# Classical Reformed Apologetics



## A.Joseph

I’m in agreement with the approach toward apologetics espoused on this episode of MoS... I think a solely presuppositional and theonomistic approach to relating to nonbelievers and nonReformed (or even minor aspects of daily living) can fall into works-words righteousness

http://www.alliancenet.org/mos/podcast/45403


----------



## RamistThomist

A.Joseph said:


> I’m in agreement with the approach toward apologetics espoused on this episode of MOS... I think a solely presuppositional and theonomistic approach to relating to nonbelievers and nonReformed (or even minor aspects of daily living) can fall into works-words righteousness
> 
> http://www.alliancenet.org/mos/podcast/45403



It *can* lead into that kind of legalism, but it doesn't have to. The real problem with modern presup today is that none of them really have done any serious reading in metaphysics or epistemology. They don't know the issues. They are good at debating Kantians and hard physicalists, but that's about it.

My own take is something along the lines of Plantinga/Moreland, etc. I think the classical Reformed approach is good in getting people to think about metaphysics and the like, but they also need to understand that some people can disagree with some formulations and not have denied the doctrine of God.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## A.Joseph

Made me think of the discussion between Crosspolitic & Matt Walsh. I don’t agree with either of their approaches. CP takes a sniper approach while Walsh is strictly rational and natural law...
One was clinically presupp. the other not at all


----------



## A.Joseph

also, I’m YEC which I believe lends itself to a more natural theological position. But I don’t think leading with YEC rhetoric is productive either, it’s simply part of a more consistent understanding/marriage of what is seen and believed. We don’t need to know everything but we should feel confident in what we do know


----------



## RamistThomist

A.Joseph said:


> also, I’m YEC which I believe lends itself to a more natural theological position.



I thought most natural theology guys were Old Earth. It's the presups who are mainly YEC.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## A.Joseph

BayouHuguenot said:


> I thought most natural theology guys were Old Earth. It's the presups who are mainly YEC.


I guess there is some evidence that points to old earth. I just don’t believe it... but wouldn’t emphasize my nonbelief in this area to a nonbeliever, at least upfront


----------



## RamistThomist

I wasn't saying there was evidence for/against Old Earth. Just noting that most of the classical apologists today lean OEC.


----------



## A.Joseph

This is interesting, White is taking issue with Fesko (who I don’t believe I had heard of prior). He also mentions RCC. I think I have an idea where White is going and he’s probably right but one thing is for sure, I could never take RCC seriously with so much of their unsound doctrine and practice. I just don’t see a pitfall there but I have to hear his next episode where he will get into his concerns more. Trueman came up (well no, more like alluded to) as did Oliphint. Seems to be getting a little controversial. Which seems to be commonplace these days or maybe I’m just paying attention


----------



## RamistThomist

A.Joseph said:


> This is interesting, White is taking issue with Fesko (who I don’t believe I had heard of prior). He also mentions RCC. I think I have an idea where White is going and he’s probably right but one thing is for sure, I could never take RCC seriously with so much of their unsound doctrine and practice. I just don’t see a pitfall there but I have to hear his next episode where he will get into his concerns more. Trueman came up (well no, more like alluded to) as did Oliphint. Seems to be getting a little controversial. Which seems to be commonplace these days or maybe I’m just paying attention



In a nutshell, what is White saying?


----------



## ZackF

BayouHuguenot said:


> In a nutshell, what is White saying?


He didn’t get to anything really.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## A.Joseph

BayouHuguenot said:


> In a nutshell, what is White saying?


He started mentioning it near the end, he will cover it his next episode. I’ll probably comment on it

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## RamistThomist

I do suspect what White will probably get at, and it is something I've noticed as well, being a former presuppositionalist and having read through Turretin (volume 1 twice) and all of Muller, I don't think there can be ultimate concord between presup and classical Reformed epistemology.

Reactions: Like 1 | Informative 1 | Amen 1


----------



## ZackF

BayouHuguenot said:


> I do suspect what White will probably get at, and it is something I've noticed as well, being a former presuppositionalist and having read through Turretin (volume 1 twice) and all of Muller, I don't think there can be ultimate concord between presup and classical Reformed epistemology.


Right. That’s what brought the former on to begin with. That doesn’t mean there needs to mutually assured excommunication.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> In a nutshell, what is White saying?





ZackF said:


> He didn’t get to anything really.



As Zack said he didnt really get to anything but he did say that the crux of the matter is that he wont allow an unbeliever to stand in judgment over God's Word. What little I understand of pressup (I consider myself one who is learning) I wholeheartedly agree with White. We cede too much ground when we argue from man to God as Classic apologist tend to do.


----------



## RamistThomist

Goodcheer68 said:


> As Zack said he didnt really get to anything but he did say that the crux of the matter is that he wont allow an unbeliever to stand in judgment over God's Word. What little I understand of pressup (I consider myself one who is learning) I wholeheartedly agree with White. We cede too much ground when we argue from man to God as Classic apologist tend to do.



I don't know what it means to let an unbeliever "stand in judgment over God's word." One can employ the traditional arguments et al, including Reformed metaphysics, without saying to the unbeliever, "Please be nice and consider the evidence. Please!"

An unbeliever (and a believer, for that matter) is going to sit in judgment on God's word. We do that every day. He is going to judge for himself whether he accepts it or not. That's life. I know all of the Van Tillian talking points. They weren't good against some naive forms of Neo-Thomism, which we should all reject, but they err when they think everyone who isn't a Van Tillian is saying "Sit in judgment on God's word."

Reactions: Like 3


----------



## RamistThomist

ZackF said:


> That doesn’t mean there needs to mutually assured excommunication.



Agreed. I've seen both sides do some really sleazy hit jobs on this point.


----------



## ZackF

I think it’s interesting that Fesko is going to RTS as a passionate classical apologist to teach alongside Anderson a dedicated presuppositionalist.


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> An unbeliever (and a believer, for that matter) is going to sit in judgment on God's word. We do that every day. He is going to judge for himself whether he accepts it or not.


 You are right but we shouldn’t accommodate his suppression of the truth as if the Triune God is something we can reason to apart from the work of the Spirit.

Reactions: Amen 1


----------



## RamistThomist

Goodcheer68 said:


> You are right but we shouldn’t accommodate his suppression of the truth as if the Triune God is something we can reason to apart from the work of the Spirit.



And aside from a few Catholic Neo-Thomists, nobody does that. Even the Papists who believe in a Nature-Grace dialectic admit we can't reason to the Triune God.

Reactions: Like 1 | Amen 1


----------



## A.Joseph

How are these approaches not truly compatible?


----------



## ZackF

A.Joseph said:


> How are these approaches not truly compatible?



They are not. They are different. The question should be are they both acceptable and are we going to respect persons who differ or not?

Are infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism compatible? Is pedobaptism compatible with credobaptism? The answer is no.


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> And aside from a few Catholic Neo-Thomists, nobody does that. Even the Papists who believe in a Nature-Grace dialectic admit we can't reason to the Triune God.



I would see it otherwise that when people try to first argue for 'some" god or a 'possible" god that is exactly what they are doing- accommodating the unbeliever's judgment upon Scripture.


----------



## RamistThomist

Goodcheer68 said:


> I would see it otherwise that when people try to first argue for 'some" god or a 'possible" god that is exactly what they are doing- accommodating the unbeliever's judgment upon Scripture.



You are welcome to see it otherwise. I don't see it that way, so there's that. When I argue for the finitude of the universe, I am not positing a generic god in general. I am simply making the claim that it is impossible to transverse an actual infinite. This removes, claim by claim, the unbeliever's routes of escape.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> I do suspect what White will probably get at, and it is something I've noticed as well, being a former presuppositionalist and having read through Turretin (volume 1 twice) and all of Muller, I don't think there can be ultimate concord between presup and classical Reformed epistemology.


 What is a Reformed epistemology?


----------



## Apologist4Him

A.Joseph said:


> I’m in agreement with the approach toward apologetics espoused on this episode of MoS... I think a solely presuppositional and theonomistic approach to relating to nonbelievers and nonReformed (or even minor aspects of daily living) can fall into works-words righteousness
> 
> http://www.alliancenet.org/mos/podcast/45403



I'm not looking for a debate here but I recently participated in an online debate: 
DEBATE: Apologetics Methodology Presuppositionalism vs Evidentialism

Also posted on my blog: Presuppositionalism 101

Thought you might be interested. 

Unfortunately I will not be able to finish the debate, Christianforums.com banned me for posting an off topic post in the free for all political forums. Nearly every warning came as a result of posting in the free for all political forums. Anyway, I might add one more response to my blog, maybe, discouraged atm.


----------



## A.Joseph

I still don’t see that these 2 approaches are multually exclusive. I love the fact that we are all born in God’s image, and yet the Bible has answers. I don’t see a problem here. If we are too scriptural we are probably going over heads, if we are not, what do we truly have to offer? God’s fingerprint is everywhere and if we go against his moral and natural laws nothing but misery and self destruction, and in the end without mercy and grace is physical and spiritual death. Why limit our approach?


----------



## Apologist4Him

A.Joseph said:


> I still don’t see that these 2 approaches are multually exclusive. I love the fact that we are all born in God’s image, and yet the Bible has answers. I don’t see a problem here. If we are too scriptural we are probably going over heads, if we are not, what do we truly have to offer? God’s fingerprint is everywhere and if we go against his moral and natural laws nothing but misery and self destruction, and in the end without mercy and grace is physical and spiritual death. Why limit our approach?



A short quote from the debate:

"I hope my indirect responses address this belief, I hope when we are done you will conclude Calvinistic presuppositionalism is: “the basis, the foundation, as an apologetical framework for all other apologetic methods from reason, facts, experience, and faith.” (See Axioms and Science heading)"​Here is part of a quote from Van Til which I included into the context of the debate:

“Historical apologetics is absolutely necessary and indispensable to point out that Christ arose from the grave, etc. But as long as historical apologetics works on a supposedly neutral basis, it defeats its own purpose. For in that case it virtually grants the validity of the meta- physical assumptions of the unbeliever. So in this case a pragmatist may accept the resurrection of Christ as a fact without accepting the conclusion that Christ is the Son of God. And on his assumptions he is not illogical in doing so. On the contrary, if his basic metaphysical assumption to the effect that all reality is subject to chance is right, he is only consistent if he refuses to conclude from the fact of Christ’s resurrection that he is divine in the orthodox sense of the term. Now, though he is wrong in his metaphysical assumption, and though, rightly interpreted, the resurrection of Christ assuredly proves the divinity of Christ, we must attack the unbeliever in his philosophy of fact, as well as on the question of the actuality of the facts themselves. For on his own metaphysical assumptions, the resurrection of Christ would not prove his divinity at all."​
To answer the question, I do not see Revelational Epistemology or a Calvinistic Presuppositionalism as limiting at all, rather the necessary preconditions of a Reformed worldview to justify (warrant) all other approaches.


----------



## A.Joseph

That’s fine, if we don’t want to give an inch, but give me an example in this day and age when such an approach worked off the bat with a nonbeliever. Heck, we can’t even keep Reformed brethren from buying into cultural Marxism... we give more leeway to our own reformed brethren, maybe we need to hit them with this approach, a second time, if need be. I don’t think most skeptics even buy into historical apologetics, so Van Til would be giving too much benefit of the doubt from the onset to today’s nonbeliever


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> And aside from a few Catholic Neo-Thomists, nobody does that. Even the Papists who believe in a Nature-Grace dialectic admit we can't reason to the Triune God.



I have to disagree, non-Calvinist apologists have and do just that. Christians who deny the doctrine of total depravity and monergistic regeneration make compromises in their debate tactics, often assuming a "neutral" ground, and end up in "god of the gaps" probability arguments. I would provide quotes or sound bites, but it's been so many years (15 or 16 years) since I devoted much time listening to or reading from non-Calvinist apologists like William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland for example. I suspect if you listened/read Catholic Peter Kreeft carefully, you would find he does this too. Any Christian who believes anyone can choose Christ, and believes faith precedes regeneration, will be more accepting and inclined towards a "neutral" ground from the start. All while there is no neutral ground between the Christian and non-Christian. I think many have taken the neutral approach so as to be respected intellectually in places where faith is mocked and ridiculed. King Solomon wrote truthful words for scoffers though.


----------



## A.Joseph

Apologist4Him said:


> I have to disagree, non-Calvinist apologists have and do just that. Christians who deny the doctrine of total depravity and monergistic regeneration make compromises in their debate tactics, often assuming a "neutral" ground, and end up in "god of the gaps" probability arguments. I would provide quotes or sound bites, but it's been so many years (15 or 16 years) since I devoted much time listening to or reading from non-Calvinist apologists like William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland for example. I suspect if you listened/read Catholic Peter Kreeft carefully, you would find he does this too. Any Christian who believes anyone can choose Christ, and believes faith precedes regeneration, will be more accepting and inclined towards a "neutral" ground from the start. All while there is no neutral ground between the Christian and non-Christian. I think many have taken the neutral approach so as to be respected intellectually in places where faith is mocked and ridiculed. King Solomon wrote truthful words for scoffers though.


But give me an example of one who holds to a classical reformed apologetics approach who does that. I would never withhold the doctrines of grace but I’m not going to hit them over the head with it. There is a name for guys who do that.....


----------



## Apologist4Him

A.Joseph said:


> That’s fine, if we don’t want to give an inch, but give me an example in this day and age when such an approach worked off the bat with a nonbeliever. Heck, we can’t even get Reformed brethren from buying into cultural Marxism... we give more leeway to our own reformed brethren, maybe we need to hit them with this approach, a second time, if need be



Presuppositionlism is the only approach which starts and ends with the self-attesting Christ of the self-authenticating Scriptures and therefore the Gospel of Christ, the power of God unto salvation, is our final defense. The Gospel works as God so wills. The work of God alone made me a believer, He used the Gospel to do His work. Personally I knew nothing of formal apologetics or philosophy before the Gospel worked in my conversion.


----------



## A.Joseph

Apologist4Him said:


> Presuppositionlism is the only approach which starts and ends with the self-attesting Christ of the self-authenticating Scriptures and therefore the Gospel of Christ, the power of God unto salvation, is our final defense. The Gospel works as God so wills. The work of God alone made me a believer, He used the Gospel to do His work. Personally I knew nothing of formal apologetics or philosophy before the Gospel worked in my conversion.


I mostly agree with you. I just think we can maintain our presuppositions and be a little nuanced working a bit outside that framework without compromising truth in anyway... I’m a YEC so my nuances are not too sophisticated by today’s standards, lol

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## Apologist4Him

A.Joseph said:


> I mostly agree with you. I just think we can maintain our presuppositions and be a little nuanced working a bit outside that framework without compromising truth in anyway... I’m a YEC so my nuances are not too sophisticated by today’s standards, lol



I'm also a YEC, my favorite YEC is astrophysicist Dr. Jason Lisle who also happens to be a presuppositionalist.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> What is a Reformed epistemology?



First principles, principia. Cf Muller, volume 1.



Apologist4Him said:


> Any Christian who believes anyone can choose Christ, and believes faith precedes regeneration, will be more accepting and inclined towards a "neutral" ground from the start.



Which is a different claim from "reasoning to the Trinity," which the nature-grace dialectic specifically says we can't do.

And nature is always pointed towards its telos, grace. So even on Thomist grounds there is no strict separation.


----------



## jwright82

What first principles? And how is that the "reformed epistemology"? It seems to me that there can be many reformed epistemologies. Van Til had one, Alvin Planting a had one. Even CA has one. What defines it? I don't have access to Mueller, though.

Anyone who draws from the tradition can in theory be "reformed". On a different note I don't like when people throw the term "reformed" on some non theological subject (philosophy, apologetics, economics, etc.). It just shuts out progress, disagreements, and draws non theological lines. I didn't like the title of the collection of essays called "Reformed Apologetics" for that reason, amazing book though. But how can we claim one position, outside of theology, as the reformed position. It just seems to try to claim that anyone who disagrees with position X (On non theological things) is not reformed. That's the sense I get anyway.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> And how is that the "reformed epistemology"?



Because all of the Reformed dogmatics used them. Turretin does ascribe a functional role to “natural reason.” Natural man, whatever that phrase means, can understand axiomatic truths (29-30). Reason is of particular instrumental use in terms of inference and middle premises. For example, Christ’s ubiquity denied in the following way: “Besides, while the theologian uses arguments drawn from reason, he does it rather as a philosopher rather than as a theologian.


jwright82 said:


> It seems to me that there can be many reformed epistemologies. Van Til had one



Except Van Til never consciously drew from the Reformed tradition, aside from some passages in calvin.


jwright82 said:


> Alvin Planting a had one.



Plantinga is drawing upon Reid, who drew from Turretin (especially on free will).


jwright82 said:


> What first principles?




Theologia viatorum (theology of pilgrims in our earthly journey)


principia theologia: the foundations of theology


principium essendi: the being of God


principium cognoscendi: cognitive foundations of theology.


principium externum: Scripture


principium internum: faith


testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti: internal testimony of the Holy Spirit (Romans 8).




To be fair, Van Til never denied any of this, but he never used it, either. You will find more of Kant than you will of Turretin in van Til.


jwright82 said:


> Anyone who draws from the tradition can in theory be "reformed"



That's true. The difference is that some use the Reformed tradition and draw upon it, and can prove it with citations, and the rest do not.


jwright82 said:


> I don't like when people throw the term "reformed" on some non theological subject (philosophy, apologetics, economics, etc.).



I thought presups said all of that was theological.


----------



## Taylor

BayouHuguenot said:


> Natural man, whatever that phrase means, can understand axiomatic truths...



Presuppositionalism doesn’t deny this, though, correct? In my understanding, the thrust of presuppositionalism is not that unbelievers cannot understand axiomatic truths, but that their unbelieving worldview is fundamentally at odds with the truths they do indeed know. The axiomatic truths the claim to know are only justified given biblical presuppositions.

What’s your assessment?

Reactions: Amen 2


----------



## RamistThomist

Taylor Sexton said:


> Presuppositionalism doesn’t deny this, though, correct? In my understanding, the thrust of presuppositionalism is not that unbelievers cannot understand axiomatic truths, but that their unbelieving worldview is fundamentally at odds with the truths they do indeed know. The axiomatic truths the claim to know are only justified given biblical presuppositions.
> 
> What’s your assessment?



In a sense, no one disagrees with that. The problem is that presups say if you don't presuppose the Trinity you cannot make sense of reality. The danger with this, besides needing a Master's degree to really understand it, is that I can posit a four-personed god, perhaps even five, and have the exact same argument.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## A.Joseph

This thread is kinda hard on Van Til, I’m not agreeing unless what they say is accurate, then I would have concerns...

https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/classical-or-presuppositional-apologetics.16967/


----------



## A.Joseph

I’m sure my pastor will ultimately set me straight on Van Til, but it seems like we should give Fesko a fair hearing, especially in this day and age where the skeptic is in a much more distant place ... 

Here’s the endorsements:
*Description*
*Product description*
Challenging the dominant Van Tillian approach in Reformed apologetics, this book by a leading expert in contemporary Reformed theology sets forth the principles that undergird a classic Reformed approach. J. V. Fesko's detailed exegetical, theological, and historical argument takes as its starting point the classical Reformed understanding of the "two books" of God's revelation: nature and Scripture. Believers should always rest on the authority of Scripture but also can and should appeal to the book of nature in the apologetic task.

*From the Back Cover*
" Reforming Apologetics presents a compelling case for the shape and content of Reformed apologetics by reconnecting it with the roots of the Reformed faith. Fesko carefully examines the nineteenth-century idealist backgrounds of the Van Tilian and Dooyeweerdian approaches and demonstrates their flawed epistemology. He outlines the enduring strength of the genuine tradition of the Reformation, which begins with the authority of Scripture but also recognizes the presence of intuitions and concepts common to believer and unbeliever and of the natural law written on the heart--common grounds of discourse necessary to the apologetic task." 
-- Richard A. Muller, Calvin Theological Seminary 

"Fesko writes with learning and verve as he ploughs up the baked ground of much current Reformed apologetics, letting in light and fresh air. His basic charge is that the apologetics of Van Til and Dooyeweerd is inconsistent in its basic method: they criticized other apologetics as unholy mixtures of the biblical and the pagan, while their own efforts did not escape from such 'synthesis.' In the final chapter, Fesko sets out afresh the methods and objectives of the classical tradition of Reformed apologetics. If you are skeptical about whether a book on apologetics can be good reading, then this incisive treatment will convince you." 
-- Paul Helm, author of Human Nature from Calvin to Edwards

"Reformed theologians haven't paid very careful attention to the doctrine of nature in the twentieth century, leading to a number of unfortunate consequences. Fesko helpfully reminds us of deeper Christian and Reformed reflection on what Holy Scripture reveals about nature and of its significant implications for Christian apologetics. It's a grace to think anew about God's creative goodness, and Fesko provides a helpful prompt in this important direction." 
-- Michael Allen, Reformed Theological Seminary 

"Fesko presents an approach to apologetics that reaffirms the theological outlook of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Reformed fathers and scholastics. Its peculiar strength is in arguing for God's revelation in the created order as the source of common principles shared by believer and unbeliever alike. These common principles give Christians the epistemological common ground necessary to begin meaningfully engaging unbelievers in defending the faith. Along the way, Fesko offers thoughtful criticism of various neo-Calvinist approaches to apologetics, including those of Dooyeweerd and Van Til. Readers are sure to benefit from this challenging volume as they consider how to faithfully defend the Christian faith." 
-- James E. Dolezal, Cairn University


----------



## RamistThomist

A.Joseph said:


> This thread is kinda hard on Van Til, I’m not agreeing unless what they say is accurate, then I would have concerns...
> 
> https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/classical-or-presuppositional-apologetics.16967/



That's because one of the guys on the thread is the most vocal Clarkian alive.


----------



## A.Joseph

BayouHuguenot said:


> That's because one of the guys on the thread is the most vocal Clarkian alive.


Excuse my ignorance, what is Clark’s position? Is it mostly rejected in Reformed circles?


----------



## RamistThomist

A.Joseph said:


> Excuse my ignorance, what is Clark’s position? Is it mostly rejected in Reformed circles?



It's presup in the sense that it rejects the classical argument and says we must presuppose Scripture as the primary axiom of human knowledge. It (usually) rejects empirical knowledge and says that we have a univocal knowledge of God.

I reviewed some of his works here.
https://tentsofshem.wordpress.com/2018/06/05/review-gordon-clark-a-christian-view-of-men-and-things/


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> Except Van Til never consciously drew from the Reformed tradition, aside from some passages in calvin.



Not true, he drew from Calvin, WCF, G. Vos, A. Kuyper, B.B. Warfield, H. Bavinck, etc. See Cornelius Van Til by John M. Frame

And consciously his aim, goal, and purpose...

"In this small pamphlet I am indicating briefly the chief purpose I have had in writing the following pamphlets, books, and syllabi.

Throughout, my aim has been to show that it is the historic Reformed Faith alone that can in any adequate way present the claims of Christ to men for their salvation. The Reformed Faith alone does anything like full justice to the cultural and missionary mandates of Christ. The Reformed Faith alone has anything like an adequately stated view of God, of man, and of Christ as the mediator between God and man. It is because the Reformed Faith alone has an essentially sound, because biblical, theology, that it alone has anything like a sound, that is, biblical method of challenging the world of unbelief to repentance and faith." - Van Til, _Towards A Reformed Apologetic_, pg.1​


BayouHuguenot said:


> To be fair, Van Til never denied any of this, but he never used it, either. You will find more of Kant than you will of Turretin in van Til.



Van Til was clearly opposed to Kant...

"A theology that is based on the _Critique of Pure Reason_ can do no justice either to the idea of God or to the idea of man. It would be simpler and more true to fact if Tillich and Niebuhr would follow the example of Eddington, Dewey, and Einstein. The same thing holds true with respect to Karl Barth. Barth’s challenge to “modern Protestantism” is to be taken _cum grano_. Modern Protestantism is modern; it is Kantian. So is Barth. The underlying epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions of Barth and of “modern Protestantism” alike are found in the critical philosophy of Kant. The quarrels between them are but family quarrels soon to be mended when anyone comes with the challenge of a self-sufficient God. Barth’s ire does not rise to the fulness of its power till he is face to face with the doctrine of the sovereign God. With the help of Kant he brings down this God to the position of correlativity with a self-existent temporal flux. We conclude that such men as Tillich, Niebuhr and Barth obscure the issues that face modern man.

From the orthodox side the issue is also obscured. It is obscured in particular by the adherents of Scholastic theology. To go back from Kant to St. Thomas and back from St. Thomas to Aristotle offers no help. Professor Etienne Gilson, for all his brilliant effort, can find no harmony between a philosophy based on autonomous reason and a theology based on revelation.

Protestant apologists have been all too ready to follow the Scholastic line. Bishop Butler’s _Analogy_ and the many books based on it still cater to autonomous reason. But for all this obscuration both on the part of the modern and the orthodox theologians the issue is at bottom simple and clear. A consistent Christianity, such as we must humbly hold the Reformed Faith to be, must set an interpretation of its own over against modern science, modern philosophy and modern religion. Its thinking is controlled, at every point, by the presuppositions of the existence of the self-sufficient God of which the Bible speaks. It is upon the basis of this presupposition alone, the Reformed Faith holds, that predication of any sort at any point has relevance and meaning. If we may not presuppose such an “antecedent” Being, man finds his speck of rationality to be swimming as a mud-ball in a bottomless and shoreless ocean.

Reason, which on Kantian basis has presumed to legislate for the whole of reality, needs chance for its existence. If reality were God-structured the human mind could not be ultimately legislative. The idea of brute irrationality is presupposed in modern methodology. At the same time it is this brute irrationality which undermines every interpretative endeavor on the part of would-be autonomous man. There is on the modern basis no possibility of the identification of any fact let alone the possibility of finding an intelligent relationship of one fact to another fact. The possibility of science and philosophy as well as the possibility of theology presupposes the idea of a God whose counsel determines “whatsoever comes to pass.” Only then has the spectre of brute fact and ultimate irrationality been slain. If we are to follow the method of modern science, modern philosophy and modern theology Merlin will never walk the earth again. Modern thought is, like the Prodigal Son, at the swine-trough, but, unlike the Prodigal, it will not return to the Father’s house." - Van Til, _Christianity and Idealism, Kant or Christ? Calvin Forum, February, 1942_​



BayouHuguenot said:


> I thought presups said all of that was theological.



God is omniscient and the knowledge of man is analogical to God, meaning man has never had an original thought, meaning the knowledge of man is dependent upon the knowledge of God, meaning to think any truth is to think God's thoughts after Him.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> Calvin, WCF, G. Vos, A. Kuyper, B.B. Warfield, H. Bavinck, etc



And they are not really representative of the classical Reformed tradition. I mean in the scholastic sense like Turretin et al. And while he "quotes" the aforementioned men, he never exegetes them (except for a few passages from Calvin). And you will search long and hard for exegesis and analysis of guys like Turretin, Cocceius, Voetius, etc.


Apologist4Him said:


> Van Til was clearly opposed to Kant...



I know that, but he couldn't form his TAG without using Kant. No one disputes that.


Apologist4Him said:


> God is omniscient and the knowledge of man is analogical to God, meaning man has never had an original thought, meaning the knowledge of man is dependent upon the knowledge of God, meaning to think any truth is to think God's thoughts after Him.



Which means you agree with me, and not with the earlier claim that those subjects aren't theological.


----------



## jwright82

Ditto


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> The problem is that presups say if you don't presuppose the Trinity you cannot make sense of reality.



Incorrect, there is a difference between knowing and justification for knowing. Plantinga used the term "warrant" for justification, while Clark used the term "axiom", and Van Til used the term "presuppose" with reference to justification. A non-Christian _can_ know as much or more than the Christian, and it is _not_ that their knowledge is false so far as it goes, it is that they _cannot_ justify their knowledge claims according to the assumptions of their worldview (because of the dependency of human knowledge on the knowledge of God), not only do they borrow from the Christian worldview, they know the true God of Scripture exists and suppress that knowledge in unrighteousness. So in all of their knowledge they rob God of the glory He deserves, taking autonomous credit, not giving credit where it is due. 



BayouHuguenot said:


> The danger with this, besides needing a Master's degree to really understand it,



I dropped out of college about nineteen years ago, I guess I really don't understand it then, not without a piece of paper on the wall implying I am a know it all. 



BayouHuguenot said:


> is that I can posit a four-personed god, perhaps even five, and have the exact same argument.



Ahh but people do make the Book of Mormon, or Watchtower or Quran or hosts of other religious texts as their "axiom" and do accent to the propositions therein. I see real danger in that as well.


----------



## Apologist4Him

jwright82 said:


> What first principles? And how is that the "reformed epistemology"? It seems to me that there can be many reformed epistemologies. Van Til had one, Alvin Planting a had one. Even CA has one. What defines it? I don't have access to Mueller, though.



Metaphysics deals with first principals...the conceptual basic laws of logic are an example, necessary for meaningful language, Science, etc. I could be wrong but honestly it seems much can be synthesized between Van Til, Plantinga, and Clark. In many ways the primary difference is in terminology. That said I believe Van Til's to be more robust, consistent, and faithful to Reformed theology.

Couple of articles on Reformed epistemology:

Unbelievers and the Knowledge of God: Biblical Warrant for a Presuppositional Apologetic

A Truly Reformed Epistemology

Reactions: Amen 1


----------



## A.Joseph

I won’t argue that Reformed systematic covenant theology is the most sound, comprehensive exposition of scripture. So Christian apologetics should be Reformed. I think the Reformed faith makes the best converts but God obviously makes the best recipients of His grace. I don’t think I have a problem with Van Til. In fact, I don’t have a problem with any of these guys. I guess I just don’t really see a problem, and I’m not sure Fesko is a threat to sound doctrine and apologetics. But I’m eager to hear the reviews as they come in


----------



## jwright82

Apologist4Him said:


> Metaphysics deals with first principals...the conceptual basic laws of logic are an example, necessary for meaningful language, Science, etc. I could be wrong but honestly it seems much can be synthesized between Van Til, Plantinga, and Clark. In many ways the primary difference is in terminology. That said I believe Van Til's to be more robust, consistent, and faithful to Reformed theology.
> 
> Couple of articles on Reformed epistemology:
> 
> Unbelievers and the Knowledge of God: Biblical Warrant for a Presuppositional Apologetic
> 
> A Truly Reformed Epistemology


I'll have to ck that out. Metaphysics is a bit more complicated than that. Consider the linguistic aspect to that. Language reveals how we think about the world and talk.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> In a sense, no one disagrees with that. The problem is that presups say if you don't presuppose the Trinity you cannot make sense of reality. The danger with this, besides needing a Master's degree to really understand it, is that I can posit a four-personed god, perhaps even five, and have the exact same argument.



Im not sure that is correct. Its been awhile but if I remember correctly both Richard of St Victor and Bosserman show that God must necessarily be a Trinity and not a bininty, quadrinity... If he were anything other than a Trinity it would involve an impersonal context between the persons in a binity and at least one impersonal context in anything more than a Trinity. My books are packed or otherwise I would give you a quote. But Im pretty sure that you mentioned that you have read both books.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> and Van Til used the term "presuppose" with reference to justification.



Bahnsen defined knowledge as justified, true belief (Van Til Reader, p. 178). Bahnsen is still working within the parameters of epistemic internalism, whereas Plantinga is an externalist.



Goodcheer68 said:


> If he were anything other than a Trinity it would involve an impersonal context between the persons in a binity and at least one impersonal context in anything more than a Trinity.



A binity is impersonal, but that's not the example I used. There is no reason why a 4 personed-god would be impersonal. I agree that it might be problematic down the road, but there is no immediate conceptual problem to it.



Apologist4Him said:


> it is that they _cannot_ justify their knowledge claims according to the assumptions of their worldview



Which is exactly what I reported presups to be saying.


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> There is no reason why a 4 personed-god would be impersonal. I agree that it might be problematic down the road, but there is no immediate conceptual problem to it.



You are going to make me have to dig up the quotes now.


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> Bahnsen defined knowledge as justified, true belief (Van Til Reader, p. 178). Bahnsen is still working within the parameters of epistemic internalism, whereas Plantinga is an externalist.



Thoughts on the epistemic internalism/externalism issue. 1.) Is this an either or situation or is both and possible? 2.) Is knowledge either entirely subjective or entirely objective or a mixture of both? 3.) Van Til described human knowledge as analogical, meaning derivative of the original knowledge of God. 4.) If the Christ of Scripture is the starting point of justified true knowledge, Christ is external, the Scriptures are external. 5.) In monergistic regeneration, God the Holy Spirit (external) transforms the internals of man, the heart, mind, soul, and the will to be in union with Christ. In this union between God and man the (external) Spirit of God comes to indwell (internal) in a man. Considering these short points, I do not see how this is an either or situation. I found a quote to share, thought you might find it interesting:

"*Internalism and Externalism*

One evident weakness of Van Til’s epistemological arguments is that he nowhere supplies an _analysis_ of knowledge or displays much awareness of distinctions now commonplace in contemporary epistemology: foundationalism versus coherentism, justification versus warrant, overriding defeaters versus undercutting defeaters, and so on. *Van Til should not be judged too harshly for this, since such epistemological niceties were not brought to prominence until near the end of his career*.

I would suggest however that one recent distinction in particular has significant implications for many of his arguments, namely, the distinction between _internalist_ and _externalist_ conditions of knowledge. An _internalist_ condition (of justification or warrant) is one to which a person has “introspective access”; in other words, the person can ascertain whether or not the condition is fulfilled with respect to a particular belief simply by reflecting internally on his or her own mental states. For example, consider the following necessary condition of epistemic warrant:

(W1) S’s belief that _p_ is warranted only if S is aware of some reason_ q_ for thinking _p_ to be true.

W1 is an internalist condition, since it requires that the knower be subjectively aware of some warrant-relevant factor. In contrast, an _externalist_ condition is one that does not require any subjective awareness on the part of the knower, such as the following:

(W2) S’s beliefs that _p_ is warranted only if S’s belief that _p_ was formed by reliable (i.e., truth-conducive) cognitive processes.

Note that W2 does not require S to be _aware_ that his belief was reliably formed; it only requires that his belief _was_ reliably formed.

Now one of the central debates in contemporary epistemology concerns whether there are any necessary _internalist_ conditions of knowledge. Generally speaking, “internalists” say yes, while “externalists” say no.58 Whether there are necessary internalist conditions of knowledge (and, if so, of what kind) has deep implications for what sort of truths can be known, how they can be known, and by whom. As one might expect, Plantinga is well aware of this debate; having entered into the fray in his _Warrant_ series, he takes a self-consciously externalist position. Moreover, his epistemological arguments reflect a sensitivity to the distinction between internalist and externalist conditions. Van Til’s arguments do not, however, and his statements of them often seem to assume (at points where specificity might be significant) an internalist perspective that tends to weaken the arguments. For instance, after summarizing the argument from induction, Van Til writes the following:

Even non-Christians presuppose [the truth of Christian theism] while they verbally reject it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own [scientific] accomplishments.59

What does Van Til mean by “presuppose” here? Is the idea simply that if the truth of Christian theism is a precondition of scientific knowledge then a person is _implicitly_ assuming its truth by engaging in science (or claiming to have scientific knowledge)? Or is it that for a person to have scientific knowledge, not only must Christian theism be true but that person must also stand in some positive epistemic relation towards its truth — by either _knowing_ it, _believing_ it, or _accepting_ it? The latter interpretation clearly involves a stronger claim but consequently requires rather more by way of argument. It is easier to show that inductive reasoning has as necessary conditions (i) the uniformity of nature, and (ii) the good design of our cognitive faculties by a being that knows and ensures that nature is uniform, than it is to show that (i), (ii), _plus_ our believing or knowing (i) and (ii), are all necessary conditions. 60

*Another example of the relevance of the internalist/externalist distinction pertains to Van Til’s argument from the unity of knowledge. The argument appears to posit a precondition of knowledge that involves a mixture of internalist and externalist considerations*: a person S can know some fact _p _only if either (a) S knows how every other fact bears on knowing _p_ (an internalist condition) or (b) the epistemic faculties employed by S in knowing _p_ have been constructed by some other person G who knows how every other fact bears on knowing _p_ (an externalist condition). 61 Whatever the answers here and elsewhere, it is evident that Van Til’s arguments would benefit from a dose of disambiguation with respect to this important distinction." James N. Anderson _Calvin Theological Journal 40 (2005) p. 70-72_​A couple of quotes from Van Til:

"On the other hand the theistic conception which underlies and forms the foundation of the conception of absolute biblical authority does not entertain a false antithesis to begin with. The very foundation of the concept of biblical authority is that because of God’s absolute self-consciousness man’s self-conscious activity is always derivative and man’s constructive activity operates in the field of God’s original constructive activity. Hence absolute authority was man’s daily meat and drink when his mind was normal. It was only because of the entrance of sin in the heart of man that it was necessary for this authority of God to come to man in an externally mediated form. But this externally mediated form was necessary because of an ethical and not because of a metaphysical separation between God and man. Accordingly it was necessary that the ethical alienation should be removed in order that the original metaphysical relation should be able to function normally again." - Van Til, _A Survely of Christian Epistemology Chapter 13 The Starting Point of Christian Theistic Epistemology_

"It is necessary, however, to think of this revelation of God to man as originally internal as well as external. Man found in his own makeup, in his own moral nature, an understanding of and a love for that which is good. His own nature was revelational of the will of God. But while thus revelational of the will of God, man’s nature, even in paradise, was never meant to function by itself. It was at once supplemented by the supernatural, external and positive expression of God’s will as its correlative. Only thus can we see how basic is the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian view of the moral nature of man in relation to ethical questions" - Van Til, _The Defense of the Faith, Chapter 4_​In light of all this, I think Van Til would consider the internalist or externalist debate a false dilemma.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> 1.) Is this an either or situation or is both and possible?



There can be degrees of both.


Apologist4Him said:


> 2.) Is knowledge either entirely subjective or entirely objective or a mixture of both



Depending on how subjective is glossed, it can be both.


Apologist4Him said:


> 3.) Van Til described human knowledge as analogical, meaning derivative of the original knowledge of God



That's good. So does everyone who isn't a Scotist. I don't know what that has to do with the present discussion.


Apologist4Him said:


> If the Christ of Scripture is the starting point of justified true knowledge, Christ is external, the Scriptures are external



That's not what externalism means in epistemology. Externalism means my cognitive faculties are properly functioning and that I don't have to meet various Gettier situations.


----------



## RamistThomist

Here is why I brought up the internalism/externalism debate. Van Tillians love to say, "Well, how can you justify your knowledge?" The problem with that question is that Van Tillians generally say knowledge is justified true belief. So they are basically asking, "How can you justify your justification?" This is known as the problem of the criterion. 

Before I can know anything (say P), I must know two other things: Q (my criterion for knowledge, which the critic seeks) and R (the fact that P satisfies Q). But there is no reason to stop here. One can now ask how I know Q and R, to which the new answer is Q' and R'. But now I have to give a reason for Q'' and R''. Further, I must now give a reason for Q''' and R'''.

Said another way: Before I can know, I must know how I know. Before I can know how I know, I must know how I know how I know. And on the nightmare goes.

A Van Tillian can avoid the problem by opting for something like Alvin Plantinga's Warrant and Proper Function, but this would mean revamping much of his epistemology.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## jwright82

I'm not sure that internalism/externalism has much use for Van Till. Knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge. So I don't see much use for that distinction, however you want to slice it.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I'm not sure that internalism/externalism has much use for Van Till. Knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge. So I don't see much use for that distinction, however you want to slice it.



Van Til is an internalist. Bahnsen made that very clear. If you hold that knowledge is justified, true belief (which Bahnsen advocated), then you are an internalist. It has nothing to do with analogical knowledge.

When CVT says our knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge, he isn't defining the "what" of knowledge. He's more defining the how of it. The what of knowledge is the current question before the house.

Internalism is internal in the sense that your mind has to justify knowledge based on certain criteria. Thus, the justification is "internal" to you. Bahnsen advocated this specifically.

Plantinga's school, by contrast, is external in the sense that I don't have to keep providing justifications for my justification, provided my cognitive faculties are properly functioning.


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> Externalism means my cognitive faculties are properly functioning



Nobody believes their cognitive faculties are not functioning properly. But this does not diminish the effects of sin on the unregenerate consciousness concerning the cognitive faculties, nor cause the unregenerate heart to be any less deceitful. The "heart" and mind function together.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> Nobody believes their cognitive faculties are not functioning properly. But this does not diminish the effects of sin on the unregenerate consciousness concerning the cognitive faculties, nor cause the unregenerate heart to be any less deceitful. The "heart" and mind function together.



What Plantinga means by proper function is that my cognitive abilities aren't impaired (e.g., by Descartes' evil demon, or alcohol, or sensory deprivation). 

Sure, noetic effects and all, but that doesn't factor into the discussion of what constitutes knowledge. Proper function, however, does factor into that discussion.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Van Til is an internalist. Bahnsen made that very clear. If you hold that knowledge is justified, true belief (which Bahnsen advocated), then you are an internalist. It has nothing to do with analogical knowledge.
> 
> When CVT says our knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge, he isn't defining the "what" of knowledge. He's more defining the how of it. The what of knowledge is the current question before the house.
> 
> Internalism is internal in the sense that your mind has to justify knowledge based on certain criteria. Thus, the justification is "internal" to you. Bahnsen advocated this specifically.
> 
> Plantinga's school, by contrast, is external in the sense that I don't have to keep providing justifications for my justification, provided my cognitive faculties are properly functioning.


What's the source of the Bahnsen quote because I have his Van Til reader and internalism isn't found in the index at least? Also maybe I misunderstand but how can someone who affirms the use of evidences, within a framework, be strictly an internalist?


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> A binity is impersonal, but that's not the example I used. There is no reason why a 4 personed-god would be impersonal. I agree that it might be problematic down the road, but there is no immediate conceptual problem to it.



Bosserman disagrees. He says on page 181 of The Trinity and Vindication of Christian Paradox that to "add or subtract from the number of three divine persons is to compromise an ultimately personalist view of reality, by making God identical with, or subordinate to, an impersonal context." I don't want to type up the whole section where Bosserman explains this, so hopefully a picture of the section will suffice.


 



edit- I cant figure out how to upload a pic that reads full size. If someone wants to explain Ill re-upload the photos. maybe this will do https://www.evernote.com/shard/s439...d8259d8a0b44/fa3088165ad434ccad5a88b0dfa74f6d

https://www.evernote.com/shard/s439...41f4b1be89f2/a5411d0139c602f08fb0974d411c6294


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> What's the source of the Bahnsen quote because I have his Van Til reader and internalism isn't found in the index at least? Also maybe I misunderstand but how can someone who affirms the use of evidences, within a framework, be strictly an internalist?



It's concerning what is knowledge. Bahnsen defines knowledge as justified, true belief. He doesn't use the term "Internalism," but that's what it is in the textbooks on epistemology.


----------



## RamistThomist

Goodcheer68 said:


> Bosserman disagrees. He says on page 181 of The Trinity and Vindication of Christian Paradox that to "add or subtract from the number of three divine persons is to compromise an ultimately personalist view of reality, by making God identical with, or subordinate to, an impersonal context." I don't want to type up the whole section where Bosserman explains this, so hopefully a picture of the section will suffice.
> View attachment 6091 View attachment 6092
> 
> edit- I cant figure out how to upload a pic that reads full size. If someone wants to explain Ill re-upload the photos. maybe this will do https://www.evernote.com/shard/s439...d8259d8a0b44/fa3088165ad434ccad5a88b0dfa74f6d
> 
> https://www.evernote.com/shard/s439...41f4b1be89f2/a5411d0139c602f08fb0974d411c6294



A quadrinity leaves one person out concerning equal ultimacy, but it does account for personalism on a more basic level (with the other three). I admitted there are problems with quadrinism, but it can play the TAG game just as well


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> What's the source of the Bahnsen quote because I have his Van Til reader and internalism isn't found in the index at least? Also maybe I misunderstand but how can someone who affirms the use of evidences, within a framework, be strictly an internalist?



This might help. I tried to discuss these issues a few years ago with the Reconstructionist terrorist Bojidar Marinov. It didn't go well.
https://tentsofshem.wordpress.com/2016/04/04/internalismexternalism-notes/

Justification seeks the satisfaction of epistemic duty. Applied to the Van Tillian case, the person must fulfill an epistemic duty in order to have true knowledge; namely, the duty is to “establish the preconditions of intelligibility.” Further, since it involves the formation of a belief, it is _internal _(hence, internalism). Internalism also involves a view of cognitive accessibility (Plantinga 36), but this isn’t relevant to the above discussion.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> It's concerning what is knowledge. Bahnsen defines knowledge as justified, true belief. He doesn't use the term "Internalism," but that's what it is in the textbooks on epistemology.


Yeah I looked up internalism on the web. Yes Bahnsen does use justified true belief. His PhD was in epistemology. Thanks. I'll ponder this, although reading about the subject, my opinion, is it seems to me that the whole debate is one of emphasis. The justifiers for knowledge vs the process of obtaining knowledge. Thanks though.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> This might help. I tried to discuss these issues a few years ago with the Reconstructionist terrorist Bojidar Marinov. It didn't go well.
> https://tentsofshem.wordpress.com/2016/04/04/internalismexternalism-notes/
> 
> Justification seeks the satisfaction of epistemic duty. Applied to the Van Tillian case, the person must fulfill an epistemic duty in order to have true knowledge; namely, the duty is to “establish the preconditions of intelligibility.” Further, since it involves the formation of a belief, it is _internal _(hence, internalism). Internalism also involves a view of cognitive accessibility (Plantinga 36), but this isn’t relevant to the above discussion.


Yes but Van Til used his apologetic as a method. I agree with you that he's an internalist of sorts. But within the context of his "whole" thought, I'm not sure the term completely applies. But I see your point. And thanks for the links.


----------



## Goodcheer68

BayouHuguenot said:


> I admitted there are problems with quadrinism, but it can play the TAG game just as well



I thought TAG needed an enclosed system?


----------



## RamistThomist

Goodcheer68 said:


> I thought TAG needed an enclosed system?



Transcendental arguments in general usually don't need a system. TAG likes to say it comes pre-packaged, but I know a number of EO and RCC guys who use TAG quite effectively. TAG proves theism, maybe Trinitarianism.


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> Bahnsen defined knowledge as justified, true belief (Van Til Reader, p. 178). Bahnsen is still working within the parameters of epistemic internalism, whereas Plantinga is an externalist.



So I decided to dig a little into this and will share the archaeology here. I own the Van Til Reader book and a number of Plantinga's works, but do not really have time to go through the Plantinga books, so I'll simply quote from Wikipedia:

"Alvin Plantinga's Reformed epistemology includes two arguments against classical foundationalism. The first grew out of his earlier argument in _God and Other Minds_ (1967). In that work Plantinga argued that if our belief in other minds is rational without propositional or physical evidence, then belief in God is also rational. In his 1993 works, Plantinga argued that according to classical foundationalism most of us are irrational for having many beliefs we cannot justify, but which foundationalism does not accept as properly basic. Plantinga's second argument against classical foundationalism is that it is self-referentially incoherent. It fails the test of its own rules, which require that it be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses.

*In Plantinga's view, warrant is defined as the property of beliefs that makes them knowledge. Plantinga argues that a properly basic belief in God is warranted when produced by a sound mind, in an environment supportive of proper thought in accord with a design plan successfully aimed at truth.*[10] Because there is an epistemically possible model according to which theistic belief is properly basic and designed to form true belief in God, belief in God is probably warranted if theism is true. Plantinga does not argue that this model is true, but only that _if_ it is true, theistic belief is also likely true, because then theistic belief would result from our belief-forming faculties functioning as they were designed.

This connection between the truth value of theism and its positive epistemic status suggests to some that the goal of showing theistic belief to be externally warranted requires reasons for supposing that theism is true (Sudduth, 2000). This point is answered by many theistic arguments which purport to provide sufficient propositional and physical evidence to warrant that belief, apart from reformed epistemology."​By contrast a quote by Bahnsen with context from Van Til Reader p.178:

“Beliefs that are arbitrarily adopted or based upon faulty grounds, even when they turn out to be true, do not qualify as instances of “knowledge.”

What is the additional ingredient, besides being correct, that a belief must have in order to count as knowledge? It must be substantiated, supported, or justified by evidence. Knowledge is true belief held on adequate grounds, rather than held fallaciously or haphazardly. To put it traditionally, knowledge is justified, true belief.

It should be noted here that by “justified” we mean that the person actually has sound reasons (good evidence), not simply that he thinks his evidence is good or sufficient in light of the pool of information available to him.” Greg Bahnsen, _Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis P.178_​
Another quote by Bahnsen from the article "The Heart of the Matter" (also in the book "Always Ready") subsection "Knowing and Believing":

"Christians are often called "believers," while non-Christians are termed "unbelievers." Scripture itself speaks this way: we read that "believers were the more added to the Lord" (Acts 5:14), and that they should not be "unequally yoked together with unbelievers" (2 Cor. 6:14). There is obviously two classes of people distinguished by whether they believe or not. It can rightly be said that what separates Christians from non-Christians is the matter of faith.

Christians believe certain things which non-Christians do not. Christians believe the claims of Christ and the teachings of the Bible to be true, but non-Christians disbelieve them. Christians have faith in Christ and trust His promises; non-Christians do not believe in Him and doubt His word. It is quite natural, then, that the gospel can be called "the word of faith" (Rom. 10:8). Becoming a Christian entails that you "believe in your heart that God raised Him [Christ] from the dead" (v. 9); likewise, "he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is the rewarder of them who diligently seek Him" (Heb. 11:6). Examples could be multiplied. What sets Christians off from non-Christians is the matter of belief or faith.

However, the difference between them is more than that in an important sense, and we need to understand this if we are going to do a faithful job in defending the faith. The Christian claims to "believe" the teachings of Scripture or to have "faith" in the person of Christ [1] because the element of trust is so prominent in our relationship with the Savior. But the Christian actually claims more than simply to believe Christ's claims to be true. The Christian also affirms that he or she "knows" those claims to be true. What is involved in saving faith is more than hope (although that is present) and more than a commitment of will (although that too is present). Job confidently asserted, "I know my Redeemer lives" (Job 19:25). John indicated that he wrote his first epistle so that those "who believe on the name of the Son of God" "may know that you have eternal life" (1 John 5:13). Paul declared that God "has furnished proof" that Jesus will judge the world (Acts 17:31). Jesus promised His disciples that they would "know the truth, and the truth shall set you free" (John 8:32).

In what way does knowledge go beyond belief? Knowledge includes having justification or good reason to support whatever it is you believe. Imagine that I believe there are thirty-seven square miles in a particular city, and imagine also that it just so happens that this claim is accurate - but imagine as well that I simply got this answer by guessing (rather than doing measurements, mathematics or checking an almanac, etc.). I believed something which happened to be true, but we would not say that I had "knowledge" in this case because I had no justification for what I believed. When we claim to know that something is true, we are thereby claiming to have adequate evidence, proof or good reason for it.

The difference between the Christian and the non-Christian is not simply that one believes the Bible and the other does not. People's beliefs can be frivolous, random, or silly. The Christian also claims that there is justification for believing what the Bible says. The non-Christian says, to the contrary, that there is no justification (or adequate justification) for believing the Bible's claims - or, in stronger cases, says that there is justification for disbelieving the Bible's claims. Apologetics amounts to an inquiry into and debate over who is correct on this matter. It involves giving reasons, offering refutations, and answering objections." Bahnsen, Greg PA099 _The Biblical Worldview_ (VII:1; Jan., 1991) (Available in the book: _Always Ready_ PA600)​
In short response to the Wikipedia entry, none of the writers of Scripture, penned Scripture with the mindset of "if" God exists or He "probably" or "likely" exists, and neither Van Til nor Greg Bahnsen taught apologetics with a doubters mindset of "if" or probably as properly basic. Dr. Bahnsen made no mention of internalism/externalism in the referenced work, and the context of justified is sound reasons or good evidence not arbitrary belief.


----------



## Apologist4Him

jwright82 said:


> What's the source of the Bahnsen quote because I have his Van Til reader and internalism isn't found in the index at least? Also maybe I misunderstand but how can someone who affirms the use of evidences, within a framework, be strictly an internalist?



I also searched the index and confirmed, also quoted from the page 178 to provide important context. And good question.


----------



## TylerRay

Goodcheer68 said:


> Bosserman disagrees. He says on page 181 of The Trinity and Vindication of Christian Paradox that to "add or subtract from the number of three divine persons is to compromise an ultimately personalist view of reality, by making God identical with, or subordinate to, an impersonal context." I don't want to type up the whole section where Bosserman explains this, so hopefully a picture of the section will suffice.
> View attachment 6091 View attachment 6092
> 
> edit- I cant figure out how to upload a pic that reads full size. If someone wants to explain Ill re-upload the photos. maybe this will do https://www.evernote.com/shard/s439...d8259d8a0b44/fa3088165ad434ccad5a88b0dfa74f6d
> 
> https://www.evernote.com/shard/s439...41f4b1be89f2/a5411d0139c602f08fb0974d411c6294


I thought of this when I was reading over this thread yesterday. The interesting thing is that if Bosserman is right, he's effectively shown that someone _can _reason to the doctrine of the Trinity.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> In short response to the Wikipedia entry, none of the writers of Scripture, penned Scripture with the mindset of "if" God exists or He "probably" or "likely" exists, and neither Van Til nor Greg Bahnsen taught apologetics with a doubters mindset of "if" or probably as properly basic. Dr. Bahnsen made no mention of internalism/externalism in the referenced work, and the context of justified is sound reasons or good evidence not arbitrary belief.



None of that has anything to do with what I said. Internalism is another way to say justified, true belief. It's internal in the sense that my mind has to account for justification of knowledge, meeting conditions, etc. This is in every epistemology textbook. Bahnsen didn't use the term "internalism" because at that time people were calling it "K=JTB"


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> None of that has anything to do with what I said. Internalism is another way to say justified, true belief. It's internal in the sense that my mind has to account for justification of knowledge, meeting conditions, etc. This is in every epistemology textbook. Bahnsen didn't use the term "internalism" because at that time people were calling it "K=JTB"



Yes I understand, I also understand Plantinga is an internalist, for it is he who must do the properly basic believing with his mind.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> Yes I understand, I also understand Plantinga is an internalist, for it is he who must do the properly basic believing with his mind.



Plantinga wrote a trilogy attacking the concept of internalism. He is the most famous exponent of Gettier's problem today. He is an externalist. No one in the field of philosophy today claims he is an internalist. 

As he noted in _Warrant, the Current Debate
_
I do not have to have some internal access to truth-making functions. Plantinga lists Aristotle (de Anima and Posterior Analytics II) and Aquinas (ST 1 q. 84, 85) as externalists (183ff). Externalism is correct about warrant (if only as a denial of internalism). 

He is an externalist in the sense that if my cognitive faculties are properly functioning, I don't have to meet criteria upon criteria to justify a belief. As he noted in _Warrant and Proper Function
_
In the nature of the case we do not have basic beliefs about these three entities in the sense that evidentialism and classic foundationalism require (especially memory and testimony; solipsism has a host of problems beyond this). 

If a belief is formed in proper circumstances according to its proper cognitive design, it has warrant. Of course, it can be subject to defeaters, but that is a different problem.


----------



## jwright82

Well to look at Van Til as offering anything other than a method is faulty. Yes Bahnsen uses the phrase JTB to describe Van Tils method but to label him as strictly an internalist is missing his work on evidences. I love Plantinga, but as a method I find Van Til better.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Well to look at Van Til as offering anything other than a method is faulty. Yes Bahnsen uses the phrase JTB to describe Van Tils method but to label him as strictly an internalist is missing his work on evidences. I love Plantinga, but as a method I find Van Til better.



If you want to use "preconditions of intelligibility" on the streets, go for it. But if Van Tillians depend on internalism as part of their method (and they do, given the line about "accounting" for your knowledge), then it is open to all the Gettier defeaters.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> If you want to use "preconditions of intelligibility" on the streets, go for it. But if Van Tillians depend on internalism as part of their method (and they do, given the line about "accounting" for your knowledge), then it is open to all the Gettier defeaters.


What defeaters? Plus Strawson gave transcendental arguments a good logical form. They have been revived you might say. Are you suggesting there are no preconditions of intelligibility? Plus you haven't proven that Van Til is a strict internalist. His work on evidences speak for itself. Thanks for the articles they are nice.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> What defeaters?



Gettier's Defeaters that show that the claim that knowledge = justified, true belief is inadequate. Not wrong, but just inadequate:

For example, I look at a field in the early morning fog and see what I think is a sheep. As it happens, it wasn’t a sheep but a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Unbeknownst to me, there was indeed a sheep in the field behind the wolf. Technically, I was correct. I saw something in the field that I thought was a sheep. It was true belief and I was justified in holding it, yet it wasn’t knowledge (Plantinga 32)



jwright82 said:


> Are you suggesting there are no preconditions of intelligibility



It's an issue that no one outside the Idealist tradition worries about. There might be preconditions of intelligibility, but I am more concerned with belief-formations in the mind.



jwright82 said:


> Plus you haven't proven that Van Til is a strict internalist.



Yes, I have. Numerous times.


jwright82 said:


> His work on evidences speak for itself



His work on evidences isn't really germane to the subject. You can find people within both internalist and externalist camps that either reject or use evidences.

Externalism doesn't mean "using evidences" in the popular apologetics sense.


----------



## jwright82

Well I think it is well documented that neither Van Til nor I am an idealist. Where did you show that Van Til was an internalist? I'll be embarrassed if it was those links you gave me, I've been jumping through hoops for this manager job (it's not been easy so sorry). I don't see how the idea of "preconditions" is irrelevant? Strawson has done work in this area, transcendental arguments in all. Evidences at least prove Van Til wasn't a complete internalist.

Reactions: Amen 1


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Well I think it is well documented that neither Van Til nor I am an idealist.



He's not, strictly speaking. He did write his dissertation on the Idealist tradition, and he employs (often successfully) many idealist concepts (e.g., "concrete universal").


jwright82 said:


> Where did you show that Van Til was an internalist?



My mistake. Bahnsen is an internalist. I'll have to look up where CVT dealt, if at all, with JTB.


jwright82 said:


> I don't see how the idea of "preconditions" is irrelevant?



It works with strict empiricists or strict monists. I've used it before in those situations.


----------



## jwright82

Well his dissertation was against idealism. But yes he did employ the vocabulary of idealism (we all employ the philosophical vocabulary of the day).

He and I are not "strict" monists or empericests. But I will concede that Bahnsen and I guess I am an internalist. But I regect the distinction as irrelevant. So I think it holds no weight. 

Also I don't see why preconditions aren't legitimate? I will read those links once I can. Why is JTB a bad thing? Good discussion though!

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> He and I are not "strict" monists or empericests.



Of course you aren't. You are a Christian. My point was that the Van tillian approach works well against strict monists and empiricists.


jwright82 said:


> Also I don't see why preconditions aren't legitimate?



They aren't illegitimate. They are just inadequate. The problem with JTB isn't that it is wrong, but even if you can account for justified true belief, there are still situations where you wouldn't have knowledge.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> Plantinga wrote a trilogy attacking the concept of internalism. He is the most famous exponent of Gettier's problem today. He is an externalist. No one in the field of philosophy today claims he is an internalist.
> 
> As he noted in _Warrant, the Current Debate
> _
> I do not have to have some internal access to truth-making functions. Plantinga lists Aristotle (de Anima and Posterior Analytics II) and Aquinas (ST 1 q. 84, 85) as externalists (183ff). Externalism is correct about warrant (if only as a denial of internalism).
> 
> He is an externalist in the sense that if my cognitive faculties are properly functioning, I don't have to meet criteria upon criteria to justify a belief. As he noted in _Warrant and Proper Function
> _
> In the nature of the case we do not have basic beliefs about these three entities in the sense that evidentialism and classic foundationalism require (especially memory and testimony; solipsism has a host of problems beyond this).
> 
> If a belief is formed in proper circumstances according to its proper cognitive design, it has warrant. Of course, it can be subject to defeaters, but that is a different problem.



My point is, I do not think Plantinga is _consistently_ an externalist (not that he claimed to be an internalist). As a related aside, Aristotle is also known for his concept of tabula rasa, and I am unclear how such a view of knowledge squares away with the doctrine of original sin... Moving on, as for Bahnsen and Van Til and externalism, first a quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"*Externalism in the philosophy of mind contends that the meaning or content of a thought[1] is partly determined by the environment.* The view has garnered attention since it denies the traditional assumption, associated with Descartes, that thought content is fixed independently of the external world. Apparently under this assumption, Descartes also believed that he could know the content of his thoughts while suspending all judgment about his environs. (Indeed, such knowledge was thought indubitable.) Yet if externalism is correct, this may well be a mistake. As we shall see, externalism can suggest that Descartes is unable to know that his own thought represents, say, elm trees (vs. beech trees) without knowing that it is _elms_ (and not beeches) that the thought is connected to in the world. But if such worldly knowledge is a prerequisite, then Descartes could not know the content of this thought just “from the armchair,” so to speak. So there seems to be a conflict between externalism and such armchair knowledge of one’s own thought contents (for short: “armchair self-knowledge”). The question whether this conflict is real is what drives the contemporary debate on externalism and self-knowledge.

Officially, we can put the issue in terms of an apparent tension between the following:

(EXT) Thought content is determined partly by the environment.[2]
(SK) A subject can know from the armchair what content her thoughts have.[3]
The issue is that EXT seemingly implies that knowing about content requires knowing about the environment. And since the latter is empirical, so too would be the former, contra SK.[4] Now it is usually thought that, if EXT is incompatible with SK, this would be a serious problem for EXT (though some think internalism also conflicts with SK; see McLaughlin & Tye 1998a, Farkas 2003, Bar-On 2006, p. 434). Yet some think the incompatibility threatens SK instead of EXT (see section2.4). Regardless, the interest in the debate goes beyond EXT, for it pertains to many central concerns of philosophers, such as the nature of knowledge and the relation between mind and world. The debate also touches on more specialized topics, including memory, concept acquisition, epistemic responsibility, and transcendental arguments.

*In the standard terminology, the dispute is between incompatibilists who affirm the conflict between EXT and SK, and compatibilists who deny it*." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​
I think both Van Til and Bahnsen would fall into the *compatibilist* category. At this point, I'd like to quote Van Til from his short work "Why I Believe in God":

"*On the other hand by my belief in God I do have unity in my experience. Not of course the sort of unity that you want. Not a unity that is the result of my own autonomous determination of what is possible. But a unity that is higher than mine and prior to mine*.* On the basis of God’s counsel I can look for facts and find them without destroying them in advance.* On the basis of God’s counsel I can be a good physicist, a good biologist, a good psychologist, or a good philosopher. In all these fields I use my powers of logical arrangement in order to see as much order in God’s universe as it may be given a creature to see. The unities, or systems, that I make are true because they are genuine pointers toward the basic or original unity that is found in the counsel of God.

Looking about me I see both order and disorder in every dimension of life. But I look at both of them in the light of the Great Orderer who is back of them. I need not deny either of them in the interest of optimism or in the interest of pessimism. I see the strong men of biology searching diligently through hill and dale to prove that the creation doctrine is not true with respect to the human body, only to return and admit that the missing link is missing still. I see the strong men of psychology search deep and far into the subconsciousness, child and animal consciousness, in order to prove that the creation and providence doctrines are not true with respect to the human soul, only to return and admit that the gulf between human and animal intelligence is as great as ever. I see the strong men of logic and scientific methodology search deep into the transcendental for a validity that will not be swept away by the ever-changing tide of the wholly new, only to return and say that they can find no bridge from logic to reality, or from reality to logic. And yet I find all these, though standing on their heads, reporting much that is true. I need only to turn their reports right side up, making God instead of man the center of it all, and I have a marvelous display of the facts as God has intended me to see them.

And if my unity is comprehensive enough to include the efforts of those who reject it, it is large enough even to include that which those who have been set upright by regeneration cannot see. My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through the woods. The child is not afraid because its father knows it all and is capable of handling every situation, So I readily grant that there are some “difficulties” with respect to belief in God and His revelation in nature and Scripture that I cannot solve. In fact there is mystery in every relationship with respect to every fact that faces me, *for the reason that all facts have their final explanation in God whose thoughts are higher than my thoughts*, and whose ways are higher than my ways. And it is exactly that sort of God that I need. Without such a God, without the God of the Bible, the God of authority, the God who is self-contained and therefore incomprehensible to men, there would be no reason in anything. No human being can explain in the sense of seeing through all things, but only he who believes in God has the right to hold that there is an explanation at all.

So you see when I was young I was conditioned on every side; I could not help believing in God. Now that I am older I still cannot help believing in God.* I believe in God now because unless I have Him as the All-Conditioner, life is chaos.*" Van Til, Why I Believe God​Read the first sentence again from the Standford entry and tell me all-conditioning does not involve partial determination by environment. But just to be clear let me quote on last time from the same writing by Van Til:

"Shall we say then that in my early life I was conditioned to believe in God, while you were left free to develop your own judgment as you pleased? But that will hardly do. *You know as well as I that every child is conditioned by his environment.*"​
Over and over throughout this discussion you have insisted Bahnsen and Van Til were strict internalists, but the quotes speak for themselves contrary to your claims. Both were epistemological compatiblists.


----------



## RamistThomist

I think you are misunderstanding what internalism is about. One can hold internalism and also hold that a person is conditioned by his environment. That's not what's being discussed. If you hold to justified true belief, you are an internalist. That's all. 

Externalism simply means if my cognitive faculties are properly working and producing reliable beliefs.



Apologist4Him said:


> My point is, I do not think Plantinga is _consistently_ an externalist (not that he claimed to be an internalist). As a related aside, Aristotle is also known for his concept of tabula rasa, and I am unclear how such a view of knowledge squares away with the doctrine of original sin... Moving on, as for Bahnsen and Van Til and externalism, first a quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
> 
> "*Externalism in the philosophy of mind contends that the meaning or content of a thought[1] is partly determined by the environment.* The view has garnered attention since it denies the traditional assumption, associated with Descartes, that thought content is fixed independently of the external world. Apparently under this assumption, Descartes also believed that he could know the content of his thoughts while suspending all judgment about his environs. (Indeed, such knowledge was thought indubitable.) Yet if externalism is correct, this may well be a mistake. As we shall see, externalism can suggest that Descartes is unable to know that his own thought represents, say, elm trees (vs. beech trees) without knowing that it is _elms_ (and not beeches) that the thought is connected to in the world. But if such worldly knowledge is a prerequisite, then Descartes could not know the content of this thought just “from the armchair,” so to speak. So there seems to be a conflict between externalism and such armchair knowledge of one’s own thought contents (for short: “armchair self-knowledge”). The question whether this conflict is real is what drives the contemporary debate on externalism and self-knowledge.
> 
> Officially, we can put the issue in terms of an apparent tension between the following:
> 
> (EXT) Thought content is determined partly by the environment.[2]
> (SK) A subject can know from the armchair what content her thoughts have.[3]
> The issue is that EXT seemingly implies that knowing about content requires knowing about the environment. And since the latter is empirical, so too would be the former, contra SK.[4] Now it is usually thought that, if EXT is incompatible with SK, this would be a serious problem for EXT (though some think internalism also conflicts with SK; see McLaughlin & Tye 1998a, Farkas 2003, Bar-On 2006, p. 434). Yet some think the incompatibility threatens SK instead of EXT (see section2.4). Regardless, the interest in the debate goes beyond EXT, for it pertains to many central concerns of philosophers, such as the nature of knowledge and the relation between mind and world. The debate also touches on more specialized topics, including memory, concept acquisition, epistemic responsibility, and transcendental arguments.
> 
> *In the standard terminology, the dispute is between incompatibilists who affirm the conflict between EXT and SK, and compatibilists who deny it*." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy​
> I think both Van Til and Bahnsen would fall into the *compatibilist* category. At this point, I'd like to quote Van Til from his short work "Why I Believe in God":
> 
> "*On the other hand by my belief in God I do have unity in my experience. Not of course the sort of unity that you want. Not a unity that is the result of my own autonomous determination of what is possible. But a unity that is higher than mine and prior to mine*.* On the basis of God’s counsel I can look for facts and find them without destroying them in advance.* On the basis of God’s counsel I can be a good physicist, a good biologist, a good psychologist, or a good philosopher. In all these fields I use my powers of logical arrangement in order to see as much order in God’s universe as it may be given a creature to see. The unities, or systems, that I make are true because they are genuine pointers toward the basic or original unity that is found in the counsel of God.
> 
> Looking about me I see both order and disorder in every dimension of life. But I look at both of them in the light of the Great Orderer who is back of them. I need not deny either of them in the interest of optimism or in the interest of pessimism. I see the strong men of biology searching diligently through hill and dale to prove that the creation doctrine is not true with respect to the human body, only to return and admit that the missing link is missing still. I see the strong men of psychology search deep and far into the subconsciousness, child and animal consciousness, in order to prove that the creation and providence doctrines are not true with respect to the human soul, only to return and admit that the gulf between human and animal intelligence is as great as ever. I see the strong men of logic and scientific methodology search deep into the transcendental for a validity that will not be swept away by the ever-changing tide of the wholly new, only to return and say that they can find no bridge from logic to reality, or from reality to logic. And yet I find all these, though standing on their heads, reporting much that is true. I need only to turn their reports right side up, making God instead of man the center of it all, and I have a marvelous display of the facts as God has intended me to see them.
> 
> And if my unity is comprehensive enough to include the efforts of those who reject it, it is large enough even to include that which those who have been set upright by regeneration cannot see. My unity is that of a child who walks with its father through the woods. The child is not afraid because its father knows it all and is capable of handling every situation, So I readily grant that there are some “difficulties” with respect to belief in God and His revelation in nature and Scripture that I cannot solve. In fact there is mystery in every relationship with respect to every fact that faces me, *for the reason that all facts have their final explanation in God whose thoughts are higher than my thoughts*, and whose ways are higher than my ways. And it is exactly that sort of God that I need. Without such a God, without the God of the Bible, the God of authority, the God who is self-contained and therefore incomprehensible to men, there would be no reason in anything. No human being can explain in the sense of seeing through all things, but only he who believes in God has the right to hold that there is an explanation at all.
> 
> So you see when I was young I was conditioned on every side; I could not help believing in God. Now that I am older I still cannot help believing in God.* I believe in God now because unless I have Him as the All-Conditioner, life is chaos.*" Van Til, Why I Believe God​Read the first sentence again from the Standford entry and tell me all-conditioning does not involve partial determination by environment. But just to be clear let me quote on last time from the same writing by Van Til:
> 
> "Shall we say then that in my early life I was conditioned to believe in God, while you were left free to develop your own judgment as you pleased? But that will hardly do. *You know as well as I that every child is conditioned by his environment.*"​
> Over and over throughout this discussion you have insisted Bahnsen and Van Til were strict internalists, but the quotes speak for themselves contrary to your claims. Both were epistemological compatiblists.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Of course you aren't. You are a Christian. My point was that the Van tillian approach works well against strict monists and empiricists.
> 
> 
> They aren't illegitimate. They are just inadequate. The problem with JTB isn't that it is wrong, but even if you can account for justified true belief, there are still situations where you wouldn't have knowledge.


Ok, sorry for assuming. My apologies. What about my position is inadequate? As a method it seems quite adequate. Plus Plantinga's is quite useful as well.

Reactions: Amen 1


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> I think you are misunderstanding what internalism is about. One can hold internalism and also hold that a person is conditioned by his environment. That's not what's being discussed. If you hold to justified true belief, you are an internalist. That's all.
> 
> Externalism simply means if my cognitive faculties are properly working and producing reliable beliefs.


It still seems the difference is one of emphasis not one of substance. Proccess vs justification is semantically one of emphasis.

Reactions: Edifying 1


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Ok, sorry for assuming. My apologies. What about my position is inadequate? As a method it seems quite adequate. Plus Plantinga's is quite useful as well.



It's only inadequate when presups start saying, "Well, how can you account for knowledge?" If the person is a pure disciple of Hume, that's a valid question. Most people aren't, and if someone knows his epistemology, he can turn the question around with a number of Gettier defeaters (which I listed above).


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> It's only inadequate when presups start saying, "Well, how can you account for knowledge?" If the person is a pure disciple of Hume, that's a valid question. Most people aren't, and if someone knows his epistemology, he can turn the question around with a number of Gettier defeaters (which I listed above).


Well I didn't go the knowledge route. But I do maintain that it is through a trancedental argument that we can account for everything in experience.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> It's only inadequate when presups start saying, "Well, how can you account for knowledge?" If the person is a pure disciple of Hume, that's a valid question. Most people aren't, and if someone knows his epistemology, he can turn the question around with a number of Gettier defeaters (which I listed above).


I don't believe I've gone the knowledge route. Only tried to argue anything and everything can't make sense outside of the Christian faith. Sure unbelievers can reason well. But ultimately they will fall short of any sort explanation. They can explain many things but as far as a "total" explination, no.
Think about it this, since Christian theism is true it stands to reason that only Christianity can account for totality of things we experience.

Reactions: Amen 1


----------



## jwright82

Unless your autonomous knowledge that doesn't fit within Christian theism. God is Lord of all, every fact points to him, unless you believe there are autonomous facts out there that need no ultimate explanation. That makes God irrelevant to our situation because we do without him and be just fine.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Only tried to argue anything and everything can't make sense outside of the Christian faith.



Depends on how you gloss "make sense out of." If you mean, given an account of their presuppositions concerning causality et al, there might be something to that. I'm not as persuaded on the stronger form of the argument, that you have to have Trinitarian theism to make it work. I think that is true, but the arguments for it aren't sufficient.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Well I didn't go the knowledge route. But I do maintain that it is through a trancedental argument that we can account for everything in experience.



But wouldn't "make sense out of the world" involve knowledge?


----------



## jwright82

Yes. If i implied there's no knowledge involved I apologize. There most definitely is. The question on the level of pressupossiton it may not be conscious recognition of it but still there acting on our thinking. I don't know what you think of postmodernism but they have worked this out too, to sometimes bad ends (maybe often?). 

Making sense out of the world is a totality of things. I would include Plantinga's work there. But there's more going on than that, it's deeper. I think two good supplements to Van Til are Plantinga and James KA smiths work because i think they can probe the more intricate nature of what's going on in general (or specific) they are not completely combatible but are nice avenues. 
"Make sense out of" I believe came from Idealist thought.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> it may not be conscious recognition of it but still there acting on our thinking.



Everyone acknowledges this, given the importance of Michael Polanyi's works. Even classical apologists like JP Moreland write books advocating the above.


jwright82 said:


> I don't know what you think of postmodernism but they have worked this out too, to sometimes bad ends (maybe often?).



With the exception of Foucault, I have read all of the major Postmodern authors. Derrida simply argues that there is no pure text, but outside of John Locke and I can't think of anyone who actually says there is.


jwright82 said:


> James KA smiths work because i think they can probe the more intricate nature of what's going on in general



Smith is good on cultural liturgies and the early critiques of Radical Orthodoxy. He has long since jumped the ship, being NPR's token apologist. He doesn't really understand, or at least he doesn't communicate that he understands, what analytic theology is really getting at.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Depends on how you gloss "make sense out of." If you mean, given an account of their presuppositions concerning causality et al, there might be something to that. I'm not as persuaded on the stronger form of the argument, that you have to have Trinitarian theism to make it work. I think that is true, but the arguments for it aren't sufficient.


What stronger form of the argument? That we must presuppose the Trinitarian Christian theistic worldview in totality to make sense out of the world? As an argument yeah this is rubbish. I tend to think that Van Til meant this statement as a methodolical one. That in our method we presuppose the entirety of Christian worldview when engaging the unbeliever, but in our actual arguments of course we don't say every time, whatever the issue is, "you must presuppose Christian theism as a whole propositionaly" to make sense out science or ethics. That's not what Van Til meant. For instance he used the trinity as a doctrine to try to solve the one and the many problem in philosophy. So he used one major doctrine to "solve" one major problem as a method.
I think also you are glossing over the theological point. Do you think there are truths out there that would be true or false regardless of whether or not Christianity was true? That's a trick question, of course not we know that only Christianity can and is true. So there cannot in principle be any truths that do not have their truthvalue apart from Christian theism being actually true. There is no other world that we exist in.


----------



## TylerRay

jwright82 said:


> Do you think there are truths out there that would be true or false regardless of whether or not Christianity was true? That's a trick question, of course not we know that only Christianity can and is true. So there cannot in principle be any truths that do not have their truthvalue apart from Christian theism being actually true. There is no other world that we exist in.


If I may, I'll jump in briefly, simply because I think Jacob's point is being missed.

Jacob is saying that it is possible to know something without accounting for it within a system of belief. Anyone whose mind and senses are functioning normally has sufficient warrant to know, for instance, that he's sitting in a chair, or that his shirt is green. He doesn't have to reason to ultimate reality in order to truly know these things.

Jacob is free to correct me if I'm misrepresenting him.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Everyone acknowledges this, given the importance of Michael Polanyi's works. Even classical apologists like JP Moreland write books advocating the above.
> 
> 
> With the exception of Foucault, I have read all of the major Postmodern authors. Derrida simply argues that there is no pure text, but outside of John Locke and I can't think of anyone who actually says there is.
> 
> 
> Smith is good on cultural liturgies and the early critiques of Radical Orthodoxy. He has long since jumped the ship, being NPR's token apologist. He doesn't really understand, or at least he doesn't communicate that he understands, what analytic theology is really getting at.


Well as far as Foucalt goes the only interesting thing is his analysis of power structures in society. He sort of stops asking things like, not completly, what is the best way to cure madness (the other) to why are even trying to do it to begin with? Of course he's not advocating letting them roam free only pointing out various historical ways that we viewed and based on that view treated the mentally ill.
I think there is more to Derrida but yeah your right. My point is that yes everyone has come to see the importance of pressupossitons.

Smith simply pointed out the guttural nature of our presuppositions, even though he wouldn't call it that. But it is an interesting caveat to the idea of pressupossiton. 
It is Van Tim's use of the transcendental argument with regard to analyzing presuppositions that was somewhat unique.


----------



## jwright82

TylerRay said:


> If I may, I'll jump in briefly, simply because I think Jacob's point is being missed.
> 
> Jacob is saying that it is possible to know something without accounting for it within a system of belief. Anyone whose mind and senses are functioning normally has sufficient warrant to know, for instance, that he's sitting in a chair, or that his shirt is green. He doesn't have to reason to ultimate reality in order to truly know these things.
> 
> Jacob is free to correct me if I'm misrepresenting him.


I completely agree, if it's simply warrant we're talking about for certain types of beliefs. I completely agree. When I was I married and someone could have asked me to prove that my wife at the time wasn't cheating on me because after all im not with her a 100% of time? I would have simply asked "can you give some reason to doubt that"? If no than i have complete warrant to not believe the statement. That fine and true but the warrant system can't work for all questions, like in what world (Christian, Muslim, Buddhist) does warrant epistemology even make sense? 
This is the one gotcha trick of Van Til. We know Christian theism to be true therefore everything is as it is because it's true. I don't know how a critic of Van Til, not saying that he or you are, could possibly object to that? The rest of his method builds upon that truth.


----------



## TylerRay

jwright82 said:


> I completely agree, if it's simply warrant we're talking about for certain types of beliefs. I completely agree. When I was I married and someone could have asked me to prove that my wife at the time wasn't cheating on me because after all im not with her a 100% of time? I would have simply asked "can you give some reason to doubt that"? If no than i have complete warrant to not believe the statement. That fine and true but the warrant system can't work for all questions, like in what world (Christian, Muslim, Buddhist) does warrant epistemology even make sense?
> This is the one gotcha trick of Van Til. We know Christian theism to be true therefore everything is as it is because it's true. I don't know how a critic of Van Til, not saying that he or you are, could possibly object to that? The rest of his method builds upon that truth.


I agree that only the Christian system can account for all facts. However, accounting for facts and knowing facts are not the same thing. Van Tillian epistemology says that they are the same thing ("How do you know that?" "You can't know that.").


----------



## jwright82

TylerRay said:


> I agree that only the Christian system can account for all facts. However, accounting for facts and knowing facts are not the same thing. Van Tillian epistemology says that they are the same thing ("How do you know that?" "You can't know that.").


Sort of. Remember Van Til us proposing a method of doing apologetics. That is of providing a rational defense of the faith. My point about the truth of Christian theism is a first step in building a method of apologetics. 
About warrant. Sure warrant by itself is adequite for certain types of knowledge. But it is not without its pressupossiton. For instance can a rock have proper function? No obviously not. So a presupposition of proper function warrant is that we are talking about rational beings capable of proper function. You might say so what? True but as an apologetical method you can press the unbeliever to account for their ability to have proper function in the first place. It is legitimate.


----------



## TylerRay

jwright82 said:


> Sort of. Remember Van Til us proposing a method of doing apologetics. That is of providing a rational defense of the faith. My point about the truth of Christian theism is a first step in building a method of apologetics.
> About warrant. Sure warrant by itself is adequite for certain types of knowledge. But it is not without its pressupossiton. For instance can a rock have proper function? No obviously not. So a presupposition of proper function warrant is that we are talking about rational beings capable of proper function. You might say so what? True but as an apologetical method you can press the unbeliever to account for their ability to have proper function in the first place. It is legitimate.


Van Til is not merely positing an apologetic. He's also positing an epistemology, correct? The two are related but distinct. Van Til categorically rejected Scottish common sense realism, which is essentially proper function epistemology.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> For instance can a rock have proper function? No obviously not. So a presupposition of proper function warrant is that we are talking about rational beings capable of proper function.



It goes back to Aristotle's teleology. What is the proper telos for a rock (or whatever)? So yes, a rock does have a proper function (if a somewhat underwhelming one).


----------



## jwright82

TylerRay said:


> Van Til is not merely positing an apologetic. He's also positing an epistemology, correct? The two are related but distinct. Van Til categorically rejected Scottish common sense realism, which is essentially proper function epistemology.


Yes but all within the context of an apologetical method. Yes there is an epistemology and I don't see an essential problem with mixing Plantinga and Van Til, an awkward. I don't see them as mutually exclusive just different.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> It goes back to Aristotle's teleology. What is the proper telos for a rock (or whatever)? So yes, a rock does have a proper function (if a somewhat underwhelming one).


I meant proper function in an epistemological sense. The point being is that any epistemology presupposes certain things to be true just to work.


----------



## TylerRay

jwright82 said:


> I meant proper function in an epistemological sense. The point being is that any epistemology presupposes certain things to be true just to work.


'Proper function' in the epistemological sense relates to the proper function of our epistemological equipment. Clearly, rocks have no epistemological equipment (intellect, senses, etc.). That's what I understood you to be saying. The reliability of properly functioning epistemological equipment is self-evident; we can't know anything any other way.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I meant proper function in an epistemological sense. The point being is that any epistemology presupposes certain things to be true just to work.



Of course. Just because a system uses "presuppositions" doesn't mean it is presuppositional or that it ought to be. Moreland and Craig list at least ten things that science must presuppose, for example.

To say that we use presuppositions (e.g., reality of the external world) doesn't commit one to the Van tillian system.


----------



## jwright82

TylerRay said:


> 'Proper function' in the epistemological sense relates to the proper function of our epistemological equipment. Clearly, rocks have no epistemological equipment (intellect, senses, etc.). That's what I understood you to be saying. The reliability of properly functioning epistemological equipment is self-evident; we can't know anything any other way.


Sure. My point was in a logical sense proper functioning cognitive faculties presupposes a being that possess these. It couldn't be otherwise. My point is that no one can get away from pressupossiton, so why not use a method that roots out and critiques these pressupossiton? We can use Plantinga all day long, and I do. I just supplement him Van Til.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Of course. Just because a system uses "presuppositions" doesn't mean it is presuppositional or that it ought to be. Moreland and Craig list at least ten things that science must presuppose, for example.
> 
> To say that we use presuppositions (e.g., reality of the external world) doesn't commit one to the Van tillian system.


True by why not use method designed to root and critique these pressupossiton? Everyone agrees in pressupossiton, why can't there be a method to deal with that?


----------



## TylerRay

jwright82 said:


> Sure. My point was in a logical sense proper functioning cognitive faculties presupposes a being that possess these. It couldn't be otherwise. My point is that no one can get away from pressupossiton, so why not use a method that roots out and critiques these pressupossiton? We can use Plantinga all day long, and I do. I just supplement him Van Til.


Sure--what you're describing is basically foundationalism. Beliefs are founded upon (i.e, presuppose) other beliefs, until you get down to the foundation of properly basic beliefs--apart from which, beliefs are groundless. That's the traditional Scottish realist position (which Van Til eschewed).

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> why can't there be a method to deal with that?



Why does there need to be an architectonic method? Classical apologists, for example, have long noted that materialism can't account for numerous extra-mental realities.


----------



## jwright82

TylerRay said:


> Sure--what you're describing is basically foundationalism. Beliefs are founded upon (i.e, presuppose) other beliefs, until you get down to the foundation of properly basic beliefs--apart from which, beliefs are groundless. That's the traditional Scottish realist position (which Van Til eschewed).


Well foundationalsm, as I understand it has nothing to do, logically, with pressupossiton, different logical forms. But nether less different. 
As I understand it, I could be wrong, foundationalsm relies on basic beliefs to build an edifice on knowledge. Presuppositions function not so much as "basic beliefs" but as a center for the web of knowledge. Not a bottom up mentality but a inward to outward mentality. The inner being more sure than outer. I'll admit it sounds similar but I don't think it is. And logical forms prove that. Good comment.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Why does there need to be an architectonic method? Classical apologists, for example, have long noted that materialism can't account for numerous extra-mental realities.


Ultimate defeating. It's the logical form that matters.


----------



## TylerRay

jwright82 said:


> Well foundationalsm, as I understand it has nothing to do, logically, with pressupossiton, different logical forms. But nether less different.
> As I understand it, I could be wrong, foundationalsm relies on basic beliefs to build an edifice on knowledge. Presuppositions function not so much as "basic beliefs" but as a center for the web of knowledge. Not a bottom up mentality but a inward to outward mentality. The inner being more sure than outer. I'll admit it sounds similar but I don't think it is. And logical forms prove that. Good comment.


I'm not sure I understand. Can you please explain the 'logical forms' part?


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Presuppositions function not so much as "basic beliefs" but as a center for the web of knowledge.



Yes and no. Beliefs do tend to form a web but that's not how they are justified. Presups like Gordon Clark held to a web like view such as coherentism. Bahnsen, on the other hand, (correctly) rejected coherentism in favor of correspondence.

The problem is that I can have a number of false beliefs yet they can perfectly cohere within my worldview, if all that needs to obtain is coherentism and not correspondence.


----------



## jwright82

TylerRay said:


> I'm not sure I understand. Can you please explain the 'logical forms' part?


Basic belief = some irrefutable belief that cannot be doubted, I exist for instance.

Pressupossiton= what must be true in order for something else to be true, like my daughter is 15 means by pressupossiton that I am the father of her.

The logical form is if if X is true than a is true.
X. Jamey Wright's daughter is 15
A. Jamey Wright is a father, pressupossiton 


A. transcendental logical form:
A. If x is true than A is either true or false.
B. If x is false than a is neither true nor false, it is meaningless. If I don't have a daughter, than it's meaningless to talk about her.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Yes and no. Beliefs do tend to form a web but that's not how they are justified. Presups like Gordon Clark held to a web like view such as coherentism. Bahnsen, on the other hand, (correctly) rejected coherentism in favor of correspondence.
> 
> The problem is that I can have a number of false beliefs yet they can perfectly cohere within my worldview, if all that needs to obtain is coherentism and not correspondence.


I'm using the metaphor because I don't like foundationalsm. I also regect coherentism. I've given the logical forms above. Plus I'm very skeptical of theories of truth outside of God's revelation, general and special ( not a Clarkian).


----------



## jwright82

BTW. I love my daughter.


----------



## ZackF

jwright82 said:


> BTW. I love my daughter.


Are we to presuppose that? How can we have certainty if that?


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I've given the logical forms above.



Can you spell this out for me again?


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Can you spell this out for me again?


116. Like the banana!, read 116.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Basic belief = some irrefutable belief that cannot be doubted, I exist for instance.



That's not entirely accurate. Basic beliefs have prima facie warrant status. I don't have to keep providing evidence for them. However, BBs can be open to severe defeaters. They aren't irrefutable.


jwright82 said:


> A. transcendental logical form:
> A. If x is true than A is either true or false.
> B. If x is false than a is neither true nor false, it is meaningless. If I don't have a daughter, than it's meaningless to talk about her.



That is a basic transcendental argument. I'm not seeing the value, though, in how it bears on whether my beliefs have warrant or justification or even how the mind forms beliefs.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> That's not entirely accurate. Basic beliefs have prima facie warrant status. I don't have to keep providing evidence for them. However, BBs can be open to severe defeaters. They aren't irrefutable.
> 
> 
> That is a basic transcendental argument. I'm not seeing the value, though, in how it bears on whether my beliefs have warrant or justification or even how the mind forms beliefs.


Is that not basic beliefs as Plantinga defined them, albeit critically? 

Warrent, justification, and forming beliefs are important. For instance is my TA not warranted, justified? Is it reflective of my mind forming proper beliefs?


----------



## jwright82

Ok the value of TA is having one option to force someone logically in a corner as an apologetical method. Warrent may work too. I've used it but only in defense. I don't know how it can be used offensively like a TA? Thats the value. Defense and offense, I don't watch football but I think both are key to success?


BayouHuguenot said:


> That's not entirely accurate. Basic beliefs have prima facie warrant status. I don't have to keep providing evidence for them. However, BBs can be open to severe defeaters. They aren't irrefutable.
> 
> 
> That is a basic transcendental argument. I'm not seeing the value, though, in how it bears on whether my beliefs have warrant or justification or even how the mind forms beliefs.


----------



## User20004000

Generally speaking TAG is a deductive argument, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others – but unlike transcendental arguments that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience (or its denial). For instance, “If causality then God” merely means that causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. Which is to say: if causality exists then it is logically necessary that God exists. However, such a premise does not delve into the question of how God and causality relate to each other. It does not tell us whether God exists because of causality or whether causality exists because of God. _Causality presupposes God_ says more than causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. If causality presupposes God then God must be logically prior to causality.

The transcendental argument for the existence of God is an argument that has as its conclusion _God exists_. It also has a particular bent, like this:

*Prove A:* The Christian God exists.
*Step 1 ~A:* (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
*Step 2 (~A--> B):* If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
*Step 3 (~B):* There is intelligible experience (Contradiction)
*Step 4 (~ ~A):* It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
*Step 5 (A):* --> God does exist (Law of negation.)
*Q.E.D.*

Whereas professing atheists are willing to concede the _validity_ of the above argument Christians should happily concede that the argument is not only _not_ fallacious (i.e. valid) but also _sound_. In other words, although professing atheists and Christians alike agree that the above argument has a valid form – i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises – Christians should agree that since the premises are all true and the form is valid _the conclusion is true_. But unfortunately Christians don't always grasp this point. 

Christians often say that TAG does not achieve its goal because not every worldview is refuted in the argument. Such a claim simply demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of TAG. The above argument is aimed to prove that _God exists_, which it does. To deny that it does is to reject logic and / or biblical truths. Again, the argument above has a specific conclusion, God exists. The _conclusion_ of the argument is not that if God does not exist, then there could be no intelligible experience. In other words, the above transcendental argument does not aim to prove that God is the precondition for intelligible experience, though that is a premise used in the argument which is why the argument is transcendental. That is where Christians who oppose TAG get tripped up. They don’t appreciate what is being argued.

So what about step 2 of the argument? We can defend the premise of step 2 deductively by appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture. Of course the unbeliever rejects that authority; nonetheless that the unbeliever is dysfunctional does not mean that an appeal to Scripture is fallacious! After all, if a skeptic rejects logic should we then argue apart from logic? Since when does the dullness of an opponent dictate which tools of argumentation may be used? Of course, given the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth the Christian does well to defend step 2 inductively by performing internal critiques of opposing worldviews, which of course can only corroborate the veracity of step 2. It would be fallacious, however, to conclude because of such condescension toward the unbeliever that the conclusion of TAG (God exists) and the justification for its step 2 (God is the precondition of intelligibility) rest upon inductive inference. By the use of induction the Christian is merely acknowledging that the unbeliever refuses to bend the knee to the self-attesting Word from which step 2 can be _deduced_ by sound argumentation. Since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, a deductive defense of step 2 the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors, but that hardly implies that step 2 cannot be proved by deduction.

Finally, it has been noted by some and popularized by Don Collet in the Westminster Theological Journal that the _only_ way a transcendental argument may be formalized is thusly (TAG***):

C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
1. If C then God exists
2. If ~C then God exists

Given such a construct, we are no longer negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God so for the construct to make sense it must pertain only to prediction _about_ causality. In other words, since non-causality is an impossible entity that defies creation, providence and intelligibility, such a formulation of TAG (TAG***) limits itself to predication only. Does the apologist really want to do that? Do we want to give up arguing that God is the precondition for the intelligible experience of _actual_ causality? I think not. TAG*** (as opposed to TAG) is indeed powerful but it does not pertain to anything other than predication; whereas TAG may pertain to predication and the reality that the predication contemplates.

Reactions: Informative 1


----------



## jwright82

RWD said:


> Generally speaking TAG is a deductive argument, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart from garden variety deduction is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others – but unlike transcendental arguments that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience (or its denial). For instance, “If causality then God” merely means that causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. Which is to say: if causality exists then it is logically necessary that God exists. However, such a premise does not delve into the question of how God and causality relate to each other. It does not tell us whether God exists because of causality or whether causality exists because of God. _Causality presupposes God_ says more than causality is a sufficient condition for God and that God is a necessary condition for causality. If causality presupposes God then God must be logically prior to causality.
> 
> The transcendental argument for the existence of God is an argument that has as its conclusion _God exists_. It also has a particular bent, like this:
> 
> *Prove A:* The Christian God exists.
> *Step 1 ~A:* (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
> *Step 2 (~A--> B):* If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
> *Step 3 (~B):* There is intelligible experience (Contradiction)
> *Step 4 (~ ~A):* It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
> *Step 5 (A):* --> God does exist (Law of negation.)
> *Q.E.D.*
> 
> Whereas professing atheists are willing to concede the _validity_ of the above argument Christians should happily concede that the argument is not only _not_ fallacious (i.e. valid) but also _sound_. In other words, although professing atheists and Christians alike agree that the above argument has a valid form – i.e. the conclusion follows from the premises – Christians should agree that since the premises are all true and the form is valid _the conclusion is true_. But unfortunately Christians don't always grasp this point.
> 
> Christians often say that TAG does not achieve its goal because not every worldview is refuted in the argument. Such a claim simply demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope of TAG. The above argument is aimed to prove that _God exists_, which it does. To deny that it does is to reject logic and / or biblical truths. Again, the argument above has a specific conclusion, God exists. The _conclusion_ of the argument is not that if God does not exist, then there could be no intelligible experience. In other words, the above transcendental argument does not aim to prove that God is the precondition for intelligible experience, though that is a premise used in the argument which is why the argument is transcendental. That is where Christians who oppose TAG get tripped up. They don’t appreciate what is being argued.
> 
> So what about step 2 of the argument? We can defend the premise of step 2 deductively by appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture. Of course the unbeliever rejects that authority; nonetheless that the unbeliever is dysfunctional does not mean that an appeal to Scripture is fallacious! After all, if a skeptic rejects logic should we then argue apart from logic? Since when does the dullness of an opponent dictate which tools of argumentation may be used? Of course, given the unbeliever’s suppression of the truth the Christian does well to defend step 2 inductively by performing internal critiques of opposing worldviews, which of course can only corroborate the veracity of step 2. It would be fallacious, however, to conclude because of such condescension toward the unbeliever that the conclusion of TAG (God exists) and the justification for its step 2 (God is the precondition of intelligibility) rest upon inductive inference. By the use of induction the Christian is merely acknowledging that the unbeliever refuses to bend the knee to the self-attesting Word from which step 2 can be _deduced_ by sound argumentation. Since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, a deductive defense of step 2 the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors, but that hardly implies that step 2 cannot be proved by deduction.
> 
> Finally, it has been noted by some and popularized by Don Collet in the Westminster Theological Journal that the _only_ way a transcendental argument may be formalized is thusly (TAG***):
> 
> C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
> 1. If C then God exists
> 2. If ~C then God exists
> 
> Given such a construct, we are no longer negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God so for the construct to make sense it must pertain only to prediction _about_ causality. In other words, since non-causality is an impossible entity that defies creation, providence and intelligibility, such a formulation of TAG (TAG***) limits itself to predication only. Does the apologist really want to do that? Do we want to give up arguing that God is the precondition for the intelligible experience of _actual_ causality? I think not. TAG*** (as opposed to TAG) is indeed powerful but it does not pertain to anything other than predication; whereas TAG may pertain to predication and the reality that the predication contemplates.


Loved everything you said except TAG is not a sort of deductive argumet. It has a unique logical form. Otherwise loved it. Don Collet, as you quoted, points this out.


----------



## User20004000

jwright82 said:


> Loved everything you said except TAG is not a sort of deductive argumet. It has a unique logical form. Otherwise loved it. Don Collet, as you quoted, points this out.



I said it _is_ a deductive argument.


----------



## User20004000

Couple things about induction / deduction and TAG...

TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not "open ended" because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That point is missed by those who think TAG is inductive. The aspect of "closure", where the premises ensure the conclusion, is unique to deduction, not induction. 

Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process that justifies its premises authoritatively. TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction. Nonetheless, TAG has an inductive aspect to it because of the exploratory nature of TAG.

Regarding TAG and deductions:

TAG is deductive, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience. 

As Bahnsen often quipped, "The proof of God's existence is that without Him one could not prove anything." That is nothing other than "Proof presupposes God" (or "If Proof, then God" since God is a necessary precondition for proof). 

(Given the inductive and deductive aspects of TAG, we shouldn't find it at all strange that Van Til said that in what he called the "Christian method" of apologetics, we find "elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.”)

*Collett:*
_
C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
1. If C then God exists
2. If ~C then God exists_ 

What Collett provides are major premises for _modus ponens_ and (_modus tollens_), which of course are deductive arguments. Whether we assert either antecedent or deny either consequent in the minor premise, the _deductive_ conclusion is God exists. 

Whether we predicate: _If Causality, then God_ (or) If ~_Causality, then God_ the same conclusion, _God_, obtains. In other words, God is the necessary precondition for _all _predication. Or to put it in Bahnsen’s terms, whether we affirm or deny the original belief, the transcendental analysis nevertheless reaches the very same conclusion given _both _premises. {*NOTE WELL:* We are not negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God(!), but indeed the belief or assertion of ~causality does. In other words, the _concept _of non-causality presupposes God.}


----------



## jwright82

RWD said:


> Couple things about induction / deduction and TAG...
> 
> TAG has a distinctly inductive aspect to it because with TAG the Christian investigates what must be true in order for some experience to be intelligible. Such explorations are inductive in emphasis. Notwithstanding, the manner of the investigation is not "open ended" because the premises within TAG do not merely support the conclusion, they ensure it. That point is missed by those who think TAG is inductive. The aspect of "closure", where the premises ensure the conclusion, is unique to deduction, not induction.
> 
> Moreover, the conclusion from TAG is not a mere hypothesis, but rather a sound conclusion derived through a deductive process that justifies its premises authoritatively. TAG falls short of being fully inductive because there is no asserting the consequent with TAG, as there is with all scientific inference, the playground for induction. Nonetheless, TAG has an inductive aspect to it because of the exploratory nature of TAG.
> 
> Regarding TAG and deductions:
> 
> TAG is deductive, but it is unlike all other deductive arguments. What sets TAG apart is that with the latter we begin with some truths (or inferences) and reason to others - but that to which we reason is not presupposed as a necessary precondition for the intelligible experience of the original fact of experience.
> 
> As Bahnsen often quipped, "The proof of God's existence is that without Him one could not prove anything." That is nothing other than "Proof presupposes God" (or "If Proof, then God" since God is a necessary precondition for proof).
> 
> (Given the inductive and deductive aspects of TAG, we shouldn't find it at all strange that Van Til said that in what he called the "Christian method" of apologetics, we find "elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense.”)
> 
> *Collett:*
> _
> C presupposes G if and only if both 1 & 2:
> 1. If C then God exists
> 2. If ~C then God exists_
> 
> What Collett provides are major premises for _modus ponens_ and (_modus tollens_), which of course are deductive arguments. Whether we assert either antecedent or deny either consequent in the minor premise, the _deductive_ conclusion is God exists.
> 
> Whether we predicate: _If Causality, then God_ (or) If ~_Causality, then God_ the same conclusion, _God_, obtains. In other words, God is the necessary precondition for _all _predication. Or to put it in Bahnsen’s terms, whether we affirm or deny the original belief, the transcendental analysis nevertheless reaches the very same conclusion given _both _premises. {*NOTE WELL:* We are not negating the metaphysicality of causality but rather the truth value of the predication of the metaphysicality of causality. In other words: ~causality (which is chaos) does not presuppose God(!), but indeed the belief or assertion of ~causality does. In other words, the _concept _of non-causality presupposes God.}


That's makes more sense.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## A.Joseph

Let me try this again....

So I was watching James White on Presuppositional Apologetics...if one were to debate somebody, or seek to preserve Biblical truth, this form of biblical interpretation (of all things) is essential. 

But, if you were to witness to a non believer would you not seek to meet them where they are at, just in the beginning? 

If our language and context is strictly biblical but we don’t attempt to make it existentially applicable to all things about us, (an almost tangible reality) could we lose the person? Based on their level of understanding or lack thereof ?

So I guess this brings me to clarify that with this approach we would still seek to incorporate applications in our current day, correct? I was just wondering if anyone could share the difficulties of witnessing to an uninformed nonbeliever using a presuppositional approach? 

If we are going to counter Karl Barth’s notions of scripture we would absolutely need to be presuppositional, but if we are confronting an average Joe with little insight into Christian Faith could we be too scriptural from the onset?

I mean, we would need some application just to make key biblical concepts understandable, no?


----------



## A.Joseph

Here’s another issue. How can a denomination like the opc not hold to literal day creation (or allow for different trains of thought) and engage in presuppositional apologetics? 6 days are 6 days, correct? Doesn’t get much clearer than that ... but Machen would not be presuppositional if inerrancy and infallibility would allow for days to be something other than what we know days to be... no?


----------



## TheOldCourse

A.Joseph said:


> Here’s another issue. How can a denomination like the opc not hold to literal day creation (or allow for different trains of thought) and engage in presuppositional apologetics? 6 days are 6 days, correct? Doesn’t get much clearer than that ... but Machen would not be presuppositional if inerrancy and infallibility would allow for days to be something other than what we know days to be... no?



I'm not quite sure how the two are related. Young earth creationism certainly did not originate with Van Til. If your concern is that old earthers knowingly presuppose, rather, the secular scientific consensus and attempt to twist the Scriptures into consistency, that's not just inconsistent with presuppositionalism--it's inconsistent with orthodox Christianity. We ought to charitably assume, however, that those in the OPC are actually convinced of the _exegetical_ argument that the Genesis record does not teach a clear chronology. Then, still presupposing the truth of Scripture, they can hold to an Old Earth simply because they believe that the Bible is silent on the matter.


----------



## A.Joseph

TheOldCourse said:


> I'm not quite sure how the two are related. Young earth creationism certainly did not originate with Van Til. If your concern is that old earthers knowingly presuppose, rather, the secular scientific consensus and attempt to twist the Scriptures into consistency, that's not just inconsistent with presuppositionalism--it's inconsistent with orthodox Christianity. We ought to charitably assume, however, that those in the OPC are actually convinced of the _exegetical_ argument that the Genesis record does not teach a clear chronology. Then, still presupposing the truth of Scripture, they can hold to an Old Earth simply because they believe that the Bible is silent on the matter.


I think we have to say presuppositional & orthodoxy are hand in hand.... and old earth defies the clear meaning of days, Adam as first man, and his creation, no? Let’s be clear - that’s why I do hold to presuppositional and orthodoxy and I think Machen erred on this point... I’m opc regardless. If we are going to be strict presuppositional we have to be firm on orthodoxy, no? Not seeing how chronology does not clearly defy old earth, do you?


----------



## Apologist4Him

TylerRay said:


> Jacob is saying that it is possible to know something without accounting for it within a system of belief. Anyone whose mind and senses are functioning normally has sufficient warrant to know, for instance, that he's sitting in a chair, or that his shirt is green. He doesn't have to reason to ultimate reality in order to truly know these things.



If I may, feel free to criticize, but the belief in possibility of knowledge outside of the Christian system of belief, is a belief in autonomous knowledge. That is external "facts" outside of and independent of the creature interpreted by the creature on the authority of creature apart from the authority of the Creator, all while the faculties used to interpret are given and designed by the Creator. In the example of the chair, an object created by the creature, only possible because the Creator designed the creature with the faculties and creative desire likened to the Creator himself. With the example of color, the eye is designed by the Creator to see colors, but we also know some people are color blind and other creatures do not see in color. So in all things our dependency is on our Creator in whom we move and have our being and is the ultimate authority of all interpretation and knowledge including knowledge acquired through sense perception.


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> If I may, feel free to criticize, but the belief in possibility of knowledge outside of the Christian system of belief, is a belief in autonomous knowledge. That is external "facts" outside of and independent of the creature interpreted by the creature on the authority of creature apart from the authority of the Creator, all while the faculties used to interpret are given and designed by the Creator. In the example of the chair, an object created by the creature, only possible because the Creator designed the creature with the faculties and creative desire likened to the Creator himself. With the example of color, the eye is designed by the Creator to see colors, but we also know some people are color blind and other creatures do not see in color. So in all things our dependency is on our Creator in whom we move and have our being and is the ultimate authority of all interpretation and knowledge including knowledge acquired through sense perception.



None of the above had anything to do with my position. I made the following claim:

1. One can have a belief without having to meet criteria for that belief.

If one wants to add stuff about "that's possible only in a Christian worldview," fine. It doesn't affect my position either way. I do think (1) entails the following:

1* If one demands that every belief meet certain criteria for justification, then what is the justification for that demand? 

1' Therefore, what is the justification of the justification?

1'' What is the justification of the justification of the justification.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## TheOldCourse

A.Joseph said:


> I think we have to say presuppositional & orthodoxy are hand in hand.... and old earth defies the clear meaning of days, Adam as first man, and his creation, no? Let’s be clear - that’s why I do hold to presuppositional and orthodoxy and I think Machen erred on this point... I’m opc regardless. If we are going to be strict presuppositional we have to be firm on orthodoxy, no? Not seeing how chronology does not clearly defy old earth, do you?



Admittedly I have not followed this whole thread carefully so perhaps some things are being taken for granted here based on earlier discussion, but I see no reason to believe presuppositional and orthodoxy are hand and hand. Presuppositionalism did not exist when either the catholic creeds or the Reformational creeds were written, and thus cannot be the standard of orthodoxy.

But that's beside the matter. The difference between an _orthodox_ (i.e. confessional) old earth advocate and a young earth advocate is in their exegetical approach to the creation narrative, rather than their apologetic philosophy. If one believes that a Klinean Framework Hypothesis, for instance, accurately captures the inspired meaning of Scripture then they may hold the possibility of an old earth together with a firm belief in inerrancy/infallibility and presuppositionalism. I say that as a young-earther who is suspicious that many old earth proponents do put the cart before the horse, so-to-speak, and allow their exegesis to be driven by a concern for cultural relevance. Nevertheless, there is no reason, conceptually, that this _must_ be the case with old-earthers and I would extend the utmost charity to those in good standing in orthodox churches like the OPC.

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## TylerRay

Apologist4Him said:


> If I may, feel free to criticize, but the belief in possibility of knowledge outside of the Christian system of belief, is a belief in autonomous knowledge. That is external "facts" outside of and independent of the creature interpreted by the creature on the authority of creature apart from the authority of the Creator, all while the faculties used to interpret are given and designed by the Creator. In the example of the chair, an object created by the creature, only possible because the Creator designed the creature with the faculties and creative desire likened to the Creator himself. With the example of color, the eye is designed by the Creator to see colors, but we also know some people are color blind and other creatures do not see in color. So in all things our dependency is on our Creator in whom we move and have our being and is the ultimate authority of all interpretation and knowledge including knowledge acquired through sense perception.


Nobody said that we don't need God in order to know things. What I was saying is that it's possible to know things without knowing the reference those things have to God.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## User20004000

TheOldCourse said:


> I'm not quite sure how the two are related. Young earth creationism certainly did not originate with Van Til. If your concern is that old earthers knowingly presuppose, rather, the secular scientific consensus and attempt to twist the Scriptures into consistency, that's not just inconsistent with presuppositionalism--it's inconsistent with orthodox Christianity. We ought to charitably assume, however, that those in the OPC are actually convinced of the _exegetical_ argument that the Genesis record does not teach a clear chronology. Then, still presupposing the truth of Scripture, they can hold to an Old Earth simply because they believe that the Bible is silent on the matter.



I agree with you on the exegetical point. We need to give that judgment of charity. 

Regarding this, 

“I'm not quite sure how the two are related. Young earth creationism certainly did not originate with Van Til.”​
clearly young earth didn’t originate with CVT. Neither did it begin with fundamentalism, yet we’d expect fundamentalists to adhere to young earth. In the like manner, yet for different reasons perhaps, one might expect the OPC to adhere to young earth. That’s how I took A.Joseph. It’s not so much a matter of where a belief originates but rather whether it’s consonant with, if not even a sufficient condition for other distinctives.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## Apologist4Him

BayouHuguenot said:


> None of the above had anything to do with my position.



Sorry I did not respond to you, my response had to do with what I responded to. 



BayouHuguenot said:


> I made the following claim:
> 
> 1. One can have a belief without having to meet criteria for that belief.



Sure, one can have true belief and false belief with or without justification. But this is oversimplification, not all beliefs are on the same level or of equal importance or have equal impact on other beliefs. The answers to the questions does God exist and the particulars about him, are circular in nature and connected with all other beliefs.



BayouHuguenot said:


> If one wants to add stuff about "that's possible only in a Christian worldview," fine. It doesn't affect my position either way.



I'd rather state it as, it's only possible because the Christian worldview is true. Which accounts for non-Christian worldviews which suppress the truth.



BayouHuguenot said:


> I do think (1) entails the following:
> 
> 1* If one demands that every belief meet certain criteria for justification, then what is the justification for that demand?



I am unclear as to exactly what you mean by "meet certain criteria", what types of criteria? Reason, experience, facts? These can support belief, but unregenerate man supposes these to be independent of the Creator and himself to be an autonomous creature. Can the justification through the assumption of autonomy be anything but subjective? That man is inconsistent and borrows from the one true worldview is apparent, because no man is a consistently a pure subjectivist. 



BayouHuguenot said:


> 1' Therefore, what is the justification of the justification?
> 
> 1'' What is the justification of the justification of the justification.



or the belief of the belief or reason of the reason or facts of the facts?

The self-revealing self-authenticating Christ of Scripture is the true justifier for all knowledge, all of which belong to the omniscience of God from all eternity. Our justification proper begins with the fear of the Lord.


----------



## User20004000

BayouHuguenot said:


> None of the above had anything to do with my position. I made the following claim:
> 
> 1. One can have a belief without having to meet criteria for that belief.
> 
> If one wants to add stuff about "that's possible only in a Christian worldview," fine. It doesn't affect my position either way. I do think (1) entails the following:
> 
> 1* If one demands that every belief meet certain criteria for justification, then what is the justification for that demand?
> 
> 1' Therefore, what is the justification of the justification?
> 
> 1'' What is the justification of the justification of the justification.



I think first you should refine this:

“One can have a belief without having to meet criteria for that belief.”

Meet the criteria? If one has a belief, whether false or true, he has by the nature of the case met the criteria for belief. When one has knowledge, same thing. He has met the criteria for knowledge. Belief and knowledge presuppose having met “the criteria.” Otherwise, how would either obtain? 

The question is not whether unbelievers know things. They do (which also mean they believe things). The question is whether knowledge comports with the unbeliever’s presuppositions.


----------



## User20004000

Apologist4Him said:


> Sorry I did not respond to you, my response had to do with what I responded to.
> 
> 
> 
> Sure, one can have true belief and false belief with or without justification. But this is oversimplification, not all beliefs are on the same level or of equal importance or have equal impact on other beliefs. The answers to the questions does God exist and the particulars about him, are circular in nature and connected with all other beliefs.
> 
> 
> 
> I'd rather state it as, it's only possible because the Christian worldview is true. Which accounts for non-Christian worldviews which suppress the truth.
> 
> 
> 
> I am unclear as to exactly what you mean by "meet certain criteria", what types of criteria? Reason, experience, facts? These can support belief, but unregenerate man supposes these to be independent of the Creator and himself to be an autonomous creature. Can the justification through the assumption of autonomy be anything but subjective? That man is inconsistent and borrows from the one true worldview is apparent, because no man is a consistently a pure subjectivist.
> 
> 
> 
> or the belief of the belief or reason of the reason or facts of the facts?
> 
> The self-revealing self-authenticating Christ of Scripture is the true justifier for all knowledge, all of which belong to the omniscience of God from all eternity. Our justification proper begins with the fear of the Lord.



Pleasure to read this.


----------



## TheOldCourse

RWD said:


> I agree with you on the exegetical point. We need to give that judgment of charity.
> 
> Regarding this,
> 
> “I'm not quite sure how the two are related. Young earth creationism certainly did not originate with Van Til.”​
> clearly young earth didn’t originate with CVT. Neither did it begin with fundamentalism, yet we’d expect fundamentalists to adhere to young earth. In the like manner, yet for different reasons perhaps, one might expect the OPC to adhere to young earth. That’s how I took A.Joseph. It’s not so much a matter of where a belief originates but rather whether it’s consonant with, if not even a sufficient condition for other distinctives.



I agree that there's a particular consonance or at least resonance between YEC and fundamentalism, namely, fundamentalism's biblicism, anti-intellectualism, and eschatological counter-culturalism. I just don't see it with presuppositionalism. Indeed, most of the theistic evolutionists I know are neo-Calvinist presuppositionalists. Van Til himself, though opposing Darwinianism, was agnostic on the age of the earth.


----------



## User20004000

TheOldCourse said:


> I agree that there's a particular consonance or at least resonance between YEC and fundamentalism, namely, fundamentalism's biblicism, anti-intellectualism, and eschatological counter-culturalism. I just don't see it with presuppositionalism. Indeed, most of the theistic evolutionists I know are neo-Calvinist presuppositionalists. Van Til himself, though opposing Darwinianism, was agnostic on the age of the earth.



The point I was making is, it’s not a matter of doctrinal origin. So, I was addressing the quandary you seemed to be having with respect to Joseph. 

With him, I too think pressups _should_ be young earth, as a general rule. My guess is, most of the OPC guys who are old earth aren’t card carrying Reformed epistemologists in the Van Tillian sense. Exceptions don’t undermine such a sense of things. Yes, we can find middle ground with the exegetical point. I am just suspicious, frankly.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## Apologist4Him

TheOldCourse said:


> I agree that there's a particular consonance or at least resonance between YEC and fundamentalism, namely, fundamentalism's biblicism, anti-intellectualism, and eschatological counter-culturalism. I just don't see it with presuppositionalism. Indeed, most of the theistic evolutionists I know are neo-Calvinist presuppositionalists. Van Til himself, though opposing Darwinianism, was agnostic on the age of the earth.



Six years ago on my blog I was asked the question; "was Van Til a 6-day Creationist?" I posted the following in response:

"Good question and thanks for the link. Before researching, my answer is yes, my reasoning is as follows:

1.) he was a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from 1936 until his death.

2.) “Officers in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church take a vow to “sincerely receive and adopt” these confessional documents “as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures.” – OPC Confession standards

3.) from the *Westminster Confession of Faith Chapter IV*

*Of Creation*

*I. “It pleased God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of His eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things therein whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days; and all very good.*

II. After God had made all other creatures, He created man, male and female,[4] with reasonable and immortal souls,[5] endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after His own image; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfil it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.”​
4. Now that I have researched, if you have access to his book “The Defense of the Faith” turn to Chapter 9 “Argument by Presupposition” from the subsection “Creation out of Nothing”

“*On the question of creation I believe that it pleased God “for the manifestation of the glory of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things therein, whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days and all very good.” This doctrine of creation fits in with the doctrine of the ontological trinity. *If God is fully self-contained then there was no sort of half existence and no sort of non-being that had any power over against him. There was therefore no impersonal law of logic that told God what he could do and there was no sort of stuff that had as much even as refractory power over against God when he decided to create the world.

I have not merely held but have also frequently defended this doctrine. I have defended it not merely against those who openly reject it or assert it to be impossible on the basis of logic as was the case with Parmenides. I have defended it against those who assumed the existence of some sort of limiting power next to God. I have in particular defended it against all forms of modern dialecticism, whether Hegelian or Barthian.” – Van Til, C.​


----------



## A.Joseph

TheOldCourse said:


> Admittedly I have not followed this whole thread carefully so perhaps some things are being taken for granted here based on earlier discussion, but I see no reason to believe presuppositional and orthodoxy are hand and hand. Presuppositionalism did not exist when either the catholic creeds or the Reformational creeds were written, and thus cannot be the standard of orthodoxy.
> 
> But that's beside the matter. The difference between an _orthodox_ (i.e. confessional) old earth advocate and a young earth advocate is in their exegetical approach to the creation narrative, rather than their apologetic philosophy. If one believes that a Klinean Framework Hypothesis, for instance, accurately captures the inspired meaning of Scripture then they may hold the possibility of an old earth together with a firm belief in inerrancy/infallibility and presuppositionalism. I say that as a young-earther who is suspicious that many old earth proponents do put the cart before the horse, so-to-speak, and allow their exegesis to be driven by a concern for cultural relevance. Nevertheless, there is no reason, conceptually, that this _must_ be the case with old-earthers and I would extend the utmost charity to those in good standing in orthodox churches like the OPC.


I understand, and for the sake of charity both to you and the opc position on the matter I will agree this is not a breaking point. But the concerns for cultural relevance has taken the church & scriptural compatibility to much crazier places than old earth


----------



## A.Joseph

Apologist4Him said:


> Six years ago on my blog I was asked the question; "was Van Til a 6-day Creationist?" I posted the following in response:
> 
> "Good question and thanks for the link. Before researching, my answer is yes, my reasoning is as follows:
> 
> 1.) he was a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from 1936 until his death.
> 
> 2.) “Officers in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church take a vow to “sincerely receive and adopt” these confessional documents “as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures.” – OPC Confession standards
> 
> 3.) from the *Westminster Confession of Faith Chapter IV*
> 
> *Of Creation*
> 
> *I. “It pleased God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of His eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things therein whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days; and all very good.*
> 
> II. After God had made all other creatures, He created man, male and female,[4] with reasonable and immortal souls,[5] endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after His own image; having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfil it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept, they were happy in their communion with God, and had dominion over the creatures.”​
> 4. Now that I have researched, if you have access to his book “The Defense of the Faith” turn to Chapter 9 “Argument by Presupposition” from the subsection “Creation out of Nothing”
> 
> “*On the question of creation I believe that it pleased God “for the manifestation of the glory of his eternal power, wisdom, and goodness, in the beginning, to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things therein, whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days and all very good.” This doctrine of creation fits in with the doctrine of the ontological trinity. *If God is fully self-contained then there was no sort of half existence and no sort of non-being that had any power over against him. There was therefore no impersonal law of logic that told God what he could do and there was no sort of stuff that had as much even as refractory power over against God when he decided to create the world.
> 
> I have not merely held but have also frequently defended this doctrine. I have defended it not merely against those who openly reject it or assert it to be impossible on the basis of logic as was the case with Parmenides. I have defended it against those who assumed the existence of some sort of limiting power next to God. I have in particular defended it against all forms of modern dialecticism, whether Hegelian or Barthian.” – Van Til, C.​


Exactly, so with regards to the OPCs official stance on the age of the earth, with special consideration & adherence to Machen I’m sure, I still kinda cry foul .... with a minor ‘f’ .... lol


----------



## RamistThomist

Apologist4Him said:


> "meet certain criteria", what types of criteria?



Starting with Plato, and with all forms of internalism that hold that knowledge = justified, true belief, the criteria would be whatever confers justification on a belief. Of course, that would depend on the type of belief in question. 

My point was that not every belief is going to need justification, or at least not in a strict sense, and so, therefore, won't need to meet certain critiera.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Starting with Plato, and with all forms of internalism that hold that knowledge = justified, true belief, the criteria would be whatever confers justification on a belief. Of course, that would depend on the type of belief in question.
> 
> My point was that not every belief is going to need justification, or at least not in a strict sense, and so, therefore, won't need to meet certain critiera.


Your right but that's not the issue. If all your wanting is an admission that "certain beliefs" don't need, in a strict sense, further justification than fine there you go. What that admission has to do with anything other than immediate beliefs, I don't know. I don't see how that admission deals with ultimate beliefs or the most central beliefs in our web of beliefs? The issue is, as Frame puts it, the metaphysics of knowledge. Ultimately is knowledge possible in any other worldview? And is there a method of Apologetics capable of capitalizing on the truth that only the Christian worldview is true and therefore capable of providing such a metaphysics of knowledge, in an ultimate sense. 
I get the feeling that you have some "enemy" in sight that may or may not be real. I think if all you want is an admission that certain beliefs don't need justification than fine you got it. That has nothing with every single form of pressupossitonalism.


----------



## jwright82

A.Joseph said:


> Let me try this again....
> 
> So I was watching James White on Presuppositional Apologetics...if one were to debate somebody, or seek to preserve Biblical truth, this form of biblical interpretation (of all things) is essential.
> 
> But, if you were to witness to a non believer would you not seek to meet them where they are at, just in the beginning?
> 
> If our language and context is strictly biblical but we don’t attempt to make it existentially applicable to all things about us, (an almost tangible reality) could we lose the person? Based on their level of understanding or lack thereof ?
> 
> So I guess this brings me to clarify that with this approach we would still seek to incorporate applications in our current day, correct? I was just wondering if anyone could share the difficulties of witnessing to an uninformed nonbeliever using a presuppositional approach?
> 
> If we are going to counter Karl Barth’s notions of scripture we would absolutely need to be presuppositional, but if we are confronting an average Joe with little insight into Christian Faith could we be too scriptural from the onset?
> 
> I mean, we would need some application just to make key biblical concepts understandable, no?


I'm not sure James White is the best example of pressupossitonalism out there but ok. The way I use it is meeting them where they are and going from there. It is conversational in nature, which means taking into account their level of sophistication. And always done with love.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> If all your wanting is an admission that "certain beliefs" don't need, in a strict sense, further justification than fine there you go. What that admission has to do with anything other than immediate beliefs, I don't know. I don't see how that admission deals with ultimate beliefs or the most central beliefs in our web of beliefs?



It does if the "certain belief" in question is an "ultimate belief."


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> It does if the "certain belief" in question is an "ultimate belief."


So your saying no ultimate beliefs have any need nor can be called into question for a lack of justification? Even as a methodological strategy?


----------



## jwright82

This also seems to imply the existence of autonomous facts.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> So your saying no ultimate beliefs have any need nor can be called into question for a lack of justification? Even as a methodological strategy?



That's not entirely the issue. A properly basic belief is one which carries its own warrant-status. That's not to say it is above challenge. It can still be defeated by a defeater.

You're continuing to operate in terms of justification (i.e., meeting internal conditions within one's own mind). I operate in terms of warrant.


----------



## Username3000

If I may add my expertise to this discussion:

Reactions: Funny 2


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> That's not entirely the issue. A properly basic belief is one which carries its own warrant-status. That's not to say it is above challenge. It can still be defeated by a defeater.
> 
> You're continuing to operate in terms of justification (i.e., meeting internal conditions within one's own mind). I operate in terms of warrant.


I'm operating on a logical basis. Logical analysis demands that certain


BayouHuguenot said:


> That's not entirely the issue. A properly basic belief is one which carries its own warrant-status. That's not to say it is above challenge. It can still be defeated by a defeater.
> 
> You're continuing to operate in terms of justification (i.e., meeting internal conditions within one's own mind). I operate in terms of warrant.


But any belief can be logically analyzed for pressupossitons. You know that as well as I do. Even a properly basic belief presupposes reliable cognitive functions. And a person to have them. Call that internal/external or some mix. It's a logical fact.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> But any belief can be logically analyzed for pressupossitons. You know that as well as I do. Even a properly basic belief presupposes reliable cognitive functions. And a person to have them. Call that internal/external or some mix. It's a logical fact.



Fine, but that's not the same as internalism or justification.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> Fine, but that's not the same as internalism or justification.


Than I guess I'm not either one of those.


----------



## User20004000

This will be of interest... Very relevant.

https://www.proginosko.com/2019/06/reforming-apologetics-introduction/

Reactions: Like 2


----------



## jwright82

I'm reluctant to adopt adopt the internalism/externalism distinction because it seems useless outside of rhetorical arguments. Practically I think it serves no purpose other than to try and box someone in who doesn't agree with it. It's like saying that if you affirm the classic creeds of Christian history than you must believe in substance metaphysics. Accepting some terminology does mean you must accept the whole thing.
I think that linguistically analyzing these will lead to less confusion about terms. Why is internalism inherently bad? And what if the term is applied to people who don't hold it? If someone is operating within a different vocabulary than the terms doesn't agree with the terms? Than What? 
It's like saying Van Til is Kantian because he got his method and form of argumentation from him. But for someone that critiqued Kant endlessly how does that even fit, or make sense? And analytic philosophers have adopted it too.
I don't see how examining one's pressupossitons
Is wrong or I'll advised? No one doubts that we have pressupossitons so I don't see the point in debating it. I've had it work quite well, practicality is no ground to judge a point of view. 
Also I don't see how Plantinga gets around the Foundationalist problem by adopting a weaker form of it, Foundationalsm is Foundationalsm. His weaker forms of basic beliefs are still basic beliefs. Changing the vocabulary so no no one can critique him is a bit badly placed. Why must I or anyone accept the vocabulary of Plantinga, or anyone else, to hold a reasonable discussion on epistemology? 
Sorry BayouHuegenot. I meant to quote you but I messed up. I look forward to the discussion.
Also a justification of a justification is not used in the same sense. To justify pro-choice or pro-life points of views both sit on one level but to justify the underlying worldview is a deeper level of justification. So one is not tied to one meaning or level of justification, there are varying degrees. Each with a unique situation and epistemic value.

Your argument only holds true if justification must mean the same thing in every application of it, no differences. Look forward to discussing this, been thinking a while.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I'm reluctant to adopt adopt the internalism/externalism distinction because it seems useless outside of rhetorical arguments.



It is simply a classification in modern academic debates on epistemology. Adopt it or don't. It really wasn't designed for apologetics but simply a taxonomy for classifying various philosophers.


jwright82 said:


> Practically I think it serves no purpose other than to try and box someone in who doesn't agree with it.



That's also not its point. It's like complaining about an apple because it doesn't unlock doors. Read Audi or Chisholm or any major epistemologist on the background for the discussion.


jwright82 said:


> It's like saying that if you affirm the classic creeds of Christian history than you must believe in substance metaphysics.



You sort of do, since there is the whole "two natures" thing.



jwright82 said:


> Why is internalism inherently bad?



It's not. It's simply a taxonomy. My criticism of internalist accounts is that they are inadequate to confer strong justfication.


jwright82 said:


> And what if the term is applied to people who don't hold it?



I don't know. What if?


jwright82 said:


> It's like saying Van Til is Kantian because he got his method and form of argumentation from him.



Kant's system is a worldview. Internalism/Externalism aren't. They are taxonomies that deal with justification only within the correspondence theory of truth. They don't deal with coherentism, for example.


jwright82 said:


> Is wrong or I'll advised?



What's the subject in the sentence?


jwright82 said:


> Also I don't see how Plantinga gets around the Foundationalist problem by adopting a weaker form of it, Foundationalsm is Foundationalsm. His weaker forms of basic beliefs are still basic beliefs.



There is a distinction between properly basic beliefs and basic beliefs.


jwright82 said:


> Changing the vocabulary so no no one can critique him is a bit badly placed.



If you read his trilogy you will realize that he has read every text on epistemology. He isn't changing the vocabulary and not a single academic critic of Plantinga ever made that charge.


jwright82 said:


> Why must I or anyone accept the vocabulary of Plantinga, or anyone else, to hold a reasonable discussion on epistemology?



That was never my charge. My charge was that strict internalist accounts fail to confer strong justification. That's it. That doesn't mean their worldview is false. Far from it.

The more practical problem was that endlessly chanting "by what standard" has to confront what Roderick Chisholm called "The Problem of Criterion" and very few presups besides Ronald Nash have ever dealt with that. It also shows that endlessly chanting "By What Standard?" itself doesn't deal with the problems of knowledge.


jwright82 said:


> Also a justification of a justification is not used in the same sense.



I've read about two dozen academic texts on justification. We all know in what sense it is being used.


----------



## RamistThomist

When I brought up internalism, I was never trying to say that "he's an internalist. haha. he's wrong." Rather, I was trying to say that those presups who endlessly chant "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?"

Have themselves to face up to Chisholm's "problem of criterion." That's all. It's not a knock-down argument, but simply noting that the epistemology debate is a bit more complex.

So it's not the same as "Well, van til used Kantian language therefore he is a kantian." Of course not. No one said that. Internalism isn't an evil bogeyman like Kant. My hero in the faith, JP Moreland, is a very strict internalist.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> When I brought up internalism, I was never trying to say that "he's an internalist. haha. he's wrong." Rather, I was trying to say that those presups who endlessly chant "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?"
> 
> Have themselves to face up to Chisholm's "problem of criterion." That's all. It's not a knock-down argument, but simply noting that the epistemology debate is a bit more complex.
> 
> So it's not the same as "Well, van til used Kantian language therefore he is a kantian." Of course not. No one said that. Internalism isn't an evil bogeyman like Kant. My hero in the faith, JP Moreland, is a very strict internalist.


I agree that chanting "by what standard" is obnoxious to say the least. That's why I don't do that. Most acedimic Vantillians don't either.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> It is simply a classification in modern academic debates on epistemology. Adopt it or don't. It really wasn't designed for apologetics but simply a taxonomy for classifying various philosophers.
> 
> 
> That's also not its point. It's like complaining about an apple because it doesn't unlock doors. Read Audi or Chisholm or any major epistemologist on the background for the discussion.
> 
> 
> You sort of do, since there is the whole "two natures" thing.
> 
> 
> 
> It's not. It's simply a taxonomy. My criticism of internalist accounts is that they are inadequate to confer strong justfication.
> 
> 
> I don't know. What if?
> 
> 
> Kant's system is a worldview. Internalism/Externalism aren't. They are taxonomies that deal with justification only within the correspondence theory of truth. They don't deal with coherentism, for example.
> 
> 
> What's the subject in the sentence?
> 
> 
> There is a distinction between properly basic beliefs and basic beliefs.
> 
> 
> If you read his trilogy you will realize that he has read every text on epistemology. He isn't changing the vocabulary and not a single academic critic of Plantinga ever made that charge.
> 
> 
> That was never my charge. My charge was that strict internalist accounts fail to confer strong justification. That's it. That doesn't mean their worldview is false. Far from it.
> 
> The more practical problem was that endlessly chanting "by what standard" has to confront what Roderick Chisholm called "The Problem of Criterion" and very few presups besides Ronald Nash have ever dealt with that. It also shows that endlessly chanting "By What Standard?" itself doesn't deal with the problems of knowledge.
> 
> 
> I've read about two dozen academic texts on justification. We all know in what sense it is being used.


Well as far as theories of truth and Van Til you should consult the Bahnsen reader 158 to 177.
As far as my point on the senses of the use of justification. It was in response to an earlier comment you made about justifiers of justifiers of justifiers, which implies an endless string of justifiers in the argument on into infinity. Which I found very good. But if I understand the argument correctly this would be a serious problem for the pressupossitional argument, unless justifier is being used in two different senses. A justifier of a belief seems quite different from a justifier of a justifier, Apple's and oranges.
It's like saying an ethical statement is exactly the same as a metaethical statement. Since the referent is different in both statements there not the same. An ethical statement is about what is right or wrong and we how we ought to behave. Metaethical statements are about the nature of ethics itself.
The pressupossitional argument is like this. Warrent operates within the various worldviews that everyone has and therefore is a universal tool we all share. An atheist is warranted to not believe in God due to the existence of evil.
But warrent is not something the pressupossitionalist is worried about. An atheist can be warranted all day long but (and here's the first level of the argument) 100% of the arguments I've seen from evil rest on faulty notions and descriptions of God ( his nature, his realation to creation, etc.) and therefore there argument is worthless. There not talking about the same person we confess.
The second deeper problem is, warrent addmited, there complaints rest on the existence of ethical norms to complain about God with. And since no form of atheism can produce a solid foundation for ethics, they in a sense have nothing to complain about (as an apologetical method). They can be warranted all day long but once the foundation for ethics is challenged they have a deeper problem.

Reactions: Like 1


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> A justifier of a belief seems quite different from a justifier of a justifier, Apple's and oranges.



They are the same, since the justifier of a justifier is itself a justifier of a belief in a justifier.


jwright82 said:


> Warrent operates within the various worldviews that everyone has and therefore is a universal tool we all share. An atheist is warranted to not believe in God due to the existence of evi



Maybe he is. Maybe he isn't. Simply having warrant doesn't solve anything. Warrants can be defeated by defeaters (of course; the defeaters themselves can be defeated).


jwright82 said:


> But warrent is not something the pressupossitionalist is worried about.



That's not the point. Warrant isn't one of those things that anyone "worries" about. 


jwright82 said:


> An atheist can be warranted all day long but (and here's the first level of the argument) 100% of the arguments I've seen from evil rest on faulty notions and descriptions of God ( his nature, his realation to creation, etc.) and therefore there argument is worthless.



That's what I've been trying to say for several months. Any warrant can be challenged by a defeater. THat's simply the nature of human conversation. Most defeaters, though, are pretty weak.


jwright82 said:


> The second deeper problem is, warrent addmited, there complaints rest on the existence of ethical norms to complain about God with.



Even classical apologists acknowledge this.


jwright82 said:


> They can be warranted all day long but once the foundation for ethics is challenged they have a deeper problem.



That's literally the definition of a defeater.

My argument was never--not once--"If you have warrant, that's all you need." I never said that. Plantinga never said that. Warrant is simply another angle to view the justification debate. That's it.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> They are the same, since the justifier of a justifier is itself a justifier of a belief in a justifier.
> 
> 
> Maybe he is. Maybe he isn't. Simply having warrant doesn't solve anything. Warrants can be defeated by defeaters (of course; the defeaters themselves can be defeated).
> 
> 
> That's not the point. Warrant isn't one of those things that anyone "worries" about.
> 
> 
> That's what I've been trying to say for several months. Any warrant can be challenged by a defeater. THat's simply the nature of human conversation. Most defeaters, though, are pretty weak.
> 
> 
> Even classical apologists acknowledge this.
> 
> 
> That's literally the definition of a defeater.
> 
> My argument was never--not once--"If you have warrant, that's all you need." I never said that. Plantinga never said that. Warrant is simply another angle to view the justification debate. That's it.


Than what's with my method of apologetics? Not a belief about a justifier of belief seems to be needlessly stretching the terms. And what about my analogy to ethical verses metaethical statements? Surely ethical statements are not the same as metaethical statements.


----------



## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Than what's with my method of apologetics? Not a belief about a justifier of belief seems to be needlessly stretching the terms.



You probably know your method better than I know your method. My only point about bringing internalism up is that the question "By What Standard" simply doesn't square with any treatment of epistemology that has already dealt with iterative skepticism.

You might say, "academic van tillians don't talk like that." That's great. Those guys aren't the debaters, either. Sye Ted is.


----------



## jwright82

BayouHuguenot said:


> You probably know your method better than I know your method. My only point about bringing internalism up is that the question "By What Standard" simply doesn't square with any treatment of epistemology that has already dealt with iterative skepticism.
> 
> You might say, "academic van tillians don't talk like that." That's great. Those guys aren't the debaters, either. Sye Ted is.


Yeah I don't like that guy. I had an old friend show me his videos and than got mad when I said I wouldn't debate like that. Something like not going for the jugular and allowing unbelief to stand. I reminded him that some of the best debates I've won, and I've lost a lot, were through subtle and indirect methods. Not being rude. These people aren't just unbelievers they're primarily human beings and ought to be treated as such.
Plus it always amazes me when adults can't tell the difference between when to be firm and when to be gentle. I have no problem being firm but only if the conversation calls for it.

Reactions: Like 2


----------

