# Is Aristotle's argument good?



## Claudiu (Aug 5, 2011)

Is Aristotle's argument in Nicomachean Ethics III.5, that vicious characters are acquired voluntarily, good? 

Outline of argument:
I. All vicious actions are voluntary 
II. All vicious characters are acquired by performing some vicious actions. 
III. If a vicious character V is acquired by peforming actions S, V is acquired voluntarily if each of S is voluntary. 
IV. ∴ All vicious characters are acquired voluntarily


----------



## Philip (Aug 5, 2011)

The argument is logically valid. However premise 2 is false---man's will is fallen and therefore vices are not primarily acquired through vicious action. Indeed, this is plain from the fact that building virtue is harder than acquiring vice.


----------



## Claudiu (Aug 5, 2011)

That's what I was thinking...valid, but not sound.

---------- Post added at 07:40 AM ---------- Previous post was at 07:36 AM ----------

I think Aristotle holds to premise 2 because in some ways he thinks we are neutral and become good or bad by habit.


----------



## Reformed Thomist (Aug 5, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> ... premise 2 is false---man's will is fallen and therefore vices are not primarily acquired through vicious action.



Objection: The first sin (the cause of man's fallen will, in turn the cause of vicious characters, vice, in us) was a vicious act; in this way is vice primarily (or ultimately) acquired through vicious action (namely, Adam's), and indeed, it can be maintained that a vicious character is acquired (primarily/ultimately) by the performance of vicious action. If anything, the Fall only supports Aristotle's premise.

In any case, Aristotle is arguing in the realm of practical, every day ethics. The second premise communicates a central principle (for Aristotle, at least) of every day human behavior and characters, I think, easily observable in the fact that what we _do_ (behaviour) 'builds up' what we _are_ (character), by virtue of _*habit*_. One can say the opposite, that it is our characters which determine our behaviors, and this is also true; but -- and this is what moral responsibility hangs upon in practical, every day ethics -- we would not have those characters in the first place without our first freely building up those characters through actions, which become _habit_ in us. 

Take the drug addict. Sure, it can be said that he cannot control his behavior (taking drugs), because he (his character) is addicted; but it would be false to conclude that he is not responsible for this behavior, for, in normal circumstances, he would not have that character (addiction) without first freely _doing drugs_, which caused his addiction. So, he is in fact morally responsible for his addictive behavior. He's at fault, by way of his drug experimentation and what not, for becoming a slave to them in the first place, putting himself in the position of not being able to control this behavior anymore. This is the kind of thing which Aristotle has in mind with the second premise.


----------



## Claudiu (Aug 5, 2011)

Reformed Thomist, yes, Aristotle is arguing in the realm of practical, every day ethics. However, can you think of any good objections to the argument he makes, or do you think it's sound?


----------



## Reformed Thomist (Aug 5, 2011)

I think it's sound. Any objection I can think of, I can think of a better rubuttal to.


----------



## Philip (Aug 5, 2011)

Reformed Thomist said:


> Objection: The first sin (the cause of man's fallen will, in turn the cause of vicious characters, vice, in us) was a vicious act; in this way is vice primarily (or ultimately) acquired through vicious action (namely, Adam's), and indeed, it can be maintained that a vicious character is acquired (primarily/ultimately) by the performance of vicious action. If anything, the Fall only supports Aristotle's premise.



But in order for said action to take place, there had to be motivation, for actions are not chosen in a vacuum. Further, motivations come from the heart and produce acts of the will.

Remember also that we are responsible for our motivations, not just our actions.


----------



## Claudiu (Aug 5, 2011)

Reformed Thomist said:


> I think it's sound. Any objection I can think of, I can think of a better rubuttal to.



For now, what about the first premise that "All vicious actions are voluntary?" Aren't there cases where this is not true?


----------



## Reformed Thomist (Aug 5, 2011)

Claudiu said:


> Reformed Thomist said:
> 
> 
> > I think it's sound. Any objection I can think of, I can think of a better rubuttal to.
> ...



Here's how I think Aristotle might reply: There are no such cases. If an action isn't voluntary, it isn't vicious (isn't _vice_-ful). Attributing viciousness/vice, or any moral category, to an act, presupposes that the actor has some _control_ over that act. But to say that an act isn't voluntary is to say that the act is beyond the actor's control. It is in some way _forced_. In this extraordinary instance (we normally do things voluntarily, all things considered) the actor is not even a moral agent.


----------



## Claudiu (Aug 6, 2011)

What about the 2nd premise? It implies that we are a blank slate and then become virtuous or vicious because of our actions.


----------



## Reformed Thomist (Aug 6, 2011)

Claudiu said:


> What about the 2nd premise? It implies that we are a blank slate and then become virtuous or vicious because of our actions.



Well, you've got Aristotle there. He does think that the mind or soul, at birth, is _tabula rasa_, and that we become virtuous or vicious because of our actions. No question about that. How do _I_, as a Reformed Christian, respond to this?

I agree with him, in the way or 'realm' that I think _he thinks_ this is the case. What did you _know_ in the womb, or at birth? Nothing. How did you come to _know_ things? By way of education, upbringing. What has determined your character by, say, the age of 13, regarding traits such as honesty, trustworthiness, resolve, fortitude, temperance, etc.? Conditioning, repeated behaviors, discipline, which become _habit_. Again, we are talking about practical, every day ethics (and a little epistemology), observable human behavior. Regarding how we behave, our characters, most of it has to do with discipline, conditioning, etc., overseen by our parents and teachers -- ideally doing their very involved and challenging job; Aristotle would probably say that this is rare in our day -- who guide our actions (behaviors) toward the desired end (character, habit), from the start of our lives. 

The question for me is, Is this (Aristotelian ethics, epistemology) reconcilable with what God has revealed to us, in particular with regard to soteriology -- namely, that we come into this world spiritually depraved, inclined toward evil, and that our damaged wills become rectified not by way of our efforts and strivings but _via_ faith, by grace ('Reformed' ethics, epistemology)? I think so. The Biblical account of salvation is not really concerned with the kind of ethics/epistemology -- every day, practical, observable -- which Aristotle is here concerned with; it is, rather, concerned with a much higher mode, what is going on 'behind the scenes', 'God's eye view', if you will. At any rate, we know that the Reformed account of 'depravity' isn't saying that we are all as 'bad' as can be, and indeed, it admits of their having been many unsaved/non-Christian people who have (from our POV) displayed honorable, virtuous characters -- the prudent Hindu, the temperate Muslim, the heroic agnostic stranger who risks life and limb by running into a burning house to save a child. Where does _this_ come from? It comes from where Aristotle says it does: Primarily, upbringing, conditioning, and discipline, becoming habit, overseen by those in charge of us from the beginning of our lives.

I don't see a real contradiction between this and the divine revelation. Think of Plato's 'soteriology' (in its simplest form, the Parable of the Cave in Book VII of the _Republic_, itself having remarkable parallels to the Biblical Gospel). Where Plato is pointing 'up', Aristotle is just pointing 'down' -- not _denying_ the Platonic 'theology', but simply focusing his attention on one aspect of reality, as a scientist.


----------



## Claudiu (Aug 6, 2011)

Thank you for your responses so far. I appreciate it. 

More on the second premise. As far as everyday ethics is concerned I think Aristotle has a lot of good stuff to say. My only concern is the "All" that begins the second premise. I don't think that "ALL vicious characters are acquired by preforming some vicious actions." In my opinion, there are many others things that form ones character. I would rephrase the second premise to say Most "vicious characters are acquired by preforming some vicious actions." Characters can be formed through education, or emotions, and not necessarily action. Action may be the most common way, but I wouldn't restrict it to just that. 

What do you think? Can other things form someone's character? or is it just actions that do so? (I want to say that there could be other things - I'm just trying to think of some concrete examples...maybe you can?).


----------



## Reformed Thomist (Aug 7, 2011)

I believe you're right about other factors (besides 'actions') contributing to the formation of character... and I think Aristotle would agree with you. 

The second premise isn't a denial of this. It is a general statement, like 'all flowers need water to survive'. True enough and good enough as a premise in an argument. Clearly flowers need more than just water to survive, namely _light_; but the general statement is in no way a denial of this. In the same way, 'all vicious characters are acquired by performing some vicious actions'. Certainly other factors may be validly included alongside _actions_ (such as genetics, one's 'stock', economic situation, and so on); but this fact isn't being denied with the general statement. The factor of 'actions' is simply all Aristotle needs to use for this particular argument, and this is perfectly fine. Don't get hung up on the "all"; it isn't implying that actions are the _only_ factor. Rather, it is simply communicating the fact that _whenever_ we are talking about the formation of character generally, action is a (key) factor.


----------



## Claudiu (Aug 7, 2011)

Would you say that there are cases where a vicious character is acquired without any action?


----------

