# Michael Horton's apologetical views?



## jwright82

I have read a few apologetically minded things by Micheal Horton and I couldn't quite nail down his apologetical views, he seems Van Tillian but I am not sure. He is a proffessor of Apologetics so what school does he fit into?


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## Notthemama1984

I had always assumed Van Til even though I have not really read anything on apologetics by him. I am interested to see if he does fall elsewhere.


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## jwright82

Me too, I am curious to see what he actually thinks.


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## PuritanCovenanter

WSCAL is most likely Vantillian. Not much rendered from Clark there if anything at all.


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## R. Scott Clark

We are Van Tillians at WSC. Mike has, however, written a lot over the last 20+ years and his views have developed. In the years following his doctoral work he studied CVT and adopted his approach though he has emphasized the utility of evidences.


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## PuritanCovenanter

I guess I will reveal my ignorance now about this issue. I have found more problems with the debating of this issue than I have found with baptism. Both seem to be just as heated. I have a problem with Van Til on the issue of paradox and a problem with Clark's view that all truth is propositional. Hopefully Dr. Horton can reconcile the issues. At least both sides are presuppositionalist.


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## jwright82

R. Scott Clark said:


> We are Van Tillians at WSC. Mike has, however, written a lot over the last 20+ years and his views have developed. In the years following his doctoral work he studied CVT and adopted his approach though he has emphasized the utility of evidences.


 
Yeah I figured as much but I have never read him utilizing certian aspects of CVT, like the transcendental argument (that doesn't mean that he doesn't just that I have have never read it, which is not saying much). I was curious about that. He definantly utilizes CVT critiques of aoutonomous thought. What is his, yall's, opinion of Dooyeweerd? I know what Frame wrote but what about the rest of ya'll?

---------- Post added at 09:18 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:09 PM ----------




PuritanCovenanter said:


> I guess I will reveal my ignorance now about this issue. I have found more problems with the debating of this issue than I have found with baptism. Both seem to be just as heated. I have a problem with Van Til on the issue of paradox and a problem with Clark's view that all truth is propositional. Hopefully Dr. Horton can reconcile the issues. At least both sides are presuppositionalist.


 
Yeah Clark's view of knowledge is that all knowledge, or truthful knowledge, is propositional in nature. I have a problem with this because it would count out very normal instances in which someone could very easily have geniune knowledge that may not be the most able to conceptualize into a propositional format, like a women's intuition. She may be consistantly right about people's charectors but never able to give a detailed description in propositional form of why she beleives as she does. He is right that beleifs of anykind are either true or false. 

As far as paradox goes in CVT he meant only that in our finite creaturly form there will be things that escape our abilities to conceptualize or completly make sense out of. The Trinity is one such idea. This relates to his wonderful discusion of the concept of mystery in a worldview. Instead of trying to make sesnse out of everything in the christian worldview he just pointed out that the unbeleiver's worldview has just as much mystery in it as well. In fact mystery will be a central concept in any worldview. He is weak in not providing a logic so to speak to rationaly deciding what counts legitmatly as mystery and what counts as a contradiction. Or to put it another way what stops us from just saying its a mystery when in fact it is a bonafied contradiction? So us Van Tillians need to work this problem out, I think he is essentially right just incomplete.


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## Philip

> He is right that beleifs of anykind are either true or false.



"I believe in Jesus." This statement is one of belief, but can neither be true nor false: it may be warranted or non-warranted, but it cannot be true or false, at least not in any factual sense.


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## Staphlobob

P. F. Pugh said:


> He is right that beleifs of anykind are either true or false.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "I believe in Jesus." This statement is one of belief, but can neither be true nor false: it may be warranted or non-warranted, but it cannot be true or false, at least not in any factual sense.
Click to expand...


Now that confuses me. The statement has to do with the person making the statement, not in Jesus Himself. So is it not true that the person believes in Jesus? Is it not a fact that they do?


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> He is right that beleifs of anykind are either true or false.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "I believe in Jesus." This statement is one of belief, but can neither be true nor false: it may be warranted or non-warranted, but it cannot be true or false, at least not in any factual sense.
Click to expand...

 
Anyone can be warranted in that rather abstract beleif like I just moved into a new neighberhood and I believe that there is a tree in my yard. Now lets say that I have not checked but in Florida everyone has a tree in their yard and laws demand that there are trees in yards but I have not checked. In this case I have warrent for my beleif but it still remains that there is either a tree in my yard or not. That is all I meant. So the person who says that they believe in Jesus needs to define what sort of Jesus they believe in. Is he the eternal Son of God and second person of the Trinity or a guy who decided to where pokadot paints everyday. Both descriptions of the name Jesus sastify the statement "I believe in Jesus" but one is more warrented than the other and they are either true or false.

---------- Post added at 07:03 AM ---------- Previous post was at 06:49 AM ----------




Staphlobob said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> He is right that beleifs of anykind are either true or false.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "I believe in Jesus." This statement is one of belief, but can neither be true nor false: it may be warranted or non-warranted, but it cannot be true or false, at least not in any factual sense.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Now that confuses me. The statement has to do with the person making the statement, not in Jesus Himself. So is it not true that the person believes in Jesus? Is it not a fact that they do?
Click to expand...

 
Your absolutly right and you hit on another problem with Clark's view. His rigidity doesn't allow him to make sense out of normal statements and beleifs like that one. If it is propositional than what is it proposing? It is as you say proposing something about the person not actual states of affairs. But Philip is correct in his assessment of warrant which is, if I understand him correctly, a different beast altogether. Warrant is wether or not I have good reasons for my beleifs or not. My tree example is a good one because I have good reasons for my beleifs but I still don't hypothetically know if there is a hypothetical tree or absence of tree until I check for myself. There is a tree in my yard and my cat loves to climb it by the way. But excellant question Kevin! I do not know how a Clarkian would answer these charges because I am not one but anyone who is please feel free to jump in here because I do not like beating up on a guy, logically speaking, who can't defend himself or be defended by someone.


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## Philip

Apparently, I worded this badly: how can we say that a belief in Jesus is either true or false.



> Both descriptions of the name Jesus sastify the statement "I believe in Jesus" but one is more warrented than the other and they are either true or false.



When one is believing in Jesus, one is not believing in a set of propositions, necessarily. How would we say that this belief is true or false regardless of its content? Statements of trust like this may or may not be warranted (slightly different sense here) but to call them "true" or "false" in a propositional sense is a category mistake. Can we meaningfully say that Jesus is true? No, he's a person not a proposition. It's meaningful to say that He _is_ truth, but that's a whole different bird.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Apparently, I worded this badly: how can we say that a belief in Jesus is either true or false.



Either he existed or he didn't or he either wore pokadot pants or he didn't, either he died for my sins or he didn't.



P. F. Pugh said:


> When one is believing in Jesus, one is not believing in a set of propositions, necessarily. How would we say that this belief is true or false regardless of its content? Statements of trust like this may or may not be warranted (slightly different sense here) but to call them "true" or "false" in a propositional sense is a category mistake. Can we meaningfully say that Jesus is true? No, he's a person not a proposition. It's meaningful to say that He is truth, but that's a whole different bird.



Yeah that is why I pointed out that your statment is too abstract to really mean anything at all. You saying you believe in Jesus tells me nothing about Jesus unless you define what you mean by the name. But beleifs about him like everything else will be either true or false. Now there are beleifs that are say less propositional than others but no one is ultimatly warrented to believe something entierly false. They may have initial warrant but if we determine that their beleif is false than they no longer have any logical warrant for beleiving it anymore. I don't think you are suggesting that there are beliefs that can be as false as the day is long and someone still has enough warrant to believe it despite that.

---------- Post added at 09:59 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:57 AM ----------

I'm not saying that faith is a purely cognitive thing, it involves the totality of us but it is still true that the gospel is cognitive enough to be factual and propositional in nature.


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## Philip

> Either he existed or he didn't or he either wore pokadot pants or he didn't, either he died for my sins or he didn't.



None of those constitute belief in Jesus. When I say "I believe in Jesus" I do not simply mean "I believe that there was a historical figure named "Jesus" who was God incarnate and died for sins." Even Satan believes that. When I profess belief in Jesus, I am professing far more than simple assent to a set of propositions. I am professing belief in a _person_, which may lead to propositions about that person, but nonetheless, the propositions can be true if and only if they accurately describe that person.



> but if we determine that their beleif is false than they no longer have any logical warrant for beleiving it anymore.



Not necessarily---that's assuming that "we" _convince_ them a) that "our" model of rationality ought to be accepted b) that on our model of rationality, the belief in question is not warranted. However, my determination of what is and is not true has no effect on someone else's warrant unless I can make a _de facto_ case that they accept.



> I don't think you are suggesting that there are beliefs that can be as false as the day is long and someone still has enough warrant to believe it despite that.



Sure they can. People were warranted for centuries in believing in abiogenesis, despite the fact that it has since been proven false.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> None of those constitute belief in Jesus. When I say "I believe in Jesus" I do not simply mean "I believe that there was a historical figure named "Jesus" who was God incarnate and died for sins." Even Satan believes that. When I profess belief in Jesus, I am professing far more than simple assent to a set of propositions. I am professing belief in a person, which may lead to propositions about that person, but nonetheless, the propositions can be true if and only if they accurately describe that person.



Which is why I pointed out that faith involves all of us not just our cognitive abilities.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Not necessarily---that's assuming that "we" convince them a) that "our" model of rationality ought to be accepted b) that on our model of rationality, the belief in question is not warranted. However, my determination of what is and is not true has no effect on someone else's warrant unless I can make a de facto case that they accept.



No thats assuming an objective reality that all of our beleifs must submit to. This clashing of "models" seems to be like the presupossitional argument put foward by Van Til but you reject that so in what ways is it different? You simply assume that your theory of rational models is true but you offer no proof of it that I can see, you only confirm Van Til's thoughts by doing so. Why must all beleifs be disproven on a de facto basis, does logical facts matter here? For instance if someone's beleif contradicts itself than their warrant disapears, so I don't have to go to immediate beleifs as facts to disprove it, it disproves itself.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Sure they can. People were warranted for centuries in believing in abiogenesis, despite the fact that it has since been proven false.



Your view of warrant seems far to subjective to me, it seems to break down all comunication between differing models. It seems that, and I could be misunderstanding you here, my holding a beleif constitutes the warrant I need to believe it. If I am warranted to believe anything I like without exception than rationality breaks down. In my opinion there is an objective standered outside all models that determines whether or not a person is warranted to hold a beleif at all, this application changes from beleif to beleif but it is still there.


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## Philip

> No thats assuming an objective reality that all of our beleifs must submit to. This clashing of "models" seems to be like the presupossitional argument put foward by Van Til but you reject that so in what ways is it different?



So would you advocate a subjective reality instead?

The difference here is that these models will share much. An atheistic common-sense model will share much in common with my own Christian model. I may be able to show that its methods are less consistent than mine, but this would not disprove the model, merely show that it needed tweaking.

To think of this in political terms: it would be like arguing for a law change based on an inconsistency in current policy. All that would be required by the critique would be an adjustment, not a new constitution or the scrapping of English Common Law.



> For instance if someone's beleif contradicts itself than their warrant disapears



That would be a _de facto_ claim.



> but you offer no proof of it that I can see



It accounts for the way in which we form and hold our beliefs far more simply than Van Til's account. Van Til's account would work only if everyone were a philosopher with a well-thought-out system of beliefs. However, this just isn't the case. We're dealing with the beliefs of philosophers, theologians, scientists, autistic individuals, 5-year-olds, down syndrome individuals, and the like.



> Your view of warrant seems far to subjective to me, it seems to break down all comunication between differing models.



On the contrary, I'm simply pointing out that warrant is dependent on the resources that one has. Aristotle was warranted, based on the evidence he was working with, in believing in geocentrism and abiogenesis. I happen to think that both of these facts are false, and probably Aristotle would were he alive today, but he was still warranted then.



> If I am warranted to believe anything I like without exception than rationality breaks down.



The fact is that you _can't_ do this. If you believe something, then most likely you have some warrant for believing it. All that warrant does is to give one grounds for rationally holding a belief.

Again, abiogenesis was a rational belief to hold before it was disproven. We cannot fault the medievals as being irrational or lacking warrant in holding this belief.



> In my opinion there is an objective standered outside all models that determines whether or not a person is warranted to hold a beleif at all



This would itself constitute a model of rationality, though. It would be the true model.

Maybe what you are trying to get at would be that certain beliefs could never be warranted. Am I correct?


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## Theogenes

Would someone please describe what a person is without using propositions or describe an individual they know without using propositions.
TIA


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## Philip

> Would someone please describe what a person is without using propositions or describe an individual they know without using propositions.



Sure, I can show you a picture.


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## PuritanCovenanter

http://www.puritanboard.com/f49/gordon-h-clark-logic-man-47056/

Just for reference we discussed some of these arguments in the thread I am posting here.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> So would you advocate a subjective reality instead?
> 
> The difference here is that these models will share much. An atheistic common-sense model will share much in common with my own Christian model. I may be able to show that its methods are less consistent than mine, but this would not disprove the model, merely show that it needed tweaking.
> 
> To think of this in political terms: it would be like arguing for a law change based on an inconsistency in current policy. All that would be required by the critique would be an adjustment, not a new constitution or the scrapping of English Common Law.



No I advocate an onjective reality. Your description of how the models relate is very Van Tillian in nature. The difference is that your agreement with him seems to be merely consequential. You believe that an atheistic model can be successful in aquireing truth, but how can a model that starts from bad assumptions be successful in the end? It is only if they betray these initial assumptions in their application and use of their model that they can arrive at truth. That is the basis for agreement in beleifs.



P. F. Pugh said:


> That would be a de facto claim.



Ok than we agree that logical facts can be used to prove something false on a _de facto_ basis. I can't disagree there and neither would Van Til.



P. F. Pugh said:


> It accounts for the way in which we form and hold our beliefs far more simply than Van Til's account. Van Til's account would work only if everyone were a philosopher with a well-thought-out system of beliefs. However, this just isn't the case. We're dealing with the beliefs of philosophers, theologians, scientists, autistic individuals, 5-year-olds, down syndrome individuals, and the like



Actually I think I pointed this out before that Van Til never really, that I can see, tried to explain how people aquired beleifs only that they do have beleifs and seek, not always with success, to have as coherent as possible a set of beleifs. So Clark did seek to explain how beleifs are formed and not formed, he used the term knowledge but it pretty much means the same thing. 

Also why we can critique the set of beleifs, or worldview, on logical and philosophical grounds is because we all inhabit the same creation with all of its aspects. We are all made in the image of God and therefore must use the tool of reason or logic in our formation and relation of beleifs. Logical fallacies are universal for this reason. So in a sense Van Til is disproving their beleif's logical foundations which is as you said is a legitemate _de facto_ form of argument.



P. F. Pugh said:


> On the contrary, I'm simply pointing out that warrant is dependent on the resources that one has. Aristotle was warranted, based on the evidence he was working with, in believing in geocentrism and abiogenesis. I happen to think that both of these facts are false, and probably Aristotle would were he alive today, but he was still warranted then.



Sure this is basically one kind of error. Another more serious kind of error is when someone who delibretly suppresses the truth is lead based on that fact to an incorrect beleif. If that is all you mean by warrant than we agree. But in our other discussions you seem to say that an unbeleiver has warrant for being an unbeleiver. That is a bit of a jump in my opinion. Being in error about a scientific fact because of his time gets Aristotle off the hook for his scientific beleifs but being in error about the basis for morality on a logical level can not be so eaisly dismissed as him having warrant for those beleifs. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> The fact is that you can't do this. If you believe something, then most likely you have some warrant for believing it. All that warrant does is to give one grounds for rationally holding a belief.
> 
> Again, abiogenesis was a rational belief to hold before it was disproven. We cannot fault the medievals as being irrational or lacking warrant in holding this belief.



Sure but I think you can't make this a blanket policy accross the board for all beleifs. To say that the utilitarianist is warranted for holding his or her beleif about morality works until they come across a logical criticism of their beleif and then either they deepen their warrant by successfully refuting said criticism or they refuse to answer it in which case they now have a shallower warrant if that makes sense, is shallower even a word? So I have far more warrant for beleiving in christian morality than they do. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> This would itself constitute a model of rationality, though. It would be the true model.
> 
> Maybe what you are trying to get at would be that certain beliefs could never be warranted. Am I correct?



Sure that would be correct but I also was focusing more on the ultimate point of view so to speak. The atheist loses warrant for his ethical beleifs when an argument against his theory of ethics or why certian things are right or wrong (which could be no more complex than that it seems right to them) and he or she offers no response or logically dodges the question. An excellant example would be Adam from Mythbusters adress to an atheistic society of some kind in which he refuses to defend his ethical claims on the grounds that he didn't see why he should and that it would be defensible to do so, if I remeber his adress right. This may constitute his reason or warrant for his beleif. 

I mean they certianly make sense liguistically speaking so on one level they are rational, they make sense. One can see why he beleives as he does or even relate to his beleifs. He is also aperantly not very schooled in the methods of philosophy so he gets off the hook so to speak on that ground as well. But the second that he and I have a debate, hypothetically speaking, and I demonstrate to him that he simply has missed the logical point that he has not shown why what he views as right or wrong is actually right or wrong, on as deep a logical depth as can be taken. I am simply asking for him to produce a deeper level of logical warrant for his beleifs. He and I may agree on many moral principles but my warrant for these beleifs is much deeper or stronger, I am searching for the right word to convey myself, than his are. Does that make sense? 
So when Van Til or I critique the unbeleiver's worldview at its most fundemental level than that is all we are doing looking for the deepest or strongest warrant that the person posses and subject it to logical analysis. You are right that most people don't care about logical precision but without such precision they lose warrant for their beleifs. This is the objective standered that I meant. We also recognize that our most cherished and deepest beleifs do affect our model of rationality. The atheist finds the miracles of the bible redicules to believe in and on his own presupossitions he is very warranted in that beleif but once his most basic beleifs are subjected to logical criticism and found irrational than his initial warrant goes away. If you would define that as a _de facto _ argument than we agree, and I will keep that in mind.

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PuritanCovenanter said:


> http://www.puritanboard.com/f49/gordon-h-clark-logic-man-47056/
> 
> Just for reference we discussed some of these arguments in the thread I am posting here.


 
Thanks, I want to say that I entered into a discussion on these issues in a thread but I don't remember where. I explained what analogical knowledge actually was and I tried to show how essential it was to any personal relationship of anykind. As far as the propositional part of this discussion goes I am Van Tillian all the way and not Clarkian in my views. I suppose that the word beleif in Jesus must mean something greater than just propositions about him but if nevr existed than any beleif about him or in him would lack the neccessary warrant to be rational. So there is an actual liguistic difference in saying that one "beleives in Jesus.." and that one has "beleifs about Jesus." The words are used with two different meanings so the disagreement there is resolved by invoking Wittgenstien's later views of language. There is some very helpful posts in that thread so thank you for sharing it! I love your "norseman modertor" name too, that is very cool!


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## nwink

Thanks all -- good discussion!


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## Philip

> No I advocate an onjective reality. Your description of how the models relate is very Van Tillian in nature. The difference is that your agreement with him seems to be merely consequential. You believe that an atheistic model can be successful in aquireing truth, but how can a model that starts from bad assumptions be successful in the end?



Except that you have it backwards. A model starts with the facts and proceeds to extrapolate, but where they take it is due to their ground motives and personal commitments. Thus, an atheist may start with truths, but he will take even those truths and reason autonomously from them.

It's like the story of "The Absence of Mr Glass" by Chesterton, where both Father Brown and the psychologist have the same facts. The difference is that the psychologist's commitments lead him to conclude that there is a blackmailing, while Father Brown concludes (rightly) that there has been no crime committed.



> Logical fallacies are universal for this reason. So in a sense Van Til is disproving their beleif's logical foundations which is as you said is a legitemate de facto form of argument.



This is where you are mistaken. You take it that most beliefs have these "logical foundations", whereas I do not. My belief in the tree outside is dependent on no other belief, neither is my belief in God. What you would refer to as the "logical foundation" of that belief, I simply take to be the metaphysical story behind why that belief is, in fact, true. Now, if you prove this story to contradict the initial belief, then all I am compelled to do is to find a new story that adequately explains the phenomenon or else just remain agnostic.



> Also why we can critique the set of beleifs, or worldview, on logical and philosophical grounds



But here's another problem, because worldviews comprise so much more than simple propositional beliefs, but include attitudes, predispositions, and sensibilities we cannot critique them on a purely propositional level. How do I critique, for example, what I consider to be bad taste?



> But in our other discussions you seem to say that an unbeleiver has warrant for being an unbeleiver.



Given his assumptions, I think he does have warrant. Now, he's suppressing everything that would lead to God, but that's not to say that his unbelief is irrational, given that his _Sensus Divinitatus_ is not functioning properly. He may well have a kind of coherence to his worldview. 

Sometime, I do need to post my full thoughts on G. E. Moore's common-sense atheism.



> Sure but I think you can't make this a blanket policy accross the board for all beleifs.



Why not? Warrant has to do with how you came to hold a belief. 



> But the second that he and I have a debate, hypothetically speaking, and I demonstrate to him that he simply has missed the logical point that he has not shown why what he views as right or wrong is actually right or wrong, on as deep a logical depth as can be taken. I am simply asking for him to produce a deeper level of logical warrant for his beleifs.



But before this criticism works, you have to show him in some compelling way the necessity of providing this. Why can't his ethical beliefs be basic (produced by moral sense) with his metaphysical story being second-order?

Again, warrant has nothing to do with the metaphysical story you tell about the content of the belief and more about how you came to hold the belief. I would have the same warrant for believing that the tree is there regardless of whether I was a Christian or an atheist or a Muslim.

Here's the example: let's say that we are walking in the desert and I say "Look, there's a lake." and you say "No, that's a mirage." Now you can try to prove that my vision is not working quite properly in this context, or you can just walk me over and show me the facts.


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## Theogenes

WHat if I'm blind?





P. F. Pugh said:


> Would someone please describe what a person is without using propositions or describe an individual they know without using propositions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sure, I can show you a picture.
Click to expand...


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## Philip

Theogenes said:


> WHat if I'm blind?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Would someone please describe what a person is without using propositions or describe an individual they know without using propositions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sure, I can show you a picture.
> 
> Click to expand...
Click to expand...

 
I can read you a poem or play you a musical piece. Even propositional communication would be indirect with regard to knowledge of persons (as opposed to knowledge _about_ persons).


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Except that you have it backwards. A model starts with the facts and proceeds to extrapolate, but where they take it is due to their ground motives and personal commitments. Thus, an atheist may start with truths, but he will take even those truths and reason autonomously from them.
> 
> It's like the story of "The Absence of Mr Glass" by Chesterton, where both Father Brown and the psychologist have the same facts. The difference is that the psychologist's commitments lead him to conclude that there is a blackmailing, while Father Brown concludes (rightly) that there has been no crime committed.



I don't disagree with that. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> This is where you are mistaken. You take it that most beliefs have these "logical foundations", whereas I do not. My belief in the tree outside is dependent on no other belief, neither is my belief in God. What you would refer to as the "logical foundation" of that belief, I simply take to be the metaphysical story behind why that belief is, in fact, true. Now, if you prove this story to contradict the initial belief, then all I am compelled to do is to find a new story that adequately explains the phenomenon or else just remain agnostic.



Well here is where I fail to follow you. It seems at times that we are so close to being in agreement but we part ways at some point. Your beleif in the tree outside may have warrant initially but if a successful logical argument is produced to demonstrate that your beleif is not so warranted after all you seem to say so what I'm still warranted after all. This is my point that your beleifs cannot be right or warranted in spite of logical criticism. I'm not suggesting that if I say you don't really know if you can trust your senses you now have a serious problem logically speaking. Again think outside the commen-sense realist/pure skepticism dichotomy you place every point of view, or as Van Til pointed out in autonomous thought the rationalist/irrationalist distinction. 

But that is not to say that the atheist is warranted to make ethical judgements about the christian in spite of the logical requirments of a philosophy of ethics. That is special pleading on the parts of well everyone. Everyone seems immune to the demands of reason because they can just claim that they view this beleif as basic or whatever and for whatever reason that makes it so they don't have to answer the question because in just asking the question I am advocating pure skepticism. 

Also I do not take it that that most beleifs have logical foundations so to speak but they require a certian level of rationality to be warranted in any sense. Warrant goes away when the reasonablness of a beleif is seriously criticized beyond the ability of the beleif holder to defend. 

Lets take your example of a tree outside. The unbeleiver points to it and says there he sees a tree. I ask for him his metaphysical story, it is pure materialism. I demonstrate for the sake of argument that this story cannot explain the fact that he beleives there is a tree outside. He then moves to some other story and again I demonstrate that he is mistaken in that one. So he then moves to agnosticism as if that now halts my criticism, as if now the reaches of logic have exausted their power and he can sit with full warrant in his beleif while beleiving ultimatly that no beleifs actually have warrant in any absolute sense, or else he wouldn't be agnostic. Since agnosticism means in one sense that a question is beyond answering or explaining than that question is not warranted for anyone's answer or beleif about the answer. So what has he gained? nothing he only once again invalidated his beleif, once again Van Til is correct that although he has the beleif in question he cannot explain why he is warranted in that beleif. So I don't know how you can still after this hypothetical discussion say that he has warrant for his beleif? That is where I am confused.



P. F. Pugh said:


> But here's another problem, because worldviews comprise so much more than simple propositional beliefs, but include attitudes, predispositions, and sensibilities we cannot critique them on a purely propositional level. How do I critique, for example, what I consider to be bad taste?



So than it could be false that you believe a certian joke is in "bad taste" and yet believe it is in bad taste? There is a propositional element to every beleif even if it is simply the proposition that I believe such and such. But how would I press the apologetical task there, well I woudn't but if I had too than I would argue over value judgements in general.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Given his assumptions, I think he does have warrant. Now, he's suppressing everything that would lead to God, but that's not to say that his unbelief is irrational, given that his Sensus Divinitatus is not functioning properly. He may well have a kind of coherence to his worldview.



Of course he is warranted in his assumptions to hold that beleif but if his assumptions cannot logically produce the foundation neccessary to prove if you will these beleifs than his warrant goes away or at least becomes more shallow. Also if I start from false assumptions I can only arrive at false conclusions, I mean that as a general rule and not s trict logical principle (reducto ad absurdiam arguments start from what they conclude are false premises and demonstrate truthfully that their conclusions are false). But how can he assume the world to be what it is not and arrive at warranted beleifs based on those false premises? He can't, he can never be justified in his beleifs that based on false assumptions and be completly truthful as well. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Why not? Warrant has to do with how you came to hold a belief.



I don't think this is entirerly correct. You come to hold a truthful beleif on false premises and you are are justified to hold that beleif? Sure his reasons may make sense, if someone started babbling incoherently when you asked them why the believe something that babling couldn't justify their warrant for beleiving something. So they must make sense. That far we both agree, I think where we break down is when we move from here. I don't know where you move from here but I would start analysing their warrant to see if it could hold up under logical analysis. It seems you are saying, and correct me if I'm wrong, that that is wrong and that the person has warrant for beleif even if I logically criticize it. They can hide in the fact they just assert, without any proof, that their beleif is basic and that invalidates my logical criticism? I fail to see how that is even possible. They state "I believe such and such..." and they are not required to give any justification for that statment? I say all that not to say that you believe these things only that once they gave reasons why they beleived such and such they are now have taken the discussion to a new level. Their warrant is now up for grabs because their reasons can be analyzed to see how much warrant they actually have. You seem to suggest that they have warrant regardless. Do you mean that their beleif is formed on the basis of their senses so that is all the warrant they need to believe that they see a tree outside? Well sure that is fine but it gets us nowhere because it says nothing about actual states of affairs. So I see no value in parking every discussion of beleifs in a spot that is at the end of the day pure subjectivity. 

If a person is hallucinating that they see a tree outside and there is none than sure they have warrant for beleiving in a tree but where does pointing that out get us apologetically speaking? I don't know how you develop an apologetical method on these assumptions. You say that you challenge them on a _de facto_ basis but when I agree and assert that the facts with which I am dealing with are logical than I am wrong for saying that? If someone uses nothing but logical fallecies to back up their beleif how can those facts not be relevant to whether or not their beleif is warranted in a larger sense than just how they came about their beleif? This is where I am confused about our philosophical differences.



P. F. Pugh said:


> But before this criticism works, you have to show him in some compelling way the necessity of providing this. Why can't his ethical beliefs be basic (produced by moral sense) with his metaphysical story being second-order?
> 
> Again, warrant has nothing to do with the metaphysical story you tell about the content of the belief and more about how you came to hold the belief. I would have the same warrant for believing that the tree is there regardless of whether I was a Christian or an atheist or a Muslim.
> 
> Here's the example: let's say that we are walking in the desert and I say "Look, there's a lake." and you say "No, that's a mirage." Now you can try to prove that my vision is not working quite properly in this context, or you can just walk me over and show me the facts.



The question itself provides the neccessaty of the question. Someone who violates the laws of logic by commiting a logical fallacy has every logical reason to answer that criticism. If you are saying that practically speaking in order for the discussion to move foward I must explain why this is bad or whatever than fine that is true on a practical level. But you seem to be suggesting more than that by saying that in theory it is not enough for me to point out his use of a fallacy but that I am compelled to show why he must care about this in order for my criticism to be valid or else I have not succeded in removing his warrant or justification for holding said beleif. Which one do you mean? If someone denies the laws of logic just to hold to not justifying their warrant for holding a beleif is not being rational and the discussion is practically over. I wouldn't even waste my time discussing anything with this kind of person. So it is not even that I am in the hot spot by having to justify my criticism to him or else I have not succeded in criticising their warrant, it is them who must justify their reasons for holding the beleif beyond the simple aquisition of the beleif.


----------



## Philip

> So I don't know how you can still after this hypothetical discussion say that he has warrant for his beleif?



Because he sees the tree. Your metaphysical story isn't your warrant. You can have warrant without a metaphysical story---a five-year-old or down syndrome patient can know that there is a tree.



> So than it could be false that you believe a certian joke is in "bad taste" and yet believe it is in bad taste?



The proposition is the expression of an attitude. It is not itself an attitude. I can't do a logical critique of said joke to show that it's in bad taste.



> Also if I start from false assumptions I can only arrive at false conclusions



Not necessarily:

All bearded things exist.
God has a beard.
Therefore God exists.



> he can never be justified in his beleifs that based on false assumptions and be completly truthful as well.



First, justified to whom? Whose standard of rationality are we talking?

Second, you're turning things on their heads. Most of our beliefs are not formed on the basis of other beliefs, but are themselves basic. Some atheists reached the conclusion that God doesn't exist as precisely that: a _conclusion_ (Bertrand Russell comes to mind).



> I don't think this is entirerly correct. You come to hold a truthful beleif on false premises and you are are justified to hold that beleif?



Again, justified before whom?



> They state "I believe such and such..." and they are not required to give any justification for that statment?



On the contrary, the fact that we ask assumes that generally we do have warrant (again, I don't like the justification language).



> You seem to suggest that they have warrant regardless. Do you mean that their beleif is formed on the basis of their senses so that is all the warrant they need to believe that they see a tree outside?



Sure. If a down syndrome patient is rationally warranted, then so am I.



> So I see no value in parking every discussion of beleifs in a spot that is at the end of the day pure subjectivity.



Again, give me a good reason to think that there is not, in fact, a tree outside or take me out to where I thoughts I saw the lake and you can prove objectively that my senses were not functioning properly.

I'll address the final criticism after class.


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## jwright82

Well your definition of warrant seems to give it way more credit than it deserves. The justification language that I use means this. I would agree that a person who says that they see a tree outside doesn't really need any othe reason for beleiving that other than seeing it, so that beleif is formed by sensation. But that beleif is itself so trivial and meaningless in the grand scheme of things that it plays no part on something as complicated as ethics. So in that sense yes he or she is very warranted to believe that and their metaphysical story will have little or no affect on that beleif. Justification for me is something that is a much deeper level of proof that goes beyond these immediate beleifs (I see a tree outside, I am going to welding school tommorow, My daughter is eight, I am carrying on a conversation with you right now) to beleifs that are not so immediate therefore there warrant operates on different level than those immediate beleifs. 

Examples of this would be political opinions, do they not require more reasons for warrant and convincing people than just pointing outside to a tree to prove that you see a tree. You must have a different kind of warrant to be viewed as rational here about your opinions. That is the next level of beleifs, now lets look at another example beliefs or theories like global warming. There are people who believe that we are causing global warming. You could now criticize this view along with the political views along two lines either on a factual basis combating their evidence with your own evidence, or along a logical one. For instance they claim that global tempetures have risen along side the rise in industrial production of carbon-dioxcide or whatever. 

Well that is a logical fallacy, the after this therefore because of this fallacy. They have never proven a direct concrete link between our production of carbon-dioxcide and the suppossed rise in tempeture, that is a logical problem with their argument. So lets say that I offer this logical argument to them now they must make a choice there warrant for beleiving that we are responsible for the rise in tempeture, despite any evidence they have, has been dealt a serious blow. In order to maintain their warrant they must logically justify their beleif now, they must prove my logical argument wrong or prove the link between carbon-dioxcide or whatever. The point is that their beleif now requires an objective justification to maintain any claim of warrant, which seems a bit more subjective in nature. They can't call it a basic beleif like pointing out a tree and go on from there, the type of beleif demands a greater level of objectivity in its proof to maintain warrant.

Lets look at yet even deeper beleifs, like ethics. When it comes to ethics there are immediate beleifs, second level beleifs, and deep assumptions about the nature of ethics. The immediate beleifs are things like there is such a thing as right and wrong, murder is bad, etc. Than there are second level beliefs like abortion and euthenasia are murder. Well there is debate over that beleif on scientific and logical grounds so both sides must come up with logical and scientific reasons as to why they are right and the other person is wrong. Now the deeper level. Some one attempts to come up a theory of ethics and they agree on virtually every immediate beleif I have and most of the second level ones regarding ethics. But they choose Kant's theories of ethics as the best theory of ethics. Well I rightly criticize Kant on purely logical grounds, I point out that logically speaking he cannot demonstrate that reason can arive at absolute moral oughtness or whatever. Notice that now with level of beleifs being wrong now affects the legitmacy of the second level beleifs as well as the immediate beleifs. So it is not that beleifs are stacked on top of eachother. It may well seem obvious that murder is wrong and abortion is murder but the warrant of those beleifs is now affected indirectly by his lack logical justification for Kant's theory of ethics. Now he has a very serious problem on his hands because his lack of justification affects all of his moral beleifs. 

Now I think I understand what has been bothering me about your aproech, I layed out different categories of beleifs and you seem to be taking what is true of one type of beleifs, basic or immediate, and making that true for all types of beleifs, which is a category mistake if my scheme is correct. This scheme is raw and unfinished but I thought it would be helpful to lay out. It marks my own sort of contibution, or lack ther of, to Van Till's theories because this is one area where he was undeveloped. 

You might say that why does someone even need to come up with a theory of ethics, in fact most people don't? Well because of the nature of the very beleif in a standered of right and wrong logically entails certian requirments for warrant in that beleif. Any moral demand can be countered with why I ought to do that? How does one establish what we ought to do? This seems to entail 2 different questions, why something is right or wrong and a method for determining what concrete actions are right or wrong. Take Kant for example he maintained that reason would decide why something is right or wrong and his categorical imperative is his method. Ulititarianism has the beleif that something is right or wrong based on the greatest good or pleasure for the greatest number, that is the why, and the pleasure calcules or whatever it was for almost mathmaticaly determing whether a concrete action was good or not, the method. 

So Kant and Utilitarianism are wrong on logical as well as practical grounds. Why ought I love thy neighbor over hating them on purely rational grounds? Now to those epitomological loafers. You say rightly that most people do not have theories of ethics worked out, true but the way they argue for or against a second level moral beleif involves more than just second level concerns. They often introduce general moral principles that fall into the deppest level of beleifs making them imply a theory of ethics. Many people throw around the phrase anything you do is ok as long as you do not hurt anyone. Well the abstracness in that phrase implies that it is a deep moral theoy, in fact it is the why question I discussed. Why is violence wrong because it violates our moral principle of not hurting anyone. 

But why ought I not hurt anyone? That logical criticism must be answered before any said actions can be deamed to violate this deep moral beleif, regardless of how many immediate beleifs we share.


----------



## Philip

> Examples of this would be political opinions, do they not require more reasons for warrant and convincing people than just pointing outside to a tree to prove that you see a tree.



True, these are value judgments. However, these are far fuzzier beliefs. How would I demonstrate to you, for instance, that freedom should be the highest priority of law? (by the way, I don't believe that it is). We have disagreements over this stuff within the Church, for crying out loud.



> That is the next level of beleifs, now lets look at another example beliefs or theories like global warming. There are people who believe that we are causing global warming.



Global warming is a scientific issue and therefore the principle of Occam's Razor is applicable here (the simplest theory that adequately explains all the data should be accepted). Now, in reality personal commitments will play a huge role, but that's not necessarily bad.



> You might say that why does someone even need to come up with a theory of ethics, in fact most people don't? Well because of the nature of the very beleif in a standered of right and wrong logically entails certian requirments for warrant in that beleif. Any moral demand can be countered with why I ought to do that? How does one establish what we ought to do?



Again, here what we have are conclusions that will be reached based on personal commitments and value judgments. Why do I accept a Christian view of ethics? Simply put, it's because I have a commitment to Christ. It's not because it's the only logically valid system out there. Frankly, I think that a non-Christian could possibly come up with an ethical system that could account for all of what you just said.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> True, these are value judgments. However, these are far fuzzier beliefs. How would I demonstrate to you, for instance, that freedom should be the highest priority of law? (by the way, I don't believe that it is). We have disagreements over this stuff within the Church, for crying out loud.



Yes but you now have crossed over into a theoretical analysis of law, so you only went into the thried level I mentioned (see how easy it is to cross bounds here).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Global warming is a scientific issue and therefore the principle of Occam's Razor is applicable here (the simplest theory that adequately explains all the data should be accepted). Now, in reality personal commitments will play a huge role, but that's not necessarily bad.



No assumptions are not neccassaraly bad but they can be logicaly analyzed for truthfullness and consistancy. Yes but the point is that in the course of the debate people are switching into differing levels of beleifs without much notice, all I did was critique those third level logical beleifs that are based on science but are more logical than anything.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, here what we have are conclusions that will be reached based on personal commitments and value judgments. Why do I accept a Christian view of ethics? Simply put, it's because I have a commitment to Christ. It's not because it's the only logically valid system out there. Frankly, I think that a non-Christian could possibly come up with an ethical system that could account for all of what you just said.



Your rigth we both have a christian ethics formost because of Christ but a christian ethic happens to be the only logicaly valid system out there as well. You will have to show me this non-christian ethic, and founding them on basic beleifs alone is little like the naturalistic fallacy moving from is to ought ("murder is wrong" is a basic beleif therefore we ought to believe it and follow it).


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## Philip

> Yes but you now have crossed over into a theoretical analysis of law, so you only went into the thried level I mentioned (see how easy it is to cross bounds here).



But that's the point. In order to evaluate an ethical claim, you have to do ethics---in the evaluation, the possibility of ethics is a given.



> No assumptions are not neccassaraly bad



I said "personal commitments" not "assumptions."



> Your rigth we both have a christian ethics formost because of Christ but a christian ethic happens to be the only logicaly valid system out there as well.



You can say that if and only if you can actually demonstrate it. The best you can do on that score would be an inductive argument.



> "murder is wrong" is a basic beleif therefore we ought to believe it and follow it



Wrongness is a basic category that implies a moral imperative.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> But that's the point. In order to evaluate an ethical claim, you have to do ethics---in the evaluation, the possibility of ethics is a given.



Sure it is possible but evaulating an ethical claim involves logical analysis, ethics is not given in a sense that we can all agree that certian things are right and wrong. I logically analyze whether or not the Kantian can give an adequite "ought" statement. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> I said "personal commitments" not "assumptions."



Fair enough. I still don't think that assumptions are neccessaraly bad.



P. F. Pugh said:


> You can say that if and only if you can actually demonstrate it. The best you can do on that score would be an inductive argument.



You rule out the transcendental argument here and assume that direct arguments are the only kind of arguments. But Strawson has worked out the basic logic of TA and there is plently of historical precedent to entertain the possibility of its objective status.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Wrongness is a basic category that implies a moral imperative.



Sure, we have many language-games that value judgements such as these are idespensable to meaningful communication. But notice how abstract it is, anything can be inserted as x in this statment "X is wrong" and it makes sense, it may not be true but it rationally make sense. What is needed is a way to apply the abstract word wrong to particuler examples of human behaviour, or a theory of ethics.

---------- Post added at 02:31 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:28 PM ----------

Just out of curiousity you didn't seem to comment much on my scheme of beleifs. What do you think? Any comments or criticisms would be nice.


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## Philip

> You rule out the transcendental argument here and assume that direct arguments are the only kind of arguments. But Strawson has worked out the basic logic of TA and there is plently of historical precedent to entertain the possibility of its objective status.



There is nothing about a TA of any kind that demands a counter-TA. Kant's justification of morality, for example, does not compel me to provide a similar one unless he can convince me that I need need one.



> What is needed is a way to apply the abstract word wrong to particuler examples of human behaviour, or a theory of ethics.



Why do we need anything other than simple moral intuition?



> Sure it is possible but evaulating an ethical claim involves logical analysis



Not necessarily---there's also counter-example.



> I logically analyze whether or not the Kantian can give an adequite "ought" statement.



Whereas I would prefer that you analyze whether the ought statement that he gives is adequate.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> There is nothing about a TA of any kind that demands a counter-TA. Kant's justification of morality, for example, does not compel me to provide a similar one unless he can convince me that I need need one.



It depends upon what you mean here. If you are simply criticizing a TA than no you are not required to give one. But if say the unbeleiver is asserting the irrationality of christianity than I can a transcendental critique of their worldview to reveal that they cannot give an adequite theory of reason so to speak. This is only an avenue of criticism like your method of de facto criticism, its just one more method of criticism in our bag of apologetical tricks. If you choose to allow the unbeleiver to have some sort of givens so to speak than that is your choice but there is nothing wrong with a transcendental critique, logically speaking. But keep in mi8nd that your givens may come back to bite you in the behind so to speak. I prefer a method that utterly destroys the very foundation the unbeleiver is sitting on.

Your model seems to demand that transcendental analysis of anykind be illegittemate, which is very curious. I wonder what in a transcendental analysis is so dangerous to your scheme, other than ruling out the ultimate sense of givens? That is to say that you can choose to allow for givens in your own method and I can choose not to but that is anathema to your scheme of things. I wonder if your problem is the age old problem of any foundationalism, it is either your scheme or pure skepticism (rationality verses irrationality).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Why do we need anything other than simple moral intuition?



What your stating, again, is a given that both sides can agree on to be a foundation for discussion. But intuitionalism is problamatic because people don't agree on what is intuitavly right or wrong. Also no logic can be established that could analyze moral claims in such a situation. If no logic could be established than no claim could ever be regarded as wrong. No de facto basis can ever, I mean natural facts here, prove that abortion is wrong because these are worldview differences, see Peter Singer's ethics.

But again it seems that your scheme demands such a situation be true or else it is pure skepticism.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Not necessarily---there's also counter-example.



But this assumes a kind of list of rights and wrongs out there that we can all agree on and either your with it or not. The absolute most that your scheme could come up with is that certian things seem right and wrong to you and nothing more. But a TA can analyze the foundations of an ethical to see if they even provide the possibility of ethics.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Whereas I would prefer that you analyze whether the ought statement that he gives is adequate.



In what way is the statment "murder is wrong" more or less adequite, whatever that means, than the statment "murder is wrong"?


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## Philip

> But if say the unbeleiver is asserting the irrationality of christianity than I can a transcendental critique of their worldview to reveal that they cannot give an adequite theory of reason so to speak.



Fair enough, but that still begs the question of who is defining what is and is not an adequate theory of reason.



> Your model seems to demand that transcendental analysis of anykind be illegittemate, which is very curious. I wonder what in a transcendental analysis is so dangerous to your scheme, other than ruling out the ultimate sense of givens?



I'm wary of it simply because, frankly, it cuts both directions.

The dilemma is this: if I were an internalist (internalism being any view where beliefs are justified in terms of systems rather than conformity to the external world), then I would have no rational reason to be a Christian. Why? Because I can conceive multiple liveable systems that do not require me to be a Christian that may be perfectly non-contradictory. I may have to explain away certain phenomena, and I'll certainly be left with a couple of disconnects, but I'm perfectly capable of creating this. Because there are no external criteria, there is no reason for me to choose any one system over another.



> But a TA can analyze the foundations of an ethical to see if they even provide the possibility of ethics.



Again, who is defining what is and is not an adequate explanation of the possibility of ethics. The metaphysical explanations are merely "why" stories to explain the phenomena of ethics. That is to say, ethics is possible (we do it)---why it is possible is a question of curiosity not necessity.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Fair enough, but that still begs the question of who is defining what is and is not an adequate theory of reason.



Without slipping into an autonomous rationality but logical analysis. If the theory under consideration has irrational foundations than the whole building is faulty.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm wary of it simply because, frankly, it cuts both directions.
> 
> The dilemma is this: if I were an internalist (internalism being any view where beliefs are justified in terms of systems rather than conformity to the external world), then I would have no rational reason to be a Christian. Why? Because I can conceive multiple liveable systems that do not require me to be a Christian that may be perfectly non-contradictory. I may have to explain away certain phenomena, and I'll certainly be left with a couple of disconnects, but I'm perfectly capable of creating this. Because there are no external criteria, there is no reason for me to choose any one system over another.



Fair enough but remember a TA seeks to make sense out of our experience. In a sense you are right we all believe cerian immediate beleifs like reason, morality, empirical knowledge but the question is does an unbeleiving worldview provide the rational basis for providing the transcendental properties that justify what we experience. 

A TA would work like this. I am sitting with an atheist lets say and she and I are talking about how bad life is in Africa and how immoral is the treatment of women there. Now our discussion presupposses such a thing as morality just to make sense. If we look at Strawson's logic of a TA it looks like this:

1. If X than Y is either true or false
2. If not-X than Y is neither true or false

So it is this
1. If morality exists than an action X can be either right or wrong
2. If morality does not exist than an action X cannot be either right or wrong

That is how the logic works here.





P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, who is defining what is and is not an adequate explanation of the possibility of ethics. The metaphysical explanations are merely "why" stories to explain the phenomena of ethics. That is to say, ethics is possible (we do it)---why it is possible is a question of curiosity not necessity.



Logic is. We subject a view of ethics to logical analysis to see how rational it is. Does it violate the rules and laws of logic? This is an important part of any critique. The ethical question itself places before us certian questions that require a logical answer to be truly rational.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Without slipping into an autonomous rationality but logical analysis. If the theory under consideration has irrational foundations than the whole building is faulty.



Again, who is defining rationality? Second, I have pointed out that foundations are extremely complex, consisting mostly of immediate beliefs.



> In a sense you are right we all believe cerian immediate beleifs like reason, morality, empirical knowledge but the question is does an unbeleiving worldview provide the rational basis for providing the transcendental properties that justify what we experience.



Again, calling this metaphysical explanation a "basis" is a bit backwards, since we normally have beliefs involving reason, morality etc before we ever consider it useful to have a theory of why these are possible.



> Logic is.



Whose logic? What "logic" says depends, at least partly, upon who is using it, for what end, and what the premises are.



> This is an important part of any critique. The ethical question itself places before us certian questions that require a logical answer to be truly rational.



I do many rational things that are not logical. It may be perfectly rational for a man to love someone, but it is not logical.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, who is defining rationality? Second, I have pointed out that foundations are extremely complex, consisting mostly of immediate beliefs.



Certianly they are complex but people always had reasons for there beleifs, I have to this date in my 28 years never met a person who had ethical beleifs for no reason or lacked a general theory of things (even if it was not very thought out). Also there are only so many options to choose from historically speaking. So if a person's beleifs about ethics are argured for on a similer basis as a Utilitarian than I will point that out to them critique Utilitarianism and then let them rethink it or argue against my critique. Also rationality here does not mean what someone feels is rational or not but the science of logical analysis. Fallacies, validity, laws, principles, etc.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, calling this metaphysical explanation a "basis" is a bit backwards, since we normally have beliefs involving reason, morality etc before we ever consider it useful to have a theory of why these are possible.



True but wrapped up with these beleifs will be or develop a theory of things. But to say that these presupossitions are based on immediate beleifs is saying to much. They force us to make sense out of them and with are own innate God knowledge so to speak we form a web of beleifs, or worldview, that becomes more complex and sophisticated as we grow old. Think Hegel's logic on a much smaller scale. But to say that our theories are so based on immediate beleifs that the immediate beleifs are not in need of a foundation is aoutonomy, in this sense it is our core basic beleifs that form the criteria for what is legitemately rational or not. Notice how if the TA is legitemate than it sort of fractures what you and Plantinga are attempting.

The basic beleifs cannot be a foundation if they can be called into question. So a TA is deemed illigetimate for this reason, and you have more reasons I know, among many for the simple fact that you and Plantinga cannot incorperate it into your scheme and attempt what it is you are attempting. Also the whole philosophy of ethics is incompatable with your scheme as well, which is why you are critical of my appeals to it. If there are such logical demsnds on the part of the person holding to ethical beleifs than that undermines your ambitions a little. Also if ethical beleifs cannot be decided on a defacto basis than that spells trouble for your scheme.

Ethical considerations cannot be decided on a de facto basis because it would commit the naturalistic fallacy, moving from what is facts to oughts. Unless of course there are uniterpreted facts of this ultimate kind, brute facts as Van Til called them. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Whose logic? What "logic" says depends, at least partly, upon who is using it, for what end, and what the premises are.



The science of logical laws and principles. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> I do many rational things that are not logical. It may be perfectly rational for a man to love someone, but it is not logical.



True but we are talking about ethical beleifs here, two different animals. Please note that I am not completly critical of your whole scheme only the level you are trying to push it too. I use your scheme for many disagreements about immediate beleifs, but I know that deeper level beleifs require a more complex type of analysis.


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## Philip

> Also rationality here does not mean what someone feels is rational or not but the science of logical analysis. Fallacies, validity, laws, principles, etc.



In other words, your model of rationality is the standard.



> But to say that these presupossitions are based on immediate beleifs is saying to much.



I'm not saying that---I'm saying that they are expressions of personal commitments that determine what we do with immediate beliefs.



> But to say that our theories are so based on immediate beleifs that the immediate beleifs are not in need of a foundation is aoutonomy, in this sense it is our core basic beleifs that form the criteria for what is legitemately rational or not.



First, define what you mean by "autonomy."

Second, when I talk about foundation, I am not talking in terms of warrant. I am simply talking about basicality---in other words, a basic belief needs no more justification than an explanation of how you came to hold it. 



> The basic beleifs cannot be a foundation if they can be called into question.



In that case there are no such things as basic beliefs---every belief can be called into question if you want to go that route. If Descartes were consistent, he would have been a nihilist---he was naive in thinking that his reasoning faculties were any more infallible than his other faculties.



> So a TA is deemed illigetimate for this reason, and you have more reasons I know, among many for the simple fact that you and Plantinga cannot incorperate it into your scheme and attempt what it is you are attempting.



I reject because, frankly, all it proves is that God is a nice explanation for lots of stuff. It doesn't prove that He exists or that He ought to be Lord. It is not an argument for theism, but for ethics, epistemology, and the like.



> Ethical considerations cannot be decided on a de facto basis because it would commit the naturalistic fallacy, moving from what is facts to oughts.



Depends---is ethics personal or not?



> The science of logical laws and principles.



What about it? Alone it can do nothing.



> but I know that deeper level beleifs require a more complex type of analysis.



Indeed, they require an analysis of the person's attitudes and ground motives.


----------



## Peairtach

I think the basic point of presuppositionalism is correct. 

That in doubting or denying the existence of God, many - rather all - atheists are ignoring the fact that doubting or denying the existence of God isn't like doubting or denying the existence of the Loch Ness Monster, or one's mother-in-law.

If you doubt or deny the existence of your mother-in -law, her posited lack of existence, doesn't undermine one's basis for intelligibility, thus an argument for her non-existence doesn't cut it's own legs from under it.

The presuppositionalists are saying that arguing for the non-existence of God is a form of sceptism that undermines itself. To show that a person's view or argument, if accepted for the sake of argument, is self-refuting, is a strong point to be able to make properly.


----------



## Philip

Richard, I would agree if someone could just demonstrate the necessary connection between intelligibility and God's existence. That is, show how God's existence is the only _possible_ basis for intelligibility.

Or to put it another way, how can we show that the propositions "There is no God" and "There are intelligible things" are contradictory?

I can only think of one argument that might do this, but most presuppositionalists routinely reject it out of hand (though Van Til is strangely silent about it). That's Anselm's ontological argument (a topic for another thread).


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm not saying that---I'm saying that they are expressions of personal commitments that determine what we do with immediate beliefs.



Than we agree. I have troulble really setting down what our disagreements are. If you think you know than please elaborate, we seem to go in endless circles (not that I don't enjoy good philosophical discussion).



P. F. Pugh said:


> In other words, your model of rationality is the standard.



Well I mean what logic has been for 2,500 years. That is hardley mine. If someone makes an ad hominem argumetn against someone else than that is not my own model of rationality but a logical fallacy. There is no logical connection between someone's charector and the truth value of their argument, that is not my model of rationality or anything that is warranted by the beleif holder, it doesn't matter if they disagree the law of non-contradiction they must demonstrate why it is false or unreasonable.



P. F. Pugh said:


> First, define what you mean by "autonomy."
> 
> Second, when I talk about foundation, I am not talking in terms of warrant. I am simply talking about basicality---in other words, a basic belief needs no more justification than an explanation of how you came to hold it.



But if basic beleifs are not our ultimate presuppossitions than that is fine and dandy but if they are logically more important than that than that is autonomy because they cannot be doubted on any grounds. But if they are not more basic or ultimate than our presuppossitions than that is something else entirly.
Autonomy would be making these basic beleifs, immediate beleifs, ultimate in terms of being beyond doubt in a logical sense. They are the measure of all things, for instance ethics if a basic moral beleif is beyond logical analysis than it is autnomous, it is its own authority.



P. F. Pugh said:


> In that case there are no such things as basic beliefs---every belief can be called into question if you want to go that route. If Descartes were consistent, he would have been a nihilist---he was naive in thinking that his reasoning faculties were any more infallible than his other faculties.



Well I agree with your analysis of Descarte. But all beleifs can and must appeal to some authority outside themselves, or else you have autonomy. Placing certian kinds of beleifs beyond the reach of logical analysis just to avoid skepticism seems a little extreme. Again I use your model for the warrant of immediate beleifs I just think it breaks down at more presuppositional levels. So please don't mistake my criticism fo an all out rejection.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Depends---is ethics personal or not?



Did Hitler wage a personal war against Jews only or was it quite physical? What he did was purely natural, "death is a natural part of life" to quote Yoda, and very factual but was it moral? That can not be decided on personal beleifs or factual considerations but logical analysis and an ethical theory of right or wrong, that is transcendentaly justified (in a logical sense).



P. F. Pugh said:


> What about it? Alone it can do nothing.



But it is a binding creational tool that we cannot avoid using, it is part of "thinking God's thoughts after him".



P. F. Pugh said:


> Indeed, they require an analysis of the person's attitudes and ground motives.



Agreed but a larger analysis of their worldview is neccessary as well.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I reject because, frankly, all it proves is that God is a nice explanation for lots of stuff. It doesn't prove that He exists or that He ought to be Lord. It is not an argument for theism, but for ethics, epistemology, and the like.



Yes but you have never criticised Strawson's argument for it, with his logical formulation of it. Do you reject that as well or just the application of it here in regards to this subject?

---------- Post added at 09:05 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:04 PM ----------




Richard Tallach said:


> I think the basic point of presuppositionalism is correct.
> 
> That in doubting or denying the existence of God, many - rather all - atheists are ignoring the fact that doubting or denying the existence of God isn't like doubting or denying the existence of the Loch Ness Monster, or one's mother-in-law.
> 
> If you doubt or deny the existence of your mother-in -law, her posited lack of existence, doesn't undermine one's basis for intelligibility, thus an argument for her non-existence doesn't cut it's own legs from under it.
> 
> The presuppositionalists are saying that arguing for the non-existence of God is a form of sceptism that undermines itself. To show that a person's view or argument, if accepted for the sake of argument, is self-refuting, is a strong point to be able to make properly.


 
Nicley put!

---------- Post added at 09:11 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:05 PM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> Richard, I would agree if someone could just demonstrate the necessary connection between intelligibility and God's existence. That is, show how God's existence is the only _possible_ basis for intelligibility.
> 
> Or to put it another way, how can we show that the propositions "There is no God" and "There are intelligible things" are contradictory?
> 
> I can only think of one argument that might do this, but most presuppositionalists routinely reject it out of hand (though Van Til is strangely silent about it). That's Anselm's ontological argument (a topic for another thread).


 
I still think that you are demanding a direct argument of a deductive type, which the TA is not. But Anselm's argument is problimatic on the grounds that it doesn't show where its definition of perfection is grounded, where di dthat come from? Assuming that everyone means the same thing by the same term is naive at best, but it is the best of the classical arguments in my opinion (and your blog formulation was nice although I still feel that my problems are problems).


----------



## PuritanCovenanter

where did that come from?

I am therefore I am. Neil Diamond. 

I define. 

Adam named all things under him. 


Be Careful of where that comes from.

I can be Shirley Mclaine if I want to be.

(I am interjecting here. I noticed my post started at the top of the second page).

Man believes all is eternity past culminating. Deficit of God even. Even with God this stands. Man named stuff to his acquisition or capability of mind. Philosophers have debated this and it is being neglected. 

(Gen 2:19) And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.


----------



## Philip

> Than we agree. I have troulble really setting down what our disagreements are.



I think the trouble is that where you say "presupposition" I would like to substitute "attitude," "personal commitment" (Polanyi), or "ground motive" (Dooyeweerd). That is, the propositions that Van Til would call "presuppositions" are actually just expressions of particular commitments/etc that will simply adjust the worldview in the face of logical analysis.

I do this too, by the way: when someone questions one of my beliefs on politics and gives good reasoning, what I do is to adjust the belief in accordance with the reason, guided by personal commitments. For example, a major reason why most on this board are advocates of constitutional republicanism as a form of government is that most on this board live in the United States and therefore have a vested interest in constitutional republicanism.



> Well I mean what logic has been for 2,500 years.



So remind me why no two philosophers have ever completely agreed on everything. If reason was as self-evident as that, we'd all agree.



> If someone makes an ad hominem argumetn against someone else than that is not my own model of rationality but a logical fallacy. There is no logical connection between someone's charector and the truth value of their argument



There are times when an _ad hominem_ attack is quite a reasonable objection. Credibility---ought I to trust this source?



> that is autonomy because they cannot be doubted on any grounds.



They can be doubted _if_ you can give a reason to doubt them. Give me a convincing reason to think that I am hallucinating, and I will doubt the senses.



> But all beleifs can and must appeal to some authority outside themselves, or else you have autonomy.



Again, what do you mean by "autonomy" here---you are using this word as if it has some sort of normative force, as if there's an "ought-not-ness" about it.

Yes, there's authority involved here, but I really don't have a good reason to ground my belief in a tree in anything more than "I see it" any more than I am compelled to explain my belief in God by anything more than "He has revealed Himself to me."

Again, if a Down Syndrome child could not comprehend it, it's not necessary for a warranted belief.



> Did Hitler wage a personal war against Jews only or was it quite physical?



Yes. When I say _personal_ I simply mean that ethics must be grounded _in a person_ and applied _by a person_.

Ethics in order to be ethical, must be grounded in a personal standard. This is why law in and of itself is ineffective in making moral people.



> Agreed but a larger analysis of their worldview is neccessary as well.



Worldview is merely a manifestation of ground motives, attitudes, and personal commitments.



> But Anselm's argument is problimatic on the grounds that it doesn't show where its definition of perfection is grounded, where di dthat come from?



It's intuitive. It's a notion of "great-making properties." Do I have a good reason to think that necessary existence (actual existence in all possible worlds) is not an absolute great-making property?



> Yes but you have never criticised Strawson's argument for it, with his logical formulation of it.



I haven't seen it.



> but it is the best of the classical arguments in my opinion



I think Van Til would agree with you there. As I've said before, it's basically a logically perfect TA (aka one that covers all possible worldviews) used in reverse. That is, it proves that God is a necessary being and therefore His non-existence is impossible.


----------



## jwright82

PuritanCovenanter said:


> where did that come from?
> 
> I am therefore I am. Neil Diamond.
> 
> I define.
> 
> Adam named all things under him.
> 
> 
> Be Careful of where that comes from.
> 
> I can be Shirley Mclaine if I want to be.
> 
> (I am interjecting here. I noticed my post started at the top of the second page).
> 
> Man believes all is eternity past culminating. Deficit of God even. Even with God this stands. Man named stuff to his acquisition or capability of mind. Philosophers have debated this and it is being neglected.
> 
> (Gen 2:19) And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.


 
Well at first I didn't know quite who or what you were refering to but now I see it is my critical comment on Anselm's argument, I believe so if not than please highlight what concerned you. Yes you are correct that we define things but your comments are a little confusing as to what your getting at, could please elaborate? As far as my criticism goes the argument assumes one selfevident meaning for the word perfection. But in everyday usage this word is used in many different sorts of ways, that doesn't mean that we can't latch on to one meaning and go from there but this only calls into question that such a word is selfevident in its meaning.

But that becomes even more problimatic when we examine the logic of the argument. God's ontological proof of exsistance is dependent on the absolute definant meaning of the word perfection, God's proof of existance is based on something outside of Himself namley the idea of perfection. But what if the way this word is defined is loaded with arbitrary metaphysical baggage or people disagree over what perfection actually means. Hence a word that was thought to be selfevident is now in trouble and since God's proof of existance is now dependent on this troubled word than his proof of existance is troubled as well. Now you may object that I sort of ridiculously described the situation but that is exactly the same vien as how Van Til describes the traditional arguments. But what does he and I mean?

The ontological argument is a direct argument, it directly attempts to show that there is a direct logical relationship between perfection as an idea and proof of God's existance, or that proof of God's existance logically is deduced from premises on the idea of perfection. There is a linier movement from one premise to other premises to the conclusion. This is logically making something prior to God in the grand scheme of things. It doesn't say that perfection as an idea is greater than God, to be sure, but Van Til always felt that it was a neccessary metaphysical truth that this was the case. Perfection as an idea must be agreed upon by linguistic users for one, for too it must have independency from being related to God for its meaning and very existance, or else you are arguing directly in a circle. If the oppisite is true that perfection as an idea owes what it owes to God up front than it cannot have any logical priorty to God's existance, hence why the transcendental argument is different in form than a direct argument. 

Also where does our very idea of perfection come from? Was it an inductivly deduced definition, which would then make the whole argument a formal logical fallacy and only probably true if that. Was it intuitivly deduced definition in which case it falls prey to the criticisms of intuitionalism. I could go on and on. If it was in fact defined from the self revealation of God in the bible than the whole argument, because it is a direct argument, is now circuler in nature and therefore commiting another logical fallacy. 

This was his whole problem with natural theology as it was traditionaly defined that, words and ideas all had individual meanings and existances apart from God. Meaning that in a sense the exsistance or nonexistance of God has no direct affect over anything at all, this Van Til worked out as a logical implications of their ideas not that this was what they really beleived. Atheists have pushed this seperation to the extreme in calling question to God's relevance to anything whatsoever, in fact it would be better if He didn't exsist at all. Van Til and Dooyeweerd both saw this as the inevitable end of such unguarded acceptance of the unbeleiving worldview. But he also felt that if you reworked the traditional arguments into a presuppossitional form this odd circualarity was absolved because of the different logical form of the TA. 

The traditional model
1. The idea of perfection, therefore proof of God's existance, or actually proof of an absolute perfect being (not neccessaraly God).

The TA model
2. The assumed existance of God, therefore the very possibility of any idea of perfection. Or that God's very being defines what perfection is, not us.

I'll elaborate a little further on the logical differences between a TA and other forms of arguments.

Traditionaly in philosophy you have two different types of arguments, generally speaking of course.
Deductive, in which case you try to deduce a truth directly, or from implication, from some premises and their logical relationships. 
1. All men are mortal
2. Socrates is a man
3. Therefore Socrates is mortal

Inductive arguments, which moves from a list of particuler instances of some occurence to a probably general truth. But only one instance of something other than this occuring is needed to disprove or greatly modify the conclusion.
1. For 28 years now everytime I drop something it falls to the ground
2. I am going to drop something 
3. Therefore it will probably drop to the ground

The TA on the other hand has a completly different logical form from the two above types of arguments, which makes it different from them. Critics of Van Til have often said that the TA is a veiled form of a direct argument, but to my knowledge not one has ever demonstrated that either:
1. All TA's are in fact direct arguments, or
2. That Van Til's TA was a direct argument in anyform it could take

This is odd when one considers that the logical forms of the arguments are so different that they don't even, in a sense, look the same. Here is the logical form of the argument.
1. The proposition Y presupposses the Proposition X 
2. If X is true than Y is either true or false
3. If X is false than Y is neither true nor false

Another way to put this is this 
Y presupposses X if and only if :
1. if Y is true than X is true
2. if Y is false than X is true

In case that didn't clear things up than here is an example. We are sitting at a table and arguing over a piece of legeslation. One of us thinks that the legeslation, we'll call it leg. A, is morally right and one of us thinks that it is morally wrong. Now our whole discussion presupposses such a thing as right and wrong in the ethical sense. That presupposition by itself doesn't tell us whether or not leg. A is right or wrong but only that the very logical possibility for our discussion rests on the assumption of "there is such a thing as right and wrong". Or to plug that into our argument.

The proposition X (there is such a thing as right and wrong) is presuppossed by the proposition Y (leg. A is either right or wrong)
1. "there is such a thing as right or wrong" is true, therefore leg. A is either rigth or wrong
2. "there is such a thing as right or wrong" is false, therefore leg. A is neither right nor wrong

I know that that is a lot of stuff but some of this is refering to Philip's response as well it just seemed appropriate to lay it out here, so I will refer him at some points to my response to you. I know that this is a long way to take to get to the point but I think that it is important to understand Van Til's more philosophical ideas.

---------- Post added at 03:49 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:30 PM ----------




P. F. Pugh said:


> I think the trouble is that where you say "presupposition" I would like to substitute "attitude," "personal commitment" (Polanyi), or "ground motive" (Dooyeweerd). That is, the propositions that Van Til would call "presuppositions" are actually just expressions of particular commitments/etc that will simply adjust the worldview in the face of logical analysis.
> 
> I do this too, by the way: when someone questions one of my beliefs on politics and gives good reasoning, what I do is to adjust the belief in accordance with the reason, guided by personal commitments. For example, a major reason why most on this board are advocates of constitutional republicanism as a form of government is that most on this board live in the United States and therefore have a vested interest in constitutional republicanism.



Than we agree on the general features of this idea, would you like me to use Dooyeweerd's phrase in the future to say the same thing, but Van Til and I would have some criticisms of it first?



P. F. Pugh said:


> So remind me why no two philosophers have ever completely agreed on everything. If reason was as self-evident as that, we'd all agree.



Well than we mean two different things here so I will stick to the word logic only, not reason. What you seem to be suggesting is that the laws of logic cannot rule out warrant for a beleif by themselves because my application of them is only my reason instead of logic. This results in skepticism because a very _de facto_ argument assumes logic in some form to even make sense, no logic no argument.



P. F. Pugh said:


> There are times when an ad hominem attack is quite a reasonable objection. Credibility---ought I to trust this source?



Correct it can be warrant for not beleiving someone but as a fallacy it means that someones charector has no logical bearing on the *truth-value* of there statement. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> They can be doubted if you can give a reason to doubt them. Give me a convincing reason to think that I am hallucinating, and I will doubt the senses.



Your model works fine on such immediate belifs as empirical ones but I am very curious on how this analogy plays out on more complicated beleifs about say morality? I don't see how the analogy concretly works out, you have layed out in theory how it would work but not in practice, which is what I am more interested in.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Yes. When I say personal I simply mean that ethics must be grounded in a person and applied by a person.
> 
> Ethics in order to be ethical, must be grounded in a personal standard. This is why law in and of itself is ineffective in making moral people.



Than your point here is irellevant to my question because I was talking about the moral aspect of creation. We all know that morality exists but we may not agree on what is moral or not, that is discussing the objectivity of ethics not its subjective ground.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Worldview is merely a manifestation of ground motives, attitudes, and personal commitments.



True but I guess we would disagree on the importance of the worldview.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I haven't seen it.



See my response to Martin above.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I think Van Til would agree with you there. As I've said before, it's basically a logically perfect TA (aka one that covers all possible worldviews) used in reverse. That is, it proves that God is a necessary being and therefore His non-existence is impossible.







P. F. Pugh said:


> It's intuitive. It's a notion of "great-making properties." Do I have a good reason to think that necessary existence (actual existence in all possible worlds) is not an absolute great-making property


----------



## Philip

James,

The trouble is that the TA, as an indirect argument is either invalid or uncompelling when translated into symbolic form. It would be better termed as a method of worldview analysis than an argument. I don't think it really useful to talk about it as an argument for God, given that the existence of God is a premise rather than the conclusion. The only way to really change this would be to demonstrate that belief x _necessarily_ (ie: in all possible worlds) presupposes the existence of God.

In other words, a TA only works within a given worldview and only if that worldview has a systematic ontology worked out---which some just don't.



> 1. The proposition Y presupposses the Proposition X
> 2. If X is true than Y is either true or false
> 3. If X is false than Y is neither true nor false



So here's how this would work:

Morality presupposes God's existence because:
a) If God exists, moral statements are either true or false
b) If God does not exist, moral statements are neither true nor false.

The problem is this: _a_ and _b_ involve a burden of proof. That is to say, what reason would the unbeliever have to accept them as true? Just because you can prove a disconnect or even contradiction in his system (such as it is) does not mean that he has any warrant for believing _a_ and _b_.



> The ontological argument is a direct argument, it directly attempts to show that there is a direct logical relationship between perfection as an idea and proof of God's existance, or that proof of God's existance logically is deduced from premises on the idea of perfection.



Yes and no---perfection is a function of what we are talking about. So for example, a chair is perfect if and only if it perfectly instantiates the ideal properties of being a chair. Thus, it would be comfortable, aesthetically pleasing, would go with anything, etc. It would not, however, be self-existent because self-existence would not make it a better chair in the least.

Now, when speaking of a perfect being, we are speaking simply of a being that has all properties that constitute being and instantiates them perfectly. Necessary existence perfectly instantiates what it is to be and therefore He is.

By the way, this is an incredibly biblical concept given that when God gives His people His most secret covenant name, it is "Jahveh", the one who is, or "I am that I am."



> Also where does our very idea of perfection come from?



I think if we analyze its use in ordinary language, we can come to some idea of what we mean by the term.



> This was his whole problem with natural theology as it was traditionaly defined that, words and ideas all had individual meanings and existances apart from God.



But that's just the point of natural theology: to prove that these ideas do _in fact_ presuppose God. That when the atheist does ethics or biology that he is ignoring the fact that God has revealed Himself in these disciplines.



> What you seem to be suggesting is that the laws of logic cannot rule out warrant for a beleif by themselves because my application of them is only my reason instead of logic. This results in skepticism because a very de facto argument assumes logic in some form to even make sense, no logic no argument.



If you accept the legitimacy of inductive reasoning, then you can't say this because all inductive reasoning involves formal fallacy.



> Than your point here is irellevant to my question because I was talking about the moral aspect of creation. We all know that morality exists but we may not agree on what is moral or not, that is discussing the objectivity of ethics not its subjective ground.



But this is exactly what I am saying---the objective ground of morality must be in a person. Law is useless without a judge, a standard of legal application. In addition, to be meaningful, law must have a personal source.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> James,
> 
> The trouble is that the TA, as an indirect argument is either invalid or uncompelling when translated into symbolic form. It would be better termed as a method of worldview analysis than an argument. I don't think it really useful to talk about it as an argument for God, given that the existence of God is a premise rather than the conclusion. The only way to really change this would be to demonstrate that belief x necessarily (ie: in all possible worlds) presupposes the existence of God.



Your right the argument is not for God isolated but Christianity as a whole. Now this does not, and cannot, mean that we have a one size fits all argument for every little thing in Christianity, but that the worldview argument involves every single aspect of our faith at least implicitly. The symbolic form could probably never do justice to an actual TA, Kant wrote a whole book on his and look at the Idealists who followed him, which involves so many elements that it is hard to pin down in perfect form a simple form of the argument. But we can show how it functions on a simpler level this way. Also the symbolic form has value to the critique because they can may analytical criticism on the TA itself with out having someone say "you are criticizinng a different TA from mine", this way you can criticize the logical form itself and that covers all that follow that form at least.



P. F. Pugh said:


> In other words, a TA only works within a given worldview and only if that worldview has a systematic ontology worked out---which some just don't.



True but we also must point out that certian justifications fro say an ethical beleif presuposse a theory in and of themselves, that the person holding the beleif may not even know about. For instance a person may have never thought about ethical theories at all but their moral conversation with someone presuposses, logically speaking, the existance of a moral standered at the very least.



P. F. Pugh said:


> So here's how this would work:
> 
> Morality presupposes God's existence because:
> a) If God exists, moral statements are either true or false
> b) If God does not exist, moral statements are neither true nor false.



I don't think it could ever be that simple, direct arguments have the benifit of being that simple. Your argument begs to many questions plus it never realy delved into the experience which with we must have preconditions for.
Morality presuposses certian logical preconditions, or questions requiring answers to, and our TA must provide aduquate logical preconditions, they do not commit logical fallacies and such, and then they must actually explain our moral experience. In the end they alow us to make sense out of morality and predicate moral judgements.

Now someone may come along and logically criticize my TA in which case I either admit defaet or defend my TA whic only keeps the ball the rolling. The argument against the use of reason by the unbeliver doesn't really apply here because whether or not they can explain reason or not they leveled a criticism against my TA that demands a response.



P. F. Pugh said:


> The problem is this: a and b involve a burden of proof. That is to say, what reason would the unbeliever have to accept them as true? Just because you can prove a disconnect or even contradiction in his system (such as it is) does not mean that he has any warrant for believing a and b.



Really that is recasting what a TA is in direct argumentitave form, I know this can be a little confusing but I cannot answer a charge that does not need to be leveled against this form of an argument. So you are right if the argument were to be worded in such a fashion it would have the burden of proof you mentioned, but in its present form it makes no such claims.

Now you may at this point cite many different sayings by Van Til and Bahnsen contradicting what I have said here but I think I can explain. Van Til beleived this that Christianity is true whether beleived or not it is still true. So only a christian view of things can ever hope to be totally correct. So in his methodology he presuppossed this. He didn't make this a premise of his argument but a methodological assumption, we all make them. If it is true than the Christian faith can be the only preconditions for making sense out of the world, this is in the most abstract general sense. In an ideal world where both beleivers and unbeleivers worked out their most deep spiritual commitments, religous ground motives, into a complete worldview the beleiver's would be completly true and acurate of the world and the unbeleiver's would be completly false.

But we do not live in such an ideal world so this applies to our world in such a way that the beleiver must account for his or her own lingering sinful nature and the unbeleiver's mixed status. This mixed status or awkward mixture of the unbeleiver's worldview means that at least in theory they will have christian ideas and pagan ideas driving their worldview development, which can be different from unbeleiver to unbeleiver. It is in this logical progression that Van Til worked out his ideas for where the unbeleiver gets it right they are betraying their own most deep religous ground motives. So I as a Van Tillian can make use of the TA in isolated forms, in fact for every "fact" there can be in theory a different TA all with the christian faith as an implicit assumption with it. But these methodological assumptions about the beleiver and the unbeleiver and the truth of Christianity may not need be premises in a TA, only methodological assumptions in our apologetical task. 

I may not call a salseman a lier to his face but I can assume it about him in my method of converstaion with him, or haggling over a price.





P. F. Pugh said:


> Yes and no---perfection is a function of what we are talking about. So for example, a chair is perfect if and only if it perfectly instantiates the ideal properties of being a chair. Thus, it would be comfortable, aesthetically pleasing, would go with anything, etc. It would not, however, be self-existent because self-existence would not make it a better chair in the least.



True but this definition of "perfect chair" can be different from person to person, giving ambiquity to the term.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Now, when speaking of a perfect being, we are speaking simply of a being that has all properties that constitute being and instantiates them perfectly. Necessary existence perfectly instantiates what it is to be and therefore He is.
> 
> By the way, this is an incredibly biblical concept given that when God gives His people His most secret covenant name, it is "Jahveh", the one who is, or "I am that I am."



Not going into revelational anthropomorphic condescension here I will point out one thing. the term "being" has had a less than populer history, in fact do we even use that term in philosophy much, as an idependent thing to be predicated to something. Did not Heiddeger implicitly point out that being by itself makes no sense unless attached to a historical existance of some kind, being-in-the-world and such? That means that the word makes no sense by itself but only in relation to some object or something, things have a being or "ready-at-hand" if I remember his _Being and Time_ at all, I could be wrong, but I thought metaphysics about being itself largley disapeared after him, is that correct?



P. F. Pugh said:


> I think if we analyze its use in ordinary language, we can come to some idea of what we mean by the term.



True but a definition that is so fixed, or ideal, that we can base a whole argument for God's existance off of is problematic, not impossible just problematic. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> But that's just the point of natural theology: to prove that these ideas do in fact presuppose God. That when the atheist does ethics or biology that he is ignoring the fact that God has revealed Himself in these disciplines.



No what he means is that general concepts like "truth" or "good" can make perfect sense by themselves or without any explination as to their meaning. So "true is something that is true" would not do for a descritptive theory of "truth". Also he objected that such words have little to know relation to the reality of God's existance, as a methodological assumption not a premise in an argument. But a TA can be fashonied to show that truth makes sense in a Christian worldview, that it meats the particuler preconditions for meaningfullness.



P. F. Pugh said:


> If you accept the legitimacy of inductive reasoning, then you can't say this because all inductive reasoning involves formal fallacy.



True but all this proves is that the ambition of what an inductive argument can prove is too large. But if one were to provide the preconditions for a rational faith in science than this problem goes away, at least in theory.



P. F. Pugh said:


> But this is exactly what I am saying---the objective ground of morality must be in a person. Law is useless without a judge, a standard of legal application. In addition, to be meaningful, law must have a personal source.



True but I think we are arguing to different things here. It is when we cross paths, so to speak, that we have problems. The unbeleivers alpha and omega of morality is not a standered in themselves, except that standered that God has revealed. "murder is wrong" is true because God said it was, they will agree with this but they will try to come up with some other reason why it so, which is autonoumy.


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## Philip

James, you put the form of the TA as this:



> 1. The proposition Y presupposses the Proposition X
> 2. If X is true than Y is either true or false
> 3. If X is false than Y is neither true nor false



My question is how you are going to prove statements 2 and 3.



> So in his methodology he presuppossed this. He didn't make this a premise of his argument but a methodological assumption, we all make them. If it is true than the Christian faith can be the only preconditions for making sense out of the world, this is in the most abstract general sense.



If this is the case, then every argument is transcendental in nature. Every argument for the existence makes the case that something in creation declares that God is---its very essence presupposes God.



> Did not Heiddeger implicitly point out that being by itself makes no sense unless attached to a historical existance of some kind, being-in-the-world and such? That means that the word makes no sense by itself but only in relation to some object or something, things have a being or "ready-at-hand" if I remember his Being and Time at all, I could be wrong, but I thought metaphysics about being itself largley disapeared after him, is that correct?



In the continental tradition only. It's alive and well in analytic metaphysics (where the ontological argument is taken quite seriously).

Also, I recall a quote from my theology prof: "If you think you understand Heidegger, you're probably wrong."



> Also he objected that such words have little to know relation to the reality of God's existance, as a methodological assumption not a premise in an argument. But a TA can be fashonied to show that truth makes sense in a Christian worldview, that it meats the particuler preconditions for meaningfullness.



Again, if this is the case, then natural theology is quite appropriate because _in fact_ the things that we see out in God's world are evidence of His existence and the unbeliever is at fault for not seeing what's so blasted obvious.



> True but I think we are arguing to different things here. It is when we cross paths, so to speak, that we have problems. The unbeleivers alpha and omega of morality is not a standered in themselves, except that standered that God has revealed. "murder is wrong" is true because God said it was, they will agree with this but they will try to come up with some other reason why it so, which is autonoumy.



Murder would be wrong even if God had not revealed it. Polygamy was wrong before God revealed it. Remember that God's word is always grounded in God Himself and His own character.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> My question is how you are going to prove statements 2 and 3.



In reverse. If Y is true or false than it proves X. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> If this is the case, then every argument is transcendental in nature. Every argument for the existence makes the case that something in creation declares that God is---its very essence presupposes God.



Well I think that there are many different kinds of arguments. But you state well what Van Til thought was the value in the traditional arguments, reformulate them in presupossitional form and you have a better argument. The way an argument is formulated determines what kind of argument it is. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> In the continental tradition only. It's alive and well in analytic metaphysics (where the ontological argument is taken quite seriously).
> 
> Also, I recall a quote from my theology prof: "If you think you understand Heidegger, you're probably wrong."



Which analytical traditions, I was not aware of any. They abstract being itself as an entity of study or just a logical category in language, I think there is a slight difference. I like the quote about Heidegger too. Did your proffessor like him or not?





P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, if this is the case, then natural theology is quite appropriate because in fact the things that we see out in God's world are evidence of His existence and the unbeliever is at fault for not seeing what's so blasted obvious.



Natural revealation certianly is, but natural theology as it has been traditionaly formulated is problematic. All that needs to be done is to reformulate it on better more solid grounds and it will be very useful.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Murder would be wrong even if God had not revealed it. Polygamy was wrong before God revealed it. Remember that God's word is always grounded in God Himself and His own character.



I don't quite get you here, do you mean that morality was in us before special revealation was revealed and therefore it was still wrong before that? I believe that general revealation and natural law do reveal this.


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## Philip

> In reverse. If Y is true or false than it proves X.



But that's exactly my question: how does one prove this. Let's take Y to be the proposition "murder is wrong." How exactly is one going to prove that its meaningfulness presupposes the existence of God?



> The way an argument is formulated determines what kind of argument it is.



But if an argument is invalid in one form, it is invalid in every form.



> Which analytical traditions, I was not aware of any. They abstract being itself as an entity of study or just a logical category in language, I think there is a slight difference. I like the quote about Heidegger too. Did your proffessor like him or not?



I'm actually studying analytic metaphysics at the moment. Stuff like ontology (nominalism, realism, substratum theory, bundle theory, etc.) is big fish for folks like David Lewis, Roderick Chisolm, W.V.O. Quine, etc. They're usually doing stuff with regard to actual metaphysics, not just language analysis.

My prof wasn't discussing Heidegger, just mentioning him in background to Bultmann.



> I don't quite get you here, do you mean that morality was in us before special revealation was revealed and therefore it was still wrong before that? I believe that general revealation and natural law do reveal this.



Meaning that it would be wrong regardless of whether God revealed it _at all_. We wouldn't know it in that case, but we'd be no less culpable.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> But that's exactly my question: how does one prove this. Let's take Y to be the proposition "murder is wrong." How exactly is one going to prove that its meaningfulness presupposes the existence of God?



The general scheme would be this.
1. Explore what the immediate preconditions for the statement as specific as that need to be in order for it to be meanigful. This involves showing that a morality of some kind must be assumed in order for that statement to be meaningful.

2. Next I would locate the argument withen the broader phenomena of value type language games, which morality seemst to be one of. I would attempt to demonstrate that it is inascapable in language to have talk about values in general, this steak is better than that steak etc. This would be basically a Wittgenstienian private language type argument against the possibility of the skeptic just saying well we can do without all value judgements by showing that he or she cannot create a form of life, or series of language games, that is sufficent without value judgements of somekind. Therefore value judgements are neccessary to language and life just for us to make sense of things. A little journey into Nietzsche's philosophy at this point would be helpful as a paradigm case. 

3. Next I would explore the preconditions for morality in general just to be meaningful. This would be to show that all ethics presuposses the two questions I have layed out over and over again which are to refresh your memory these:
a. All ethics must be able to justify why something is right or wrong at all, in an abstract sense.
b. All ethics must have a method for determining concrete cases as either right or wrong.

4. Next I would show how the christian worldview in general logically meets these preconditions. 

5. Lastly I would explore how the christian concept of ethics doesn't fall prey to the reacuring problems of ethics in the history of philosophy, this due to the fact that we have a different metaphysical conception of what right and wrong is than they do. 

Now as you can see this would take up an entire book to give it proper philosophical consideration, in fact each number could easily be a different section of a book. Now every point up there I have discussed with you, except 2, but I don't expect you to remember them just that that is how the TA would work itself out in a practical discussion. But that would be the general method I would assume in any discussion no matter how complicated. It is perfectly valid though. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> But if an argument is invalid in one form, it is invalid in every form.



I wouldn't say so, there are formualations of arguments that are invalid but one can reformulate the premises to get rid of this invaldness. It is true that you could demonstrate kinds of arguments that are analytically invalid I supposse but that wouldn't say anything about all arguments.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm actually studying analytic metaphysics at the moment. Stuff like ontology (nominalism, realism, substratum theory, bundle theory, etc.) is big fish for folks like David Lewis, Roderick Chisolm, W.V.O. Quine, etc. They're usually doing stuff with regard to actual metaphysics, not just language analysis.
> 
> My prof wasn't discussing Heidegger, just mentioning him in background to Bultmann.



How interesting. Does Quine delve into these metaphysical considerations in his work _From A Logical Point of View_, if you are familiar with that work? It is the only book of his that I have but I have troulbe with all the symbolic logic, I have never sat down and really learned that language at all (which has seriously hampered my philosophical development, but now that I am sufficently "convicted" of my sins I will "repent" and make a better effort to learn them). 

Strawson has some interesting things to say about metaphysics. In fact I am reading an online book of his on the subject here.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.
I like it so far because he follows the later Wittgenstien in his linguistic views but sees a place for a "purged metaphysics" despite the somewhat negative apparent metaphysical implications of the _Philosophical Investigations_, I hope you enjoy. 

What works would you recomend on this subject of analytical metaphysics, you are much more familiar with the tradition than I am? In fact I have come to reasesse my whole largley negative opinion regarding postmodern and analytical thinkers in general, and am going back and restudying them as best that I can.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Meaning that it would be wrong regardless of whether God revealed it at all. We wouldn't know it in that case, but we'd be no less culpable.



Are you saying that we would be culpable to God regardless of wrether or not he revealed it in scripture or culpable in general regardless of whether or not He existed at all?


----------



## Philip

> But that would be the general method I would assume in any discussion no matter how complicated. It is perfectly valid though.



All that it proves is that "murder is wrong" _possibly_ presupposes the existence of God. It doesn't prove that X presupposes Y because you haven't proved that X is meaningful _if and only if_ Y is true. You've proved that Y would be a sufficient condition for X's meaningfulness, but you haven't proved it to be a necessary one.



> How interesting. Does Quine delve into these metaphysical considerations in his work From A Logical Point of View, if you are familiar with that work?



Most of my familiarity with Quine comes from his "Epistemology Naturalized" and "On What There Is." A lot of the work in metaphysics right now takes place in journals.

If you want a basic survey of what's going on right now, I'd suggest "Metaphysics: The Big Questions" a collection (mostly) of the best of metaphysics in the past fifty-sixty years.



> Are you saying that we would be culpable to God regardless of wrether or not he revealed it in scripture or culpable in general regardless of whether or not He existed at all?



We would not be culpable if God didn't exist, but we would be even if God had not revealed Himself.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> All that it proves is that "murder is wrong" possibly presupposes the existence of God. It doesn't prove that X presupposes Y because you haven't proved that X is meaningful if and only if Y is true. You've proved that Y would be a sufficient condition for X's meaningfulness, but you haven't proved it to be a necessary one.



You are right if and only if the TA is a direct deductive argument, but I have seen no reason to suppose that it is not historical or otherwise. A critique of a TA comes in roughly 2 forms. Either you internaly critique the argument itself on logical grounds and/or you offer a better TA of somekind. It is odd that it is only in recent analytical history that we have this drive to demand that the TA be just like a direct argument, the idealists who followed Kant's method did exactly what I said they offered what they thought were better TA's than him plus criticized him for not providing the preconditions for knowledge that he claimed he did. 

The reason why this is not only possibly is because the issue itself regards whether or not ethics is possible at all. What is at stake is not the validity of an argument or being right but the very possibility of ethics at all. That is a huge difference between the two types of arguments. The direct argument is indifferent to rationality itself for the most part in its argumentation, in fact they are considered implicational arguments too. The TA for say rationality is concerned with how the very phenomena can exist as it is at all. There scopes and concerns are too different to be the same, just like there is a huge difference between inductive and deductive arguments.

Another reason why it is not only possible is because to deny the validity of a deductive argument affects nothing else but the argument. To deny the validity of a TA brings into question the very thing under discussion, that is why idealists offered better solutions in their opinions first. You can criticize the validity of the TA and not offer an alternative but you have not erased the problem, it still begs the question on what are the transcendental preconditions for morality or knowledge? 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Most of my familiarity with Quine comes from his "Epistemology Naturalized" and "On What There Is." A lot of the work in metaphysics right now takes place in journals.
> 
> If you want a basic survey of what's going on right now, I'd suggest "Metaphysics: The Big Questions" a collection (mostly) of the best of metaphysics in the past fifty-sixty years.



Thank you, I have "On What There is" in my book by him, but I have not read it in years. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> We would not be culpable if God didn't exist, but we would be even if God had not revealed Himself.



I would say that He revealed in our nature, being made in His image but yes I agree.


----------



## Philip

> The reason why this is not only possibly is because the issue itself regards whether or not ethics is possible at all.



We do ethics, therefore ethics is possible.

However, you can't claim that ethics "presupposes" God unless you can show that ethics is possible _if and only if_ God exists. That is to say, if God's being is not only a sufficient condition for the possibility of ethics, but a necessary one.

I'm not criticizing the TA, just its use in apologetics. One TA does not demand another.

Consider this claim by the atheist:

"I concede your point: you have proved that if God did exist, He would provide sufficient conditions for the possibility of ethics. However, since God doesn't exist, and ethics is possible (we do it, after all), so what?"


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> We do ethics, therefore ethics is possible.



Exactly that is the starting point for any good TA!



P. F. Pugh said:


> However, you can't claim that ethics "presupposes" God unless you can show that ethics is possible if and only if God exists. That is to say, if God's being is not only a sufficient condition for the possibility of ethics, but a necessary one.



Again I believe I laid out the differences between a direct argument and an indirect one so if you would like to go ahead and frame this TA in a direct form than good luck but I cannot respond to a different form of the TA as a direct argument. I agree that that form of an argument is nearly impossible to prove that is why I employ a TA instead of that.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I'm not criticizing the TA, just its use in apologetics. One TA does not demand another.



Well you are right, but denying a TA raises the question of what TA will work? Again denying a particuler TA does not erase the transcendental problem.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Consider this claim by the atheist:
> 
> "I concede your point: you have proved that if God did exist, He would provide sufficient conditions for the possibility of ethics. However, since God doesn't exist, and ethics is possible (we do it, after all), so what?"



The atheist is mistaken because they are attempting to do ethics now with no foundation whatsoever. Now it is correct to ask them to provide a better foundation for ethics than we have. Saying so what does not erase a logical problem it only invalidates the rationality of the person, if they do not wish to be reasonable than we cannot help that. Again denying the validity of one TA does not require you to give an alternative but it does not erase the problem either, the atheist still has a problem they must deal with and any ethical claim can now legitmatly be criticized as unfounded.


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## Philip

> Again denying a particuler TA does not erase the transcendental problem.



What is the transcendental problem and why would I care?



> Saying so what does not erase a logical problem it only invalidates the rationality of the person



What exactly is unreasonable about that statement? Again, you assume some sort of normative standard here, but why does the atheist have to accept it? For that matter, why do I have to accept that rationality of argument is dependent upon the ability to provide a TA?



> but it does not erase the problem either



What problem? He does ethics, therefore ethics is possible---what requires him to give further explanation? Why should he accept this standard that you propose?


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> What is the transcendental problem and why would I care?



It comes up when we try to base morality or reason on something. Materialism has metaphysical consequences and those consequences may or may not conflict with life as we experience it, thus there are certian transcendental problems that arise in any discussion or theory of something. Your own basic beleif scheme is a transcendental analysis or sorts based on the fact that it trys to dodge the problem by stating certian beleifs, like moral beleifs, as off limits to logical analysis. There can be no TA of these beleifs because that would destroy there basicality. What it fails to do is adequtly erase the problems of say a philosophy of ethics because it can only try to remove certian beleifs from logical criticism not prove that the trascendental basis for such beleifs is a ridiculous question to ask. It doesn't even refer to these problems it can't it can only assert that they do not in fact exist, which only begs the question.

Richard Rorty I'm sure would view my TA as absurd philosophical rubbish, yet in the theory of mind he is logically compelled to explain a materialist view of mind because he recognizez the problems that are inherent in the view. He is attempting to give a TA for mind based on materialist assumptions, so even for an anti-philosopher these problems are inescable. If you really believe a TA to be innaffective than prove that is absurd to ask why I should believe that a certian action in human behaviour is wrong? For as long as we can ask such questions TA's will be in demand for our answers to such questions. I may give individual reasons for these beleifs but the belifs will form a rough theory of why such a thing is right or wrong hence a TA for ethical action.



P. F. Pugh said:


> What exactly is unreasonable about that statement? Again, you assume some sort of normative standard here, but why does the atheist have to accept it? For that matter, why do I have to accept that rationality of argument is dependent upon the ability to provide a TA?



It is unreasonable because given the criteria of the problem it in no way even touchs upon the heart of the issue, it is a fallacy of absurdity. Unless the statement is supplimented with reasons why it is reasonable than it is hoplessly fallacious in nature and not a proper logical response to the question. They call those logical dodges for a reason. Your last statment is again framing the whole discussion in a direct deductive sort of way. To you what we're saying is that the TA starts from some premise that reason is such and such and that is proven and then and only then can the person reason only after they have proven that or the possibility of that. 

No the TA starts from the reality that we all reason and do ethics and seeks the logical preconditions for reason or ethics as we use it to exist at all. I think you are rightly hung up on the possibility of a Van Tillian dodging a rational criticism by say an atheist by asserting that they cannot account for rationality in their worldview therefore I do not have to take their rational criticisms seriously. No Van Tillian that I know of beleives that, but a criticism of an unbeleiver's worldview could be on the grounds that they cannot account for reason as we experience it in their view of things. That would be a logical criticism of their view. If they refused to give one than that is different but refusing to give an answer to a question in no way invalidates the question. Calling into question the basis of this question ironicaly involves a TA of sorts about the limits of say reason or language and its autonomy.



P. F. Pugh said:


> What problem? He does ethics, therefore ethics is possible---what requires him to give further explanation? Why should he accept this standard that you propose?



That statment involves you in several problems. For one you take a view of language that is indefensable, people talk about ethical things therefore there is ethics somewhere out there. Just because we talk about things in a certian way does not guarentee there existance. Unless you view language with Russell, Moore, and the early Wttgenstien as modeling what reality is like and therefore every word must corespond to some actual thing, we talk ethics therefore there is ethics, but just because I can talk about Ghosts does not mean they exist.

Also you are missing the point that we can say there is ethics but that is such an empty and abstract beleif so as to tell us nothing about what is ethical or not. You cannot avoid my questions in this way because I soon as you or whomever elaborates on what ethics is out of neccessaty in deciding what is ethical or not my questions will arise out of logical neccessaty. The two statments:
1. There is such as ethics, and 
2. Such and such is an ethical behaviour
Do not have any logical conection whatsoever. You need more premises to fill out the argument that answer why something is right or wrong and the method used in deciding that such and such is an ethical behaviour. In order to make ethics practical at all you must answer my questions. Simply asserting that ethics exists tells us nothing about ethics at all. 

You do bring up a good point remenescent to Anscombe's criticism, invoking the later Wittgenstien, of Lewis' argument from reason. Since I like the later Wittgenstien and the TA, which her criticisms at least indirectly affect I felt compelled to give an analysis of it in the philosophy section of this website, I will be posting my thoughts on it tommorow or the next day. I have to read up on it tonight and prepare my thoughts while handing out candy, I know I have not always been the best at posting threads that I promised to this one is definant, so we can deal with those issues relating to using reason and explaining reason in the context of her criticisms there if you like. For whatever its worth happy Halloween/Reformation day Philip!


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## Philip

> To you what we're saying is that the TA starts from some premise that reason is such and such and that is proven and then and only then can the person reason only after they have proven that or the possibility of that.



I am doing it, therefore it is possible. We are reasoning, therefore reason is possible.



> Calling into question the basis of this question ironicaly involves a TA of sorts about the limits of say reason or language and its autonomy.



What I'm saying is that the demand for a TA constitutes a normative standard---which implies that someone is judging me for it. I just want compelling reasons why I should be answerable to this standard.



> No the TA starts from the reality that we all reason and do ethics and seeks the logical preconditions for reason or ethics as we use it to exist at all.



But all you'll ever come up with is something along the lines of "well here's an interesting possibility." What you will never come up with is "here is what is necessary for us to reason." The so-called "logical preconditions" start to sound like speculations. This is why Clark, for example, starts to look an awful lot like Leibniz. It's easy: you find a couple of plausible explanations for certain phenomena and build a nice beautiful system---the only problem is that a system so built will not necessarily have much connection to reality (again, see Leibniz).



> Unless you view language with Russell, Moore, and the early Wttgenstien as modeling what reality is like and therefore every word must corespond to some actual thing, we talk ethics therefore there is ethics, but just because I can talk about Ghosts does not mean they exist.



But talk about ghosts is still meaningful. Ghosts are certainly possible beings---we talk meaningfully about them all the time. Similarly, we talk meaningfully about ethics, so unless you can prove some inconsistency in the very notion of ethics, then we must assume ethics to be possible. The only impossible things are things like spherical cubes.



> You need more premises to fill out the argument that answer why something is right or wrong and the method used in deciding that such and such is an ethical behaviour. In order to make ethics practical at all you must answer my questions. Simply asserting that ethics exists tells us nothing about ethics at all.



But at that point, you're not talking about the possibility of ethics, but ethics. As soon as you reach that stage, you've assumed that ethics is possible. Now, you might try to ground your standard of ethics in some metaphysical theory, but it's obvious that ethics is meaningful, otherwise we wouldn't treat it as a serious discipline.



> It comes up when we try to base morality or reason on something.



Well why is this necessary?



> I may give individual reasons for these beleifs but the belifs will form a rough theory of why such a thing is right or wrong hence a TA for ethical action.



I don't think that an ethical theory necessarily involves a TA. Ethical theories are merely systems of value.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I am doing it, therefore it is possible. We are reasoning, therefore reason is possible.



Yes but that fact still needs to be explained. Again refusing to admit that a metaphysical theory demands certian things be true about the world does not erase the logical problems involved in that theory. For the materialist to say that they don't have to explain away this problem is remeniscent to Anscombe's critique of Lewis' argument from reason. I decided against a whole thread on this because probably only you and I would even care about it, so I will lay it out, in breifer form here as it relates to your arguments.

She basically objected to Lewis demamnding that the causual explinations are the same as reason explinations with regard to reasoning. That is to say that how the materialist explains reasoning on a causal level must, in Lewis' view, be the same as or the foundation for reason type explinations. She would say that to explain why I didn't follow your advice on how to fix my car is that I thought it was irrational would be a reason explinaition for my behavior. But a causal explination of the same event, whatever that would be (forgive the bad analogy), need not conflict with my earlier reason type explinaition. An empathetic person and a neurologist would explian my arm hurting in two different ways, from different forms of life with two different language-games, and that is just fine in everyday life. So the TA is uneccessary because the person can make perfect sense talking about ethics or reason and not be required to give an account of what they are. Also the materialist may have reason and there metaphysical views without either one conflicting with eachother. So I and Van Til are asking too much. 

But the catch here is this, materialism is not attempting to explian one aspect of a thing but all aspects of a thing. They have committed themselves to this logical problem by their metaphysical theory. So they have the burden of proof to show how reason and ethics as we all experience them and do them makes sense in their metaphysical theory. That is why she is wrong in her critique because the claims are different. A neurologist would never in their right mind pretend to exaustivly explian every aspect of my pain away, but the materialist is. If the materialist cannot or will not explain away this problem, which demonstrated by a transcendental critique, than they have lost the warrant for their reasoning even though they keep on reasoning. So the TA stands against this because of the types of logical commitments that implicitly made by a theory of some kind determine the very nature of what a thing is or must be and that either matchs reality or it doesn't.



P. F. Pugh said:


> What I'm saying is that the demand for a TA constitutes a normative standard---which implies that someone is judging me for it. I just want compelling reasons why I should be answerable to this standard.



I can think of only one type of claim that would be immune to this demand and that is a claim that no one can legitmatly ask why to, which do not exist. If you say that something is wrong morally I can ask why that is so? That very ability to ask why about claims is why eventually you will end up in some sort of theory of some kind, even if it is only by logical commitment meaning that this theory of ethics must be true in order for your argument to stand. So you can and are unknowingly logically commiting to a theory by simple logical presupossition. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> But all you'll ever come up with is something along the lines of "well here's an interesting possibility." What you will never come up with is "here is what is necessary for us to reason." The so-called "logical preconditions" start to sound like speculations. This is why Clark, for example, starts to look an awful lot like Leibniz. It's easy: you find a couple of plausible explanations for certain phenomena and build a nice beautiful system---the only problem is that a system so built will not necessarily have much connection to reality (again, see Leibniz).



You have got it all wrong we are not trying to prove that people reason that is a given we are concerned with what else must be presupossed by the person to make reason possible at all. That is different from trying to prove that people reason or trying to give a nice speculative explinaition of something that we can't really know for sure. We know that people reason, we know that there are preconditions that a theory of reason must pass to explian in a logical sense why reason is possible, we know that christianity furnishes these preconditions and avoids the traditional errors in this area. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> But talk about ghosts is still meaningful. Ghosts are certainly possible beings---we talk meaningfully about them all the time. Similarly, we talk meaningfully about ethics, so unless you can prove some inconsistency in the very notion of ethics, then we must assume ethics to be possible. The only impossible things are things like spherical cubes.



Yes but meaningful talk does not guarentee the existance of the thing being talked about. So meaningful ethical talk does not guarentee the existance of right and wrong. Also ethics is actual the possibility of ethics is what is in view. We are not trying to prove that ethics is actual so that then the world can get on with its merry ethical life. Ethics doesn't stop just because we ask these questions about it.



P. F. Pugh said:


> But at that point, you're not talking about the possibility of ethics, but ethics. As soon as you reach that stage, you've assumed that ethics is possible. Now, you might try to ground your standard of ethics in some metaphysical theory, but it's obvious that ethics is meaningful, otherwise we wouldn't treat it as a serious discipline.



Exactly! That is the starting point for a TA. But the actuality of ethics is not sufficient reason for a person to be ethically justified in holding a particuler ethical beleif. Ethics is empty in this sense because by itself it can no more arbritate between ethical claims by itself than reason could by itself. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Well why is this necessary?



Same reason why you can't build a house with no foundation. The claim is not self supportive it is not true by itself, even tautologies assume the existance of logical laws to work. If a person says that they do not have to justify their moral beleif that abortion is good, than they have not only one problem (an unjustified beleif) but now they have commited the fallacy of special pleading. If they ask why they should submit to standered of logic that says they have commited this fallacy than they are using the same logical principles they are calling into question, which can be argued against by a paradigm case argument. So you see it is not that they have found a magical loophole to get out of this problem but only have stacked more problems on top of themselves in the proccess, why not just answer the question?

So lets say that they are like everybody else and they answer the questions. The most popular answer for this beleif that I know of would be the practical benefits of allowing abortion. This logically assumes that what ever is most practical for society is what is morally good. But how many moral atrocities have been justified by practical considerations alone? Also it begs the question of why practicality is the standered for right and wrong? Why should I obey a particuler course of action because it is the most practical? This never doubted the existance of ethics only whether a particuler assumed standered of ethics could in fact justify ethical claims.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I don't think that an ethical theory necessarily involves a TA. Ethical theories are merely systems of value.



True but we can give TA's and TC's of sytems of values to see if they justify ethical claims. Remember there is Ethics, the logical questions of right and wrong, and ethics, the various attempts at answering those questions, and we criticize ethics not Ethics.


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## Philip

> If the materialist cannot or will not explain away this problem, which demonstrated by a transcendental critique, than they have lost the warrant for their reasoning even though they keep on reasoning.



I would guess that most materialists would claim that they came to materialism through reason, not the other way round.



jwright82 said:


> So you can and are unknowingly logically commiting to a theory by simple logical presupossition.



Not necessarily---the way out is to appeal to a common standard.



jwright82 said:


> That very ability to ask why about claims is why eventually you will end up in some sort of theory of some kind, even if it is only by logical commitment meaning that this theory of ethics must be true in order for your argument to stand.



Theories of ethics, though, are not necessarily metaphysical in nature.



jwright82 said:


> We know that people reason, we know that there are preconditions that a theory of reason must pass to explian in a logical sense why reason is possible, we know that christianity furnishes these preconditions and avoids the traditional errors in this area.



So you say. Leibniz also provided a monadology that did the same thing.

And by the way, what are these preconditions and why _must_ a theory of reason pass them, and who is the judge of what constitutes a passing grade? You're using all kinds of normative language.



> Same reason why you can't build a house with no foundation. The claim is not self supportive it is not true by itself, even tautologies assume the existance of logical laws to work.



Why can't you have a group of mutually supporting propositions, a sort of spherical system?



> If a person says that they do not have to justify their moral beleif that abortion is good, than they have not only one problem (an unjustified beleif) but now they have commited the fallacy of special pleading.



No they haven't. What have they claimed about the belief that would make it special pleading?



> Why should I obey a particuler course of action because it is the most practical?



Because of the ends to which the practical course leads. Practicality is only practical in terms of some other value.



> True but we can give TA's and TC's of sytems of values to see if they justify ethical claims.



Justify before whom? Who is judging? Whose standard? Which rationality? I'm going to keep asking this because you are bringing in some sort of normative standard and some sort of judge every time you use the word "justify."


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I would guess that most materialists would claim that they came to materialism through reason, not the other way round.



I have no idea what you mean here I can only guess that it is a misunderstanding of how presuppositions formed and there affect on future belif formation, I don't quite know what you are getting at. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Not necessarily---the way out is to appeal to a common standard.



No you are misunderstanding me here. When someone argues for a beleif on specific grounds they logically presuposse that like practicality for instance is the decider for all moral issues. They don't have to actually hold that theory but logic demands that they do in this particuler issue. Why you might ask? Because if the presupposition is false than their moral beleif loses all rational grounding, if practicality is not the decider in all moral affairs than it is useless and pointless to argue for a specific action on soley practical grounds.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Theories of ethics, though, are not necessarily metaphysical in nature.



Fine but a theory is a theory, this is just semantics.



P. F. Pugh said:


> So you say. Leibniz also provided a monadology that did the same thing.
> 
> And by the way, what are these preconditions and why must a theory of reason pass them, and who is the judge of what constitutes a passing grade? You're using all kinds of normative language.



Well look at it this way, what you are advocating is a relativism of the worst sort. People get to pick and choose what logical principles they believe in, and whats worse is they are not to blame for this deviation because they can subjectivly set a burden of proof so high that no reasons why they should believe in the fallacy of special pleading will ever presuade them. So can commit any fallacy they want with full rational warrant, it seems this way in your responses of course. Your model seems to be creaping very closly to skepticism because you have given every person the ultimate reasons to be irrational.

The preconditions for reason will be those things that must be true in order for reason to be as it is. If a person offer s a TA in which they argue that in order for reason to make sense it must not exist than obviously that theory, which might have full warrant in your model unless I have missed something, is not an adequite TA. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Why can't you have a group of mutually supporting propositions, a sort of spherical system?



Incompletness theorms of Godel.



P. F. Pugh said:


> No they haven't. What have they claimed about the belief that would make it special pleading?



How have they not? If they state that such and such is the case and I ask why and they refuse to answer the question because they don't have to than that is very much so special pleading. There opinion is beyond that sort of logical criticism, but logical criticism seems to be nonexistant in your model, at least I'm am unsure as to its proper place. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Because of the ends to which the practical course leads.



Naturalistic fallacy and begging the question. Just because a course of action *is* the most practical does not mean that I *ought* to obey it. You are also begging the question again of why I should care about practicality in ethics.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Practicality is only practical in terms of some other value.



I don't quite understand you here.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Justify before whom? Who is judging? Whose standard? Which rationality? I'm going to keep asking this because you are bringing in some sort of normative standard and some sort of judge every time you use the word "justify."



Do you really mean to suggest that normative standereds do not exist? If you are waiting for me to say something like agreed standereds of logic than fine those, but that statement poses no problem for me or Van Til because of common grace and the metaphysical and psychological point of contact between the beleiver and the unbeleiver. If you mean that there are no standereds beyond models of rationality than that is going to lead to skepticism pure and simple. My model doesn't match up to your and vice versa so we have no point of contact.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Well look at it this way, what you are advocating is a relativism of the worst sort. People get to pick and choose what logical principles they believe in



Not at all---no one chooses what they believe. I can't just choose not to be a Christian.



jwright82 said:


> I have no idea what you mean here I can only guess that it is a misunderstanding of how presuppositions formed and there affect on future belif formation, I don't quite know what you are getting at.



Simply this: most materialists would say that they arrived at the _conclusion_ that materialism is true on the grounds of reason, or at least common sense.



jwright82 said:


> The preconditions for reason will be those things that must be true in order for reason to be as it is. If a person offer s a TA in which they argue that in order for reason to make sense it must not exist than obviously that theory, which might have full warrant in your model unless I have missed something, is not an adequite TA.



There are plenty of things that don't exist that we find quite useful---imaginary numbers, for instance. Meaning does not imply existence in the least: the concept of a spherical cube is perfectly meaningful---and one condition of its being meaningful is that no spherical cubes exist.



jwright82 said:


> How have they not? If they state that such and such is the case and I ask why and they refuse to answer the question because they don't have to than that is very much so special pleading. There opinion is beyond that sort of logical criticism, but logical criticism seems to be nonexistant in your model, at least I'm am unsure as to its proper place.



Logical criticism is valid if you can show a contradiction between the propositions advocated. Otherwise, it may be a disconnect, it may be weird, but it's not illogical.



jwright82 said:


> I don't quite understand you here.



"Practical" implies practice, which implies some goal of practice. E.G. pragmatism as such cannot be advocated---those philosophies that have claimed to be pragmatist are simply arguing for various workable goals.



jwright82 said:


> Just because a course of action is the most practical does not mean that I ought to obey it.



Practicality is a function of goals.



> Do you really mean to suggest that normative standereds do not exist?



Not at all, just pointing out that until you appeal to a common standard and a commonly agreed-upon judge (remember that standards imply interpreters, judges) the unbeliever has no reason to accept your argument. 



> If you mean that there are no standereds beyond models of rationality than that is going to lead to skepticism pure and simple.



But the standards we are talking about are standards of rationality. For example, if God did not exist (let's set the impossibility of that aside for now), it would be very likely that my belief in Him is irrational, a cognitive dysfunction. On the other hand, since God does exist, it is very likely that my belief in Him is quite rational.

However, I take issue with the idea that not having a nice metaphysical story for why X is true, when warrant has nothing to do with such a story, is grounds for saying that my belief in X is unjustified. 



> The preconditions for reason will be those things that must be true in order for reason to be as it is.



Ok, now here we come down to the point: you have just uttered a tautology. I want specifics. What are those propositions that are such that reason is meaningful if and only if they are true? What is the argument that shows this to be true?


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Not at all---no one chooses what they believe. I can't just choose not to be a Christian.






P. F. Pugh said:


> Not at all, just pointing out that until you appeal to a common standard and a commonly agreed-upon judge (remember that standards imply interpreters, judges) the unbeliever has no reason to accept your argument.






P. F. Pugh said:


> Simply this: most materialists would say that they arrived at the conclusion that materialism is true on the grounds of reason, or at least common sense.



If I understand you right you are basically getting at the same thing here. The use of reason is a common agreed upon shared standered that is social in this sense, common sense realism is right on this point. Van Til never denied this, he only put it in perpective. You can make great use of common notions but not make common notions autonomous, they are true because they are thinking God's thoughts after Him.



P. F. Pugh said:


> "Practical" implies practice, which implies some goal of practice. E.G. pragmatism as such cannot be advocated---those philosophies that have claimed to be pragmatist are simply arguing for various workable goals.






P. F. Pugh said:


> Practicality is a function of goals.



Yes but you have not arived at an ought statement, the question still remains why I ought to follow your suggestion. Remember this is not the skeptic question of prove ethics itself but only a conception of of ethics, this principle is key to understanding all of continental thinking in general, aspect and direction or historical development of an aspect scientifically. 





P. F. Pugh said:


> But the standards we are talking about are standards of rationality. For example, if God did not exist (let's set the impossibility of that aside for now), it would be very likely that my belief in Him is irrational, a cognitive dysfunction. On the other hand, since God does exist, it is very likely that my belief in Him is quite rational.
> 
> However, I take issue with the idea that not having a nice metaphysical story for why X is true, when warrant has nothing to do with such a story, is grounds for saying that my belief in X is unjustified.



You are correct in that the unbeleive can and does reason without a correct theory of reason. You are also correct in saying that the unbeleiver is still warranted in making rational statments and criticisms, for instance if a materialist logically criticizes my argument I cannot avoid answering that criticism by appealing to their inability to give a theory of reason. Notice that the TC is not a logical dodge of criticism but a criticism of the opposing persons general beleifs or worldview. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Ok, now here we come down to the point: you have just uttered a tautology. I want specifics. What are those propositions that are such that reason is meaningful if and only if they are true? What is the argument that shows this to be true?



First of all in what way is my statement either true by itself or an unnecessary repetition of words, or a tautology? I repeated the words to illustrate my method of TA that is all. I will answer your question because I brought up the issue of reason but to be fair I brought up ethics as well and you have answered those questions. 

Reason as a word can be used to mean many different things, for our discussion we will stick to the meaning of this word as a normative standard of authority. If it is not normative than it cannot be authoritative. So here are two preconditions that must be met to make reason what it is as we experience it: normative reason and authoritative. Another precondition that arises in this discussion is the issue of uniformity, that is to say reason must be uniform across cultural bounds and history. We must all use or do the same thing in order for reason to have any meaning.

So our most general preconditions are these:
1.	normative reason
2.	authority
3.	uniformity
It might be asked why such a TA is needed when we experience all three of these things already in the very use of reason? This argument is circular in nature and therefore fallacious. So since we cannot appeal to reason by itself to explain itself we need a theory that satisfies these three preconditions. I think the Christian worldview does all these nicely.

In the Christian worldview, henceforth CW, reason is simply a tool that we use to fulfill our nature as the image bearers of God, so that we think God’s thoughts after Him in making sense out of creation. So we see that the second precondition is met because the authority of reason does not rest in itself but in the very being of God, who is the Creator. So the modernist’s dilemma is avoided because we don’t have to locate the authority of reason in itself but in the Creator, this avoids the rash but correct conclusions of the postmodernists regarding the modernist enterprise.

But what about the other two preconditions? Well the third one is answered by the very nature of man in the CW. We are all uniformly created as the image bearers of God. We uniformly use the same tool of reason in our attempts to make sense out of the world around us. So the first is therefore answered as well because uniformity and authority guarantee normative reason. To go against reason is therefore to deny our very being.

Now I didn’t give the propositions you asked for because you are stuck on this unfounded notion that a TA must be formed in a direct deductive type argument. Since I have not seen any reason to do so I don’t feel the need to do so. If I did than this argument could never be proven in that way because it would be impossible to do so. Also this is as specific as I can get because again this whole argument could fill a book out.


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## Philip

> You can make great use of common notions but not make common notions autonomous, they are true because they are thinking God's thoughts after Him.



No, they are true because they correspond to the reality that God has created. What makes my belief that there is a tree outside true is not the fact that God believes it (though that is certainly necessary) but the fact that there is a tree outside.



jwright82 said:


> First of all in what way is my statement either true by itself or an unnecessary repetition of words, or a tautology?



Here's what you said.



> The preconditions for reason will be those things that must be true in order for reason to be as it is.



That's just a definition---I'm asking for concrete criteria.



jwright82 said:


> So our most general preconditions are these:
> 1. normative reason
> 2. authority
> 3. uniformity



Ok:

1) Why must reason be normative? What kind of blame is assigned to those who fail to meet such a standard? Is this standard going to be comprehensible across cultures?
2) Whose authority?
3) Again, what kind of uniformity would be capable of transcending cultures? Even in reading church fathers, I find myself at times scratching my head at their reasoning.

Again, why these preconditions and not others?



jwright82 said:


> In the Christian worldview



Which one? Eastern? Western? Far Eastern?


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> No, they are true because they correspond to the reality that God has created. What makes my belief that there is a tree outside true is not the fact that God believes it (though that is certainly necessary) but the fact that there is a tree outside.



What does that have to do with the discussion? I do not believe I said that a tree is tree because God beleives it.



P. F. Pugh said:


> That's just a definition---I'm asking for concrete criteria



No it is a explinaition of method and scope not a tautology.



P. F. Pugh said:


> 1) Why must reason be normative? What kind of blame is assigned to those who fail to meet such a standard? Is this standard going to be comprehensible across cultures?



The problem here is that we experience reason in a normative sense. Going all the back to Augustine and Aristotle, if you deny the law of noncontradiction, in a sense its normativity, than you must assume this same law as a normative standered just for your argument to make sense. Denying the normativity of reason just makes your opinion as worthless as anyother. But denying the normative status of reason involves not a problem with my view but theirs hence I need to give no answer to such questions or criticisms. This is the simple logical process of presuppossition, a logical criticism assumes the normativity of reason so it cannot be denied.



P. F. Pugh said:


> 2) Whose authority?



The argument indirectly showed God's authority. If you feel that it is unreasonable to place the authority of reason in the Creator than please show what is intrinsicly irrational or invalid about that assumption, note that asking me to prove the existance of God in no way shows that this assumption is invalid or irrational (unless you can hypothetically prove that God does not exist). No one person, besides God, can be an authority for reason. Again you must show why my TA does not provide what it claims to, answering these preconditions. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> 3) Again, what kind of uniformity would be capable of transcending cultures? Even in reading church fathers, I find myself at times scratching my head at their reasoning.



Reason is what is in view here, not individual cases of reasoning. Why do I need to transcend culture per se. The beuaty here is that not culture that is irrational can be shown to exist, including eastern ones. If reason is neccessary for making sense of things than no culture could communicate without some basic ability to make sense of things. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, why these preconditions and not others?



This list is not exaustive, but contains the most important preconditions. I did demonstrate in my original argument why they were neccessary for reason to be as we experience it, if you feel that these preconditions are not neccessary than please explain why one or all is not? If your questions indicate areas of weaknesses in my logic than they have been given at least initial answering.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Which one? Eastern? Western? Far Eastern?



Reformed, sorry I thought that was given.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Why do I need to transcend culture per se.



Because if you are going to set up reason as a transcendent normative standard, then you would need to make sure that such reasoning would be comprehensible and known as reasonable not only in our own culture, but in China, or in Korea, or in Germany, or in Africa, or in the Arab world.



jwright82 said:


> If reason is neccessary for making sense of things than no culture could communicate without some basic ability to make sense of things.



But how we make sense of things often looks substantially different.



jwright82 said:


> Reformed, sorry I thought that was given.



Which reformed? Dutch? Korean? American? Scottish? English? All of these have some fairly significant differences of approach.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Because if you are going to set up reason as a transcendent normative standard, then you would need to make sure that such reasoning would be comprehensible and known as reasonable not only in our own culture, but in China, or in Korea, or in Germany, or in Africa, or in the Arab world.



Well to that I would have to consider the language games of reasoning or making sense of things. I find it to be increasingly important in my philosophy to consider language games as a good place to start in any philosophical analysis. Because it almost tells us something of metaphysics, at least indirectly. What would a language game look like that never attempted to make sense out of ideas or conceptions through the use of words? It would be pretty incoherent right. Without logical connectives in our conceptual scheme we couldn't even talk sensecly about anything. These logical conectives are part of what I mean by reason, in a broad sense. So if it is an indespensable part of our conceptual scheme, so that even extreme skeptics need to assume its validity just to deny it, than what are the preconditions that make it as we experience it. These will be cultural, language games, as well as transcultural as being something essential to us.

To be fair to you there are two areas of weakness in any TA, that need people like myself to work out. One that you have somewhat alluded to is the ontological status of what is proven. Meaning something similer to, not the same as, the ontological argument. One famous critique of that is that people say it defines God into existance and that involves, although I do not agree with this argument, strange ontological problems. In a simieler vein the TA may prove that God is neccessary for morality to make sense as we experience it but does that really prove that God exists or only that the idea of God is neccessary in our moral conceptions? That is a problem that we utilizers of the TA must work out for ourselves. Also as to how much do they actually prove? Or what should be the ambition or scope of a TA? How much does it actually prove?



P. F. Pugh said:


> But how we make sense of things often looks substantially different.



Yes but what concerne us in a TA is that we all try to make sense of things. Notice that the materialist may be true or false in their theory of mind, but that has no bearing on whether or not reason is as I have argued it must be. If reason is not as I have argued than the question is neither true nor false it is meaningless.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Which reformed? Dutch? Korean? American? Scottish? English? All of these have some fairly significant differences of approach.



I know nothing about Korean reformed churches. But in this area they all agree in the basic creator/creature distinction, in the idea of creation, in the image of God in man, it is all these doctrines that are more or less in view here, not their in house squabbles.


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## cih1355

> In a simieler vein the TA may prove that God is neccessary for morality to make sense as we experience it but does that really prove that God exists or only that the idea of God is neccessary in our moral conceptions? That is a problem that we utilizers of the TA must work out for ourselves.



Moral values come to us in the form of commands. Impersonal things do not give commands. Ideas do not give commands. Persons give commands. Commands come from entities that have a will. Abstract ideas and impersonal things do not have a will.


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## jwright82

cih1355 said:


> In a simieler vein the TA may prove that God is neccessary for morality to make sense as we experience it but does that really prove that God exists or only that the idea of God is neccessary in our moral conceptions? That is a problem that we utilizers of the TA must work out for ourselves.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Moral values come to us in the form of commands. Impersonal things do not give commands. Ideas do not give commands. Persons give commands. Commands come from entities that have a will. Abstract ideas and impersonal things do not have a will.
Click to expand...

 
I completly agree, it would seem neccessary for God to be the author of morals, which would denote his existance. Never the less philosophers aperently debate this issue anyway, but I think you are right on target in your argument. I do not doubt what the TA proves only that this one area where we Van Tillians can take up the burden of expanding our understanding of TA.


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## cih1355

jwright82 said:


> cih1355 said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In a simieler vein the TA may prove that God is neccessary for morality to make sense as we experience it but does that really prove that God exists or only that the idea of God is neccessary in our moral conceptions? That is a problem that we utilizers of the TA must work out for ourselves.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Moral values come to us in the form of commands. Impersonal things do not give commands. Ideas do not give commands. Persons give commands. Commands come from entities that have a will. Abstract ideas and impersonal things do not have a will.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I completly agree, it would seem neccessary for God to be the author of morals, which would denote his existance. Never the less philosophers aperently debate this issue anyway, but I think you are right on target in your argument. I do not doubt what the TA proves only that this one area where we Van Tillians can take up the burden of expanding our understanding of TA.
Click to expand...

 
I would like to add that if there are moral values that apply to all people in all places at all times, then those moral values must come from someone who has authority over all people in all places at all times. Impersonal things can't obligate everyone to do something. Impersonal things don't have authority over people. 

Absolute moral values are not just good evidence for God's existence; they presuppose God's existence.


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