# Two wills of God



## ClayPot

I posted this in the "Wading Pool" but since nobody responded I figured I'd post it here since more people would be able to respond. 

Until reading this thread about high and low calvinism I thought pretty much all calvinists believed in the two wills of God: i.e., the decretive and preceptive wills, the secret and revealed wills, the sovereign and moral wills, etc.

Obviously I was wrong. I do believe this doctrine currently because it seems to me the best way to reconcile passages like Romans 9:19, "For who resists his will"? and passages like 1 Thess 4:3, "It is God's will that you should be sanctified: that you should avoid sexual immorality" where it seems like there is one will of God that cannot be resisted and one that can. (I am not trying to argue this viewpoint; I just want to give you an idea of where I am coming from.)

For those who DO NOT believe in the two wills of God, why do you not believe it? How do you reconcile these types of passages? What do you think is a better explanation?

Thanks for your answers in advance!


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## larryjf

Matthew Winzer helped my understanding a great deal when he posted...




> The usual way they are distinguished without introducing contrariety into the will of God is to acknowledge the simple point that the word "will" is used in two different ways. In one sense He is said to will something volitionally. This is God's will properly speaking. "God works all things after the counsel of His own will." There is also the extended use of the word "will" when a certain course of action is said to be the will of God. "This is the will of God concerning you, even your sanctification." In this latter sense the word "will" is being used morally, not volitionally. The two words may be used without contradiction or confusion if we keep in mind that the secret will refers to what shall be and the revealed will concerns what should be.
> The moral will is not God’s will in a proper sense as He doesn’t will it to happen, but demands it of us.


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## ClayPot

Hi Larry,

Thanks for the reply. 

Why is there a distinction between the moral will and the decretive will in the sense that only the decretive will is God's will? If the Bible uses the term will in both cases why is it legitimate to say one is really God's will and the other isn't? Hopefully that doesn't sound combative; tone is difficult to convey in writing. I look forward to your reply.


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## MW

jpfrench81 said:


> Why is there a distinction between the moral will and the decretive will in the sense that only the decretive will is God's will? If the Bible uses the term will in both cases why is it legitimate to say one is really God's will and the other isn't? Hopefully that doesn't sound combative; tone is difficult to convey in writing. I look forward to your reply.



Language must be understood according to nuance. When a word is used in multiple ways one must derive a sense as to how the word is used in specific contexts in order to understand how to interpret it. If the Bible both affirms and denies the same proposition in the same terms then it becomes obvious that there is both a proper and improper sense of the terms employed. E.g. "repent:" the Bible says that God is not a man that He should repent, but also maintains in different contexts that God repents. Obviously the word "repent" is being used properly in terms of an actual change of mind when it is denied that God repents, and it is being used improperly of a mere change in actions when it is affirmed that God repents. Likewise, the word "will" strictly means something which is volitionally determined. Reformed theology understands that God's will always comes to pass and is never frustrated so far as the futurition of events is concerned. On the other hand, there is also a use of the word "will" which does not accord with its strict meaning of volitional determination, as when an action is said to be God's will, that is, God requires that a certain action should be done by men. This does not necessarily come to pass because God may not have willed it to come to pass. Hence it is a less than literal or improper use of the word "will." Note, "improper" does not imply that the word should not be used; it only refers to the fact that a word is not being used in accord with its strict meaning.


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## ClayPot

armourbearer said:


> jpfrench81 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Why is there a distinction between the moral will and the decretive will in the sense that only the decretive will is God's will? If the Bible uses the term will in both cases why is it legitimate to say one is really God's will and the other isn't? Hopefully that doesn't sound combative; tone is difficult to convey in writing. I look forward to your reply.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Language must be understood according to nuance. When a word is used in multiple ways one must derive a sense as to how the word is used in specific contexts in order to understand how to interpret it. If the Bible both affirms and denies the same proposition in the same terms then it becomes obvious that there is both a proper and improper sense of the terms employed. E.g. "repent:" the Bible says that God is not a man that He should repent, but also maintains in different contexts that God repents. Obviously the word "repent" is being used properly in terms of an actual change of mind when it is denied that God repents, and it is being used improperly of a mere change in actions when it is affirmed that God repents. Likewise, the word "will" strictly means something which is volitionally determined. Reformed theology understands that God's will always comes to pass and is never frustrated so far as the futurition of events is concerned. On the other hand, there is also a use of the word "will" which does not accord with its strict meaning of volitional determination, as when an action is said to be God's will, that is, God requires that a certain action should be done by men. This does not necessarily come to pass because God may not have willed it to come to pass. Hence it is a less than literal or improper use of the word "will." Note, "improper" does not imply that the word should not be used; it only refers to the fact that a word is not being used in accord with its strict meaning.
Click to expand...


Thank you very much for the detailed post it was very helpful.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

Hi Joshua,

I agree with some of Rev. Winzer's comments above. I agree that the term "will" when predicated of God in the Bible is used in different senses. Sometimes it's used to refer to what God plans and providentially brings about. This is sometimes called his "decretive or secret will." In other places, it refers to what God desires should be with regard to the character and behavior of his moral creatures. This is sometimes called God's "preceptive or revealed will."

I do not agree, however, that one of these "wills" properly belongs to God while the other does not. God's will of purpose flows from and, therefore, reflects his character. Moreover, God's revealed will for his moral creatures is both a reflection of his character and an aspect of his volition. Right and wrong, good and evil, are so defined by God's choice, and God's choice is conditioned by God's wise, powerful, holy, just, good and true character.

Moreover, Rev. Winzer uses the words "proper" and "improper" to refer to what he terms "the strict meaning" of a term in contrast with "a less than literal" meaning. The English noun "will" as well as the Hebrew and Greek terms it translates have a broad range of meanings, including such ideas as "disposition," "inclination," "intention," "wish," "desire," "purpose," "determination," and "choice." All of these uses fall within the semantic range of "will" and none of them is more "proper" or more "literal" than the other. Indeed, the Bible nowhere teaches that one will of God is more real or proper or literal than the other. 

In my opinion, it is unwise and unbiblical to speak in terms that construe one sense of God's will as being more proper, real, or essential to another sense of God's will. This tendency has led some, for example, to "reinterpret" passages where God expresses his desire or wish that saving good might be experienced by those whom he knows will never experience that good (e.g., Deut. 5:29; Isa. 45:22; Luke 13:34; John 5:34). Since God does not elect every person unto eternal life and since God's will of purpose (related to election) is more "proper," then God's revealed will (wish, desire, and command) that all men turn from their sins and believe in Christ is interpreted as "less literal," that is, as a figurative "anthropopathic" expression that doesn't really tell us what God wants. 

One may ask, "How can God wish or desire two mutually exclusive ends, i.e., the salvation of the elect (which he brings to pass) and the salvation of all indiscriminately (which he doesn't actually bring to pass)?" Part of the answer lies in the fact that God can have multiple intentions and reserves the right to decide which of his intentions come to fruition and which do not. Robert L. Dabney has an excellent essay in which he address this point: "God's Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy as Related ot His Power, Wisdom, and Sincerity." The other part of the answer lies in the inscrutible and secret counsels of God into which we are not permitted to enter:The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law (Deut. 29:29). ​Your servant,


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## ClayPot

Hello Dr. Gonzales,

Thank you very much for the helpful post. I see that there is certainly divided opinion on this topic! I will have to continue to learn and seek.

Another quick example that I have heard regarding "willing" two things simultaneously is something as common as child vaccinations. I certainly don't will (desire) to hurt my son. However, I do will (determinatively) that he receive vaccinations which hurt at the time but are ultimately for his good. It doesn't win the argument but I have found it a useful example. Thanks again.


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## py3ak

Joshua, don't let the fact that words have a range of meanings mislead you. Certainly, as words appear in Scripture they can have quite a broad range. We are familiar with this phenomenon in everyday life; "cleave" can mean "divide" or it can mean something like "attach" or "cling". But in each specific context "cleave" does not mean both of those things.

So the word "will" can cover the range of "purpose", "wish", "desire", "intention", "command" and so forth. So we add modifiers to establish what we mean. Sometimes we speak of "theology" to mean our whole system of doctrine. But when we wish to speak specifically of the doctrine of God we will say "theology proper", to express that we do not intend the "broad" sense of the term, but a focussed sense. Both are _correct_; but one is more _specific_ or _precise_ than another. I think it's a trifle absurd to say that we can't use such modifiers to establish which part of the semantic range of a given word we are actually intending to communicate - particularly if the failure to use those modifiers involves us in contradiction: asserting, for instance, that the most blessed God deliberately chooses to frustrate Himself, by _desiring_ something that He chooses not to effect.

Turretin says, speaking of the erroneous distinctions in God's will that some had suggested, such as antecedent and consequent, efficacious and inefficacious, conditional and absolute:



> Second, this distinction cannot have place in God without ascribing to him not only folly and impotence (by making him intend seriously and desire with natural affection that which is not performed and cannot be performed through man because he himself does not will it); but also mutability because there can be no place for the consequent will until the antecedent is first rescinded. For how could God at the same time, by the same act of will, will to save all men and to damn the greater part of them?
> Third, the antecedent will is not so much a will as a velleity, an empty and void desire incapable of accomplishment which cannot apply to God (the most wise and powerful [who has done whatever he pleases -RZ]). For how can he be called the most perfect and happy who cannot carry out the design and object truly intended, on account of the intervention and obstacle of the creature determining itself otherwise independently.


(_Institutes_, III.16.7,8)

That there is sound theological precedent for speaking of God's will in a proper and an improper sense, is well shown in this statement that Heppe drew from Heidan:


> (1) Strictly speaking there is but a single will of God called _beneplaciti_, whereby God determines by Himself what He wills to do in and concerning the creature. The second is but the sign and indication by which He shows what He wishes creatures to do. But He does not wish them to make His _beneplacitum_ universal, but only the things which He reveals to them, Deut. 29. 29 (p.85).
> (2) God often wills the same thing by _voluntas beneplaciti_ and _signi_; the same thing as happens he enjoins in His holy law, e.g., the conversion of the Gentiles. Although God wills some things _voluntate signi_, like the repentance of the reprobate, the faith of Judas, the non-slaying of Christ, which he nevertheless anything but decreed by _voluntas beneplaciti_ as things that would never happen; and He wills some things _voluntate beneplaciti_, which He can anything but will _voluntate signi_, like the selling of Joseph or the slaying of Christ.
> (3) But these wills are not contrary, because they are not concerned with the same things, not is their connection and reference the same. The object of the _beneplacitum_ is an existent eventuating in the nature of things, which is to have or not to have an actual existence, be it a good or a bad existent, consonant or not with the _voluntas signi_. But the object of the _voluntas signi_ is approval of the morally good and honourable or disapproval of the unjust and wicked.
> (4) Whence as a result of _voluntas beneplaciti_ fixed inference may be drawn as to the issue of the matter, though this cannot be done as a result of _voluntas signi_. That is merely moral regulation of human action, whether they eventuate or not. In His law God did not formally decree our moral acts to exist or not to exist; He only enjoins their ordination, forbids their non-ordination. The existence and non-existence of things is determined by God's _voluntas beneplaciti_, not _signi_.
> (5) Hence it often happens that man's unrighteous will is discovered to be conform [sic] with God's _voluntas beneplaciti_, which is yet not in accord with His _voluntas signi_, as if a bad son should wish his father to die, whom God also wills to die; and man's will may not agree with God's will, as though a godly son should wish his father not to die, whom God does not will to live longer.



The importance of these matters is that they do impinge upon your doctrine of God. From Heppe again:


> Since God's will is not a blind urge but an _appetitus intelligens_, it must indeed be distinguished from _scientia_. Yet it coincides with it in such a way, that it may be conceived as just the obverse of it, i.e., God wills precisely because He wills it: *the divine willing is the divine nature itself*."


 (emphasis added)

Psalm 115:3 & Ephesians 1:5,11 should suffice to show that the proper sense of "God's will", as in that by which God determines and effects what shall and shall not be and come to pass, is invariably accomplished in its fullest extent and in its minutest detail. This is the _voluntas beneplaciti_.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

jpfrench81 said:


> Hello Dr. Gonzales,
> 
> Thank you very much for the helpful post. I see that there is certainly divided opinion on this topic! I will have to continue to learn and seek.
> 
> Another quick example that I have heard regarding "willing" two things simultaneously is something as common as child vaccinations. I certainly don't will (desire) to hurt my son. However, I do will (determinatively) that he receive vaccinations which hurt at the time but are ultimately for his good. It doesn't win the argument but I have found it a useful example. Thanks again.



Joshua,

I like your illustration. If you read Dabney's essay, you'll find he uses a similar one. 

You are also quick to perceive that there is a divided opinion on this topic. It is good that you hear both perspectives. Ruben has provided you with some citations from some older Reformed divines. I'm sorry to demur with my brothers above and the theologians they've cited, but I just don't find warrant for treating the _voluntas beneplaciti_ as more important or essential to God's being and character than the _voluntas_ _signi_. In contrast, consider the words of John Frame, Professor of Systematic Theology at Reformed Theological Seminary in Orlando, Florida:
God's decrees and his precepts both represent divine values. It is true that the decrees always take effect, whereas the precepts do not necessarily do so. That seems to give special honor to the decrees above the precepts. But one can also argue the other way. God's precepts represent his ideals, which describe states of affairs that are often far more excellent than the world as it has been decreed. God's precepts, for example, demand a world in which everyone honors the true God, in which everyone honors his parents, in which there is no murder or even murderous anger, etc. Would not such a world be better than the one in which we live?

God's precepts also express goals, to which his decrees are means. The new heaven and the new earth are a place where righteousness dwells (2 Peter 3:13; cf. Matt. 6:33). So one could argue that God's preceptive will is his "real" will, the one he seeks to achieve in this world through the history of redemption. 

But I will not argue that point. Rather, I will insist that *Scripture does not value one will above another, or compare one unfavorably to the other.* The fact is that both these precepts and these decrees are divine desires and should be given the highest honor. God's precepts are an object of worship in the Psalms (56:4, 10) and are worthy of the most profound meditation (Ps. 1) and obedience (Ps. 119). God's decrees represent his control, and his precepts represent his authority. *We honor both equally as we honor the Lord* (emphasis added). The Doctrine of God (P&R, 2002), 538.​Though both the Confessions (WCF, Savoy, LBCF) and the Westminster Catechisms begin with a focus on God's will of precept, I'm not aware that they require one to treat one as more proper, literal, or real than the other. 

Hope this helps.

-----Added 5/2/2009 at 09:58:17 EST-----



py3ak said:


> That there is sound theological precedent for speaking of God's will in a proper and an improper sense, is well shown in this statement that Heppe drew from Heidan:
> 
> 
> 
> (1) Strictly speaking there is but a single will of God called _beneplaciti_, whereby God determines by Himself what He wills to do in and concerning the creature. The second is but the sign and indication by which He shows what He wishes creatures to do. But He does not wish them to make His _beneplacitum_ universal, but only the things which He reveals to them, Deut. 29. 29 (p.85).
> (2) God often wills the same thing by _voluntas beneplaciti_ and _signi_; the same thing as happens he enjoins in His holy law, e.g., the conversion of the Gentiles. Although God wills some things _voluntate signi_, like the repentance of the reprobate, the faith of Judas, the non-slaying of Christ, which he nevertheless anything but decreed by _voluntas beneplaciti_ as things that would never happen; and He wills some things _voluntate beneplaciti_, which He can anything but will _voluntate signi_, like the selling of Joseph or the slaying of Christ.
> (3) But these wills are not contrary, because they are not concerned with the same things, not is their connection and reference the same. The object of the _beneplacitum_ is an existent eventuating in the nature of things, which is to have or not to have an actual existence, be it a good or a bad existent, consonant or not with the _voluntas signi_. But the object of the _voluntas signi_ is approval of the morally good and honourable or disapproval of the unjust and wicked.
> (4) Whence as a result of _voluntas beneplaciti_ fixed inference may be drawn as to the issue of the matter, though this cannot be done as a result of _voluntas signi_. That is merely moral regulation of human action, whether they eventuate or not. In His law God did not formally decree our moral acts to exist or not to exist; He only enjoins their ordination, forbids their non-ordination. The existence and non-existence of things is determined by God's _voluntas beneplaciti_, not _signi_.
> (5) Hence it often happens that man's unrighteous will is discovered to be conform [sic] with God's _voluntas beneplaciti_, which is yet not in accord with His _voluntas signi_, as if a bad son should wish his father to die, whom God also wills to die; and man's will may not agree with God's will, as though a godly son should wish his father not to die, whom God does not will to live longer.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Psalm 115:3 & Ephesians 1:11 should suffice to show that the proper sense of "God's will", as in that by which God determines and effects what shall and shall not be and come to pass, is invariably accomplished in its fullest extent and in its minutest detail. This is the _voluntas beneplaciti_.
Click to expand...


Ruben, 

I located the citation of Heiden (above) in Heinrich Heppe's _Reformed Dogmatics_. If the reader continues, however, he finds Heppe citing Heidegger, who traces the distinction of the _voluntas beneplaciti _and the _voluntas signi _to Medieval theology and who thinks the distinction is marred with ambiguities. "Hence," concludes Heppe, "we must say that generally Reformed theology has disapproved of the distinction between _voluntas signi et beneplaciti_" (p. 88). What do you make of that?


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## chbrooking

I don't know if I should post at all, given that your OP asks for those who do not accept the division. But if I may, I would suggest that our division is heuristic, but necessary. It is necessary because of the Creator/creature distinction. We are told quite clearly that God works all things after the counsel of his will (Eph 1:11). And yet we are likewise we are told that The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you,not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance. (2Peter 3:9 ESV) 

While it does not satisfy our sinful proclivity for going beyond our appropriate state, trying to comprehend the incomprehensible, I believe that the junction between the two lies beyond us, because it is God's ONE will. Ultimately, there is but one will of God. But our finite minds cannot -- and never will be able to -- grasp junction between them. 

All scripture is condescension and accommodation to our finite minds. God reveals for us two truths that we must hold. The fact that we cannot find the joint does not make either of them less true. But we must affirm that ultimately the will of God is single, as God is simple, not complex (Deut 6:4). In him there is no equivocation or ambivalence. Our finite minds, however, must deal with two truths that are not in tension within the divine mind or being, but which seem in tension because we are finite. 

This should not trouble us, though. We see in many areas of theology. We know Jesus is God. We know Jesus is man. How that works is beyond us. We know God is one God, but that he exists in three co-equal, co-eternal persons. We can't understand that. We don't have to. We simply affirm it. It is the same with the will of God. We believe that there is no contradiction in affirming Eph 1:11 and 2 Pet. 3:9, because the author of both is God, who cannot lie and does not change (Num 23:19; Jam 1:17). 

The distinction between the will of decree and the will of precept is our way of distinguishing these things heuristically -- nothing more. They do not reflect some ultimate, ontological distinction in the one will of God. Nevertheless, if we are to discuss the will of God, we will have to make the distinction to account for all the biblical evidence.


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## py3ak

Dr. Gonzales, I don't have Heppe to hand at the moment, so I can't give you an exact reference. But in the prefaces by Thompson and Bizer you will find some mention of the way Heppe's personal idiosyncrasies intruded on his work of collation.

He was correct to trace the distinction to the Scholastics, but incorrect in his conclusion. Consider the opinion of Dr. Muller on the topic (_PPRD_, v.3 p.457):


> *1. Voluntas beneplaciti and voluntas signi.* In most of the orthodox systems this stands as the initial or at least one of the basic distinctions -- and it is certainly a distinction well established in the older theological tradition. Wendelin and Rutherford comment that the distinction between the will of the divine good pleasure (_beneplaciti_) and the will of the sign or precept (_signi_) is unanimously attested and rightly used by the scholastics. It is, however, omitted by the _Synopsis purioris_ and Hottinger.



As to Professor Frame's remarks, I think everyone could agree with the last two sentences. And the idea of "competition" between different senses in which the phrase "God's will" may be understood is rather fantastic - we are not children asking whether a giraffe is stronger than a grizzly bear. The fact is that what God has chosen to require of us, and what God has chosen to effect do not always overlap: and God has chosen the timing and the extent of those non-overlapping areas.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

Ruben,

Above (in post 8) you write (presumably alluding to my previous statement in Post 6?):"I think it's a trifle absurd to say that we can't use such modifiers to establish which part of the semantic range of a given word we are actually intending to communicate - particularly if the failure to use those modifiers involves us in contradiction: asserting, for instance, that the most blessed God deliberately chooses to frustrate Himself, by _desiring_ something that He chooses not to effect." ​First, I don't object to using modifiers in order to distinguish or make clearer different senses of a given word. I simply object to some of the modifiers that portray God's purpose as his "real" or "proper" will in contrast to God's precept as his his "less literal" or "improper" will. Those modifiers I don't find helpful, especially in today's English. "Wish" and "desire" are just as much part of God's volitional faculty as "purpose" and "choice." Hence, we might speak, perhaps, of different facets or aspects of God's will. 

You think the modifiers proper and improper are necessary to avoid "asserting ... that the most blessed God deliberately chooses to frustrate Himself, by _desiring_ something that He chooses not to effect." What, then, do you do with a passage like Deuteronomy 5:29:"Oh that they had such a heart in them, that they would fear Me and keep all My commandments always, that it may be well with them and with their sons forever!" (Deut. 5:29, NAS).​The opening Hebrew phrase _miy-yitten_ signals the optative mood (See Ronald Williams, _Hebrew Syntax: An Outline_, 2nd ed. [Toronto University Press, 1976], sec. 547; Paul Joüon, _A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew_ [Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2000), sec. 163d; Bruce Waltke and M. O'Connor, _An Introduction of Biblical Hebrew Syntax_ [Eisenbrauns, 1990], sec. 40.2.2d), which is defined as follows: "designating a statement using a verb in the subjunctive mood to indicate a wish or desire." For other examples of this construction, see Exod. 16:3; Deut. 28:67; 2 Sam. 19:1; 2 Sam. 23:15; Job 6:8; 14:13; 23:3). We know from subsequent revelation that most of these of whom God spoke never enjoyed the good God says he wished for them (see 1 Cor. 10:5). Clearly, God is, to use your language, "_desiring_ something that He chooses not to effect." 

How do you explain this passage?


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## py3ak

Dr. Gonzales, if I equated "proper" with "real" then I think I would object to it as well. But since "proper" and "improper" don't correlate to "real", "ultimate" or "correct" and their opposites, I find them useful terms to reflect the degree of accommodation in a given usage of a term.

As far as Deuteronomy 5:29 and similar passages go, in keeping with the analogy of Scripture I do not interpret them in such a way as to hold that God has _not_ done whatsoever pleased him (Psalm 115:3).
If I can borrow and accommodate a little from Turretin, "If human [qualities] are attributed to God in the Scriptures ... they are ascribed to him after the manner of men and must be understood in a manner becoming God."

So what is a _theoprepos_ method of understanding the optative? Well, apart from its great elegance, I would suggest that it is a most clear and compact way of stating quite a lot.

1. It shows them what God approves (_voluntas signi_).
2. It shows them therefore what they ought to desire and seek God for.
3. It may contain an implication that they will not, in fact, have always such a heart (as was proved by the event) but it lays all the blame for their wrong-heartedness squarely upon themselves, and not at all upon God. 

For myself, I can think of no more concise way in which to express all that meaning than through the lovely use of the optative.

Moving on, though, I wonder how you would explain the supposed presence of unrealized desires in God in light of these considerations?
1. That God has no _potentia_.
2. That God is most wise, most blessed, most simple.


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> I agree that the term "will" when predicated of God in the Bible is used in different senses. Sometimes it's used to refer to what God plans and providentially brings about. This is sometimes called his "decretive or secret will." In other places, it refers to what God desires should be with regard to the character and behavior of his moral creatures. This is sometimes called God's "preceptive or revealed will."



At this point a very good distinction has been made by using the clearest terminology. It is carefully noted that the prescriptive will deals with the "should be" rather than the "shall be," or obligation rather than futurition. So far so good. If everyone maintained this distinction in these terms there would be no problem. But as Dr. Bob's post goes on to speak of God's will of precept in terms of what "shall be" rather than what "should be," he introduces a third category of "will" into the discussion, which basically maintains that God wills things "to be" conditioned on the will of the creature. This third category of "will" has no precedent in reformed theology and was outrightly rejected by reformed theologians when attempted to be introduced by the defenders of the Remonstrant cause.

Reactions: Like 1


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

py3ak said:


> Dr. Gonzales, if I equated "proper" with "real" then I think I would object to it as well. But since "proper" and "improper" don't correlate to "real", "ultimate" or "correct" and their opposites, I find them useful terms to reflect the degree of accommodation in a given usage of a term.



Ruben,

I object to the contrast of God's decretive will as "proper" with God's revealed will as "improper" when the contrast is intended to convey the following ideas, which were advanced by the Rev. Winzer whom I respect but with whom on this particular issue I humbly disagree:

*(1) The "strict" meaning of will is volitional determination; hence, ideas like "wish" or "desire" to not belong to the "strict" meaning of "will." *

Response: The word "strict" means "exact or precise." As I pointed out above, the meaning of a word is determined by its usage. It turns out the both the English terms as well as the corresponding Hebrew and Greek terms are used to convey such ideas as "disposition," "inclination," "intention," "wish," "desire," "purpose," "determination," and "choice." 

Whether one of these ideas is more "strict" or "precise" than the other is relative to the context, not to the particular idea itself. In other words, it is linguistically wrong to assert that "determination" or "choice" is always in every biblical context a more "strict" or "proper" meaning of the term "will." On the contrary, "determination" or "choice" is only more "precise" or "strict" in those contexts or passages where such an idea is intended by the author. 

Conversely, the ideas of "wish" or "desire" may be the more "proper, strict, and precise" meanings of "will" in other contexts, such as Deuteronomy 5:29. Context, context, context, not some a prior predilection determines what idea within the semantic range of a word is more "proper, precise, or strict." That's Linguistics 101. 

*(2) God's will of precept is "a less than literal" meaning of "will."*
Response: This statement also betrays a basic misunderstanding of language in general and the semantic range of "will" in particular. What makes the senses of "wish" or "desire" less literal than the senses "determination" or "choice"? Whether a described "wish" or "desire" is being used "literally" or "figuratively" must be determined by the context and authorial intent, not by personal predilection. A "wish" or "desire" may be just as concrete and literal as a "determination" or "choice." 
*
(3) In contexts referring to God's preceptive will, the word "will" is being used morally, not volitionally.*

Response: This statement is potentially confusing. First, God's decretive will certainly not amoral. Every decree God has made and executes flows from and is consistent with his moral character (Pss. 104:24; 145:17; Rom. 11:33). I suspect Matthew Winzer would agree. He no doubt intended to apply the word "moral" to God's preceptive will not because God's decretive will is amoral but because God's preceptive will is the revelation of _man's_ moral duty. And man's moral duty is to reflect his Maker's moral character. 

Nevertheless, he does assert that God's preceptive will is moral _not volitional_. This too is ambiguous and potentially misleading. The adjective "volitional" denotes "of, relating to, or produced by volition or the will." In reality, "wish" and "desire" belong to the category or faculty of _volition_ as do "determination" or "choice" (See Jonathan Edwards, _The Religious Affections_ [reprint, Banner of Truth, 2001], 24-25). My point is that we cannot detach God's precept from his volition or construe his decree as amoral. Both flow from and reflect God's most holy, wise, and powerful person and character and both are expressions of God's volitional faculty. 

For these reasons, I do not find the distinctions "proper" (i.e., strict and literal) and "improper" (i.e., loose and less literal) vis-a-vis God's decree and God's precept to be useful or demanded by Scripture. 



> As far as Deuteronomy 5:29 and similar passages go, in keeping with the analogy of Scripture I do not interpret them in such a way as to hold that God has _not_ done whatsoever pleased him (Psalm 115:3).


Neither do I. When the Psalmist refers to "whatsoever pleased him," he's clearly referring to God's freedom and ability to effect whatever he desires to come to pass (i.e., his sovereign decree and providence). Deuteronomy 5:29 is referring to something God desires but does not freely choose to effect. I do not see a contradiction. 



> If I can borrow and accommodate a little from Turretin, "If human [qualities] are attributed to God in the Scriptures ... they are ascribed to him after the manner of men and must be understood in a manner becoming God."


Fine, so long as we remember that both human beings and their language are _analogical forms of revelation_ designed to relate correspondence, not merely discorrespondence. Moreover, Turretin's axiom must not be applied merely to God's preceptive will but also to God's decretive "choices" as well as his providential "actions." Such descriptions too "are ascribed to him after the manner of men and must be understood in a manner becoming God." 



> So what is a _theoprepos_ method of understanding the optative? Well, apart from its great elegance, I would suggest that it is a most clear and compact way of stating quite a lot.
> 
> 1. It shows them what God approves (_voluntas signi_).


Very well, I take it that by "approve" you mean something like "to speak or think favorably of; pronounce or consider agreeable or good." That leads the reader to inquire, "What does God consider agreeable or good?" The text provides the answer:Oh that they had such a mind as this always, to fear me and to keep all my commandments, that it might go well with them and with their descendants forever!​So, according to this text, God thinks favorably of, considers agreeable and good the following: (1) that a particular group of people might show genuine and lasting devotion and obedience to his word, and (2) that in doing such, they and their descendents might experience his blessing forever. For God to find these two objects "favorable, agreeable, and good" is for God to desire them both. And that is precisely the meaning of the optative mood--_a strong wish and/or desire_ for a particular object and/or objective.

Of course, one might try to avoid these implications by construing the object or objective of which God approves as (1) some abstract notion, i.e., that people or sinners _in general_ (not the reprobates he was directly addressing) might do an approved thing, or as (2) a more particular referent, i.e., that _the elect_ among the mass of those of whom God speaks might do an approved thing. 

But both of these options are ruled out by responsible exegesis and are in no way demanded in this text by the analogy of Scripture. 



> 2. It shows them therefore what they ought to desire and seek God for.


Yes. But I'm assuming that you're not using "ought" as a reference to some abstract "moral" code that exists _outside of God_. "Ought" refers not to an abstract moral duty but to those attitudes and actions which reflect _the moral bent of God's own nature_. God wishes, desires, and longs for his moral beings to glorify and enjoy him forever. Hence, Deuteronomy does not merely reveal a standard toward which I "ought" to strive, but it discloses the Creator/Redeemer's heart--He really _wants_ these particular people to seek and serve him. 



> 3. It may contain an implication that they will not, in fact, have always such a heart (as was proved by the event) but it lays all the blame for their wrong-heartedness squarely upon themselves, and not at all upon God.


Certainly. So did Jesus' lament: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it! How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not!" (Luke 13:34). Jesus' words not only imply that Jerusalem, a synecdoche for the Jewish people, by and large would reject their Messiah, but they also serve to lay the blame where it belongs: "you would not!"



> For myself, I can think of no more concise way in which to express all that meaning than through the lovely use of the optative.


In reality, Ruben, your exegesis of the optative in this text is depriving it of the essence of its meaning and is not in accordance with its biblical usage. You think that you need to relieve the optative as used in this context of some of its full force because of the analogy of Scripture. I would leave you with the caution which one of my professors directed to his students in a course on hermeneutics:"There is but one step between the responsible interpretation of the Bible which believing in its theological unity, refuses to so interpret any text as to transgress that unity; and on the other hand, the dogmatic interpretation of the Bible which assuming its system to be biblical, refuses to allow the Bible to speak. This latter method _gags the Bible_ under the pretence of the analogy of faith" (emphasis his). ​You may believe your toning down of the optative force of Deuteronomy 5:29 is constrained by the analogy of Scripture. I would humbly suggest that you reconsider whether you've not taken that dangerous step into the second category above. 



> Moving on, though, I wonder how you would explain the supposed presence of unrealized desires in God in light of these considerations?
> 1. That God has no _potentia_.


How would I "explain the supposed presence of unrealized desires in God in light of" the assertion that "God has no _potentia_"? Hmm. This is a little confusing to me. What do you mean by the Latin term _potentia_? It can mean either efficaous power, i.e., power that actual effects or realizes, or potential power, i.e., the capacity to effect or realize some thing or objective. Do you think I deny either of these with respect to God? If so, you've deduced wrongly. I affirm them both. Are you assuming that my interpretation of Deuteronomy 5:29 necessitates a denial of God's potential or efficacious power? If so, I don't follow your logic. 

First, the reality of an unrealized desire in God does not necessitate that God is without the capacity to realize that desire. God is, of course, omnipotent and can, therefore, do anything that is consistent with his holy and wise nature. Since what God desires here (vis-a-vis his preceptive will) is consistent with his nature, then God has the capacity to realize that desire. Whether God chooses to realize that matter is another question. God may desire multiple objectives but not choose to bring them all into realization. 

Second, the reality of an unrealized desire in God does not negate His efficacy to decree the realization of other desires. As the passage you referenced above teaches, "Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases" (Ps. 115:3). God has both the freedom and the ability to effect whatever desired objectives he chooses to bring into realization. God did not desire Adam and Eve to eat the forbidden fruit--He said so! But God chose not to bring that particular desire of his into realization. That was his sovereign prerogative. God did not desire David to commit adultery and murder Uriah. But God chose not to bring that particular desire of his into realization. Once again, that's God's sovereign right. Furthermore, God did not desire that the Israelites of whom he spoke in Deuteronomy would only exercise a spurious and fleeting devotion to him but that they might demonstrate true and lasting fealty. But God (for reasons he has not revealed to us, Deut. 29:29a) chose not to elect these hell-deserving sinners unto eternal life and thus realize the particular desire for their good but instead chose to leave them perish in their sins in order to bring about the realization of other divine desires. I see _mystery_, but I see _no contradiction_. 

In sum, I affirm both God's omnipotence and his sovereignty. I affirm that those divine desires _God has decreed_ will inexorably come to pass. Those divine desires that God _has not decreed_ wlll not come to pass. 



> 2. That God is most wise, most blessed, most simple.


One again, I stand perplexed.  How does the fact that God's particular desire expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29 went unrealized (at least in the lives of most of whom God spoke) undermine or fail to cohere with the proposition that God "is most wise, most blessed, most simple"? 

Does God's desiring the salvation of reprobates but deciding not to realize that desire while choosing to realize other desires make him unwise? No. His wisdom transcends ours, and I'm confident that his choices of which desires to fulfill and which desires not to fulfill are wise choices. 

Does God's desiring the salvation of reprobates but deciding not to realize that desire while choosing to realize other desires make him unblessed? Apparently not. For God certainly isn't happy (at one level) about sin, yet he ordained it. Hence, the entrance of sin into the world through God's ordination must be consisent with his happiness (at another level). God certainly isn't happy (at one level) with the prospect that the audience he addresses in Deuteronomy 5:29 do not really love him and will not (nor many of their descendents) experience the good He wishes them. Yet, God chose to pass them by, and he was happy (at another level) to do so. 

Does God's genuine but unrealized desire for the good of his audience in Deuteronomy 5:29 conflict with his "simplicity"? I guess it depends on what one means by _divine simplicity_ (unbiblical ideas have been floated, see Hodge, ST, 369; Bavinck, DofG, 121, 127). By God's "simplicity," I affirm that _God's nature is unitary_, i.e., _his attributes are what he is though God's attributes are distinguishable aspects of God's nature_. Forgive me, but it's unclear to me how my straightforward reading of Deuteronomy 5:29 conflicts with God's simplicity in this sense. 

Ruben, I realize that you and others like Matthew do not agree with me on this issue. I guess that makes me a "Low" or "Moderate" Calvinist. That's okay. I'm not concerned much with labels, and I'm sure that you and Rev. Winzer are honestly seeking to handle God's word properly to the best of your ability. I respect both of you and love you in the Lord.

It's probably unlikely either party will convince the other. So we'll have to agree to disagree on this point and ask the Lord to have mercy on whichever party is in error. I can only hope that you'll judge my motives (in the interest of charity) in the best light. I'm honesty endeavoring to interpret God's word accurately and to embrace all its parts with the biblical assumption that all those parts ultimately cohere though I may not have the capacity to explain the relation of every part. If I'm erring, I pray the Lord will show me and grant me grace to readjust my reading of his Word to match his inspired intent.

Sincerely yours,


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## py3ak

Dr. Gonzales, thank you for the gracious and detailed reply. I am developing a strong suspicion that you type faster than I do by several orders of magnitude! Given the length of the discussion, and how it intersects with past discussions we've had, I'll reply only briefly and thus only to those points which are susceptible of a brief and hopefully clear response.

On _potentia_ I mean it in the sense called by Dr. Muller Aristotelian, _potential being_. God has no unrealized potential: He is _actus purus_.



> His wisdom transcends ours, and I'm confident that his choices of which desires to fulfill and which desires not to fulfill are wise choices.


If God has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill, does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_? 

Psalm 115:3 says more than just that God is free and able to do whatever He wants: it says that He actually _does_ all He pleases. If He does all He pleases, there is nothing He pleases to do that is not done. 

I don't by any means suspect that you have low motives in expressing your views, and as always I thank you for your humble and gracious approach to discussions. I share your commitment to _tota_ and _sola scriptura_, and hope to be delivered from throwing any particular text under the bus of an agenda-driven exegesis. I find what I know of the Protestant Scholastic theology to be the best expression of Scriptural theology, not least for the consistency and rationality with which they understand the function and recognise the presence of anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms in the text; other approaches often fall pray to inconsistency. Thus most people don't believe that God _physically_ "came down" to see the tower of Babel, or that He _literally_ thought of something that had slipped His mind when the Hebrews called out to Him, but they will think that God has wishes (whims?) which He doesn't care enough about to effect: but that kind of language is all of a piece.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

py3ak said:


> Dr. Gonzales, thank you for the gracious and detailed reply. I am developing a strong suspicion that you type faster than I do by several orders of magnitude! Given the length of the discussion, and how it intersects with past discussions we have, I'll reply only briefly and thus only to those points which are susceptible of a brief and hopefully clear response.
> 
> On _potentia_ I mean it in the sense called by Dr. Muller Aristotelian, _potential being_. God has no unrealized potential: He is _actus purus_.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> His wisdom transcends ours, and I'm confident that his choices of which desires to fulfill and which desires not to fulfill are wise choices.
> 
> 
> 
> If God has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill, does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?
> 
> Psalm 115:3 says more than just that God is free and able to do whatever He wants: it says that He actually _does_ all He pleases. If He does all He pleases, there is nothing He pleases to do that is not done.
> 
> I don't by any means suspect that you have low motives in expressing your views, and as always I thank you for your humble and gracious approach to discussions. I share your commitment to _tota_ and _sola scriptura_, and hope to be delivered from throwing any particular text under the bus of an agenda-driven exegesis. I find what I know of the Protestant Scholastic theology to be the best expression of Scriptural theology, not least for the consistency and rationality with which they understand the function and recognise the presence of anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms in the text; other approaches often fall pray to inconsistency. Thus most people don't believe that God _physically_ "came down" to see the tower of Babel, or that He _literally_ thought of something that had slipped His mind when the Hebrews called out to Him, but they will think that God has wishes (whims?) which He doesn't care enough about to effect: but that kind of language is all of a piece.
Click to expand...


Ruben,

Thanks for the gracious rejoinder! My earlier response took me longer than you may think. I'm really not a quick thinker or typist. 

I don't want to belabor this issue since it has been hashed out thoroughly elsewhere on other threads as well as in essays and books. I would, however, offer brief responses to two remarks you made above. 

First, you query: "If God has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill, does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?"

My simply answer is "no." Jesus, whom knowing we know the Father (John 14:7-9), desired for God to remove the cup from him (Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42). Nevertheless, he also desired to accomplish the work God had prepared for him to do (Ps. 40:7-8; John 4:34). That meant Jesus had to reject one desire (please remove this cup) in order to fulfill another desire, namely, to drink the cup. 

If Jesus "has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill [keep in mind that Jesus voluntarily of _his own initiative_ took the cup, John 10:18], does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?" No. It was perfectly and morally appropriate and wise for Jesus to desire (as a sinless man) to avoid God's wrath. Nevertheless, there were other considerations that made Jesus decision to take the cup a wiser course of action. 

Analogously, whatever God desires is consistent with his wisdom. God doesn't wish for ideals that are unwise. But apparently, God may choose to bring to fruition one desire and not another because he deems such a course of action wiser. 

Second, you assert: "Psalm 115:3 says more than just that God is free and able to do whatever He wants: it says that He actually _does_ all He pleases. If He does all He pleases, there is nothing He pleases to do that is not done."

I respectfully disagree with your exegesis. The word translated "pleases" is the Hebrew _chaphats_. It denotes "delight" or "pleasure." To interpret the verse to mean that God brings to fruition everything concerning which he has _chaphats_ is to ignore the plain teaching of other texts:
ESV 1 Samuel 15:22 And Samuel said, "Has the LORD as great *delight* in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the LORD? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to listen than the fat of rams.​God "delights" when his people, in this case Saul, obey his voice. But God does not bring all his "delights" to fruition. 
ESV Psalm 5:4 For you are *not* a God who *delights* in wickedness; evil may not dwell with you.​Here God does not "delight" in wickedness. Nevertheless, God chooses to ordain such wickedness. 
ESV Psalm 22:8 "He trusts in the LORD; let him deliver him; let him rescue him, for he *delights* in him!"​Though this text has immediate reference to David, it refers ultimately to Christ. The Hebrew parallelism links "delights in him" with "let him deliver him." The full sense is "let God deliver the one in whom he delights since God delights to deliver those in whom he delights." Yet we know from the testimony of Scripture that God did chose not to fulfill this "delight" in order to obtain a greater objective. 

I could cite many more such passages. Therefore, the point of Psalm 115:3 is not that God is bound to bring into realization every object or event concerning which the divine _chaphats_ may be predicated. There are, according to the plain language of Scripture, things in which God "delights" but does not bring to pass. Hence, I am forced, by the analogy of Scripture, to read Psalm 115:3 as teaching that God is free and able to bring to fruition whichever of his manifold "delights" he sees fit to accomplish. 

Your servant,


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> I object to the contrast of God's decretive will as "proper" with God's revealed will as "improper" when the contrast is intended to convey the following ideas, which were advanced by the Rev. Winzer whom I respect but with whom on this particular issue I humbly disagree:
> 
> *(1) The "strict" meaning of will is volitional determination; hence, ideas like "wish" or "desire" to not belong to the "strict" meaning of "will." *



Not sure where this comes from as I readily accept that the words "desire" and "wish" are contextually related to the word "will" even in its reference to the preceptive will of God. In Psalm 51, God is said to desire truth in the inward parts and to not desire sacrifice, which clearly refer to what God requires of men.

I can't see why the word "improper" would cause a problem since it is accepted terminology amongst lexicographers. It does not suggest that the word should not be used, but only that it is not being used in the proper sense of "to will" or "to determine to do" a thing. That would seem to me to be fairly basic in any distinction that is made between "decretive" and "preceptive" will; a will of decree properly includes "determination" which is essential to "will," whereas a precept is given but may or may not be "determined" to come to pass, and hence the volitional aspect is wanting. But I'm not inclined to squabble over words, so if someone wants to take issue with the word "improper," I am happy to simply say that the word "will" is obviously being used in two different senses.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> I object to the contrast of God's decretive will as "proper" with God's revealed will as "improper" when the contrast is intended to convey the following ideas, which were advanced by the Rev. Winzer whom I respect but with whom on this particular issue I humbly disagree:
> 
> *(1) The "strict" meaning of will is volitional determination; hence, ideas like "wish" or "desire" to not belong to the "strict" meaning of "will." *
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Not sure where this comes from as I readily accept that the words "desire" and "wish" are contextually related to the word "will" even in its reference to the preceptive will of God. In Psalm 51, God is said to desire truth in the inward parts and to not desire sacrifice, which clearly refer to what God requires of men.
> 
> I can't see why the word "improper" would cause a problem since it is accepted terminology amongst lexicographers. It does not suggest that the word should not be used, but only that it is not being used in the proper sense of "to will" or "to determine to do" a thing. That would seem to me to be fairly basic in any distinction that is made between "decretive" and "preceptive" will; a will of decree properly includes "determination" which is essential to "will," whereas a precept is given but may or may not be "determined" to come to pass, and hence the volitional aspect is wanting. But I'm not inclined to squabble over words, so if someone wants to take issue with the word "improper," I am happy to simply say that the word "will" is obviously being used in two different senses.
Click to expand...


Matthew, 

In older linguistics, lexicographers attempted to get at the "root meaning" or "most basic" meaning of a term. Usually, the sense of a word that was used most frequently in the literature they examined was deemed by them the "root meaning" or "basic sense." I don't have access to the Oxford English Dictionary right now, which provides a diachronic history of terms, but I suspect that the "proper/improper" distinction may be related to this older approach to linguistics. Hence, since the ideas of "determination" and "choice" are probably used more frequently in connection with the noun "will," one could, following the older linguistic approach, view "determination" or "choice" as the "root meaning" of "will," that is, as its "proper" meaning. As you pointed out, this doesn't mean that its wrong to use "improper" senses of the term "will." It would only mean, under this model, that the reader understand those improper senses as being less related to the basic or root idea. This may explain why the older theologians spoke of God's will of decree as his proper will and his will of precept as his improper will. 

The science of linguistics, however, has moved away from attempting to pin some "basic" or "root" idea to a particular lexeme in the sense of making that sense more official or "proper" than others. This is not to say that certain ideas within the semantic range of a word may be used more frequently than others and, therefore, be considered more "primary." But the "primariness" is not related to the lexeme _per se_ but to its frequency of usage. In the case of "will," it's true that the noun is used more frequently to denote the ideas of "determination" or "choice." The term "will" is apparently used less frequently to denote the ideas of "wish" or "desire" (at least according to most dictionaries I've consulted. Hence, "determination" and "choice" are more primary (proper?); "wish" and "desire" are less primary (improper?). But the primariness or non-primariness is related not to some property or isolated value of the lexeme itself. Rather, its related to usage and context. 

Above you write, "a will of decree properly includes 'determination' which is essential to 'will.'" I do agree that "will" when modified by "decree" most certainly and "properly" includes "determination." But when you then say, "which is essential to 'will'" (emphasis added), I agree if you mean _when "will" is used on contexts speaking of God's decree_. When "will" is used in contexts that speak of "wish" or "desire" rather than "determination," then _in those contexts_ "wish" or "desire" becomes more "essential" or "proper." 

Accordingly, following what is sometimes called "descriptive linguistics," I am hesitant to make one sense of God's will proper and the other sense of God's will improper in any isolated and absolute sense. Rather, I find it more helpful to relate the predicate to the particular context or instance of usage. "Determination" and "choice" are the proper, basic, or strict ideas when God's decree is in view. On the other hand, "wish" or "desire" are more proper or basic in contexts when God's precept is in view. 

This may have been your intented approach above, and I may have misread you. If so, I apologize. Or, it may be that you prefer to follow the older linguistic approach that prescribes "root" or "basic" meanings to certain lexemes irrespective of usage or context. If so, I would commend to you the work of James Barr, _The Semantics of Biblical Language_ (Oxford, 1961), which seeks to show fallacies associated with the older approach and to provide evidence for the new approach using examples from Scripture.

Your closing statement reflects my own thoughts. I think we both agree that the term "will" as predicated of God and used in Scripture has different senses. What words we use to distinguish these senses is of lesser consequence provided that we attempt to make clear how we're using the terms and that are distinctions correspond to the state of affairs we're seeking to describe. 

Thanks for the interaction and your Christian chivalry.


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## Jimmy the Greek

I'm just going to add my  for the record, although I am not able to argue at the level of some of you.

First, acknowledging the Reformed distinction between God's decretive and preceptive wills, I tend to hold to Turretin's understanding, which I see generally in line with Matthew Winzer and Ruben.

Secondly, in the discussion above, I find Dabney's argument unsatisfying and dubious.

Thirdly, the quote from Frame does not mitigate against the view of Matthew Winzer or Ruben. Though it wouldn't matter to me whether Frame agreed or not.

Thirdley, I find Ruben's question below, quite germane.



py3ak said:


> If God has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill, does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?



I am unsatisfied with Bob's answer to this question via Jesus' desire to have the cup pass from him. I think this verse could be understood another way. Therefore, I would like to see another answer to Ruben's point. I failed to grasp the significance in Bob's analogies that followed, which is perhaps ignorance on my part.

Finally, I appreciate the discussion from all of you. Thanks for stimulating my thinking. But so far, I have not seen anything to change my mind.

Peace.


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## coramdeo

One of the main reasons I am a member of this board is to have my mind stretched by the discussions ...and you guys with "Dr." in your name sure do a good job of that!....just remember the rest of us ... sometimes the more I read the "confusder" I get.


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## OPC'n

I don't believe that God has two wills. He knows the future because He planned it the way He wanted it to happen. What would be the use in two wills? Also, God isn't fickled about His emotions concerning mankind. God's ultimate goal is His glory and He uses each and every living person to bring glory to Himself. Some do it by following the path of life and others the path of destruction. He doesn't on one hand regret that fact that He created a person to go to hell and then on the other hand find glory in doing so. This is how humans operate not God. I believe God loves eternally His children and hates eternally with a holy hatred His enemies. He has plan A and nothing will derail that plan.


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## py3ak

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Ruben,
> 
> Thanks for the gracious rejoinder! My earlier response took me longer than you may think. I'm really not a quick thinker or typist.
> 
> I don't want to belabor this issue since it has been hashed out thoroughly elsewhere on other threads as well as in essays and books. I would, however, offer brief responses to two remarks you made above.
> 
> First, you query: "If God has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill, does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?"
> 
> My simply answer is "no." Jesus, whom knowing we know the Father (John 14:7-9), desired for God to remove the cup from him (Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42). Nevertheless, he also desired to accomplish the work God had prepared for him to do (Ps. 40:7-8; John 4:34). That meant Jesus had to reject one desire (please remove this cup) in order to fulfill another desire, namely, to drink the cup.
> 
> If Jesus "has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill [keep in mind that Jesus voluntarily of _his own initiative_ took the cup, John 10:18], does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?" No. It was perfectly and morally appropriate and wise for Jesus to desire (as a sinless man) to avoid God's wrath. Nevertheless, there were other considerations that made Jesus decision to take the cup a wiser course of action.
> 
> Analogously, whatever God desires is consistent with his wisdom. God doesn't wish for ideals that are unwise. But apparently, God may choose to bring to fruition one desire and not another because he deems such a course of action wiser.



Dr. Gonzales, I don't believe the analogy from Christ in Gethsemane is good: Christ is also man. It is man's place to submit to God's will, even when that will is directed against what in ordinary circumstances is proper (e.g., Abraham's offering of Isaac). But God does not _submit_ to Himself, anymore than God _rules over_ Himself.



Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Second, you assert: "Psalm 115:3 says more than just that God is free and able to do whatever He wants: it says that He actually _does_ all He pleases. If He does all He pleases, there is nothing He pleases to do that is not done."
> 
> I respectfully disagree with your exegesis. The word translated "pleases" is the Hebrew _chaphats_. It denotes "delight" or "pleasure." To interpret the verse to mean that God brings to fruition everything concerning which he has _chaphats_ is to ignore the plain teaching of other texts:
> ESV 1 Samuel 15:22 And Samuel said, "Has the LORD as great *delight* in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the LORD? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to listen than the fat of rams.​God "delights" when his people, in this case Saul, obey his voice. But God does not bring all his "delights" to fruition.
> ESV Psalm 5:4 For you are *not* a God who *delights* in wickedness; evil may not dwell with you.​Here God does not "delight" in wickedness. Nevertheless, God chooses to ordain such wickedness.
> ESV Psalm 22:8 "He trusts in the LORD; let him deliver him; let him rescue him, for he *delights* in him!"​Though this text has immediate reference to David, it refers ultimately to Christ. The Hebrew parallelism links "delights in him" with "let him deliver him." The full sense is "let God deliver the one in whom he delights since God delights to deliver those in whom he delights." Yet we know from the testimony of Scripture that God did chose not to fulfill this "delight" in order to obtain a greater objective.
> 
> I could cite many more such passages. Therefore, the point of Psalm 115:3 is not that God is bound to bring into realization every object or event concerning which the divine _chaphats_ may be predicated. There are, according to the plain language of Scripture, things in which God "delights" but does not bring to pass. Hence, I am forced, by the analogy of Scripture, to read Psalm 115:3 as teaching that God is free and able to bring to fruition whichever of his manifold "delights" he sees fit to accomplish.
> 
> Your servant,



In Psalm 115:3 what is the force of the word _whatsoever_? Is there any reason to restrict it? 
To me it seems quite patent that here "delights" has the force of "decrees", which is not surprising because we know that God ordains things _according to the good pleasure of His will_. At this point another distinction may be useful: that between the will _eudokias_ (Matthew 11:26 & Ephesians 1:5) and the will _euarestias_ (Romans 12:2, Ephesians 5:10). That sufficiently explains the first two references you give.
As for Psalm 22, the fact is that God _did_ deliver Him, though it was not in the way the mockers expected.


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> The science of linguistics, however, has moved away from attempting to pin some "basic" or "root" idea to a particular lexeme in the sense of making that sense more official or "proper" than others.



The root fallacy really has nothing to do with what we are discussing as I haven't appealed to etymology but to "use in context." Besides, modern biblical linguists post Barr only maintain that a word's etymology may or may not affect its meaning, not that it never affects its meaning. And there is an ongoing debate between realist and non-realist approaches to linguistics, and orthodoxy's commitment to revealed verbal theology depends on a realist commitment to meaning. At any rate, both sides of that debate allow for proper meanings of shared technical vocabulary, and the word "will" is a clear example of a technical word being used with shared understanding by the author and the community to whom he writes. But, as stated, I see no benefit squabbling over words. By virtue of the decretive-preceptive distinction, we are bound to acknowledge two distinct senses in which the word "will" is understood. As "decree" by very nature is determinative, and "precept" by very nature is not, it should be obvious that the distinct uses of the word "will" includes a determinative and non-determinative sense. When one seeks to introduce a determinative sense to the preceptive will of God he can only be regarded as introducing a third distinction which has not been historically accepted.


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## Jimmy the Greek

The problem is exacerbated when published theologians introduce the idea of a "desiderative will" that is somehow distinct from both the traditional decretive (volitional) and preceptive (non-volitional) aspects. 

As I've said before, Piper seems to do this when he suggests that God volitionally desires the saving of the reprobate but this is trumped by a higher desire to manifest his glory by actually saving only some. He puts it this way:

Quote:
God's expression of pity and his entreaties have heart in them. There is a genuine inclination in God's heart to spare those who have committed treason against his kingdom. But his motivation is complex, and not every true element in it rises to the level of effective choice. In his great and mysterious heart there are kinds of longings and desires that are real— they tell us something true about his character. Yet not all of these longings govern God's actions. He is governed by the depth of his wisdom expressed through a plan that no ordinary human deliberation would ever conceive (Romans 11:33-36; 1 Corinthians 2:9). There are holy and just reasons for why the affections of God's heart have the nature and intensity and proportion that they do. (Piper, Are There Two Wills in God?) 

As I recall, Piper also refers to Dabney for support here. But this still seems to leave a God who is (to some extent) eternally frustrated -- since some of his "longings" are not realized. However, Scripture says that God does what He desires, and whatever He desires He does. So that's where I am having a little trouble.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

Gomarus said:


> The problem is exacerbated when published theologians introduce the idea of a "desiderative will" that is somehow distinct from both the traditional decretive (volitional) and preceptive (non-volitional) aspects.
> 
> As I've said before, Piper seems to do this when he suggests that God volitionally desires the saving of the reprobate but this is trumped by a higher desire to manifest his glory by actually saving only some. He puts it this way:
> 
> Quote:
> God's expression of pity and his entreaties have heart in them. There is a genuine inclination in God's heart to spare those who have committed treason against his kingdom. But his motivation is complex, and not every true element in it rises to the level of effective choice. In his great and mysterious heart there are kinds of longings and desires that are real— they tell us something true about his character. Yet not all of these longings govern God's actions. He is governed by the depth of his wisdom expressed through a plan that no ordinary human deliberation would ever conceive (Romans 11:33-36; 1 Corinthians 2:9). There are holy and just reasons for why the affections of God's heart have the nature and intensity and proportion that they do. (Piper, Are There Two Wills in God?)
> 
> As I recall, Piper also refers to Dabney for support here. But this still seems to leave a God who is (to some extent) eternally frustrated -- since some of his "longings" are not realized. However, Scripture says that God does what He desires, and whatever He desires He does. So that's where I am having a little trouble.



Jim and Ruben,

I'm sorry you're having a little trouble. But in my humble opinion, whenever we attempt with our human minds to trace out all the connections between God's decrees and his revealed desires we're bound to have some difficulty in fully grasping how they relate to his ultimate wisdom, happiness, and glory. Here's what I believe the Bible teaches:

(1) All God's decrees (choices made in eternity past) inexorably come to pass--not one fails. 
(2) Every decree that God brings into being (via providence), he (at some level) desires to come to pass. Note carefully, the qualifier. God's delight in bringing about David's repentance was at a different level than His desire to bring about David's fall into adultery and murder. While I think few of us would hesitate in giving God all the glory and praise for whatever virtue David exhibited, not one of us would dare charge God with being the author of David's sin. Hence, we need to make the distinction above. 
(3) God's preceptive will does not merely reflect what man ought to do, as if the "oughtness" or human duty could be abstracted from God's own inclination or will. So, one one hand, there's the text Ruben cited:ESV Psalm 115:3 Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he *pleases*[_chaphats_].​To this I might add (Ps. 135:6; Isa. 46:10; 48:14; 53:10; 55:11). These are obviously speak of God's decree. With Jim and Ruben, I agree that all DECREE-DESIRES come to pass. However, in contrast with Jim and Ruben, I do believe (on the basis of Scripture's testimony) that God has some DESIRES that are NOT DECREED and that, therefore, do not come to pass. Consider:ESV 1 Samuel 15:22 And Samuel said, "Has the LORD as great *delight* [_chaphats_] in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the LORD? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to listen than the fat of rams.​Please note: same Hebrew word. The term refers not merely to "determinations" or "decisions" but to "inclinations," "desires," "preferences," "pleasures." So, a plain reading of the text indicates that God WANTED, that is, DESIRED King Saul to obey rather than to engage in empty ritual. Of course, this is referring to God's preceptive will. Nevertheless, God's preceptive will refers here not merely to something King Saul OUGHT TO DO but to some God WANTED King Saul do to. 

Then comes along a verse like Proverbs 21:1:ESV Proverbs 21:1 The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it wherever *he will* [_chaphats_].​Interestingly, this verse not only employs the same Hebrew word for "desire" or "delight," as those above, but it also employs the Hebrew phrase col-'usher, meaning something like "whatever," "whenever," "whichever," etc. 

Now, let's try to harmonize the logic here:(1) God takes delight in obedient kings (1 Sam. 15:22)
(2) God turns the heart of kings in the direction he takes delight (Prov. 21:1). 
(3) Indeed, God does whatever he delights in doing (Pss. 115:3; 135:6). 
(4) But in fact, God did not decree to bring about the obedience he desired from Saul. ​There is, I hope you see, an apparent incongruity, at least at a grammatical level. Now it seems to me (and I may be wrong) that there are some on this list who want to reserve the terminology or concept of divine delight to God's decretive will alone. Hence, if God delights in a certain state of affairs, he is bound to bring it into being. Yet there are clear texts that employ the exact same terminology describing states of affairs in which God delights or doesn't delight but does not always in every case choose to bring into realization or refrain from bringing into realization (compare Pss. 5:4; 51:6, 17-18; 147:10; Eccl. 5:4; Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11; Hos. 6:6; Mic. 7:18; Mal. 1:10). 

Note carefully: God *takes delight* [_chaphats_] in the prospect that all people practice loyalty, justice, and righteousness in the earth (Jer. 9:24; cf. Isa. 56:4). BUT GOD DOESN'T DECREE THAT THIS DESIRED END BE FULLY REALIZED IN EVERY PERSON! Conversely, God does not take delight in human disobedience: "I also will choose harsh treatment for them and bring their fears upon them, because when I called, no one answered, when I spoke, they did not listen; but they did what was evil in my eyes and chose that in which I did not *delight* [_chaphats_]. BUT GOD DOES DECREE THAT CERTAIN PEOPLE DO THE VERY THING IN WHICH HE DOES NOT TAKE DELIGHT.

It seems to me that the High Calvinist wants to reserve language of desire and delight when predicated of God to God's decree (Ps. 115:3). Unfortunately, the Bible does not accommodate them. So, when God is said to delight in something he chooses not to bring to pass, then the reader is instructed to "interpret" that desire "anthropothatically," that is, not literally. The best it teaches is what we ought to do and what God (in some abstract sense) approves. Why not also interpret God's decretive delight anthropopathically, then? If there was every an area in which the Creator-creature distinction was great, it would be in the area of the divine decree. So maybe Psalm 115:3 means something other than it says!

Personally, I think there's a better way, the way I've sought to argue for in my posts above. God can have a myriad of desires but He is free to choose which of those desires he deems best to realize in the interests of his ultimate plan to effect his glory and the happiness of his elect. 

Consider the following passage, which illustrates that God can have *layered desires*:ESV Hosea 6:6 For *I desire* [_chaphats_] steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings.​Note carefully, the text does NOT teach that God despised or hated or had no desire for sacrifice or burnt offering. In reality, God desired both sacrifices AND steadfast love. However, the contrast (as rightly interpreted by the ESV translators) is one of priority. God's desire for heart devotion took greater precedence than his desire for religious ritual. It was, as Jesus says elsewhere, a "weightier commandment" (Matt. 23:23). 

Consequently, I wholeheartedly affirm on the basis of Scripture that every single one of God's decrees comes to pass without exception. With regard to God's decree, no one can resist his will (Rom. 9:19). But Ruben thinks such an affirmation requires one to affirm also, on the basis of Psalm 115:5, "if [God] does all He pleases, there is nothing He pleases to do that is not done." 

Here is where I apparently differ with some of you, I do not believe God brings to pass every state of affairs in which *he takes delight* [_chaphats_]. To affirm such would be to deny the testimony of Scripture, which I dare not do. Some have labeled my approach "squeamish Calvinism." I prefer to call it "cautious Calvinism." 

But, says Ruben, doesn't this leave God with some unfufilled desires? "If God has desires He has _wisely_ chosen not to fulfill," says Ruben, "does this not necessarily entail that those desires were _unwise_?"

I tried to answer this question by noting that Christ had two desires: On the one hand, he desired not to drink the cup of God's wrath. Certainly, that desire was not sinful and if not sinful, then not _unwise_. Yet, just as God could have layered desires, so could Jesus (who was the exact visible representation of God). So he chose a higher desire, namely, to accomplish the work of redemption.

Let me offer another illustration: The apostle Paul found himself in a strait. On the one hand, he desired to depart and to be with Christ, for that was, in his words, far better. On the other hand, he desired to be as useful to the church on earth as long as possible and to fulfill his earthly mission, which might mean that he not depart. "I am pressured by both," Paul says (Phil. 1:21-25, CSB). Neither of these desires were sinful or unwise. God would, no doubt, do what He deemed best for Paul. But he would not hold Paul guilty of folly or sin because Paul happened (as it latter turned out) to desire an end (to die immediately and be with Christ) which God had not decreed!

God, according to the passages I cited above, chooses not to decree and bring into realization every single state of affairs in which he "*takes delight" *[_chaphats_]. He "*took delight*" [_chaphats_] in the prospect that King Saul would obey him (1 Sam. 15:22). God even had the power to bring about that obedience--to turn Saul's heart in what every direction God "*took delight*" [_chaphats_] (Prov. 21:1). Yet, God chose not to turn Saul's heart, something He desired, presumably because God has other desires that took precedence over the particular desire he had for Saul's obedience. Should we interpret God's failure to turn Saul's heart towards obedience, a state of affairs that God himself at one level desired, as unwise simply because God chose not to do so? God forbid!

This is precisely how I interpret Deuteronomy 5:29. God strongly desired, _which is the precise import of the optative construction_, that the Israelites of whom he spoke would manifest genuine and lasting loyalty that it might go well for them and their descendants forever. But God reserves the right to choose which of his manifold desires to effect by decree and providence which which not to effect by decree and providence. Hence, I read Psalm 115:3 to teach that God brings to pass all of _those desires_ that he has desired to bring to pass. The fact that God does not decree everyone of his desires does not at all necessitate the blasphemous conclusion that there is a lack of wisdom in God. 

Respectfully yours,


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

Just one more brief clarification. 

Rev. Winzer above (post 24) writes: As "decree" by very nature is determinative, and "precept" by very nature is not, it should be obvious that the distinct uses of the word "will" includes a determinative and non-determinative sense. When one seeks to introduce a determinative sense to the preceptive will of God he can only be regarded as introducing a third distinction which has not been historically accepted."

Before that he wrote (post 14): "But as Dr. Bob's post goes on to speak of God's will of precept in terms of what "shall be" rather than what "should be," he introduces a third category of "will" into the discussion, which basically maintains that God wills things "to be" conditioned on the will of the creature. This third category of "will" has no precedent in reformed theology and was outrightly rejected by reformed theologians when attempted to be introduced by the defenders of the Remonstrant cause."

I'm really not sure what in any of my posts the Rev. Winzer has in view. I have not (to my knowledge) tried to posit a third category. God's so-called desiderative wish or desire in Deuteronomy 5:29 is not part of his decree and is, therefore, part of his revealed will. I don't recall saying that what God "wished" in this instance "shall" or "would" actually come to pass, but I said the opposite. 

Do God's decrees include "wishes" and "desires." Sure, according to Scripture. In that sense, even God's decrees contain a desiderative element as well as determinative element. But just as the desiderative element in God's decree is genuine, so the desiderative element in God's revealed will is genuine.


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## timmopussycat

Gomarus said:


> The problem is exacerbated when published theologians introduce the idea of a "desiderative will" that is somehow distinct from both the traditional decretive (volitional) and preceptive (non-volitional) aspects.
> 
> As I've said before, Piper seems to do this when he suggests that God volitionally desires the saving of the reprobate but this is trumped by a higher desire to manifest his glory by actually saving only some. He puts it this way:
> 
> Quote:
> God's expression of pity and his entreaties have heart in them. There is a genuine inclination in God's heart to spare those who have committed treason against his kingdom. But his motivation is complex, and not every true element in it rises to the level of effective choice. In his great and mysterious heart there are kinds of longings and desires that are real— they tell us something true about his character. Yet not all of these longings govern God's actions. He is governed by the depth of his wisdom expressed through a plan that no ordinary human deliberation would ever conceive (Romans 11:33-36; 1 Corinthians 2:9). There are holy and just reasons for why the affections of God's heart have the nature and intensity and proportion that they do. (Piper, Are There Two Wills in God?)
> 
> As I recall, Piper also refers to Dabney for support here. But this still seems to leave a God who is (to some extent) eternally frustrated -- since some of his "longings" are not realized. However, Scripture says that God does what He desires, and whatever He desires He does. So that's where I am having a little trouble.



I don't think Piper would consent to the idea that his view leaves God frustrated. Rather he clearly presents God as being ultimately satisfied in all he does. God is not unsatisfied by the unfulfilled nature of some of his longings since he gains a superior satisfaction by the fulfillment of the longings that block the fulfillment of the unfulfilled ones.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

timmopussycat said:


> I don't think Piper would consent to the idea that his view leaves God frustrated. Rather he clearly presents God as being ultimately satisfied in all he does. God is not unsatisfied by the unfulfilled nature of some of his longings since he gains a superior satisfaction by the fulfillment of the longings that block the fulfillment of the unfulfilled ones.



Tim,

Well-said!


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## py3ak

I was wondering last night if perhaps the reason we don't make much progress in seeing eye to eye on this point has to do with an unexpected difference between us. Some things, of course, are probably just issues that are so obvious to us we don't see the need to explain them: that God _announcing his moral delight_ in something shows a _desire_ to bring something about to me seems like a clearly unwarranted assumption; to Dr. Gonzales, it would seem, its warrant is quite obvious.

But getting back to my pondering last night, I wondered if this came down to a difference in our perspective on psychology. This speculation may be off base, and I would be glad for more complete information on it, but it seems that since Edwards (or before?) the idea is current that the _will_ follows the _affections_. But listen to Turretin:


> ...original righteousness, which was created with man and bestowed upon him at his origin, embracing wisdom in the mind, holiness in the will, and rectitude and good order (_eutaxian_) in the affections. It bespeaks such a harmony among all his faculties that the members obey the affections, the affections the will, the will reason, reason the divine law, and thus the man exists upright and innocent and without sin....


(_Institutes_ V. X,8)

Of course now, as fallen creatures, our affections often obey our members and our will our affections. But it isn't supposed to be like that. But it seems to me that in thinking that God could have _conflicting_ desires we are assuming that will following affections is normative; but the quote from Turretin shows that this is by no means an automatic assumption. If we think that affections follow will (really in the holy) then God will not _want_ or _wish_ anything which He does not _determine_.


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> I'm really not sure what in any of my posts the Rev. Winzer has in view. I have not (to my knowledge) tried to posit a third category. God's so-called desiderative wish or desire in Deuteronomy 5:29 is not part of his decree and is, therefore, part of his revealed will. I don't recall saying that what God "wished" in this instance "shall" or "would" actually come to pass, but I said the opposite.



Bob, According to an earlier post you agreed that the decretive will concerned what "shall be" and the preceptive will what "should be." When, however, you interpret the divine optatives of Scripture in a literal way you present a preceptive will which concerns things which "shall be" contingent on man's obedience. The same historic reformed theology which brought you the decretive-preceptive distinction also maintained that divine optatives were speeches after the manner of men. You are claiming to maintain a reformed distinction while at the same time repudiating the distinction by rejecting the reformed understanding of divine optatives.


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## MW

timmopussycat said:


> I don't think Piper would consent to the idea that his view leaves God frustrated. Rather he clearly presents God as being ultimately satisfied in all he does. God is not unsatisfied by the unfulfilled nature of some of his longings since he gains a superior satisfaction by the fulfillment of the longings that block the fulfillment of the unfulfilled ones.



If Scripture is to be interpreted literally in the case of divine desires for things that shall never come to pass, then it should be taken literally when God is presented as"sorrowing" and "grieving" over these unfulfilled desires.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

py3ak said:


> I was wondering last night if perhaps the reason we don't make much progress in seeing eye to eye on this point has to do with an unexpected difference between us. Some things, of course, are probably just issues that are so obvious to us we don't see the need to explain them: that God _announcing his moral delight_ in something shows a _desire_ to bring something about to me seems like a clearly unwarranted assumption; to Dr. Gonzales, it would seem, it's warrant is quite obvious.
> 
> But getting back to my pondering last night, I wondered if this came down to a difference in our perspective on psychology. This speculation may be off base, and I would be glad for more complete information on it, but it seems that since Edwards (or before?) the idea is current that the _will_ follows the _affections_. But listen to Turretin:
> 
> 
> 
> ...original righteousness, which was created with man and bestowed upon him at his origin, embracing wisdom in the mind, holiness in the will, and rectitude and good order (_eutaxian_) in the affections. It bespeaks such a harmony among all his faculties that the members obey the affections, the affections the will, the will reason, reason the divine law, and thus the man exists upright and innocent and without sin....
> 
> 
> 
> (_Institutes_ V. X,8)
> 
> Of course now, as fallen creatures, our affections often obey our members and our will our affections. But it isn't supposed to be like that. But it seems to me that in thinking that God could have _conflicting_ desires we are assuming that will following affections is normative; but the quote from Turretin shows that this is by no means an automatic assumption. If we think that affections follow will (really in the holy) then God will not _want_ or _wish_ anything which He does not _determine_.
Click to expand...


Ruben,

I'm in the middle of writing another article, so I don't have time to carry on this discussion but hope to come back to it later. Short answer: I do not follow Turretin's "primacy of the intellect." The reason sinners don't come to Christ cannot be narrowed down to bad thinking. One might argue the reverse: they don't think rightly about Christ, perceiving his moral excellency, because they don't want to--their affections are depraved. Moreover, like Edwards, I don't draw a dichotomy between the will and the affections. Biblically speaking, man ultimately has one faculty. It's called "the heart," which is cognitive, volitional, and emotive in nature. They are all interrelated and interdependent. 

One other thing. You said: "that God _announcing his moral delight_ in something shows a _desire_ to bring something about to me seems like a clearly unwarranted assumption; to Dr. Gonzales, it would seem, it's warrant is quite obvious." Once again, listen to Scripture:ESV Hosea 6:6 For *I desire* steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings.​No assumptions here. Just Bible. Does God actually choose to bring this desire to realization in the case of every human being? Nope. Never said that! But I did say that God has some desires that he does bring about (decrees) and some desires that he doesn't bring about but reveals to us in his word. Why does he not choose to bring about those un-decreed desires? See Tim Cunningham's response above.

Gotta go but hope to come back to this later.

-----Added 5/5/2009 at 07:49:42 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'm really not sure what in any of my posts the Rev. Winzer has in view. I have not (to my knowledge) tried to posit a third category. God's so-called desiderative wish or desire in Deuteronomy 5:29 is not part of his decree and is, therefore, part of his revealed will. I don't recall saying that what God "wished" in this instance "shall" or "would" actually come to pass, but I said the opposite.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Bob, According to an earlier post you agreed that the decretive will concerned what "shall be" and the preceptive will what "should be." When, however, you interpret the divine optatives of Scripture in a literal way you present a preceptive will which concerns things which "shall be" contingent on man's obedience. The same historic reformed theology which brought you the decretive-preceptive distinction also maintained that divine optatives were speeches after the manner of men. You are claiming to maintain a reformed distinction while at the same time repudiating the distinction by rejecting the reformed understanding of divine optatives.
Click to expand...


Matthew,

I did not interpret the optative as referring to things that "shall be" contingent on man's obedience as an Arminian might do who ignores the fact that man's obedience, upon which the realized promise is contingent, is itself contingent on God's regenerating grace which in turn is contingent on God's decree. I interpreted the optative as referring to (1) what God desired to be but did not decree for other reasons and (2) what "would have been" had God chosen to give the Israelites circumcised hearts. Jesus himself used such language: ESV Matthew 11:21 "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, *they would have repented* long ago in sackcloth and ashes.​You go on to say: "The same historic reformed theology which brought you the decretive-preceptive distinction also maintained that divine optatives were speeches after the manner of men." That we are to interpret all language about God "after the manner of men" I hold. That we are to explain away the force of optatives I do not hold, nor am I convinced that this is the official, Confessionally endorsed manner in which all optatives must be interpreted. Would Professor John Murray agree with you?

Sorry, gotta go and work on another paper. Blessings!


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> I did not interpret the optative as referring to things that "shall be" contingent on man's obedience (as an Arminian might do). I interpreted the optative as referring to (1) what God desired to be but did not decree for other reasons and (2) what "would have been" had God chosen to give the Israelites circumcised hearts.



First, the texts which include the divine optatives express a state conditional on man. E.g., Ps. 81:13, "Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways." If one is going to insist that the optatives express a literal desire in God for the futurition of His blessings then one cannot ignore the fact that these blessings are expressly said to be contingent upon what man does. There is no liberty to read the theological concept of irresistible grace into the optatives in order to make them conditional on God's saving activity, especially considering that this is a facet of the decretive will, and your whole case for literalism depends on a "tension" between the decretive and preceptive aspects of God's will.

Secondly, your subpoint (2) conclusively proves that you are in fact introducing a third aspect into the will of God, because you teach that God expresses a desire for things that "would have been" under different circumstances. Hence you teach that God has a "will" for the futurition of events which is non-determinative. This is nothing other than the Arminian concept of "conditional will."


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## py3ak

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Ruben,
> 
> I'm in the middle of writing another article, so I don't have time to carry on this discussion but hope to come back to it later. Short answer: I do not follow Turretin's "primacy of the intellect." The reason sinners don't come to Christ cannot be narrowed down to bad thinking. One might argue the reverse: they don't think rightly about Christ, perceiving his moral excellency, because they don't want to--their affections are depraved. Moreover, like Edwards, I don't draw a dichotomy between the will and the affections. Biblically speaking, man ultimately has one faculty. It's called "the heart," which is cognitive, volitional, and emotive in nature. They are all interrelated and interdependent.
> 
> One other thing. You said: "that God _announcing his moral delight_ in something shows a _desire_ to bring something about to me seems like a clearly unwarranted assumption; to Dr. Gonzales, it would seem, it's warrant is quite obvious." Once again, listen to Scripture:
> ESV Hosea 6:6 For *I desire* steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings.​No assumptions here. Just Bible. Does God actually choose to bring this desire to realization in the case of every human being? Nope. Never said that! But I did say that God has some desires that he does bring about (decrees) and some desires that he doesn't bring about but reveals to us in his word. Why does he not choose to bring about those un-decreed desires? See Tim Cunningham's response above.
> 
> Gotta go but hope to come back to this later.



Dr. Gonzales, you are reasoning from how _sinful_ man operates in rejecting Christ. I understand that many will not hold to the reason directing the will, but that argument in itself is not very strong support. Of course their affections are depraved - so are their minds. God's work in effectual calling, of course, addresses the whole man. But in any case I think this difference in our views of psychology goes a long way in explanation of our other differences.

Hosea 6:6 has another instance of the word we've been discussing. Since we've spoken of its semantic range before, it hardly needs to be mentioned that we can't _automatically_ take it to be speaking of _rejected_ desires in God (because though He felt (?) them, He chose not to carry them out).


----------



## Dr. Bob Gonzales

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> I did not interpret the optative as referring to things that "shall be" contingent on man's obedience (as an Arminian might do). I interpreted the optative as referring to (1) what God desired to be but did not decree for other reasons and (2) what "would have been" had God chosen to give the Israelites circumcised hearts.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> First, the texts which include the divine optatives express a state conditional on man. E.g., Ps. 81:13, "Oh that my people had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways." If one is going to insist that the optatives express a literal desire in God for the futurition of His blessings then one cannot ignore the fact that these blessings are expressly said to be contingent upon what man does. There is no liberty to read the theological concept of irresistible grace into the optatives in order to make them conditional on God's saving activity, especially considering that this is a facet of the decretive will, and your whole case for literalism depends on a "tension" between the decretive and preceptive aspects of God's will.
> 
> Secondly, your subpoint (2) conclusively proves that you are in fact introducing a third aspect into the will of God, because you teach that God expresses a desire for things that "would have been" under different circumstances. Hence you teach that God has a "will" for the futurition of events which is non-determinative. This is nothing other than the Arminian concept of "conditional will."
Click to expand...


Matthew,

The futurition of God's promises or curses are proximately contingent on human response but ultimately dependent on divine decree. Indeed, the human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's unconditional decree. Does that make me an Arminian?  Thanks for the complement.


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Does that make me an Arminian?



John Owen's Display of Arminianism certainly contains rebuttals to various teachings which you advocate in this area, including the concept of "conditional will."


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> Does that make me an Arminian?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> John Owen's Display of Arminianism certainly contains rebuttals to various teachings which you advocate in this area, including the concept of "conditional will."
Click to expand...


Matthew,

I said, "The futurition of God's promises or curses are proximately contingent on human response but ultimately dependent on divine decree. Indeed, the human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's unconditional decree."

Then I asked (with reference to the above), "Does that make me an Arminian?"

You replied, "John Owen's Display of Arminianism certainly contains rebuttals to various teachings which you advocate in this area, including the concept of 'conditional will.'"

(1) Whose "will" are you talking about when you say "conditional will"? God's or man's?
(2) "Conditional" on what? Are you making a difference between proximate and ultimate? Do you understand that distinction? "if we confess Jesus as Lord and believe in our heart that God has raised him from the dead, we'll be saved" (Rom. 10:9). So the proximate condition for salvation is saving faith. Nevertheless, only those whom the father draws (John 6:44), who have been ordained (via decree) to eternal life will actually fulfill this "condition." Hence, God's decree (which is not contingent upon some "foreseen" response) is the ultimate condition of our salvation. 
(3) I've just affirmed (above) the (ultimately) unconditional nature of God's decree with reference both to the actuation of human responses as well as to the futurition of divine sanctions (blessings or curse). Please direct me to the pages where Owen unveils such a view as Arminianism. I own his Works, so it would help if you gave me volume and page numbers. 
(4) How does my statement above conflict with the 2nd London Baptist Confession of 1689? Please provide the chapter(s), paragraph(s), and appropriate arguments. 

Thanks!


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Please direct me to the pages where Owen unveils such a view as Arminianism. I own his Works, so it would help if you gave me volume and page numbers.



For starters, please consult volume 10, and the paragraph which concludes p. 25, and continues to p. 26.


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## Prufrock

armourbearer said:


> For starters, please consult volume 10, and the paragraph which concludes p. 25, and continues to p. 26.



Can you provide the the opening words to the paragraph? I have a different edition, and can ballpark where you're referring, but would like to be sure as to which paragraph you intend.


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## py3ak

A Brakel also addresses himself to this topic:



> In making a distinction in the will of God, we are not suggesting that God has two wills. In God the act of the will is singular. The difference rather relates to the objects towards whom His will is exercised. Much less do we suggest that God has two wills which are incompatible, as if God with His revealed will would desire something and His secret will would be opposed. When we consider the will of God as being either secret or revealed, this distinction pertains to decidedly different matters, some of which are revealed whereas others are not. The secret and revealed will of God neither relate to one and the same matter, nor should they be viewed from the same perspective. Let me illustrate. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice and kill His son Isaac; nevertheless, it was not God’s will that Isaac would die. This became evident from the outcome. There is a distinction here between the command and the result. God’s command was His revealed or preceptive will, which was the basis for Abraham’s behavior. He had to do everything which would contribute to the death of his son, which he also did. The result—that the death of Isaac would not take place by Abraham’s activity—was another matter and belonged to the secret will of God’s decree which Abraham perceived afterward when the voice of God prevented him. There should therefore be no concern as to what will should govern our behavior, as the Lord’s secret will is solely His domain and against it we cannot sin. God will accomplish His good pleasure. Nevertheless, it is expressed in God’s revealed will that we are to exercise confidence and subjection towards His secret will. It is His revealed will, however, which must be regulative for our behavior and it is in regard to the latter that we are guilty of sin.
> 
> .....
> 
> When God is said to desire something which does not occur, such as when He states, “O that there were such a heart in them, that they would fear Me, . . . that it might be well with them, and with their children for ever!” (Deut. 5:29), or, “O that thou hadst hearkened to My commandments! then had thy peace been as a river” (Isa. 48:18), He is speaking in the manner of men. Strictly speaking, such can never be said concerning the omniscient, omnipotent, immutable, and most perfect God. Rather, it indicates God’s displeasure toward sin and how He delights in holiness. It indicates that sin is the reason why those blessings are withheld from them—blessings which they, according to His promise, would have received as a reward upon godliness. The promises are made upon condition of obedience which is granted to the elect according to God’s immutable purpose. When God says, “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die? saith the Lord God: and not that He should return from His ways, and live?” (Ezek. 18:23), this does not suggest that God’s will is impotent. Rather, it indicates that God has no pleasure in the destruction of men, inasmuch as they are His creatures. He has pleasure in the exercise of righteousness and godliness, and in blessing the godly.



Wilhelmus a Brakel, _The Christian's Reasonable Service, Volumes 1 and 2 : In Which Divine Truths Concerning the Covenant of Grace Are Expounded, Defended Against Opposing Parties, and Their Practice Advocated as Well as The Administration of This Covenant in the Old and New Testaments_, Published in Electronic Form by Christian Classics Foundation, 1996., electronic ed. of the first publication in the English language, based on the 3rd edition of the original Dutch work. (Morgan PA: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1996, c1992), 1:114,117.​
In anthropopathic expressions, God indicates a change in His proceeding by using terms that reflect the cause of a similar change in human beings. Thus when God repents for making man, His proceeding towards men is changing - He is going to drown all but 8 of them. Similarly when He remembers His covenant: He is now going to take action upon it. We know, however, that God did not forget anything, and that it was always His plan to bring in the flood upon the world of the ungodly.
So when God expresses Himself anthropopathically as having unfulfilled wishes He indicates that He has not hindered the obedience or repentance He has wished for (indeed, He has provided means that tend to that end).


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> Please direct me to the pages where Owen unveils such a view as Arminianism. I own his Works, so it would help if you gave me volume and page numbers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> For starters, please consult volume 10, and the paragraph which concludes p. 25, and continues to p. 26.
Click to expand...


Matthew is referring to Owen's _A Display of Arminianism_, Chapter III, which deals with the question of God's prescience or foreknowledge. The paragraph he has in minds opens thus:

"Secondly, They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. "We grant," saith Corvinus, "that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled" (p. 25). Owen goes on to argue that such concepts as God "expecting" something to happen should be interpreted anthropopathically and not literally. 

*Rejoinder*: Because this statement bears some semblance to my comments above, Matthew thinks that what I affirm is, to use his words, "nothing other than the Arminian concept of 'conditional will.'" I have flatly denied this throughout. For some reason, though, Matthew seemed to ignore those places where I make both the human action and the divine blessing/curse contingent on God's unconditional decree. 

Be that as it may, let me help the reader interpret Owen's comments in their context, something Rev. Winzer fails to do. 

(1) Note first that I have not argued that God "properly expects" the desires he does not decree to come to pass. True, I have affirmed that according to Deuteronomy 5:29, God desires that all sinners (irrespective of whether they're the elect or no) truly repent and believe and be saved (which is the position of Professor John Murray, hardly an Arminian). There are many other things that God desires (like universal obedience to His moral law) that he does not decree. While I affirm the analogical nature of all human language, I don't feel compulsion from the exegetical data or the analogy of faith to employ a kind of anthropopathic hermeneutic that practically obscures all correspondence and only emphasizes discorrespondence. In this sense, I do disagree with Owen's use of anthropopathism to explain away divine emotivity (a topic I've already discussed elsewhere). But I agree with Owen's position, namely, that God only expects to happen (in the sense of a confident expectation in the realization of future events) what he decrees will happen. 

(2) Owen's 2nd paragraph is followed by a 1st paragraph in which Owen exposes the Arminian view of God's decree as being "conditional." "For instance," says Owen, "God willeth that all men should be saved. This act of his will, according to the Arminian doctrine, is his conditional decree to save all men if they will believe. Well, among these is Judas, as equal a sharer in the benefit of this decree as Peter" (p. 25). Note carefully that for the Arminian, God's decree is ultimately conditional on human response. Contrast that with my position, which I communicated to Matthew earlier:"The futurition of God's promises or curses are proximately contingent on human response but ultimately dependent on divine decree. Indeed, the human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's *unconditional decree*[emphasis added]."​Again,"If we confess Jesus as Lord and believe in our heart that God has raised him from the dead, we'll be saved" (Rom. 10:9). So the proximate condition for salvation is saving faith. Nevertheless, *only those* whom the father draws (John 6:44), *who have been ordained (via decree)* to eternal life will actually fulfill this "condition." Hence, *God's decree (which is not contingent upon some "foreseen" response) is the ultimate condition of our salvation*" (emphasis added).​So I clearly affirm that God's decrees are not conditioned on anything _ad extra_, that is, outside of God. They are, in that sense, unconditional. This point is vitally important to remember for a proper interpretation of Owen's 2nd paragraph. 

(3) Equally important is what Owen says in his 3rd paragraph. "They teach," says Owen, "that God hath determined nothing concerning such things as these in question." Then he quotes Arminius: "That God hath determined future contigent things unto either part (I mean such as issue from the free-will of the creature), I abominate, hate, and curse, as false, absurd, and leading us on unto blasphemy." Hence, when the Arminian says, "We grant that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled" (2nd paragraph), he doesn't mean, as I affirm, that God determines (_ad intra_) which of his desires to decree unto realization and which not to decree. That is, they don't predicate the fulfillment of God's desires ultimately on God's decree (as I do) but on man's response. It follows, then, that the view Owen was addressing is quite distinct from the view I affirm. 

In closing, I have found Rev. Winzer in the habit of being quite selective in his choosing comments made by his opponents (ignoring the context of their arguments or ignoring some of their other arguments altogether). In the interest of charity, I'll assume that he's being selective because he doesn't always have time to address all his opponents' arguments or perhaps he agrees with those he does not address. 

But in this case, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it seems to me he has made two mistakes. First, he has excerpted statements I've made _without including the context in which they were stated_, which, if included, should have prevented a man of his learning and understanding from accusing me of Arminianism. Second, he has excerpted a statement from Owen _while ignoring the larger context in which Owen provides the theological framework in which said statement was made_. This is poor scholarship. 

I don't believe Matthew has any personal animus towards me. But he apparently has a great distaste for theological positions that don't cohere with his "High Calvinism." That's fine. There are aspects of "High Calvinism" that I dislike and think are unhealthy for the Christian and the Church. Be that as it may, I would kindly ask that in the future Rev. Winzer refrain from accusing me of the kind of teachings that he knows are incompatible with the Confessions _without any real basis_. Such unwarranted mudslinging tends to foster suspicion and at worst is tantamount to bearing false witness against one's neighbor. 

Respectfully yours,

-----Added 5/6/2009 at 10:04:16 EST-----

Here's an excerpt from John Murray's "The Free Offer of the Gospel," which constituted the majority report and was submitted to the Fifteenth General Assembly of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1948):*Deuteronomy 5:29 (26 in Heb.); 32:29; Psalm 81:13ff. (14ff.); Isaiah 48:18.* The purpose of adducing these texts is to note the optative force of that which is expressed. There can be no reasonable question as to the optative force of Deuteronomy 5:29 (26). It is introduced by the idiom _mi yitten_ which literally means "who will give?" but is really a strong optative expression meaning "Oh that there were!" Consequently the text reads, "Oh that there were such a heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might be well with them, and with their children for ever!" It is the Lord who is speaking and we shall have to conclude that here we have the expression of earnest desire or wish or will that the people of Israel were of a heart to fear him and keep all his commandments always. It is apparent from the book of Deuteronomy itself (cf. 31:24-29) and from the whole history of Israel that they did not have a heart to fear God and to keep all his commandments always. Since they did not fulfil that which was optatively expressed in 5:29 (26), we must conclude that God had not decreed that they should have such a heart. If God had decreed it, it would have been so. Here therefore we have an instance of desire on the part of God for the fulfilment of that which he had not decreed; in other words, a will on the part of God to that which he had not decretively willed.

In Deuteronomy 32:29 the construction is somewhat different. In our English versions it is translated, "Oh that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their latter end." This rendering is distinctly optative and has the same effect as Deuteronomy 5:29 (26), considered above. It must be admitted that this is a perfectly legitimate rendering and interpretation. The conjunction _lu_ with which the verse begins has undoubtedly this optative force. It has such force unquestionably in Genesis 17:18; Numb. 14:2, 20:3; 22:29; Joshua 7:7; Isaiah 63:19, and possibly, if not probably, in Genesis 23:13, 30:34. When _lu_ has this optative force it means "Oh that" or "if only" and expresses strong desire. In view of what we found in Deut. 5:26 there is no reason why the optative force of _lu_ should not be adopted here. We may not, however, insist that _lu_ must have optative force here because _lu_ is also used with conditional force, as in Judges 8:19; 13:23; II Samuel 18:12 and elsewhere. If _lu_ is understood conditionally, Deut. 32:29 would be rendered as follows: "If they were wise they would understand this, they would consider their latter end." This, however, is not the most natural rendering. The optative interpretation is smoother and more meaningful in the context. If this more natural construction is followed it shows the same thing as we found in Deut. 5:26, that earnest desire is expressed for what is contrary to fact (cf. v. 28).

In Psalm 81:14 it may readily be detected that the conditional force of the conjunction _lu_ cannot reasonably be adopted. The thought is rather distinctly optative, "Oh that my people were hearkening unto me, that Israel would walk in my ways."

Isaiah 48:18 could readily be rendered conditionally thus: "If thou hadst hearkened to my commandments, thy peace had been as a river and thy righteousness as the waves of the sea." It can also be rendered optatively, as in our English versions.

It should be noted that even when the conjunction _lu_ is given very distinct conditional force, the optative idea is sometimes rather noticeably in the background. This would very likely be the case in Isaiah 48:18, even if the optative rendering gives way to the conditional. The desirableness of that which is expressed in the condition and its corresponding consequence cannot be suppressed. This can be expressed in our English idiom very well when we render, "If only thou hadst hearkened to my commandments, then had thy peace been as a river," etc. Both the conditional and optative appear here, and there is much to be said in favour of the conclusion that whether we render Isa. 48:18 optatively or conditionally the optative notion still persists, in the former case, of course, directly and in the latter case indirectly.

Should we make full allowance for doubt as to the exact force of the construction in the case of Deut. 32:29 and Isa. 48:18, there can be no room for question but that the Lord represents himself in some of these passages as earnestly desiring the fulfilment of something which he had not in the exercise of his sovereign will actually decreed to come to pass. This bears very directly upon the point at issue.​Apparently Murray and many other WCF adherents have not agreed with some of the older divines in their approach of obscuring the meaning of these texts under the banner of anthropopathism. I am inclined to agree with the OPC majority report.


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## timmopussycat

armourbearer said:


> timmopussycat said:
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think Piper would consent to the idea that his view leaves God frustrated. Rather he clearly presents God as being ultimately satisfied in all he does. God is not unsatisfied by the unfulfilled nature of some of his longings since he gains a superior satisfaction by the fulfillment of the longings that block the fulfillment of the unfulfilled ones.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If Scripture is to be interpreted literally in the case of divine desires for things that shall never come to pass, then it should be taken literally when God is presented as"sorrowing" and "grieving" over these unfulfilled desires.
Click to expand...


I have no problem with that conclusion, but if I correctly understand the latter portion of his argument in... Are There Two Wills in God? :: Desiring God Christian Resource Library 
...where Piper cites Dabney's use of the incident in George Washington's life, I think Piper's point still stands. The God who sorrows or grieves over an unfulfilled desire cannot properly be called frustrated or unwise to feel sorrow or grief in cases where such unfulfillment is caused the fulfillment of a contrary desire that God wills and takes joy in. In such cases, the emotion felt by God in connection with the rejected alternative is momentary and subsumed in his delight in the desire fulfilled. God's desires for, and emotions in response to, unfulfilled alternative are expressions of the complexity of his being, but they never rise to determining his volition. As such, they are neither at odds with his sovereignty nor with the moral and emotional perfection of his character.

If people are going to reject this possibility, it seems to me they must interact with it. Neither the Owen or A'Brakel passages cited deal with the possibility that God's emotions over rejected alternatives may be momentary and effectively subsumed by joy in his chosen ones. To reject the idea that God's emotional life may genuinely include emotions arising from unfulfilled alternatives, we must find Scriptural or GNC deductions from the same that prove that the Scripturally stated emotions experienced by God over a rejected alterative are either not subsumbed in God's joy over an accomplished one, or that even the most momentary experience of such emotions is incompatible with God's nature. 

And may I make a request about referiencing secondary sources? Some of us don't have immediate access to theological libraries or EEBO and others don't have any access at all. Instead of giving only citations, can I request that sufficient quotation be supplied so that the arguments may be fairly assessed?


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

timmopussycat said:


> And may I make a request about referiencing secondary sources? Some of us don't have immediate access to theological libraries or EEBO and others don't have any access at all. Instead of giving only citations, can I request that sufficient quotation be supplied so that the arguments may be fairly assessed?



Tim,

Since you may have been referring to my references above in which I gave small excerpts of Owen's _A Display of Arminianism_ in order to exonerate myself from the Rev. Winzer's charges. If so, I apologize for being inconsiderate of readers without access to this work. Here are the three paragraphs in full (which I derived from the following website):
First, Their doctrine of the mutability of God’s decrees, on whose firmness is founded the infallibility of this prescience, doth quite overthrow it. God thus foreknowing only what he hath so decreed shall come to pass, if that be no firmer settled but that it may[be] and is often altered, according to the divers inclinations of men’s wills, which I showed before they affirm, he can have at best but a conjectural foreknowledge of what is yet for to come, not founded on his own unchangeable purpose, but upon a guess at the free inclination of men’s wills. For instance, [xcii] [10] God willeth that all men should be saved. This act of his will, according to the Arminian doctrine, is his conditionate decree to save all men if they will believe. Well, among these is Judas, as [xciii] [11] equal a sharer in the benefit of this decree as Peter. God, then, will have him to be saved, and to this end allows him all those means which are necessary to beget faith in him, and are every way sufficient to that purpose, and do produce that effect in others; what can God foresee, then, but that Judas as well as Peter will believe? He intendeth he should, he hath determined nothing to the contrary. Let him come, then, and act his own part. Why, he proves so obstinately malicious, [xciv] [12] that God, with all his omnipotency, as they speak, by any way that becomes him, which must not be by any irresistible efficacy, cannot change his obdurate heart. Well, then, he determineth, according to the exigence of his justice, that he shall be damned for his impenitency, and foreseeth that accordingly. But now, suppose this wretch, even at his last moment, should bethink himself and return to the Lord, which in their conceit he may, notwithstanding his former reprobation (which, [xcv] [13] as they state it, seems a great act of mercy), [xcvi] [14] God must keep to the rules of his justice, and elect or determine to save him; by which the varlet hath twice or thrice deceived his expectation.


Secondly, [xcvii] [15] They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass. “We grant,” saith Corvinus, “that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled.” Now, surely, to desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by wisdom or counsel; and, therefore, they must grant that before he did not know but perhaps so it might be. “God wisheth and desireth some good things, which yet come not to pass,”[xcviii] [16] say they, in their Confession; whence one of these two things must needs follow,—either, first, that there is a great deal of imperfection in his nature, to desire and expect what he knows shall never come to pass; or else he did not know but it might, which overthrows his prescience. Yea, and say they expressly, [xcix] [17] “That the hope and expectation of God is deceived by man;” and confess, “that the strength of their strongest argument lies in this, that God hoped and expected obedience from Israel.” Secondly, That he complaineth that his hope is deluded, which, being taken properly, and as they urge it, cannot consist with his eternal prescience; for they disesteem the usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which include in them any imperfection, are ascribed unto God per ajnqrwpopa>qeian,—in regard of that analogy his actions hold with such of ours as we perform having those passions.


Thirdly, [c] [18] They teach that God hath determined nothing concerning such things as these in question. “That God hath determined future contingent things unto either part (I mean such as issue from the free-will of the creature), I abominate, hate, and curse, as false,  absurd, and leading us on unto blasphemy,” saith Arminius. To determine of them to either part is to determine and ordain whether they shall be, or whether they shall not be; as, that David shall or shall not go up tomorrow against the Philistines, and prevail. Now, the infallibility of God’s foreknowing of such things depending on the certainty of his decree and determination, if there be no such thing as this, that also must needs fall to the ground.​ Your servant,


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## py3ak

timmopussycat said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> timmopussycat said:
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think Piper would consent to the idea that his view leaves God frustrated. Rather he clearly presents God as being ultimately satisfied in all he does. God is not unsatisfied by the unfulfilled nature of some of his longings since he gains a superior satisfaction by the fulfillment of the longings that block the fulfillment of the unfulfilled ones.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If Scripture is to be interpreted literally in the case of divine desires for things that shall never come to pass, then it should be taken literally when God is presented as"sorrowing" and "grieving" over these unfulfilled desires.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I have no problem with that conclusion, but if I correctly understand the latter portion of his argument in... Are There Two Wills in God? :: Desiring God Christian Resource Library
> ...where Piper cites Dabney's use of the incident in George Washington's life, I think Piper's point still stands. The God who sorrows or grieves over an unfulfilled desire cannot properly be called frustrated or unwise to feel sorrow or grief in cases where such unfulfillment is caused the fulfillment of a contrary desire that God wills and takes joy in. In such cases, the emotion felt by God in connection with the rejected alternative is momentary and subsumed in his delight in the desire fulfilled. God's desires for, and emotions in response to, unfulfilled alternative are expressions of the complexity of his being, but they never rise to determining his volition. As such, they are neither at odds with his sovereignty nor with the moral and emotional perfection of his character.
> 
> If people are going to reject this possibility, it seems to me they must interact with it. Neither the Owen or A'Brakel passages cited deal with the possibility that God's emotions over rejected alternatives may be momentary and effectively subsumed by joy in his chosen ones. To reject the idea that God's emotional life may genuinely include emotions arising from unfulfilled alternatives, we must find Scriptural or GNC deductions from the same that prove that the Scripturally stated emotions experienced by God over a rejected alterative are either not subsumbed in God's joy over an accomplished one, or that even the most momentary experience of such emotions is incompatible with God's nature.
> 
> And may I make a request about referiencing secondary sources? Some of us don't have immediate access to theological libraries or EEBO and others don't have any access at all. Instead of giving only citations, can I request that sufficient quotation be supplied so that the arguments may be fairly assessed?
Click to expand...


Tim, that "possibility" is thoroughly and soundly rejected by the orthodox. See in general _PRRD_, III, 551-561.

You are asserting that God's inner emotional life is "complex" - but God is most simple and most pure. You assert also that God's emotions may be "momentary", that is _transitory_ - but God is unchangeable. Given that this is a confessional board, WCF II.1 is quite reason enough why we feel no need to "interact" with this view: it runs contrary to the interpretation of Scriptures received as normative in the churches most of us belong to, and to that common interpretation of Scripture required for participation in this forum.


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## Jimmy the Greek

Just a note on Timmo's statement that "the emotion felt by God in connection with the rejected alternative is _momentary_ and _subsumed_ in his delight in the desire fulfilled."

In addition to Ruben's comment, since God is above/outside time, the notion of momentary passing emotions in God doesn't compute.

I will add that even though we are seeing some basic disagreement in this thread, it has been very interesting and I appreciate the many comments from those obviously more astute than I.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

py3ak said:


> timmopussycat said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> If Scripture is to be interpreted literally in the case of divine desires for things that shall never come to pass, then it should be taken literally when God is presented as"sorrowing" and "grieving" over these unfulfilled desires.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I have no problem with that conclusion, but if I correctly understand the latter portion of his argument in... Are There Two Wills in God? :: Desiring God Christian Resource Library
> ...where Piper cites Dabney's use of the incident in George Washington's life, I think Piper's point still stands. The God who sorrows or grieves over an unfulfilled desire cannot properly be called frustrated or unwise to feel sorrow or grief in cases where such unfulfillment is caused the fulfillment of a contrary desire that God wills and takes joy in. In such cases, the emotion felt by God in connection with the rejected alternative is momentary and subsumed in his delight in the desire fulfilled. God's desires for, and emotions in response to, unfulfilled alternative are expressions of the complexity of his being, but they never rise to determining his volition. As such, they are neither at odds with his sovereignty nor with the moral and emotional perfection of his character.
> 
> If people are going to reject this possibility, it seems to me they must interact with it. Neither the Owen or A'Brakel passages cited deal with the possibility that God's emotions over rejected alternatives may be momentary and effectively subsumed by joy in his chosen ones. To reject the idea that God's emotional life may genuinely include emotions arising from unfulfilled alternatives, we must find Scriptural or GNC deductions from the same that prove that the Scripturally stated emotions experienced by God over a rejected alterative are either not subsumbed in God's joy over an accomplished one, or that even the most momentary experience of such emotions is incompatible with God's nature.
> 
> And may I make a request about referiencing secondary sources? Some of us don't have immediate access to theological libraries or EEBO and others don't have any access at all. Instead of giving only citations, can I request that sufficient quotation be supplied so that the arguments may be fairly assessed?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Tim, that "possibility" is thoroughly and soundly rejected by the orthodox. See in general _PRRD_, III, 551-561.
> 
> You are asserting that God's inner emotional life is "complex" - but God is most simple and most pure. You assert also that God's emotions may be "momentary", that is _transitory_ - but God is unchangeable. Given that this is a confessional board, WCF II.1 is quite reason enough why we feel no need to "interact" with this view: it runs contrary to the interpretation of Scriptures received as normative in the churches most of us belong to, and to that common interpretation of Scripture required for participation in this forum.
Click to expand...


Ruben,

I find your response to Tim quite unfair. First, the "simplicity" of God does not necessitate that God's moral attributes or emotive qualities are indistinguishable. God's love can be distinguished from his hatred. God's joy can be distinguished from his wrath. This is acknowledged by Reformed theologians who in fact affirm the simplicity of God. 

Second, the immutability of God, which Tim and I affirm, does not mean that God is immobile when he interacts on the stage of human history. God's sending the Flood, leading Israel out of Egypt, and bruising his Son on the cross are historical events that took place in time and space. These divine acts were not eternal constants. God is not presently bringing Israel out of Egypt or bruising Jesus on the cross. These were divine _outward responses_ to human events or states of affairs based on a God whose ethical nature is eternally constant and unchanging. They were also temporal divine interventions in time and space that had been decreed from eternity. 

Similarly, divine immutability does not require that God is inwardly motionless when he interacts on the stage of human history. God's sorrow and anger at human sin (Gen. 6:6) and his expression of joy every time a sinner repents (Luke ) are not eternal constants. These are divine inward responses to human events or states of affairs based on a God whose ethical nature is eternally constant and unchanging. God is holy and just and thus he always responds to human sin with sorrow and anger. God is holy and good, therefore he always responds to repentance and faith (which are his gifts) with joy and satisfaction. 

So the view that posits divine outward acts and inward motions also affirms God's immutability and sovereignty. Charles Hodge and B. B. Warfield both affirm genuine emotivity while at the same time affirming and upholding WCF II.1. I trust they would be welcome on this board. 

Respectfully yours,

-----Added 5/6/2009 at 11:57:11 EST-----



Gomarus said:


> Just a note on Timmo's statement that "the emotion felt by God in connection with the rejected alternative is _momentary_ and _subsumed_ in his delight in the desire fulfilled."
> 
> In addition to Ruben's comment, since God is above/outside time, the notion of momentary passing emotions in God doesn't compute.



Jim,

We affirm that God is above/outside of time. That's what makes him transcendent. But we also affirm that God is immanent. The very doctrine of omnipresence means that God occupies all space. The biblical reality of God's special or covenant presence also necessitates that God is not merely above but actually relates to time and space. The notion that God is *ONLY* outside time and space does not compute with the biblical data but is rather a philosophical notion borrowed from Platonism.


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## PuritanCovenanter

Well, we have drifted from 'does God have two wills?' to 'does God have emotions?'. Take a break guys. I am closing the thread for the time being.


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## py3ak

Here are some references which may further understanding. We can reopen the thread a little later, but it needs to be clearly understood that people come to the Puritan Board for discussions that fall within the boundaries of the Reformed confessions: if it doesn't, this isn't the venue for it. Now the immutability and impassibility of God are confessional matters and are thus not up for debate (WCF II.1). The quotes below should be read and digested before we proceed.

Richard Muller, _Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics_, III

p.433


> Far from being an excessively "speculative" doctrine in the modern sense of the term, the orthodox discussion of the divine will was deeply rooted in the redemptive and historical elements of Christian theology and indicative of the a posteriori character of much Reformed theology in the era of Protestant scholasticism: for the distinctions made by the orthodox concerning the divine willing were not a matter of rational speculation but rather a result of the examination of biblical texts and traditional discussions of the _voluntas Dei_, the latter with particular respect to the needs or concerns of the doctrine of salvation by grace alone.




pp.450, 451


> In our finite minds, we divide the will of God, as the Scripture itself does, "according to the diversity of its objects." [quoting from Pictet, _Theologia christiana_, II.vi.3] To make the point as forcefully as possible, the distinctions in the divine will serve the purpose, not of dividing the will, but, explicitly, of preserving the sense of its unity: it is the Arminian, not the Reformed theology, that argued two wills in God.



pp.451,452


> Here, admittedly, the orthodox line of thought is guided not by a totally open or unbiased exegesis of texts, but by an ontological conception of the immutability of God: this guiding conception in turn leads to an interpretation of Scripture that gives priority to those texts stressing the unchangeability of God over those texts which indicate change, priority to those texts which stress God's otherness over those which indicate emotion, passion, or other kinship with humanity. But this is not a case of rationalism or metaphysical speculation overruling revelation: instead it is an example of one of the many instances in which theology must make a choice concerning its view of God, deciding which aspects of the scriptural view are governing concepts, anthropomorphism or transcendence, the "repentance" of God or the divine constancy. And in this case in particular, the Reformed orthodox stand not only in the line of the more philosophical arguments typical of scholastic theology but, together with the older scholasticism, in the line of the church's exegetical tradition — and, indeed, in accord with the doctrinal statements and with the exegesis of the Reformers.



p.553


> The Reformed orthodox doctrine of the divine affections and virtues, although far more elaborate and characterized by a fuller and clearer recourse to scholastic distinctions, also stands in substantial continuity with the views of the Reformers. In particular, apart from differing nuances found in various thinkers throughout the period, the exegetical basis of the doctrine remained much the same: the orthodox systems refer to the same texts that the Reformers had identified as the crucial loci and, we might add, had themselves received from the medieval and patristic exegetes as the primary points of reference. Nor, indeed, has the basic doctrinal assumption shifted: life the Reformers, the orthodox assume that God has affectiones that characterize his relationship to the world and that some analogy can be drawn between these "divine affections" and the affections that belong to human willing — with the major qualification that, unlike human affections, the divine affections do not indicate essential change in God and that they are permanent rather than transient dispositions.



p.555 [quoting from Vermigli, _Commonplaces_, I.xii.21 on the attribution of repentance and anger to God]


> it must be considered, that the scripture speaketh of God after the manner of men, for the affect of remembrance declareth the goodness of God: for they which be mindful of their friends in danger, do (for the most part) relieve them. Howbeit, to remember, accordeth not properly with God, seeing it noteth a certain forgetfulness that went before; which to ascribe unto God, were an unjust thing. But of knowing we see there be three kinds, the which are distinguished one from another, according to the difference of time. For if a thing present be found out ... this knowledge is the root of all the other and more sure than the rest. Further, if it respect unto things that be past, it is called memory. If unto things to come, it is foresight. ... Of those kinds of knowledge, none is truly attributed unto God, but the first, seeing all things are present with him: and even as his nature, so his actions are by no means comprehended within the course of time. But yet it is said in the Scriptures, that either he remembered, or that he foresaw; because oftentimes those effects are attributed unto him which they are wont to do that foresee or remember.​


​


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## py3ak

Thread reopened. Please don't post without first reading the Richard Muller quotes I posted above.


----------



## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> (1) Note first that I have not argued that God "properly expects" the desires he does not decree to come to pass.



If one appeals to an optative as literal he does not have liberty to deny the optative force of the expression. The optative expresses a "wish" for things to come to pass, and a "wish" includes the state of aspiration.



Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Contrast that with my position, which I communicated to Matthew earlier:"The futurition of God's promises or curses are proximately contingent on human response but ultimately dependent on divine decree. Indeed, the human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's *unconditional decree*[emphasis added]."​




There it is in plain black and white. Bob maintains the Arminian concept of "conditional will" in a proximate sense. Like the Arminian he posits God willing things which are dependent on human response for their fulfilment.



Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> That is, they don't predicate the fulfillment of God's desires ultimately on God's decree (as I do) but on man's response. It follows, then, that the view Owen was addressing is quite distinct from the view I affirm.



The fact that Bob also maintains an unconditional will which "determines" the fulfilment of certain of God's desires does not negate the fact that he has espoused a conditional will which leaves many of God's desires unfulfilled becuse they have not met with the right human response.



Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> In the interest of charity, I'll assume that he's being selective because he doesn't always have time to address all his opponents' arguments or perhaps he agrees with those he does not address.



A good theological discussion concentrates on facts.

Concerning the quotation at the end of Bob's post from John Murray's Free offer of the Gospel, I have shown in my review of that booklet that the reformed tradition has maintained the optatives of Scripture are an example of God speaking after the manner of men or anthropopathism. This is also a key point in the paragraph of John Owen under discussion. Bob has failed to address that point because he blatantly rejects it, as do the Arminian polemicists.​


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## MW

timmopussycat said:


> In such cases, the emotion felt by God in connection with the rejected alternative is momentary and subsumed in his delight in the desire fulfilled.



First, even momentary sorrow in God is an outright repudiation of the teaching that God is blessed for ever. Secondly, to speak of God having momentary states is to maintain divine changeability. Such is the mire into which one will be cast when he rejects the well advised theology of the reformed tradition.


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## Bodigean

Bob,

I hope this is OK to ask in this thread as you mentioned it above. You said, "I don't believe Matthew has any personal animus towards me. But he apparently has a great distaste for theological positions that don't cohere with his "High Calvinism." That's fine. There are aspects of "High Calvinism" that I dislike and think are unhealthy for the Christian and the Church."

While I am not interested per say in Matthew's High Calvinism, he can define that if he likes, but I am curious as to what you consider High Calvinism is and how it is unhealthy for the Christian and the Church.

Thanks, Bob.

Sincerely,


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## NaphtaliPress

Mark,
Actually, this is a rabbit trail on this thread and so should be a new thread if it is to be discussed; and if it can be discussed dispassionately. So I would frame it without reference to persons.


Bodigean said:


> Bob,
> 
> I hope this is OK to ask in this thread as you mentioned it above. You said, "I don't believe Matthew has any personal animus towards me. But he apparently has a great distaste for theological positions that don't cohere with his "High Calvinism." That's fine. There are aspects of "High Calvinism" that I dislike and think are unhealthy for the Christian and the Church."
> 
> While I am not interested per say in Matthew's High Calvinism, he can define that if he likes, but I am curious as to what you consider High Calvinism is and how it is unhealthy for the Christian and the Church.
> 
> Thanks, Bob.
> 
> Sincerely,


----------



## Bodigean

Forgive me, Chris. I was wondering if holding the position of one will in God would constitute in Bob's or anyone's thinking as High Calvinism. No disrespect or judgment was intended in any sense. Thanks.

Sincerely,


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## coramdeo

Better yet, could you fellows just quote the a fore mentioned works for those of us following your discussion but might not own all such works? Thanks.


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## timmopussycat

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> (1) Note first that I have not argued that God "properly expects" the desires he does not decree to come to pass.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If one appeals to an optative as literal he does not have liberty to deny the optative force of the expression. The optative expresses a "wish" for things to come to pass, and a "wish" includes the state of aspiration.
Click to expand...


This comment appears to overlook a necessary distinction that Dr. Bob already pointed out. 

While a wish may include an aspiration for things to come to pass, it does not necessarily include an expectation that the thing desired will come to pass. Christ certainly strongly wished that the cup might pass from him in the garden of Gethsemene, but he concluded his prayer with the expectation that the cup would not pass without him drinking it (Matt. 26:39-42). 
And if Christ could hold strongly wish the former wish without sinning, wouldn't that fact in itself prove that God can also wish for something that he has not decreed to come to pass without losing his moral perfections? 



Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Contrast that with my position, which I communicated to Matthew earlier:"The futurition of God's promises or curses are proximately contingent on human response but ultimately dependent on divine decree. Indeed, the human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's *unconditional decree*[emphasis added]."​






armourbearer said:


> [There it is in plain black and white. Bob maintains the Arminian concept of "conditional will" in a proximate sense. Like the Arminian he posits God willing things which are dependent on human response for their fulfilment.





Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> That is, they don't predicate the fulfillment of God's desires ultimately on God's decree (as I do) but on man's response. It follows, then, that the view Owen was addressing is quite distinct from the view I affirm.





armourbearer said:


> The fact that Bob also maintains an unconditional will which "determines" the fulfilment of certain of God's desires does not negate the fact that he has espoused a conditional will which leaves many of God's desires unfulfilled becuse they have not met with the right human response.



Dr. Bob maintains nothing of the sort. He ultimately predicates the fulfilment of God's decrees on God, not on man's responses when he writes


> "The human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's *unconditional decree*[emphasis added]."





armourbearer said:


> Concerning the quotation at the end of Bob's post from John Murray's Free offer of the Gospel, I have shown in my review of that booklet that the reformed tradition has maintained the optatives of Scripture are an example of God speaking after the manner of men or anthropopathism. This is also a key point in the paragraph of John Owen under discussion. Bob has failed to address that point because he blatantly rejects it, as do the Arminian polemicists.



Where can one find your review? 
Owen, in the paragraph mentioned gives no scriptural or exegetical reason supporting his choice to attribute emotivity in God to anthropopathism. As I will show in my post to Reuben, a true lack of emotivity in God creates a real theological problem for us, nor is it, perhaps, necessarily confessionally mandated.

-----Added 5/7/2009 at 08:36:42 EST-----



py3ak said:


> timmopussycat said:
> 
> 
> 
> Neither the Owen or A'Brakel passages cited deal with the possibility that God's emotions over rejected alternatives may be momentary and effectively subsumed by joy in his chosen ones. To reject the idea that God's emotional life may genuinely include emotions arising from unfulfilled alternatives, we must find Scriptural or GNC deductions from the same that prove that the Scripturally stated emotions experienced by God over a rejected alterative are either not subsumbed in God's joy over an accomplished one, or that even the most momentary experience of such emotions is incompatible with God's nature.
> 
> And may I make a request about referiencing secondary sources? Some of us don't have immediate access to theological libraries or EEBO and others don't have any access at all. Instead of giving only citations, can I request that sufficient quotation be supplied so that the arguments may be fairly assessed?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Tim, that "possibility" is thoroughly and soundly rejected by the orthodox. See in general _PRRD_, III, 551-561.
> 
> You are asserting that God's inner emotional life is "complex" - but God is most simple and most pure. You assert also that God's emotions may be "momentary", that is _transitory_ - but God is unchangeable. Given that this is a confessional board, WCF II.1 is quite reason enough why we feel no need to "interact" with this view: it runs contrary to the interpretation of Scriptures received as normative in the churches most of us belong to, and to that common interpretation of Scripture required for participation in this forum.
Click to expand...


WCF II 1 does not mention God’s emotivity directly, and it is possible that God may be both immutable and impassable properly understood without requiring a rejection of the possibility that he experiences variable emotivity within the immutable and impassible divine being. How can this be? 

First, I agree that all discussion of emotional states in God must be carefully nuanced as we know that in at least some respects God’s emotivity is not our own. That said however, we may have a problem. For we may predicate of someone a general truth which is true taken generally but not at all true taken exhaustively. I can say describing my wife, that she is a happy and joyful woman and that statement is true as a description of her general emotional condition. But that statement is not understood by reasonable people to mean that the Orchid Lady is happy and joyful 60/60/24/7/365. When Scripture predicates “blessedness” of God for example, is it predicating a general state of unmixed blessedness which may include times of other emotions or is is positing a timeless emotional passivity? 

Second: Those who think the question of emotivity in God is included in the 39 Articles and WCF’s affirmation that the Divine being is without “passions” must prove that their move has the support of Scripture. The Scripture texts given by the Confession to support the denial of “passions” in God do not support the denial of all emotivity in God. What Scriptures support the one and deny the other? 

This is important because Scripture argues from the existence of some of our organs to prove that the same capacity that these organs address exists in God. “Shall he who formed the eye not see?” Turn this in reverse. If God lacks all emotivity, how did we wound up with the capacity for emotivity that God lacks? Can God give us something he does not first have? Or must we conclude that all our emotive capacity is a result of the fall? If our answer to the latter question is no, we can fairly deduce from this line of thought that all human capacities, including that of variable emotional responses to events outside the divine being must, to at least some extent, be present in God, or it would not be present in us. 

The orthodox are divided on whether the move to deny an unfallen emotional variableness in God can be supported. Warfield and Hodge (if Dr. Bob correctly represents them, sources please Dr. Bob?) are not alone in denying that emotivity could not occur in God without violating his impassibility. Berkhof also has defined God’s impassibility without denying emotivity in God when he writes: “The Divine immutability should not be understood as implying immobility, as if there were no movement in God. It is even customary in theology to speak of God as actus parus, a God who is always in action. The Bible teaches us that God enters manifold relations with men, and as it were, lives their lives with them. There is change round about him, change in the relations of men to him, but there is no change in His Being, His attributes, His purpose, His motives of action, or His promises.” L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Eerdmans, 1941, p. 59. 
More recently J. I. Packer has made an interesting observation. After noting that the statemtent God has no passions “does not mean that he is unfeeling (impassive) or that there is nothing in him that corresponds to emotions and affections in us, but that whereas human passions – especially the painful ones, fear, regret, grief, despair, – are in a sense passive and involuntary, being called forth and constrained by circumstances not under our control,” Packer goes on to observe: “the corresponding attitudes in God have the nature of deliberate voluntary choices and are therefore not of the same order as human passions at all.” (J.I. Packer, Knowing God, IVP, 1993, p. 121). 

This description of God’s experience of emotion maintains that God sovereignly chooses what emotions he will experience and to what extent he will experience them. Since he never lets these experiences affect his Being, His attributes, His purpose, His motives of action, or His promises, he maintains the immutability and impassibility of his being.​


----------



## MW

timmopussycat said:


> [While a wish may include an aspiration for things to come to pass, it does not necessarily include an expectation that the thing desired will come to pass.



Whence the disappointment at Israel's disobedience if there was no aspiration included in the wish? One is not at liberty to give words a meaning they do not inherently possess. If they are to be taken literally then they must be understood according to the full force of their meaning. Anthropopathism can give the expressions their full force because they are explained in terms of the immanence of God in salvation history.



timmopussycat said:


> Dr. Bob maintains nothing of the sort. He ultimately predicates the fulfilment of God's decrees on God, not on man's responses when he writes
> 
> 
> 
> "The human responses themselves are ultimately dependent on God's *unconditional decree*[emphasis added]."
Click to expand...


He undoubtedly allows the "ultimate" fulfilment of God's decrees to depend on God, but he specifically maintains that God wills things to happen which do not happen because the event "proximately" depends upon man's obedience. He has said so in plain black and white. The very texts he adduces in support of these desires in God are texts which speak of the failure of men to obtain the blessings of God because of their lack of obedience. The ultimate resolution in the unconditional decree of God does not negate his affirmation that there is a proximate frustration of God's will which is owing to the disobedience of men.



timmopussycat said:


> Where can one find your review?
> Owen, in the paragraph mentioned gives no scriptural or exegetical reason supporting his choice to attribute emotivity in God to anthropopathism. As I will show in my post to Reuben, a true lack of emotivity in God creates a real theological problem for us, nor is it, perhaps, necessarily confessionally mandated.



The review is available here: Murray on the Free Offer: A Review by Matthew Winzer

Owen was undoubtedly depending on the exegetical groundwork which had already become part and parcel of the catholic tradition in which he was operating. The very fact that he did not provide individual exegesis goes to show how firmly the anthropopathic rule is embedded in Christian theology.


----------



## MW

timmopussycat said:


> WCF II 1 does not mention God’s emotivity directly, and it is possible that God may be both immutable and impassable properly understood without requiring a rejection of the possibility that he experiences variable emotivity within the immutable and impassible divine being. How can this be?



Anyone who deals seriously with the Confession in terms of its theological background knows that variable divine states was specifically rejected by all orthodox divines of the period. Please note: you are not given liberty on this board to deconstruct an historical confession to justify your theological aberrations; you will need to take it elsewhere.


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## py3ak

Tim, I was going to save you some time by posting some links, but you were faster than I was. In any case, here are some things you might find of interest.

Mr. Winzer reviews John Murray

One previous discussion on this topic

Another previous discussion on this topic

This post may also prove helpful

Look at those threads: also look at the quotes I posted from Dr. Muller on this thread. Your post to me shows that you didn't actually appreciate the force of what was quoted on there - or at least you didn't take it into account in your reply.

In addition, your description of God is sadly lacking - He is _generally_ happy, but not so much that He can't have _transitory emotions_? I rather hope you don't quite understand what you're saying there: it boils down to this, that though God may have a cheerful temperament, He is subject nonetheless to mood swings.

These previous threads show that the board administration has come to a definite position on the confession's teaching with regard to divine emotions and the confessional doctrines of immutability and impassibility. Promotion of error on this point is not going to be tolerated.


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## timmopussycat

py3ak said:


> Tim, I was going to save you some time by posting some links, but you were faster than I was. In any case, here are some things you might find of interest.
> 
> Mr. Winzer reviews John Murray
> 
> One previous discussion on this topic
> 
> Another previous discussion on this topic
> 
> This post may also prove helpful
> 
> Look at those threads: also look at the quotes I posted from Dr. Muller on this thread. Your post to me shows that you didn't actually appreciate the force of what was quoted on there - or at least you didn't take it into account in your reply.
> 
> In addition, your description of God is sadly lacking - He is _generally_ happy, but not so much that He can't have _transitory emotions_? I rather hope you don't quite understand what you're saying there: it boils down to this, that though God may have a cheerful temperament, He is subject nonetheless to mood swings.
> 
> These previous threads show that the board administration has come to a definite position on the confession's teaching with regard to divine emotions and the confessional doctrines of immutability and impassibility. Promotion of error on this point is not going to be tolerated.



Reuben, of the other threads you cite, the Murray review did not open for me and at least one of the previous discussions appears to come to the position I outline below. As you will see I suspect much of this present thread is due to individuals talking past each other by interpreting words such as "emotivity" as they understood it, rather than noticiing how the writers using it had qualified the terms. 

I had read your citations from Muller but did not want to comment on them, as I have reason to suspect that I need to study more than the excerpts you cited, since none of them attempt to give the reasons why the Reformers arrived at their conclusion i.e. why that conclusion followed from particular Biblical texts something I assume Muller gives in his footnotes which would have taken you too long to type up. Since PRRD is not immediately available to me, I wanted to withhold comment and even more so once I discovered that Dr. Bob cited him in an earler thread (which I discovere before you included it in your post)as writing the following (citation please Dr. Bob?): 



> Since a passion has its foundation or origin ad extra [without] and its terminus ad intra [within], it cannot be predicated of God and, in fact, fails to correspond in its dynamic with the way that God knows. An affection or virtue, by way of contrast, has its foundation or source ad intra and terminates ad extra, corresponding with the pattern of operation of the divine communicable attributes and, in particular, with the manner of the divine knowing. This understanding of affections and passions corresponds, moreover, with the etymology of the terms: an af- or ad-fectio from adficio, to exert an influence on something—in other words, an influence directed toward, not a result from, something; whereas passio, from patior, is a suffering or enduring of something—it can refer to an occurrence or a phenomenon and even to a disease.



This is not too far removed from the Muller excerpt from p. 553 which Reuben earlier supplied: 



> Nor, indeed, has the basic doctrinal assumption shifted: life the Reformers, the orthodox assume that God has affectiones that characterize his relationship to the world and that some analogy can be drawn between these "divine affections" and the affections that belong to human willing — with the major qualification that, unlike human affections, the divine affections do not indicate essential change in God and that they are permanent rather than transient dispositions.



Notice that Muller distinguishes between rejecting passions originating ad extra as experienced by God and His affections which originate ad intra and terminate ad extra. It appears that Muller views these affections as a biblically accurate description of God's capacity for feeling. To put what I think Dr. Bob and Dr. Packer are saying and what I am definitely saying into Muller's language, God's experience of feelings are self chosen "affections" and not passions originating ad extra. 

With that clarified, is there anything in Scripture that renders this view of God's affections either unscriptural or unconfessional? If not then what is this fuss about?


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## MW

It must be remembered that the terms _ad extra_ and _ad intra_ simply refer to what is external and what is internal in relation to God. God's external working changes simply by virtue of the fact that the creation changes; but divines are careful to note that God wills this outward change, and that internally speaking there is no change in the will of God.


----------



## timmopussycat

armourbearer said:


> timmopussycat said:
> 
> 
> 
> [While a wish may include an aspiration for things to come to pass, it does not necessarily include an expectation that the thing desired will come to pass.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Whence the disappointment at Israel's disobedience if there was no aspiration included in the wish? One is not at liberty to give words a meaning they do not inherently possess. If they are to be taken literally then they must be understood according to the full force of their meaning. Anthropopathism can give the expressions their full force because they are explained in terms of the immanence of God in salvation history.
Click to expand...


That one may strongly desire an event to come to pass, expect it not to come to pass, yet be dissapointed when it actually does not come to pass is not impossible either for humans or for God. Let me give two examples one human, one from Christ. Note that although I present the examples in this order, I am not reasoning from lesser to greater.

In my days as a trombone performance major at University, an annual ritual was to apply for a position in the National Youth Orchestra of Canada. I had particular problems with one excerpt in the audition list; and although I always aced the others and strongly desired to get into the orchestra, I never seriously expected to pass the audition. Yet every time the letter with the bad news arrived, I experienced the human emotion of disappointment because, contrary to my wish, my expectation had now been actualized. 

It seems to me that Christ's prayer in the garden of Gethsemene goes through something of the same process. He had a strong desire not to drink the cup and an even stronger desire to do the father's will and the two were in conflict since his whole prayer shows that He had reason to believe that drinking the cup was the father's will. The strength of both of Christ's desires was such that the strain on his human constitution produced bloody sweat. Christ's resignation in his second and third prayers suggests that He had recognized that his desire would not be granted and that his recognition, contrary to his lesser wish to avoid it, that the cup must be drunk, may well have been accompanied with the human emotion of disappointment. 

Turning to God and using Muller's terminology of affections originating ad intra not emotions arising from without, may we not posit that God, well anticipating Israel's disobedience, has, for whatever reasons of his own, allowed himself, to experience and express the affection of disappointment when it finally eventuated? 



timmopussycat said:


> Dr. Bob maintains nothing of the sort. He ultimately predicates the fulfilment of God's decrees on God, not on man's responses when he writes





armourbearer said:


> He undoubtedly allows the "ultimate" fulfilment of God's decrees to depend on God, but he specifically maintains that God wills things to happen which do not happen because the event "proximately" depends upon man's obedience. He has said so in plain black and white. The very texts he adduces in support of these desires in God are texts which speak of the failure of men to obtain the blessings of God because of their lack of obedience. The ultimate resolution in the unconditional decree of God does not negate his affirmation that there is a proximate frustration of God's will which is owing to the disobedience of men.



Please the exact quote from which you derive this and show how you do so, because I do not find anything in this thread that fairly leads you to this conclusion. Rather, I am wondering if a possible equivocation on the word "will" is misleading you. Putting the question in Muller's terms: why is it unScriptural to posit that God lets himself experience an affection (originating ad intra) somwhat analogus to the human emotions of disappointment when, from his eternal perspective, he interacts with those moments at which his will of precept, not decree, is violated?

I suggest that God's "feelings" of disappointment or similar are affections volitionally experienced by God when his precepts are violated and the consequences result. This will hold true of both Israel's disobedience and the rejection of the gospel by reprobates. If I am correct God's proper will, his will of decree, is not involved in either case.

BTW thanks for supplying the link to your review. Of 3 links to it I had seen, yours was the only one that worked. 



armourbearer said:


> Owen was undoubtedly depending on the exegetical groundwork which had already become part and parcel of the catholic tradition in which he was operating. The very fact that he did not provide individual exegesis goes to show how firmly the anthropopathic rule is embedded in Christian theology.



However helpful tradition may be, the WCF tells us that Scripture or good and necessary deductions from the same as the only grounds of settling controversy. Anthing less than supplying Scripture and and at least the gist of the supporting exegesis in theological controversy, is by definition sub-Reformed. 

In theological controversy, making any claim unsupported by Scripture and at least a gist of the supporting exegesis, in this case the claim that the anthorpopathic rule is embedded in Christian theology, carries with it a message that those who follow the practice may not realize. It tells readers who may not have an exhaustive knowlege of the Reformed tradition, not only that the claimant believes that they are ignorant, but that the claimant will not bother to minister to their ignorance, which in turn suggests that the claimant believes they are invincibly ignorant. 

I don't think any teacher should ever take the risk of making such a suggestion. Here is one way of making sure such situations don't arise.

Could it not be made board policy that theological arguments were required to be supported by Scripture and exegesis FIRST? That doesn't mean that tradition can't be used. One could simply lay out the Scriptures and the exegesis then mention something like that "this line has been adopted by Calvin, Bullinger, the WCF and others." 

I believe this practice would prove a profoundly helpful discipline for us.


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## py3ak

Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from _PRRD_ III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are _permanent_ not _transient_ (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).

That is hugely different from your previous suggestions in this thread about God having momentary sorrow/frustration/regret/etc., etc. So if God's affections are permanent, but you would like to assert that they include self-inflicted sorrow/frustration/regret, then God is "forever frustrated". Does that sound like the One who has all blessedness and sufficiency in Himself?

One more point: if I say that God is one do I really have to provide an exegesis of Deuteronomy 6 and 1 Corinthians 8? This is part of our Christian heritage: we can take it for granted in the sense of not having to prove it every time we speak. In the same way, that God is most wise, most pure, most simple, most blessed is part of our heritage: I don't have to list the references and expound the texts everytime I speak of it. That is in part what a confession _does_: it provides a _common understanding_ of Scripture.


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## timmopussycat

py3ak said:


> Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from _PRRD_ III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are _permanent_ not _transient_ (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).
> 
> That is hugely different from your previous suggestions in this thread about God having momentary sorrow/frustration/regret/etc., etc. So if God's affections are permanent, but you would like to assert that they include self-inflicted sorrow/frustration/regret, then God is "forever frustrated". Does that sound like the One who has all blessedness and sufficiency in Himself?



Where is the Scriptural evidence that supports the premise that God's affections on occasion cannot be a) transient since they are b) subsumed by contrary and superior affections arising from the fulfillment of his will of decree? 




py3ak said:


> One more point: if I say that God is one do I really have to provide an exegesis of Deuteronomy 6 and 1 Corinthians 8? This is part of our Christian heritage: we can take it for granted in the sense of not having to prove it every time we speak. In the same way, that God is most wise, most pure, most simple, most blessed is part of our heritage: I don't have to list the references and expound the texts everytime I speak of it. That is in part what a confession _does_: it provides a _common understanding_ of Scripture.



As I already pointed out, the WCF and the Scripture text it gives in support do not explicitly address the possibility of God having momentary affections when it denies that God has "passions." Therefore, before denying the possibility, one must prove that such are included in the Confessional "passions" by exegesis from Scripture or GNC deductions from the same. This you have not yet done, nor supplied sufficient information for your readers to find sufficient Scripture analysis done by others demonstrating that such a denial is in fact biblical.

If a non-Christian or recently converted Christian arrived at your church holding views contrary to "God is one", you would (I hope!!!) take him to those Scriptures to demonstrate that truth rather than asserting the "the tradition says" without telling him why the tradition says so. The claim that all temporary "affective" states premised of God are nothing more than anthropopathisms is far more suble than your test case. Presenting such a claim unaccompanied by Scripture and supporting exegesis presumes an expert's knowledge of Reformed theological exegesis on the part of one's readers and it is not wise to do so.

Not all readers here are Reformed experts and it would be good discipline for us if we consciously considered those readers our primary audience, not to mention that providing Scripture and supporting exegesis brings us in line with the confessional position mandated by the WCF for setlling theological controversy.


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## toddpedlar

In any discussion it is highly impractical and unreasonable to expect everyone to do what you ask, Tim. You are also misunderstanding the way theological debate does and should take place. The arguments against the emotivity you posit to be characteristic of God have been shot down time and again, using Scripture. Must everyone in every discussion repeat the entireity of those same arguments? Must those same Scripture references be brought up exhaustively every single time someone puts forth a position like yours of God's transient emotions? 

I suppose if you want to grind any discussion to a halt, you can expect this of people... but don't expect your unreasonable expectations to be respected. The point is that the position you want to argue for is NOT Biblical, and it has been argued, with Scripture by many - including those who wrote the Confessions that you claim as your own, by joining this board, and many others throughout Reformed history. Must every discussion be an indepth exegesis of the large array of Scripture references that are in play on any given topic? You're asking for something unwieldy and, in my opinion, quite foolish.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

py3ak said:


> Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from _PRRD_ III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are _permanent_ not _transient_ (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).



Ruben,

I'm not advancing my own position on the subject, but I do think a clarification need to be made that contradicts your assertion above, which you apparently base on Richard Muller. You said, "Note that God's affections are _permanent_ not _transient_."

However, John Owen rejects that God has affections for the reasons below. Note especially how Owen's description of affections in point #3 differs from your (or Muller's) assertion:

1. "Affections, considered in themselves, have always _an incomplete, imperfect act of the will_ or volition joined with them."
2. "They have their _dependence on that wherewith he in whom they are is affected_; that is, they owe their rise and continuance to something without him in whom they are." 
3. "Affections are necessarily _accompanied with change and immutability_; yea, he who is affected properly is really changed." 
4. "Many of the affections here ascribed to God _do eminently denote impotence_." 

Your servant,

-----Added 5/8/2009 at 02:44:52 EST-----

To the Administrators, Moderators, and PB members,

The Rev. Winzer has accused me three times of affirming Arminian views. True, he hasn't called me a "full-blown" Arminian. But attaching that epithet to views advanced on this list is obviously calculated to foster suspicion and to cast aspersion on one's opponent. I have grown weary of trying to interact with him. I do, however, want to make one last attempt to clear myself of his charges. 

Please consider the following:

(1) My view of God having "unfulfilled desires" is not equivalent to saying God has unfilled decrees. It is equivalent, rather, to saying that God has unfulfilled commands or revealed obligations. 

To "command" or "obligate" means "to bind or oblige morally or legally." In the case of God, he "binds or obligates humans to be and to do that of which he approves and in which he delights, namely, his moral law. I fail to see how one can command another person to conform to that concerning which he approves and in which he takes delight without simultaneously WANTING that person do comply. Note that I didn't say "WILLING" in the sense of effectively bringing to realization. I simply hold that what God commands men to do, He wants them to do. Consider the following illustration from Scripture:
"What do you think? There was a man who had two sons. He went to the first and said, 'Son, go and work today in the vineyard.' "'I will not,' he answered, but later he changed his mind and went. "Then the father went to the other son and said the same thing. He answered, 'I will, sir,' but he did not go. "Which of the two did *what his father wanted*?" "The first," they answered. Jesus said to them, "I tell you the truth, the tax collectors and the prostitutes are entering the kingdom of God ahead of you" (Matthew 21:28-31). ​ Obviously, the Greek word _thelema_ does not refer to God's _decretive purpose_ in this context but to his _revealed will_. Here's the definition offered by Bauer, Arndt, and Gingrich for thelema in this sense: 
"what one *wishes* to bring about by the activity of others, to whom one assigns a task" (emphasis added).​ So my view of the relationship between "command" and "desire" is grammatically sound and, I believe, theological sound and within Reformed Confessional Christianity (see below). 

(2) My view of God having desires that he does not sovereignly choose to fulfill is NOT equivalent to the Arminian view Owen is refuting. 

The "unfulfilled desires" in God posited by the Arminian position asserts that such desires are unfulfilled because of the contingency of the human will. I, on the other hand, make all states of affairs, events, and human actions contingent on God's sovereign and unconditional decree. Therefore, Rev. Winzer is wrong in equating my view of God's optative wish with the Arminian view of optative wish that Owen was refuting.

(3) The Reverend Winzer is allowed to twist what I say and get away with it. Consider the following:

a) I cited Owen who represents the Arminian position thus: "Secondly, They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass.

b) Then I responded: "Note first that I have not argued that God "properly expects" the desires he does not decree to come to pass." I pointed this out because "desire" and "expectation" are not synonymous. "Desire" means "to wish or long for." "Expect," on the other hand, denotes, "to regard as likely to happen; anticipate the occurrence or the coming of." While the Arminians Owen is refuting may want to posit both ideas, I do not for the simple reason that I don't believe the Arminian position Owen addresses here is Scriptural. 

c) Nevertheless, Rev. Winzer responds refuses to accept my rejection of the Arminian position but writes in response to my rejection of unfulfilled "expectations" in God, "If one appeals to an optative as literal he does not have liberty to deny the optative force of the expression. The optative expresses a "wish" for things to come to pass, and a "wish" includes the state of aspiration."

Please note carefully his sleight of hand. He says in essence that "wish" includes the "state of aspiration." Okay. I don't argue with that. But that's not the Arminian position Owen is refuting. He's refuting the position that God has BOTH unfulfilled desires AND ALSO unfulfilled "expectations." As I demonstrated above, "expectations" are not equivalent to "the state of aspiration." Hence, the Rev. Winzer fails to discern the distinction between my position and that which Owen is refuting. 

(4) Winzer then makes the groundless claim: "Bob maintains the Arminian concept of "conditional will" in a proximate sense. Like the Arminian he posits God willing things which are dependent on human response for their fulfilment."

No, Bob does not make that claim! I emphatically do NOT make God's willing things (in the sense of his decree, which the Arminians simply equate with willing) dependent on the human response for their fulfillment. I have said to you privately and on the board time and time again: *All that was, is, or every will be is contingent on God's unconditional decree, and God's unconditional decree is NOT contingent on anything outside God himself--including human responses. *

How much more "un-Arminian" do I need to get?! Matthew calls me a Pantheist and gets away with it. Now he claims that I have Arminian views. Well, I do agree with Arminians that God is a Trinity. But I strongly disagree with their rejection of God's absolute sovereignty and the unconditional nature of his decrees. 

What more can I say? The Reverend Winzer has already resorted to calling me a Pantheist and now he gets away with labeling my viewpoint Arminian. If I were truly guilty of either of these positions, I should not be allowed to remain on this board. I close with the following summary affirmations:
(1) I affirm the LBCF. 
(2) I affirm God's decretive will
(3) I affirm that God's decretive will is not contingent on anything outside himself.
(4) I affirm that what God commands all men to do he wants all men to do. Not in the sense of decree but in the sense of desire.
(5) I affirm that though God's revealed will may be unfulfilled, his decretive will is never unfulfilled. ​If that 4th proposition places me outside of Confessional Reformed Christianity, then i'm afraid I'll have to plead guilty. That proposition was the majority position of the Fifteenth General Assembly of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1948). That certainly suggests that more Reformed teachers and pastors affirmed proposition #4 than simply John Murray. Moreover, if I'm not mistaken, the Christian Reformed Church also adopted a similar view and rejected Herman Hoeksema's view as un-orthodox. So I suspect that Confession Reformed Christianity is broader than some on this board would prefer. 

I don't say this because I expect everyone to adopt my position. I only "wish" (can I use that word?!) for a degree of latitude within Confessional bounds that refrains from heaping derogatory epithets on one's opponent simply because he doesn't hold to one's own particular strain of Calvinism. 

Respectfully yours,


----------



## Dr. Bob Gonzales

Joshua said:


> In Isaiah 46:10, the Lord says that He does _all_ that He pleases. So if any of what he pleases (i.e. desires) is left unmet, did God _not_ do all that He desired?  I'm pretty confident that God does exactly what He wants and _all_ of what He wants. What a frustrating concept it would be if God decreed that He would desire something that He would not get.



Joshua,

Thanks for your input. Isaiah 46:10 is referring God's decretive will or desire. Such I affirm are never unfulfilled. God's revealed will, however, is sometimes broken and therefore unfulfilled. Since the Greek term _thelema_, when predicated of God's revealed will, means, "what one *wishes* to bring about by the activity of others, to whom one assigns a task" (emphasis added), I hold that _the conduct of which God approves and to which he obliges humanity_ is conduct that God also _desires_ humanity to fulfill. I see no contradiction between my position and Isaiah 46:10. 

How do you explain the parable that speaks of one son not fulfilling what his father had "wanted" him to do?

Your brother,


----------



## py3ak

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> py3ak said:
> 
> 
> 
> Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from _PRRD_ III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are _permanent_ not _transient_ (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ruben,
> 
> I'm not advancing my own position on the subject, but I do think a clarification need to be made that contradicts your assertion above, which you apparently base on Richard Muller. You said, "Note that God's affections are _permanent_ not _transient_."
> 
> However, John Owen rejects that God has affections for the reasons below. Note especially how Owen's description of affections in point #3 differs from your (or Muller's) assertion:
> 
> 1. "Affections, considered in themselves, have always _an incomplete, imperfect act of the will_ or volition joined with them."
> 2. "They have their _dependence on that wherewith he in whom they are is affected_; that is, they owe their rise and continuance to something without him in whom they are."
> 3. "Affections are necessarily _accompanied with change and immutability_; yea, he who is affected properly is really changed."
> 4. "Many of the affections here ascribed to God _do eminently denote impotence_."
> 
> Your servant,
Click to expand...



Dr. Gonzales, I should probably have been more clear - I was very pressed for time. Whatever the relationship between Owen's views and what Dr. Muller says is the general view of the Reformed orthodox, it is very clear that Dr. Muller's summary gives no support to Tim's position of transitory emotions, because according to Him the affections are permanent dispositions in God. That does not allow for temporary frustration, temporary sorrow, etc.

I'm sorry to hit and run but I have to head off to a homeless shelter.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

Joshua,

I wanted to follow up my comments above to attempt to underscore common ground in an honest effort to show that I'm not just trying to be argumentative but that I really do affirm much of what you and others affirm.

First, you write, "I'm pretty confident that God does exactly what He wants and _all_ of what He wants." You are absolutely correct in the following senses:
(1) Anything and everything God chooses to do He does.
(2) All that God wants to do He does.
(3) God doesn't just do generally what he wants to do but precisely and exactly what he decrees to do. 
(4) I think we would agree that there are some states of affairs and human conduct of which God morally approves and delights that he does not, however, will to happen. I'm fine with phrasing it, "God did not desire Adam to refrain from eating the forbidden fruit but rather desired or wanted Adam to sin" provided that it's God's decretive will in view. 
(5) When God's preceptive will is in view, I prefer to say, "God did not want Adam to take the fruit but he wanted Adam to obey." You and others may not feel comfortable with that language and prefer something like, "God didn't approve of Adam taking the fruit but He approved of Adam obeying." Honestly, in light of passages I've cited where the terms like "want" or "desire" are applied to the preceptive will of God, I can't understand the objection to using those terms provided that we make it clear we're referring not to God's decree (in which he always gets what he wants) but to God's precept (in which men do not always do what God wants them to do.)​Second, you write, "What a frustrating concept it would be if God decreed that He would desire something that He would not get." 
(1) It would be incompatible with God's perfection should any of his decreed-desires not come to pass. 
(2) God has decreed a word in which states of affairs that he commands, i.e., "be holy as I am holy," are not fulfilled. This does not frustrate God since God in his wisdom works all things (including sin) for his own glory and the good of his people. 
(3) The thought of God desiring (preceptively) that all men obeying him yet not decreeing that all men obey him may be a "frustrating concept" for us. We're zealous for God's honor, we rightly pray that his kingdom come and his will be done on earth as it is in heaven. The fact remains, however, that God's will is not presently being done on earth as it is in heaven. This is terribly frustrating to God's people. But it's not frustrating to God. God is absolutely free to plan and run the world in the way He sees fit. He "desires obedience, not mere sacrifice" (Hos. 6:6). The fact men do not always comply with his wish does not, however, frustrate God. God is overruling their evil for good (Gen. 50). Such unfulfilled wishes (at the level of precept) are actually fulfilling God's wishes (at the level of decree). So, in the end, God gets his way. ​In Christ,


----------



## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> (1) My view of God having "unfulfilled desires" is not equivalent to saying God has unfilled decrees. It is equivalent, rather, to saying that God has unfulfilled commands or revealed obligations.



Drawing on the decretive-preceptive distinction fails to alleviate the situation because Bob has clearly stated in an earlier post that he affirms a "volitional" sense in the preceptive will of God. As has been pointed out, the distinction between decretive and preceptive depends on the non-volitional sense of "will" when applied to "precept." Because Bob affirms a volitional sense to the preceptive will, he makes the preceptive will identical with the decretive will, with the only difference being that the preceptive will is not fulfilled. Hence, looking at the meaning of the words as provided by Bob, he maintains God "volitionally" desires things to come to pass which never will come to pass, just as John Owen represented the Arminians as maintaining.

Bob is clearly using the terms of traditional reformed theology when he claims that there are unfulfilled desires relative to the preceptive will; but he gives a "volitional" sense to the preceptive will, which traditional reformed theology has restricted to the decretive will; hence he effectively destroys the traditional distinction and sets up the Arminian tenet of "conditional will" in its place. Unlike reformed theologians, Bob does not affirm that God will do all His pleasure.

Bob obviously doesn't like being told that he espouses Arminian tenets; the way to remedy that is to alter what one teaches rather than complain about that teaching being called what it is.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

The "will," according to Richard Muller, is "the appetitive power (_potentia appetitiva_) of a spiritual being." The adjective "appetitive" signifies "having the quality of desiring gratification; a strong wish or urge." 

According to Deuteronomy 5:29, God expresses an optative wish for his people's obedience. I believe that optative wish or desiderative longing when predicated of God signifies that *the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward*. 

Does anyone still find fault with this definition of God's preceptive wish as expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29? Yes, it is volitional in the sense that Muller defines "will" or _voluntas_.


----------



## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Does anyone still find fault with this definition of God's preceptive wish as expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29?



As has been pointed out, the reformed tradition finds fault with this definition when it is not understood anthropopathically. As Owen states of the Arminian understanding:



> they disesteem the usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which include in them any imperfection, are ascribed unto God per anthrwpopatheian — in regard of that analogy his actions hold with such of ours as we perform having those passions.



The degree to which an individual's view reflects the Arminian view will depend on the extent to which one accepts the "usual answer" that divine optatives refer to God's external works rather than to an internal state in God.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> Does anyone still find fault with this definition of God's preceptive wish as expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> As has been pointed out, the reformed tradition finds fault with this definition when it is not understood anthropopathically.
Click to expand...


Matthew, 

You didn't answer my specific question. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that *the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward*. 

Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?


----------



## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> You didn't answer my specific question. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that *the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward*.
> 
> Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?



The reformed answer that it is pleasing and rewarded because God wills it; in and of itself such obedience is not commensurate with the pleasure and reward of God. "My goodness extendeth not to thee." Hence the reformed teach that God desires out of fulness rather than out of want. When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen."


----------



## Dr. Bob Gonzales

armourbearer said:


> Bob is clearly using the terms of traditional reformed theology when he claims that there are unfulfilled desires relative to the preceptive will; but he gives a "volitional" sense to the preceptive will, which traditional reformed theology has restricted to the decretive will; hence he effectively destroys the traditional distinction and sets up the Arminian tenet of "conditional will" in its place. Unlike reformed theologians, Bob does not affirm that God will do all His pleasure.
> 
> Bob obviously doesn't like being told that he espouses Arminian tenets; the way to remedy that is to alter what one teaches rather than complain about that teaching being called what it is.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Matthew's remarks remind me of Herman Hoeksema's opinion of Louis Berkhof and the Synod of Kalamazoo:
> For the fact is, that the first point [on common grace] reminds one of the two-faced Janus. Janus was a Roman idol, distinguished by the remarkable feature of having two faces and looking in two opposite directions. And in this respect there is a marked similarity between Janus and the first point. The latter is also two-faced and casts wistful looks in opposite directions.... One of his faces reminds you of Augustine, Calvin, Gomarus; but the other shows the unmistakeable features of Pelagius, Arminius, Episcopius. And your troubles begin when you would inquire of this two-faced oracle, what may be the exact meaning of the first point. For, then this modern Janus begins to revolve, alternatively showing you one face and the other, till you hardly know whether you are dealing with Calvin or Arminius. ​So Louis Berkhof and his colleagues were, in Hoeksema's view, crypto-Arminians. Oh well, I guess I won't complain too much if I'm lumped together with Louis Berkhof.
> 
> -----Added 5/8/2009 at 08:36:15 EST-----
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> 
> You didn't answer my specific question. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that *the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward*.
> 
> Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> The reformed answer that it is pleasing and rewarded because God wills it; in and of itself such obedience is not commensurate with the pleasure and reward of God. "My goodness extendeth not to thee." Hence the reformed teach that God desires out of fulness rather than out of want. When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen."
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Once again, the Reverend Winzer dances around the question. You say, "When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen." This I whole-heartedly affirm and have never said otherwise, unless, of course, we're talking about God's decree. God's decretive-desires "shall happen" inexorably.
> 
> Now, let's get back to the question again Mr. Winzer. A simple answer will do and no evasions please. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that *the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward*.
> 
> Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?
> 
> -----Added 5/8/2009 at 08:52:40 EST-----
> 
> A Biblical Syllogism for the Reverend Winzer:
> 
> Major premise: God's will of precept includes the component of "desire" or "delight" in what conforms to divine virtue: "For *I desire* [_chaphats_] steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings" (Hos. 6:6).
> Minor premise: The concepts of "desire" and "delight" are _volitional_ qualities. The _voluntas_ according to Richard Muller, is "the appetitive power (_potentia appetitiva_) of a spiritual being." The adjective "appetitive" signifies "having the quality of desiring gratification; a strong wish or urge."
> Conclusion: God's preceptive will contains a _volitional_ element.
> 
> This syllogism corresponds nicely with the biblical evidence that applies volitional vocabulary both to God's decretive will as well as to his preceptive will. So when the Rev. Winzer writes, "the distinction between decretive and preceptive depends on the non-volitional sense of "will" when applied to "precept," I think either (1) he doesn't read his Bible or (2) he's adopted a narrower definition of "volitional" (apparently limiting it solely to _arbitrium_ or "choice." If the former, he needs to study his Bible ; if the latter he needs to study linguistics.
> 
> -----Added 5/8/2009 at 09:10:12 EST-----
> 
> Okay, if the Reverend Winzer cannot answer this question, perhaps someone else on the board will oblige. We've been discussing the optative as predicated in God in Deuteronomy 5:29, which reads,
> ESV Deuteronomy 5:29 *Oh that they had* such a mind as this always, to fear me and to keep all my commandments, that it might go well with them and with their descendants forever!​I maintain that the optative ascribed to God here signifying the following: that *the obedience of these human beings is exceedingly pleasing to God, and not without reward*.
> 
> Would you classify my understanding of the optative or desiderative will of God as Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?
Click to expand...


----------



## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Once again, the Reverend Winzer dances around the question. You say, "When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen." This I whole-heartedly affirm and have never said otherwise, unless, of course, we're talking about God's decree. God's decretive-desires "shall happen" inexorably.



No, this is the very hinge of the issue. The optatives taken literally do not express a "should be" but a counterfactual "shall be." The advocate for conditional "volitional" desire in God is maintaining that He wishes something to come to pass as a future event contingent on other factors.


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## MW

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Would you classify my understanding of the optative or desiderative will of God as Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?



It is sub-reformed because you hold that human obedience and disobedience affects the essential glory of God and that God desires out of want rather than out of fulness.


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