# The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs



## Confessor

This is part of what I wrote for an assignment from my Philosophy class:

_The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs_

If I were to tell my friend that I owned a “gobiant,” he would reasonably ask what exactly a gobiant is. If I did not have an answer, he would have a good reason to deny that I own a gobiant, because my positive assertion that I do would be nonsensical. Prior to my proving to him that I own such a thing, I would have to establish a definition of what I own, so that proof of my ownership of the gobiant would actually be coherent. It makes no sense to speak of owning something prior to establishing what exactly that “something” is. In like fashion, the traditional arguments for the existence of God attempt to prove that God exists _prior to_ establishing a distinctly Christian conception of God (or any other conception, for that matter). But this is a huge flaw. The Christian God, according to orthodox denominations of Christianity, is a deity who has sovereignly revealed Himself through the Bible. Therefore, if it were true that He existed, then it would follow that the entirety of the Bible must be true, and vice versa. But the very, very most that traditional arguments can possibly yield is that something supernatural might exist – far less that this being is a deity as typically conceived, that he cares about the world, that he has any infinite characteristics, and that he has revealed himself to the world. The arguments therefore are misnomers and entirely misleading. They cannot prove God’s existence and therefore they should not be called theistic proofs.

Aquinas embarrassingly confirms this linguistic mistake: after attempting to prove an unmoved mover, he says, “And this is what everybody understands by God” (p.7); after attempting to prove a first cause, he says, “to which everyone gives the name God” (p.8); and after attempting to prove a causal perfection or goal-director, he says, “And this we call God” (p.8). He takes for granted that God is those things, but God is only those things if the Bible is assumed to be true! He has not proven God in the least; he has only proven an unmoved mover, a first cause, a necessary being, a causal perfection, and a goal-director, none of which even cumulatively can constitute God. For instance, one does not even need to assign a sentient being to the descriptors of “unmoved mover” and “first cause,” causal perfection can be merely conceptual and not a real existence, and a goal director could be a magic rabbit (or something else equally absurd). What is certain from Aquinas’s arguments is that the Christian God is not proven; he still has an extremely long way to go, demonstrating that the entire revelation claimed by Christians is true. (In their defense, evidentialist Christian apologists go from theistic proofs to evidence for Christ’s resurrection to the veracity of the Bible, but I still have severe disputations with their methodology.)

There is a much more terrible problem with the cosmological argument: it is entirely question-begging. This is best demonstrated by formulating the argument “backwards” as a disproof of a supernatural first cause: (1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence, _except the universe itself_; (2) the universe began to exist; (3) therefore, the universe did not have a cause for its existence. Of course, the first premise introduces an obviously false premise – it is not established that the universe itself did not have to be caused into existence by the fact of its beginning to exist. But with this, we can see the question-begging premise in a theistic cosmological argument: it is not established that the universe itself _must_ have been caused into existence by the fact of its beginning to exist. The reason that this premise is entirely unwarranted is because of the nature of causality and what we can induce through our perception: all causes and effects have taken place in time, and therefore it is acceptable for us to induce conclusions from these perceived causes and effects, _as long as the inductions are pertaining to causality within time_. The universe’s cause is emphatically “before” time began: time did not yet exist. How, then, can anyone possibly make a definite claim about causality in the absence of time itself? The truth is that one cannot, and consequently inasmuch as Aquinas or any other philosopher attempts to prove a supernatural first cause from the existence of causality in a temporal framework, he or she _necessarily_ begs the question.

Paley’s teleological argument suffers from a logical fallacy as well. He argues that just as a watch points to an obvious watchmaker, so also a well-designed or fine-tuned universe points to a divine Designer. But he equivocates here on “design.” The reason we can know that a watch is designed is because of precedent – we know that previous watches had to be constructed by watchmakers, and therefore a new watch we discovered was likely made by a watchmaker too. We have received trustworthy knowledge that a watch must be designed; hence when we see a watch we know that it is _actually_ and not just _apparently_ designed. But this type of design does not translate to a cosmic level, for two reasons: (1) there is no definite precedent of universe creation (indeed if there were we would already have proven what we were attempting to do!), and (2) there is no discernible way to differentiate between apparent design and actual design. The former is obvious. The latter is significant because actual designer rather than apparent design is the crux of Paley’s argument. If he has no grounds upon which he can definitively state that the universe is actually designed, then his argument fails. The required grounds cannot exist unless there is a way to demonstrate that the universe was actually designed, but the only way to do that (which we know of) is by precedent, an impossible task. Paley’s argument, like all the traditional theistic proofs, is stuck in the mud.


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## Hilasmos

> There is a much more terrible problem with the cosmological argument: it is entirely question-begging. This is best demonstrated by formulating the argument “backwards” as a disproof of a supernatural first cause: (1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence, except the universe itself; (2) the universe began to exist; (3) therefore, the universe did not have a cause for its existence. Of course, the first premise introduces an obviously false premise – it is not established that the universe itself did not have to be caused into existence by the fact of its beginning to exist. But with this, we can see the question-begging premise in a theistic cosmological argument: it is not established that the universe itself must have been caused into existence by the fact of its beginning to exist. The reason that this premise is entirely unwarranted is because of the nature of causality and what we can induce through our perception: all causes and effects have taken place in time, and therefore it is acceptable for us to induce conclusions from these perceived causes and effects, as long as the inductions are pertaining to causality within time. The universe’s cause is emphatically “before” time began: time did not yet exist. How, then, can anyone possibly make a definite claim about causality in the absence of time itself? The truth is that one cannot, and consequently inasmuch as Aquinas or any other philosopher attempts to prove a supernatural first cause from the existence of causality in a temporal framework, he or she necessarily begs the question.



Lets assume that the "cause" was God speaking the world, or universe, into existence. Secondly, lets propose that it is possible to measure time, or prove its existence, not just by physical change, but any change. 

Now, if the "cause" of the universe was God's "speaking" or willing it into existence, God must have entered "time" before the speaking took place. At the moment He "chose" to speak He entered into "time" by means of having a "change" in His thoughts. That is, God didn't arbitrarily say, "let there be light," there must have been, for a lack of a better term, an entering into a thought of contemplation that he was "going to speak" the world into existence (this "thought" differentiated from, to borrow William Craig's word, His singular intuition that existed in a state of timelessness). Upon this thought of "contemplation" there was a change and time began.

Conclusion, time existed before the efficient cause of the universe.


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## Confessor

Hilasmos said:


> Lets assume that the "cause" was God speaking the world, or universe, into existence. Secondly, lets propose that it is possible to measure time, or prove its existence, not just by physical change, but any change.
> 
> Now, if the "cause" of the universe was God's "speaking" or willing it into existence, God must have entered "time" before the speaking took place. At the moment He "chose" to speak He entered into "time" by means of having a "change" in His thoughts. That is, God didn't arbitrarily say, "let there be light," there must have been, for a lack of a better term, an entering into a thought of contemplation that he was "going to speak" the world into existence (this "thought" differentiated from, to borrow William Craig's word, His singular intuition that existed in a state of timelessness). Upon this thought of "contemplation" there was a change and time began.
> 
> Conclusion, time existed before the efficient cause of the universe.



Well, yeah, if you assume that action requires time -- which is of course based on observable and therefore uninformed premises -- then time had to exist during the universe's beginning. _But you have to beg the question to say that action requires time_, placing God on a creaturely level.

Even if you were right about this, however, it is still the case that we would not know how causality works at that point. Time could exist in a different sense, for all we know. We have only observed causality _within_ the universe, and we therefore cannot make any decently correct statements regarding causality _of_ the universe.


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## Hilasmos

packabacka said:


> Hilasmos said:
> 
> 
> 
> Lets assume that the "cause" was God speaking the world, or universe, into existence. Secondly, lets propose that it is possible to measure time, or prove its existence, not just by physical change, but any change.
> 
> Now, if the "cause" of the universe was God's "speaking" or willing it into existence, God must have entered "time" before the speaking took place. At the moment He "chose" to speak He entered into "time" by means of having a "change" in His thoughts. That is, God didn't arbitrarily say, "let there be light," there must have been, for a lack of a better term, an entering into a thought of contemplation that he was "going to speak" the world into existence (this "thought" differentiated from, to borrow William Craig's word, His singular intuition that existed in a state of timelessness). Upon this thought of "contemplation" there was a change and time began.
> 
> Conclusion, time existed before the efficient cause of the universe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, yeah, if you assume that action requires time -- which is of course based on observable and therefore uninformed premises -- then time had to exist during the universe's beginning. _But you have to beg the question to say that action requires time_, placing God on a creaturely level.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think action requires time, it causes time. I don't follow how it begs the question.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Even if you were right about this, however, it is still the case that we would not know how causality works at that point. Time could exist in a different sense, for all we know. We have only observed causality _within_ the universe, and we therefore cannot make any decently correct statements regarding causality _of_ the universe.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Ok, so if I'm right, your argument from time no longer works, and its only based on the assumption that "time" is different outside of the universe. You would have to assume that just because there isn't a universe that time is somehow not time? When we speak of "time" I think there are some basic universals to it, and it is only those basic foundations of the linearity of time that are needed to establish cause & effect -- from how I see it; and, I think the existence of linearity is established in the mind of God.
> 
> Keep in mind when you read my posts that I really have no idea what I am talking about, but I just enjoy these types of conversations
Click to expand...


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## Confessor

Hilasmos said:


> I don't think action requires time, it causes time. I don't follow how it begs the question.



In your defense, you didn't say that it did, but I still inferred that from "Secondly, lets propose that it is possible to measure time, or prove its existence, not just by physical change, but any change." If any change measures time, then the two are inexorably linked such that one cannot exist without the other, and therefore action requires time.

The fact is, though, even if it doesn't mean that "action requires time," you still have given no reason why I must accept that proposition -- only what I must accept if I were to accept that proposition.



> Ok, so if I'm right, your argument from time no longer works, and its only based on the assumption that "time" is different outside of the universe. You would have to assume that just because there isn't a universe that time is somehow not time?



I'm not assuming that "time is somehow not time." I am simply remaining silent about what I do not know, the nature of time outside our own observable space-time universe. It is not the case that I am assuming that time is different outside the universe; I am merely rejecting the assumption that time is the same outside the universe, limiting my inductive premise to what is observable. That is required for induction.



> When we speak of "time" I think there are some basic universals to it, and it is only those basic foundations of the linearity of time that are needed to establish cause & effect -- from how I see it; and, I think the existence of linearity is established in the mind of God.



Well, how could this (if it's what you're trying to establish) lay the groundwork for causality "before" the universe began?

For the record, I agree that causality and time is ultimately founded in God's mind. I deny, however, that we can go from causality and time as entities in themselves (i.e. outside a Christian framework) to "prove" God.



> Keep in mind when you read my posts that I really have no idea what I am talking about, but I just enjoy these types of conversations



 Will do.


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## MW

packabacka said:


> He takes for granted that God is those things, but God is only those things if the Bible is assumed to be true! He has not proven God in the least; he has only proven an unmoved mover, a first cause, a necessary being, a causal perfection, and a goal-director, none of which even cumulatively can constitute God.



Well noted!


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## Hilasmos

> Well, how could this (if it's what you're trying to establish) lay the groundwork for causality "before" the universe began?



Because, according to my idea, time began to exist before the universe began, or more precisely, before the efficient "cause" of the universe. Therefore, the universe's cause happened within time and is therefore subject to the laws of cause and effect.

-----Added 12/8/2008 at 09:51:10 EST-----



> If any change measures time, then the two are inexorably linked such that one cannot exist without the other, and therefore action requires time.



Okay, I suppose what I am getting at is that "requires time," at least to me, denotes that time must or may be existent prior to any action (and I don't think this is the case). Action at least causally or logically "precedes" time (in a non-temporal manner), despite that time and action would occur simultaneously.

-----Added 12/8/2008 at 10:01:07 EST-----



> I am simply remaining silent about what I do not know, the nature of time outside our own observable space-time universe. It is not the case that I am assuming that time is different outside the universe; I am merely rejecting the assumption that time is the same outside the universe, limiting my inductive premise to what is observable. That is required for induction.



Wouldn't our own mental processes, which are after the image of God, serve as observable data? I guess I just don't follow why time may be so different, at least in the realm of causality, just because "matter" didn't exist yet.


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## Confessor

Hilasmos said:


> Because, according to my idea, time began to exist before the universe began, or more precisely, before the efficient "cause" of the universe. Therefore, the universe's cause happened within time and is therefore subject to the laws of cause and effect.



Why ought I accept this idea? Naturalists usually posit that the Big Bang was the beginning of time as we know it. Prior, there was a singularity.



> Okay, I suppose what I am getting at is that "requires time," at least to me, denotes that time must or may be existent prior to any action (and I don't think this is the case). Action at least causally or logically "precedes" time (in a non-temporal manner), despite that time and action would occur simultaneously.



What I meant by "action requires time" is that they would have to occur simultaneously.



> Wouldn't our own mental processes, which are after the image of God, serve as observable data? I guess I just don't follow why time may be so different, at least in the realm of causality, just because "matter" didn't exist yet.



Oh yeah, if we're going off of Christian presuppositions (e.g. our minds are in the image of God), then the cosmological argument is absolutely sound. Without them (which is what I'm trying to prove), they cannot prove God in the least.

It's not the fact that time is necessarily different in a singularity; it's the fact that we don't know if it is the same in a singularity. Therefore, we cannot make definitive statements about causality and try to construct an argument for God being the uncaused cause.


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## ChristianTrader

packabacka said:


> This is part of what I wrote for an assignment from my Philosophy class:
> 
> _The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs_
> 
> If I were to tell my friend that I owned a “gobiant,” he would reasonably ask what exactly a gobiant is. If I did not have an answer, he would have a good reason to deny that I own a gobiant, because my positive assertion that I do would be nonsensical. Prior to my proving to him that I own such a thing, I would have to establish a definition of what I own, so that proof of my ownership of the gobiant would actually be coherent. It makes no sense to speak of owning something prior to establishing what exactly that “something” is. In like fashion, the traditional arguments for the existence of God attempt to prove that God exists _prior to_ establishing a distinctly Christian conception of God (or any other conception, for that matter). But this is a huge flaw. The Christian God, according to orthodox denominations of Christianity, is a deity who has sovereignly revealed Himself through the Bible. Therefore, if it were true that He existed, then it would follow that the entirety of the Bible must be true, and vice versa. But the very, very most that traditional arguments can possibly yield is that something supernatural might exist – far less that this being is a deity as typically conceived, that he cares about the world, that he has any infinite characteristics, and that he has revealed himself to the world. The arguments therefore are misnomers and entirely misleading. They cannot prove God’s existence and therefore they should not be called theistic proofs.



Could a person make and accept or reject traditional arguments without first having ever seen or heard of a Bible?

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> Could a person make and accept or reject traditional arguments without first having ever seen or heard of a Bible?



They might be able to posit a first cause or some plan of design apart from the Bible, but not the traditional arguments as generally conceived.


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## ChristianTrader

packabacka said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Could a person make and accept or reject traditional arguments without first having ever seen or heard of a Bible?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> They might be able to posit a first cause or some plan of design apart from the Bible, but not the traditional arguments as generally conceived.
Click to expand...


I am not asking if the traditional arguments work or not, but only if the traditional arguments include some premise that a regular person could not evaluate and accept or reject without first having seen a Bible.

If so, where/what are those premises.

CT


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## Hilasmos

Going back to the cosmological argument, a possible solution for the need of empirical evidence may be the existence of virtual particles, which are "are scientific examples of particles caused by an atemporal cause, viz., the laws of quantum mechanics."


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## Davidius

Thomas believed that some knowledge of God is available to us through reason, and that other knowledge of God is available only through revelation. I've seen these critiques of Aquinas before. In fact, your argument is the exact same argument Gordon Clark and John Robbins used, with "snark" instead of "gobiant." In my opinion, they and you misunderstand Aquinas' intention in that first book of the _Summa_. His goal in the argument for a first mover is simply to argue for the existence of a first mover. The more precise definition of the first mover comes with more reasoning, and ultimately with revelation, since Thomas believed that the doctrine of the Trinity could not be proved by reason, but was dependent upon revelation. He uses the term _deus_, as it were, as a placeholder. Therefore these arguments from Clark, Robbins, do not deal adequately with Thomas because they lift about three sentences from three thousand pages and import a foreign intention into them.


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## MW

Davidius said:


> His goal in the argument for a first mover is simply to argue for the existence of a first mover. The more precise definition of the first mover comes with more reasoning, and ultimately with revelation, since Thomas believed that the doctrine of the Trinity could not be proved by reason, but was dependent upon revelation. He uses the term _deus_, as it were, as a placeholder.



That is correct to a certain extent because Thomas held that the theology included in sacred doctrine differs *in kind* to the theology which is part of philosophy. But this only shows that his "God" which is proved by reason is not the same kind of "God" which is revealed in the Bible. Hence I think that systemic critiques of Aquinas have merit to them. Aquinas' arguments only work on the assumption that they are moving towards the acceptance of divine revelation; this means that the system of Christian truth is a pre-requisite to the proper understanding of his causal argument. This becomes apparent when the leap is made from the ordinary cause-effect relationship to the extraordinary cause-effect relationshio which exists between God and the world. The biblical doctrine of creation is necessary in order to prove the point.


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> I am not asking if the traditional arguments work or not, but only if the traditional arguments include some premise that a regular person could not evaluate and accept or reject without first having seen a Bible.
> 
> If so, where/what are those premises.



Yeah, of course they could. Hence the "natural" part of "natural theology." Of course, I doubt they could reach any sort of reliable conclusions from these arguments due to additional unanswered questions: e.g. "Is the first cause natural or supernatural?"

The premises would probably be such things as "the world appears designed," "everything perceived has a cause", etc.

-----Added 12/9/2008 at 12:43:17 EST-----



Hilasmos said:


> Going back to the cosmological argument, a possible solution for the need of empirical evidence may be the existence of virtual particles, which are "are scientific examples of particles caused by an atemporal cause, viz., the laws of quantum mechanics."



What exactly are you trying to prove with this? This would seem to negate the concept of theistic creation even further.

-----Added 12/9/2008 at 12:47:23 EST-----



Davidius said:


> I've seen these critiques of Aquinas before. In fact, your argument is the exact same argument Gordon Clark and John Robbins used, with "snark" instead of "gobiant."



Haha, this is awesome! I honestly did not know that such a critique existed.



> In my opinion, they and you misunderstand Aquinas' intention in that first book of the _Summa_. His goal in the argument for a first mover is simply to argue for the existence of a first mover. The more precise definition of the first mover comes with more reasoning, and ultimately with revelation, since Thomas believed that the doctrine of the Trinity could not be proved by reason, but was dependent upon revelation. He uses the term _deus_, as it were, as a placeholder. Therefore these arguments from Clark, Robbins, do not deal adequately with Thomas because they lift about three sentences from three thousand pages and import a foreign intention into them.



Still, Aquinas's arguments don't take a single step towards God. The first cause is essentially a blank entity, which could even be non-supernatural. If that is what Aquinas was attempting to prove, then he did not make it clear how to connect that and accepting the truthfulness of the Bible.

Of course, if he says that we should accept the Bible because of its inherently divine nature, then he's a presuppositionalist, and his five arguments actually have meaning.


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## Hilasmos

> (1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence, except the universe itself; (2) the universe began to exist; (3) therefore, the universe did not have a cause for its existence.




Here is a summary of a former converstaion I had with someone. What if we reworded your assertion above, positively, as follows:

1) Everything that begins to exist has either necessary and/or sufficient conditions for its existence

2) the universe began to exist

3) therefore, the universe has necessary and/or sufficient conditions for its existence.

We cannot say that the universe does_ not_ have necessary or sufficient conditons for its existence, for then it would follow that it also doesn't have necessary or sufficent conditions for its evolution. The reverse of 3), that the universe does NOT have necessary and/or sufficent conditions for its existence, is contrary to scientific observations. 

If the universe, therefore, has necessary and/or sufficient conditions for its existence, then the universe has causal conditions - or conditions that causally precede its existence - that is, it has a cause.


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## Confessor

The point of that syllogism was to make an obviously question-begging cosmological argument for the _nonexistence_ of God, in order to show that the traditional argument is equally question-begging.



Hilasmos said:


> If the universe, therefore, has necessary and/or sufficient conditions for its existence, then the universe has causal conditions - or conditions that causally precede its existence - that is, it has a cause.



No, this does not follow. Why couldn't the universe be self-caused? What exactly do you know of the nature of singularities which would necessitate that it have a cause outside itself?

By the way, if you claim to have studied singularities at all, I'm not going to believe you.


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## ChristianTrader

packabacka said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I am not asking if the traditional arguments work or not, but only if the traditional arguments include some premise that a regular person could not evaluate and accept or reject without first having seen a Bible.
> 
> If so, where/what are those premises.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah, of course they could. Hence the "natural" part of "natural theology." Of course, I doubt they could reach any sort of reliable conclusions from these arguments due to additional unanswered questions: e.g. "Is the first cause natural or supernatural?"
> 
> The premises would probably be such things as "the world appears designed," "everything perceived has a cause", etc.
Click to expand...


We can get into what can in fact be proven by natural theology, but the first step is to just justify that there is no question begging in not starting with the premise that "the Bible is the Word of God". Either the argument works or it does not, but question begging is not a real objection.



> Aquinas embarrassingly confirms this linguistic mistake: after attempting to prove an unmoved mover, he says, “And this is what everybody understands by God” (p.7); after attempting to prove a first cause, he says, “to which everyone gives the name God” (p.8); and after attempting to prove a causal perfection or goal-director, he says, “And this we call God” (p.8). He takes for granted that God is those things, but God is only those things if the Bible is assumed to be true! He has not proven God in the least; he has only proven an unmoved mover, a first cause, a necessary being, a causal perfection, and a goal-director, none of which even cumulatively can constitute God. For instance, one does not even need to assign a sentient being to the descriptors of “unmoved mover” and “first cause,” causal perfection can be merely conceptual and not a real existence, and a goal director could be a magic rabbit (or something else equally absurd). What is certain from Aquinas’s arguments is that the Christian God is not proven; he still has an extremely long way to go, demonstrating that the entire revelation claimed by Christians is true. (In their defense, evidentialist Christian apologists go from theistic proofs to evidence for Christ’s resurrection to the veracity of the Bible, but I still have severe disputations with their methodology.)



All Aquinas is appealing to when he talks about "what everyone knows as God" is General Revelation. His attempt is to show that people are treating General Revelation wrongly when they infer something opposed to x. Therefore he can make a claim even to people who have never seen the Bible. They may object but so what, the issue is whether the objections can be answered, not whether they can be made.

Next, it is not the point of Natural Theology to demonstrate that Jesus was dead three days instead of four and all other sorts of facts that we believe the Bible tells us.

I think the third paragraph of your opening post is the one with the biggest problems but I think I need to make sure that we are on the same page before we get there. 

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> We can get into what can in fact be proven by natural theology, but the first step is to just justify that there is no question begging in not starting with the premise that "the Bible is the Word of God". Either the argument works or it does not, but question begging is not a real objection.



Well, using natural theology as any sort of theistic evidences would absolutely be question-begging. They can't even establish that the cause or designer was supernatural, much less a deity.



> All Aquinas is appealing to when he talks about "what everyone knows as God" is General Revelation. His attempt is to show that people are treating General Revelation wrongly when they infer something opposed to x. Therefore he can make a claim even to people who have never seen the Bible. They may object but so what, the issue is whether the objections can be answered, not whether they can be made.



I'm not sure I follow you here. Are you saying that he is attempting to show that non-Christian conclusions based on natural revelation are wrong?



> Next, it is not the point of Natural Theology to demonstrate that Jesus was dead three days instead of four and all other sorts of facts that we believe the Bible tells us.



I understand that. But natural theology takes us absolutely nowhere near an establishment of Christianity, either.


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## Davidius

I don't see how presuppositionalism escapes your charge. Whether you argue like Thomas toward a first mover that is undefined, or simply assume the truth of "scripture," you are at the same point. You still have to ask what the thing is, and supplement that with more information and argumentation.


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## Confessor

Davidius said:


> I don't see how presuppositionalism escapes your charge. Whether you argue like Thomas toward a first mover that is undefined, or simply assume the truth of "scripture," you are at the same point. You still have to ask what the thing is, and supplement that with more information and argumentation.



I would define my methodology and carry it out. Aquinas (or at least, other people who use these arguments) is misleading people into thinking that God is proven, but He is not. Aquinas is necessarily using a false definition, since he either must add to it in the future or not prove God completely in the present. In both situations, he is not proving God's existence in the least.


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## ChristianTrader

packabacka said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> We can get into what can in fact be proven by natural theology, but the first step is to just justify that there is no question begging in not starting with the premise that "the Bible is the Word of God". Either the argument works or it does not, but question begging is not a real objection.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, using natural theology as any sort of theistic evidences would absolutely be question-begging. They can't even establish that the cause or designer was supernatural, much less a deity.
Click to expand...


What kind of objection are you using here: Some sort of induction/abduction - I have not seen an answer to objections that I have, so those objections cannot be answered?

Also it assumes that materalism cannot be shown to be false without special revelation. (Because if materialism is false then supernaturalism is all you have left - depending on how broadly you construe "nature') That is an enormous claim to justify.

Show me that if I have never seen the Bible, I am *required* to accept materialism as true. 



> All Aquinas is appealing to when he talks about "what everyone knows as God" is General Revelation. His attempt is to show that people are treating General Revelation wrongly when they infer something opposed to x. Therefore he can make a claim even to people who have never seen the Bible. They may object but so what, the issue is whether the objections can be answered, not whether they can be made.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure I follow you here. Are you saying that he is attempting to show that non-Christian conclusions based on natural revelation are wrong?
Click to expand...


I think that such is at least part of his project. I think another part is the attempt to show that "right reason" and Christianity are not at war.



> Next, it is not the point of Natural Theology to demonstrate that Jesus was dead three days instead of four and all other sorts of facts that we believe the Bible tells us.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I understand that. But natural theology takes us absolutely nowhere near an establishment of Christianity, either.
Click to expand...


If natural theology could eliminate any semi-coherent alternative to Christianity, would you consider it to have been useful?

CT

-----Added 12/9/2008 at 05:56:53 EST-----



packabacka said:


> Davidius said:
> 
> 
> 
> I don't see how presuppositionalism escapes your charge. Whether you argue like Thomas toward a first mover that is undefined, or simply assume the truth of "scripture," you are at the same point. You still have to ask what the thing is, and supplement that with more information and argumentation.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would define my methodology and carry it out. Aquinas (or at least, other people who use these arguments) is misleading people into thinking that God is proven, but He is not. Aquinas is necessarily using a false definition, since he either must add to it in the future or not prove God completely in the present. In both situations, he is not proving God's existence in the least.
Click to expand...


Let us say that Aquinas "proves" that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?

CT


----------



## Hilasmos

packabacka said:


> The point of that syllogism was to make an obviously question-begging cosmological argument for the _nonexistence_ of God, in order to show that the traditional argument is equally question-begging.
> 
> 
> 
> Hilasmos said:
> 
> 
> 
> If the universe, therefore, has necessary and/or sufficient conditions for its existence, then the universe has causal conditions - or conditions that causally precede its existence - that is, it has a cause.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No, this does not follow. Why couldn't the universe be self-caused? What exactly do you know of the nature of singularities which would necessitate that it have a cause outside itself?
> 
> By the way, if you claim to have studied singularities at all, I'm not going to believe you.
Click to expand...


1') premise: If the evolving universe began to exist at event1, then there are no external causal conditions to its existence.

2') premise: the evolving universe began to exist.

3') therefore, the evolving universe is a brute fact. 

We can then extend this argument as follows:

4') premise: If the evolving universe began to evolve at event1, then it does so brute factly or according to external causal conditions.

5') the evolving universe began to evolve at event1 (from 1')

6') therefore, the evolving universe evolves brute factly. (from 1', 4', 5')

7') premise: the evolving universe does not evolve brute factly.

8') thus, 6' is false.

9') thus, 4' is false.

10') thus, 1' is false.

11') ergo, the evolving universe either did not begin to exist at event1 or there are external conditions to its existence.

(7') is based on scientific observations that strongly suggest that this premise is true.

-----Added 12/9/2008 at 07:27:46 EST-----

If we say the universe is self-caused, then causal conditions that currently exist are not conditions for an event to happen since an event did happen without any conditions present (namely the universe began). That is, it's beginning would be a brute fact. But, in that case, every event follows as a brute fact. Since there are causal conditions that appear to require the universe to evolve in a certain manner (e.g., the laws of physics), it is apparent that we do not in fact live in this kind of universe.


----------



## Vytautas

How come you did not write about the ontological argument? Is it not traditional?


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> What kind of objection are you using here: Some sort of induction/abduction - I have not seen an answer to objections that I have, so those objections cannot be answered?



It's based on the finiteness of the human mind. We are existing within this universe. Therefore we cannot make inductive premises pertaining to causal relationships outside our universe. That would be a severe categorical error.



> Also it assumes that materalism cannot be shown to be false without special revelation. (Because if materialism is false then supernaturalism is all you have left - depending on how broadly you construe "nature') That is an enormous claim to justify.



How does it assume this? I am not saying one must be a materialist without a Bible; I would only say that one would have to be a non-Christian without the Bible, which is nearly truistic and of course biblical (Rom. 10:14).



> I'm not sure I follow you here. Are you saying that he is attempting to show that non-Christian conclusions based on natural revelation are wrong?
> 
> 
> 
> I think that such is at least part of his project. I think another part is the attempt to show that "right reason" and Christianity are not at war.
Click to expand...


He is not showing either. An uncaused cause need not be anything resembling the Christian God (unless an authoritative revelation were to say otherwise ), and of course I would argue that he's not using "right reason" insofar as he's not presupposing God's existence, so he can't demonstrate that in the first place.



> If natural theology could eliminate any semi-coherent alternative to Christianity, would you consider it to have been useful?



Hypothetically, if that were the case, yes.



> Let us say that Aquinas "proves" that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?



If he were to do that, then the end of his conclusion should be that he has proved an eternal being, not God. This is the linguistic impropriety I was talking about.

-----Added 12/9/2008 at 09:47:56 EST-----



Hilasmos said:


> If we say the universe is self-caused, then causal conditions that currently exist are not conditions for an event to happen since an event did happen without any conditions present (namely the universe began). That is, it's beginning would be a brute fact. But, in that case, every event follows as a brute fact. Since there are causal conditions that appear to require the universe to evolve in a certain manner (e.g., the laws of physics), it is apparent that we do not in fact live in this kind of universe.



Are you saying that if the universe were self-caused, every event within the universe would have to be self-caused as well? If so, how does that follow? If not, please explain.

-----Added 12/9/2008 at 09:49:24 EST-----



Vytautas said:


> How come you did not write about the ontological argument? Is it not traditional?



The professor asked that we write about 800-900 words, and I was already over 1000.

I do think the ontological argument is ridiculous though.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> What kind of objection are you using here: Some sort of induction/abduction - I have not seen an answer to objections that I have, so those objections cannot be answered?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It's based on the finiteness of the human mind. We are existing within this universe. Therefore we cannot make inductive premises pertaining to causal relationships outside our universe. That would be a severe categorical error.
Click to expand...


I have no objection to the finiteness of the human mind, but I do think that it will be difficult to show that any knowledge that I have is due to induction. I am not an empiricist and my last name is not Hume.



> Also it assumes that materalism cannot be shown to be false without special revelation. (Because if materialism is false then supernaturalism is all you have left - depending on how broadly you construe "nature') That is an enormous claim to justify.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How does it assume this? I am not saying one must be a materialist without a Bible; I would only say that one would have to be a non-Christian without the Bible, which is nearly truistic and of course biblical (Rom. 10:14).
Click to expand...


Let us go back to your actual statement: 


> Well, using natural theology as any sort of theistic evidences would absolutely be question-begging. They can't even establish that the cause or designer was supernatural, much less a deity.



You said it could not be established that the designer or cause was supernatural. That would seem to imply that without the Bible one has to be a materialist of some sort to believe that nature/material is all there is. If you wish to recant or correct what you said here, then you can do so and then we can move along. If you don't wish to recant, then you have some defending to do.




> He is not showing either. An uncaused cause need not be anything resembling the Christian God (unless an authoritative revelation were to say otherwise ), and of course I would argue that he's not using "right reason" insofar as he's not presupposing God's existence, so he can't demonstrate that in the first place.



Actually all you are doing here is making assertions. You seem to assume that an uncaused being has no implications for worldview etc. and that it can be made to fit any possible worldview. Why do you make such assumptions.



> Hypothetically, if that were the case, yes.



Good, so we now have the stage set for some debate on what natural theology can/could tell us.



> If he were to do that, then the end of his conclusion should be that he has proved an eternal being, not God. This is the linguistic impropriety I was talking about.



There would only be a problem if one says that one can only know that an eternal being exists. At the very least some worldviews have been ruled out of bounds right out of the gate.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> I have no objection to the finiteness of the human mind, but I do think that it will be difficult to show that any knowledge that I have is due to induction. I am not an empiricist and my last name is not Hume.



The premise "everything that begins to exist has a cause" is informed by induction.



> Well, using natural theology as any sort of theistic evidences would absolutely be question-begging. They can't even establish that the cause or designer was supernatural, much less a deity.
> 
> 
> 
> You said it could not be established that the designer or cause was supernatural. That would seem to imply that without the Bible one has to be a materialist of some sort to believe that nature/material is all there is. If you wish to recant or correct what you said here, then you can do so and then we can move along. If you don't wish to recant, then you have some defending to do.
Click to expand...


One would still only be a materialist if he were to presuppose materialism as his starting point. I am merely saying that one cannot _positively prove_ that the cause was supernatural. This would only necessitate materialism if one were to use the typical autonomous mindset. Materialism is by no means the "default" position in the case that the supernatural has not been proven "on top" of that. In fact, this is related to a central tenet of presuppositionalism.



> Actually all you are doing here is making assertions. You seem to assume that an uncaused being has no implications for worldview etc. and that it can be made to fit any possible worldview. Why do you make such assumptions.



The _only_ thing his argument proves is that there is an uncaused cause. His argument tells nothing of the nature of this cause, and consequently it is not specific towards any one worldview. I am not making an assumption; I am merely being honest about what Aquinas is proving here.



> If he were to do that, then the end of his conclusion should be that he has proved an eternal being, not God. This is the linguistic impropriety I was talking about.
> 
> 
> 
> There would only be a problem if one says that one can only know that an eternal being exists. At the very least some worldviews have been ruled out of bounds right out of the gate.
Click to expand...


I deny that he can prove an eternal being from his premises. You assumed that he could prove it when you asked the question, so I answered what would be the case in the hypothetical scenario that it was possible. I deny that natural theology could tell us that much.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I have no objection to the finiteness of the human mind, but I do think that it will be difficult to show that any knowledge that I have is due to induction. I am not an empiricist and my last name is not Hume.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The premise "everything that begins to exist has a cause" is informed by induction.
Click to expand...


Nope, we should know it because the opposite entails a contradiction. It could be written in this fashion "something that begins to exist has no cause" or stated another way "nothing/non being caused something".

Causation presupposes being and intelligibility presupposes cause.

If you dont quite see it, then answer what you mean by nothing when you saying nothing caused X to happen.



> You said it could not be established that the designer or cause was supernatural. That would seem to imply that without the Bible one has to be a materialist of some sort to believe that nature/material is all there is. If you wish to recant or correct what you said here, then you can do so and then we can move along. If you don't wish to recant, then you have some defending to do.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> One would still only be a materialist if he were to presuppose materialism as his starting point. I am merely saying that one cannot _positively prove_ that the cause was supernatural. This would only necessitate materialism if one were to use the typical autonomous mindset. Materialism is by no means the "default" position in the case that the supernatural has not been proven "on top" of that. In fact, this is related to a central tenet of presuppositionalism.
Click to expand...


Why do you have to positively prove anything. If you can rule all other alternatives out, that is enough, right? To rule out the ability to rule things out is only to assume that materialism et. al is correct from the beginning.



> The _only_ thing his argument proves is that there is an uncaused cause. His argument tells nothing of the nature of this cause, and consequently it is not specific towards any one worldview. I am not making an assumption; I am merely being honest about what Aquinas is proving here.



So your saying in his 3k page book (not including other works) he only argues that God is an uncaused cause? So he does not argue for the dependency of creation etc.

Either you are not familiar with Aquinas or you are attempting to fault him for not having arguing for everything at once. Or put into other words, faulting him for not being infinite.



> If he were to do that, then the end of his conclusion should be that he has proved an eternal being, not God. This is the linguistic impropriety I was talking about.
> 
> 
> 
> There would only be a problem if one says that one can only know that an eternal being exists. At the very least some worldviews have been ruled out of bounds right out of the gate.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I deny that he can prove an eternal being from his premises. You assumed that he could prove it when you asked the question, so I answered what would be the case in the hypothetical scenario that it was possible. I deny that natural theology could tell us that much.
Click to expand...


But remember we had not currently gone into what his argument does or does not prove. We were simply going into what are the problems or successes if he accomplished what he wished to accomplish. In that context, your objection had no teeth.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> Nope, we should know it because the opposite entails a contradiction. It could be written in this fashion "something that begins to exist has no cause" or stated another way "nothing/non being caused something".
> 
> Causation presupposes being and intelligibility presupposes cause.
> 
> If you dont quite see it, then answer what you mean by nothing when you saying nothing caused X to happen.



According to the general scientific consensus, prior to the Big Bang there was a singularity. Thus, when I say that the universe began to exist, I don't mean that nothing existed previously, only that universe "as we know it" began to exist.



> Why do you have to positively prove anything. If you can rule all other alternatives out, that is enough, right? To rule out the ability to rule things out is only to assume that materialism et. al is correct from the beginning.



But that wouldn't be ruling all other alternatives out. Proving that the first cause need not be supernatural does not necessitate that nothing supernatural exists, and therefore materialism is not a necessary belief by any means.



> So your saying in his 3k page book (not including other works) he only argues that God is an uncaused cause? So he does not argue for the dependency of creation etc.



No, I'm saying that _in that argument_ he is only arguing for that. He never reaches the actual definition of God without presupposing that the Bible is authoritative.



> Either you are not familiar with Aquinas or you are attempting to fault him for not having arguing for everything at once. Or put into other words, faulting him for not being infinite.



...or for pretending to be arguing for more than he is.



> I deny that he can prove an eternal being from his premises. You assumed that he could prove it when you asked the question, so I answered what would be the case in the hypothetical scenario that it was possible. I deny that natural theology could tell us that much.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But remember we had not currently gone into what his argument does or does not prove. We were simply going into what are the problems or successes if he accomplished what he wished to accomplish. In that context, your objection had no teeth.
Click to expand...


You stated, "Let us say that Aquinas 'proves' that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?"

My answer: If he were to argue that an eternal being existed, and he called it God (rather than "an eternal being), then his argument would be false. It would not be false that an eternal being existed in that situation, however.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Nope, we should know it because the opposite entails a contradiction. It could be written in this fashion "something that begins to exist has no cause" or stated another way "nothing/non being caused something".
> 
> Causation presupposes being and intelligibility presupposes cause.
> 
> If you dont quite see it, then answer what you mean by nothing when you saying nothing caused X to happen.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> According to the general scientific consensus, prior to the Big Bang there was a singularity. Thus, when I say that the universe began to exist, I don't mean that nothing existed previously, only that universe "as we know it" began to exist.
Click to expand...


Just to be fair, general scientific consensus can be coherent or incoherent. Just because it is the consensus does not mean very much.

Next, if we agree that the universe began to exist, then we can start asking what began it, or what caused it (and what characteristics that causer/creator has)



> Why do you have to positively prove anything. If you can rule all other alternatives out, that is enough, right? To rule out the ability to rule things out is only to assume that materialism et. al is correct from the beginning.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But that wouldn't be ruling all other alternatives out. Proving that the first cause need not be supernatural does not necessitate that nothing supernatural exists, and therefore materialism is not a necessary belief by any means.
Click to expand...


My point here, is that there are no objections to ruling all alternatives out and then sticking with what is left. There is no need for positive vs. negative proof. There is just need for proof and justification.




> No, I'm saying that _in that argument_ he is only arguing for that. He never reaches the actual definition of God without presupposing that the Bible is authoritative.



His point, is to see what he can argue and prove using just General Revelation. The question we have before us, is how far can he go.




> ...or for pretending to be arguing for more than he is.



He is not pretending anything. The issue is simply appealing to what people know by SD and Natural Revelation.



> I deny that he can prove an eternal being from his premises. You assumed that he could prove it when you asked the question, so I answered what would be the case in the hypothetical scenario that it was possible. I deny that natural theology could tell us that much.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But remember we had not currently gone into what his argument does or does not prove. We were simply going into what are the problems or successes if he accomplished what he wished to accomplish. In that context, your objection had no teeth.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> You stated, "Let us say that Aquinas 'proves' that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?"
> 
> My answer: If he were to argue that an eternal being existed, and he called it God (rather than "an eternal being), then his argument would be false. It would not be false that an eternal being existed in that situation, however.
Click to expand...


Why would it be false? Is something else eternal besides God? Is something else infinite besides God? If not, then when one refers to eternal, one is referring to God, right?

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> Just to be fair, general scientific consensus can be coherent or incoherent. Just because it is the consensus does not mean very much.
> 
> Next, if we agree that the universe began to exist, then we can start asking what began it, or what caused it (and what characteristics that causer/creator has)



For the record, I was only bringing up the scientific consensus as being the materialistic take on the matter, not on what everyone should believe. Secondly, yeah, we could begin to ask what caused it, but we cannot get much further than that. As I have been saying, all the cosmological argument proves is a first cause, and nothing else.



> My point here, is that there are no objections to ruling all alternatives out and then sticking with what is left. There is no need for positive vs. negative proof. There is just need for proof and justification.



I understand the methodology you are presenting: if the supernatural did not exist, then materialism would be the only option remaining, and thus it alone should be believed. I am saying instead that the fact that we do not certainly know that the first cause is supernatural is not tantamount to the fact that nothing supernatural exists. Consequently, there is no necessary materialism.



> His point, is to see what he can argue and prove using just General Revelation. The question we have before us, is how far can he go.



...and he cannot go further than "first cause", or anywhere near "God" -- all he can posit is that there was some first cause, and offer nothing more about the nature of this first cause.



> He is not pretending anything. The issue is simply appealing to what people know by SD and Natural Revelation.



He is falsely saying that causation entails God's existence, when all it entails is a first cause. Even if he doesn't mean it, he is still saying so. He is not presenting a _theistic_ proof in the least.



> You stated, "Let us say that Aquinas 'proves' that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?"
> 
> My answer: If he were to argue that an eternal being existed, and he called it God (rather than "an eternal being"), then his argument would be false. It would not be false that an eternal being existed in that situation, however.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why would it be false? Is something else eternal besides God? Is something else infinite besides God? If not, then when one refers to eternal, one is referring to God, right?
Click to expand...


God is much more than just eternal. Therefore, if he were to argue that the existence of _something_ eternal was tantamount to the existence of God, then he would be making a false argument.

Nothing else is eternal or infinite besides God (in reality), but people can still offer concepts of infinite entities which rival God. In fact, if he were to say that the existence of an eternal being equaled God's existence, then he would be presupposing that the Bible is accurate in its portrayal of the living God; i.e. he would be presupposing the truth of the Bible.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Just to be fair, general scientific consensus can be coherent or incoherent. Just because it is the consensus does not mean very much.
> 
> Next, if we agree that the universe began to exist, then we can start asking what began it, or what caused it (and what characteristics that causer/creator has)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> For the record, I was only bringing up the scientific consensus as being the materialistic take on the matter, not on what everyone should believe. Secondly, yeah, we could begin to ask what caused it, but we cannot get much further than that. As I have been saying, all the cosmological argument proves is a first cause, and nothing else.
Click to expand...


How do you know how much farther we can or cannot go? Why am I so limited?

For example, is it possible for the first cause to not be eternal?



> My point here, is that there are no objections to ruling all alternatives out and then sticking with what is left. There is no need for positive vs. negative proof. There is just need for proof and justification.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I understand the methodology you are presenting: if the supernatural did not exist, then materialism would be the only option remaining, and thus it alone should be believed. I am saying instead that the fact that we do not certainly know that the first cause is supernatural is not tantamount to the fact that nothing supernatural exists. Consequently, there is no necessary materialism.
Click to expand...


Tell me why I cannot know whether or not the first cause was or was not supernatural?



> ...and he cannot go further than "first cause", or anywhere near "God" -- all he can posit is that there was some first cause, and offer nothing more about the nature of this first cause.



Here you are just making assertions based on some theory of knowledge. What theory of knowledge is that, and why should I accept it. If I accept a different theory of knowledge, then I could come to a different conclusion.

Or put another way, it does not seem that your theory of knowledge is necessary, so tell me why it is so.



> He is falsely saying that causation entails God's existence, when all it entails is a first cause. Even if he doesn't mean it, he is still saying so. He is not presenting a _theistic_ proof in the least.



If you reject causation, then you have to reject knowledge. If you reject knowledge then you could not even speak to defend your position, because to do so presupposes knowledge that is being conveyed.



> You stated, "Let us say that Aquinas 'proves' that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?"
> 
> My answer: If he were to argue that an eternal being existed, and he called it God (rather than "an eternal being"), then his argument would be false. It would not be false that an eternal being existed in that situation, however.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why would it be false? Is something else eternal besides God? Is something else infinite besides God? If not, then when one refers to eternal, one is referring to God, right?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> God is much more than just eternal. Therefore, if he were to argue that the existence of _something_ eternal was tantamount to the existence of God, then he would be making a false argument.
Click to expand...


God is more than eternal, however being eternal does not imply just being eternal, it implies much besides that.



> Nothing else is eternal or infinite besides God (in reality), but people can still offer concepts of infinite entities which rival God. In fact, if he were to say that the existence of an eternal being equaled God's existence, then he would be presupposing that the Bible is accurate in its portrayal of the living God; i.e. he would be presupposing the truth of the Bible.



How could they presuppose the Bible being accurate when you have already agreed that they can evaluate and accept the argument without even knowing that the Bible exists.

How do you presuppose the accuracy of something that you don't know.

CT


----------



## Hilasmos

> Originally Posted by Hilasmos
> If we say the universe is self-caused, then causal conditions that currently exist are not conditions for an event to happen since an event did happen without any conditions present (namely the universe began). That is, it's beginning would be a brute fact. But, in that case, every event follows as a brute fact. Since there are causal conditions that appear to require the universe to evolve in a certain manner (e.g., the laws of physics), it is apparent that we do not in fact live in this kind of universe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *Originally Posted by Confessor*
> Are you saying that if the universe were self-caused, every event within the universe would have to be self-caused as well? If so, how does that follow? If not, please explain.
Click to expand...


Well, I am saying that there would be self-caused events in the world, which is contrary to the rationality of science, based on the fact that what came into existence was an _evolving_ universe. That is, it wasn't a static universe that came into existence but a universe "in motion" (evolving); and if done as a brute fact, the evolutionary effects taking place at event1 would proceed, and exist at t1, with no causal conditions (e.g. apart from the laws of physics), which is irrational.

The _evolving_ universe that came into existence at t1, if it appears rational (which it does), would have to evolve by mathematical logic brute factly, and not because it is governed by laws. In that case, no causal conditions are established for events t2 and t3...They would also require to exist according to brute facts that just happen, or appear, to follow mathematical logic.


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> How do you know how much farther we can or cannot go? Why am I so limited?
> 
> For example, is it possible for the first cause to not be eternal?



Well, all that the argument proves is a first cause. If you were to add (sound) premises and a (sound) conclusion that the first cause is eternal, then it's another story.



> Tell me why I cannot know whether or not the first cause was or was not supernatural?



Just like my above answer: the supernatural aspect of the first cause is not concluded in the argument. All that is concluded is that a first cause existed. To speculate on top of that without sound premises is foolish.



> Here you are just making assertions based on some theory of knowledge. What theory of knowledge is that, and why should I accept it. If I accept a different theory of knowledge, then I could come to a different conclusion.
> 
> Or put another way, it does not seem that your theory of knowledge is necessary, so tell me why it is so.



I am not speaking of any specific epistemology, just what the argument does or does not prove. All the cosmological argument can prove is a first cause. To start adding godly or divine or eternal or infinite (etc.) characteristics is without warrant.



> If you reject causation, then you have to reject knowledge. If you reject knowledge then you could not even speak to defend your position, because to do so presupposes knowledge that is being conveyed.



I am not rejecting causation in the least. I am rejecting that causation (viewed from a "neutral" or "autonomous" framework) entails the existence of God. All it could possibly entail is a first cause.



> God is more than eternal, however being eternal does not imply just being eternal, it implies much besides that.



Then make sure you include these implications as premises in a modified, improved cosmological argument.



> Nothing else is eternal or infinite besides God (in reality), but people can still offer concepts of infinite entities which rival God. In fact, if he were to say that the existence of an eternal being equaled God's existence, then he would be presupposing that the Bible is accurate in its portrayal of the living God; i.e. he would be presupposing the truth of the Bible.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How could they presuppose the Bible being accurate when you have already agreed that they can evaluate and accept the argument without even knowing that the Bible exists.
> 
> How do you presuppose the accuracy of something that you don't know.
Click to expand...


That is the point! No one can inferentially arrive at the logical conclusion of God's existence apart from supernatural revelation! Natural theology is a failure.

They can evaluate and accept the argument as proving the empty entity of a first cause (and this only by God allowing them Christian knowledge [i.e. knowledge based on Christian presuppositions] through common grace), but not God, not even close.

-----Added 12/11/2008 at 01:24:49 EST-----



Hilasmos said:


> Well, I am saying that there would be self-caused events in the world, which is contrary to the rationality of science, based on the fact that what came into existence was an _evolving_ universe. That is, it wasn't a static universe that came into existence but a universe "in motion" (evolving); and if done as a brute fact, the evolutionary effects taking place at event1 would proceed, and exist at t1, with no causal conditions (e.g. apart from the laws of physics), which is irrational.



Why couldn't the one instance at t1 be a self-causation? Why does it necessarily entail future examples of self-causation? Why does it necessarily entail _one_ future example of self-causation?

That is, just because the universe is not static, but rather is in motion, it does not follow that there could not be one self-causing force at t1. The fact's being "contrary to the rationality of science" is not an applicable objection because science cannot possibly deal with the state of a singularity and thus cannot make any possible judgments of how causality was or should have been at t1.



> The _evolving_ universe that came into existence at t1, if it appears rational (which it does), would have to evolve by mathematical logic brute factly, and not because it is governed by laws. In that case, no causal conditions are established for events t2 and t3...They would also require to exist according to brute facts that just happen, or appear, to follow mathematical logic.



What do you mean by "evolving by mathematical logic brute factly," and as as a result of that "no causal conditions are established for t2 and t3"? I'm not sure what exactly to picture in my mind when you speak of the evolving universe, brute fact, and mathematical logic (although I have a pretty good idea of "evolving universe).


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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> How do you know how much farther we can or cannot go? Why am I so limited?
> 
> For example, is it possible for the first cause to not be eternal?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, all that the argument proves is a first cause. If you were to add (sound) premises and a (sound) conclusion that the first cause is eternal, then it's another story.
Click to expand...


The whole discussion is not really the cosmological/ontological/or teleological arguments, but instead what one can know by natural theology/natural revelation. 

Your argument seems to be something along the line of thinking that it is a problem that Genesis does not teach everything about world and God, therefore the Bible is not useful.



> Tell me why I cannot know whether or not the first cause was or was not supernatural?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Just like my above answer: the supernatural aspect of the first cause is not concluded in the argument. All that is concluded is that a first cause existed. To speculate on top of that without sound premises is foolish.
Click to expand...


You made the claim that one cannot know one way or the other if the first cause was supernatural or not. Why do you make that claim?



> I am not speaking of any specific epistemology, just what the argument does or does not prove. All the cosmological argument can prove is a first cause. To start adding godly or divine or eternal or infinite (etc.) characteristics is without warrant.



But if being the first cause implies that one is eternal, then the cosmological argument proves both, right? 



> I am not rejecting causation in the least. I am rejecting that causation (viewed from a "neutral" or "autonomous" framework) entails the existence of God. All it could possibly entail is a first cause.



Why? Are you using induction again?



> Then make sure you include these implications as premises in a modified, improved cosmological argument.



But if you accept X as true, then you have to accept all that is implied by it being true. A new argument would not be necessary, but instead just an explanation of what you already are on the hook for holding.



> That is the point! No one can inferentially arrive at the logical conclusion of God's existence apart from supernatural revelation! Natural theology is a failure.



You have definitely not demonstrated such. All you keep doing is saying, "If one is autonomous, one cannot know X or Y or Z." Why not?



> They can evaluate and accept the argument as proving the empty entity of a first cause (and this only by God allowing them Christian knowledge [i.e. knowledge based on Christian presuppositions] through common grace), but not God, not even close.



It could only possibly be empty if natural revelation/SD did not exist. Since that is false, I do not see what you are trying to say?

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> The whole discussion is not really the cosmological/ontological/or teleological arguments, but instead what one can know by natural theology/natural revelation.



Okay, if in any natural-theological arguments, one were to attempt to prove anything _other_ a than a first cause, source of design, etc., one would have to positively prove that this cause or source of design (etc.) is divine, eternal, etc. The whole point is that we don't get to automatically assume more than we prove. We stick only with what natural theology proves. Insofar as natural theology proves very little, we cannot say that "God exists" as a result.



> Your argument seems to be something along the line of thinking that it is a problem that Genesis does not teach everything about world and God, therefore the Bible is not useful.



Well, if someone were to try to prove something that Genesis _did not teach_, then I would not accept it. Applying this principle to natural theology, we should only accept the actual conclusions of it and nothing more.



> You made the claim that one cannot know one way or the other if the first cause was supernatural or not. Why do you make that claim?



I'm not trying to make a sweeping statement here; all that I am saying is that insofar as the cause is not proven to be natural or supernatural _in the argument_, we cannot assume it is one or the other without begging the question.



> But if being the first cause implies that one is eternal, then the cosmological argument proves both, right?



Yes, if that is proved.



> I am not rejecting causation in the least. I am rejecting that causation (viewed from a "neutral" or "autonomous" framework) entails the existence of God. All it could possibly entail is a first cause.
> 
> 
> 
> Why? Are you using induction again?
Click to expand...


No, because the cosmological argument does not _positively prove_ that God exists. The conclusion of the cosmological argument is that a first cause exists. To add anything else without sound premises or valid logic would not constitute an argument.



> But if you accept X as true, then you have to accept all that is implied by it being true. A new argument would not be necessary, but instead just an explanation of what you already are on the hook for holding.



If you think so, then put the implications into the argument.



> That is the point! No one can inferentially arrive at the logical conclusion of God's existence apart from supernatural revelation! Natural theology is a failure.
> 
> 
> 
> You have definitely not demonstrated such. All you keep doing is saying, "If one is autonomous, one cannot know X or Y or Z." Why not?
Click to expand...


Because X or Y or Z are not positively proven.



> They can evaluate and accept the argument as proving the empty entity of a first cause (and this only by God allowing them Christian knowledge [i.e. knowledge based on Christian presuppositions] through common grace), but not God, not even close.
> 
> 
> 
> It could only possibly be empty if natural revelation/SD did not exist. Since that is false, I do not see what you are trying to say?
Click to expand...


When I refer to the first case being an "empty entity," I mean that we know pretty much nothing about it (Is it natural or divine? Is it God? etc.) purely from natural revelation, and consequently it is useless information -- it is a blank entity.

As Van Til said, and I think Bahnsen affirmed, natural theology should rather be called "natural atheology."


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## ChristianTrader

1) What is a positive vs. a negative proof?
2)You said that we know nothing about the first cause by natural revelation. Why do you believe such?

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> 1) What is a positive vs. a negative proof?
> 2)You said that we know nothing about the first cause by natural revelation. Why do you believe such?



(1) All that I mean by a positive proof is proof itself. That is, if some natural-theological argument establishes that a first cause exists, but does not go further in establishing that this first cause is God, then we do not have sufficient grounds to say that God exists as a result of that argument. We have equal grounds to say that a magic rabbit is the first cause, the universe is self-caused, God is the first cause, etc.

(2) Since we only the fact of the first cause's existence and nothing more, then we know essentially nothing about the first cause -- i.e. besides the fact that it exists. This does not help in any type of worldview discussion, as materialists will believe in a first cause too. In fact, you could say that the identity of the first cause...is...dependent...on...your..._presupposition_.  Thus, we know nothing substantive about the first cause, since it is entirely contingent on one's presupposition, proving worthless in any apologetical argumentation.


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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 1) What is a positive vs. a negative proof?
> 2)You said that we know nothing about the first cause by natural revelation. Why do you believe such?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> (1) All that I mean by a positive proof is proof itself. That is, if some natural-theological argument establishes that a first cause exists, but does not go further in establishing that this first cause is God, then we do not have sufficient grounds to say that God exists as a result of that argument. We have equal grounds to say that a magic rabbit is the first cause, the universe is self-caused, God is the first cause, etc.
Click to expand...


I reject that you have equal grounds to call all those things the first cause. Why should I accept your assertion?



> (2) Since we only the fact of the first cause's existence and nothing more, then we know essentially nothing about the first cause -- i.e. besides the fact that it exists. This does not help in any type of worldview discussion, as materialists will believe in a first cause too. In fact, you could say that the identity of the first cause...is...dependent...on...your..._presupposition_.  Thus, we know nothing substantive about the first cause, since it is entirely contingent on one's presupposition, proving worthless in any apologetical argumentation.



It seems that you are close to falling into fideism. Prove or justify that the first cause could be something other than God?

If you can't then I do not see your objection to natural theology.

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> I reject that you have equal grounds to call all those things the first cause. Why should I accept your assertion?



My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.



> It seems that you are close to falling into fideism. Prove or justify that the first cause could be something other than God?
> 
> If you can't then I do not see your objection to natural theology.



...or presuppositionalism. I am merely trying to show the weaknesses of traditional natural theology and evidentialism.

I don't have to prove that the first cause can be something other than God. Using the presuppositions typically espoused in natural theology, God is not a "default position" in which all other options must be disproven; He must be positively proven as the likely first cause. Until you establish God's existence on top of the first cause's existence, I have absolutely no reason to believe in God's existence (based on natural theology, that is).

In fact, since there is no rational connection (on autonomous presuppositions) from the first cause's existence to God's existence, I have no reason to believe that He exists as a result of natural theology. Consequently, if one were to try to tell me that I ought to believe God existed as a result of natural theology, I could simply tell him that he ought to believe that the first cause is a magic rabbit -- if there is no connection between a first cause and God, and God must be believed; then by the same principle I can tell someone to believe in a magic rabbit.

In other words, I am not trying to argue that God is not the first cause, or that anyone can definitively prove that something other than God is the first cause. I am trying to argue instead that we cannot definitively prove (with autonomous presuppositions as typically used in natural theology) that God exists beyond establishing the existence of a first cause, and therefore the unbeliever would have no reason to accept it. Natural theology -- apart from Christian presuppositions -- is a failure.


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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I reject that you have equal grounds to call all those things the first cause. Why should I accept your assertion?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.
Click to expand...


And my point is that if the other options are not plausible, then natural theology has to lead to the same God found in the Bible.

Or put another way, if natural theology shows that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture, then I have no idea what your objection is.



> It seems that you are close to falling into fideism. Prove or justify that the first cause could be something other than God?
> 
> If you can't then I do not see your objection to natural theology.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...or presuppositionalism. I am merely trying to show the weaknesses of traditional natural theology and evidentialism.
Click to expand...


What you are trying to do and what you are doing at not necessarily the same thing.



> I don't have to prove that the first cause can be something other than God. Using the presuppositions typically espoused in natural theology, God is not a "default position" in which all other options must be disproven;



I am not saying that you have to make God the default. I am saying make something else the default first cause, then if that leads to contradictions then you have to reject it. If the other positions, are incoherent, then you must accept God as the first cause, right?



> He must be positively proven as the likely first cause. Until you establish God's existence on top of the first cause's existence, I have absolutely no reason to believe in God's existence (based on natural theology, that is).



If self-causation etc are incoherent, then you have your proof, right?



> In fact, since there is no rational connection (on autonomous presuppositions) from the first cause's existence to God's existence, I have no reason to believe that He exists as a result of natural theology.



You are making an assertion again. You keep saying that natural theology can lead to whatever. I am just asking you to show me that it can lead to whatever, no just assert it.



> Consequently, if one were to try to tell me that I ought to believe God existed as a result of natural theology, I could simply tell him that he ought to believe that the first cause is a magic rabbit -- if there is no connection between a first cause and God, and God must be believed; then by the same principle I can tell someone to believe in a magic rabbit.



Is positing a magic rabbit as first cause, coherent? Tell me about this magic rabbit that is the first cause.



> In other words, I am not trying to argue that God is not the first cause, or that anyone can definitively prove that something other than God is the first cause. I am trying to argue instead that we cannot definitively prove (with autonomous presuppositions as typically used in natural theology) that God exists beyond establishing the existence of a first cause, and therefore the unbeliever would have no reason to accept it. Natural theology -- apart from Christian presuppositions -- is a failure.



You keep saying something cannot be proven. Why should I believe you? Just because you say so?

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.
> 
> 
> 
> And my point is that if the other options are not plausible, then natural theology has to lead to the same God found in the Bible.
Click to expand...


You misunderstood me when I said they are not plausible. They are absolutely plausible in the sense that the cosmological argument "proves" the other options as much as it proves God -- nothing besides the first cause's existence is proven from the argument. Since a magic rabbit in the sky is a ridiculous notion, and since it is just as legitimate a conclusion from the cosmological argument as "God exists" is, then that constitutes as a _reductio ad absurdum_ on the argument, rendering the argument powerless as a theistic proof. If a magic sky-rabbit is a plausible conclusion of the argument as the argument currently is, then the argument _as it currently is_ is absurd and needs to be modified or discarded.



> Or put another way, if natural theology shows that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture, then I have no idea what your objection is.



That's my point -- it doesn't. Beyond the proven premise "a first cause exists," there is nothing to preclude the options of self-causation, a magic rabbit, etc. Natural theology _does not_ show that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture.



> I am not saying that you have to make God the default. I am saying make something else the default first cause, then if that leads to contradictions then you have to reject it. If the other positions, are incoherent, then you must accept God as the first cause, right?



There are an infinite number of possibilities that I can conceive of besides God as being a potential first cause. Theoretically, yeah, if you were to eliminate all other options, then you would be left with the Christian God. Good luck with that endeavor.



> If self-causation etc are incoherent, then you have your proof, right?



But even self-causation is not incoherent (it better not be or God could not exist). We only posit this because we have not observed self-causation within our universe, but it doesn't follow that the universe as a whole entity cannot cause itself. We have no inductive data to make any kind of judgment on whether or not the universe as a whole can cause itself.



> You are making an assertion again. You keep saying that natural theology can lead to whatever. I am just asking you to show me that it can lead to whatever, no just assert it.



Okay, this is starting to get frustrating, so I'll try to lay out my case point by point:

The cosmological argument proves that a first cause exists.
The cosmological argument does not prove that this first cause is the Christian God.
There are other possibilities of what this first cause may be.
Therefore, it is improper for the cosmological argument, after proving the first cause's existence, to state that "God exists."

If you think the first cause's existence necessitates God's existence, then _put it into the argument_. Otherwise, as the argument stands right now, it cannot righteously be called a theistic proof.



> Is positing a magic rabbit as first cause, coherent? Tell me about this magic rabbit that is the first cause.



All I know is that he is the first cause. That is all the cosmological argument has proven.

(See why we can't say "God exists" as a conclusion of that argument?)



> You keep saying something cannot be proven. Why should I believe you? Just because you say so?



Because I'm not saying that something _cannot_ be proven, only that something _has not_ been proven. The cosmological argument proves a first cause exists. The cosmological argument does not prove that God exists. Therefore, it should not say "God exists" as the conclusion of the argument.

However, if you think there is a necessary correlation between the first cause and God (such that God is the only candidate for being the first cause), then _put it into the argument_. As of now, it is not there, and it is improper to call the argument a theistic proof. Do you understand the point I am trying to make?


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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.
> 
> 
> 
> And my point is that if the other options are not plausible, then natural theology has to lead to the same God found in the Bible.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> You misunderstood me when I said they are not plausible. They are absolutely plausible in the sense that the cosmological argument "proves" the other options as much as it proves God -- nothing besides the first cause's existence is proven from the argument. Since a magic rabbit in the sky is a ridiculous notion, and since it is just as legitimate a conclusion from the cosmological argument as "God exists" is, then that constitutes as a _reductio ad absurdum_ on the argument, rendering the argument powerless as a theistic proof. If a magic sky-rabbit is a plausible conclusion of the argument as the argument currently is, then the argument _as it currently is_ is absurd and needs to be modified or discarded.
Click to expand...


For the magic rabbit to be a legitimate conclusion, it must not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know that it does not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know what features the magic rabbit has and what features it does not have, right? Because if you don't then you would not know if a contradiction was entailed or not, right?



> Or put another way, if natural theology shows that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture, then I have no idea what your objection is.
> 
> 
> 
> That's my point -- it doesn't. Beyond the proven premise "a first cause exists," there is nothing to preclude the options of self-causation, a magic rabbit, etc. Natural theology _does not_ show that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture.
Click to expand...


So are you against natural theology, because you have not seen it do some things to your satisfaction, or are you against it because it cannot do some things to your satisfaction?

Next, lets say that I prove that I have a functioning car. I do not then have to prove to you that it has a steering wheel, four tires etc. I can explain to you what is entailed by a car, but it does not require a separate argument.

Next, self-causation is a contradiction. I do not have to experience a contradiction in order to know that a contradiction is false. If you want to argue the point, then good luck on defeating non Christian worldviews.



> I am not saying that you have to make God the default. I am saying make something else the default first cause, then if that leads to contradictions then you have to reject it. If the other positions, are incoherent, then you must accept God as the first cause, right?
> 
> 
> 
> There are an infinite number of possibilities that I can conceive of besides God as being a potential first cause. Theoretically, yeah, if you were to eliminate all other options, then you would be left with the Christian God. Good luck with that endeavor.
Click to expand...


Are the possibilities, coherent. If they are not, then you really cannot conceive of them.

It also seems that you do not know what one can know by natural theology, so why are you so negative on the whole project. Perhaps you just have not seen it done well.



> If self-causation etc are incoherent, then you have your proof, right?
> 
> 
> 
> But even self-causation is not incoherent (it better not be or God could not exist).
Click to expand...


God is not self caused. He is independent and eternal. If one is eternal then one does not need a cause. Conversely, if one is not eternal, then one does need a cause.



> We only posit this because we have not observed self-causation within our universe, but it doesn't follow that the universe as a whole entity cannot cause itself. We have no inductive data to make any kind of judgment on whether or not the universe as a whole can cause itself.



Is it coherent to say that it is possible to have a ball is red all over and blue all over at the same time in the same fashion, but we just have not seen it yet?

Induction is not the only way to know something.



> You are making an assertion again. You keep saying that natural theology can lead to whatever. I am just asking you to show me that it can lead to whatever, no just assert it.
> 
> 
> 
> Okay, this is starting to get frustrating, so I'll try to lay out my case point by point:
> 
> 
> 1
> The cosmological argument proves that a first cause exists.
> 2
> The cosmological argument does not prove that this first cause is the Christian God.
> 3
> There are other possibilities of what this first cause may be.
> Therefore, it is improper for the cosmological argument, after proving the first cause's existence, to state that "God exists."
Click to expand...


Premise 3 is the one with serious problems. As I explained above, a contradiction has a probability of 0. Therefore you will need to know the features of the other possibilities in order to rule out contradictions. Can you share those features with me?



> If you think the first cause's existence necessitates God's existence, then _put it into the argument_. Otherwise, as the argument stands right now, it cannot righteously be called a theistic proof.



Do you know what something has to be in order to be the first cause? If not then, how do you know that there are other possibilities other than God?



> Is positing a magic rabbit as first cause, coherent? Tell me about this magic rabbit that is the first cause.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> All I know is that he is the first cause. That is all the cosmological argument has proven.
> 
> (See why we can't say "God exists" as a conclusion of that argument?)
Click to expand...


Okay, if the magic rabbit is the first cause, then show me why you are not just referencing the God of the Bible by an odd name?



> You keep saying something cannot be proven. Why should I believe you? Just because you say so?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Because I'm not saying that something _cannot_ be proven, only that something _has not_ been proven. The cosmological argument proves a first cause exists. The cosmological argument does not prove that God exists. Therefore, it should not say "God exists" as the conclusion of the argument.
> 
> However, if you think there is a necessary correlation between the first cause and God (such that God is the only candidate for being the first cause), then _put it into the argument_. As of now, it is not there, and it is improper to call the argument a theistic proof. Do you understand the point I am trying to make?
Click to expand...


Unless you can show that there is another candidate, then you should accept the conclusion, right?

CT


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## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> For the magic rabbit to be a legitimate conclusion, it must not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know that it does not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know what features the magic rabbit has and what features it does not have, right? Because if you don't then you would not know if a contradiction was entailed or not, right?



He looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he's magic. No contradictions so far.

You're actually requesting a rather odd amount of knowledge: unless we know _everything about everything_, we cannot know there is not a contradiction and consequently we cannot accept it?

Besides, you're missing my point entirely. If we get to arbitrarily jump from "a first cause exists" to "God exists," then another person has the same right to jump from "a first cause exists" to "a magic sky rabbit exists." There isn't actually any ground to believe in a magic sky rabbit, and likewise there is not any ground _from this argument_ to believe in God. It is not a theistic proof.



> So are you against natural theology, because you have not seen it do some things to your satisfaction, or are you against it because it cannot do some things to your satisfaction?



I'm against it because (1) it treats lesser authorities as greater authorities (which we discussed in the other thread) and (2) it doesn't prove what it claims to prove.



> Next, lets say that I prove that I have a functioning car. I do not then have to prove to you that it has a steering wheel, four tires etc. I can explain to you what is entailed by a car, but it does not require a separate argument.



I don't care whether it's in a different argument or not. Just show me why "a first cause exists" necessitates "God exists."



> Next, self-causation is a contradiction. I do not have to experience a contradiction in order to know that a contradiction is false. If you want to argue the point, then good luck on defeating non Christian worldviews.



Self-causation is only incoherent insofar as you limit all possible knowledge to what you can induce from the observable world.



> Are the possibilities, coherent. If they are not, then you really cannot conceive of them.
> 
> It also seems that you do not know what one can know by natural theology, so why are you so negative on the whole project. Perhaps you just have not seen it done well.



Yes, the possibilities are coherent. Being weird or uncommon does not equal being contradictory.

Also, please drop the red herring and claim that I am negative simply because "I don't know natural theology" or "I haven't seen it done right."



> God is not self caused. He is independent and eternal. If one is eternal then one does not need a cause. Conversely, if one is not eternal, then one does need a cause.



Self-caused, self-existent, you know what I meant. The singularity can be self-existent for all we know.



> Is it coherent to say that it is possible to have a ball is red all over and blue all over at the same time in the same fashion, but we just have not seen it yet?
> 
> Induction is not the only way to know something.



But when the premise is _explicitly inductive_, then we are limited to what we can induce. Self-existence is not an inherently impossible concept, such as the red/blue example.



> Premise 3 is the one with serious problems. As I explained above, a contradiction has a probability of 0. Therefore you will need to know the features of the other possibilities in order to rule out contradictions. Can you share those features with me?



The magic sky rabbit is purple and he looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he has really long claws.



> Do you know what something has to be in order to be the first cause? If not then, how do you know that there are other possibilities other than God?



No, I don't know what exactly a first cause has to be in order to be a first cause. I know there are other possibilities because I can conceive of them.



> Okay, if the magic rabbit is the first cause, then show me why you are not just referencing the God of the Bible by an odd name?



Because the description of the rabbit is different from the description of Jehovah.



> Unless you can show that there is another candidate, then you should accept the conclusion, right?



If all other possibilities were logically _ruled out_, then we would have to accept God. If others cannot be thought of at the moment, we do not have to accept God. Furthermore, I _can_ think of others.

Do you honestly think God is the only conceivable and coherent candidate to be the first cause? You can't expect unbelievers to accept this, unless they are being extremely inconsistent in their unbelief.


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## Augusta




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## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> For the magic rabbit to be a legitimate conclusion, it must not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know that it does not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know what features the magic rabbit has and what features it does not have, right? Because if you don't then you would not know if a contradiction was entailed or not, right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> He looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he's magic. No contradictions so far.
Click to expand...


So far, not so good. Is it possible for the first cause to be material vs. being immaterial?



> You're actually requesting a rather odd amount of knowledge: unless we know _everything about everything_, we cannot know there is not a contradiction and consequently we cannot accept it?



That is part of my point. When you say something is possible, then you are making the positive claim that it is not a contradiction. When you make that claim then you can be attacked and forced to defend it. If you do not know anything (or very little) about the magic rabbit, then why are you making the claim that it is the first cause?

If you do not know what is implied by saying that something is the first cause, then how do you have the right to say that something is a first cause as opposed to something else?

If this is the case, then why are you arguing about the impropriety of the cosmological argument if you do not understand what it's purpose is and what it is saying. It is something like saying, that you do not know what black is but I am not black.



> Besides, you're missing my point entirely. If we get to arbitrarily jump from "a first cause exists" to "God exists," then another person has the same right to jump from "a first cause exists" to "a magic sky rabbit exists." There isn't actually any ground to believe in a magic sky rabbit, and likewise there is not any ground _from this argument_ to believe in God. It is not a theistic proof.



Who said anything about arbitrary? Does your disagreement cause something to be arbitrary?

My point here is that when you say something else can be that first cause, you have the obligation to defend that position, as much as I have an obligation to defend the position that God is that first cause. You do not have the right to just say, "I can imagine", without examining what it is that you are saying that you are imagining. I am asking you to be presuppositional through and through, and not just partially.



> So are you against natural theology, because you have not seen it do some things to your satisfaction, or are you against it because it cannot do some things to your satisfaction?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm against it because (1) it treats lesser authorities as greater authorities (which we discussed in the other thread) and (2) it doesn't prove what it claims to prove.
Click to expand...


We discussed it (1) in the other thread, but I definitely still disagree with your position; we can get back to it later. 
2)Is just a restatement of your view of empiricist viewpoint, which is definitely not self evident.



> I don't care whether it's in a different argument or not. Just show me why "a first cause exists" necessitates "God exists."



We are going to get to that in a bit. The first step is to shut off objections (show that you do not know what you think you know), then move forward. If one moves forward too fast, the objections will keep popping up. 



> Self-causation is only incoherent insofar as you limit all possible knowledge to what you can induce from the observable world.



Nope, the problem is that the meaning is incoherent. It has nothing to do with where you are at or which world your in.

Self causation either means:
1)You already exist, then you cause yourself to exist. - But since you already exist, you did not cause yourself to exist.
2)You did not exist, but you cause yourself to exist - In this case, you have nothing doing something. What does nothing doing something even mean? Or put another way, you have being coming from non-being.
-That would deny causation and intelligibility presupposes causation. We could go on, but hopefully we do not have to continue.



> Are the possibilities, coherent. If they are not, then you really cannot conceive of them.
> 
> It also seems that you do not know what one can know by natural theology, so why are you so negative on the whole project. Perhaps you just have not seen it done well.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, the possibilities are coherent. Being weird or uncommon does not equal being contradictory.
Click to expand...


It is true that being weird does not equal being contradictory, but it really seems that you do not know enough about magic rabbit to sustain the claim that he/she is the first cause. If you do not know what is or is not possible, then we can go from there.



> Also, please drop the red herring and claim that I am negative simply because "I don't know natural theology" or "I haven't seen it done right."



You are the empiricist, or at least hold to empiricist principles when they suit you. These conclusions come from those principles.



> Self-caused, self-existent, you know what I meant. The singularity can be self-existent for all we know.



Self-caused and self-existent are two vastly different concepts. If you want to drop self-caused due to the conceptual problems, that would be fine. If you claim that the singularity is the first cause instead of the rabbit, then tell me about it, so we can examine it, to see if it can be the first cause.



> But when the premise is _explicitly inductive_, then we are limited to what we can induce. Self-existence is not an inherently impossible concept, such as the red/blue example.



Self-existence is not a problem, but actually a necessity. (If something is not self-existent then you run into being from non-being again) Self-causation is the problem.



> The magic sky rabbit is purple and he looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he has really long claws.



Does he grow? Does he age? How big is he?



> No, I don't know what exactly a first cause has to be in order to be a first cause. I know there are other possibilities because I can conceive of them.



But if you don't know what it is, then how do you know that you are not conceiving a contradictory set of affairs?

Is it not like conceiving someone under 100 feet tall, but not knowing what a foot is?



> Okay, if the magic rabbit is the first cause, then show me why you are not just referencing the God of the Bible by an odd name?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Because the description of the rabbit is different from the description of Jehovah.
Click to expand...


Fair enough. We finally agree on something.



> Unless you can show that there is another candidate, then you should accept the conclusion, right?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If all other possibilities were logically _ruled out_, then we would have to accept God. If others cannot be thought of at the moment, we do not have to accept God. Furthermore, I _can_ think of others.
> 
> Do you honestly think God is the only conceivable and coherent candidate to be the first cause? You can't expect unbelievers to accept this, unless they are being extremely inconsistent in their unbelief.
Click to expand...


I do honestly believe that such is the case. I do wish that unbelievers are consistent in their belief, because it allows the error of their ways to be shown easier.

CT


----------



## Confessor

For brevity's sake, I'll limit this discussion to this point, since it is most crucial. A lot of the rest is _ad hominem_, or red herrings, or just plain obstinacy (speaking of which, do you think I am making some crucial attack on the rational foundations of your faith? If so, I'll stop).



> If you do not know what is implied by saying that something is the first cause, then how do you have the right to say that something is a first cause as opposed to something else?



This is the crux of my argument against the theistic proofs.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> For brevity's sake, I'll limit this discussion to this point, since it is most crucial. A lot of the rest is _ad hominem_, or red herrings, or just plain obstinacy (speaking of which, do you think I am making some crucial attack on the rational foundations of your faith? If so, I'll stop).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If you do not know what is implied by saying that something is the first cause, then how do you have the right to say that something is a first cause as opposed to something else?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is the crux of my argument against the theistic proofs.
Click to expand...


If this is the crux of your argument, are you saying that one cannot know what is implied by a first cause, or just that you personally do not know?

If it is the former, then I would like to see an argument that one cannot know such. If it is the later, then you should be asking if someone could help you to see what can be known by natural theology instead of claiming that there are natural theology cannot do X and it cannot do Y.

My crux is that you should be more presuppositional not less. You move too quickly between, I do not know, to it cannot be known.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> If this is the crux of your argument, are you saying that one cannot know what is implied by a first cause, or just that you personally do not know?
> 
> If it is the former, then I would like to see an argument that one cannot know such. If it is the later, then you should be asking if someone could help you to see what can be known by natural theology instead of claiming that there are natural theology cannot do X and it cannot do Y.
> 
> My crux is that you should be more presuppositional not less. You move too quickly between, I do not know, to it cannot be known.



I am saying that the theistic proofs in their present form do not imply that the first cause is God. They state the fact of the first cause's existence and leave it at that.

_I am not saying that the first cause cannot be God._ I am saying that the first cause has not yet been proven to be God.

If you think natural theology can establish the first cause as God, then please demonstrate it. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> If this is the crux of your argument, are you saying that one cannot know what is implied by a first cause, or just that you personally do not know?
> 
> If it is the former, then I would like to see an argument that one cannot know such. If it is the later, then you should be asking if someone could help you to see what can be known by natural theology instead of claiming that there are natural theology cannot do X and it cannot do Y.
> 
> My crux is that you should be more presuppositional not less. You move too quickly between, I do not know, to it cannot be known.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I am saying that the theistic proofs in their present form do not imply that the first cause is God. They state the fact of the first cause's existence and leave it at that.
> 
> _I am not saying that the first cause cannot be God._ I am saying that the first cause has not yet been proven to be God.
> 
> If you think natural theology can establish the first cause as God, then please demonstrate it. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim.
Click to expand...


So if you say that the first cause could be anything (magic rabbits etc) are you not making a claim that anything is consistent with the first cause? (So you are saying that you understand what a first cause is and are able to evaluate the implications. and those implications are not inconsistent with Mr. Rabbit) 

At bottom, if you do not know/assume anything to be true, then you could not make an objection to any claim.

Anyway, let us start pretty low.

Is it possible that nothing is eternal?

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> So if you say that the first cause could be anything (magic rabbits etc) are you not making a claim that anything is consistent with the first cause? (So you are saying that you understand what a first cause is and are able to evaluate the implications. and those implications are not inconsistent with Mr. Rabbit)
> 
> At bottom, if you do not know/assume anything to be true, then you could not make an objection to any claim.
> 
> Anyway, let us start pretty low.
> 
> Is it possible that nothing is eternal?



I am not making the claim that the first cause can be anything, only that the first cause must be positively demonstrated to be something more than a first cause if one were to claim such. I only said that the sky-rabbit can be a plausible first cause _if we are allowed_ to jump from "a first cause exists" to the fact that something is that specific first cause. I was making a _reductio ad absurdum_ on the fact that "God exists" is the conclusion of the cosmological argument -- the premise should rather be "a first cause exists."

No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> So if you say that the first cause could be anything (magic rabbits etc) are you not making a claim that anything is consistent with the first cause? (So you are saying that you understand what a first cause is and are able to evaluate the implications. and those implications are not inconsistent with Mr. Rabbit)
> 
> At bottom, if you do not know/assume anything to be true, then you could not make an objection to any claim.
> 
> Anyway, let us start pretty low.
> 
> Is it possible that nothing is eternal?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I am not making the claim that the first cause can be anything, only that the first cause must be positively demonstrated to be something more than a first cause if one were to claim such. I only said that the sky-rabbit can be a plausible first cause _if we are allowed_ to jump from "a first cause exists" to the fact that something is that specific first cause. I was making a _reductio ad absurdum_ on the fact that "God exists" is the conclusion of the cosmological argument -- the premise should rather be "a first cause exists."
Click to expand...


So one can say that a first cause exists, but then not say that something particular fills that role? You say that is a jump? Do you know what a first cause is? If you don't then how do you know its a jump?



> No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.



Okay, is it possible that matter is eternal (aka: materialism is true)

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> So one can say that a first cause exists, but then not say that something particular fills that role? You say that is a jump? Do you know what a first cause is? If you don't then how do you know its a jump?



It's alright to make the jump as long as it is logically justified. If you have reasons to go from "a first cause exists" to "God exists" then by all means tell me. Otherwise, I'm going to stick with what I know from the argument and say that a first cause exists, nothing more.



> No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Okay, is it possible that matter is eternal (aka: materialism is true)
Click to expand...


Apart from Christian presuppositions, I don't know how I could disprove this. A singularity could be eternal or self-existent.


----------



## ChristianTrader

> No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Okay, is it possible that matter is eternal (aka: materialism is true)
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Apart from Christian presuppositions, I don't know how I could disprove this. A singularity could be eternal or self-existent.
Click to expand...


When you say Christian presuppositions, what do you mean? Are you saying something other than the Bible says so?

Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> When you say Christian presuppositions, what do you mean? Are you saying something other than the Bible says so?



Basically, that the entirety of the Bible is true.



> Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.



It has infinite density because it has an infinitesimally small volume and some amount of mass. I have no idea how time would behave in a singularity. I cannot think of a reason to deny its eternality "before" the Big Bang supposedly occurred.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> When you say Christian presuppositions, what do you mean? Are you saying something other than the Bible says so?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Basically, that the entirety of the Bible is true.
Click to expand...


Alright. I am not sure how one differentiates between your position and fideism but we shall come back to that at some point.



> Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It has infinite density because it has an infinitesimally small volume and some amount of mass. I have no idea how time would behave in a singularity. I cannot think of a reason to deny its eternality "before" the Big Bang supposedly occurred.
Click to expand...


Infinite density, implies no volume, right? If there is volume, then density is at best just very high and not infinite. Or put another way, how do you differentiate between something immaterial and something with infinite density?

Next, there is the problem of going from the singularity to non singularity. It looks like one runs into the problem of uncaused cause/or nothing doing something again.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> Alright. I am not sure how one differentiates between your position and fideism but we shall come back to that at some point.



R.C. Sproul and all the authors of _Classical Apologetics_ would agree with you here. But presuppositionalism is not fideism.



> Infinite density, implies no volume, right? If there is volume, then density is at best just very high and not infinite. Or put another way, how do you differentiate between something immaterial and something with infinite density?



Yeah, it has no volume. That doesn't mean it's not material.



> Next, there is the problem of going from the singularity to non singularity. It looks like one runs into the problem of uncaused cause/or nothing doing something again.



Something in the singularity could set the whole thing off.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> Alright. I am not sure how one differentiates between your position and fideism but we shall come back to that at some point.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> R.C. Sproul and all the authors of _Classical Apologetics_ would agree with you here. But presuppositionalism is not fideism.
Click to expand...


If you argue that you hold your position because ever other system is incoherent, that is not fideism. If you hold your position, because every other positions, leads to skepticism, then that is not fideism.

But it seems that your position is something other than either one of those.



> Infinite density, implies no volume, right? If there is volume, then density is at best just very high and not infinite. Or put another way, how do you differentiate between something immaterial and something with infinite density?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Yeah, it has no volume. That doesn't mean it's not material.
Click to expand...


So what is the difference between material with no volume and immaterial? So you have a material something without mass and without volume? In the previous post, I asked a question here. You seemed to answer, it is material because its material.

What do you mean by the term material vs. the term immaterial?



> Next, there is the problem of going from the singularity to non singularity. It looks like one runs into the problem of uncaused cause/or nothing doing something again.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Something in the singularity could set the whole thing off.
Click to expand...

If you want to say that the immaterial is eternal and gave rise to the material, then alright, but one could not be a materialist anymore.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> If you argue that you hold your position because ever other system is incoherent, that is not fideism. If you hold your position, because every other positions, leads to skepticism, then that is not fideism.
> 
> But it seems that your position is something other than either one of those.



I have gone in-depth on what exactly my position is in other threads. If you want me to repeat it here, I can.



> So what is the difference between material with no volume and immaterial? So you have a material something without mass and without volume? In the previous post, I asked a question here. You seemed to answer, it is material because its material.
> 
> What do you mean by the term material vs. the term immaterial?



In a singularity mass is present but takes up negligible volume. If it were immaterial mass would not be present (I don't know of any "rules" regarding the volume of immaterial entities, so I'll be quiet about that).

I am not saying that it's material because it's material; I am saying that it is material because it coheres with the definition of "material." It has matter. Hence, it is material.



> If you want to say that the immaterial is eternal and gave rise to the material, then alright, but one could not be a materialist anymore.



I'm not saying that. The singularity is material.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> If you argue that you hold your position because ever other system is incoherent, that is not fideism. If you hold your position, because every other positions, leads to skepticism, then that is not fideism.
> 
> But it seems that your position is something other than either one of those.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have gone in-depth on what exactly my position is in other threads. If you want me to repeat it here, I can.
Click to expand...


I know what your position is. It can be reduced down to non Christian belief is wrong because if you do not see that Christianity is true and all alternatives are false, then you are just wrong. (The whole: we have paradoxes, while others have contradictions issue)



> So what is the difference between material with no volume and immaterial? So you have a material something without mass and without volume? In the previous post, I asked a question here. You seemed to answer, it is material because its material.
> 
> What do you mean by the term material vs. the term immaterial?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In a singularity mass is present but takes up negligible volume. If it were immaterial mass would not be present (I don't know of any "rules" regarding the volume of immaterial entities, so I'll be quiet about that).
Click to expand...


Actually Hawkins claims infinite density which implies zero mass and zero volume. But if one wants to just say very high density instead of infinite, fine.

So you have the force pulling the singularity in being = to the force wanting to expand. You have an equilibrium. So one needs to propose that a push was given to the system in order to break the equlibrium. But the system is all there is, so there is nothing to give it the push.

All the while the universe is running down (entropy)which implies that if it is material that is eternal, the universe would have already run down.

CT

-----Added 12/13/2008 at 07:58:27 EST-----



Confessor said:


> Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It has infinite density because it has an infinitesimally small volume and some amount of mass. I have no idea how time would behave in a singularity. I cannot think of a reason to deny its eternality "before" the Big Bang supposedly occurred.
Click to expand...


Sorry I missed this at the time. Infinitesimally small volume does not imply infinite density. I think you are trying to say "arbitrarily small" (as small as you want to go). Think the difference between an really really big number and infinity. You can always think of a larger number than a really really big number but you can't do the same with infinity.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> I know what your position is. It can be reduced down to non Christian belief is wrong because if you do not see that Christianity is true and all alternatives are false, then you are just wrong. (The whole: we have paradoxes, while others have contradictions issue)



Ultimately, unbelievers are wrong because they deny the obvious fact of Scripture's divine authorship. In that sense, yes, they are just wrong -- even if they are not presented a formidable apologetic for Christianity in their lifetime, they are still absolutely and completely without excuse, per Romans 1. We cannot deny this crucial part of theology in our apologetic. You seem to think we can separate the two.

Apologetics goes to demonstrate that the unbeliever is wrong by showing that all unbelieving starting points lead to absurdity. We do not believe because all other starting points are false -- it is right to believe first of all by the obviousness of Christianity's truthfulness -- but the rational underpinning of the Christian framework is made obvious in apologetics. People who say otherwise -- who say that things (i.e. presuppositions) must be inferentially proven to them before they accept it are presupposing an antitheistic belief that surfaced in the Enlightenment and is without any type of grounds at all. We do _not_ believe in Christianity because we have proven it -- we believe in Christianity because it is obviously true. To show the absurdity of unbelief, and the consistency of belief, we invoke apologetics. Apologetics is not the ground of our faith; God Himself is.

The notion of contradictions and paradoxes are actually not a problem at all. As an obvious example, it would be a paradox (a currently unsolved problem which can logically be "pushed back" towards divine mystery) to say that the Trinity is one essence and three Persons, but it would be an outright contradiction to say that the Trinity is one Person and three Persons. It is absurd to deny the obvious truthfulness of Christianity and claim that contradictions are possible within Christianity, but we can still definitively demonstrate that Christianity has no contradictions.



> Actually Hawkins claims infinite density which implies zero mass and zero volume. But if one wants to just say very high density instead of infinite, fine.



That's interesting. All I have seen (and probably what I would claim if I were a materialist) is that the mass of the singularity is infinite or otherwise non-negligible.



> So you have the force pulling the singularity in being = to the force wanting to expand. You have an equilibrium. So one needs to propose that a push was given to the system in order to break the equlibrium. But the system is all there is, so there is nothing to give it the push.



I don't know how it worked, but you can't tell me that something material definitely didn't cause it. In fact, all causality that we have perceived in this universe -- and upon which the appropriate premise of the cosmological argument exists -- presupposes the existence of time. Why couldn't the universe be self-caused? You have made a case that nothing can be self-caused into _existence_ but not into _occurrence._



> All the while the universe is running down (entropy)which implies that if it is material that is eternal, the universe would have already run down.



Only insofar as time has existed.



> Sorry I missed this at the time. Infinitesimally small volume does not imply infinite density. I think you are trying to say "arbitrarily small" (as small as you want to go). Think the difference between an really really big number and infinity. You can always think of a larger number than a really really big number but you can't do the same with infinity.



No, I'm trying to say that the volume is infinitesimally small, as in negligible or of zero value.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I know what your position is. It can be reduced down to non Christian belief is wrong because if you do not see that Christianity is true and all alternatives are false, then you are just wrong. (The whole: we have paradoxes, while others have contradictions issue)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ultimately, unbelievers are wrong because they deny the obvious fact of Scripture's divine authorship.
Click to expand...


And here is the massive problem. Unbelievers are wrong before they see Scripture. If they never see a Bible they are still wrong. If they were born in Iran and they only know and ever hear from are Muslims, they are still wrong for being Muslims.

No one will get to Judgment Day and be able to answer God, "but I never had the Bible in my language." I see now way of holding to the position, without natural theology of some form.



> In that sense, yes, they are just wrong -- even if they are not presented a formidable apologetic for Christianity in their lifetime, they are still absolutely and completely without excuse, per Romans 1. We cannot deny this crucial part of theology in our apologetic. You seem to think we can separate the two.



Romans 1, does not talk about what one learns due to the Bible. It talks about what one knows from the created order.



> Apologetics goes to demonstrate that the unbeliever is wrong by showing that all unbelieving starting points lead to absurdity. We do not believe because all other starting points are false -- it is right to believe first of all by the obviousness of Christianity's truthfulness -- but the rational underpinning of the Christian framework is made obvious in apologetics. People who say otherwise -- who say that things (i.e. presuppositions) must be inferentially proven to them before they accept it are presupposing an antitheistic belief that surfaced in the Enlightenment and is without any type of grounds at all. We do _not_ believe in Christianity because we have proven it -- we believe in Christianity because it is obviously true. To show the absurdity of unbelief, and the consistency of belief, we invoke apologetics. Apologetics is not the ground of our faith; God Himself is.



Who said about inferentially proving presuppositions? One does not inferentially prove the laws of logic, do you?

Next, part of being obviously true is to be without contradictions. You seem to need to be able to accept truth before even thinking of contradictions.

God is the ground of our apologetics. Fortunately, he has told us about himself in general revelation.



> The notion of contradictions and paradoxes are actually not a problem at all. As an obvious example, it would be a paradox (a currently unsolved problem which can logically be "pushed back" towards divine mystery) to say that the Trinity is one essence and three Persons, but it would be an outright contradiction to say that the Trinity is one Person and three Persons. It is absurd to deny the obvious truthfulness of Christianity and claim that contradictions are possible within Christianity, but we can still definitively demonstrate that Christianity has no contradictions.



Actually, one person and three persons does not have to be a problem. Just say that the word person is being used in two different ways that I do not understand. One could do the same things with any claimed contradiction. Dealing with contradictions is much harder than you wish it to be.



> Actually Hawkins claims infinite density which implies zero mass and zero volume. But if one wants to just say very high density instead of infinite, fine.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That's interesting. All I have seen (and probably what I would claim if I were a materialist) is that the mass of the singularity is infinite or otherwise non-negligible.
Click to expand...


You mean the density is infinite. If this is the case, then there is no difference between material and immaterial. And if this is the case, then why be a materialist vs. some sort of non-theistic idealist? And any argument against non-theistic idealism would be an argument against materialism.



> I don't know how it worked, but you can't tell me that something material definitely didn't cause it. In fact, all causality that we have perceived in this universe -- and upon which the appropriate premise of the cosmological argument exists -- presupposes the existence of time. Why couldn't the universe be self-caused? You have made a case that nothing can be self-caused into _existence_ but not into _occurrence._



Then you would be claiming that that which does exist eternally was caused to do X by something that does not exist at all. You have nothing doing something. Or put another way, you have non-being bringing forth being (can't push if you don't exist) Now one can say that existence and non-existence are the same thing, but that would destroy knowledge.

Next, certain things can be shown to be contradictory/incoherent without having experienced them. 

Next, are you hypothesizing that in the beginning was some mass and volume, but no time (time was created later) , the mass itself generated an infinite force to counteract the infinite density, then created time?

What does causation without time even mean? You cannot conceive or argue for things that have no meaning.

Lastly, the classic Christian view of time is that God created it when he created everything else. The cosmological argument has no problem with this scenario.



> All the while the universe is running down (entropy)which implies that if it is material that is eternal, the universe would have already run down.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry I missed this at the time. Infinitesimally small volume does not imply infinite density. I think you are trying to say "arbitrarily small" (as small as you want to go). Think the difference between an really really big number and infinity. You can always think of a larger number than a really really big number but you can't do the same with infinity.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> No, I'm trying to say that the volume is infinitesimally small, as in negligible or of zero value.
Click to expand...


Negligible and zero value have different meanings in this context. If you mean zero value then materialism can be reduced to a form of idealism.

CT


----------



## Confessor

ChristianTrader said:


> No one will get to Judgment Day and be able to answer God, "but I never had the Bible in my language." I see now way of holding to the position, without natural theology of some form.



A non-inferential sense of deity, which _everyone_ would possess, would solve the problem admirably. As I said, there is no possible way that everyone's being without excuse in Romans 1 is referring to the fact that everyone has thought about and understood the cosmological argument and decided that God existed and that they were under His condemnation -- thus Romans 1 cannot _possibly_ be referring to natural theology, or any type of argumentation without a Bible. There's no way people would actually come to the conclusion that they're under the condemnation of a holy God from natural theology. Natural theology only proves a first cause, a designer, etc. at the very most.



> Romans 1, does not talk about what one learns due to the Bible. It talks about what one knows from the created order.



I know. I never claimed that it did. I merely claimed that the fact of every single unbeliever (including those who have never seen a Bible) being without excuse points to the fact of their necessary condemnation apart from apologetics. We cannot do apologetics while somehow forgetting this fact or deeming it false or unproven for the sake of "fairness."



> Who said about inferentially proving presuppositions? One does not inferentially prove the laws of logic, do you?



Have you never seen an atheist ask for "evidence for God"? They would be asking for inferential proof of a presupposition.



> Next, part of being obviously true is to be without contradictions. You seem to need to be able to accept truth before even thinking of contradictions.



This truth can be accepted before thinking of contradictions, because the certainty given to us directly from the Holy Spirit is far greater than any human's application of the law of contradiction. It opens our eyes to the obvious fact of the Bible's divine authorship, from which we derive that it has no contradictions, from which we can _demonstrate_ that there are no contradictions. You seem stuck in the Enlightenment mindset where rational proof became the ultimate criterion and precondition for rational belief. While this is good in many circumstances, it is not nearly applicable to the truth of Scripture, or as a basis of any philosophical system.



> Actually, one person and three persons does not have to be a problem. Just say that the word person is being used in two different ways that I do not understand. One could do the same things with any claimed contradiction. Dealing with contradictions is much harder than you wish it to be.



You know what I meant: it would be a contradiction to say that the Trinity is one Person and three Persons _at the same time, in the same place, and in the same manner._ It was implied in the example.



> That's interesting. All I have seen (and probably what I would claim if I were a materialist) is that the mass of the singularity is infinite or otherwise non-negligible.
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> You mean the density is infinite. If this is the case, then there is no difference between material and immaterial. And if this is the case, then why be a materialist vs. some sort of non-theistic idealist? And any argument against non-theistic idealism would be an argument against materialism.
Click to expand...


What do you mean, "You mean the density is infinite"? I never said anything about density, only about mass. You keep asserting that a singularity with zero volume would be tantamount to being immaterial, but why? The fact that you can't understand the difference between a material singularity with no volume and an immaterial singularity does not preclude the fact that the former can exist.



> Then you would be claiming that that which does exist eternally was caused to do X by something that does not exist at all. You have nothing doing something. Or put another way, you have non-being bringing forth being (can't push if you don't exist) Now one can say that existence and non-existence are the same thing, but that would destroy knowledge.



No, I would rather be claiming that that which does exist eternally did X by itself.



> Next, certain things can be shown to be contradictory/incoherent without having experienced them.



Yes, but that does not necessarily apply to this. You are trying to apply a premise learned from induction in one area to an entirely different area, which does not work.



> Next, are you hypothesizing that in the beginning was some mass and volume, but no time (time was created later) , the mass itself generated an infinite force to counteract the infinite density, then created time?



Sure, why not?



> What does causation without time even mean? You cannot conceive or argue for things that have no meaning.



Whoa, slow down. You just admitted that you do not understand what causation without time is, and consequently denied that causation can be coherent without time! That is entirely arrogant and the exact problem I am pointing out in the cosmological argument, that we cannot induce a premise from one set of circumstances and argue that it applies in a different set. Causation sans time might be inconsistent with reality (which you couldn't prove from your being trapped in temporal circumstances), but it is not inconsistent with itself, such as the concept of a married bachelor.



> Negligible and zero value have different meanings in this context. If you mean zero value then materialism can be reduced to a form of idealism.



If you really want to "argue" that negligible is somehow different from "of zero value," then I'll just use the words "of zero volume" to suit your fancy. That being said, a material singularity of zero volume does not necessitate idealism. The fact that you cannot understand how something of zero volume contains matter does not preclude the fact of its possibility. Otherwise, if you think that a material singularity of zero volume logically leads to idealism, then please demonstrate this.


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