# Need Clarification on premiss 3 of the Ontological Argument as exposed by Plantinga



## John Bunyan (Feb 4, 2012)

The argument goes as follows:


> 1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
> 
> 2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
> 
> ...



Ok, I understand premiss 2, for if the existence of a maximally great being exists, then that being exists, necessarily, in some possible world, because the expression "possible world" means, in the argument, not merely a world, neither a universe (or multiverse) but a entire description of reality, so, if (1) is true, (2) is true because the two premisses mean the same thing, for if it's even possible that something might exist, than that something must exist in some possible world (description of reality).

Now, (4), (5) and (6) are fairly obvious, but I don't think I understand (3). Is it because God's aseity? Is (3) telling that if God can exist (meaning that He exists in some possible world), then He must exist in all possible worlds because he is a necessary being? How so?

Is a being whose existence is necessary in one possible world, then, necessary in all of them? Why? Is it because logics is uniform among all possible worlds?


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Feb 4, 2012)

To not exist in all possible worlds is not maximal greatness. It would be contingent greatness, and a contingent God is not a maximal conception of God.

AMR


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## John Bunyan (Feb 5, 2012)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> To not exist in all possible worlds is not maximal greatness. It would be contingent greatness, and a contingent God is not a maximal conception of God.
> 
> AMR



Oh, I think I understood.

So, if (2) implies that God exist's in some possible world X, a characteristic of God in X, since He is a maximally great being, is to exist in all other possible worlds and not only in X.

So, by (1) we get (2), and by God's aseity and maximal greatness in (2) we get (3).

Thank you.


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