# Was God obligated to create the best of all possible worlds?



## Pergamum (Nov 25, 2009)

Is God obligated to create the best of all possible creations? 

If He did not do so, would this then reflect a deficiency of His character?


If He does so, can we assert any reason for this world to qualify as the best of all possible worlds besides, "This is the best of all possible worlds precisely because this is the one that God made. Therefore it must be the best."

If the best of all possible worlds included sin, then, in order to make the best of all possible worlds, was God obligated them to permit sin to enter this world, so that the best of all possible worlds (one in which Christ would maximize the attributes of God in wrath, justice and mercy, and love) could come into being.



Sorry, been reading Leibniz again.


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## Peairtach (Nov 25, 2009)

I don't know about this.

I don't believe that the Old Creation was the best of all possible worlds, in the sense that I think it likely that the New Creation will be the best of all possible worlds because it will be made for Christ and His people.

The Bible doesn't say that the Old Creation was the best of all possible worlds, but merely that it was good, that it was capable of corruption, and that Man was capable of falling and leading the world into corruption.

Maybe the Old Creation was the best of all possible worlds _with a view to _ God's ultimate purpose of the New Heavens and New Earth, incorruptible and undefiled, a home for His Son and His redeemed people (?)


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## MMasztal (Nov 25, 2009)

I'd say the first question, "Is God obligated to create the best of all possible creations?" is self-refuting.

"Obligated"? To whom? 

If to anyone else, God would not be God. 

But since we know God is perfect and holy, he is "obligated" only to Himself and cannot create or even do anything which would be contrary to His nature nor should anything He does be subject to man's scrutiny. 

Like Leibniz, most philosophers err in their worldview which is where questions like these arise.


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## py3ak (Nov 25, 2009)

It seems like there are several different angles from which to tackle the precise questions you've asked, but they all come out to the same result.

Was God obligated to create the best of all possible worlds? Well, God was not obligated to create at all, so right there is an answer. 
Given the decree to create, is God obligated to create the best possible world? There you run into a difficulty: you have no standard of best and you have no conception of possible that can be derived from any source other than God's will. 

The Reformed have traditionally held that God, being free, could have willed things extrinsic to Him to have turned out differently. For instance, the lot could have fallen on Justus rather than Matthias. But He has done what He pleased: that He do what He wills is best, that He do what He does not will is the only impossibility. God is not patient of psychoanalysis, so it seems best to leave it there.


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## ClayPot (Nov 25, 2009)

The best of all possible worlds in what sense?

- That glorifies God the most?
- That results in the most people being saved?
- That allows people the most "freewill"?

Best is relative to what you are talking about. Roundup may be the best weedkiller but it is a terrible ice cream topping.


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## TimV (Nov 25, 2009)

If God wants to make a bad pot fitted only to destruction, He can do it since He is God.


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## WAWICRUZ (Nov 25, 2009)

God is not on Plan B.

Reality as it has been, as it is now, and as it shall be is as God wants it to be.

Is man to be the determiner of what the best "kind" of reality must be? Surely his finitude incapacitates him for this task.


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## Semper Fidelis (Nov 25, 2009)

Calvin's Institutes Book 3, Chapter 21, Section 1


> But before I enter on the subject, I have some remarks to address to two classes of men. The subject of predestination, which in itself is attended with considerable difficulty is rendered very perplexed and hence perilous by human curiosity, which cannot be restrained from wandering into forbidden paths and climbing to the clouds determined if it can that none of the secret things of God shall remain unexplored. When we see many, some of them in other respects not bad men, every where rushing into this audacity and wickedness, it is necessary to remind them of the course of duty in this matter. First, then, when they inquire into predestination, let then remember that they are penetrating into the recesses of the divine wisdom, where he who rushes forward securely and confidently, instead of satisfying his curiosity will enter in inextricable labyrinth[1]. For it is not right that man should with impunity pry into things which the Lord has been pleased to conceal within himself, and scan that sublime eternal wisdom which it is his pleasure that we should not apprehend but adore, that therein also his perfections may appear. Those secrets of his will, which he has seen it meet to manifest, are revealed in his word - revealed in so far as he knew to be conducive to our interest and welfare.


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## Pergamum (Nov 25, 2009)

jpfrench81 said:


> The best of all possible worlds in what sense?
> 
> - That glorifies God the most?
> - That results in the most people being saved?
> ...



Once God decreed to create, did He create in such a way as to maximize the "best" - i.e., a world which would maximize His glory?

He was under no obligation to create, and yet, by creating, allowing the Fall, and having Christ be incarnate and successfully do His Work, then God's justice, wrath, goodness, mercy, love, etc, are shown forth in a way to the universe to its maximum degree.


Once God decided to create, He ordained a world where the Fall occurred. And through it, glorified Himself all the more. 



Leibniz's theodicy seems to be a better attempt than the attempts of many other philosophers. What other theodicies are in print that you would recommend?


In general, I am studying various theodicies at present, and would welcome any thoughts on theodicies.

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 12:55:25 EST-----



TimV said:


> If God wants to make a bad pot fitted only to destruction, He can do it since He is God.



But this verse speaks of God enduring these vessels with much longsuffering so that He might make known His mercy to the vessels of mercy. 

So, the possibility that God would merely make a lump of humanity for their damning would be contrary to the nature of our God, who delights to work mercy.

And, in a sense, God cannot do all things merely because He is God. God does all things that are consistent with His nature. God does what He does because of who He is.

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 12:56:59 EST-----



py3ak said:


> It seems like there are several different angles from which to tackle the precise questions you've asked, but they all come out to the same result.
> 
> Was God obligated to create the best of all possible worlds? Well, God was not obligated to create at all, so right there is an answer.
> Given the decree to create, is God obligated to create the best possible world? There you run into a difficulty: you have no standard of best and you have no conception of possible that can be derived from any source other than God's will.
> ...



I think Leibniz was probably trying to tackle this problem:



> 1) If God were all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, then this world would be the best possible world.
> 2) But surely this world is not the best possible world.
> 
> 3) Thus, God is not all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good.




Ruben, do you have any thoughts on theodicies in general?

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 12:59:49 EST-----



MMasztal said:


> I'd say the first question, "Is God obligated to create the best of all possible creations?" is self-refuting.
> 
> "Obligated"? To whom?
> 
> ...



Obligated to whom? The answer would be obligated to His own nature; which is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing. Many atheists suppose that the traits of God which most assert are self-contradictory.

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 01:01:10 EST-----



> Roundup may be the best weedkiller but it is a terrible ice cream topping.



This might be the Quote of the Day!  Do you speak from experience?


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## Zenas (Nov 25, 2009)

Pergamum said:


> Is God obligated to create the best of all possible creations?
> 
> If He did not do so, would this then reflect a deficiency of His character?
> 
> ...



Define best. Best in what sense? Best for whom?

As we understand, God created the best of all possible worlds to effect His purpose and His glory. I do not think we can say He was obligated to do any of this, as He is free in His will, bound by nothing but consistent with His own nature.


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## Pergamum (Nov 25, 2009)

Zenas said:


> Pergamum said:
> 
> 
> > Is God obligated to create the best of all possible creations?
> ...



Best = most glorifying to Him.


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## tdowns (Nov 25, 2009)

*I love this quote...always have.*



Semper Fidelis said:


> Calvin's Institutes Book 3, Chapter 21, Section 1
> 
> 
> > But before I enter on the subject, I have some remarks to address to two classes of men. The subject of predestination, which in itself is attended with considerable difficulty is rendered very perplexed and hence perilous by human curiosity, which cannot be restrained from wandering into forbidden paths and climbing to the clouds determined if it can that none of the secret things of God shall remain unexplored. When we see many, some of them in other respects not bad men, every where rushing into this audacity and wickedness, it is necessary to remind them of the course of duty in this matter. First, then, when they inquire into predestination, let then remember that they are penetrating into the recesses of the divine wisdom, where he who rushes forward securely and confidently, instead of satisfying his curiosity will enter in inextricable labyrinth[1]. For it is not right that man should with impunity pry into things which the Lord has been pleased to conceal within himself, and scan that sublime eternal wisdom which it is his pleasure that we should not apprehend but adore, that therein also his perfections may appear. Those secrets of his will, which he has seen it meet to manifest, are revealed in his word - revealed in so far as he knew to be conducive to our interest and welfare.



Since I first started studying these topics, I loved the above quote, and this one:

VIII. The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care,[18] that men, attending the will of God revealed in His Word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election.[19] So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God;[20] and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the Gospel.[21]


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## py3ak (Nov 25, 2009)

Pergamum said:


> I think Leibniz was probably trying to tackle this problem:
> 
> 1) If God were all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, then this world would be the best possible world.
> 2) But surely this world is not the best possible world.
> ...



There are many things that can be said to someone who is struggling with the harsh realities of life in the world. But the affirmation of the Psalms that the Lord is righteous in all His ways is not negotiable: understand it or not, agree with it or not, that is the reality. Although I know that Job was not satisfying to Jung, God's questions to Job or Paul's question to the one replying against God still stand as fundamental: _Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?_ We do not have the ontological stature to question God. Once that is made plain and accepted, you can proceed to point out other aspects: such as that we are not yet at the end of the story; that God did not refuse to bear the cost of His decisions, but in fact the Son became man and was subject to the curse; and so forth.

I notice you said that God does all things that are consistent with His nature. Everything that God does is consistent with His nature (but of course, "God wills precisely because He wills it: the divine willing is the divine nature"), but that does not mean He does everything that could be consistent with His nature.


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## Mushroom (Nov 25, 2009)

God is perfectly holy and wise, so what He does/decrees is perfectly holy and wise in it's purpose. The creation in which we now reside is transitory, decreed so by God for His own good and perfect purpose. There is a day and place coming that will be eternally perfect and without sin.

It seems to me whether God was obligated to do anything is beyond the pale of our determining. That what He has done, is doing, and will do is perfect is evident because that is in keeping with His nature.

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 01:59:43 EST-----



> we do not have the ontological stature to question god.


amen!


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## Grillsy (Nov 25, 2009)

Pergy,

Seems like maybe you had your own answer to this before you posted.


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## Pergamum (Nov 25, 2009)

py3ak said:


> Pergamum said:
> 
> 
> > I think Leibniz was probably trying to tackle this problem:
> ...



Ruben:

Your quote:



> that does not mean He does everything that could be consistent with His nature.



I think nails it. Thanks.

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 02:24:35 EST-----



Grillsy said:


> Pergy,
> 
> Seems like maybe you had your own answer to this before you posted.



The PB is a good place to refine ideas and look for internal weaknesses.


And also to look for help.....

Anyone out there have links to theodicies that are better stated than Leibniz?


Also, how would Leibniz compare/contrast with Jay Adams in this bookbelow:

Amazon.com: The Grand Demonstration: A Bibical Study of the So-Called Problem of Evil (9781889032023): Jay Edward Adams: Books


And Edwards; _End for Which God Created the World_:

Amazon.com: God's Passion for His Glory: Living the Vision of Jonathan Edwards (With the Complete Text of The End for Which God Created the World) (9781581347456): John Piper, Jonathan Edwards: Books


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## TimV (Nov 25, 2009)

> So, the possibility that God would merely make a lump of humanity for their damning would be contrary to the nature of our God, who delights to work mercy.





> Rom 9:20 But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, "Why have you made me like this?"
> Rom 9:21 Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?
> Rom 9:22 What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction,



You're not in a position to say what is and isn't in God's nature.


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## Grillsy (Nov 25, 2009)

Pergamum said:


> Grillsy said:
> 
> 
> > Pergy,
> ...



I am aware. I was not trying to be insulting. Just trying to comment that it seems that you have done much thinking on the subject. That is all.


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## Pergamum (Nov 25, 2009)

TimV said:


> > So, the possibility that God would merely make a lump of humanity for their damning would be contrary to the nature of our God, who delights to work mercy.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



God shows us His nature in the Scripture. 

We can draw upon what God tells us about Himself.

-----Added 11/25/2009 at 02:45:15 EST-----



Grillsy said:


> I am aware. I was not trying to be insulting. Just trying to comment that it seems that you have done much thinking on the subject. That is all.



Yes, the problem of evil hinders many, and hindered me when I was young.


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## earl40 (Nov 25, 2009)

What is interesting is that God did not create man with the knowledge of good and evil and us with that knowledge man is more glorifying to Him.


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## Iconoclast (Nov 26, 2009)

I think all human philosophy fails to even approach an understanding of why ,what and how God has ordained His decreed purpose to unfold.


> 33O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!
> 
> 34For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?





> 3When thou didst terrible things which we looked not for, thou camest down, the mountains flowed down at thy presence.
> 
> 4For since the beginning of the world men have not heard, nor perceived by the ear, neither hath the eye seen, O God, beside thee, what he hath prepared for him that waiteth for him



In Light of these passages, as well as Job 38-39, I personally am not at all comfortable even asking or inquiring into these type of philosophical sort of 
"possibilities".
If God has given us all that pertains to life and godliness, and has not seen fit to address in more detail that which is more speculative in our defective imaginations, I just draw back from this type of speculation.
It seems as if He is doing and ordering everything that comes to pass for His own glory, so why would there be any half way measures or non essentials included in this eternal purpose.
We are to search out the word of God and seek to grow in grace and knowledge. I enjoy wrestling with many topics, but the philisophical I am not so equipped to help with. I must leave it to others once it goes past some elementary concepts. Sorry I cannot be more helpful with this.


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## earl40 (Nov 26, 2009)

Iconoclast said:


> If God has given us all that pertains to life and godliness, and has not seen fit to address in more detail that which is more speculative in our defective imaginations, I just draw back from this type of speculation.
> It seems as if He is doing and ordering everything that comes to pass for His own glory, so why would there be any half way measures or non essentials included in this eternal purpose.
> We are to search out the word of God and seek to grow in grace and knowledge. I enjoy wrestling with many topics, but the philisophical I am not so equipped to help with. I must leave it to others once it goes past some elementary concepts. Sorry I cannot be more helpful with this.



Contemplation on the fall and the cross can lead to "speculation" that is alluded to in the scripture. We know that man was created good without a certain quality that The Lord withheld, which was bestowed when Adam ate the fruit. So though it was a sin for Adam to eat was the result good?


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## Semper Fidelis (Nov 26, 2009)

earl40 said:


> Contemplation on the fall and the cross can lead to "speculation" that is alluded to in the scripture. We know that man was created good without a certain quality that The Lord withheld, which was bestowed when Adam ate the fruit. So though it was a sin for Adam to eat was the result good?



No.


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## earl40 (Nov 26, 2009)

Semper Fidelis said:


> earl40 said:
> 
> 
> > Contemplation on the fall and the cross can lead to "speculation" that is alluded to in the scripture. We know that man was created good without a certain quality that The Lord withheld, which was bestowed when Adam ate the fruit. So though it was a sin for Adam to eat was the result good?
> ...



Would you want to make a bet? It takes a little "speculation" though.


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## Amazing Grace (Nov 26, 2009)

Pergamum said:


> So, the possibility that God would merely make a lump of humanity for their damning would be contrary to the nature of our God, who delights to work mercy.



Pergy: I know this may digress this thread, but why did you mention this in your inquiry? Can you clarify the connection with the op and this comment?


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## Peairtach (Nov 26, 2009)

> So, the possibility that God would merely make a lump of humanity for their damning would be contrary to the nature of our God, who delights to work mercy.



God wouldn't damn someone who hadn't sinned as that would be unjust, and God cannot be unjust.

God is now a Man forever. Becoming Man in itself isn't part of Christ's humiliation, otherwise He would be in a state of humiliation forever. God must have wanted to glorify Himself by becoming a Man in the way in which He did. I don't say He _needed_ to glorify Himself.

Was that the best way in which God could glorify Himself? We do not know of other cosmoses to compare with this one, nor do we know the other possiblities that may have been in the mind of God. 

But that God chose to do things in this way seems fairly significant, especially since God in His Son is God-man forever. 

When God "determined" to make the world and humanity, He knew He was making a world and humanity in which He would dwell by His Son and His Spirit for all eternity.

I haven't studied Leibniz.

A simpler theodicy, that doesn't involve so much speculation about high and difficult matters for our simple minds, may be found in Greg Bahnsen's "Always Ready" in the chapter on "The Problem of Evil"


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## Pergamum (Nov 26, 2009)

Amazing Grace said:


> Pergamum said:
> 
> 
> > So, the possibility that God would merely make a lump of humanity for their damning would be contrary to the nature of our God, who delights to work mercy.
> ...



Romans 9:



> 20Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?
> 
> 21Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?
> 
> ...






There seems to be a different disposition towards those that God endures and those that God delights in. God endures the unsaved, but His real delight is to show His mercy through these vessels of mercy.


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## Iconoclast (Nov 26, 2009)

earl40 said:


> Iconoclast said:
> 
> 
> > If God has given us all that pertains to life and godliness, and has not seen fit to address in more detail that which is more speculative in our defective imaginations, I just draw back from this type of speculation.
> ...



Hello Earl ,Thank you for your response. I am not the best when it comes to philosophy but I will offer my thoughts to you.
I do believe we are to meditate,think, discuss, ponder,examine Acts17:11
on the scripture. It is when we sort of go over the line that i become hesitant.
God withheld the knowledge of good and evil from Adam and Eve for His own
eternal purpose to unfold as he planned in His decree.
It was Satan who suggested that God witheld something *desirable *
that placed a doubt on God's law word to them.
The result of sin and death is unnatural, not good. That God overcomes this by having already decreed the incarnation and the cross, does not somehow make the sorrow and suffering from the fall into something good.
God's eternal plan is perfect for the elect, and is just toward the reprobate,although somehow I do not see how it is "good" for the unsaved .

Earl , were you suggesting that the fall was good,because ultimately we get to understand the depth of God's love expressed by the cross? Or am I missing something when I read your post? Let me know
Do you understand what I am getting at?


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## steadfast7 (Nov 26, 2009)

Rather than the question of whether God was obligated to create the best possible world _in the past, _perhaps we need to answer whether God's continual providence over all history up to now has been perfect. After all, his continual care and meticulous providence must be in accordance with his good nature, as it was in his original intention for creation. He is the same yesterday, today and forever.

Does God, then, do good to all, at all times?

There's probably a reason why the brightest minds have yet to offer a satisfying theodicy. The epilogue of Job doesn't even attempt to answer the question, but asks the question: ""Who is this that darkens my counsel
with words without knowledge?"

I like what Voddie Baucham once said (paraphrase): The question of why God allows evil in this world is the wrong question. The right question is "How can it be that a holy God did not kill a sinner like me in my sleep last night?


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## Confessor (Nov 27, 2009)

It's awkward to say that God is ever _obligated_ in anything, for He is God; but I think it is safe to say that He necessarily acts with perfect wisdom. Therefore, if there is one world which would glorify Him most, He would necessarily choose it -- this necessity not a weakness of His or a hindrance unto freedom, but a strength of His and a conduit unto freedom (I wish I could choose with perfect wisdom every time).


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

Ben, the unstated premise in your argument is that God's end is always His maximal glorification. The problem is that "glorify" is used in multiple ways. In one sense it means "to manifest His glory". If you maintain that this is always God's end, then God was obligated to create, which is contrary to Reformed theology, because His glory couldn't be manifested unless there was someone to manifest it to. That's why I'd rather stick with what Dennis said, and not attempt to figure out the background to God's volition - because that no cause can be assigned for the will of God is pretty standard Christian doctrine.


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## Pergamum (Nov 27, 2009)

py3ak said:


> Ben, the unstated premise in your argument is that God's end is always His maximal glorification. The problem is that "glorify" is used in multiple ways. In one sense it means "to manifest His glory". If you maintain that this is always God's end, then God was obligated to create, which is contrary to Reformed theology, because His glory couldn't be manifested unless there was someone to manifest it to. That's why I'd rather stick with what Dennis said, and not attempt to figure out the background to God's volition - because that no cause can be assigned for the will of God is pretty standard Christian doctrine.



Yes, you are exploring exactly some of the issues I am thinking through! 

Leibniz' theodicy seems to lead to this "obligated to create (in order to provide a canvas on which to paint His attributes on)" view. So, I am looking for stronger theodicies. I like Plantinga, maybe he is better to read than Leibniz.


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

I think Calvin addresses these issues in a classical passage:

_Institutes of the Christian Religion_, III.23.2
These observations would be amply sufficient for the pious and modest, and such as remember that they are men. But because many are the species of blasphemy which these virulent dogs utter against God, we shall, as far as the case admits, give an answer to each. Foolish men raise many grounds of quarrel with God, as if they held him subject to their accusations. First, they ask why God is offended with his creatures who have not provoked him by any previous offense; for to devote to destruction whomsoever he pleases, more resembles the caprice of a tyrant than the legal sentence of a judge; and, therefore, there is reason to expostulate with God, if at his mere pleasure men are, without any desert of their own, predestinated to eternal death. If at any time thoughts of this kind come into the minds of the pious, they will be sufficiently armed to repress them, by considering how sinful it is to insist on knowing the causes of the divine will, since it is itself, and justly ought to be, the cause of all that exists. For if his will has any cause, there must be something antecedent to it, and to which it is annexed; this it were impious to imagine. The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found. Let human temerity then be quiet, and cease to inquire after what exists not, lest perhaps it fails to find what does exist. This, I say, will be sufficient to restrain any one who would reverently contemplate the secret things of God. Against the audacity of the wicked, who hesitate not openly to blaspheme, God will sufficiently defend himself by his own righteousness, without our assistance, when depriving their consciences of all means of evasion, he shall hold them under conviction, and make them feel their guilt. We, however, give no countenance to the fiction of absolute power, which, as it is heathenish, so it ought justly to be held in detestation by us. We do not imagine God to be lawless. He is a law to himself; because, as Plato says, men laboring under the influence of concupiscence need law; but the will of God is not only free from all vice, but is the supreme standard of perfection, the law of all laws. But we deny that he is bound to give an account of his procedure; and we moreover deny that we are fit of our own ability to give judgment in such a case. Wherefore, when we are tempted to go farther than we ought, let this consideration deter us, Thou shalt be “justified when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest,” (Psalm 51:4.)​
There's not much to add to that.


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## earl40 (Nov 27, 2009)

Iconoclast said:


> Earl , were you suggesting that the fall was good,because ultimately we get to understand the depth of God's love expressed by the cross? Or am I missing something when I read your post? Let me know
> Do you understand what I am getting at?




Exactly! Unfallen creatures, with no knowledge of good vs. evil, would not glorify God as much as we will in the future as redeemed people.

Romans 8:28 makes clear that the fall was ultimately good also.

-----Added 11/27/2009 at 08:48:14 EST-----



Semper Fidelis said:


> earl40 said:
> 
> 
> > Contemplation on the fall and the cross can lead to "speculation" that is alluded to in the scripture. We know that man was created good without a certain quality that The Lord withheld, which was bestowed when Adam ate the fruit. So though it was a sin for Adam to eat was the result good?
> ...




Though I agree the result was bad then, do you think ultimately it will be bad for those Jesus died for?


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## steadfast7 (Nov 27, 2009)

The Institutes quote above:


> The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found.



By "will of God", Calvin seems to be referring to God's sovereign will. Then he would have to affirm that everything that has been allowed to happen, has happened according to God's pleasure. That means even evil (which has a role to play in his sovereign will) has flowed forth from God's pleasure.

I think I have a problem with this, unless Calvin is not referring to God's sovereign will, but his will of desire.

----

Plantinga is apparently the most cogent theodicy written in the modern age, but I don't think he added anything significant to the free-will argument.


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

steadfast7 said:


> The Institutes quote above:
> 
> 
> > The will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness, so that everything which he wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of his willing it. Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found.
> ...



Dennis, I'm not sure that I am entirely following your post. It sounds like you're saying that you're OK with God _wishing_ for evil to happen, but not _decreeing_ that it happen. That is absurd, so I would like some clarification. Of course, I deny any ineffective will of God.

Calvin seems very clear to me, but if you clarify where your problem lies maybe someone can assist to remove it.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 27, 2009)

py3ak said:


> steadfast7 said:
> 
> 
> > The Institutes quote above:
> ...



Sorry for the confusion. By will of desire, I mean that God has desires that do not necessarily come to pass, like the desire for everyone to repent. Likewise what he does not desire may come to pass, such as sin and evil. This sense of God's will is good and righteous. So if Calvin means this, I agree that God's desires are the supreme rule of righteousness and indeed flows from his pleasure.

However, if Calvin is referring to God's sovereign will, which includes the operation of evil, then I don't see how God can take pleasure in those evil acts, even if he does sovereignly oversee them. For example, did God take pleasure in Judas' betrayal?


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

I think your solution is worse than the problem. To attribute ineffectual desires to God is repugnant to His power and His wisdom. As Turretin says, "Who would dare to attribute such wills to a man of sound mind, as to say that he willed seriously and ardently what he knew would never happen, and indeed would not happen because he nilled to effect it, on whom alone the effect depends?" (_Institutes of Elenctic Theology_, III.16.6)

Again, nothing happens without His decree. So it was God's choice to permit sin to enter the world. Saying that things He does not desire may come to pass is to say that He is not in control.

It was right and good for God to allow sin to enter the world. How do you know that? Because God willed to allow it, and there is no standard apart from God to which we can hold Him. That doesn't mean we think that God can deny Himself - but His will is His law, and so nothing higher than the will of God can be found.

The will of good pleasure (_euarestias_) is answerable to God's preceptive will, that is His commands. Turretin, again: 
The _euarestian_ is frequently referred to the preceptive will, which is called both that of approbation and that of complacency (as in Rom. 12:2 where the will of God to which we ought to conform is called good and acceptable [_eaurestos_]; cf. "proving what is acceptable [_euareston_] unto the Lord," Eph. 5:10); "for this is acceptable [_eaureston_] unto the Lord," Col. 3:20). In this sense, _euarestia_ indicates the preceptive and approving will by which God declares what is pleasing to himself and what he wills to be done by men; but _eudokia_ indicates the decretive will by which God testifies his good pleasure about the things which he has determined to perform.​(_Institutes_, III.15.8)
So according to the precept, Judas' betrayal was highly displeasing to God; according to the decree, Judas' betrayal was a step forward in the fulfilment of God's good purpose.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 27, 2009)

So, 
Everything that is decreed is desired by God
Evil is decreed
Evil is desired by God

or, put another way ...

God takes pleasure in everything he decrees
God decrees evil
God takes pleasure in evil.

I understand the logic, it's simple enough. But by lumping God's pleasure and desire with his sovereign will in every instance, then there are some problems:
1. God would never be displeased at anything that happens in the world - but he is.
2. God takes pleasure in evil - but he doesn't.

-----Added 11/27/2009 at 10:59:17 EST-----

also 3. God's pleasure in his election is the same as in his reprobation. 

This is not comforting.

-----Added 11/27/2009 at 11:08:27 EST-----



py3ak said:


> So according to the precept, Judas' betrayal was highly displeasing to God; according to the decree, Judas' betrayal was a step forward in the fulfilment of God's good purpose.



God is good, then, not in his decree of Judas' betrayal, but in its eventual outcome.

So then, you agree with me that at the point of God's decree of Judas' betrayal, God pleasure was nowhere to be found.

I'm willing to accept that God has an "ends justifies the means" way of being sovereign and coming out righteous. But the problem of evil is usually conceived of in the here and now - How is God good at this very moment of evil? Does God desire and take pleasure in this evil act?

The problem of evil is a very real problem, and we probably do not have the resources in this lifetime to adequately tackle it.


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## Pergamum (Nov 27, 2009)

Ruben, do you believe in 2 wills of God?

Two Wills of God


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

Pergamum, I haven't read that book. I largely agree with Turretin. The will of God is only one and most simple, yet because it is occupied differently about various objects we make distinctions. Properly there is only one will; but we can distinguish what God commands from what God decrees, because the word "will" is used in Scripture for both aspects, but we know that they do not always coincide: God's decree often effects that which is contrary to His command. That's not a conflict in His will or a tension in God, it is simply one of the things we have to do in order to discuss His will clearly.

Dennis, your post skates right over the distinctions I provided and critiques my view without providing any defense for your own. That doesn't leave much room for interaction as I can only repeat myself until there's some ground to advance upon. I can't answer a question if my terms are subject to radical misapprehension. You would have to define desire, I think, in order for us to make much headway here. 

Do you believe that God commands things He does not plan to effect? 

It seems that you are thinking of God's pleasure in an emotional, anthropomorphic way. That does make these discussions more difficult.

Here is one question that might enable us to move forward. Do you believe that God effects things He would really rather not bring about?


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## steadfast7 (Nov 27, 2009)

py3ak said:


> Do you believe that God commands things He does not plan to effect?



For example, God commands obedience and repentance of the world, yet this does not mean that everyone obeys and repents.
God commands that everyone believe in Jesus, yet not everyone believes.



> It seems that you are thinking of God's pleasure in an emotional, anthropomorphic way. That does make these discussions more difficult.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Amazing Grace (Nov 27, 2009)

steadfast7 said:


> Sorry for the confusion. By will of desire, I mean that God has desires that do not necessarily come to pass, like the desire for everyone to repent. Likewise what he does not desire may come to pass, such as sin and evil. This sense of God's will is good and righteous. So if Calvin means this, I agree that God's desires are the supreme rule of righteousness and indeed flows from his pleasure.
> 
> However, if Calvin is referring to God's sovereign will, which includes the operation of evil, then I don't see how God can take pleasure in those evil acts, even if he does sovereignly oversee them. For example, did God take pleasure in Judas' betrayal?



I used to believe in this until I realized it portrayed God as some schizophrenic. Some Jekyll and Hyde. God has one unitary will.


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## Pergamum (Nov 27, 2009)

Humans can hold different dispositions of the will in their bosom at the same time. But we are not schizophrenic.

For instance: A judge sentences a murderer to the death penalty. The judge, while he regrets to enact justice that will kill the perpetrator, delights that justice will be served.


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

steadfast7 said:


> py3ak said:
> 
> 
> > Do you believe that God commands things He does not plan to effect?
> ...



Good. So here is a clear and definite sense in which God _wills_ (commands) what He does not effect. Now, to stick with the example of Judas, was it God's desire that Judas betray Christ, or was it not?



steadfast7 said:


> py3ak said:
> 
> 
> > Here is one question that might enable us to move forward. Do you believe that God effects things He would really rather not bring about?
> ...



You acknowledge the danger, and that's good. Can you agree in saying that God brings about nothing _against His will_?

The vital point here is relating desire to will. If you can use those two words interchangeably, then you can obviously affirm that God does not desire Judas to betray Christ, _according to the preceptive will_, but that He does desire Judas to betray Christ, _according to the decretive will_. God's desire also to punish Judas for that betrayal does not impact the point that it did not happen _against God's decretive will_.



steadfast7 said:


> Although it makes things difficult, we probably need to tackle the question of God's emotion, namely pleasure. Because of the limits of human language we can really only use human categories and experience to make sense of the world and communicate anything. The bible describes God as displaying pleasure and displeasure. While the living God may be far transcendent above these human qualities, we have no way of knowing anything of what that's like except what is described in our language.
> 
> If God exhibits displeasure, it can only mean that he is being offended in some way, or that his will or desires have been frustrated, _at least in some sense_. In other words, something is not going the way he wants it, and we see this in scripture constantly. If you are able to conceive of displeasure as resulting from something else, I'm all ears. But so long as we using human categories and language, don't we basically need to except
> this assumption?



Saying _at least in some sense_ is not usually helpful in a discussion, because everyone can import their own sense into that, and apparent agreement simply covers real disagreement. I don't believe it's actually necessary to tackle the topic of emotions. If you want to go there, I would ask you to read these two threads first, and respect the boundaries of discussion that are set out there:
http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/figurative-descriptions-god-48694/
http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/two-wills-god-47586/

It is not necessary to suppose that things are not going as God wants (you have to define what you mean here by 'want'): as shown above, it is only necessary to suppose that things are not going as God has commanded moral agents. Saying that something is not going as God wants, when 'want' is not defined, gives a strong anti-scriptural impression. The following verses should suffice to show why: Psalm 115:3; Psalm 135:6; Isaiah 46:10; Daniel 4:35; Ephesians 1:11. But really, it almost seems invidious to list individual proof texts, as though it were not the tenor of the whole Scripture to assert that all God's will is infallibly accomplished.



steadfast7 said:


> Here's my argument.
> 1.There is a categorical distinction between God's pleasure and his displeasure
> 2. Certain things bring about his pleasure and other things bring out his displeasure
> 3. Things that accord with his character pleases him. Both he and his creatures can perform these things, and when it happens he is pleased.
> ...



In point 2 you have "bring about" and "bring out": the one suggests that God is reacting to events, the other that events serve to manifest some specific aspect of His character. The first idea is objectionable, the second is not.
In points 3 and 4 you assert that something "happens". But does it happen in connection with God's will? Point 5 says yes. So it is not happenstance, but execution of God's decree. Is God disappointed at the execution of His decree? 
Point 7 seems to imply that God has changing emotional states - that is not a position which can be promoted on the board.


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

Pergamum said:


> Humans can hold different dispositions of the will in their bosom at the same time. But we are not schizophrenic.
> 
> For instance: A judge sentences a murderer to the death penalty. The judge, while he regrets to enact justice that will kill the perpetrator, delights that justice will be served.



Humans also function under external constraints, whereas God does not. This shows why it is inadvisable to argue from man to God.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 27, 2009)

One problem with the way this is going is that you have already assumed that there is but one singular will in God. As the one who needs convincing, you need to condescend to me for a while... 

Without reading those two very long threads in their entirety, let me just ask some diagnostic questions, to get a sketch of your view. Please answer as succinctly as possible.

1. A murderer wields a knife and stabs a man. Who performed the act?
2. Was God involved in the act?
3. Did God actively bring out the stabbing in the sense that he animated the man to make a stabbing motion?
4. Did God react in any way to the act, by expressing emotion, or otherwise?
5. Suppose another person performs a kind act of love. God does react differently to this one than to the murderer?

p.s. I don't believe God is schizo, or inconsistent within his nature. But I'm confident I could produce plenty scriptural quotes that do SEEM to suggest that God displays emotion, and that these emotions SEEM to change depending on the situation. Whether God actually has these we can leave to the theologians, but am I not entitled to read the text simply and naturally? I'm not well versed (as you can see) in philosophical theology, so I sincerely want to know what I can and cannot say here. 

thanks.


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## Confessor (Nov 27, 2009)

py3ak said:


> Ben, the unstated premise in your argument is that God's end is always His maximal glorification. The problem is that "glorify" is used in multiple ways. In one sense it means "to manifest His glory". If you maintain that this is always God's end, then God was obligated to create, which is contrary to Reformed theology, because His glory couldn't be manifested unless there was someone to manifest it to. That's why I'd rather stick with what Dennis said, and not attempt to figure out the background to God's volition - because that no cause can be assigned for the will of God is pretty standard Christian doctrine.



Ruben, this raises many topics which I would like to sort out, if you are interested. (You can very well decide if you would prefer to finish the discussion on God's will, or not to discuss the issues I am about to present, and I would not be offended.) As you'll see by the way I state the issues, I am inclined towards certain answers; but I approach these with trepidation, for I do not wish to err in any central matters.

(1) Does not God always act for some end? If He did not act for a specific purpose, He would be acting capriciously or chaotically.

(2) If God always acts for some end, then is not this end properly identified as the manifestation of His glory? This is what Scripture seems to attest: 1 Sam. 12:22; 2 Sam. 7:23; Ps. 23:3; 31:3; Jer. 14:7; Isa. 63:12; Ezek. 20:9; etc.

(3) It seems that if God's glorification (i.e., the manifestation of His glory) is His ultimate end, then He would strive for this to the best of His abilities. For, He clearly has no lack of intellect or power to bring about His ends; therefore if it is His desire to glorify Himself, He will glorify Himself maximally. Is there any error in this?

(4) You stated that if God's glorification was His ultimate end, then He would be obliged to create, for a world would necessarily glorify Him more than the lack of a world, and therefore He had no genuine choice in whether to create or not to.
-This presupposes a libertarian view of freedom, in which power of contrary choice is essential to freedom. But what if God operates in terms of compatibilist freedom, always acting in accord with His strongest inclination? In such a case, the fact that He would never desire not to create a world (and therefore that it's impossible for Him not to create, on those terms) would not be destructive of freedom. Put differently, if it is the case that God necessarily selects the wisest option, and if it is the case that creating the world is the wisest option, then why would we want to affirm that He would possibly choose otherwise? Choosing with perfect wisdom -- and doing so _necessarily_ -- seems destructive to freedom only on a libertarian notion of freedom; it is conducive to freedom on a compatibilist notion.

[But, I am fairly certain that this topic goes back to the nature (for severe lack of a better term) of God's nature, i.e. whether "God wills His nature." If our disagreement rests on that proposition, then I would prefer we halt discussion at that point.]

(5) You said, "That no cause can be assigned for the will of God is pretty standard Christian doctrine." I agree, but this doesn't mean that God's will has to be isolated from the components which essentially make up volition (e.g. means, intents/ends, etc.). In other words, yes, nothing causally precedes God's will, but this does not imply that God's will is "empty" or cannot be construed in terms of God's desiring His self-glorification, His acting necessarily wise.

Grace and peace,


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

steadfast7 said:


> One problem with the way this is going is that you have already assumed that there is but one singular will in God. As the one who needs convincing, you need to condescend to me for a while...



But as the one not embracing the classic Reformed position, you bear the burden of proof. If you are able to read Turretin, I would strongly recommend that you do so. He is able to set things out in a systematic and detailed way that is difficult to replicate in discussion.



steadfast7 said:


> Without reading those two very long threads in their entirety, let me just ask some diagnostic questions, to get a sketch of your view. Please answer as succinctly as possible.



On those threads, I think the posts by armourbearer and Prufrock are probably the most succinct and clear statements that were promulgated.
I will answer your questions, but you must define 'want' and 'desire' in relation to God's will, or I don't think things can be made plain.



steadfast7 said:


> 1. A murderer wields a knife and stabs a man. Who performed the act?


The man.


steadfast7 said:


> 2. Was God involved in the act?


God decreed that it would occur.


steadfast7 said:


> 3. Did God actively bring out the stabbing in the sense that he animated the man to make a stabbing motion?


I don't know what you mean by "animated". God concurred in the act considered as a physical motion; God did not concur in the act considered as a sinful expression of anger and hatred.


steadfast7 said:


> 4. Did God react in any way to the act, by expressing emotion, or otherwise?


The act introduced no change in God. He has already given His prohibition of murder, and will take vengeance for the crime at some point.


steadfast7 said:


> 5. Suppose another person performs a kind act of love. God does react differently to this one than to the murderer?


Neither act introduces any change in God. He has already given His command to do unto our neighbor as we would have our neighbor do unto us.



steadfast7 said:


> p.s. I don't believe God is schizo, or inconsistent within his nature. But I'm confident I could produce plenty scriptural quotes that do SEEM to suggest that God displays emotion, and that these emotions SEEM to change depending on the situation. Whether God actually has these we can leave to the theologians, but am I not entitled to read the text simply and naturally? I'm not well versed (as you can see) in philosophical theology, so I sincerely want to know what I can and cannot say here.
> 
> thanks.



No. If you will read the first post on the first thread I linked, you will see that Scripture itself does not entitle you to read anthropopathic texts without reference to the rest of Biblical revelation. It is not a Reformed distinctive, but standard Christian teaching (as the rest of that thread demonstrates), that it is circumstances, not God, that changes.


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## py3ak (Nov 27, 2009)

Ben, I'm not sure that I can discuss this in much detail or sort out all of these questions, but I will make an attempt to interact with what you've posted and we can see where it goes from there.

(1) Does not God always act for some end? If He did not act for a specific purpose, He would be acting capriciously or chaotically.​
God does have an end in willing. As Turretin teaches, the good God wills can have two objects, Himself and finite good. Himself, God wills necessarily, but all other things freely.

(2) If God always acts for some end, then is not this end properly identified as the manifestation of His glory? This is what Scripture seems to attest: 1 Sam. 12:22; 2 Sam. 7:23; Ps. 23:3; 31:3; Jer. 14:7; Isa. 63:12; Ezek. 20:9; etc.​God does purpose His own glory. Intrinsically speaking, God will His glory necessarily inasmuch as it inseparable from Himself. Extrinsically speaking, God does will the manifestation of His glory, but that is willed freely (which explains why it can sometimes be temporarily occluded - Psalm 50:21).

(3) It seems that if God's glorification (i.e., the manifestation of His glory) is His ultimate end, then He would strive for this to the best of His abilities. For, He clearly has no lack of intellect or power to bring about His ends; therefore if it is His desire to glorify Himself, He will glorify Himself maximally. Is there any error in this?​God Himself is His ultimate end. His glorification is willed freely, and hence can be willed to any particular degree. The whole purpose of creation is not exhaustive of God's whole purpose with regard to Himself.


(4) You stated that if God's glorification was His ultimate end, then He would be obliged to create, for a world would necessarily glorify Him more than the lack of a world, and therefore He had no genuine choice in whether to create or not to.
-This presupposes a libertarian view of freedom, in which power of contrary choice is essential to freedom. But what if God operates in terms of compatibilist freedom, always acting in accord with His strongest inclination? In such a case, the fact that He would never desire not to create a world (and therefore that it's impossible for Him not to create, on those terms) would not be destructive of freedom. Put differently, if it is the case that God necessarily selects the wisest option, and if it is the case that creating the world is the wisest option, then why would we want to affirm that He would possibly choose otherwise? Choosing with perfect wisdom -- and doing so _necessarily_ -- seems destructive to freedom only on a libertarian notion of freedom; it is conducive to freedom on a compatibilist notion.

[But, I am fairly certain that this topic goes back to the nature (for severe lack of a better term) of God's nature, i.e. whether "God wills His nature." If our disagreement rests on that proposition, then I would prefer we halt discussion at that point.]​
Turretin affirms that God is said to be free with regard to indifference. _Institutes_, III.14.3:


> Free is said either with reference to spontaneity or indifference: the former what is done spontaneously and without compulsion, but the latter what is so disposed that it can be done and not be done. When it is asked whether God wills some things freely, not only the will of spontaneity is meant (for so the things which God wills most necessarily, he wills also freely, i.e., without coaction), but properly the liberty of indifference (i.e., whether he so wills that he could have nilled them).


One reason this is important is because God desires out of fulness, not out of want: to make creation _necessary_ is to deny one aspect of God's glory which is set out rather fully in Psalm 50.
When you suggest that God acts in accordance with His strongest inclination, there seems to be a suggestion of multiple, inconsistent inclinations: that, I think, is incompatible with the wisdom and simplicity of God.
I suspect that the real difference may lie not so much with questions of God's nature, as with the question of whether the will follows the intellect or the affections. Turretin, again, "The will of God (whose object is only the good, as that of the intellect is the true) necessarily follows his understanding." (_Institutes_, III.14.1)
As I recall a discussion about God willing His nature, "the divine willing is the divine nature", tailed off a bit, but I don't remember reaching a conclusion with you.

(5) You said, "That no cause can be assigned for the will of God is pretty standard Christian doctrine." I agree, but this doesn't mean that God's will has to be isolated from the components which essentially make up volition (e.g. means, intents/ends, etc.). In other words, yes, nothing causally precedes God's will, but this does not imply that God's will is "empty" or cannot be construed in terms of God's desiring His self-glorification, His acting necessarily wise.​
According to Calvin, it explicitly means that we cannot ask why God was pleased to do something. As cited before: "Therefore, when it is asked why the Lord did so, we must answer, Because he pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask why he pleased, you ask for something greater and more sublime than the will of God, and nothing such can be found." And that accords with the example of Christ in Matthew 11:25,26, who founds His rejoicing on what it has pleased God to do, without going beyond that. Of course God at times reveals the reason for an aspect of His decree (as that He brought Israel out of Egypt because of the promise made to the fathers), but when you continue to ask "why" you eventually arrive at "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." There is nothing we can find behind that, and it seems to me that attempts to find something else, usually wind up creating more problems than they solve.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 27, 2009)

Thanks. So onto a definition for desire or want. 

We know from scripture that God desires. He desires truth, he desires mercy, he desires to be glorified, etc. Is there any serious doubt about this? As to how God desires, we have no hope of knowing. We only know that if scripture has any meaning for us, he must have it, and it must be _something _like our very own desire, minus the sinfulness. if we deny that God has desires, then we deny large portions of scripture.

Because we cannot really define the way God desires, we need to accept the definition that we know in our experience, and guided by scripture.

My further question: 
When the murderer stabbed the man, was God displeased at this act?
Can displeasure be called an emotion that God exhibited?


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## py3ak (Nov 28, 2009)

So your definition of "desire" with regard to God is "like human desire, but without sin"? That is quite inadequate, and still makes no attempt to relate desire to will. It is inadequate because God desires out of fulness not out of want (lack). It is not sinful in me to desire food for my sustenance; but I desire it in a creaturely way because I lack food, I need nourishment periodically or I will malfunction. God has no needs. It is also inadequate because I may or may not have the requisite abilities to carry out my desires; but in God there can be no such lack. 
In addition, it may be sin in me to have multiple, mutually exclusive desires; but whether it is sin in me or not, it is absurd to predicate such internal conflict of God.

God disapproves of murder - hence the 6th Commandment.
It is better not to call displeasure an "emotion" that God exhibits; God is without body, parts, or passions, and emotion is too readily understood as passion to be a useful term here. God's displeasure, or anger, is a disposition of His will to punish sinners for their sin.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 28, 2009)

Thanks for that. I appreciate the intentional effort to employ safeguards against God having a lack or being in want. We must empty the elements of desire that are unbecoming of God. I do affirm this to be true when God has desires. 

But I think you would also agree that the Bible speaks on numerous times about God having desires, and the descriptions were inspired and written so that we can know God and what he is like, not so that we would have no idea what he's like. We are free to redefine it so that it can apply to God, but when a word is emptied of its understood meaning, how can it be comprehensible to us? Can you honestly say that when you read of God's desires in this redefined sense, that you can understand and relate to God? If the word 'desire' now has no correspondence to anything in our experience, can we say that scripture really informs us about anything about God? This is why I think scholastic renderings of words can be inadequate: it does not correspond to human realities.

In my mind, removing meaning can be as, if not more, tragic than keeping it in. Scripture was written so for us to understand and comprehend the incomprehensible, and like Jesus, the word comes to us in human terms. To undermine the way scripture attempts to reveal is to shoot ourselves in the foot and leave ourselves in utter ignorance.

You say that it is wrong to call God's displeasure an emotion, even though scripture on numerous times describes it in this way. Do you disagree? God's anger is described as being "kindled", "burning", "poured out", "appeased"; he is often "provoked" to anger and reacts with "fierce" wrath in response to timely disobedience. There are hundreds of occurences of this in the bible, all suggesting emotion and passion. Why would the writers use these terms when all they wanted to communicate was God's unchanged disapproval of sin? Rather, the writers never hide these attributes or explain them away, or soften their impact on our imaginations. The Hebrews have always thought of God in this way, and continue to this day.

My question, does the Bible, in its inerrant texts, seem to portray God as having passionless dispositions, or does he seem to have what looks like emotions? It might require that we let Thomas Aquinas have a rest whlie we consider the text of scripture.


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## py3ak (Nov 28, 2009)

[Moderator]Dennis, you need to read the threads I linked you to before you post again on this thread. I've pointed out to you that the Board has strict boundaries for discussion and asked you to respect those. The linked threads should make it clear where those boundaries lie so you can be sure you don't cross them.[/Moderator]

Scripture itself will not let you read it without comparing its parts so as to arrive at a consistent interpretation. Thus 1 Samuel 15:11 God repents that He has made Saul king, and this same point is reiterated in v.35. But in v.29 Samuel announces that God is not a man that he should repent. So the words given "so that we can know God and what he is like", in that same chapter are put in juxtaposition with words that remove God from being compared to us. Only a careless reader would come across 1 Samuel 15 and not be faced with the fact that these statements must be taken together in order to arrive at the whole truth. It was not out of a fondness for Aquinas (though the apparent assumption that Aquinas did not reflect on the Biblical text is not well-grounded) that the Protestant Orthodox followed their patristic and medieval predecessors in maintaining that God's repentance is an anthropopathism and describes a change in what God is doing, not in His being, but because careful attention to Scripture forces you to acknowledge that God is not a man, and therefore it is wrong to make Him in our image, or apply terms symmetrically to humans and God. Reasoning from my human experience of emotions to God having similar emotions is ruled out by the uncontroversial statement that God is not a man. So I can be anthropomorphic in speaking of God, and I can learn about Him in that way; but if I am merely anthropomorphic I prevent myself from understanding 1 Samuel 15:29 and similar texts. The inerrant Bible portrays God as being changeless, and as varying His procedure in a manner analogous to the way humans vary theirs under the influence of particular emotions. That the text is consistent with dogmatic formulations is no surprise - the dogmaticians were well aware of the text.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 28, 2009)

Apparently I do need to do more reading, and I've been trudging through the threads.

Scripture needs to interpret itself and be read within its proper contexts, certainly. Thus, the reference to God's repentance must be read and defined in light of the passage that he does not repent as a man does. However, I am not aware of any text that suggests that God doesn't have any emotions. So, I don't see any counterbalances to this attribute of God. Whether it is inherited by gnostic influence I'm not sure. But there has been this tendency to distance God from anything remotely human. If you consider Jesus, however, when he flares up in anger or weeps, he maintains his divine integrity and dignity in all his perfection. Nothing has been compromised. This suggests that it is possible for God to exhibit such emotional display.

I agree that there are very real anthropomorphisms and -pathisms that we cannot and should not take literally, but this does not mean that our human experiences do not correspond to _any _of God's, does it? If there is no overlap whatsoever, then God is utterly unknowable and Scripture has invited us to create God wholly in our image. 

I probably need further clarification of the orthodox understanding of "change." 

If God were to do anything, like create, or destroy, does he not change, in some sense?
Does God act, does God move, does he listen and respond to prayer, is there some sequence to his thoughts and actions? Scripture does describes him as so. if so, does he not change?

From what little I understand, Thomistic thought suggests that God does not change in any way shape or form. He is a being of pure act, performing everything in a single eternal now. There are no sequences in God such that everything he has ever and will ever do happens in an eternal now. This may be so, but I marvel at how different this picture is from scripture. 

Would this be the orthodox position as the Reformed understand it as well?
if scripture is so accommodating, why is theology so incomprehensible?


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## py3ak (Nov 28, 2009)

The other threads address most of your questions. Why don't you let me know when you've finished them? 

Scripture certainly does not invite us to create God in our own image: it asserts that God is not a man, and it raises the rhetorical question of to whom we will compare God.

Arguing that because Jesus experiences emotions therefore emotions are proper to God is as absurd as saying that because Jesus has bones therefore a skeleton is also proper to God. Jesus is fully man, as well as fully God, and some things are proper to one nature, not the other (as sleeping to the human, and omnipresence to the divine).

All of your questions about creating, destroying, hearing prayer, etc., and their relation to God's immutability are answered in the Protestant literature. I don't know what books you have to hand, but John Gill's _Body of Doctrinal Divinity_ discusses these matters, and can be found online. See here.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 28, 2009)

thanks, will do.

sorry Pergy for the digression on your thread.


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## py3ak (Nov 28, 2009)

I just noticed that the Google books edition of Gill that I linked is abridged, so it does not contain his response to the questions you raised. With apologies for the bizarre formatting, here is the unabridged version.



> CHAPTER 5
> OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN GENERAL, AND OF HIS IMMUTABILITY IN PARTICULAR.
> 
> The attributes of God are variously distinguished by divines; some distinguish them into negative and positive, or affirmative: the negative are such as remove from him whatever is imperfect in creatures; such are infinity, immutability, immortality, etc. which deny him to be finite, mutable, and mortal; and, indeed, it is easier to say what God is not, than what he is: the positive, or affirmative, are such as assert some perfection in God, which is in and of himself; and which in the creatures, in any measure, is from him, as wisdom, goodness, justice, holiness, etc. but the distinction is discarded by others; because in all negative attributes some positive excellency is found. Some distribute them into a “twofold order”, first and second: attributes, or essential properties of the “first order”, declare the essence of God as in himself, such as his simplicity and perfection, infinity and immutability; and attributes, or essential properties of the “second order”, which though primarily and properly, and naturally, and infinitely, and in a more excellent manner are in God, than in creatures; yet secondarily, and in an analogical sense, are in them, there being some similitude of them in them, of which there is none of the former order in them; these are said to be life and immortality, blessedness and glory.
> ...


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## Semper Fidelis (Nov 28, 2009)

This might also help. It is a bit technical but lays out the Reformed understanding of God _in se_. The Reformers followed in a long tradition of guarding the transcendence of God against thinking of Him as just a bigger version of ourselves:



> *2. The Reformed orthodox definition and discussion of archetypal theology. *
> 
> True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, can be identified as knowledge that stands beyond doubt (cognitio indubitata) over against the depraved opinion (opinio depravata) of false theology.25 The orthodox recognize, then, the necessity of arguing a set of criteria for and a paradigm of true theology, beginning with the divine archetype that must underlie all truth about God and continuing through the several orders of rational creatures capable of knowing God. Although true theology is diverse or “multiplex” considered according to its modes of communication and the “subjects” or knowers in which it is found, true theology is one according to substance, whether it is found in God himself or in his creatures. The divisions into archetypal and ectypal, and of ectypal into theologies of the vision, of union, and of revelation, respects the fact that there is not one “species of theology” found in a series of “degrees” or gradus.26 This substantially singular theology, as known infinitely and absolutely by the divine subject, God, is archetypal; as known finitely and relatively by the creaturely subject, ectypal.27 There are, Alsted notes, three causes or grounds for the identification of this theologia vera: first, that it arises from the source that is truth itself (qui ipsissima est veritas); second, that those who study it receive or achieve truth in their statements; and third, that it is internally harmonious, inasmuch as the mutual agreement and consent of all parts of a given body of ideas with one another’s is an index of truth.28
> 
> ...


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## Peairtach (Nov 28, 2009)

God wasn't obligated, but He would have wanted to create human beings and a creation that would one day be a suitable dwelling place for His Son, and His Spirit, and Himself, if that was His ultimate plan for this creation, which it is.

I presume there aren't any other creations, cosmoses, divine plans in operation, as the Bible appears to be silent on these (?) That may be a presumption too far (?)


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## Confessor (Nov 29, 2009)

Ruben,

Thanks for responding.

(1) What is the difference between God putting Himself as His ultimate end, and God putting His self-glorification as His ultimate end?

(2) I did not intend to suggest that God has conflicting inclinations, not in the least.


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## py3ak (Nov 29, 2009)

1. God's self-glorification refers to the manifestation of His glory (as His glory is not susceptible of increase or diminution). Manifestation involves the concept of an audience. God willing Himself implies nothing about things external to Him.

2. Good.


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## Confessor (Nov 29, 2009)

So does "God willing Himself" mean that He sustains His own existence through His volition?


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## py3ak (Nov 29, 2009)

God's will is His existence. When you come back to these ultimate levels the simplicity of God has to be a governing concern, so you can't forget that there is nothing accidental in Him. It's not as if He's barely hanging onto existence by a continual effort of will; but His existence is volitional, there is nothing potential in Him, He is fully realized - _actus purissimus_.


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## Spinningplates2 (Nov 29, 2009)

I think you should search your spirit to find out why you would ask a question such as this. What type of person on this board whoul think that God would or could do anything less then perfect. I think you should give an example of God doing anything, ever, less then perfect. In all honesty sometimes you worry me.


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## Confessor (Nov 29, 2009)

py3ak said:


> God's will is His existence. When you come back to these ultimate levels the simplicity of God has to be a governing concern, so you can't forget that there is nothing accidental in Him. It's not as if He's barely hanging onto existence by a continual effort of will; but His existence is volitional, there is nothing potential in Him, He is fully realized - _actus purissimus_.



I have a further question:

Is this similar/identical to Thomas Aquinas's notion that God's existence is His essence?


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## py3ak (Nov 29, 2009)

It is. Of course, I would deny that this is simply Thomas' notion. This quote from Heppe should show that:



> —Next it has to be acknowledged that in the absolute essence essentiality is completely identical with personality, existence and substance. In creaturely substances these differ from each other, because in their case the one is carried by the other. God in His essence is life par excellence and absolutely unifold life and absolutely unifold actuosity (_actus purissimus et simplicissimus_).
> Polan (II, 5): "God's essence is Deity itself, by which God is and exists absolutely _a se_ and _per se_". At the same time the concept of "God's essence" is not made properly clear, until the difference between it and the concept of creaturely truth is visualized. Three points require consideration here. "(1) Essence and _ho wn_, he who is, differ in creatures: God alone is that which He is and is who He is, i.e., an _ousia_ which does not depend on another. (2) Though essence and existence differ in creatures, they do not do so in God. (3) Essence and substance differ in the same way in creatures, because essence is contained in substance, and besides the essence itself, all the things that naturally inhere in the essence. But in things divine they mean that same thing."



And there is great unanimity on this topic of simplicity. So the denial that God's attributes are really distinct from His essence is taken up by Turretin, and thus in the third topic, question five, denies, against the Socinians, that the divine attributes can really be distinguished from the divine essence. And so he says, "Thus omnipotence is the divine essence itself apprehended as free from every obstacle in acting; eternity is the essence of God as without limit in duration; and so of the rest." Or a little below, "The attributes of God cannot really differ from his essence or from one another (as one thing from another) because God is most simple and perfect." They are essentially and intrinsically one in God, but we have different conceptions of then, and so "it is best to say that these attributes giving rise to such conceptions are virtually to be distinguished both from the essence and from each other." Turretin does not differ from his cohorts in this matter. Drawing from Heppe's _Reformed Dogmatics_ here is another helpful excerpt:



> ...Hottinger, p.44: "The attributes are distinguished neither from the essence nor from each other but only by our conceiving".—Hence, since every attribute is a manifestation of the same absolutely simple essentiality of God, it may justifiably be said (Braun, I, ii, 2, 19) that "God's righteousness is His goodness, is His knowledge, is His will; or His mercy is His righteousness, etc. But it would be wrong for me to say that the concept I have of the righteousness is the same concept which I have of the deity, mercy or eternity."



In his _Vindiciae Evangelicae_ Owen also manifests his agreement, writing against Mr. Biddle. I cite the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of Owen's reasons against Biddle's exceptions to the simplicity of God, which includes an identification of God as _actus purissimus_.



> Secondly, God is absolutely and perfectly one and the same, and nothing differs from his essence in it: “The LORD our God is one LORD,” Deuteronomy 6:4; “Thou art the same,” Psalm 102:27. And where there is an absolute oneness and sameness in the whole, there is no composition by an union of extremes. Thus is it with God: his name is, “ I AM; I AM THAT I AM ", Exodus 3:14, 15; “Which is,” Revelation 1:8. He, then, who is what he is, and whose all that is in him is, himself, hath neither parts, accidents, principles, nor any thing else, whereof his essence should be compounded.
> Thirdly, The attributes of God, which alone seem to be distinct things in the essence of God, are all of them essentially the same with one another, and every one the same with the essence of God itself. For, first, they are spoken one of another as well as of God; as there is his “eternal power” as well as his “Godhead.” And, secondly, they are either infinite and infinitely perfect, or they are not. If they are, then if they are not the same with God, there are more things infinite than one, and consequently more Gods; for that which is absolutely infinite is absolutely perfect, and consequently God. If they are not infinite, then God knows not himself, for a finite wisdom cannot know perfectly an infinite being. And this might be farther confirmed by the particular consideration of all kinds of composition, with a manifestation of the impossibility of their attribution unto God; arguments to which purpose the learned reader knows where to find in abundance.
> Fourthly, Yea, that God is, and must needs be, a simple act (which expression Mr B. fixes on for the rejection of it) is evident from this one consideration, which was mentioned before: If he be not so, there must be some potentiality in God. Whatever is, and is not a simple act, hath a possibility to be perfected by act; if this be in God, he is not perfect, nor all-sufficient. Every composition whatever is of power and act; which if it be, or might have been in God, he could not be said to be immutable, which the Scripture plentifully witnesseth that he is.


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## steadfast7 (Nov 30, 2009)

Hey Guys,
hope you had a good weekend with the Saints! A couple of things ...

1.Are we straying off topic a bit?
2.I did my homework reading through those threads on figurative descriptions of God, and the two wills, which Ruben graciously linked. I feel enlightened, though some of the debate was closed before reaching it conclusion 

Maybe we can get back to the OP as best we can and then stray off again, as God's wills.

Let's ask whether God has created the best of possible worlds? 

forgive the gross simplicity of this summary, but ...

I think the Single-Will, "High Calvinist" would say _Yes_. The world that presently _is _is the result of the volitional exertion of God's perfect, pleasing and singular will, which can only be perfect by definition.

The Double-Will, "moderate Calvinist", would pause. He notices that there are many things in this world that are short of perfect; there are things that God has sincerely desired and commanded, but have not come to fruition. However, everything is working toward our ultimate good and God's ultimate glory; the "frustration" that might seem to result from these unfulfilled desires is eclipsed by God's joy in decreeing all things toward its perfection in him. The advocate of this would then answer the question, "Yes and No." In one sense it is perfect, in another it is not.

If it is held that God's decree, his desire, and his delight are all uniformly and invariably produced in a single act of will, then I am only able to conclude that God *not only *decrees, but _desires and delights in _every effect that he has produced, even evil. This is where I originally began to butt heads with Ruben, probably because I did not (and maybe _still_ do not?) understand the complexity of his argument. I don't want to attack a straw man, so Ruben, I await your response. Thanks for the assistance.

blessings,

Dennis.

-----Added 11/30/2009 at 12:09:53 EST-----

Note: when I say "every effect he has produced, even evil" I am NOT saying God is the producer or author of evil, but that his decree makes him (in some sense) the producer of all things in the universe.


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## Pergamum (Nov 30, 2009)

Spinningplates2 said:


> I think you should search your spirit to find out why you would ask a question such as this. What type of person on this board whoul think that God would or could do anything less then perfect. I think you should give an example of God doing anything, ever, less then perfect. In all honesty sometimes you worry me.



Ha ha, people who box with pigs in their avatar worry me. 






P.s., if I worry you, many, many infra/supra debates also should worry you.



Happy Boxing!


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