# Is God Triune or possibly 3+?



## ChristianTrader (Nov 5, 2006)

There has been a discussion in the philosophy section on this very question.

The question is this: Does the Bible leave any room for the possibility of one or more members of the Godhead that we have just not been told about?

A measure of support for this view is the "conflicting" reports concerning the number of angels at Jesus' tomb after his Resurrection. Some places says, one while others say more. We can reconcile this by saying that it was "at least one".

What is the hermeneutic consensus on this?

CT


----------



## Scott Bushey (Nov 5, 2006)

Hermonta,
Not that I am anywhere near you or Paul M. theologically or philosophically, I would have to say that entertaining a discipline like this would lead to disaster hermeneutically. If one is willing to entertain silence or presumption as a rule for interpretation, where would the discipline end? We could do this to the point of destroying sola scriptura. 

My 1cents worth. I'm probably not following you.


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 5, 2006)

Scott Bushey said:


> Hermonta,
> Not that I am anywhere near you or Paul M. theologically or philosophically, I would have to say that entertaining a discipline like this would lead to disaster hermeneutically. If one is willing to entertain silence or presumption as a rule for interpretation, where would the discipline end? We could do this to the point of destroying sola scriptura.
> 
> My 1cents worth. I'm probably not following you.



Your following me all right.

I am currently thinking of a counter using worship. We are told to worship God in spirit and in truth. So if one makes the argument that God tells us to worship him as a Truine God then that would end the debate.


----------



## turmeric (Nov 5, 2006)

This brings to mind R.C. Sproul's Friday broadcast...


----------



## Semper Fidelis (Nov 5, 2006)

We are commanded to baptize in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. I frankly find any argument that would try to speculate beyond the Triune nature of God to be dangerous and non-Confessional. I believe the Canon to be closed and God reveals Himself as One in Three and leaves no room for us to vainly imagine further concerning His Holy nature.


----------



## Civbert (Nov 5, 2006)

Since we are presuming Scripture is God's Word, then it is clear that God is triune. But in the other thread, we are speaking about worldviews, and appeals to Scripture would be question begging. The quadriune (sp?) god would be an element of a different worldview than Christianity.


----------



## Semper Fidelis (Nov 5, 2006)

Civbert said:


> Since we are presuming Scripture is God's Word, then it clear the God is triune. But in the other thread, we are speaking about worldviews, and appeals to Scripture would be question begging. The quadriune (sp?) god would be an element of a different worldview than Christianity.



That sounds rather like it's OK to blaspheme so long as we're only "pretending". 

"Honey, I didn't _really_ commit adultery because I wasn't in my worldview when I did it."

I don't mean to seem harsh here but you seem to regard "question begging" as the greatest danger here.

We don't stop being Christians who believe in the Triune God just because we're "talking Philsophy now..."


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 5, 2006)

Civbert said:


> Since we are presuming Scripture is God's Word, then it clear the God is triune. But in the other thread, we are speaking about worldviews, and appeals to Scripture would be question begging. The quadriune (sp?) god would be an element of a different worldview than Christianity.



So again the question is if there is a neutral source of possibility for a four member Godhead? If not then they will have to find their own source of it and defend it. Otherwise, one will just be using the Christian God as a source of possibility against His existence.

CT


----------



## rmdmphilosopher (Nov 5, 2006)

> Since we are presuming Scripture is God's Word, then it clear the God is triune. But in the other thread, we are speaking about worldviews, and appeals to Scripture would be question begging.



Not to totally barge in on an argument from the middle of nowhere, but glancing at the other thread on this subject it seems that an appeal to scripture is not at all begging the question for this reason: the question was asked from a presuppositionalist standpoint, which most definately DOES 'presume' that scripture is God's word. I will quote Van Til from many dozen contexts in support of this statement if called upon. 

But I think what Civbert was trying to say was that from the presuppositionalist standpoint, the way Christians hold their own in the war of worldviews is by showing the internal contradiction of other worldviews--by showing 'the impossibility of the contrary'. 

Presupositionalists say that any worldview that is not Christianity is not internally consistent. They would also say that Any worldview that is not internally consistent is not Christianity; and again, they would say that Any worldview that is internally consistent is Christianity.

The place that Scripture's stance on the 3+ issue is important is this: according to the presuppositionalists, if 3+ can be shown to not be a part of the christian worldview (as delineated in scripture) then by definition it is internally inconsistent. But they have themselves in a double bind, because if they can't show that 3+ is internally inconsistent then likewise by definition it is a part of the christian worldview! 

So the really important question, barring other solutions than an appeal to scripture is this: does the testimony of scripture against an idea CONSTITUTE an internal contradiction (i.e., do we posit that a worldview making any statement about God that it cannot find in special revelation is necessarily inconsistent?) in which case we are scot free, or does this question highlight a real fault in the system of pressupositional apologetics?


----------



## bookslover (Nov 5, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> There has been a discussion in the philosophy section on this very question.
> 
> The question is this: Does the Bible leave any room for the possibility of one or more members of the Godhead that we have just not been told about?
> 
> ...



(sigh) People have enough problems dealing with the biblical doctrine of the Trinity as it is. Let's not be philosophically inventing any more members of the Godhead. All other "gods" referred to in Scripture are always described as false gods. As for the angels at the tomb, if there were two, then there was one, right?

This is the trouble with philosophy!  Maybe we need some federal legislation to crack down on these people... (heh, heh)


----------



## Civbert (Nov 10, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> So again the question is if there is a neutral source of possibility for a four member Godhead?


Why neutral? Nothing in _this _is world neutral. The point is, you are asking for proof that the God of Christianity could be quadrune. But the God of Christianity is triune by definition of biblical Christianity. The question is, is there a possible world where the correct worldview includes a quadrune god. This does not suppose there _are _other worlds, but what would be logically possible in a hypothetical world. 

Paul gave an excellent example in the other thread. In a hypothetical world, it is possible the sky could be pink, but it is not possible that 2 + 2 = 5. Maybe the "sky" example made people think Paul was talking about other planets. Let's try some other examples. In a hypothetical world, dogs could have 6 legs, cows could bark, the favorite drink could be straight lemon juice, and the bible could reveal a quadrune godhead. But what would not be possible in a hypothetical world: square circles, 2 + 3 = 4, and dogs that are cats. In other words, a hypothetical world can include anything but logical contradictions.


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 10, 2006)

Civbert said:


> Why neutral? Nothing in _this _is world neutral.



So there is neutrality, elsewhere? I do not see how you can make that stance stick.



> The point is, you are asking for proof that the God of Christianity could be quadrune.



No, I asked if there was any room in the Bible for such an idea.



> But the God of Christianity is triune by definition of biblical Christianity.



That officially ends the part of the discussion that this thread was about.



> The question is, is there a possible world where the correct worldview includes a quadrune god.



That is another good question.



> This does not suppose there _are _other worlds, but what would be logically possible in a hypothetical world.



But that begs a few questions. The primary one is that there is no other criteria to possibility beyond some state of affairs not being contradictory.

For example a square circle: "a plane figure that is closed, equilateral, rectangular, and has every point equidistant from a given point."

There is no contradiction here, but we still consider it impossible.

If you do not like that one, think about this one: Euclid talks about a breadth less length. That is impossible, but there is no logical contradiction there.



> Paul gave an excellent example in the other thread. In a hypothetical world, it is possible the sky could be pink, but it is not possible that 2 + 2 = 5.



To make the assumption about pink sky, I believe that we have to make certain unwarranted assumption about God. We have to assume that God arbitrary made the sky some other color than pink. At best, all we can say is that I do not see the reason that God did not make the sky color, pink. That iis a great deal away from saying that it is arbitrary.

As a corollary of the above point, we have to assume that if God did make a pink sky, that He would have changed nothing else in how He did make creation.

You have to assume no secondary or tertiary effects. And since you cannot ever "go" to this alternative world, it is all bare assumptions.

It is something like how atheists tend to deal with the problem of evil. "Until you tell me why X happens then I get to assume that there is no point."



> Maybe the "sky" example made people think Paul was talking about other planets. Let's try some other examples. In a hypothetical world, dogs could have 6 legs, cows could bark, the favorite drink could be straight lemon juice, and the bible could reveal a quadrune godhead.



Again there are a number of assumptions here that need to be justified.



> But what would not be possible in a hypothetical world: square circles, 2 + 3 = 4, and dogs that are cats. In other words, a hypothetical world can include anything but logical contradictions.



Just to note, I am not saying that certain things are not impossible, just that I believe that there is more impossible things than you seem to want to accept.

CT


----------



## Civbert (Nov 10, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> But that begs a few questions. The primary one is that there is no other criteria to possibility beyond some state of affairs not being contradictory.
> 
> For example a square circle: "a plane figure that is closed, equilateral, rectangular, and has every point equidistant from a given point."
> 
> ...



There is a contradiction. The last premise (has every point equidistant from a given point) implies a figure with curved sides and no angles, which contradicts the equilateral rectangle (which implies straight sides with 90 degree angles). You can not logically reconcile the definition of a circle and the definition of a square - ergo the logical impossibility of a square circle.


----------



## Civbert (Nov 10, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> To make the assumption about pink sky, I believe that we have to make certain unwarranted assumption about God. We have to assume that God arbitrary made the sky some other color than pink.



No arbitrary assumption is called for. The scope of hypothetical "possible world" includes a hypothetical god and planet and everything else necessary. Any time you question the hypothetical "possible" world, and you base the question on anything in the "actual" world, then you are begging the question. You've based you assumption using this planet and real God. I'm making no assumptions based on the real world. 

Here's a link to a wikipedia article on "possible worlds". It does a better job than I am at explaining the concept of "possible worlds" and modal logic. 


Here's another link: http://experts.about.com/e/p/po/possible_world.htm

My post will make more sense after reading those articles.


----------



## Scott Bushey (Nov 11, 2006)

What do you all think of this statement?



> Orthodoxy requires of us to confess a triune God. To assume the position of "at least triune, but perhaps other" is a denial of the triune God, even if it merely for argument's sake. The point is the respect for the holiness of God, not mere doctrinal orthdoxy. Carelessly speaking of God, without respect to His supreme deity and majesty, is as much a breaking of the second commandment as worshipping idols is.



Scott


----------



## Semper Fidelis (Nov 11, 2006)

Scott Bushey said:


> What do you all think of this statement?



Sounds like it was written by a *Christian*.


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 11, 2006)

From what I understand Paul is not saying that God is anything other than triune. In fact I think he has stated that clearly. What is being said is that it wouldn't be *illogical* for God in another possible world to be 4 in 1. Since the strong modal version of TAG asserts the *impossibility* of the contrary, then the strong modal version of TAG would have to show that this possible world (the quadrune god) is illogical, and thus not a viable possible world. From what I have seen, this hasn't been done.

As well, a person in that possible world can appeal to their "scripture" and then try to prove from the impossibility of the contrary their view. Now if you said that God was triune, they would just say you were (hypothetically now) blaspheming. So they could use your own argument against you. You would have to show that their view isn't logically possible (or that yours is also logically possible, thus defeating their *impossibility* claim) in order to defeat their claim. So that is where the real issue lies.


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 11, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> From what I understand Paul is not saying that God is anything other than triune. In fact I think he has stated that clearly. What is being said is that it wouldn't be *illogical* for God in another possible world to be 4 in 1.



Actually, he has stated two different things at two different times. At one point he made the argument that hermeneutically, we cannot prove without any doubt that the Christian God is only 3, but instead could be more than 3. He even stated that he talked to a WTS professor who said that such is possible.

He has also stated that the 4-in-1 is possible in a possible world meaning that he did not see the logical necessity in 3-in-1.

I disagree with the first part and the second part. The second part because it implies that which is not a contradiction can be considered possible. (See Breadthless length example above)



> Since the strong modal version of TAG asserts the *impossibility* of the contrary, then the strong modal version of TAG would have to show that this possible world (the quadrune god) is illogical, and thus not a viable possible world. From what I have seen, this hasn't been done.



Again, one does not have to demonstrate that something is illogical, just that it is impossible. And I do not see how those are necessarily the same thing.



> As well, a person in that possible world can appeal to their "scripture" and then try to prove from the impossibility of the contrary their view. Now if you said that God was triune, they would just say you were (hypothetically now) blaspheming. So they could use your own argument against you. You would have to show that their view isn't logically possible (or that yours is also logically possible, thus defeating their *impossibility* claim) in order to defeat their claim. So that is where the real issue lies.



The real issue is with possible worlds entirely.

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 11, 2006)

Civbert said:


> There is a contradiction. The last premise (has every point equidistant from a given point) implies a figure with curved sides and no angles, which contradicts the equilateral rectangle (which implies straight sides with 90 degree angles). You can not logically reconcile the definition of a circle and the definition of a square - ergo the logical impossibility of a square circle.



To be fair, that is only a this world objection. Now if you wish to say that space is necessarily a certain way, then you have added a criteria besides lack of contradiction to be a possible world.

If I can get this point accepted, then I am on my way. 
CT


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 11, 2006)

Civbert said:


> No arbitrary assumption is called for. The scope of hypothetical "possible world" includes a hypothetical god and planet and everything else necessary. Any time you question the hypothetical "possible" world, and you base the question on anything in the "actual" world, then you are begging the question. You've based you assumption using this planet and real God. I'm making no assumptions based on the real world.



Of course you are. If you did not, then your assertions would have no content. Attempt to talk about pink sky's, singing pigs etc. without referencing the "real" world. What is pink? What is a pig? You have to make the assumption that you can change, "one thing" while keeping everything else the same.


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 11, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> He has also stated that the 4-in-1 is possible in a possible world meaning that he did not see the logical necessity in 3-in-1.
> 
> I disagree with the first part and the second part. The second part because it implies that which is not a contradiction can be considered possible. (See Breadthless length example above)


I guess it depends on how you define ‘possible’. From what I have heard while listening to Greg Bahnsen lectures (and I have heard quite some now, although not all of his apologetic lectures on audio) possibility is defined as what is logically possible. So with that respect proving the impossibility of the contrary would have to show that all other views reduce to absurdity. 


ChristianTrader said:


> One does not have to demonstrate that something is illogical, just that it is impossible. And I do not see how those are necessarily the same thing.


Would you agree that if something is illogical then it is impossible? 
Hermonta do you hold to the strong modal version of TAG or not?


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 11, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> I guess it depends on how you define ‘possible’. From what I have heard while listening to Greg Bahnsen lectures (and I have heard quite some now, although not all of his apologetic lectures on audio) possibility is defined as what is logically possible. So with that respect proving the impossibility of the contrary would have to show that all other views reduce to absurdity.



If it reduces to something that is impossible, is that not absurd?


> Would you agree that if something is illogical then it is impossible?
> Hermonta do you hold to the strong modal version of TAG or not?



I have no problem with saying that something that is illogical is impossible. The issue is if there are more things that are impossible, than just what is contradictory.

CT


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 11, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> I have no problem with saying that something that is illogical is impossible. The issue is if there are more things that are impossible, than just what is contradictory.
> CT



It depends on how we are defining the term 'possible'. If we mean physically possible then we would come up with totally different conclusions than logically possible. For example it is physically impossible for me to run 7,000 mph but it is logically possible. Does that mean it conforms with reality? no, it just means it is logically possible.

I would be interested to know how one could disprove the "quadrune god" on other 'possible' definitions though. I haven't seen it done yet with respect to logic.


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 11, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> It depends on how we are defining the term 'possible'.



Sounds fair  



> If we mean physically possible then we would come up with totally different conclusions than logically possible.



I agree. The problem is then do you take on over the other or do you say something has to be both physically and logically possible to earn the title "possible".



> For example it is physically impossible for me to run 7,000 mph but it is logically possible. Does that mean it conforms with reality? no, it just means it is logically possible.



No disagreement here. When you say something is logically possible, you simply mean there are no contradictions in the terms, right? I do not disagree with that point.

My point is this, "so what it is not a contradiction in terms, we both know that X is impossible."

For example, if you told me, that you just ran 7,000 mph, I would laugh at you, call you absurd, and not give it a second thought. Not only that I would be completely justified in laughing at you.



> I would be interested to know how one could disprove the "quadrune god" on other 'possible' definitions though. I haven't seen it done yet with respect to logic.



The issue is to turn the whole debate into a "real" world fight. If someone claims alternate revelation, show me it. If they want to assert that it is the same, except X, "show me".

CT


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 11, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> My point is this, "so what it is not a contradiction in terms, we both know that X is impossible."
> CT



Impossible as in it doesn’t conform with reality? I would agree that the quadrune god doesn’t conform with reality (is not true), but I would also say that there would be nothing illogical *if* he did (in some possible world). 

So if you want to make it real world then I would be fine in saying he doesn’t exist. All I am saying is that in a hypothetical world he could exist logically speaking. My point is that impossibility and possibility with respect to TAG are speaking of logical possibility. At least that is what I have gathered thus far, but I could be wrong. My


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 12, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> Impossible as in it doesn’t conform with reality? I would agree that the quadrune god doesn’t conform with reality (is not true), but I would also say that there would be nothing illogical *if* he did (in some possible world).



My question is to see the case made that illogical and impossible are synonymous and not just overlapping categories. Especially noting that logic has to be applied to concrete things. For example, your running 7000 mph. 

Premise 1: Your legs can only take a pounding of 1k pounds before they shatter.

Premise 2: Running 7000 mph would mean that they take a pounding of 10k pounds.

Conclusion: You cannot run 7000 mph.

So see you have your logical contradiction. It is now impossible, right 

One big problem is before you can even use the laws of logic, you have to assume a large number of other things. The biggest problem is asserting that only X number of changes are made and nothing else. How can you know nothing else would change or not?



> So if you want to make it real world then I would be fine in saying he doesn’t exist. All I am saying is that in a hypothetical world he could exist logically speaking. My point is that impossibility and possibility with respect to TAG are speaking of logical possibility. At least that is what I have gathered thus far, but I could be wrong. My



Logical possibility is the cherry on top of the sundae, Try to determine what is logically possible in a possible world without first determining what is physically possible.

CT


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 12, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> My question is to see the case made that illogical and impossible are synonymous and not just overlapping categories. Especially noting that logic has to be applied to concrete things. For example, your running 7000 mph.
> 
> Premise 1: Your legs can only take a pounding of 1k pounds before they shatter.
> 
> ...


Again, it depends on how we define impossible. If we define it as impossible logically speaking then obviously something that is illogical is impossible. I don’t think logic has to be applied to concrete things. I will explain later in this post with a thought experiment to show why. 

In your example of the 7000mph running, I’m not really sure what you are trying to say. 



ChristianTrader said:


> One big problem is before you can even use the laws of logic, you have to assume a large number of other things. The biggest problem is asserting that only X number of changes are made and nothing else. How can you know nothing else would change or not?



I’m not understanding what you are saying here. 



ChristianTrader said:


> Logical possibility is the cherry on top of the sundae. Try to determine what is logically possible in a possible world without first determining what is physically possible.



Let’s say I have a possible world where no matter exists. Now there is a conversation between two spirits (through telepathic communication lets say) and one spirit asserts an illogical proposition about another spirit. The laws of logic still hold up even though no matter exists. I may still be misunderstanding what you are questioning, but hopefully my example gave some indication of where I am coming from.


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 12, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> Again, it depends on how we define impossible. If we define it as impossible logically speaking then obviously something that is illogical is impossible. I don’t think logic has to be applied to concrete things. I will explain later in this post with a thought experiment to show why.



It does seem that "He who makes the definitions, makes the rules".  



> In your example of the 7000mph running, I’m not really sure what you are trying to say.



1)When we claim that one has a logical contradiction it is not simply the laws of logic that we are using. We are implying a great deal of knowledge to the situation.



> I’m not understanding what you are saying here.



Look at the hypothetical Quadrune God worldview. When a person makes the hypothetical, they say, it is exactly the same as this world, with this one change. How can they assert that? How do they get to assume that this one change would not lead to more than they bargain? Think Econ.



> Let’s say I have a possible world where no matter exists. Now there is a conversation between two spirits (through telepathic communication lets say) and one spirit asserts an illogical proposition about another spirit. The laws of logic still hold up even though no matter exists. I may still be misunderstanding what you are questioning, but hopefully my example gave some indication of where I am coming from.



You would still be dealing with a concrete.

For me to answer you, give me an example of the contradiction. (I do not believe that there is such a thing as an illogical proposition, but instead illogical groups of propositions).

CT


----------



## Scott Bushey (Nov 12, 2006)

Caleb and Hermonta,
You never responded to this question. What do you think of this statement:


> Orthodoxy requires of us to confess a triune God. To assume the position of "at least triune, but perhaps other" is a denial of the triune God, even if it merely for argument's sake. The point is the respect for the holiness of God, not mere doctrinal orthdoxy. Carelessly speaking of God, without respect to His supreme deity and majesty, is as much a breaking of the second commandment as worshipping idols is.


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 12, 2006)

Scott, I don’t hold that position. I am just saying there wouldn’t be anything illogical about saying in a hypothetical possible world (even though this hypothetical world is *false*) a quadrune god could exist (logically speaking that is, as I can't see anything illogical about such a world). 




ChristianTrader said:


> 1)When we claim that one has a logical contradiction it is not simply the laws of logic that we are using. We are implying a great deal of knowledge to the situation.


I don’t agree with you here. I may be wrong, but it seems your running example conclusion followed from your premises, and thus is logical. 



ChristianTrader said:


> You would still be dealing with a concrete.
> 
> For me to answer you, give me an example of the contradiction. (I do not believe that there is such a thing as an illogical proposition, but instead illogical groups of propositions).



I don’t see how I am still dealing with a concrete, as everything in my example is immaterial. 

To further my example, let’s say that one spirit asserts (through telepathic communication perhaps) that God is both ‘all good’ and ‘all bad’ in the same sense and in the same relationship. 

Or perhaps, one spirit might assert that 
1)	All demon spirits are evil
2)	Timmy is a spirit
Therefore, Timmy is evil

The conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises, and is thus invalid. 

I can give more examples if you like, but this should suffice for now.


----------



## Scott Bushey (Nov 12, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> Scott, I don’t hold that position. I am just saying there wouldn’t be anything illogical about saying in a hypothetical possible world (even though this hypothetical world is *false*) a quadrune god could exist (logically speaking that is, as I can't see anything illogical about such a world).



Caleb, 
But since you are a Christian, and that is not _hypothetical_, isn't dealing with such an issue hypothetically, possibly bordering upon sinful?


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 12, 2006)

Scott Bushey said:


> Caleb and Hermonta,
> You never responded to this question. What do you think of this statement:



I do not think it is a very robust statement. The problem is that one basically has to do "for the sake of arguments" in order to refute any false position. I think you would agree with the premise that to deny God's word is equivalent to denying God?

If this is so, then for example, let us say that we are arguing with a five point Arminian. We could not say, "For the sake of argument, let us assume your positions and see if we can make sense of the Biblical data".

Or think of Elijah vs. the prophets of Baal. When there prayers were not working, Elijah said, "Maybe your god is sleeping". For him to make that statement, he had to imply, "For the sake of argument, your God exists and is the true God, why then does he not answer you."

But to do that, according to the quote, he would have to deny the real truine God and for the sake of argument, say that Baal is the real God.

I could go on and on.

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 12, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> I don’t agree with you here. I may be wrong, but it seems your running example conclusion followed from your premises, and thus is logical.



What I mean is that in order to determine if something is a contradiction, you have to assume other laws in addition to the laws of logic: laws of space, laws of time etc.



> I don’t see how I am still dealing with a concrete, as everything in my example is immaterial.



When I said, "concrete" I was not attempting to imply physical, I was just meaning to imply an actual hypothetical situation. I think you can understand what I mean, but if not, ask again.



> To further my example, let’s say that one spirit asserts (through telepathic communication perhaps) that God is both ‘all good’ and ‘all bad’ in the same sense and in the same relationship.
> 
> Or perhaps, one spirit might assert that
> 1)	All demon spirits are evil
> ...



Alright, first question,

What are the consequences of an immaterial world as opposed to our material world? The answer is that we really do not know.

One issue that we do know is that time and space (with its matter) are inter-related. So what happens to time when matter disappears.

So first off, you have to assert that they are not inter-related or at best the inter-relation is irrelevant.

Without time, there is no progress and one cannot do logic (as far as we know logic, in a time bound universe). No time no communication and no thoughts, as we know them today.

CT


----------



## Civbert (Nov 12, 2006)

Scott Bushey said:


> Caleb and Hermonta,
> You never responded to this question. What do you think of this statement:
> 
> 
> > Orthodoxy requires of us to confess a triune God. To assume the position of "at least triune, but perhaps other" is a denial of the triune God, even if it merely for argument's sake. The point is the respect for the holiness of God, not mere doctrinal orthodoxy. Carelessly speaking of God, without respect to His supreme deity and majesty, is as much a breaking of the second commandment as worshipping idols is.



_Orthodoxy requires of us to confess a triune God._ -- I agree.


_To assume the position of "at least triune, but perhaps other" is a denial of the triune God, even if it merely for argument's sake._ - Maybe. It depends on what other presuppositions when is assuming for argument sake. One can assume Buddha for argument sake. But if we are merely assuming God and the law of contradiction - everything thing else is contingently true. Including the triune nature of God.

The point is the respect for the holiness of God, not mere doctrinal orthodoxy. -- I don't see the connection between the premise and "the point".


Carelessly speaking of God, without respect to His supreme deity and majesty, is as much a breaking of the second commandment as worshipping idols is. -- I don't think modal argumentation is careless. And it does not necessarily challenge God's supreme deity and majesty. It does however, challenge the contents of His revelation to us. It makes scriptures as we know them only a contingent truth, and not a logically necessary truth. 

This is the reason I started the thread questioning if modal logic is evil. It seems that with modal logic, the only thing that is impossible is two contrary propositions being true at the same time. 


The quote sounds to me like something Calvin would say, except the language seems more contemporary. Who said it? Van Til?

I think that whoever wrote it, would vote that Modal Logic is evil.


----------



## Civbert (Nov 12, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> To be fair, that is only a this world objection. Now if you wish to say that space is necessarily a certain way, then you have added a criteria besides lack of contradiction to be a possible world.
> 
> If I can get this point accepted, then I am on my way.
> CT



No, it's impossible at all possible worlds. All it takes is a contradiction. God might transcend possible words, but other than God, the only thing assumed true at all possible worlds is the law of contradiction. Nothing else is assumed. The LC must be assumed or nothing would be impossible - and modal logic would have no tools for saying what is possible and what is impossible.


----------



## Cheshire Cat (Nov 12, 2006)

Hermonta, I think with respect to an immaterial world the main question that your getting at is can progression take place without our view and understanding of physical time? 

Although even if there wasn't progression, I think the law of non-contradiction would still hold, for example Satan could not equal Gabriel in the same sense and in the same relationship. It depends on how people define the LNC I guess...

Anyways, I think that is irrelevant to whether or not the quadrune god world is logically possible. The point is your example argument of the runner was not illogical, so it was not logically impossible. Physically impossible? Yes, but illogical? No.


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 12, 2006)

caleb_woodrow said:


> Hermonta, I think with respect to an immaterial world the main question that your getting at is can progression take place without our view and understanding of physical time?



My main point is that possible worlds seem to imply things that are false. Namely, we have more understanding than we do have. Since we do not, on what basis is one going to claim possibility.



> Although even if there wasn't progression, I think the law of non-contradiction would still hold, for example Satan could not equal Gabriel in the same sense and in the same relationship. It depends on how people define the LNC I guess...



I think you would have to admit, that logic as we know it, would not exist.



> Anyways, I think that is irrelevant to whether or not the quadrune god world is logically possible. The point is your example argument of the runner was not illogical, so it was not logically impossible. Physically impossible? Yes, but illogical? No.



So it is possible depending on how defines the laws of space, time etc. The problem is then, the same one as when we come to Econ, changing one thing leads to other changes that you do not account for.

CT


----------



## ChristianTrader (Nov 12, 2006)

Civbert said:


> _To assume the position of "at least triune, but perhaps other" is a denial of the triune God, even if it merely for argument's sake._ - Maybe. It depends on what other presuppositions when is assuming for argument sake. One can assume Buddha for argument sake. But if we are merely assuming God and the law of contradiction - everything thing else is contingently true. Including the triune nature of God.



When you say that you assume God but not his triune nature, what exactly do you mean?



> Carelessly speaking of God, without respect to His supreme deity and majesty, is as much a breaking of the second commandment as worshipping idols is. -- I don't think modal argumentation is careless. And it does not necessarily challenge God's supreme deity and majesty. It does however, challenge the contents of His revelation to us. It makes scriptures as we know them only a contingent truth, and not a logically necessary truth.



How can you challenge God's word but not God? Is not that almost exactly like Challenging Jesus but not God?

Also one can say that God did not have to reveal himself to us. But is not the same as challenging who God is.

Or put another way, you seem to be moving from epistemology to metaphysics. One can know or not know the way to Chicago, but that does not imply that this is the same there not being a Chicago to know or not know.


----------



## Civbert (Nov 12, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> > _Originally Posted by _*Civbert *
> > It depends on what other presuppositions [one] is assuming for argument sake. One can assume Buddha for argument sake. But if we are merely assuming God and the law of contradiction - everything thing else is contingently true. Including the triune nature of God.
> 
> 
> When you say that you assume God but not his triune nature, what exactly do you mean?



I mean the triune nature God is not a necessary truth in modal logic. Even if we assume God is necessary, that does not make the _triune Godhead_ is logically necessary at all possible worlds. 



ChristianTrader said:


> How can you challenge God's word but not God? Is not that almost exactly like Challenging Jesus but not God?


In modal logic, Jesus is not necessary either. Why is it necessary that God would have to send Jesus to save us at every possible world? That's the nature of "possible worlds". No assumptions are made except the law of contradiction. Did you read the article I linked to in the other thread on modal logic?




ChristianTrader said:


> Also one can say that God did not have to reveal himself to us. But is not the same as challenging who God is.


Sure. But all we know of who God is, is what He has revealed. But unless you presume the Bible is God's Word, you can not say who God is. Modal logic does not assume the Bible is God's World. In modal logic, God has no univocal or necessary definition. Asking who God is with modal logic yields no necessarily true answers (in the model sense of necessarily true). 



ChristianTrader said:


> Or put another way, you seem to be moving from epistemology to metaphysics. One can know or not know the way to Chicago, but that does not imply that this is the same there not being a Chicago to know or not know.


 Chicago is not a necessary true place in modal logic. Chicago itself is only a possible truth. In another world, it is possible that Chicago does not exist. 

I don't think Modal Logic deals with epistemology (not to be confused with epistemic modal logic). Epistemology depends on presuppositions, which entails more than what is required for using modal logic. Epistemology depends on some content to know. As a Scripturalist, I assume the Bible is the Word of God as my epistemological starting point. That is why I find modal logic troubling. It is incompatible with the Bible since the Bible is unnecessary in modal logic. It is merely possible. At other possible worlds, the bible . Modal logic is primarily metaphysical.

Here's a diagram I got from a poster on the Christian Logic Discussion Board showing the square of opposition in modal logic:

```
__________or__________ 
      |                      | 
  NECESSARY  <contrary>  IMPOSSIBLE 
      v  c                y  v 
   implies  o           r implies 
      v        n     o       v 
    TRUE          t        FALSE 
      v        c     r       v 
   implies  i           a implies 
      v  d                -  v 
  POSSIBLE <subcontrary> UNNECESSARY 
      |_________   __________| 
                and
```
Notice that "true" does not imply "necessary" in modal logic. If we were speaking in terms of epistemology, true does imply necessary. But epistemology only makes sense at one world. What is true in one possible world, can be false in another. Only the "necessary" is true in all possible worlds.


----------



## Brian Bosse (Nov 18, 2006)

Hello Civybaby,

I was wondering where your questioning of Modal Logic comes from, and I now think I understand better. You are still wrong to think it is evil.  



> God might transcend possible words, but other than God, the only thing assumed true at all possible worlds is the law of contradiction. Nothing else is assumed.



Consider the following proposition: The only thing assumed true in all possible worlds is the law of contradiction. Is this proposition true in all possible worlds? 



> Even if we assume God is necessary, that does not make the triune Godhead is logically necessary at all possible worlds.



Yes, it does - unless you are equivocating on the term 'God'. Let's say that 'God' in the actual world is the triune God of Christianity. Let's now say in modal terms that God is necessary. That means God is true in every possible world including our actual world, and if this God in our actual world is triune, then this God is triune in every possible world. Think of the law of contradiction. If it is necsessary in every possible world, then it cannot be a different law in some possible world from our actual world.



> In modal logic, Jesus is not necessary either. Why is it necessary that God would have to send Jesus to save us at every possible world? That's the nature of "possible worlds". No assumptions are made except the law of contradiction. Did you read the article I linked to in the other thread on modal logic?



*(1)* If God is necessary, and He always acts in a manner that glorifies Himself maximally, and if sending Jesus to die for the elect is part of these actions that glorifies God, then sending Jesus to die is necessary.

*(2)* If God is necessary, and God creates necessarily, then sending Jesus to die for the elect is necessary. 

Anthony, Modal Logic is no different from any other type of logic. It is a system of deduction and no more. You take your starting axioms and apply the modal logic system of deduction. Take your Scripturalism. If you apply Modal Logic to this system you will end up with precisely those truths that make up Christianity.



> Modal logic does not assume the Bible is God's World.



Neither does propositional logic, and I do not see you criticizing it. Take the system of deduction espoused in Clark's logic book. That system does not assume the Bible is God's word. In fact, that system was first formalized by Aristotle who never believed the Bible was God's word. Clark's system is the same as Aristotle's system. My point here is that no deductive system assumes your starting axiom - at least in the sense you are using the word assumption. All systems of deduction are dependent upon God. 



> Chicago is not a necessary true place in modal logic. Chicago itself is only a possible truth. In another world, it is possible that Chicago does not exist.



What you said is technically correct. Chicago is not a true place _in modal logic_. It also is not a true place _in propositional logic_. However, I think you meant something differently. If God is necessary, and if God creates necessarily, then Chicago is necessarily a true place. If God creates contingently, then Chicago may not be necessary. The whole point is the axioms of the system you are applying modal logic to are what matters! It is the system that matters and not the deductive system system used to draw conclusions from the initial axioms of the given system. 



> As a Scripturalist, I assume the Bible is the Word of God as my epistemological starting point. That is why I find modal logic troubling. It is incompatible with the Bible since the Bible is unnecessary in modal logic.



Hopefully, you now see that that is mistaken. I can start with Scripture as my epistemological starting point and use modal logic as my deductive system to derive truth claims about Christianity. Again, it is no different than your using Aristotelian syllogisms to derive truths from your starting point. 

Now, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this thread, I would argue that it is not possible for God to be a quadrinity - but my argument is only probably so. That is to say, it is probably the case that it is not possible for God to be a quadrinity. But this is not a modal logic issue, but rather my own epistemic inability. I am fallible. 

*(1)* If the Christian God is necessary, and *(2)* the Christian God is triune, then the Trinity is necessary. 

The consequent follows deductively from my two premises. Premise 1 is established on the basis that the Christian God is necessary for intelligibility. This is not establilshed in a certain manner, but rather in a manner that provides a rationally justified reason to adopt it. Premise 2 is established by exegesis of the Bible, which is the revelatory source for the Christian God. Again the doctrine of the Trinity is not established in a certain manner, but rather it is justified. Since we are justified in believing these two premises, then we are warrented to conclude that the Trinity is necessary. On this basis we are warranted to conclude that God cannot be a quadrinity. 

This is a good proof even though it does not provide philosophical certainly. I would argue that we as creatures do not have the luxury of philosophical certainty. If we know something in a philosophically certain manner, then we cannot know we know it this way.

Brian


----------



## AV1611 (Nov 19, 2006)

ChristianTrader said:


> The question is this: Does the Bible leave any room for the possibility of one or more members of the Godhead that we have just not been told about?



No it does not. God is triune (1 John 5:7) and that is final.


----------



## larryjf (Nov 19, 2006)

As this is a question of the essence of God it deals with the necessity of his being. What would be the necessity of having more than the 3 persons in the Godhead? Since the 3 persons in the Godhead effect the perfect intrinsic relationships i see no philosophical reason for more persons.

I don't see how there can be any Scriptural support for more than a triune Godhead at all.


----------

