# Why is God Revealing Himself a Precondition for Knowledge/Rationality?



## Afterthought (Apr 4, 2015)

One argument for God's existence says that, since we are finite and could not verify any fact to have the quality of truth, we could not know anything unless an absolute, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable Mind existed to verify the facts. To this, it is added that this is not the only precondition of knowledge, but the Mind must reveal Himself too. Why is this last point a precondition?

I suppose one might say that we need to know the Mind exists in order for this precondition to do any good, and we could only know this Mind exists if the Mind revealed Himself. But couldn't we stop at the first line of argument and say, "But we do know things. Therefore, this Mind exists"? That is, the bare fact that we know things shows knowledge is possible and so we can conclude this Mind exists? Cause if we could argue like this, then the Mind revealing Himself is not necessary for knowledge to be possible.


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## PhillipJLee (Apr 4, 2015)

I'm not entirely sure what the context of your post is but here is an attempt at a reply:

(1) First, it is important to nip-in-the-bud the notion that, "the bare fact that we know things shows knowledge is possible and so we can conclude this Mind exists." This idea is essentially Descartes' "cogito ergo sum," or "I think; I exist." This form of logic fails to overcome solipsism or, as Lewis once said in The Abolition of Man, “You cannot go on 'explaining away' for ever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away. You cannot go on 'seeing through' things for ever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it.” This was and still is Descartes' self-defeating logic, as you've concluded yourself: "...the Mind revealing Himself is not necessary for knowledge to be possible" -- a notion Protestant Christians believe to be a contradiction as it assumes absolute knowledge about an absolute without absolute authority.

(2) Calvin, in turn, argues that "Our wisdom, insofar as it ought to be deemed true and solid wisdom, consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves... For...no man can survey himself without forthwith turning his thoughts toward the God in whom he lives and moves; because it is perfectly obvious, that the endowments which we possess cannot possibly be from ourselves; no, that our very being is nothing else than subsistence in God alone... For as there exists in man something like a world of misery, and ever since we were stripped of the divine attire our naked shame discloses an immense series of disgraceful properties, every man, being stung by the consciousness of his own unhappiness, in this way necessarily obtains at least some knowledge of God" (Institutes, 1.1).

Or, in other words, the assumption in the hypothetical question posed is exclusivity between the revelation of "the Mind" (that is, in this context, God) and the self. It is true that the self cannot know the Mind unless it reveals itself to be absolute (since the qualifications for understanding an absolute is an exclusive absolute -- again, that is, God). Enter from stage right (that is, the absolute Word of God) the term "faith," a non-absolute experience of the absolute, defined by the Westminster Confession of Faith as, "accepting, receiving, and resting upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of grace" (WCF, 14.2). And what are the means of this covenant of grace? The Westminster Larger Catechism concludes, "The outward and ordinary means whereby Christ communicateth to us the benefits of redemption, are his Ordinances, especially the word, sacraments, and prayer, all which are made effectual to the elect for salvation" (WLC, 88).

The covenantal nature of God bridges that which was and forever is impossible for man to bridge on his or her own. Even the knowledge of absolutes, as God says in Ecclesiastes 3:11, is a product of God's revelation of His absolute nature.

Hope this helps!


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## Afterthought (Apr 6, 2015)

Thanks for the thoughtful and informative response! I don't have time to look at it carefully yet, but I'll get to it. I'm just posting because I noticed an error in logic in the OP. I had tried objecting, ""But we do know things. Therefore, this Mind exists"? That is, the bare fact that we know things shows knowledge is possible and so we can conclude this Mind exists?" The problem though is that the fact we know has a number of preconditions and proves each one. "But we do know things" proves that the Mind exists. "But we do know things" should also prove "The Mind has revealed Himself." They are separate preconditions for the same phenomenon, so arguing for one precondition (the Mind exists) does nothing to argue against another thing being a precondition (the Mind has revealed Himself).

Edit: The only way the objection would work is if one had argued that revelation was a precondition because we could not otherwise know the Mind exists.


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## jwright82 (Apr 12, 2015)

I think the point is this, how necessary is God's existence for anything? That is could things be as they are if Christianity were false? Is God's existence so unimportant that it would make no difference if we proved he didn't exist? Or is his truth so important that we couldn't make sense of the way things are without our faith being actually true in reality?

Now demonstrating this logically is another matter. The basic method would be this which piece of knowledge are you referring to? Each piece of knowledge proves Our faith but each one requires a different way to show that. Not that there aren't groups of knowledge that can be proof in the same way.

As far as God revealing himself as a precondition for knowledge I would say that again this is true but showing it in neat syllogism might be more complex than could be presented here. A shot would be this: how could we interpret anything around us without the creator mind revealing to us a basic context to do so? How could Adam ever of figured what he was supposed to do without God's revelation?


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## Peairtach (Apr 12, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> One argument for God's existence says that, since we are finite and could not verify any fact to have the quality of truth, we could not know anything unless an absolute, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable Mind existed to verify the facts. To this, it is added that this is not the only precondition of knowledge, but the Mind must reveal Himself too. Why is this last point a precondition?
> 
> I suppose one might say that we need to know the Mind exists in order for this precondition to do any good, and we could only know this Mind exists if the Mind revealed Himself. But couldn't we stop at the first line of argument and say, "But we do know things. Therefore, this Mind exists"? That is, the bare fact that we know things shows knowledge is possible and so we can conclude this Mind exists? Cause if we could argue like this, then the Mind revealing Himself is not necessary for knowledge to be possible.



I would recommend Bahnsen's "Van Till - Readings and Analysis" on this.

Sent from my HTC Wildfire using Tapatalk 2


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## MW (Apr 12, 2015)

The association with Descartes is unhelpful. Descartes' argument essentially makes man the sum and substance of his own thought and thereby self-referential. The "I" in the argument is self-justified. It also abstracts thinking from the content of thought.

Without the creative act of God it is impossible for philosophy to explain the verb to be. Every predicate becomes a game with the word "is." Unless "God is" there is no ultimate reality upon which to base the act of predication. What "is" for the speaker will be entirely different for the hearer unless there is a shared reality between them.

To relate this back to the OP, the creative act of God is a revelation. Everything that "is" bears witness to Him in one way or another. It is not that things do this in and of themselves. They do this as manifestations of eternal power and Godhead. Their existence is a revelation. Human thought about these things is also a revelation. Even when men exchange the truth of God for a lie, it is revelatory of the justice of God in giving men over to the worship of things which reflect the foolishness of their choice.


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## Afterthought (Apr 24, 2015)

If I'm understanding correctly, it appears you all are saying that an objective reality is a precondition for human knowledge? If so, then it would seem that an objective reality, not revelation _per se_, is the precondition for knowledge? So God could create an objective reality without necessarily needing to reveal Himself, even though it's impossible to untangle God's revelation of Himself and the creation of an objective reality (since, I suppose, the work of any creator reveals something about the creator)?

If special revelation is needed to reveal the context in which the world about us must be interpreted, then do we know nothing (i.e., have no ultimate epistemic justification for what we know) until we have access to special revelation?



MW said:


> The association with Descartes is unhelpful. Descartes' argument essentially makes man the sum and substance of his own thought and thereby self-referential. *The "I" in the argument is self-justified. It also abstracts thinking from the content of thought.*


Could you expand on the bold some more? What do you mean by the "I" being self-justified? And how does it abstract thinking from the content of thought?


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## MW (Apr 24, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> If special revelation is needed to reveal the context in which the world about us must be interpreted, then do we know nothing (i.e., have no ultimate epistemic justification for what we know) until we have access to special revelation?



"Revelation" has been limited to "special revelation" in the question.

Let's ponder this statement -- one cannot see the sun without the sun. It is also true that one cannot see the sun without eyes and the power of sight. The sun, however, does not give us eyes or the power of sight. In the case of God and knowledge, He is not only the knowledge by which we know all things; He has also given us reason and the power to reflect on Him. This means that knowledge itself is a revelation of God. It is God communicating Himself to us in one way or another. The Creator revealing Himself is thus the necessary pre-condition of creaturely knowing.

Note, this entails that human knowledge is a revelation in general. "Special revelation," by definition, must then be defined as a a "special form of revelation." It cannot be regarded as the necessary precondition for knowledge; although we have established a connection which shows it will be a necessary precondition for a special kind of knowledge.



Afterthought said:


> MW said:
> 
> 
> > The association with Descartes is unhelpful. Descartes' argument essentially makes man the sum and substance of his own thought and thereby self-referential. *The "I" in the argument is self-justified. It also abstracts thinking from the content of thought.*
> ...



"I" think; therefore "I am." On what basis does he say "I" think? He has already justified the use of "I," and does so by an appeal to himself.

For "I" to think there must be specific content in what is thought. E.g., voluntary expression. Otherwise the thinking might be an involuntary reaction, as when a dead body moves from an electrical impulse moving through it. Bare thought does not prove the proposition. There is voluntary content which is open to moral investigation. And the first idea to investigate is whether or not human thought is the basis for justifying one's existence or whether it points to an external giver to which human thought is accountable.


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## Afterthought (Apr 29, 2015)

It seems that the argument has shifted, perhaps because of my misunderstanding of thinking you all were referring to special revelation. But now that that's cleared up, and I understand "revelation" to refer to general revelation, it seems the argument is that all knowledge is revelatory of God and therefore God revealing Himself must be a precondition of knowledge? How can it be known then that all knowledge is revelatory of God (since we are discussing preconditions and so can't simply assume knowledge is revelatory)?

Perhaps it may also help me if I understand what you mean when you say that God is the knowledge by which we know all things. Do you simply mean God is the ultimate reference point (since God has created "objective reality") upon which we can ground predication? Or do you mean the content of knowledge (e.g., "the grass is green")?

What sort of knowledge is special revelation a precondition for? Do you mean such things such as knowledge of salvation?


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## MW (Apr 29, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> How can it be known then that all knowledge is revelatory of God (since we are discussing preconditions and so can't simply assume knowledge is revelatory)?



We are simply applying the ontological argument to the sphere of knowledge.

"All knowledge" doesn't exist in your mind or my mind or any other finite mind. For us it is just a concept. If that concept is true there must be a real existence of the thing. Where does it exist? If it doesn't exist, why are we speaking about it as a reality. If it does exist, the only place it could exist is in a Mind capable of holding all knowledge.

Now, we know it exists, otherwise we would not be speaking about it as a reality. The fact we know it exists means it has been revealed to us. If it were not revealed to us, we would not know it exists, and we would be back to speaking about a meaningless concept.

Add to this the fact that our knowledge is a "part" of what constitutes "all knowledge," and it is apparent that our knowledge is revelatory of this "all knowledge."



Afterthought said:


> Do you simply mean God is the ultimate reference point (since God has created "objective reality") upon which we can ground predication? Or do you mean the content of knowledge (e.g., "the grass is green")?



It is the ultimate reference point, to be sure, but it is more than that. Without God we could not think. He has created and conserves the reality which we think upon and the reality of thinking itself. The very act of thinking is revelatory of His creating and conserving work.



Afterthought said:


> What sort of knowledge is special revelation a precondition for? Do you mean such things such as knowledge of salvation?



Special revelation was necessary in a state of innocence in order to lead man into his eschatological rest. General revelation points beyond itself to the necessity of special revelation to direct man in this way. After the fall special revelation is necessary for salvation. But it is also true that our very thinking needs to be saved.


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## Afterthought (May 1, 2015)

Ah, thanks. I see the argument now. An objection that could be raised might be that "all knowledge" is a meaningless concept, a mere illusion. What we really mean when we say "all knowledge" is that there is an external world filled with a variety of phenomena that could potentially be "known" and then described as "fact;" "all knowledge" does not exist in reality.



MW said:


> Special revelation was necessary in a state of innocence in order to lead man into his eschatological rest. General revelation points beyond itself to the necessity of special revelation to direct man in this way. After the fall special revelation is necessary for salvation. But it is also true that our very thinking needs to be saved.


Probably a basic question that has been answered in a variety of systematic works, but what sorts of things do you have in mind when speaking of General revelation pointing to the necessity of special revelation?


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## MW (May 1, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> Probably a basic question that has been answered in a variety of systematic works, but what sorts of things do you have in mind when speaking of General revelation pointing to the necessity of special revelation?



We might consider the covenant of works in the light of 1 Cor. 15. Here is Adam. He is a natural man who has been blessed in a natural way. But he has not been confirmed in his relation to God, and he has not attained to the spiritual state described in 1 Cor. 15. This immediately points to the need for some revelation he cannot know by nature, which will direct him to a spiritually blessed end. This is the function of the covenant described for us in Gen. 2:16-17.

Other matters of special revelation would be the institutions of sabbath and marriage, which are both partly moral and partly positive. Both are grounded in special acts of creation which could not be deduced by reason, and both have eschatological fulfilments in the work of Christ.


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## Afterthought (May 6, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> An objection that could be raised might be that "all knowledge" is a meaningless concept, a mere illusion. What we really mean when we say "all knowledge" is that there is an external world filled with a variety of phenomena that could potentially be "known" and then described as "fact;" "all knowledge" does not exist in reality.


Actually, I wonder whether this objection rests on "all knowledge" being a meaningful concept? Although I'm not sure how to draw that out.


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## MW (May 6, 2015)

Afterthought said:


> Afterthought said:
> 
> 
> > An objection that could be raised might be that "all knowledge" is a meaningless concept, a mere illusion. What we really mean when we say "all knowledge" is that there is an external world filled with a variety of phenomena that could potentially be "known" and then described as "fact;" "all knowledge" does not exist in reality.
> ...



All-knowledge has to exist; otherwise nothing could be known. Without all-knowledge there would be no way of classifying what is known as a category of knowledge. There would also be the possibility of further knowledge which overturns what we now call knowledge. So every claim to "knowledge" is an appeal to the fact that all-knowledge exists somewhere.


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