# And Reason Also! WCF, XX, ii



## JohnV (May 1, 2007)

> II. God alone is Lord of the conscience,[10] and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are, in anything, contrary to his Word; or beside it, if matters of faith, or worship.[11] So that, to believe such doctrines, or to obey such commands, out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience:[12] and the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience, and reason also.[13]
> 
> 10. James 4:12; Rom. 14:4, 10; I Cor. 10:29
> 11. Acts 4:19, 5:29; I Cor. 7:22-23; Matt. 15:1-6, 9; 23:8-10; II Cor. 1:24
> ...



Above is paragraph ii of the Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter XX, Of Christian Liberty, and Liberty of Conscience. the section that is underlined is what I am asking about: why is this added? 

Specifically, if someone believes that his own personal view on something that falls under liberty of conscience follows reasonably from Scripture, then why is it that requiring this view of others destroys reason? How so?

Why is this phrase, in direct relation to its context, namely Christian liberty and liberty of conscience, is in the Confession too?


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## Civbert (May 1, 2007)

JohnV said:


> Above is paragraph ii of the Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter XX, Of Christian Liberty, and Liberty of Conscience. the section that is underlined is what I am asking about: why is this added?
> 
> Specifically, if someone believes that his own personal view on something that falls under liberty of conscience follows reasonably from Scripture, then why is it that requiring this view of others destroys reason? How so?
> 
> Why is this phrase, in direct relation to its context, namely Christian liberty and liberty of conscience, is in the Confession too?



Because "the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience" is irrational. We are _only_ required to "believe such doctrines, or to obey such commands" that are "clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other" (WCF 1:7) and/or "_by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture_" (WCF 1:6). Anything else, that is not contrary to Scripture is permitted, but may never be demanded of a fellow Christian. "Reason" for the Westminster Divines is not simply "being reasonable" - it means clear and correct thinking. To demand something be believed or obeyed, it must either be clearly given in Scripture (e.g. "Thou shall not murder"), or follow by strict _logical necessity_ from the clear statements of Scripture (e.g. the doctrine of the Atonement). It is insufficient to say it "follows reasonably" - it must follow necessarily.

The Catholic Church (following Thomistic Philosophy) taught that all teachings of the Catholic Church should be believed implicitly. It's view of faith was "implicit faith" in the statements of the Church, rather than faith in the clear statements of Scripture, and those things that can be deduced by good and necessary consequences from Scripture. Christian liberty protects men from this kind of legalism.


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## JohnV (May 2, 2007)

Civbert said:


> Because "the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience" is irrational. We are _only_ required to "believe such doctrines, or to obey such commands" that are "clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other" (WCF 1:7) and/or "_by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture_" (WCF 1:6).


Agreed so far,


> Anything else, that is not contrary to Scripture is permitted,


but I can't agree with this. I would think that the "anything else" would have to be derived reasonable from Scripture *and* not be contrary to Scripture. Without at least these two you could say that about a lot of things that are not contrary to the Scriptures that still are not permitted. For example, it should not be permitted that ministers make the pulpit the focus of political action, or for political action. 


> but may never be demanded of a fellow Christian.


We're back on track.


> "Reason" for the Westminster Divines is not simply "being reasonable" - it means clear and correct thinking. To demand something be believed or obeyed, it must either be clearly given in Scripture (e.g. "Thou shall not murder"), or follow by strict _logical necessity_ from the clear statements of Scripture (e.g. the doctrine of the Atonement). It is insufficient to say it "follows reasonably" - it must follow necessarily.
> 
> The Catholic Church (following Thomistic Philosophy) taught that all teachings of the Catholic Church should be believed implicitly. It's view of faith was "implicit faith" in the statements of the Church, rather than faith in the clear statements of Scripture, and those things that can be deduced by good and necessary consequences from Scripture. Christian liberty protects men from this kind of legalism.



OK, I think I understand this much of what you're saying: there is a distinction between "reason" and "logical necessity", between "following reasonably" and "following necessarily". One can be reasonable and not yet be logical necessarily. I'm not saying that I know how that is so, but that I understand that you are making this distinction. 

But say that a minister is preaching the Framework Hypothesis while he's going through Genesis in his sermons. He outlines a very reasonable argument for what he believes to be the case, how he understands the creation account and how it comports with general revelation as he understands it. In all his reasoning, how is he being destructive of reason in propounding as Bible doctrine, as the preached Word of God, a matter which the church he serves at best allows it as a matter of liberty of conscience and no more? It is a matter which is beside the Word, because it calls for subjective human judgment in the equation, and is not expressly from Scripture, nor comes from logical necessity, and so is not doctrinal but clearly a matter of liberty of conscience. So to preach it as what the Bible teaches, by using the office and the pulpit to propound it, is destructive of liberty of conscience insofar as he is using his office and the pulpit to make his view of greater importance, or of more acceptability, or of more popular assent, or of more persuasive argumentation, than the equally valid and equally accepted views of the members of the congregation which might differ. In short, he using his own position of superiority to lend superiority to his own personal convictions at the cost of others' personal convictions. 

But how is it destructive of reason?


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## Civbert (May 2, 2007)

JohnV said:


> but I can't agree with this. I would think that the "anything else" would have to be derived reasonable from Scripture *and* not be contrary to Scripture. Without at least these two you could say that about a lot of things that are not contrary to the Scriptures that still are not permitted. For example, it should not be permitted that ministers make the pulpit the focus of political action, or for political action.


Agreed. I was overstating the case. 



JohnV said:


> OK, I think I understand this much of what you're saying: there is a distinction between "reason" and "logical necessity", between "following reasonably" and "following necessarily". One can be reasonable and not yet be logical necessarily. I'm not saying that I know how that is so, but that I understand that you are making this distinction.


 Fair enough.



JohnV said:


> But say that a minister is preaching the Framework Hypothesis while he's going through Genesis in his sermons. He outlines a very reasonable argument for what he believes to be the case, how he understands the creation account and how it comports with general revelation as he understands it. In all his reasoning, how is he being destructive of reason in propounding as Bible doctrine, as the preached Word of God, a matter which the church he serves at best allows it as a matter of liberty of conscience and no more? It is a matter which is beside the Word, because it calls for subjective human judgment in the equation, and is not expressly from Scripture, nor comes from logical necessity, and so is not doctrinal but clearly a matter of liberty of conscience.


 I think he is fine as long as he doesn't condemn those who may disagree as heretics. This is assuming that he believes what he is teaching is not strictly demanded by Scripture. If he believes that what he is teaching follows necessarily from Scripture (not simply reasonably), and has potential consequences on correctly understanding the gospel, then he has no choice but to present it as such. But otherwise, he should make it clear that this is not dogma, but rather a reasonably hypothesis or theory. 



JohnV said:


> So to preach it as what the Bible teaches, by using the office and the pulpit to propound it, is destructive of liberty of conscience insofar as he is using his office and the pulpit to make his view of greater importance, or of more acceptability, or of more popular assent, or of more persuasive argumentation, than the equally valid and equally accepted views of the members of the congregation which might differ. In short, he using his own position of superiority to lend superiority to his own personal convictions at the cost of others' personal convictions.
> 
> But how is it destructive of reason?


If something follows from Scripture necessarily, it is our duty to believe it, and his duty to proclaim it so. But if this is not the case, then it is destructive to reason for him to claims this teaching is explicitly given in Scripture, or follows necessarily. To claim the teaching as a standard of faith, or a matter of correct belief in the gospel, when there is no logical warrant for such a claim, is a violation of reason.


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## Civbert (May 2, 2007)

Let me try it this way.

Suppose someone teaches something that appears to reasonably follow from Scripture but is not necessarily/logically based on Scripture. (Technically this would be an opinion.) 

If what he teaches logically implies a contradiction of Scriptural dogma, then to demand someone believe such a teaching is to ask them to violate reason. One can not logically believe two contradictory propositions. The definition of a contradiction requires that if one is true, the other is necessarily false. So to insist someone believe contradictory propositions is a violation of reason. 

Now lets drop the bar a little. Let's say someone is teaching something that is "reasonable" but not necessary. In other words, it is not be "unreasonable" to believe. But it happens this teaching, if believed, would contradict some other belief that is equally "reasonable". To demand someone believe this teaching is again a violation of reason since it clearly contradicts a different belief. They are both beliefs that are less than logically necessary from Scripture, but they do logically contradict each other. It is _un_reasonable to believe both.


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## Civbert (May 2, 2007)

OK. Still thinking about this.

Let's say the teaching is reasonable (in that is does not clearly contradict Scripture or anything the necessarily follows from Scripture), and it does not clearly contradict any other "reasonable" beliefs you have. It is a violation of reason to demand you believe this teaching by implicit/blind faith because it is also reasonable that in the coarse of your sanctification, as you being to know more the truths of Scripture, that this teaching could contradict what this future knowledge. In other words, anything that is not clearly Scripture, or necessarily/logical implied by Scripture, could be false, and so it is unreasonable (a violation) to demand someone to believe such on blind/implicit faith.


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## VirginiaHuguenot (May 2, 2007)

Edward D. Morris, _Theology of the Westminster Symbols: A Commentary Historical, Doctrinal, Practical on the Confession of Faith and Catechisms and the Related Formularies of the Presbyterian Churches_, pp. 561-562:



> The section also warns against the sin of professing to accept any human dogmas or obey any human commandments, when the reason and the conscience, properly enlightened by Scripture, are in protest against them. Doubtless the main reference was to those who as a matter of policy professed to accept teachings and commands of the papacy; but the principle laid down is universal. To avow or support a belief which we do not truly hold, or to give credence to what we do not perceive on reasonable grounds to be true, even in submission to the behests of the organized church, is justly said _to betray true liberty of conscience;_ and such betrayal, it is implied, is a sin not only against the truth, but against him who is the supreme Lord of the conscience. On the other hand, to require implicit or unreasoning faith as Romanism did, -- to demand blind obedience on any pretext of human right to control belief, is said to destroy liberty of conscience, _and reason also_. In other words, it is as sinful to require such obedience as it is to yield it, and the authority ecclesiastical or otherwise which makes such a requisition is guilty of invading that holy freedom which God has given to every Christian as a part of his spiritual birthright.



Robert Shaw, _An Exposition of the Westminster Confession of Faith_:



> From the principles laid down in this section, it manifestly follows, that a right of private judgment about matters of religion belongs to every man, and ought to be exercised by every Christian. Christians are expressly required to examine and prove every doctrine by the unerring rule of the Word of God.–Isa viii. 20; 1 John iv. 1. They ought to be ready to render a reason of the hope which is in them (1 Pet. iii. 15); and this none can do who receive the doctrines and commandments of men with implicit faith and blind obedience. Whatsoever is not done in faith, nor accompanied with a personal persuasion of the obligation or lawfulness of it in the sight of God, is pronounced to be sin. - Rom. xiv. 23.



Francis Beattie, _The Presbyterian Standards_:



> First, The statement here made by the Confession is to the effect that God alone is Lord of the conscience, in accordance with the word of God. This being the case, the conscience of the Christian man is free from the doctrines and commandments of men, if these be contrary in any way to his word, or beside it in matters of faith and worship. It is well to note that it is matters of faith and worship that are here signalized; and in regard to these matters the Christian conscience is free from the commands of men, and bound only by God, as he has revealed his will touching these matters in his holy word. In such a case, to believe and obey the commands of men out of conscience is to betray true liberty of conscience. And, further, to require implicit faith in such commands, and an absolute obedience to mere human authority, unsupported by, or contrary to, the word of God, is to destroy both liberty of conscience and sound reason.



A.A. Hodge, _A Commentary on the Westminster Confession of Faith_:



> 1. That, in the highest and only absolute sense, God alone is Lord of the human conscience, has never been denied. The real question raised by Romanists, and those in general who have claimed the authority of binding and loosing the consciences of their fellow-men, relates to the standard which God has given us of his will, and the means he has chosen to enforce it. The Romanists maintain that the true standard and organ of the will of God in the world is the infallible inspired Church, or body of bishops ordained regularly in a direct line from the apostles, and in communion with the See of Rome. They hold that this Church has power to define doctrines and enact laws in God's name, binding the consciences of men; and that it possesses, in the power of the keys, the right, in execution of these laws, to absolve or condemn in God's name, to bind or loose the subject, and open or shut the kingdom of heaven, and to impose ecclesiastical penalties. By far the larger part of what the Church of Rome actually enforces, in the way of faith and practice, is derived from ecclesiastical tradition and, evidently perverted interpretations of Scripture.
> 
> The Erastian State Churches of Germany and England have often attempted to enforce outward uniformity in profession and worship, in spite of the conscientious scruples of multitudes of their best citizens, on the plea that the right and responsibility of regulating the ecclesiastical as well as the civil interests of the nation devolve upon the civil magistrate.
> 
> ...


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## JohnV (May 2, 2007)

Andrew:

Do these quotes mean, you think, that there are some things that other men, not even ministers and elders, and not even fathers in the Church have any authority over? Is that where such things not only violate but destroy conscience and reason, if these bounds are transgressed? 

I guess the thing that's bothering me, at least in part, is that every man has a responsibility to believe as best he knows how. Sometimes that's not the same thing as believing as someone else best knows how. And sometimes that other someone can be a minister or someone of higher rank. We can't always believe the smartest or brightest or most educated people, and we can't always trust everyone who holds office in the church. The Reformers, after all, broke with those who had ecclesiastical authority over them, and we believe they were justified doing so. 

Sometimes, though, we can get to fine lines of demarcation when it comes to liberties of conscience. The person's rank or position of authority makes no difference to the issue under question, whatever matter of conscience it may be. If the church accepts opinion A, B, and C as equally acceptable, then the fact that a person in a position of authority holds opinion A does not make opinion A of any more acceptability than opinions B and C. And it is not a minister's place to be adding weight to any of them, since the church's position is that A, B, and C are equal. If a minister preaches opinion A, its OK; but if an ordinary person in the congregation starts to push his opinion B it is called being divisive. 

I was thinking that the reference to reason might be that everyone has the right and obligation to reason as best he can, without being told by anyone else what to believe when it comes to things not clearly revealed from God. God has granted men the right, ability, and responsibility to reason on his own. But at the same time taking away that obligation by allowing things to be imposed that go beyond the limits of revelation leaves men without a solid base from which to reason. He must be free from such insecure commandments as men's opinions offer to be able to reason properly. If opinion A is 99.9% certain, or any small amount below 100% certainty, then it may not be obligated. For to do so would destroy reason. 

In other words, there is no way that a man can be lord of another man's conscience, no matter his position of authority or status over other men. *This is crucial to reason*. The quotes you supplied could be read to agree with this.


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## Civbert (May 2, 2007)

JohnV said:


> ...In other words, there is no way that a man can be lord of another man's conscience, no matter his position of authority or status over other men. *This is crucial to reason*. The quotes you supplied could be read to agree with this.



_I_ agree with it, so you better believe it!


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## C. Matthew McMahon (May 2, 2007)

"I guess the thing that's bothering me, at least in part, is that every man has a responsibility to believe as best he knows how."

There is, though, a great differecne between what someone "thinks" they know as best, and that which is true. In other words, Luther's "Here I stand" speech was predicated upon "unless you can prove to me from Scripture..." His conscience was held captive to the Word, and to go against a conscience held to the WORD is neither right nor safe.

It should be, then, in an argument from simplicity, that God's ambassadors herald His Word. On that idea alone, provided THEY are following Scripture, and Theological Traditionalism is on their side in such a regard as I outlined in that paper at APM, they should follow the Word, as heralded by the ambassador.

Otherwise, one would have to conclude that to go with conscience alone is a license for anarchy.


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## Semper Fidelis (May 2, 2007)

I think Hodge probably explained this section best but there's still a sense in which I'm dissatisfied with the way the section is being understood.

It really helps to understand what "implicit faith" (implicitum fide) according to Papist dogma. The idea, in a nutshell, is that the Word of God is not really understandable by the common man. His faith isn't actually in Christ then or in the truths of Scripture but in the teaching of the Church. He has faith _implicitly_ in Biblical truth by trusting everything that the Church tells him. This is why personal Bible study was long discouraged and a person is still required to go to Penance if personal reading of the Word in any way causes them to reason contrary to the Word of God.

In one aspect, this section is denying that Christians are supposed to have a "I believe it because the Church says it...." This goes to the perspicuity of the Scriptures on matters essential and that the Scriptures are written in a way that the common man can understand and attain to a knowledge sufficient for him to actually put trust in Christ as He is revealed by the Word of God.

Thus, the blind obedience that is condemned is that you actually have to believe yourself and reason yourself as to embrace the doctrines of the Word.

Notice, further, that what is roundly condemned is the ability of the Church to add doctrines that are not propounded in the Word of God. This passage is used quite a bit for the RPW where non-Reformed bodies will claim the right to add elements of worship. A man's conscience is pricked by such things? That's OK because, some reason, the Church has the right to do these things. Wrong. The Church may only prick the conscience of a man based on the testimony of the Word and not a tradition of men.

I do think that this passage is pushed too far about what it means that the Church has no role with respect to the conscience of a man. This passage does not teach private interpretation in the sense that every man is free to decide what the Word says for himself and if the Church's testimony differs then each man must be left alone. 

This would obviously destroy the ability to conduct any Church discipline. It would also contradict with the WCF on the role of councils to settle controversies in matters of faith. Insofar as the Church is witness to the voice of the Spirit in the Word, men are under obligation to submit to it. They cannot be put in the stocks if they do not but they can be disciplined and removed from fellowship if they refuse to submit to the Word of God.


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## JohnV (May 3, 2007)

Rich and Matt:

I was headed another direction with this this morning, after thinking about those quotes which Andrew provided. But you bring up important points to think about. It seems, I suppose, that the idea of being like-minded and having a free conscience may be seen as contraries, as if freedom of conscience can be used to undermine ecclesiastical unity. My first reaction to that would be that this notion understands neither freedom of conscience nor like-mindedness. If they're put against each other, then this contravenes reason. 

Where I was thinking about this over night was that this principle of a free conscience is also at the heart of democracy, of rule of law, as opposed to the king or dictator being law: A country can't operate on the conscience of one man, but must operate upon the principle that a country's peoples have a free conscience under one law. In other words, what holds true for a true church also holds true for a truly free society. 

But let's go back to your points: the need to avoid the use of freedom of conscience to keep from anarchy, and the need to avoid the use of freedom of conscience to keep from theological individualism and confusion. There definitely have to be limits to the use of freedom of conscience, but I think we would have to know what we mean by limits. If you limit freedom of conscience in one way, as to confine it in some way, then you destroy freedom of conscience. But if you put a fence around it by stating within which parameters this freedom is exercised, then that's a different story, as long as no real freedoms are violated. 

For example, we have to maintain the univocal meaning of the Word of God. That's non-violable. It can't mean one thing to one person and another to someone else. To accept that kind of "lowest common denominator" type of theology would being a denial of theology. Theology may not be controlled by freedom of conscience, but freedom of conscience must have the control factor of proper theology. 

In short, what is theology and what is liberty of conscience have to clearly distinguished in a person's thinking in order to know both. Placing what is a liberty of conscience in front of, as if prerequisite to, theology, is destructive of both theology and liberty of conscience: to be guided by less than certain truths is to let true liberty fall to the ground. 

I am suggesting that those who use liberty of conscience to undermine Church-adopted, established theology are misusing or abusing this liberty. And those who mandate to the consciences things that are not Church-adopted, established theology, are mistreating and violating this liberty. The Church *needs* to have liberty of conscience in subservience to proper theology. 

The Apostles agreed with this, I am supposing, because they called all the Church together to concur with their decision in the Jerusalem Council episode. I would suggest that in Acts 15 we have a clear example of all things working together properly and in order, to show how liberty of conscience cannot be violated by mandated doctrines which are true, and how true leadership and authority in the Church may rule and yet also not violate either true doctrine or liberty of conscience, on a matter that was deeply divisive.


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## JohnV (May 4, 2007)

I've been running this through my mind over and over; playing one extreme over against the other, and trying to figure out how this doctrine comes out true. 

Something came to mind (again) as I was listening to the news on my radio. (It's something that has bothered me a number of times in the past.) In Canada there is a continuing question about how much was known by the intelligence and law enforcement authorities before the Air India disaster. In the U.S., I suppose, there is a continuing question as to how much was known by the intelligence people about WMD in Iraq before the invasion. The question for ordinary people here is: how many secrets are too many secrets? When does so-called "national security" become an excuse for illegal or immoral covert action by a democratic government, to the destruction of democracy? When does overuse, misuse, or abuse of authority become destructive of the personal responsibilities of liberties of conscience that a true demoncracy depends upon? 

And conversely, when does overuse, misuse, or abuse of the responsibilities of personal liberties of conscience become destructive of the rule of law and moral principles that a true democracy depends upon? Terrorists are certainly extremists on their own points of view. 

Are we seeing extremes becoming evident on both sides? Are we seeing a breakdown of the proper balance by a tendency to extremes in both directions? Is liberty of conscience (absolute freedom) or rule of authority (unquestioned, though limited, power of elected officials), seen as if we must have either one or the other, but we cannot have both? Are we answering an extreme on one side by employing an extreme on the other side? And is this trend deepening as both become more entrenched in their determinations?



As this relates to the ecclesiastical realm I see another battle going on. For example, Reformed churches recognize three millennial views as possibly Biblical. It is not that all of them follow necessarily from Scripture, because that could not be. It is that all of them *may* possibly follow from Scripture; what follows *necessarily* in this regard is not known. But yet some churches allow ministers to preach their particular view as Bible doctrine as if for that minister his view follows necessarily, if just for him. They allow it to answer the growing division arising within the congregations from people or groups putting too much emphasis on their particular views, and thus having a polarizing effect. They are allowing the use of authority on matters of _ADIAPHORA_ to settle the matter of division in the church. "Not enough central authority" is the reason given to justify this. Since it is a church matter, the church steps in. 

In my way of thinking this is an abuse of authority that undermines true liberty of conscience. 

On the other hand, though, raising a liberty of conscience to the point that it upsets the peace and unity of the church, by an individual member or group, so that this begins to be normative to their theology, undermines the theology of the Church and the authority of the church's offices. If it causes division, if it allowed a degree of normativity, then it is not treated any longer as a liberty of conscience by that person, and is the beginning seeds of destructive heresies. 

That's why we see so much individualism, and why we see so much effort by some ministers to alleviate that individualism by arbitrarily authorizing doctrines that are not doctrines. They want to set things right by unifying the ecclesiastical community by citing matters of _ADIAPHORA_ as prerequisite to established doctrine, to offset all the division that now appears in this community as people follow too much their liberties regarding those _ADIAPHORA_ matters as prerequisite to their own theology. 

For example, some people go off on tangents by making their eschatological view normative over all of the Bible when they read it for themselves, ending up with some strange ideas on established doctrines. And some ministers think the way to set that right is to mandate one eschatological view, so that the others will be regarded as unwelcome. But both are wrong: wrong uses of liberty of conscience and wrong uses of rule of authority. So it seems to me, at least. 

Or you could use as an example the idea of establishing a unified epistemological system as a solution for all the different ways that people understand the Bible. Surely no one doubts that there must be only one way to understand truth, but it is not established by the arbitrary rule of the academic elite outside the church's authority. No one may mandate what the Bible does not mandate, and man does not have sufficient power to know what is beyond God's revelation. Making one epistemological system the rule for all is no solution, because God has given us only one system for that, which the guidance of the perfect knowledge of the Holy Spirit; man's deductions not being sufficient to establish it since he is not perfectly knowledgeable. Depending upon yourself for truth is wrong, and depending upon man's deductions to make a rule of knowledge is wrong; we can only govern our own understanding by subjecting to the governance of the Spirit. And the Spirit wishes us to govern ourselves and our knowing in His light. 


What goes for the proper and rightful environment for the church, one would think, would go for the proper and rightful environment for a free society as well. Personal responsibility in matters of morals and conduct, as well as rule of law by authority.


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## Civbert (May 4, 2007)

JohnV said:


> Are we seeing extremes becoming evident on both sides? Are we seeing a breakdown of the proper balance by a tendency to extremes in both directions? Is liberty of conscience (absolute freedom) or rule of authority (unquestioned, though limited, power of elected officials), seen as if we must have either one or the other, but we cannot have both? Are we answering an extreme on one side by employing an extreme on the other side? And is this trend deepening as both become more entrenched in their determinations?.



In principle, there is no conflict between the two. Liberty of conscience should never overlap what is nominative. Liberty of conscience is very strictly limited to those things that are not specifically demanded by Scripture. If it is "normative", it's not an issue of liberty of conscience. And the authority is always Scripture, not "the Church". When the "Church" (represented by some one of "authority" in church) tries to impose some teaching that is not clearly propounded in the Word, the the church is violating the liberty of conscience for everyone. Not just those who disagree. The Church's authority is strictly limited by what is clearly propounded in Scripture. This is a very strict limitation, and anything beyond it is a matter of _liberty _of conscience. The line is between what is necessary according to Scripture, and what is allowable. 


Now a separate issue of conscience is what happens when a particular church fails to draw the line correctly. We all know that there is disagreements on what is commanded by the Word, and what is permitted. And this is why we have different denominations. And this is where each person has a duty to understand for himself (and not by blind faith in the church) where the line falls. And if you do not agree where a particular denomination draws the line, you have a duty to find a denomination you can better agree with. The church has not authority over your conscience, only the Scripture does. And we are talking now about issues that are normative and commanded by the Word. Any church has the duty to set it's own standards, but can not demand a person violate their conscience in order to follow those standards. This is not a question of "liberty of conscience" by the demands of the Word. 

If someone in your church teaches something that you disagree with, but it is not a matter clearly propounded in Scripture, and he does not demand your agreement, there is no discipline issue. Discipline is an issue for the church when someone violates the standard of God's Word. That's not an issue of liberty of conscience. But when someone disagrees with what a church has officially said is commanded, then discipline is limited to excommunication if the person does not agree with the standard. The church can not make a person follow a standard they disagree with. That would be a violation of conscience, not liberty of conscience. 

So if by clear reason from Scripture, you believe a church has failed to draw the line according to the dictates of the Word, then you must leave that church. The church can do nothing more than excommunicate you. But an issue that falls under the liberty of conscience should not result in discipline since this is an area outside to the commands of Scripture and outside of the authority of the church. 

Interestingly enough, there was a church I read about where an elder said that if he told everyone (as an elder) that they should drive cars with white-wall tires, then it would be a sin not to drive cars with white-wall tires, and they could face church discipline. This is a case where the "church" did not understand that it's ability to discipline is limited to the clear commands of the Word. It's a case where the church failed to draw the line correctly, and it has gone beyond a violation of the liberty of conscience.


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## JohnV (May 4, 2007)

Civbert said:


> And if you do not agree where a particular denomination draws the line, you have a duty to find a denomination you can better agree with. The church has not authority over your conscience, only the Scripture does. And we are talking now about issues that are normative and commanded by the Word. Any church has the duty to set it's own standards, but can not demand a person violate their conscience in order to follow those standards. This is not a question of "liberty of conscience" by the demands of the Word.





> So if by clear reason from Scripture, you believe a church has failed to draw the line according to the dictates of the Word, then you must leave that church.


The underlined parts are the things I question here. I'm not saying I'm disagreeing altogether, but just questioning. Is it my duty to leave and find another denomination? Are we assuming here that all means have been applied to reconcile members? Or are we assuming that members have no obligation to the church if they seem to be standing alone? Or are we assuming that the established church practice is too big a problem to solve through the dissention of one man's conscience? 

I mean, this is just the type of thing that I think is wrong, that a church continue or be allowed to continue without someone standing up. If everyone just left to find a church of their choice, then we would have, so to speak, marketplace-type churches. And the only accountability that a church would have would be themselves, having all the liberties of conscience confined to what they like to see within their midst. That is neither true authority nor true liberty of conscience. 

But if everything has been done, and the church or the dissenter remains obstinate, then there has to be a parting of the ways, whether it is dismissal or excommunication on the part of the church, or leaving on the part of the person. 


> Interestingly enough, there was a church I read about where an elder said that if he told everyone (as an elder) that they should drive cars with white-wall tires, then it would be a sin not to drive cars with white-wall tires, and they could face church discipline. This is a case where the "church" did not understand that it's ability to discipline is limited to the clear commands of the Word. It's a case where the church failed to draw the line correctly, and it has gone beyond a violation of the liberty of conscience.


Whether it is kind of tires on the car or colour of ties, or whether it is something that is Scriptural but not doctrinal, a breach of liberty of conscience, with its ever-present partner of abuse of authority on the other side, or vice versa, it is all the same. 

But these don't have to be together all the time, and that's the difference, it seems to me, more so than what it's about. It is possible that there is a breach of liberty of conscience or a breach of authority without the other necessarily being present. That's the only way that I can see to handle things like this when they happen. The answer to the breach of the one is not a breach of the other, but always an upholding of both together.


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