# Luther vs. Edwards



## NB3K

Ok I have both Luther's _Bondage of the Will _and Jonathan Edward's _The Freedom of The Will._

My problem is, whenever I try to sit and read Edwards he makes my head hurt. From glossing over the two it seems that Luther speaks in a common language (easier to understand).

Are the two works basically the same? 

Is one better than the other?

Or should I give attention to both and suck it up and learn the language of Edwards?


----------



## Philip

NB3K said:


> Are the two works basically the same?



The position argued is more or less the same. However, the language that each uses is different, so it can apppear that the two are in conflict. Luther is dealing with the moral ability of a sinner to choose to follow Christ, while Edwards is concerned with the subject of that freedom which is necessary for moral responsibility. Further, Edwards is writing after there has been a huge change in the definition of "free." For Luther, freedom has to do with the ability to do good, whereas for Edwards, it has to do with the ability to choose either good or evil.


----------



## NB3K

P. F. Pugh said:


> NB3K said:
> 
> 
> 
> Are the two works basically the same?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The position argued is more or less the same. However, the language that each uses is different, so it can apppear that the two are in conflict. Luther is dealing with the moral ability of a sinner to choose to follow Christ, while Edwards is concerned with the subject of that freedom which is necessary for moral responsibility. Further, Edwards is writing after there has been a huge change in the definition of "free." For Luther, freedom has to do with the ability to do good, whereas for Edwards, it has to do with the ability to choose either good or evil.
Click to expand...

 
So basically I should read both?


----------



## Pilgrim

With regard to the language and ease of reading, my guess is that your suspicion is correct. But someone would have to have read Luther in the original language to really answer your question. As I'm sure you know, what you are reading is an English translation, one that dates from the 50's assuming it's the Packer and Johnston translation.

I used to have Edwards' book, but never read it, probably in part because I was too lazy to plow through it.


----------



## py3ak

In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it. Unless you are interested in intellectual history or American Calvinistic thought I doubt you need to force yourself through the Edwards volume.
However you would probably find it quite profitable to read some of his sermons, like "Ruth's Resolution".

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## NB3K

py3ak said:


> In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it. Unless you are interested in intellectual history or American Calvinistic thought I doubt you need to force yourself through the Edwards volume.
> However you would probably find it quite profitable to read some of his sermons, like "Ruth's Resolution".



Thank you.

---------- Post added at 03:24 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:21 PM ----------




py3ak said:


> In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it.



Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?


----------



## CharlieJ

Luther at times gets a bit too necessitarian. Human free will almost disappears, absorbed into God. Calvin is more careful in his formulations. Anthony Lane has written on this topic, I think in his introduction to Calvin's _Bondage and Liberation of the Will_.

Also, I found this PhD dissertation that discusses the matter, starting at p. 220: http://www.calvin.edu/library/database/dissertations/Choy_Kiven_S.PDF


----------



## Alan D. Strange

Edwards on the will is brilliant and maddening. Edwards is speculative in ways that Luther is not, which is to say that Edwards's approach is more philosophical than Luther's. Luther hated the speculative approach of many of the schoolmen, so he is more down to earth in his treatment of the Scriptures and theology. Though I love Edwards for many things, I would say if you need to pick between the two, read Luther's debate with Erasmus (although Charlie is right too, though I think that may be due to the nature of Luther when engaged in direct polemics).

If you are interested in American Intellectual History and the place of Edwards's work in it, pick up Allen Guelzo's _Edwards on the Will_, a provocative and interesting work. I have a bit of a different take on the relationship of Edwards to the New Divinity that followed in his wake, but Guelzo is worth reading (he has now become a first-rate Lincoln scholar).

Peace,
Alan


----------



## Philip

NB3K said:


> Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?



The academic language has something tod with the fact that Edwards is not addressing the issue of human salvation but of human responsibility.


----------



## Prufrock

NB3K said:


> _In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it._
> 
> 
> 
> Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?
Click to expand...


Jason, the case has been made that Edwards brought a doctrine of philosophical necessity into the Reformed system that was not present in earlier teachers, thus changing the shape of this aspect of Reformed thought; and that his concept of freedom was shaped by anthropological factors more philosophical than theological.


----------



## py3ak

NB3K said:


> py3ak said:
> 
> 
> 
> In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it. Unless you are interested in intellectual history or American Calvinistic thought I doubt you need to force yourself through the Edwards volume.
> However you would probably find it quite profitable to read some of his sermons, like "Ruth's Resolution".
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you.
> Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?
Click to expand...


No - or at least that's not what Bavinck identifies as the issue. On p.201 of the first volume of _Reformed Dogmatics_ Bavinck says: "By his metaphysical and ethical speculations he attempted to strengthen Calvinism but actually weakened it by the distinction between natural and moral impotence --a distinction that already occurs in John Cameron-- and by a peculiar theory concerning freedom of the will, original sin, and virtue."


----------



## NB3K

Is Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics worth getting? And can someone please explain what the work is.


----------



## JM

One is biblical the other is more philosophical...get Bavinck, the full set.


----------



## py3ak

NB3K said:


> Is Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics worth getting? And can someone please explain what the work is.



Bavinck's _Reformed Dogmatics_ is a 4-volume set of exactly what the title describes - Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck was an extremely learned and profound Dutch theologian, and this work has only become available in English fairly recently. It's worth not only getting, but reading; but whether it's worth it for you will depend on many factors.


----------



## jwithnell

By Mr. Luther's pounding the point home in_ Bondage of the Will_, I first came to understand total depravity -- and that established the basis for my Calvinist viewpoint. (Most Lutherans give me a funny look when I say that!)

I have not read Mr. Bavink's comments so I can't speak directly to them, though I hugely admire the Dutch theologians in general and they have had a huge impact on my life. However after years of reading Mr. Edwards's sermons, I came to realize that he placed very high expectations on his hearers and this may lead to the idea of his being more philosophical and perhaps less grounded in a sermon text. Here's what I mean: he will make a reference to another text or concept from scripture and draw a conclusion that may not be reached by the exegesis of his original sermon text. However, he is assuming that his listener has had a full exegesis of the text he is referencing and is bringing all that information in to reach his conclusion. If, while you are reading his sermon, you look up these supporting texts and carefully examine them, you will see what I mean.

The historical context is also critical for appreciating Mr. Edwards. The awakening and the developing enlightenment philosophy of the age gives context to his work. He was interested in some of the concepts being developed by the philosophers, but the logical conclusions that later came to full fruition were far into the future. He was a brilliant man, and naturally took interest in the developing thoughts of his time. It would be considerably unfair to fault him for this.

However, in answer to the original post, I think _Bondage of the Will_ is must reading for reformed folk. Read _The Freedom of The Will_ if it interests you. Definitely read some of Mr. Edwards' sermons!

And please don't dis him on my watch


----------



## py3ak

Stating (or quoting others stating) that Edwards was incorrect or that he adopted the wrong approach to attain his desired result is not dissing him. Except for certain superhumans, everyone must make choices about what to read and what not to read, simply as a matter of time and energy; and so recommendations or dissuasions can be quite helpful.


----------



## Philip

Prufrock said:


> Jason, the case has been made that Edwards brought a doctrine of philosophical necessity into the Reformed system that was not present in earlier teachers, thus changing the shape of this aspect of Reformed thought; and that his concept of freedom was shaped by anthropological factors more philosophical than theological.



These issues were inevitable, in any case, given the tack that western thought was taking, and given hard determinists like Thomas Hobbes and libertarians like John Locke. It was Edwards who established that reformed thought is compatibilist (ie: theological determinism is compatible with human responsibility). The fact is that metaphysically, I've never been able to see a solution to the problem of freedom and determinism apart from the compatibilism of Edwards. Does Bavinck offer a different solution here? Or does he play the mystery card?


----------



## Prufrock

P. F. Pugh said:


> These issues were inevitable, in any case, given the tack that western thought was taking, and given hard determinists like Thomas Hobbes and libertarians like John Locke. It was Edwards who established that reformed thought is compatibilist (ie: theological determinism is compatible with human responsibility). The fact is that metaphysically, I've never been able to see a solution to the problem of freedom and determinism apart from the compatibilism of Edwards. Does Bavinck offer a different solution here? Or does he play the mystery card?



I'll leave that question to someone currently reading Bavinck. I've heard rumors that at least one person here is currently reading volume 1 (hint).

As to the inevitability of the issues, well, that's an issue for historians of philosophy - I can't speak intelligibly as to whether it the trains of philosophical thought of the day made the issue inevitable. I *can*, however, say that any such necessity would be limited to the context of that philosophical framework. Each of those "-isms" you mention are too recent on the scene to say that "Reformed thought is _______-ist (insert above mentioned word of your choice)." Reformed thought on the issue of the nature of the will _as will_ existed long before the modern (and by nature, transient) philosophical framework which demands answers in a context it is capable of handling or understanding. The "compatibilism" Edwards brings is not "the" Reformed understanding of the will, though I can see how one would think it would become necessary if for one's starting point they accepted the basic philosophical framework and anthropology emerging in that day. As a side note, though 17th century dogmatics was by no means shy about humbling itself before existent mystery, I'm unaware that mainstream scholasticism played "the mystery card" on this issue (if that was implied in the general tenor of your post).


----------



## py3ak

Bavinck doesn't address that issue in v.1 and my other volumes are in storage - he makes that comment in the context of a brief overview of the history of dogmatics.


----------



## Philip

Prufrock said:


> Each of those "-isms" you mention are too recent on the scene to say that "Reformed thought is _______-ist



Determinism is as old as Greek philosophy, as is the supposed conflict between human responsibility and determinism. Boethius proves interesting on this point.



Prufrock said:


> The "compatibilism" Edwards brings is not "the" Reformed understanding of the will



Has God ordained the future? Are humans responsible agents? Are the two logically compatible in reformed thought? If so, then compatibilism is the reformed position. We are clearly not hard determinists, Molinists, or libertarians. If there is a historic Calvinist position other than one that affirms 1) that the future is knowable 2) that humans are responsible 3) that the two are logically compatible and in fact necessary for one another, then it has yet to be explained to me.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> If there is a historic Calvinist position other than one that affirms 1) that the future is knowable 2) that humans are responsible 3) that the two are logically compatible and in fact necessary for one another, then it has yet to be explained to me.



The future isn't knowable to the human being making the choice. As it is not a real condition of human volition there is no need for a refined theory which makes the freedom of human choice compatible with a divinely determined event. It is not even desirable to know the future should it be remotely possible. It is, in fact, discouraged in many different ways in Scripture. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> The future isn't knowable to the human being making the choice.



The question is whether it is knowable _at all_ by anyone, including God. Do the reformed affirm foreordination? Yes or no?


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> The question is whether it is knowable _at all_ by anyone, including God. Do the reformed affirm foreordination? Yes or no?


 
That's not the question, and a little experience in dealing with these topics would make that evident. The reformed affirm the fore-ordination of all things which come to pass. They also affirm, "the liberty or contingency of second causes" is not taken away, WCF 3.1. The liberty, in other words, which reformed theology maintains, is not one which requires the necessity of a specific event, but allows for contingency, which means the event may or may not have fallen out from the perspective of secondary causation.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> The reformed affirm the fore-ordination of all things which come to pass. They also affirm, "the liberty or contingency of second causes" is not taken away



Which is why the reformed position is compatibilist, not hard determinist. This is the classic compatibilist position.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Which is why the reformed position is compatibilist, not hard determinist. This is the classic compatibilist position.


 
I'm not interested in word games. Compatibilism, as an "ism," does not merely state that the fore-ordination of all things is systematically compatible with a belief in the freedom of the will; it maintains a specific theory of compatibility, which defines "liberty" in terms of "necessity," and makes the "determinism" internal to the willing agent.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> Compatibilism, as an "ism," does not merely state that the fore-ordination of all things is systematically compatible with a belief in the freedom of the will; it maintains a specific theory of compatibility, which defines "liberty" in terms of "necessity," and makes the "determinism" internal to the willing agent.



Necessity has to do with whether God could have created the world such that something is other than it is. Certainly God could have created the world such that I had eggs for breakfast this morning---I would still have been free to have not eaten them. I'm not entirely sure how saying that we act rationally based on our desires entails a lack of freedom. The alternative is chance (ruled out by default). If you want to take up indeterminism, be my guest, but those are the logical options available (unless we want to add the self-contradictory "solution" that is Molinism).


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Necessity has to do with whether God could have created the world such that something is other than it is. Certainly God could have created the world such that I had eggs for breakfast this morning---I would still have been free to have not eaten them. I'm not entirely sure how saying that we act rationally based on our desires entails a lack of freedom. The alternative is chance (ruled out by default). If you want to take up indeterminism, be my guest, but those are the logical options available (unless we want to add the self-contradictory "solution" that is Molinism).



I can understand your binding ultimatum given your theology of bondage, but I think I am safe to reject the binding ultimatum in the liberty which the truth of Jesus Christ has brought.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> I can understand your binding ultimatum given your theology of bondage, but I think I am safe to reject the binding ultimatum in the liberty which the truth of Jesus Christ has brought.



Do you care to propose an alternative solution to the problem? If not, then compatibilism (or Molinism) is the only game in town. Compatibilism does not deny agent causation or contingency---however it does recognize the limits of the ordinary uses of these terms and refuses to admit that there could be an element of chance in either.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Do you care to propose an alternative solution to the problem? If not, then compatibilism (or Molinism) is the only game in town. Compatibilism does not deny agent causation or contingency---however it does recognize the limits of the ordinary uses of these terms and refuses to admit that there could be an element of chance in either.


 
Your theory supposes "determinism" is a real condition of human volition. It isn't. The willing agent doesn't know the secret things of the Lord. It is always an hypothetical condition. Your theory denies contingency, or what the Bible calls "time and chance," from the point of view of the secondary cause. Your "determinism" is not the divine foreordination of reformed Theism, but the mechanistic and internal causation which is required by the system of Deism.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> Your theory supposes "determinism" is a real condition of human volition.



Naturally---even self-determination is a sort of determinism. When a person acts in a random manner, we diagnose him as insane.



armourbearer said:


> Your theory denies contingency, or what the Bible calls "time and chance," from the point of view of the secondary cause.



Not at all---all things are contingent upon the will of God. For any event X, God could have created the world such that X does not happen. The reason why probabilistic theories are needed is because of our finitude. As you say, such constructs are mere circumstances of our point of view as secondary agents.


----------



## jwithnell

A thorough review of *God's Eternal Decree* would settle most of the discussion on determinism. In my understanding, this is not a debatable issue on Puritan Board. WCF Chapter 3:1 "God, from all eternity, did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeable ordain whatsoever comes to pass." And to the issue of free will and the end of this section: "yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

This part of the confession would have remained intact in the Savoy Declaration and would have been the doctrinal standard for Jonathan Edwards -- given the wide circulation of His sermons both in the colonies and in Europe, any divergence from this standard would have been well noted.


----------



## CharlieJ

According to Richard Muller, Edwards' divergence from standard Reformed teaching on the will was in fact noted by many, both inside and outside Reformed circles. 

http://www.jecteds.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Richard_Muller_Lecture.mp3


----------



## a mere housewife

Rev. Winzer, if I understand correctly, you are saying that 'compatibilism' seeks to take what properly belongs to the decree of God, and is both hidden from us and irrelevant to our actions, and bring it into the human perspective, in limiting our definitions of 'time and chance' and the agent's freedom. In doing so, it robs God of what is His --and 'fuses' into some sort of mechanism His freedom to determine events and our freedom to act. Is it right to understand that the decree of God not only places no constraint from the perspective of second causes; but is in fact, the only arena of that unconstraint (because it is the only arena where 'determination' is kept outside the realm of contingencies, and in which contingent causes operate quite freely?)


----------



## Prufrock

jwithnell said:


> A thorough review of God's Eternal Decree would settle most of the discussion on determinism. In my understanding, this is not a debatable issue on Puritan Board. WCF Chapter 3:1 "God, from all eternity, did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeable ordain whatsoever comes to pass." And to the issue of free will and the end of this section: "yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."
> 
> This part of the confession would have remained intact in the Savoy Declaration and would have been the doctrinal standard for Jonathan Edwards -- given the wide circulation of His sermons both in the colonies and in Europe, any divergence from this standard would have been well noted.



Rest assured, there is no denial of God's explicit ordination of all that comes to pass. And please be assured, as well, that there is no slight to Edwards here - his "new directions" in different areas of Reformed thought were widely discussed and debated at the time. With respect to his doctrine of philosophical necessity, many in the Reformed world accepted it gladly - but by no means did all. What is under discussion is not _whether_ it is both true that God has ordained all that comes to pass, and that creatures have freedom - that is happily accepted by all; it is simply over the specific manner in which Edwards reconciled the two. Mr Pugh is asserting Edwards' way is the only way; others will point out that, while the Westminster Confession (for example) _allows_ Edwards' teaching, it does not require it - there are older ways of dealing with the issue. Reformed theology simply hardly requires Edwards' explanation.

.........

Mr. Pugh, it has been noted to you already, but you've (whether intentionally or unintentionally, it doesn't matter) exploited an ambiguity in the term "compatibilism." Yes, I am more than aware that the idea that all things are determined, or that things aren't determined, or that things being determined is compatible with liberty and contingency are far older than Reformed theology: that is an obvious statement.

I would note that you stated earlier in this thread: "Further, Edwards is writing after there has been a huge change in the definition of "free." For Luther, freedom has to do with the ability to do good, whereas for Edwards, it has to do with the ability to choose either good or evil." Precisely. Older Reformed formulations were produced in the context of the essence of freedom being found in "rational willingness," not in "indifference." Any attempt to be satisfied with an answer presented from the former context is bound to be unsatisfying to you if you are accepting as your starting point a definition of freedom based upon indifference. If you are accepting the latter, please be sure not to import any technical definitions of terms which are built upon this foundation or within this paradigm into words which older theologians (or, in the context of this discussion, Mr. Winzer) are using.


----------



## Philip

Prufrock said:


> Any attempt to be satisfied with an answer presented from the former context is bound to be unsatisfying to you if you are accepting as your starting point a definition of freedom based upon indifference.



The older formulation is as satisfying to me as the newer, given that I see no conflict between them. I have long noted the synthesis between the earlier Anselmian/Thomist/Lutheran formulations and the later formulations of Anglo-American theologians, following Edwards.



Prufrock said:


> Any attempt to be satisfied with an answer presented from the former context is bound to be unsatisfying to you if you are accepting as your starting point a definition of freedom based upon indifference.



Indifference is probably a bad term---natural ability is slightly better. The solution of Edwards makes the distinction between natural ability and moral ability such that Luther's "bondage of will" is covered under moral ability. While one may disagree with the precise mechanisms by which he describes the workings of moral ability, the distinction is no less helpful.


----------



## a mere housewife

I thought Dr. Muller's assessment at minute 26 of the lecture Charlie linked to was interesting: 'Edwards seems to have reversed what I think was a very old traditional Reformed assumption of a radically contingent world order, and reduced all to necessity, with acts of will standing in no contrast either to natural or physical necessity. His understanding of causality and necessity is remarkably akin to that of Hume: specifically, causality is reduced to efficiency; necessity is uniformly identified as physical necessity, and generated in the chain of causality. In short, Edwards understood the causality of the human will in much the same way that he understood efficient causality in the world around him. There is no room for change, for actual choice, certainly not for liberty of contradiction. His formulations are illustrative of something that happens in the 18th century -- which is, a loss of the philosophical foundation for the expression of the older reformed theology on issues of contingency and human freedom.'


----------



## Don Kistler

And you guys think that EDWARDS is hard to understand???


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Not at all---all things are contingent upon the will of God. For any event X, God could have created the world such that X does not happen. The reason why probabilistic theories are needed is because of our finitude. As you say, such constructs are mere circumstances of our point of view as secondary agents.



If you allow contingency of events then you have denied the first condition of your compatibilism -- determinism. Why not have a think about it before responding.


----------



## MW

a mere housewife said:


> Is it right to understand that the decree of God not only places no constraint from the perspective of second causes; but is in fact, the only arena of that unconstraint (because it is the only arena where 'determination' is kept outside the realm of contingencies, and in which contingent causes operate quite freely?)



That's correct. As the saying goes, I don't know what the future holds but I know Who holds the future.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> If you allow contingency of events then you have denied the first condition of your compatibilism -- determinism.



By determinism, I mean that all things are determined and knowable. You are assuming that my position is a particular brand of determinism. I consider any sort of foreordination to be deterministic. If God has ordained the future, then the future is determined. And contingency simply means that for any event X, God did not have to create the universe such that X comes to pass.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> You are assuming that my position is a particular brand of determinism.



You earlier maintained a particular form of determinism, namely, that which is espoused by compatibilism. In that definition "determinism" is one of the conditions to be logically explained in harmony with free will. The compatibilist position argues that there is an internal causation such that the willing person could not have chosen anything other than what he has chosen. There is no "contingency" in that "necessary" process of causation. If you are now willing to allow that there is contingency from the perspective of the secondary cause, then all's well that ends well; if not, please don't play word games.


----------



## a mere housewife

armourbearer said:


> As the saying goes, I don't know what the future holds but I know Who holds the future.



Listening through the lecture by Dr. Muller today, with the question at the end about the practical use of this doctrine, this has been my thought this evening as well. It would detract from the comfort and joy of that personal knowledge to deposit any of it instead in a string of necessary events.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> The compatibilist position argues that there is an internal causation such that the willing person could not have chosen anything other than what he has chosen.



Are we talking natural or moral ability here? Certainly there are possible worlds in which I chose different things than I in fact chose. Possibility and contingency are functions of logic.

Now, in practical terms, certainly there is a level of agent determinism: I have conflicting desires that play out in my mental (and physical) processes that eventually lead to various actions. Doesn't make them any less mine or me any less responsible for them. I, the agent, am acting of my own accord. What I don't see is how human freedom could be anything other than this and still be rational rather than arbitrary or random.

I am perfectly willing to grant contingency, by all means. I don't see how this particular brand of compatibilism is inconsistent with it.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Are we talking natural or moral ability here? Certainly there are possible worlds in which I chose different things than I in fact chose. Possibility and contingency are functions of logic.



Now you have introduced a distinction which has nothing to do with the discussion. For this discussion to be meaningful it can only refer to what has come to be called "natural ability." This realities of God's decree and human willing are true in all man's moral conditions and relations. Please try to stay on track.

You have also introduced another irrelevancy by speaking of "possible worlds." A possible world requires its own "book," which contains all the conditions of a real world. The confession is speaking about the contingency of events in the real world in which God has foreordained all things which come to pass. In that real world of foreordained events, the events are "contingent" on the secondary causation. Again, please try to stay on track.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> For this discussion to be meaningful it can only refer to what has come to be called "natural ability."



If we're speaking of natural ability, then you and I are in agreement.



armourbearer said:


> You have also introduced another irrelevancy by speaking of "possible worlds."



A possible world is simply a hypothetical---God could have created the world such that X. If X is contingently true, this implies that God could have created the world such that ~X.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> For this discussion to be meaningful it can only refer to what has come to be called "natural ability."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If we're speaking of natural ability, then you and I are in agreement.
Click to expand...


Good; there is "contingency," not "necessity," in human choice. Compatibilism is dead. May it rest in peace.



P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> You have also introduced another irrelevancy by speaking of "possible worlds."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A possible world is simply a hypothetical---God could have created the world such that X. If X is contingently true, this implies that God could have created the world such that ~X.
Click to expand...

 
Obviously that is the way it is stated. It is irrelevant. The Confession is dealing with a real world -- the world which God has fore-ordained. In that real world there is contingency.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> Compatibilism is dead. May it rest in peace.



Correction: one (straw-man) form of compatibilism is dead. I would contend that my position is what might be called "soft" compatibilism.



armourbearer said:


> In that real world there is contingency.



And possible worlds are a necessary theoretical construct when speaking of contingency.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> Compatibilism is dead. May it rest in peace.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Correction: one (straw-man) form of compatibilism is dead. I would contend that my position is what might be called "soft" compatibilism.
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> In that real world there is contingency.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> And possible worlds are a necessary theoretical construct when speaking of contingency.
Click to expand...

 
In Edwardsean terms, my inclination to preserve my sanity prevails over my inclination to continue discussion. Good day!


----------



## jwithnell

> If God has ordained the future, then the future is determined.


 It is this perspective that was giving me heartburn. I suppose we are free to redefine terms, but determinism has centuries of usage behind it (along with the question of how it interfaces with free will).

And I'm a Jonathan Edwards groupie; what can I say?  (How's that for thoroughly academic philosophy?)


----------



## MW

jwithnell said:


> And I'm a Jonathan Edwards groupie; what can I say?  (How's that for thoroughly academic philosophy?)



You were bound out of necessity to do it. What could you do?


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> You were bound out of necessity to do it.



Bound by contingency, I would say.


----------



## moral necessity

Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will

Thanks and Blessings!


----------



## jwithnell

> Quote Originally Posted by armourbearer View Post
> You were bound out of necessity to do it.
> Bound by contingency, I would say.


You guys are too funny!


----------



## MW

moral necessity said:


> Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will



That is correct. The tell tale sign of the new psychology is the introduction of a new element, called "appetency," "desire," or "emotion," into human agency. The traditional psychology only spoke of will and understanding, with "appetency" being identified as a function of the will. The introduction of this new element opened the door for the human agent to be passive in some way, which creates the mechanism for "necessary volitions." From a Reformed perspective, the exploitation of this passivity in twentieth century psychology, and the "monstrous" conclusions which were drawn from it, should suffice as an historical condemnation of the idea.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> That is correct. The tell tale sign of the new psychology is the introduction of a new element, called "appetency," "desire," or "emotion," into human agency.



Careful here---I generally don't will myself into a state of happiness, sadness, hunger, or anger. My rational faculties have some control over my state (ie: "I'm depressed, so let's watch a Jimmy Stewart film"), but there are also aspects of desires, appetites, etc that are not willed and do affect my willing. There are aspects (I won't say "parts" because I'd rather not divide the human being) of my psyche (dispositions, temperaments, etc) that a) aren't entirely rational b) tend toward reaction.


----------



## MW

P. F. Pugh said:


> Careful here---I generally don't will myself into a state of happiness, sadness, hunger, or anger. My rational faculties have some control over my state (ie: "I'm depressed, so let's watch a Jimmy Stewart film"), but there are also aspects of desires, appetites, etc that are not willed and do affect my willing. There are aspects (I won't say "parts" because I'd rather not divide the human being) of my psyche (dispositions, temperaments, etc) that a) aren't entirely rational b) tend toward reaction.


 
You begin by telling me to be careful; you provide rational considerations which you suppose will give me the motive to take care; but then your rational considerations introduce a non-rational motive over which, you claim, I myself am not actively in control.

As above, I choose sanity over the madness of talking with you about such things.


----------



## Philip

armourbearer said:


> You begin by telling me to be careful; you provide rational considerations which you suppose will give me the motive to take care; but then your rational considerations introduce a non-rational motive over which, you claim, I myself am not actively in control.



I consider your emotions to be as much an aspect of you as your reason. Both of them are you as much as any other aspect.

Let me define freedom (for the purposes of moral responsibility) as follows: Agent X is free action Y iff the only factor preventing X from performing action Y is agent X.


----------



## moral necessity

armourbearer said:


> moral necessity said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is correct. The tell tale sign of the new psychology is the introduction of a new element, called "appetency," "desire," or "emotion," into human agency. The traditional psychology only spoke of will and understanding, with "appetency" being identified as a function of the will. The introduction of this new element opened the door for the human agent to be passive in some way, which creates the mechanism for "necessary volitions." From a Reformed perspective, the exploitation of this passivity in twentieth century psychology, and the "monstrous" conclusions which were drawn from it, should suffice as an historical condemnation of the idea.
Click to expand...


Thanks, Rev. Winzer. Could you direct me to a few writers who lay out the traditional reformed view? 

Thanks and blessings!


----------



## MW

moral necessity said:


> Could you direct me to a few writers who lay out the traditional reformed view?



Please see Calvin's Institutes, Owen's Display of Arminianism, Turretin's Institutes, Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, and McCosh's Method of Divine Government. That is in chronological order. It may be best to begin with Shedd and McCosh, as they undertake to explain the traditional view in light of modern developments, whereas the older writers adopt it as a matter of course.


----------



## moral necessity

armourbearer said:


> moral necessity said:
> 
> 
> 
> Could you direct me to a few writers who lay out the traditional reformed view?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Please see Calvin's Institutes, Owen's Display of Arminianism, Turretin's Institutes, Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, and McCosh's Method of Divine Government. That is in chronological order. It may be best to begin with Shedd and McCosh, as they undertake to explain the traditional view in light of modern developments, whereas the older writers adopt it as a matter of course.
Click to expand...


Thanks again, Rev. Winzer! I'll enjoy the homework assignment!

Blessings!


----------



## Matthew Tringali

The best I have found on this topic is Frame's _Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_. It is incredible.


----------



## MW

Matthew Tringali said:


> The best I have found on this topic is Frame's _Doctrine of the Knowledge of God_. It is incredible.



It is confusing. First, Which is primary? will or understanding? Secondly, "Knowing and doing are one," according to Prof. Frame; yet James 4:17 clearly distinguishes them. The "theology of application" fails to account for basic distinctions and dynamics in biblical psychology. Thirdly, he states, on the one hand, "we choose to pay attention to sensations or to ignore them." Good! On the other hand, "It could be argued that will is a function of an individual's strongest emotion: my choice is what I most feel like doing." Which is it? He hasn't identified "volition" as an exercise of will, and has failed to ground emotion in the will, according to his earlier assertion.


----------



## moral necessity

moral necessity said:


> Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will
> 
> Thanks and Blessings!



I would like to correct my post here. Having read Shedd, it sems to me that he speaks of Edwards as being in line with the classical reformed theology. Therefore Dabney appears to be as well. I'll cite the pages from his chapter on Free Will later, but I just wanted to make known my error before the thread closed. If I read him in error, I hope to be corrected.

Blessings!


----------

