncertainty as to something's existence. But if something necessarily exists than there cannot be any uncertainty at all.



Philip said:


> a) I haven't met many atheists who would take Islam or Mormonism seriously.
> 
> b) I am not trying to suggest that this is a convincing argument, merely that it is valid and sound.



Are you suggesting that we Christians should also not take Islam or Mormonism seriously? Most well-known and outspoken atheists come from Western society, which was a predominantly Christian society. You probably won't find many open atheists in Muslim countries, and even Bart Ehrman said that he would only start criticizing the Quran (like he does the Bible) when he no longer values his life. Perhaps atheists don't take Islam seriously because of fear and intimidation.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> Why does maximal greatness logically entail necessary existence?



That's what the argument demonstrates---it is inherently greater to have necessary existence than to have contingent existence. Hence why the God of the ontological argument cannot be the god of Mormonism.



Loopie said:


> I understand that the argument is deductive. It is rather similar to proving that all bachelors are men. Being a bachelor logically entails being a man. So even though the argument may be valid and sound, that is only if all parties agree on the same definition of 'bachelor' (or in the case of the OA, the same meaning of 'maximal greatness'). It doesn't prove that a bachelor exists, but it does show that IF a bachelor existed, it must necessarily be a man.



Except that in this case, the question is whether our understanding of the concept entails that you believe in its existence. The point of the argument is that "There is a God" is tautological---it's necessarily true.



Loopie said:


> If something possibly exists, than that same thing possibly does not exist.



Not at all. It is possible that X does not entail that it is possible that ~X.


----------



## Loopie

Philip said:


> That's what the argument demonstrates---it is inherently greater to have necessary existence than to have contingent existence. Hence why the God of the ontological argument cannot be the god of Mormonism.



But it could be the God of Deism or Islam. 



Philip said:


> Except that in this case, the question is whether our understanding of the concept entails that you believe in its existence. The point of the argument is that "There is a God" is tautological---it's necessarily true.



It is only true if God does indeed exist as you define him, and this depends on which religious text you wish to hold up as your source of information.



Philip said:


> Not at all. It is possible that X does not entail that it is possible that ~X.



In common usage, when you say that something is 'possible' you are implying that it 'may or may not be'. This is how the word is used, and the implication is unavoidable. If you wish to say that something MUST be, and cannot be otherwise, you use the word 'necessary'.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> But it could be the God of Deism or Islam.



Which is why the project of perfect being theology continues beyond the OA.



Loopie said:


> It is only true if God does indeed exist as you define him, and this depends on which religious text you wish to hold up as your source of information.



I'm not sure I follow.



Loopie said:


> In common usage, when you say that something is 'possible' you are implying that it 'may or may not be'.



Ok, but this is the logical "possible." You seem to think that "possible" implies "contingent" whereas in modal logic, "possible" simply means "not impossible." To be metaphysically possible, all that is required in logical coherence. The point of the "possible" here is to rule out the arguments of some that even though a maximally great being _would_ possess necessary existence, it is possible that the concept itself is incoherent.

I understand that colloquial usage has a range of meaning here, but in this case, "possibility" has a long history of usage in modal logic that is perfectly valid.


----------



## Loopie

I agree that the term 'possible' has a wide range of meanings, and I also agree that based on your use of the term, it is valid. You are absolutely right that we must go beyond the OA, even though the OA can certainly be useful in certain ways (much like the CA).


----------



## John Bunyan

Loopie said:


> I would like to add that it seems the Ontological Argument is 'inaccurate' in its very first premise. Here is the premise:
> 
> 1) It is possible that God exists.
> 
> Another version of this premise is from Plantinga: "It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness."
> 
> Yet if we are indeed talking about God in this premise, we are therefore talking about a God whose existence is necessary. By definition, God is a being whose existence is necessary.
> 
> So it would be inaccurate to say that "it is possible that God (a necessary being) exists". If we continue to define God as a being whose existence is necessary, then it is not merely 'possible' for him to exist, it would be NECESSARY. To say that it is possible for a necessary being to exist is to make a rather sillly statement, because BY DEFINITION such a being MUST exist (it is inaccurate to attach the word 'possible' to a being who by definition must exist). Rather, it is impossible for God NOT to exist.
> 
> This is the heart of the problem of the ontological argument (as it is presented in this discussion), because it essentially starts off with the assumption that God is a being who necessarily exists, downgrades him to 'possibly' existing, and then from there concludes its own assumption (that God necessarily exists). There may be other forms of the Ontological Argument that avoid this, but I do not know of any off the top of my head.


I believe premiss (1) is in the argument for one could say "The existence of a necessary, all-powerful being is impossible", so what we're saying in (1) is "There is no inherent contradiction in the concept of God" (His existence is possible).

By the way, God must be necessary, otherwise His existence would be Contingent, wouldn't it? (or am I wrong?)



Claudiu said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Claudiu said:
> 
> 
> 
> When talking about "possible worlds", what you're saying is that "x" is logically possible, or consistent. For example, I can say that "in a possible world, all objects are such that they are red". There is no logical contradiction. However, is a were to say that "in a possible world all objects are such that they are red and not red", then I have committed a logical contradiction. There are some atheists who say that God existing in any possible is impossible because it is not logically possible, or consistent.
> 
> Also, there are other "Ontological Arguments", such as Anselm's and Descartes.
> 
> 
> 
> So to answer the "inverse" ontological argument (against God) I would have to prove that given any propositions in a possible world imagined by the atheist, it is impossible that God does not exist? How can I do that? That's my problem, the only way to prove that it's impossible that God does not exist is by proving that God exists in some possible world, and the only world for which I know how to argue in favor of God's existence is the real world. So why bother about the ontological argument at all? It all comes down to wheter it's possible that God exists or not (meaning, "Does God exist in some possible world?"), and we can't argue about that with consistency without using other arguments for God's existence in the real world.
> The only way to respond to the argument against God is to say "Well, no, God exists in the real world, so he exists in all worlds". IS there other way to prove the proposition "It is possible that God does not exist" false?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I'm having a hard time following what your worry is exactly. The Ontological Argument is an a priori argument that reasons its way to the necessary existence of God. The problem with the atheist is that he does not believe you can prove God. Note, proof, in philosophy, is different from everyday, ordinary usage. At the same time, some philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, also believe that one can not prove the nonexistence of God.
Click to expand...


My problem is not with the ontological argument per se, but with it's opposite. It seems to me that the only important proposition is (1), and if I present the ontological argument, the atheist then has to prove that God is, in some way, a incoherent idea. But if someone says "Ok, but it is also possible that God does not exist, so your own beloved ontological argument can be used to prove that God does not exist", how can I respond? Is there any way to prove that "It is possible that God does not exist" is a false proposition without giving another argument to God's existence (proving that He does exist in the real world, so must exist in all worlds)? How can I respond to such a comeback?


----------



## Philip

John Bunyan said:


> "It is possible that God does not exist" is a false proposition without giving another argument to God's existence



That's exactly what the OA deals with: if God exists, in one possible world, He exists in all. That is why we end up with the conclusion that God is a necessary being. The burden of proof to negate this conclusion would have to demonstrate either a) that necessary existence is not an absolute great-making property (absurd) b) that God's existence is not possible (ruled out by definition in the first premise).


----------



## Loopie

It seems to me, that when I look at the Ontological Argument, a few things come to mind:

1) If ANY being is defined as having 'necessary existence', then it must exist. This follows from the OA, since the OA argues that there is some possible world (alternate universe) where a being of necessary existence exists. If there is some possible world where such a being exists, then this must be true in all possible worlds (I think we need to go into more detail about why, if something is true in some possible world, that it MUST be true in ALL possible worlds). 

2) I understand that some opponents of the OA argue that they can 'conceive' of beings that don't exist. I mean, there are numerous super heroes and super beings in comic books that simply do not exist. Is there some alternate universe where these things DO exist? If the atheist believes that a maximally great being (with necessary existence) is just a figment of human imagination, then it does not necessarily follow that such a being exists. I mean, it would seem that the atheist could liken the conception of a maximally great being with the concept of a comic book character. Simply because all-powerful, god-like characters exist in comic books does not mean that they exist in reality (or even in some other possible world). Essentially, the person who uses the OA must work with his opponent to figure out what it means to be a maximally great being. Interestingly, this would require a Christian to go to scripture first (a sort of presuppositional apologetics), in order to describe what a maximally great being looks like. The OA is only really helpful or useful in light of what we as Christians know from scripture about God (the maximally great being).


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> If ANY being is defined as having 'necessary existence', then it must exist.



That's the key: you can't simply define a being as being necessarily existent. You have to prove that the essence of that being requires that it be necessarily existent. In other words, you start with the concept of God as maximally great (indisputable) and reach the conclusion that He is necessarily existent.



Loopie said:


> I understand that some opponents of the OA argue that they can 'conceive' of beings that don't exist.



This is, in essence, Gaunilo's argument "on behalf of the fool." He brings up the example of the greatest possible island. However, why would necessary existence make an island better? There is nothing in the nature of islands that requires that they exist in order to be greater. But what is the essence of a being? To be. Necessary existence, in the case of a being, would most certainly be an absolute great-making property.


----------



## Loopie

Believe me, I am not a big fan of Gaunilo's argument. I don't think bringing up the greatest possible island idea does anything to really address the OA. 

There is one thing that came to mind during our discussion. Much like the CA, the OA seems to be valid (or at least has yet to be proven invalid). And even though these arguments do not specifically describe the Triune God of Scripture, they seem to be akin to General Revelation. That is, the validity and soundness of these arguments for the existence of God testify to the fact that God has revealed himself to the world (generally speaking) in such a way that the unbelievers are without excuse, and cannot fully dismiss or discard the truth that they suppress (they cannot invalidate the OA and the CA). Though these arguments for God's existence do not specifically reveal the Triune God of Scripture, they reveal enough of Him so that the unbeliever is condemned by ignoring the evidence of his creator.

Thoughts?


----------



## Apologist4Him

John Bunyan said:


> The ontological argument goes as follows:
> 1- It is possible that God exists
> 2- If it's possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
> 3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.
> 4- If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
> 5- Therefore, God exists.



Which God exists? We’re light years from proving whatever God exists is God according to Calvinism. But, the problems run deeper I think. The argument is based on “possibility”. To quote myself, from my blog:

“You see my friends, either Christianity is true or it is not, there is no “probability” about it. None of the writers of Scripture speak of their faith in God in terms of probability. Would the apostles have suffered and given their lives up for a God they thought might exist, or probably, most likely exists? Absolutely not!

To the Romans the Apostle Paul declares:
“Yet in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him who loved us.*For I am persuaded* that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come,nor height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”Romans 8:37-39 (NKJV)

To the Colossians the Apostle Paul writes:
“that their hearts may be encouraged, being knit together in love, and _attaining_ to all riches of the *full* *assurance* of understanding, to the knowledge of the mystery of God, both of the Father and of Christ, *3* in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” Colossians 2:2-3 (NKJV)

To the Philippians the Apostle Paul writes:
“I thank my God upon every remembrance of you,always in every prayer of mine making request for you all with joy,for your fellowship in the gospel from the first day until now,*being confident* *of this very thing, that He who has begun a good work in you will complete* _*it*_ *until the day of Jesus Christ*;” Philippians 1:3-6

Finally, *“Now faith is the assurance* of things hoped for” Heb 11:1 (ESV)”

Another objection concerns premise 3 "If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.” How do we make the logical leap from God possibly existing in a single world, to God existing in all possible worlds? I think most people can conceive of a possible world where God does not exist, at least one, especially since the argument leaves room for doubt, and we’ve all struggled with doubt at various times. The argument leaves the back door open for the skeptic to make their exit, because the “possibility” is decided on autonomous grounds.



John Bunyan said:


> Know the good thing in this argument is that it puts the burden of proof on the atheist, whom have to prove that it is not possible that God exists - meaning, that the concept of God is self-contradictory or impossible.


All the atheist has to do, to throw the argument back, is ask the question, “is it possible God does not exist?” And we’re back to carrying the burden.



John Bunyan said:


> Now, I do not know of any sucessful argument to show that the very idea of God is absurd and impossible, so it seems that God does, matter fact, exist.


Perhaps not successful in one sense, but in another sense the traditional arguments in themselves, leave room for doubt, and those spaces are the springboards for non-Christians to plant their seeds of doubt. The “Invisible Pink Unicorn” (IPU) or Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM) may not be a successful arguments, but they certainly do make a point concerning the traditional arguments.



John Bunyan said:


> We could create an ontological argument against God's existence, however, which would go as follows:
> 1- It is possible that God doees not exist.
> 2- If its possible that God does not exist, then God does not exist in some possible world.
> 3- If God does not exist in some possible world, than God does not exist in all possible worlds.
> 4- If God does not exist in all possible worlds, than God does not exist in the possible world.
> 5- Therefore, it is possible that God does not exist.
> 
> The argument is coherent, so we need only to judge it's premises.


Premise 3 is suspicious in both formulations in my honest opinion.



John Bunyan said:


> As a theist, it's my job to deny 1, and affirm that it is not possible that God does not exist, but how can this by done? Seems to me that to prove that God's existense is necessary in all possible worlds is an impossible task. How can I prove that something is impossible in all possible worlds? Seems to me that there is no way to prove that God must exist in all possible worlds without using steps 2 to 5 in the ontological argument to prove that God is a necessary being.


Well said, you are correct it is an impossible task, for it requires exhaustive knowledge which we do not have.



John Bunyan said:


> So, what is really important in the whole argument is wheter God's non-existence is possible in some world. But how can this be proven without other argument for God's existence?


So far as ontological argument are concerned, I’ve always preferred the argument from causality, and I think it does a better job of demonstrating a “necessary being”, but even so, that argument is also light years from the Reformed faith.



John Bunyan said:


> The only way to prove God's existence is not impossible positively (for the lack of good arguments showing that the concept God is a incoherent one does not prove that it's not) is to prove that God does exist in some possible world, and to do this we must prove God's existence in the actual world (how can we prove that it is possible that God exists in any other possible world without reasoning in circles?), and to do this we need to use some other argument for God's existence, like the Moral Argument or the Teleological Argument.


Even strings of traditional arguments fall short. If we prove God necessary exits, and that He is the source of moral absolutes, the almighty lawgiver, the almighty watchmaker, we’re still light years from the Reformed faith. The same God could be the God of Deism, and if God isn’t interested why should the atheist become interested? Once again the back door is open and our friend is on the move.



John Bunyan said:


> What is the Ontological argument worth for, then, if it's crucial premiss cannot be proven without recurring to other arguments for God? Isn't the ontological argument better as a argument for God's aseity? Or am I just bad at thinking?


Brother, without a doubt you are good at thinking, and I thought your post to be laid out rather well. The root of the problem is that in the traditional arguments, we’re allowing the non-Christian to be the autonomous judge of whether God exists or not, and we are giving up the common ground, that is that humanity was specially created in the image of God. We do not hold that it’s possible people were created in the image of God, we take the affirmative yes people were created in the image of God. Ontological Arguments, Teleological Arguments, Moral Arguments, etc. are perfectly valid….within a Christian worldview. But the reason we can appreciate them, where others do not, is because we already believe.


----------



## Philip

Apologist4Him said:


> but in another sense the traditional arguments in themselves, leave room for doubt



Consider this scenario, though: you and I are having a discussion over some topic, where both of us have a vested interest in our position. Let's also say that, in actuality, your position is correct and you pull out a flawless argument that, in theory, would blow my position out of the water. However, such an argument is not necessarily sufficient to convince me because I have a vested interest in my position. Doubt doesn't necessarily mean that an argument is flawed---it may simply be that arguments aren't sufficient to convince.



Apologist4Him said:


> The root of the problem is that in the traditional arguments, we’re allowing the non-Christian to be the autonomous judge of whether God exists or not, and we are giving up the common ground, that is that humanity was specially created in the image of God.



He does this anyway---it's not a question of whether you allow him to do so: he does so. He does not require your permission. No, the unbeliever is not, in actuality, in a position to judge God, but that's between him and God---you are still required to give an answer. In doing this, we affirm the common ground of the image of God: without this common ground, there would be no possibility of argument.


----------



## Apologist4Him

Philip said:


> Consider this scenario, though: you and I are having a discussion over some topic, where both of us have a vested interest in our position.



In other words,, neither party is "neutral", I wholeheartedly agree!



Philip said:


> Let's also say that, in actuality, your position is correct and you pull out a flawless argument that, in theory, would blow my position out of the water. However, such an argument is not necessarily sufficient to convince me because I have a vested interest in my position. Doubt doesn't necessarily mean that an argument is flawed---it may simply be that arguments aren't sufficient to convince.



Absolutely, the actual lack of neutrality, whether spoken or unspoken, most definitely plays a role in whether a person is convinced or not.

Brother Philip, the context for doubt here concerns the existence of God. Doubt concerning the existence of God is not only a flaw, it is a sin, it is to suppress the truth of God's existence in unrighteouness. Nowhere in Scripture is doubting the existence of God praised. Quite the contrary is true. Leaving non-Christians room to suppress the truth of God's existence is a flaw, a major one.



Philip said:


> He does this anyway---it's not a question of whether you allow him to do so: he does so. He does not require your permission. No, the unbeliever is not, in actuality, in a position to judge God, but that's between him and God---you are still required to give an answer. In doing this, we affirm the common ground of the image of God: without this common ground, there would be no possibility of argument.



Of course they do it anyway, of course they do not require our permission. However, for us, in entertaining the notion of uncertainty about God, we entertain the notion of uncertainty about man being made in the image of God. Without the certainty of God's existence, there is no certainty of common ground, just the autonomy of "I think therefore I am".


----------



## John Bunyan

Apologist4Him said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Know the good thing in this argument is that it puts the burden of proof on the atheist, whom have to prove that it is not possible that God exists - meaning, that the concept of God is self-contradictory or impossible.
> 
> 
> 
> All the atheist has to do, to throw the argument back, is ask the question, “is it possible God does not exist?” And we’re back to carrying the burden.
> 
> 
> 
> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Now, I do not know of any sucessful argument to show that the very idea of God is absurd and impossible, so it seems that God does, matter fact, exist.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> Perhaps not successful in one sense, but in another sense the traditional arguments in themselves, leave room for doubt, and those spaces are the springboards for non-Christians to plant their seeds of doubt. The “Invisible Pink Unicorn” (IPU) or Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM) may not be a successful arguments, but they certainly do make a point concerning the traditional arguments.
Click to expand...


I think I've found the answer to my original question. Something is possible if all its characteristics are not logically impossible and can coexist with it other. So, if anyone says "such and such is not possible", then he is the one who must give me a good argument showing that "such and such" is self-contradictory or that any of its characteristics are inherently impossible (like the idea of a married bachelor). So, in dealing with possibilities, the denier is always the one with the burden of proof (meaning that belief in impossibility is not the default position).

*Now back to the OA itself.*

I will try, in this post, to show why (3) makes sense. We're talking, here, about an Anselmian insight into theology (sometimes called Maximal Being Theology), which states that God is the greatest conceivable being. Now, it is greater to exist in all possible worlds (notice that a possible world is not a universe, but a description of reality) than in just one, so the greatest conceivable being, if possible, must exist in all possible worlds (otherwise it wouldn't be the greatest conceivable being). It is greater to be concrete than abstract, all-loving than partially-loving, etc.

So when we know that "It is possible that a maximally great being exists" or "It is possible that the greatest conceivable being exists", it follows necessarily that the greatest conceivable exist in at least one possible world, so that being must exist in all possible worlds (as the very definition of God as the greatest conceivable being already includes necessary existence in it).
Otherwhile, if the proposition "It is not possible that the greatest conceivable being exists", it follows necessarily that he doesn't exist (for if this being doesn't exist in one possible world, than it cannot exist in any world at all).

The only proposition that people (a.k.a.: atheists) usually argue about is (1).
That's why the ontological argument makes sense.

In other words (quoting from WLC's website, where I first heard of philosophical apologetics)
_"For example, his objection to (2) is based upon an apparent unfamiliarity with possible worlds semantics. To say that some entity exists in a possible world is just to say that such an entity possibly exists. It isn’t meant that the entity actually exists somewhere. Look again at my explanation: “To say that God exists in some possible world is just to say that there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement ‘God exists’ as part of that description.” Only if that description is true will the entity, in this case God, actually exist. So (2) is definitionally true.

Again, (3) is virtually definitionally true. A maximally great being is one that has, among other properties, necessary existence. So if it exists in one world, it exists in all of them! In that sense, such a being is different than contingent beings, which exist in only some possible worlds. A unicorn, for example, exists in some possible world, but not in all of them, for its existence is possible but not necessary."_



Loopie said:


> Believe me, I am not a big fan of Gaunilo's argument. I don't think bringing up the greatest possible island idea does anything to really address the OA.
> 
> There is one thing that came to mind during our discussion. Much like the CA, the OA seems to be valid (or at least has yet to be proven invalid). And even though these arguments do not specifically describe the Triune God of Scripture, they seem to be akin to General Revelation. That is, the validity and soundness of these arguments for the existence of God testify to the fact that God has revealed himself to the world (generally speaking) in such a way that the unbelievers are without excuse, and cannot fully dismiss or discard the truth that they suppress (they cannot invalidate the OA and the CA). Though these arguments for God's existence do not specifically reveal the Triune God of Scripture, they reveal enough of Him so that the unbeliever is condemned by ignoring the evidence of his creator.
> 
> Thoughts?


I agree. The CA, for example, is only denied to avoid God's existence. Any unbiased rational person would conclude, from the CA, that God is real, yet people go to extremes like saying that the universe is only an illusion, or that it came from nothing, through nothing and for no purpose whatsoever.

We need to keep in mind, however, that the OA, the CA and all of these natural theology arguments are not intended to be used against islam or mormonism, but against atheism. They are absolutely irrelevant in our evangelism towards muslims or jews, for they already believe in God. Atheists, however, can and should be confronted with these arguments, to be shown that there is no excuse to unbelief (they love to say that "there is no evidence", and with these and other arguments we show them that this makes no sense).

With muslims and jews we should proceed like the apostles, arguing from fulfilled prophecy, miracles and historical reliability.


----------



## Loopie

John Bunyan said:


> I agree. The CA, for example, is only denied to avoid God's existence. Any unbiased rational person would conclude, from the CA, that God is real, yet people go to extremes like saying that the universe is only an illusion, or that it came from nothing, through nothing and for no purpose whatsoever.
> 
> We need to keep in mind, however, that the OA, the CA and all of these natural theology arguments are not intended to be used against islam or mormonism, but against atheism. They are absolutely irrelevant in our evangelism towards muslims or jews, for they already believe in God. Atheists, however, can and should be confronted with these arguments, to be shown that there is no excuse to unbelief (they love to say that "there is no evidence", and with these and other arguments we show them that this makes no sense).
> 
> With muslims and jews we should proceed like the apostles, arguing from fulfilled prophecy, miracles and historical reliability.



Keep in mind though that according to the Christian worldview, there is no such thing as a perfectly unbiased or 'neutral' person. People are either believers or unbelievers; rebels, or children of God. They do indeed go to 'extremes' in order to justify their rebellion, because they are absolutely unwilling to bend the knee to God.

I agree that the OA and CA are not especially helpful when witnessing to Jews, Mormons, or Muslims. But that is why I always try to engage in a form of presuppositional apologetics, which can mold itself to whatever situation you are facing. The only worldview that truly makes sense, and can account for everything in the world, and in history (while being consistent externally and internally) is the Christian worldview. You are absolutely right that in the case of Mormons, Muslims, and Jews, we can look at prophecy, archeaology, and historical data to show them that only the Christian worldview can make sense of the 'evidence' that we see around us (such as the evidence for Christ's existence, death, and resurrection).

By the way, we don't just use prophecy, miracles, and historical reliability in our discussions with Jews and Muslims. Those things are just as helpful in our discussions with atheists. Fulfilled prophecy, the reliability of scripture, and the historical evidence for miracles are things that atheists have to deal with as well.


----------



## Philip

Apologist4Him said:


> Brother Philip, the context for doubt here concerns the existence of God. Doubt concerning the existence of God is not only a flaw, it is a sin, it is to suppress the truth of God's existence in unrighteouness. Nowhere in Scripture is doubting the existence of God praised. Quite the contrary is true. Leaving non-Christians room to suppress the truth of God's existence is a flaw, a major one.



Granted---but all that this means is that faith is the transcendence of doubt. It doesn't mean that you are capable of presenting an argument that is airtight, nor does it mean that such an argument would be convincing. The room for doubt is the result of man's sin. But where there is room for doubt, there is room for faith which comes by hearing God and trusting Him.



Apologist4Him said:


> However, for us, in entertaining the notion of uncertainty about God, we entertain the notion of uncertainty about man being made in the image of God.



What do we mean here by "uncertainty?" If what you mean is that you must not present an argument capable of being doubted, there's no such thing. Everything is dubitable by a consistent skeptic. By presenting an argument at all, you concede the unbeliever's ability to form judgments: that is what an argument is. An argument is aimed at persuasion, which assumes an audience capable of reasoned judgment.

Back to the OA: I do think it germane to point out Anselm's context and intent. Anselm's _Proslogion_ is presented as a series of arguments in the form of prayers, and the ontological argument is one of these. He does not present the argument in the absence of faith but rather as (in his own words) _fides quaerens intellectum_. 

_I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe,—that unless I believed, I should not understand. _

I would suggest that the apologist should be arguing with this attitude regardless of what argument he uses. We argue in faith.


----------



## Apologist4Him

Philip said:


> Granted---but all that this means is that faith is the transcendence of doubt. It doesn't mean that you are capable of presenting an argument that is airtight, nor does it mean that such an argument would be convincing.



There is a difference between being able to present an airtight argument, and whether or not such an argument can be argued. Truth is truth, whether or not anyone is convinced. Afterall, even airtight arguments lack the power to regenerate the unregnerate. Our duty is to speak the truth in love, and leave the persuading up to God the Holy Spirit.



Philip said:


> What do we mean here by "uncertainty?" If what you mean is that you must not present an argument capable of being doubted, there's no such thing. Everything is dubitable by a consistent skeptic. By presenting an argument at all, you concede the unbeliever's ability to form judgments: that is what an argument is. An argument is aimed at persuasion, which assumes an audience capable of reasoned judgment.



What I mean by uncertainty is simply implied from positing our sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immutable Creator of the universe in terms of "possibilities". By presenting an argument, I concede the unbeliever is created in the image of God, and in using his reasoning, he is borrowing from the only true worldview, the Christian worldview, God's worldview. An argument aimed at persuasion, assumes several things, other minds with which to debate, shared language, shared rationality, and truth are all necessary preconditions for an intelligible debate, and they all presuppose the existence of the Ontological Trinity. The question is not whether the skeptic can reason, but can the skeptic account for his rationality, and any answer he gives assumes one thing, autonomy, that his rationality is independent of God, that he needs no God to be rational. Are we biblical in our approach, giving God all of the glory, if we assume rationality as a common ground, when Christian rationality is accounted for by the existence of a rational God, all while accepting and conceding the non-Christian denial of God as the source of, and with their reasoning? I am sorry brother Philip, but I do not think so. 



Philip said:


> I would suggest that the apologist should be arguing with *this attitude* regardless of what argument he uses. We argue in faith.




Please do not assume or judge the attitude or motives of my heart. I only post because I love the Lord and honestly do care about what my Reformed brothers and sisters think. I care enough that I would try to correct a brother, to try to bring him or her closer to the truth, because the closer we are to truth, the closer we are to the Lord Jesus. I apologize if my style of posting rubs you the wrong way, I might be more of a preacher than a teacher, I cannot say for sure, all depends. One of my desires is to rescue Van Tillian apologetics from the ivory tower seminarians and academic philosophical journals and teach the average layman the Van Tillian apologetic, kind of like Dr. Bahnsen did, though I will never come close to his intellect, knowledge, qualifications/degrees etc. God has often created awareness of my limitations, at the same time, I am what I am by the grace and mercy of God. Please pray for me brother, without going into details, I have many many needs, going through a good deal of hardships. most of all, I need to depend on the grace of God to see me through.


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## Supersillymanable

I keep hearing people say you can simply throw the argument back, when I think this is a misunderstanding of the argument. 

If one simply comes back and says "Is it possible God does not exist", all they're doing is questioning the conclusion, as the conclusion is that it is not possible that God does not exist. The simple reason that they cannot throw the question back, is because existence is a property a being that it infinitely great would have. To then ask, is it possible he does not exist, doesn't affect the argument, because we already asked that question ourselves at the start, concluding he must in fact exist. The simple possibility of him existing leads us to the conclusion that he must do. 

The atheist cannot simply throw that question out, he has to show that God is not a coherent idea or being. Only then does the argument fail (because then he is unable to exist). The possibility of not existing leads to the possibility of existence, and so leaves us with the present conclusion of the argument. 

I hope that all makes sense...


----------



## John Bunyan

Apologist4Him said:


> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> What do we mean here by "uncertainty?" If what you mean is that you must not present an argument capable of being doubted, there's no such thing. Everything is dubitable by a consistent skeptic. By presenting an argument at all, you concede the unbeliever's ability to form judgments: that is what an argument is. An argument is aimed at persuasion, which assumes an audience capable of reasoned judgment.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What I mean by uncertainty is simply implied from positing our sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immutable Creator of the universe in terms of "possibilities". By presenting an argument, I concede the unbeliever is created in the image of God, and in using his reasoning, he is borrowing from the only true worldview, the Christian worldview, God's worldview. An argument aimed at persuasion, assumes several things, other minds with which to debate, shared language, shared rationality, and truth are all necessary preconditions for an intelligible debate, and they all presuppose the existence of the Ontological Trinity. The question is not whether the skeptic can reason, but can the skeptic account for his rationality, and any answer he gives assumes one thing, autonomy, that his rationality is independent of God, that he needs no God to be rational. Are we biblical in our approach, giving God all of the glory, if we assume rationality as a common ground, when Christian rationality is accounted for by the existence of a rational God, all while accepting and conceding the non-Christian denial of God as the source of, and with their reasoning? I am sorry brother Philip, but I do not think so.
> 
> Click to expand...
Click to expand...

 I believe that it's actually the unbeliever that is conceding to the christian worldview when he assumes rationality. Also, how does one concede to the denial of God when he assumes reason to be thrustable? The reason why reason can be trusted is because it comes from God - once more, the unbeliever believes in reason without no good reason, since he denies the very grounds of rationality. When arguing in rational terms, we do nothing but use our God-given abilities, how is this wrong?
If the skeptic has an inconsistent position, that's his problem - and we can point this out to him.
It is important to realize that everything that is true is possible.
Also, I don't think that any of the arguments cited here (two versions of the OA and the CA) leave room for denying God's existence. If proven wrong, they would only show that these are not good reasons to believe in God, not that He doesn't exist. And I don't think that something being possible entails that its negation is also possible. An equation, for example, is either necessarily true or necessarily false. If the equation is true, then its falsehood is impossible (and vice-versa).


Supersillymanable said:


> The possibility of not existing leads to the possibility of existence, and so leaves us with the present conclusion of the argument.


That's true in relation to epistemic possibility, but I'm not so sure if it holds true when talking about metaphysical possibility.


----------



## moral necessity

Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.

I suppose, if he operates "in a world", and by definition he is also outside and independent of it, that would make more sense to me. And, if he creates worlds, then he created this one and is involved within its realm as well.

Just another thought...


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## Philip

Apologist4Him said:


> What I mean by uncertainty is simply implied from positing our sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immutable Creator of the universe in terms of "possibilities".



Are we going to say that God is not a possible being, then? Have we said domething untrue of God, here?



Apologist4Him said:


> The question is not whether the skeptic can reason, but can the skeptic account for his rationality, and any answer he gives assumes one thing, autonomy, that his rationality is independent of God, that he needs no God to be rational.



But in presenting an argument, you concede that he can form judgments and reach these conclusions. The trouble is that you believe that if we present a direct argument, we've conceded, in principle, his autonomy. I would submit that we have not. The unbeliever must recognize God Himself before he will recognize God-as-source-of-cognitive faculties. For me to do otherwise would be to present a kind of "God-of-the-gaps" where God fills in for places I can't explain---and that would present a false picture of faith. I believe in God because I have been born again and because of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit in my life and through Scripture. 



Apologist4Him said:


> Please do not assume or judge the attitude or motives of my heart.



I do not presume to do so, brother. My post was directed at those who think that, somehow, the OA is an example of theological autonomy when in reality it is a supreme example of faith seeking understanding.


----------



## Philip

moral necessity said:


> Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.



The language of "Possible worlds" simply refers to "states of affairs." One might say that there is no possible state of affairs in which God does not exist.


----------



## Unoriginalname

moral necessity said:


> Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.


But wouldn't worlds in this construct just mean possible other realities? I understand the weakness of the vocabulary here but it is ultimately a thought experiment that needs to condescend to some degree.


----------



## moral necessity

Philip said:


> moral necessity said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The language of "Possible worlds" simply refers to "states of affairs." One might say that there is no possible state of affairs in which God does not exist.
Click to expand...


If that's the case, then it makes more sense...

Blessings!


----------



## moral necessity

Unoriginalname said:


> moral necessity said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.
> 
> 
> 
> But wouldn't worlds in this construct just mean possible other realities? I understand the weakness of the vocabulary here but it is ultimately a thought experiment that needs to condescend to some degree.
Click to expand...


Agreed...I suppose I was taking the language more literally...

Blessings...


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## Apologist4Him

Philip said:


> Are we going to say that God is not a possible being, then? Have we said domething untrue of God, here?



No, God actually exists, it is not possible that He does not exist. 



Philip said:


> But in presenting an argument, you concede that he can form judgments and reach these conclusions. The trouble is that you believe that if we present a direct argument, we've conceded, in principle, his autonomy. I would submit that we have not. The unbeliever must recognize God Himself before he will recognize God-as-source-of-cognitive faculties. For me to do otherwise would be to present a kind of "God-of-the-gaps" where God fills in for places I can't explain---and that would present a false picture of faith. I believe in God because I have been born again and because of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit in my life and through Scripture.



I believe you are confusing the issue, OA is a "God of gaps" argument (as in which God?), and the version presented is based on *WLC's Molinism*_. "_The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world." - Wiki


----------



## Apologist4Him

So which God is possible in which possible world? I can imagine a world ruled by a supremely evil god, where the roles are switched, can you? I have heard it said that for a god to be God, God MUST be maximal, but where is the necessity? Why must God even be Triune if we're talking about possible gods. Atheists and agnostics claim the Christian concept of God is a logical contradiction, how is an OA gonna bring them any closer to our concept of God?


----------



## Philip

Apologist4Him said:


> No, God actually exists, it is not possible that He does not exist.



In which case, we have not spoken falsely in saying that God is a possible being. If it is not possible that God does not exist, then it is possible (as well as necessary) that He exists. In starting from possibility, we are not speaking falsely, indeed we are helping to explain God's necessity. We don't end with possibility.



Apologist4Him said:


> OA is a "God of gaps" argument (as in which God?), and the version presented is based on WLC's Molinism.



Two things:

a) I find it hard to believe that the version of the OA that I put forth was Molinist given that it's a form of Anselm's argument, and to call Anselm a Molinist would be anachronistic. Further, the variations on Anselm were actually proposed to me by a professor who is both confessional and who also has put forward a number of arguments against Molinism.

b) OA is not a God of the Gaps argument, even if it were true that it could, say, apply to the god of deism. God-of-the-gaps arguments present God as a stopgap explanation: when you can't explain something, you play the "God did it" card. In this style of argumentation, you treat God as a working hypothesis, not as a person to be believed in for His own sake.


----------



## Apologist4Him

Philip said:


> a) I find it hard to believe that the version of the OA that I put forth was Molinist given that it's a form of Anselm's argument, and to call Anselm a Molinist would be anachronistic



Except that I realize St. Anselm predates Luis de Molin. Anselm's argument is not framed in probability language, his argument is as follows:



Our understanding of God is a being than which no greater can be conceived.
The idea of God exists in the mind.
A being which exists both in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only in the mind.
If God only exists in the mind, then we can conceive of a greater being—that which exists in reality.
We cannot be imagining something that is greater than God.
Therefore, God exists.

Where does Anselm's OA use the term "possible"? Where does his argument mention "other worlds"? It does not. You are mixing the two.




Philip said:


> b) OA is not a God of the Gaps argument, even if it were true that it could, say, apply to the god of deism. God-of-the-gaps arguments present God as a stopgap explanation: when you can't explain something, you play the "God did it" card. In this style of argumentation, you treat God as a working hypothesis, not as a person to be believed in for His own sake.



True, but I use the phrase in a different way as well, to bring attention to the "gaps" between the beliefs one holds and what an argument or string of arguments attempt to prove. Atheists and agnostics sometimes call these "leaps of faith".


----------



## John Bunyan

Apologist4Him said:


> Philip said:
> 
> 
> 
> But in presenting an argument, you concede that he can form judgments and reach these conclusions. The trouble is that you believe that if we present a direct argument, we've conceded, in principle, his autonomy. I would submit that we have not. The unbeliever must recognize God Himself before he will recognize God-as-source-of-cognitive faculties. For me to do otherwise would be to present a kind of "God-of-the-gaps" where God fills in for places I can't explain---and that would present a false picture of faith. I believe in God because I have been born again and because of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit in my life and through Scripture.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I believe you are confusing the issue, OA is a "God of gaps" argument (as in which God?), and the version presented is based on *WLC's Molinism*_. "_The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world." - Wiki
Click to expand...

Actually the argument as I have used in this post was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga, a reformed philosopher.


Apologist4Him said:


> So which God is possible in which possible world? I can imagine a world ruled by a supremely evil god, where the roles are switched, can you? I have heard it said that for a god to be God, God MUST be maximal, but where is the necessity? Why must God even be Triune if we're talking about possible gods.


Supreme evil is not a great-making property. Do you suggest God is less than maximal?



> Atheists and agnostics claim the Christian concept of God is a logical contradiction, how is an OA gonna bring them any closer to our concept of God?


And for this they present no good argument. Saying something is a logical contradiction doesn't make it a logical contradiction.


----------



## Apologist4Him

John Bunyan said:


> Actually the argument as I have used in this post was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga, a reformed philosopher.



I thought you said "In other words (quoting from WLC's website, where I first heard of philosophical apologetics)" As in William Lane Craig, a Molinist. As much as I would like to think Alvin Plantinga is on our side, Alvin Plantinga also spent 28 years teaching at University of Notre Dame, a Catholic University. Further one of his philosophical goals was to further the notion of compatibility between TOE and Christianity, his philosophy of origins, is pro-theistic evolution. On one hand I can appreciate his efforts against naturalism, on the other hand, I simply do not agree with his TE conclusions.


----------



## Philip

Apologist4Him said:


> Where does Anselm's OA use the term "possible"?



I said it was "a form of" Anselm's argument---the reason for use of the word "possible" is to exclude impossibility from the discussion. If something is not possible, it is impossible. God is not impossible, therefore God is possible. I can conceive of plenty of impossible things (spherical cubes, for instance), but I want to make clear that God is not one of them.



Apologist4Him said:


> Where does his argument mention "other worlds"?



Where did mine? I discussed contingent vs. necessary existence, following the logic of Anselm's second ontological argument.

_AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God._ ~Proslogion Chapter 3


----------



## John Bunyan

Apologist4Him said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Actually the argument as I have used in this post was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga, a reformed philosopher.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I thought you said "In other words (quoting from WLC's website, where I first heard of philosophical apologetics)" As in William Lane Craig, a Molinist. As much as I would like to think Alvin Plantinga is on our side, Alvin Plantinga also spent 28 years teaching at University of Notre Dame, a Catholic University. Further one of his philosophical goals was to further the notion of compatibility between TOE and Christianity, his philosophy of origins, is pro-theistic evolution. On one hand I can appreciate his efforts against naturalism, on the other hand, I simply do not agree with his TE conclusions.
Click to expand...


It was from his website, but the argument was created by Plantinga. A lot of people use Plantinga's argument.


----------



## Apologist4Him

Loopie said:


> It seems to me, that when I look at the Ontological Argument, a few things come to mind:
> 
> 1) If ANY being is defined as having 'necessary existence', then it must exist. This follows from the OA, since the OA argues that there is some possible world (alternate universe) where a being of necessary existence exists. If there is some possible world where such a being exists, then this must be true in all possible worlds (I think we need to go into more detail about why, if something is true in some possible world, that it MUST be true in ALL possible worlds).
> 
> 2) I understand that some opponents of the OA argue that they can 'conceive' of beings that don't exist. I mean, there are numerous super heroes and super beings in comic books that simply do not exist. Is there some alternate universe where these things DO exist? If the atheist believes that a maximally great being (with necessary existence) is just a figment of human imagination, then it does not necessarily follow that such a being exists. I mean, it would seem that the atheist could liken the conception of a maximally great being with the concept of a comic book character. Simply because all-powerful, god-like characters exist in comic books does not mean that they exist in reality (or even in some other possible world). Essentially, the person who uses the OA must work with his opponent to figure out what it means to be a maximally great being. Interestingly, this would require a Christian to go to scripture first (a sort of presuppositional apologetics), in order to describe what a maximally great being looks like. The OA is only really helpful or useful in light of what we as Christians know from scripture about God (the maximally great being).



 I thought about mentioning Marvel and DC super heroes or Greek gods from mythology. Thunder and Lightening exist, therefore Thor necessarily exists.


----------



## John Bunyan

Apologist4Him said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> It seems to me, that when I look at the Ontological Argument, a few things come to mind:
> 
> 1) If ANY being is defined as having 'necessary existence', then it must exist. This follows from the OA, since the OA argues that there is some possible world (alternate universe) where a being of necessary existence exists. If there is some possible world where such a being exists, then this must be true in all possible worlds (I think we need to go into more detail about why, if something is true in some possible world, that it MUST be true in ALL possible worlds).
> 
> 2) I understand that some opponents of the OA argue that they can 'conceive' of beings that don't exist. I mean, there are numerous super heroes and super beings in comic books that simply do not exist. Is there some alternate universe where these things DO exist? If the atheist believes that a maximally great being (with necessary existence) is just a figment of human imagination, then it does not necessarily follow that such a being exists. I mean, it would seem that the atheist could liken the conception of a maximally great being with the concept of a comic book character. Simply because all-powerful, god-like characters exist in comic books does not mean that they exist in reality (or even in some other possible world). Essentially, the person who uses the OA must work with his opponent to figure out what it means to be a maximally great being. Interestingly, this would require a Christian to go to scripture first (a sort of presuppositional apologetics), in order to describe what a maximally great being looks like. The OA is only really helpful or useful in light of what we as Christians know from scripture about God (the maximally great being).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I thought about mentioning Marvel and DC super heroes or Greek gods from mythology. Thunder and Lightening exist, therefore Thor necessarily exists.
Click to expand...

Neither greek gods nor marvel super heroes have necessary existence as part of their nature. And Marvel and Dc heroes are all physical beings, therefore it is logically impossible that they exist in all possible worlds (there are possible worlds without anything physical). Also, if someone exists necessarily it is not a greek god, as their whole cosmogeny declared that their gods were contingent beings born from the ever-existing chaos.


----------



## Apologist4Him

John Bunyan said:


> Neither greek gods nor marvel super heroes have necessary existence as part of their nature.



How do you know? 



John Bunyan said:


> And Marvel and Dc heroes are all physical beings, therefore it is logically impossible that they exist in all possible worlds (there are possible worlds without anything physical).



Why is it necessary that they exist in all possible worlds, are we not concerned with the actual world, the world as it is? How many actual worlds can exist? How many can be verified to exist? 



John Bunyan said:


> Also, if someone exists necessarily it is not a greek god, as their whole cosmogeny declared that their gods were contingent beings born from the ever-existing chaos.



How about Eternity? (practically a visual representation of Pantheism)


----------



## John Bunyan

Apologist4Him said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Neither greek gods nor marvel super heroes have necessary existence as part of their nature.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How do you know?
Click to expand...

By their very descriptions. They all begin to exist, therefore they must be contingent beings, not necessary ones.


John Bunyan said:


> And Marvel and Dc heroes are all physical beings, therefore it is logically impossible that they exist in all possible worlds (there are possible worlds without anything physical).



Why is it necessary that they exist in all possible worlds, are we not concerned with the actual world, the world as it is? How many actual worlds can exist? How many can be verified to exist? [/Quote]
They don't exist in all possible worlds. That's my point. You're the one trying to mock the ontological argument with a Gaunillo kind of analogy. That's the point: they're not necessary beings, therefore the ontological argument has nothing to do with them.
Also, I don't believe you understand 'possible world semantics'. You're confusing a possible world with another universe, or something like this. Possible world = possible description of reality. Existing in a possible world = being true in a possible description of reality.


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also, if someone exists necessarily it is not a greek god, as their whole cosmogeny declared that their gods were contingent beings born from the ever-existing chaos.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How about Eternity? (practically a visual representation of Pantheism)
Click to expand...

"Eternity came into existence when the universe was formed". Therefore Eternity has a beggining, therefore Eternity can't logically be a necessary being. And Eternity is also not a greek god.

The OA works only for a maximally great being. You can invent some other being and say he's maximally great, if you want, but them you would only be inventing new names for God.


----------



## J. Dean

Keep something in mind: no matter how clever or sound the argument, a diehard atheist will find an excuse to disbelieve, even at the risk of looking like a fool in the process.


----------



## Apologist4Him

John Bunyan said:


> By their very descriptions. They all begin to exist, therefore they must be contingent beings, not necessary ones.



good answer



John Bunyan said:


> They don't exist in all possible worlds. That's my point. You're the one trying to mock the ontological argument with a Gaunillo kind of analogy. That's the point: they're not necessary beings, therefore the ontological argument has nothing to do with them.



You responded to a post that was not directed to you, I had a laugh with a brother in agreement on this, and it sounds like you took it serious, sorry. I have noticed large portions of my responses glossed over and ignored. Loopie did a good job of showing the circularity of the OA, and even in your opening post you provide a valid counter response to OA. *shrug*



John Bunyan said:


> Also, I don't believe you understand 'possible world semantics'. You're confusing a possible world with another universe, or something like this. Possible world = possible description of reality. Existing in a possible world = being true in a possible description of reality.



Perhaps not, I take it impossible worlds cannot co-exist with possible worlds. One of the points I was driving at is this: for all we know, in another universe there could be some very different worlds from our own, after all, we are venturing into the unknown, the speculative when we start talking about possibilities. I've honestly not dabbled much with middle knowledge and Molinism, only enough to know that it is a component of the LFW defense, and is popular among OVT's. 



John Bunyan said:


> "Eternity came into existence when the universe was formed". Therefore Eternity has a beggining, therefore Eternity can't logically be a necessary being. And Eternity is also not a greek god.



The link is to a fictional character in the Marvel Universe, I know this. The real eternity has no essence or being and by definition has no beginning nor end. Have you ever wondered where Heaven begins and where it ends..or does it?



John Bunyan said:


> The OA works only for a maximally great being. You can invent some other being and say he's maximally great, if you want, but them you would only be inventing new names for God.



Sounds like something I used to say to unconvinced Atheists and agnostics. As Loopie pointed out before me, at _maximum_ OA proves a mysterious unknown generic deity, sorry but that is the truth.


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## Philip

Apologist4Him said:


> I take it impossible worlds cannot co-exist with possible worlds. One of the points I was driving at is this: for all we know, in another universe there could be some very different worlds from our own, after all, we are venturing into the unknown, the speculative when we start talking about possibilities.



The possible worlds discussion isn't speculation and here's why: when we talk about possible worlds in this context, we are simply ruling out the impossible. No possible world, for instance, could contain spherical cubes---spherical cubes cannot exist. Impossible worlds cannot exist at all: they are states of affairs which would be contradictory. Talking about possibility does not necessarily imply Molinism, merely that one is acquainted with modern thought in this area (Leibniz, for instance).



Apologist4Him said:


> As Loopie pointed out before me, at maximum OA proves a mysterious unknown generic deity, sorry but that is the truth.



I disagree---it proves a God who is there.



Apologist4Him said:


> Loopie did a good job of showing the circularity of the OA



All he showed was that it makes a move from definition to reality that, in this case, is justified by the nature of necessity.


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## John Bunyan

> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> They don't exist in all possible worlds. That's my point. You're the one trying to mock the ontological argument with a Gaunillo kind of analogy. That's the point: they're not necessary beings, therefore the ontological argument has nothing to do with them.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You responded to a post that was not directed to you, I had a laugh with a brother in agreement on this, and it sounds like you took it serious, sorry. I have noticed large portions of my responses glossed over and ignored. Loopie did a good job of showing the circularity of the OA, and even in your opening post you provide a valid counter response to OA. *shrug*
Click to expand...

I tooked it seriously because it showed a common misunderstanding. I don't want people to get the wrong impressions on the OA. Also I think I've already answered my own objection, so that know I see that the burden of proof is always on the atheist - and he will never be able to prove that it is possible that God does not exist, because it is not.



> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> Also, I don't believe you understand 'possible world semantics'. You're confusing a possible world with another universe, or something like this. Possible world = possible description of reality. Existing in a possible world = being true in a possible description of reality.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Perhaps not, I take it impossible worlds cannot co-exist with possible worlds. One of the points I was driving at is this: for all we know, in another universe there could be some very different worlds from our own, after all, we are venturing into the unknown, the speculative when we start talking about possibilities. I've honestly not dabbled much with middle knowledge and Molinism, only enough to know that it is a component of the LFW defense, and is popular among OVT's.
Click to expand...

It doesn't really need molinism or middle knowledge. As I said, it was developed by Plantinga, who believes neither of these two ideas is true. And you're right, impossible worlds cannot coexist with possible worlds, because impossible worlds are impossible and, therefore, don't exist.


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> The OA works only for a maximally great being. You can invent some other being and say he's maximally great, if you want, but them you would only be inventing new names for God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sounds like something I used to say to unconvinced Atheists and agnostics. As Loopie pointed out before me, at _maximum_ OA proves a mysterious unknown generic deity, sorry but that is the truth.
Click to expand...

It proves an existent God whose some of the qualities we can know - omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience and all other great-making properties.


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## pepper

The Bible does not try to prove that God exist, but it simply states that God is. All men know that God exist, see Romans 1 ff. They reject him and worship the creature instead. When a person tries to tell me that there is no God, I simply tell them that they know there is God but they hate him so much they wish he did not exist. So far everyone of them ends the discussion. Not one of them attempts to tell me I am wrong.


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## Loopie

John Bunyan said:


> It proves an existent God whose some of the qualities we can know - omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience and all other great-making properties.



Please keep in mind John that the OA could easily be used to defend the God of Islam, who is also omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omnisicient. Obviously Christians and Muslims have a different idea of what an 'all-loving' God would look like, but that just goes to show that we MUST presuppose the Triune God of Scripture, and begin with the Bible. The OA is very useful in a sort of general revelation sense, but special revelation must also be used in presenting the gospel.


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> Please keep in mind John that the OA could easily be used to defend the God of Islam



I don't think so. There is an Islamic version of the OA, but it looks rather different than the Anselmian one and looks very like the Cosmological Argument. The difference is such that I hesitate to call them by the same name. The reason is that Anselm's OA proceeds following a methodology that will lead to conclusions such that only the God of Scripture is a live option.


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## John Bunyan

Loopie said:


> John Bunyan said:
> 
> 
> 
> It proves an existent God whose some of the qualities we can know - omnipotence, omnibenevolence, omniscience and all other great-making properties.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Please keep in mind John that the OA could easily be used to defend the God of Islam, who is also omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omnisicient. Obviously Christians and Muslims have a different idea of what an 'all-loving' God would look like, but that just goes to show that we MUST presuppose the Triune God of Scripture, and begin with the Bible. The OA is very useful in a sort of general revelation sense, but special revelation must also be used in presenting the gospel.
Click to expand...


I know that. I do believe we can argue against an unitarian view of God, though - since i don't see how one person can be all-loving without no one to live; in the Trinity we have three persons who exercise love, in the Tawhid we don't.
But I know that I have to present special revelation in my evangelism, I'm not denying that. If special revelation is not used, there is no presentation of the gospel at all - "gospel" meaning Jesus' life, death and ressurrection.


Philip said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please keep in mind John that the OA could easily be used to defend the God of Islam
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think so. There is an Islamic version of the OA, but it looks rather different than the Anselmian one and looks very like the Cosmological Argument. The difference is such that I hesitate to call them by the same name. The reason is that Anselm's OA proceeds following a methodology that will lead to conclusions such that only the God of Scripture is a live option.
Click to expand...


How so?


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## Apologist4Him

Loopie said:


> Please keep in mind John that the OA could easily be used to defend the God of Islam, who is also omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omnisicient. Obviously Christians and Muslims have a different idea of what an 'all-loving' God would look like, but that just goes to show that we MUST presuppose the Triune God of Scripture, and begin with the Bible. The OA is very useful in a sort of general revelation sense, but special revelation must also be used in presenting the gospel.



Something related that came to mind has to do with Sola Scriptura, I am confident everyone in the discussion holds to Sola Scriptura (I would hope so), and I understand the difference between Sola Scriptura and Solo Scriptura, but the question remain as to just how authoritative extra biblical arguments like OA can be, and how one climbs up (autonmously) from a lesser authority to (Theonomous) biblical authority. I guess what I am getting at is that in using these types of arguments, we're starting with extra biblical "authority", rather than the standard measure of faith. Even if the person were to intellectually assent, their conversion would be based on an extra biblical authority....


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## CalvinandHodges

Hi:

In answer to the question of the OP - No. To deny the ontos of God would be to deny your own ontos. This is the reverse of the argument. As Jonathan Edwards points out, "To think of absolutely nothing is impossible."

Blessings,

Rob


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## Loopie

Philip said:


> I don't think so. There is an Islamic version of the OA, but it looks rather different than the Anselmian one and looks very like the Cosmological Argument. The difference is such that I hesitate to call them by the same name. The reason is that Anselm's OA proceeds following a methodology that will lead to conclusions such that only the God of Scripture is a live option.



Even if there is an Islamic version of the OA, a Muslim could look at the same OA that we ourselves have been talking about in this thread, and applaud it. There is nothing in the OA, as presented in this thread, that goes against how the Quran presents Allah. Anselm developed his argument from the perspective of a Christian, based on a Christian understanding of 'worship-worthy' and 'greatness'. How can the Muslim not do the very same thing based on HIS understanding of 'worship-worthiness' and 'greatness'? That is why I believe that the OA only functions properly when you presuppose the Triune God of Scripture.


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> There is nothing in the OA, as presented in this thread, that goes against how the Quran presents Allah.



Except for the whole worship-worthiness thing. Or are we seriously going to suggest that a god who doesn't keep promises is more worship-worthy than one who does? A reading of the Q'uran is an excellent defeater for the notion that the OA could support Islam.


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