# Are we living in a postmodern world?



## jwright82

Postmodernism as a cultural and academic philosophy is on the way out. It is said that we live in a transmodern world, whatever that is. I hear people, especialy christians, saying that we live in a postmodern world but I just don't think that is accurate. I have not really scholerly thought this out but I do have some sighn posts to back up what I'm saying here but I wanted to start this thread to explore if we are in fact living in a postmodern world or not? I will lay out some evidence to suggest why I don't think we are living in a postmodern world.

I am cursed with constantly philosophicaly analysing everything I experience. Every little commercial or movie my daughter watches. I listen into conversations and try to place all that into a historical philosophical situation. With that said here are some little things I noticed in the discourse of our culture. 

1. A preocupation with the "real". If you pay attention this word is thrown around a lot. It is used especialy in relation to love. One example is Jessica Simpson's little sister's, I don't remember her name (I'm not a fan of her or her sister), song a few years back (my coworker's in the military listened to pop radio so that is how I heard it) had a part in the chorus that said this I believe "I can finaly rest my head on something real." The problem with this word is that it is not very postmodern, at all. Postmodernism self-consciencely went out to criticize words like this as being basicaly metaphysical fictions. There is no real anything that our words and concepts refer to. So why the preocupation with something "real?"

2. Hyper morality. I know this seems like a strange word but if you pay attention we live in a hyper moral world. Everyone is morally preocupied with what everyone else is saying or doing. The problem is that we are not very moral as a society and postmodernism never could furnish a theory of ethics. To my knowledge no one even tryed to produce a postmodern ethics, but I'm sure that someone did. Foucalt and Derrida never realy had solid ethical theory but there work did in a way have ethical implications it is just that their work destroyed any ethics at all. The liberal use of the word homophobia is a good example of this. Anyone who disagrees with homosexuality is so morally wrong that there particuler reasons are not even worth looking at. But you could use postmodern philosophy to criticize this point of view, that is odd if we in fact live in a postmodern world.

---------- Post added at 04:47 AM ---------- Previous post was at 04:43 AM ----------

Here is a website of a conference devoted to this subject, the papers on here are somewhat technical is philosophical language but here you go.
After Postmodernism.


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## Scott1

> Romans 1
> 
> 20For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:
> 
> 21Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened.
> 
> 22Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools,
> 
> 23And changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things.
> 
> 24Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves:
> 
> 25Who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen.
> 
> 26For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
> 
> 27And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompence of their error which was meet.
> 
> 28And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient;
> 
> 29Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers,
> 
> 30Backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents,
> 
> 31Without understanding, covenantbreakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful:
> 
> 32Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.



God tells us, it's not "new," not "post," and not "modern."



> Romans 2
> 
> 1Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest: for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things.
> 
> 2But we are sure that the judgment of God is according to truth against them which commit such things.
> 
> 3And thinkest thou this, O man, that judgest them which do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?
> 
> 4Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?
> 
> 5But after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God;
> 
> 6Who will render to every man according to his deeds:
> 
> 7To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life:
> 
> 8But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath,
> 
> 9Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile;
> 
> 10But glory, honour, and peace, to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile:
> 
> 11For there is no respect of persons with God.



Nor will it escape the wrath of a Holy God.

Not in this life, nor in that to come.


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## jjraby

I feel like we as a society are still very postmodern. its true that it may be on its way out but i think the way our culture acts and behaves is still overtly postmodern.


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## christiana

Postmodernism denies that there is Truth! I doubt that philosophy will cease before our Lord returns! Denial of biblical truth, inerrancy, sufficiency are evident in all the 'new' evils that are propagated under different and ever changing labels such as Open Theism, Emerging Church, liberal 'christians'. Satan has unlimited supplies of his ways to repeat what he told Eve in the garden 'Did God say......?'


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## torstar

We have post-modern architecture, art and literature. I much enjoy po-mo novels.

My high demands for irony are easily met. 

Even on this board I can read about someone telling me they are philsophizing about Jessica Simpson's effect on the culture. Doesn't get any better than that...

Fortunately scripture is chock-full of irony, my fave being John's brand, so it will always be with us.


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## JBaldwin

While there is definitely obsession with what is real, it is not an obsession with what is true. For those of us who grew up in the modern world, real and true have similar meanings, and both have to do with what is certain or absolute. To the mind of a child growing up today, real is what is true for me or true for the moment. Even if you watch reality shows, they are about what is real to the people in the unreal situations in which they find themselves. The realities are created for them. 

I was shocked this week when a friend of mine showed me her third grade son's English test from the local public school. The test had multiple choice questions for definitions of vocabulary words. There were no correct answers for any of the questions (at least according to the dictionary). The poor child did his best to answer the questions as close the right definition of the words, but his answers were wrong. According to this curriculum "summer" is "when you take care of the cows". The mother told me this kind of thing is typical of what her children bring home.


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## Philip

Postmodernism is rather nebulous and hard to define but I would agree that, at least in the academic world, it has been more or less dead since Derrida. I would define postmodernism broadly as a combination of a hermaneutic of suspicion toward all metanarratives combined with an embrace of deconstructionism. The end result is a skepticism that precludes the possibility of truth.

The current trend that I am seeing in the academy (bear in mind that my perspective as a student is fairly limited) is toward analytic pluralism. The father of pluralism, in my opinion, was Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings. Basically, the idea is that all metanarratives or "language-games" are correct on their own terms and no one language-game is qualified to judge any other. Thus, all critiques must be completely internal to the language-game being critiqued. The analogy is trying to judge a game of checkers by the rules of chess. It's an incredibly hard position to critique because a) it's more or less internally coherent on its own terms b) an external critique is ruled out by default.


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## Zenas

Those I have contact with are still very post-modern. When I have been able to discuss worldview, the people I've interacted with justify their views on morality and religion on subjectivism. I could have been hanging out with the last few pomo's, but I doubt it.


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## jjraby

while academia may be dead to postmodernism. Our culture is still heavy po-mo. Any lost fans? The final episode reeked of post modernism, with strong pluralistic themes. makes me want to vomit.


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## MRC

christiana said:


> Postmodernism denies that there is Truth!


 
It's not that they deny the existence of truth, rather they deny our ability to know truth. For postmoderns the denial of truth is epistemological rather than ontological.


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## Philip

jjraby said:


> while academia may be dead to postmodernism. Our culture is still heavy po-mo. Any lost fans? The final episode reeked of post modernism, with strong pluralistic themes. makes me want to vomit.


 
Pluralism and postmodernism are two different animals. Postmodernism seeks to deconstruct metanarratives and live in a complete void. Its conclusion is that we are just objects in space, lost in the cosmos with no possible direction. What truth there is, is just an assortment of random facts floating around with no connection to one another. Umberto Eco's novel _The Name of the Rose_ is probably the best guide to postmodern thinking that I've ever read (it's also a great guide to the state of the church in the 14th century).

Pluralism says that the right direction depends on who you are and what your culture ("language-game") says. You and your community determine what is true. Truth is not subjective, but constructed. That's pluralism in a nutshell.


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## jwright82

Wow, I am pleased this thread got this much attention. To piggy back on what Philip is saying he is right postmodernism is inherently skepticism. So yes I still see many residual elements of Postmodernism in our society. My theory is that postmodernism philosophicaly destroyed itself and we are witnessing whatever is growing out of that corpse you could say. I see it employing the hermnenuetic of suspicsion but attempting to aproech something real. Also in postmodernism the idea of the idividual is swallowed up so a new emergence of a type of existential thought is aproeching, the whole concept of being an individual and having my own style etc. I think that for now it is hoplessly contradictory but may yeild positive results when it has worked it's course. 



> The current trend that I am seeing in the academy (bear in mind that my perspective as a student is fairly limited) is toward analytic pluralism. The father of pluralism, in my opinion, was Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings. Basically, the idea is that all metanarratives or "language-games" are correct on their own terms and no one language-game is qualified to judge any other. Thus, all critiques must be completely internal to the language-game being critiqued. The analogy is trying to judge a game of checkers by the rules of chess. It's an incredibly hard position to critique because a) it's more or less internally coherent on its own terms b) an external critique is ruled out by default.



Thanks. My connection to the acedemy is less than yours, I had to put college on hold while I went through welding school to get a good paying job and pay for the rest of college out of pocket. Analytic pluralism, does this philosophy utilize analytic philosophy for these pluralistic ends? Do people like Quine, Rorty, Davidson matter much to this movement?


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## Zenas

If external critique is ruled out by default then isn't the stance as a whole unable to assert the critique that other positions are unable to critique the others? While it is true that external critique is ruled out by default, internally, it restricts itself from imposing it's own restriction on other positions.

It's the same reason subjectivism fails: the position, by definition, states that it cannot authoritatively speak to other positions because all positions, including the proposed one, cannot speak or contradict the others authoritatively. It's oxymoronic.


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## Philip

> Analytic pluralism, does this philosophy utilize analytic philosophy for these pluralistic ends? Do people like Quine, Rorty, Davidson matter much to this movement?



More or less. Essentially it's analytic philosophy without the dogmatic assertion of the supremacy of science that marked it before the demise of Logical Positivism and the rise of Ordinary Language thought. It's analytic with a respect for all traditions.

I would say that Quine is a key figure, Rorty is to a lesser extent (he's usually considered postmodern). I'm not sure about Davidson. The figure I would most identify with analytic pluralism (my own term, by the way) today would be William Rowe, a self-described "friendly atheist" (ie: he doesn't rule God out of the question---you just need a good proof). 

The trouble with identifying particular figures, though, is that each has his own perspective, meaning that to look at the movement as a whole, you have to step away from the individuals, or at least their philosophies. Rowe, for instance, is an atheist, but he takes Christianity and Christians (Plantinga, for instance) seriously and treats them with respect. In other words, any position is respectable as long as you can make a half-decent case.



Zenas said:


> If external critique is ruled out by default then isn't the stance as a whole unable to assert the critique that other positions are unable to critique the others? While it is true that external critique is ruled out by default, internally, it restricts itself from imposing it's own restriction on other positions.



It sees itself as a ladder to be thrown away when it's no longer necessary (true Wittgenstein there). The inability is supposed to be real, ie: I can't really critique Islam unless I am a Muslim---I may think I am doing so, but I'm really just evaluating a straw man in light of my own language-game. Again, the illustration is trying to evaluate a game of checkers using the rules of chess.

Absurd, yes, but that's because we are all objectivists on this board.


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## Zenas

But that then presents the same problem. If I cannot critique Islam because I'm not a Muslim, you cannot critique me because you are not a man who is not a Muslim who is critiquing Islam. The essential issue seems to be since you do not hold the position, you cannot know that you are correctly analyzing it. The same gun can be turn on the analytic pluralist by saying that they cannot know that I am not correctly analysing it. 

Phrased in a more complicated but more literal statement, they cannot know that I cannot not know because I don't hold the position because they don't hold the position that I hold. 

Put another way, C states I cannot critique A because I am B, and not A. If that is true, C cannot critique B regarding critiquing A because C is not B.

Addendum: I absolutely love philosophy, mainly because it's an exercise in logical games to me. There's also no money to be had in it precisely because it's just that.


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## Philip

> But that then presents the same problem. If I cannot critique Islam because I'm not a Muslim, you cannot critique me because you are not a man who is not a Muslim who is critiquing Islam. The essential issue seems to be since you do not hold the position, you cannot know that you are correctly analyzing it. The same gun can be turn on the analytic pluralist by saying that they cannot know that I am not correctly analysing it.



Your critique does not apply to Islam because it is coming from a non-Muslim perspective. Your analysis would be correct if "analytic pluralism" actually considered itself to be a system of thought. However, it's not: it's supposed to be a framework for categorizing language-games. In the metaphor of the chess vs. checkers, AP would be the games closet (and please remember that it's my own term---you won't hear it from anyone else that I know of). According to AP, truth and falsehood are functions of whatever language-game one is operating in.



> Put another way, C states I cannot critique A because I am B, and not A. If that is true, C cannot critique B regarding critiquing A because C is not B.



C is not critiquing, simply stating fact. Again, this is what makes AP so hard to deal with: it isn't self-conscious about itself at all and can never be.



> Addendum: I absolutely love philosophy, mainly because it's an exercise in logical games to me. There's also no money to be had in it precisely because it's just that.



Funny, that's Wittgenstein (both early and late) all over.


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## Zenas

The game's closet is still functioning in the capacity of a realm wherein rules are enforced, and the same problem persists. Put another way, in order to be relevant to categorizing language games, it has to engage in and with the language-games.

Implicitly, a language-game or culture is a framework through which truth is created, judging from what I have read. If this is so, then a true statement is a result of a language-game. AP asserts that it is true, therefore AP must be the result of a language-game if it is to be true and applicable to other language games. In order to function as the rule through which the other language-games must behave, it must be the result of a language-game itself. If it is so, then it is subject to its own rules. If it is subject to its own rules, then it may not function as the rule through which other language-games behave because it is not a truth created from those language-games.



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P. F. Pugh said:


> Pluralism says that the right direction depends on who you are and what your culture ("language-game") says. You and your community determine what is true. Truth is not subjective, but constructed. That's pluralism in a nutshell.



But the assertion that truth is constructed purports to be a truth. If truth is contructed then the truth that truth is constructed is likewise constructed. 

My friend fumbled around with this concept a couple of months ago. Neither he nor I knew exactly what he was trying to espouse, but it was very clear to me he was trying to prove that truth lived and died on the hill of public assent or creation. It's much more clear to me what he was trying to say now. I had forced him to abandon subjectivism because it was untenable. It's clear that he logically jumped to this Analytical Positivism, assumedly unknowingly.


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## jwright82

I do think you raise a good point Zenas. If I understand you than what you are sugesting is that the person is at fault because they are asserting statments about the nature of things but those statments assert that no such statements are possible. It is the classic "this statment is false" paradox essentially. I can't say if it applys to AP but it is a good point. I know what I'll be reading about tonight though.


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## Philip

> But the assertion that truth is constructed purports to be a truth. If truth is constructed then the truth that truth is constructed is likewise constructed.



Sure---where's the contradiction?



> In order to function as the rule through which the other language-games must behave, it must be the result of a language-game itself. If it is so, then it is subject to its own rules. If it is subject to its own rules, then it may not function as the rule through which other language-games behave because it is not a truth created from those language-games.



If it sees itself at all (and I maintain that the majority of the time it does not) then it sees itself purely in the role of description, not evaluation. Of course on any other terms it is not true, because truth is defined by what terms you start from. This is why Quine (though he later backed down from this) suggested that philosophy should become a branch of psychology. In other words, AP is merely descriptive.


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## Zenas

That's what appears to be the case to me. I've been trying to conceptualize and understand the approach for about the past two hours.

---------- Post added at 04:10 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:07 PM ----------

Even an observation purports to be true though because truth is what is really real. If an observation purports to be consistent with reality, it must be true. That being the case, AP, even if its a descriptor, still must purport to be true in order to be descriptive. _That_ being the case, it still must conform to its own description of reality.


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## Philip

> That being the case, AP, even if its a descriptor, still must purport to be true in order to be descriptive. That being the case, it still must conform to its own description of reality.



And I think it holds up under them. It's circular, but not inconsistent. Remember that it's describing not judging and therefore not critiquing any language-game.

Now, is it liveable? I don't think so.


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## MW

I would venture to say that we live in a post postmodern world. The deconstructive phase of postmodernism has well and truly changed the world so as to necessitate open dialogue, but now we find signs of constructive discourse which is starting to build the kind of stable society which modernism assumed but without dependence on modernism's laws and institutions.


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## ZackF

More than anything I think people are finding postmodernism exhausting. Not only is it morally draining and debasing, it is literally a headache to figure out. It leaves people going in circles until they give up and winding up with an existential "will to power" trip that puts them in some direction. The show "Brothers and Sisters" (my dear wife's doing.. ) is an example of this confusion. The subjectivism of all of the characters just wears me out by watching them. All of the characters are literally morally groundless but wanting to "do the right thing" but never wanting to ask why.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> That being the case, AP, even if its a descriptor, still must purport to be true in order to be descriptive. That being the case, it still must conform to its own description of reality.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And I think it holds up under them. It's circular, but not inconsistent. Remember that it's describing not judging and therefore not critiquing any language-game.
> 
> Now, is it liveable? I don't think so.
Click to expand...

 
I don't know much about AP but I think Zenas has a point. How can being descriptive of the limits of language games be different from judgeing in this case only. For instance to invoke Wittgenstien at this point how does saying "you can't do that" not put someone withen the language-game of judgment? Their reason why you can't do that is descriptive but the initial statement is a judgment statment and therefore breaks down because if the descriptive statment is true than the original judgment statement is meaningless. How would AP avoid this conclusion?

---------- Post added at 01:05 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:03 PM ----------




armourbearer said:


> I would venture to say that we live in a post postmodern world. The deconstructive phase of postmodernism has well and truly changed the world so as to necessitate open dialogue, but now we find signs of constructive discourse which is starting to build the kind of stable society which modernism assumed but without dependence on modernism's laws and institutions.


 
I think you are correct but I do not think that deconstruction as it stands can mix well with constructive anything, the theory must be changed limitations must be put in place for constructive anything to take place.

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KS_Presby said:


> More than anything I think people are finding postmodernism exhausting. Not only is it morally draining and debasing, it is literally a headache to figure out. It leaves people going in circles until they give up and winding up with an existential "will to power" trip that puts them in some direction. The show "Brothers and Sisters" (my dear wife's doing.. ) is an example of this confusion. The subjectivism of all of the characters just wears me out by watching them. All of the characters are literally morally groundless but wanting to "do the right thing" but never wanting to ask why.


 
My sentiment exactly!


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## Philip

> I don't know much about AP but I think Zenas has a point. How can being descriptive of the limits of language games be different from judgeing in this case only. For instance to invoke Wittgenstien at this point how does saying "you can't do that" not put someone withen the language-game of judgment? Their reason why you can't do that is descriptive but the initial statement is a judgment statment and therefore breaks down because if the descriptive statment is true than the original judgment statement is meaningless. How would AP avoid this conclusion?



Remember that when I talk about "judgment" in this context, I am referring primarily to normative judgment of which critique is a type. When Wittgenstein or someone else says that no system is able to judge another, they do not mean that system A _may_ not (normative) judge system B, but that it _cannot_ (ability). It is not a normative statement for me to say that chess cannot be played by the rules of checkers---it's simple definition. My point is not that it would be wrong for you to attempt to do so, but that once you make that attempt, you are no longer playing chess.

In other words, you'd have to prove that description is somehow compelling or normative.



> I think you are correct but I do not think that deconstruction as it stands can mix well with constructive anything, the theory must be changed limitations must be put in place for constructive anything to take place.



Deconstruction can be extremely useful, I think, for analysis, particularly of our own hearts and ground-motives. The trouble is that postmodernism has tended to commit the genetic fallacy by saying that "because belief A has been used for the gaining of power by group _y_, A is false."


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I don't know much about AP but I think Zenas has a point. How can being descriptive of the limits of language games be different from judgeing in this case only. For instance to invoke Wittgenstien at this point how does saying "you can't do that" not put someone withen the language-game of judgment? Their reason why you can't do that is descriptive but the initial statement is a judgment statment and therefore breaks down because if the descriptive statment is true than the original judgment statement is meaningless. How would AP avoid this conclusion?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Remember that when I talk about "judgment" in this context, I am referring primarily to normative judgment of which critique is a type. When Wittgenstein or someone else says that no system is able to judge another, they do not mean that system A _may_ not (normative) judge system B, but that it _cannot_ (ability). It is not a normative statement for me to say that chess cannot be played by the rules of checkers---it's simple definition. My point is not that it would be wrong for you to attempt to do so, but that once you make that attempt, you are no longer playing chess.
> 
> In other words, you'd have to prove that description is somehow compelling or normative.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think you are correct but I do not think that deconstruction as it stands can mix well with constructive anything, the theory must be changed limitations must be put in place for constructive anything to take place.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Deconstruction can be extremely useful, I think, for analysis, particularly of our own hearts and ground-motives. The trouble is that postmodernism has tended to commit the genetic fallacy by saying that "because belief A has been used for the gaining of power by group _y_, A is false."
Click to expand...

 
Nice points Philip I completly agree. I use Postmodern philosophy all the time, I just know it has limitations.

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Couldn't there be a seperate language-game that dealt primaraly with the judgment of one point of over another?


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## Pergamum

I also believe that we are now one step beyond postmodernism, but only a first step.


How do you think globalization and the West's losing their world dominance will play in philosophy, since most of it has been Western so far? Will the next "major paradigm" come out of the East?


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## Peairtach

The modernist Enlightenment project which got going in the Seventeenth Century is showing signs of strain with the arrival of pomo and popomo.


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## jayce475

The post-modernist take on the question of whether we are living in a post-modern world should be rather interesting. In fact, it's amazing that they can provide any answers to any questions.


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## jwright82

Richard Tallach said:


> The modernist Enlightenment project which got going in the Seventeenth Century is showing signs of strain with the arrival of pomo and popomo.


 
One of the benifits of postmodernism is that it really revealed the shallow autonomy of the modernist project, I mean don't get me wrong I love studying postmodern thought I just thought it was wrong on a fundemental level.

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Pergamum said:


> I also believe that we are now one step beyond postmodernism, but only a first step.
> 
> 
> How do you think globalization and the West's losing their world dominance will play in philosophy, since most of it has been Western so far? Will the next "major paradigm" come out of the East?


 
That is an interesting angle, I can't say how it will affect things but it is possible because postmodernism left a vacuem so to speak and something or many things will fill it so it is a possibillity. The problem with pardigm changes is that there are impossible to predict in detail but broad elements may be determined. But globalism is a huge problem for contemporary philosophy right now and it will be interesting to see what happens.


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