# The Epistemology of Scripturalism



## Civbert

I want a chance to explain my understanding of Scripturalism, and epistemology in general - and maybe clear up some misunderstandings. I don't present myself as an expert in philosophy or an authority on scripturalism - but I spent some time working out what I think it means and I find it best satisfies my desire for a sound biblical worldview. 

So I'd like to start this thread by asking people how they define epistemology, knowledge, scripturalism, and other relevant terms. Then maybe we can look at the strengths and weaknesses of scripturalism and compare it to other epidemiologies. 

So, let's gets going.


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## tewilder

Here are a few questions I have wanted to see Scripturalists take on:

Would you say the scripturalism is a form of classical foundationalism? 

How do you regard the old saws such as "You don't know unless you know you know." 

Is the method my which you acquire familiarity with the axioms of Scripture relevant to whether they can properly be taken as axioms?


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## polemic_turtle

Just wondering, do you derogate common sense observations such as your existance as mere "opinions"? For another one, which I know you must get a lot, how do you consider the need for empirical data to receive the Scriptures( eg. sight, hearing )? If I cannot be said to know anything through experience, then I cannot know whether what I'm reading as Scripture should be what I attempt to construct my ideas from, etc.. What do you say?


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> Here are a few questions I have wanted to see Scripturalists take on:
> 
> Would you say the scripturalism is a form of classical foundationalism?


I think it is. All I know of foundationalism is a wikipedia article on it I read a few months ago, and it seems that scripturalism is a kind of foundationalism. I believe foundationalism says that knowledge must be founded on something in order to be justified. I consider scripture to be the foundation of knowledge. (BTW, Bahnsen and Van-Til agree.)



tewilder said:


> How do you regard the old saws such as "You don't know unless you know you know."


I'm not really sure. Do you mean that a person knows what they know? Personally, I think a person is rarely aware of the knowledge their minds posses. I think people possess knowledge they are unaware of. But that is my opinion, I don't think scripturalism addresses that issue directly.



tewilder said:


> Is the method by which you acquire familiarity with the axioms of Scripture relevant to whether they can properly be taken as axioms?


No, I don't think so. I take scripture itself as the axiom. But how I come to learn or understand true scripture is a different issue. By method do you mean reading or hearing, or induction/deduction?


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## Semper Fidelis

Anthony,

Why aren't you interacting with Paul? It's kind of strange. He defined the terms almost two days ago.


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## Civbert

polemic_turtle said:


> Just wondering, do you derogate common sense observations such as your existence as mere "opinions"?


I do, yes. I don't think on can gain any real knowledge from experience. But I do not derogate "mere" opinion. I think most of what we believe is opinion. And a great deal of that opinion are things we are wise in believing. Experience can add great weight to opinions even if it can not justify those beliefs as knowledge.



polemic_turtle said:


> For another one, which I know you must get a lot, how do you consider the need for empirical data to receive the Scriptures( eg. sight, hearing )? If I cannot be said to know anything through experience, then I cannot know whether what I'm reading as Scripture should be what I attempt to construct my ideas from, etc.. What do you say?


I don't believe "reading and hearing" are really empirical functions in the sense of the epistemology called empiricism. For a proposition to be justified by empiricism, it must be based solely on sensory experience. Reading, and hearing (language) requires one to understand a language before one can take sounds and sights and translate them into words and ideas. If you can take a collection of sound vibrations and turn them into ideas that are also true propositions, without knowing any language - then you have gained knowledge empirically.


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## Civbert

SemperFideles said:


> Anthony,
> 
> Why aren't you interacting with Paul? It's kind of strange. He defined the terms almost two days ago.


 
With the exception of your post here, I was answering them in order. First *tewilder*, then *polemic_turtle. *Next will be Paul. 

OK?


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## Semper Fidelis

Roger. I guess I should have assumed you were busy. My sincere apologies.


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## Civbert

Thanks, Paul. Anyone else?



Paul manata said:


> Epistemology: The study of the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge.


 
I would have simply said 'a theory of knowledge'. But I agree with your definition as it best defines epistemology in general. The scope of this discussion is a particular epistemology. Rationalism, empiricism, mysticism, etc, can all be considered different theories of knowledge.



Paul manata said:


> Knowledge: Warranted true belief, where warrant is defined as that quantity, enough of which turns true belief into knowledge...


That works for me. I think the rest is more of an epistemology then a definition of knowledge. 

I guess before I "interact" with more of Paul's definitions, I should give my own definitions - which I will in my next post.


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## Civbert

Knowledge - justified true belief. 

Epistemology - a theory of knowledge.

Scripturalism - (the epistemology of) - that the Bible alone is God's Word, and therefore all scriptures, and whatever can be deduced therefrom, are justified true beliefs and are therefore knowledge.


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## Civbert

Now let me look at bit at Paul's definition of scripturalism.



Paul manata said:


> Scripturalism: The worldview which claims that the Bible is the axiom from which to start.


That's about it as far as the epistemology goes.



Paul manata said:


> Empiricism cannot yield knowledge.


I certainly agree with this, but it's not part of the definition of scripturalism. 



Paul manata said:


> Knowledge must be certain and, therefore, one must use sound and valid deductive arguments which guarantee the truth of the conclusion and, thus, can be said to be known.


 This isn't a part of the definition of scripturalism. And personally, I disagree that knowledge must be certain.




Paul manata said:


> Since one starts with the infallibility of revelation, one has, on that axiom, true propositions.


Certainly.




Paul manata said:


> If one reasons validly from true propositions, one will have a certain conclusion.


Again, "certainty" is not the issue. All scripturalism asserts is that since the propositions of scripture are true, so too are all propositions which can be validly deduced from scripture true. This is simply a consequence of saying the propositions of scripture are true. 




Paul manata said:


> Since all truth is in the mind of God, therefore we can only know that which is either expressly set down in revelation, or that which can be deduced from revelation; as the confession says - by good an necessary inference.


 
I don't know about this "we can only know...". But I don't know of any other propositions one can justify true then those of scripture and those deduced from them. If there is any other way to show a proposition is justified true, I'm open to learning what that is. 



Paul manata said:


> (I hope that was fine for a succinct statement But, Anthony, feel free to correct me, or offer your own definition.)


 
I think you brought up some important issues - and not just for scripturalism. Certainty is an important issue for epistemology in general. I think it's debatable if it is a necessary ingredient for "knowledge". But "certainty" could be one desideratum of an epistemology, and one which scripturalism offers and other's lack. 

Also, in common usage of "know", it means those things one is certain of. "I just _know_ she loves me or she wouldn't have bought me that gold chain. It _proves_ her love is true." Here we have "know" and "proves" used colloquially. But is "she loves me" a _justified true belief_? Does her buying a gold chain for him _logically_ prove her love is true? 

Empiricism seems to be an issue that comes up from time to time. Mainly because of the idea that knowledge gained through reading or hearing is the knowledge described by the epistemology called empiricism. While reading and hearing does require the use of our senses, it is not really empirical. Empirical knowledge would be knowledge that is gained _only_ through sensory input. 

On the other hand, "empirical data" is generally observational data about an object like color, texture, shape. If you _read_ about the yellow rose that is 1 foot tall, that is not empirical data. If you observe a rose and conclude it is yellow and 1 foot tall, that is technically _empirical_ _data_ (data from observation), but that itself is not "empiricism" because the ideas of "yellow" and "1-foot" are concepts that are a priori to the observation of the rose. Empiricism says that knowledge is based solely on sensory input. That means nothing is a priori to the sensations. You must start with the mind completely blank, then give is sensations like sight and sound, and produce propositions. If you add none-sensory information (like words and ideas passed on from parents), then you've undermined the theory of empiricism. This gets us into theories of language and I'm sure a true empiricist will give an evolutionary theory of language to explain it.


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## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> How is justification being understood. Deontologically?


I don't think so. I think one could say something is justified if it is accountable. If it can be shown to be the case. I think there are whole areas of philosophy dedicated to "justification" in this sense. But I think simply to say that something is justified if it can be accounted for.



Paul manata said:


> You said you agree with my definition of knowledge (the "rest" was my definition of 'warrant' and, therefore, part of the definition of knowledge), but my definition is externalist. JTB is usually considered as an internalist definition because of the notion of duty that is tied in with the idea of 'justification.'.


 
Could you explain the ideas of "internalist" and "externalist" . I read something about them on a philosophy site, and the idea the JTB was insufficient due to the Gettier (sp?) problems. Ironically, the Gettier problems presumed empiricism was the valid epistemology. But I might be crossing some wires.




Paul manata said:


> Do you place an infallibilst constraint on knowledge?


 
Not that I know of. 
I do think this is another desideratum of epistemology, but not a deal breaker. 




Paul manata said:


> Does the possibility of being wrong about P mean that one can't know P?


No. Not in my opinion. If that were the case, could we know anything. I guess you mean being wrong about P being true - that you think P is justified true, but you could be wrong. Well anyone could be wrong. I could misunderstand scripture, or be mistaken in my deductive reasoning. But I don't think one have to personally deduce something to know it. But, if P is scripture, it is true, and if Q is correctly deduced from scripture, it too is true. 




Paul manata said:


> Wasn't God speaking to Adam "God's word?" Wasn't all the things Jesus said that were not written down, God's Word?


Sure. And Adam would have justified true belief. But since it was not written down in scripture, we can't know it. Now, if God reveals something to you directly (enlightens your mind to some truth), that is a justified true belief. But it's not very useful since you can not pass that justification true belief on to me. I guess, if I believe it, I know it in a sense. But (you like this), I don't think I'd know that I knew it. There ought to be some means of knowing what we know, even if it is not essential. We know a lot of things we don't know we know in my opinion.  




Paul manata said:


> Can you know anything that is not deducible from scriptural propositions?


Yes. But I think my prior comments show the problem. What ever God reveals to us is knowledge. But something revealed to our minds in such a direct fashion could not be shared. Is this related to the internalist/externalist issues? 

Anyway, I think there are internal and external perspectives to knowledge. Knowledge is in a sense completely independent of man, since all truth is God's mind. And so, any belief a man has that is also a proposition God knows, would be knowledge. But one a practical level, what good is knowledge we don't know we know? Isn't that a more important part of epistemology? If we can't have some guidance in determining what is justifiable true, then how can we say we know what we think we know. I think these are interesting things one needs to consider. 




Paul manata said:


> Your definition (if you deny my question directly above) would allow non-Scripturalists to be Scripturalists. Of course we can know what follows necessarily from true propositions.


 I'm not sure what you mean. Do you mean that I think non-Scripturalists can know things, yes I do think non-Scripturalists can know things. Can they justify knowing things, no I don't think they can.


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## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> I have so much to say Anthony. Mainly because you're not really presenting us with a standard Scripturalist epistemology.


Actually I have. But I think the details may work out differently between different _Scripturalists_. The standard Scripturalist epistemology is simply: Knowledge is the Scriptures and what can be deduced from Scripture. The only difference between what I wrote and Cheung is I don't make the claim *all* knowledge is... That is simply because I like to use terms like "all" in the deductive logical sense of "each and every". 

But I think Cheung would agree that God has not revealed all his knowledge, and that God has revealed some knowledge to individuals that is not recorded in Scripture. But for a statement of epistemology, using all in a less vigorous fashion is reasonable because the knowledge available outside of scripturalism is nigh impossible to justify. It may be a knowledge that one can never "know" you know. Ya know? 

One can be even more general I suppose and say knowledge is only what God reveals. But I think Van Til, Bahnsen, Clark, John Robbins, and Cheung (to name a few presuppositionalists and Scripturalists) would agree with the statement that for the Christian world-view, God's Word is the Foundation of Knowledge. Isn't that a chapter in Bahnsen's book? 



Paul manata said:


> ...
> 
> Previously you have supported Vincent Cheung. You have said that there's not much you disagree with him on. Having said that, how do you reconcile what you've said above with the position Vince calls Scripturalism. Specifically, for now, I'm thinking of what you said in response to my asking:
> 
> _Can you know anything that is not deducible from scriptural propositions?_
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> _"Yes."_
> 
> Cheung states:
> 
> 
> 
> Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview,* so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best*. This biblical epistemology necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics. Any other epistemology is indefensible, and unavoidably collapses into self-contradictory skepticism. (p. 43; cf. “Systematic Theology,” p. 18 para. 4, p. 22 para. 5, p. 41 fn. 42)
Click to expand...

I think I covered that question in the prior comments. I think the statement is correct as it applied to the knowledge men can share between them. From a Christian worldview perspective, God's Word is the foundation of all knowledge.

I'm not certain about Chueng's scripturalism in all it's details, but it works as a solid system of epistemology - so I have few problems with it. It may not agree with my views in detail, but we are getting beyond the essentials of scripturalism and into the finer details for working it out. 



Paul manata said:


> When you say that you don't hold to an infallibilist constraint, how do you take these statements by Cheung:
> 
> 
> 
> However, all the “seems like” *could* be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don’t know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone. (“Arguing By Intuition,” pp. 3-4)
Click to expand...

I'm not sure what this has to do with the so-called "infallibilist constraint". I would think a good epistemology should have less guesswork and better justification than offered by intuition. 

Maybe you can explain what an "infallibilist constraint" is in general. Every place I've looked points to papal infallibility. Well the reformers threw out papal infallibility and turned to scriptural infallibility. I agree with the in-errancy and infallibility of scripture. If that makes scripturalism infallible - I'm all for it. 

(PS - when I google "infallibilist constraint" all I got were links to this board and aquascum's screed. I thought "infallibilst constraint" was a standard epistemological term of objection. Maybe aquascum made up the term. Or maybe one of his professors did. It does not seem to be a standard category in epistemology.)

(PPS - having better luck with "infallibilist epistemology". But I haven't figured out if "infallibilist" is anything more than a neutral term. If I get time, I'll read some more and see what I can see. ) 



Paul manata said:


> Clearly Cheung rejects arguing by intuition because it "could be" the case that their intuition is wrong. Whereas in Chueng's epistemology, he clearly thinks that he could not be wrong since he holds to infallibilism. ...


Cheung does consider scripturalism to be infallible in principle - in the same sense that logical deduction is infallible. He doesn't say that people are infallible, and do not need to be to have knowledge. So I don't understand you point. It might be helpful to explain terms such as "infallibilist" and internalist and externalist in regular language. Most people reading this will not understand this technical/philosophical jargon, and if it can't be said in regular speech, then I find it suspect. 



Paul manata said:


> ... His arguments, says he, are "irrefutable and invincible." One only claims that if one holds an infallibilist constraint on knowledge.


 Well so far he has been right. But if the "infallibilist constraint" means one can not know something unless one can know it infallibly, then I don't think Cheung says this. It's one thing to say ones system is irrefutable and invincible, but that does not imply that Scripturalists can never be wrong. We are all sinners and incapable of perfect understanding. What we do know, ultimately, is by God's grace and power. You agree that in order to correctly discern scripture, one is completely dependent on the Holy Spirit. Yes? So whatever truth the Spirit reveals to your mind, will be infallibly true. 




Paul manata said:


> Next, what do you mean by a belief B is justified if B can "be shown to be the case?" In other words, are you saying that for S to know that P, P must be true, P must be believed, and S must be able to "show that P is the case?" What is the nature of this 'showing?'


If proposition B is deducible from Scripture, then B is a justified true proposition. 



Paul manata said:


> Lastly, above you seemed to question whether you held to internalism. And, you seemed a bit unsure about T.E. Wilder's question about 'knowing that you know.' Well, how do you regard Cheung here, then:
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, but unless you can show how you know at any given instance whether that particular sensation is reliable or not, then you can’t show how you could trust any given instance of sensation.
> 
> http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/04...and-empiricism
Click to expand...

Sounds correct to me. Tell me, how do you know when you know something? We can go round and round over this internalism/externalism but it doesn't' really effect scripturalism. 



Paul manata said:


> Anyway, if you can clarify those, I'll be back sometime later to respond.


Oy! Did I clarify anything?? I hope so, but I'm not sure about some of these issues. I have my opinions on them, some more strongly held then others. But mostly they are just opinions and from speaking with Cheung, I think he would agree they are not necessarily critical issues. They are very interesting and worth study, and could be important too. But I don't know if they are issues we can perfectly settle. As I said before, none seem to be deal breakers. I could be wrong so I'm happy to be further educated.

P.S. I've covered a lot of stuff so please don't feel rushed. I know you wanted to address some other questions I asked in the prior posts and I'd be happy to have to answer those before you address all that was covered in this post.

P.P.S. To *tewilder *and *polemic_turtle*,I did answer your questions, I don't want you to miss them since this thread has grown long and it was earlier on that I replied. I'd like others to participate and maybe help us clear up some of the questions I'm a little fuzzy on. Any Scripturalists out there want to add some comments?? Paul and I could easily dominate this thread but others may have more interesting comments and insights than I do.


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## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> If proposition B is deducible from Scripture, then B is a justified true proposition.
> 
> 
> 
> Is the above quote necessary and sufficient?
Click to expand...

Sure. 



Paul manata said:


> Is the above quote justified?


I think so. 




Paul manata said:


> If so, is the above quote deducible from Scripture?


 Yes. I believe we can deduce the laws of logic and rules of inference from Scripture. It would kind of be like reverse engineering. But the procedure would be in effect to say, if Scripture follows the laws of logic (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) then the laws are validated by scripture. Van Til said all things conform to the law of contradiction (LC), Clark said language and meaning depend on the LC. Since scripture is language, and it is meaningful, then it must be the case that scripture affirms the laws of logic. 

Second, if arguments in scripture use the rules of inference, then the rules of inference are valid. And indeed, the rules of inference are found in arguments given by Christ himself. So that's good enough for me. 

The above quote is merely a statement that says that if a statement is true, then what ever can be deduced from it by "good and necessary consequences" is also true. This is also confirmed by the WCF. 




Paul manata said:


> (P.S. P usually stands for proposition, B for belief.)


 
B is still a proposition. Since the belief B is also justified true, then B is also knowledge.


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## Magma2

tewilder said:


> Here are a few questions I have wanted to see Scripturalists take on:
> 
> Would you say the scripturalism is a form of classical foundationalism?



It could be, but I suppose it's all in how you define "classical foundationalism" since I've come across some definitions which would seem compatible with Scripturalism, others not so much. If you mean that in order for any system of thought to start it must start somewhere, then I think, yes, Scripturalism, being a more consistent form of biblical presuppositionalism is concerning with where one starts.



> How do you regard the old saws such as "You don't know unless you know you know."



Why would this be an old saw? Or, has it simply been abandoned since non-Christian epistemology has been unable to produce or account for any knowledge at all?



> Is the method my which you acquire familiarity with the axioms of Scripture relevant to whether they can properly be taken as axioms?



I think the method of Scripturalism is nicely summed up in WCF 1.5. Technically, I don't think there is any divergence between WCF 1 and Scripturalism. Prior to Dr. Robbins coining the phrase Clark would refer to his position as the "Westminster Principle" (see Clark's response to Mavordes for example) among other names over the years including "Dogmatism."


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## Magma2

polemic_turtle said:


> Just wondering, do you derogate common sense observations such as your existance as mere "opinions"? For another one, which I know you must get a lot, how do you consider the need for empirical data to receive the Scriptures( eg. sight, hearing )? If I cannot be said to know anything through experience, then I cannot know whether what I'm reading as Scripture should be what I attempt to construct my ideas from, etc.. What do you say?



I say many confuse arbitrary marks on a page with Scripture, but Scripture consists of propositions and imperatives, none of which can be perceived with the eyes or the ears. To hear or see in Scripture is a metaphor for the enlightening work of the Spirit. It has to do with intellection and not sensation. As Jesus said repeatedly; "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The problem, of course, is most to whom the word comes do not hear or see and the reason is because their minds have been darkened (see Eph. 4:17,18 and elsewhere). Ezek 12:2; Son of man, thou dwellest in the midst of a rebellious house, which have eyes to see, and see not; they have ears to hear, and hear not: for they are a rebellious house. Their problem is not that their eyesight is bad or they're in need of hearing aids, rather their minds are alienated from God in Christ who said His very words are spirit and life. Biblically one comes to know the truth and grow in the truth the same way they come to be saved, and that by the grace of God alone.


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## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> Well, I don't hold to it as a necessary or sufficient condition.



Since when are you the standard bearer of all things epistemological? Actually, you might be a good reason to bring back that old saw.  




> I suggest Civbert re-title the thread and change it to "Civbert's Version of The Epistemology of Scripturalism"



The "Shotgun" Manata attempt at divide and conquer. Having to deal with what Gordon Clark thought and wrote might be asking too much, since Scripturalism is, after all, a reference to Clark's philosophic distinctives, not Anthony's, mine or anyone else's. I suppose that way you can thump your chest and think you've actually accomplished something.


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## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> So to "show" that P is the case, one must be able to deduce P from scriptural propositions, or P must be a proposition in Scripture itself? That is, S shows that P _iff _ S can deduce P from scriptural propositions, or S knows that P is a proposition in Scripture.
> 
> If one can't "show" (where show is defined above) that P is the case, then one can't know that P? Right?


Not sure if the "if and only if" is warranted. It is sufficient to say that if one can demonstrate the P is scripture or deducible ,then S is justified in claiming to know P. That seems self evident. Do you agree?

My reply earlier was that a belief (proposition) is a justified true belief, if an account for the truth of B can be given. But I did not say if S must actually show B is true in order to know it. Maybe he does, maybe he doesn't. If he doesn't, does that mean he doesn't know B? Maybe it is sufficient for B to be deducible, even if not personally deduced by S. Maybe S need only have a reasonable belief that B is deducible from Scripture. Or maybe he can need only believe B is true and for B to be a JTB. These are all interesting questions, but again, they are not critical to Scripturalist epistemology. 




Paul manata said:


> I'm just talking about people in our epistemic situation right now. Not Adam, or the people who heard Jesus, etc. Us now. So, for a subject S in our current epistemic situation E, to know that P, S must believe that P, P must be true, and S must 'show' that P, where 'show' means S must be able to deduce P from scriptural propositions, or P must itself be a Scriptural proposition. ...


 I'm not committed to S having to show P is true to know P. I am committed that the truth of P should be at least show_able_ if S is to be reasonable certain and aware that P is justified as knowledge.




Paul manata said:


> ... Negatively, if S believes P, and P is true, and S cannot "show" (deduce from scriptural propositions, or P is a proposition in Scripture) that P, then S in E does not know P. ...


 That really depends on what on considers sufficient justification for claiming to know P doesn't it? 

Scripturalism at face value only says that P is knowledge if it is Scripture or deducible therefrom. It doesn't say S must personally deduce P. It seems fair to ask how S knows P, what are his epistemic presuppositions regarding knowledge. Is he using assumptions about his perceptions (some sort of empiricism), or some sort of rationalism, or is does he presume mysticism. Personally, I think if he believes P and P is deducible from scripture, then S has knowledge - but he can not justify that knowledge personally. Others, maybe Van Til might say this - believe that non-believers know nothing what-so-ever. I've seen people switch around about this. 

I tend to lean toward an externalist view of knowledge - in that knowledge has epistemic existence outside of the mind of man, and that many will have knowledge they can not justify simply because they believe truths revealed by God, but they can not give any account of that knowledge. This is true for the knowledge of God's existence which all men are born with and suppress. I don't think one needs to even be aware of the knowledge they hold for them to know it. 

But I think the internalist view is valid if one wishes to justify to himselves what he knows. And for the Christen, he should test propositions against scripture. If it contradicts scripture, clearly it is false. If it coherent with scripture, it is at least a reasonable opinion. If it is deducible from scripture, then the Christian personally knows (is aware) that it is true. 




Paul manata said:


> .... And so this would be the how the Scripturalist grants the honorific title of "s/he knows that P" to S in E, have I got that about right?


Maybe. Maybe not. 




Paul manata said:


> _Originally Posted by Paul manata_
> (P.S. P usually stands for proposition, B for belief.)
> 
> _Originally Posted by civbert_
> B is still a proposition. Since the belief B is also justified true, then B is also knowledge.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Not quite. A belief B is not a proposition P, rather B is a positive cognitive attitude *toward* a P.
Click to expand...

Who's B are we dealing with here?  True, you introduced the B shorthand for belief, but you were asking me "what do you mean by a belief B is justified if B can "be shown to be the case?". Clearly my B is a proposition believed, not simply a "positive cognitive attitude". It is a _proposition_ one has a "positive cognitive attitude" toward. 



Paul manata said:


> A belief is not knowledge, because, as you said, knowledge is JTB.


"_A_ belief" or just "_belief_".



Paul manata said:


> B may be necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient, as you yourself said.


 Here you're addressing a different issue, if it is sufficient to believe a proposition to know it. That is "belief" in the abstract, not *a* belief that is "shown to be the case". We don't show "belief" to be the case, we show the proposition B is the case (i.e. true). 

Anyhow, For _a_ belief to be a JTB, then B must a least be a proposition believed. But "belief" itself can not be knowledge becausea "positive epistemic attitude" is non-propositional, and knowledge itself is propositional. Let's get our B's in order. Huh?



Paul manata said:


> {I know I said I'd respond in full later, but I'm trying to make sure I have *your* version of Scripturalism nailed down first.}


My version is essentially the same as Robbins, Clark, and even Cheung. It even works with Bahnsen and possible Van Til.


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## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> Well, I don't hold to it as a necessary or sufficient condition.
> 
> And so we have Civbert saying he's unsure about an internalist constraint, and Magma explicitly endorsing one.
> 
> So, what *is* the "epistemology of Scripturalism" (the title of the thread)? Is an internalist constraint part of the package or not? Is Civbert putting forth Scripturalist epistemology, or is Magma, or Cheung?
> 
> I suggest Civbert re-title the thread and change it to "Civbert's Version of The Epistemology of Scripturalism"



It's not an either/or situation. The issue of internalist/externalist is not a necessary element to Scripturalism. The epistemology of Scripturalism is (once again) that knowledge is the propositions of Scripture and that which can be deduced from Scripture by "good and necessary consequences".  

That's it. So what's next? I don't mind answer questions about how I think it works, but when it comes to extream details, then it's really my opinion.


----------



## Civbert

Magma2 said:


> ...I think the method of Scripturalism is nicely summed up in WCF 1.5. Technically, I don't think there is any divergence between WCF 1 and Scripturalism. Prior to Dr. Robbins coining the phrase Clark would refer to his position as the "Westminster Principle" (see Clark's response to Mavordes for example) among other names over the years including "Dogmatism."



Good point.


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## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> And so we have Civbert saying he's unsure about an internalist constraint, and Magma explicitly endorsing one.



Paul, then what *were* you endorsing in your debate with Dan Barker? As I recall much, if not all, of your debate consisted of your demanding he account for his many truth statements in opposition to Christianity and your demonstrating that his arguments in his defense were insufficient. It seems to me that the externalist have basically relinquished the battlefield -- just when they had the enemy on the run. Rather than an account, reliablists have simply made the Christian faith, or, more properly theism, something respectable at Yale and that's about it. Did your recognition that Van Tilianism has failed to live up to your expectations lead to your defection?


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## MW

Anthony, I would be interested to know if Scripturalism depends upon the idea that all revelation is propositional and not in any sense personal. From a Westminster tradition perspective, I am surprised when I find any epistemic claim omitting the testimony of the Spirit. Blessings!


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## Magma2

armourbearer said:


> Anthony, I would be interested to know if Scripturalism depends upon the idea that all revelation is propositional and not in any sense personal. From a Westminster tradition perspective, I am surprised when I find any epistemic claim omitting the testimony of the Spirit. Blessings!



While I don't want to answer for Anthony, please see above concerning WCF 1.5 and the role the Spirit plays, and must play, in the acquisition of knowledge (rightly defined). Beyond that, all revelation IS personal for in Scripture we have "the mind of Christ." It also is complete, coherent and sufficient, contra the Van Tilian, for the perfect has come. However, if you're suggesting that there is a person apart from the propositions he thinks, or that the Spirit speaks or acts apart and independent from the propositions revealed, please feel free to advance your argument here Rev. Winzer. I'm confident that is not your position, but I've been wrong before


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## MW

Sean, it's not my intention to offer a critique of scripturalism, only to point out that Anthony's presentation of it omitted reference to the testimony of the Spirit. The testimony of the Spirit is always by and with the Word. That is not at issue.

In theological discourse, "personal" revelation does not refer to the person knowing but to the Person known. Revelation does not begin with propositions or axiomatic principles, but with the Person of Jesus Christ. It is the Person of Christ who gives meaning both to the ink spots on the page (empirical) and the propositions which those ink spots represent (rational). The personal revelation of Christ by the power of the Spirit (faith) is as much needed to account for the objects of sense as the objects of the mind.


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Anthony, I would be interested to know if Scripturalism depends upon the idea that all revelation is propositional and not in any sense personal. From a Westminster tradition perspective, I am surprised when I find any epistemic claim omitting the testimony of the Spirit. Blessings!



Thanks for the question Rev. Winzer. 

I'm not sure I see any dichotomy between the propositional and the personal. But the role of the Spirit in Scripturalism is, in my opinion, vital. The text we find in our Bibles in not Scripture per say, but a means by which the propositional truths of Scripture are conveyed to the believer/regenerate/reader. The exact same propositional truths can be conveyed in many different languages, and through various interpretations and translations. The reason is first that a proposition is the meaning of the statements in a text, and in order to correctly understand the meaning of the Bible texts, one depends on the Spirit. 

The Spirit enlightens the mind by making us understand the truths (propositions) of Scripture. Without the Person of the Spirit working in our minds, we would be entirely dependent on our unreliable minds and senses - just a little better off than the rationalist and empiricists. 

The Person of the Spirit works within our minds - literally renewing andand transforming our minds to the truths of the Word of God, which is literally Christ Jesus. The Person of Christ Jesus is known personally by knowing the Word (Scripture), and this by the working of the Person of the Spirit. I can't see how it can get any more personal then to know the propositions of the Word.

I hope that answered your question - I'm not sure I understood it. I think Sean's answer also reinforces what I've said here.


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Sean, it's not my intention to offer a critique of scripturalism, ...



I wouldn't mind. 




armourbearer said:


> ... only to point out that Anthony's presentation of it omitted reference to the testimony of the Spirit. The testimony of the Spirit is always by and with the Word. That is not at issue.



You are correct. I hadn't gotten to that point. The testimony of the Spirit not clearly inferable by my presentation of Scripturalism, but I know of no Scripturalist that would nothing less than the testimony of the Spirit is a vital component to a sound Christian worldview. Of course, one need not be a Scripturalist to agree. 




armourbearer said:


> In theological discourse, "personal" revelation does not refer to the person knowing but to the Person known. Revelation does not begin with propositions or axiomatic principles, but with the Person of Jesus Christ. ...



I'm not sure I understand. I agree revelation begins with the Person of Jesus Christ. But I also believe that the Person of Jesus Christ is the Word of God, and the Word of God is propositional. To know the Word is to know Christ. 



armourbearer said:


> ... It is the Person of Christ who gives meaning both to the ink spots on the page (empirical) and the propositions which those ink spots represent (rational). The personal revelation of Christ by the power of the Spirit (faith) is as much needed to account for the objects of sense as the objects of the mind.



I'm not sure exactly what it means to "give meaning to" something. It sounds good to me. I just have an aversion to embracing any statements I don't really understand. It's one of the reasons I have a strong aversion to the mystical elements most Christians seem so fond of. But I'm not criticizing your words or inferring they are mysticism. I'm just confessing my uncertain comprehension of them. We may be in full agreement.


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## Magma2

armourbearer said:


> Sean, it's not my intention to offer a critique of scripturalism, only to point out that Anthony's presentation of it omitted reference to the testimony of the Spirit. The testimony of the Spirit is always by and with the Word. That is not at issue.
> 
> In theological discourse, "personal" revelation does not refer to the person knowing but to the Person known.



And I would hope you agree that the person known could not be known at all apart from (propositional) self-revelation. How many times have I heard a variant of the pietistic nonsense about knowing a person and not a proposition. I recall a powerful piece by Machen railing against such anti-intellectual religiosity posing as Christian faith. In theological discourse personal revelation means many things to many people, not much of which has anything to do with the God of Scripture. Regardless, in the beginning was the Word.




> Revelation does not begin with propositions or axiomatic principles, but with the Person of Jesus Christ. It is the Person of Christ who gives meaning both to the ink spots on the page (empirical) and the propositions which those ink spots represent (rational). The personal revelation of Christ by the power of the Spirit (faith) is as much needed to account for the objects of sense as the objects of the mind.



Not exactly sure what you mean that revelation does not begin with propositions since only propositions can be either true or false and the God of Scripture is the Lord God of Truth. If you mean that the Spirit's intimidate illumination is necessary for a man to know anything at all and that you were concerned that His work was absent from the discussion, no problem.


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## MW

Anthony and Sean, does knowing the proposition mean one ipso facto knows the Person?


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Anthony and Sean, does knowing the proposition mean one ipso facto knows the Person?



Yes. To know proposition_s_ of Scripture, is to know the Word, is to know the Person Christ. 

To know me, you would need to know my beliefs, my opinions, what I know. It means to know what I have faith in, how I reason, what I think is important, the sins I struggle with, the things I love. These are all propositions that I hold in my mind. 

Knowledge is propositional. So to know a person is to know propositions that person thinks. In the case of Christ, it is the propositions He has revealed to us in Scripture.

P.S. This all fits in with Scripturalism.


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## MW

Civbert said:


> Yes. To know proposition_s_ of Scripture, is to know the Word, is to know the Person Christ.



This is the point at which I believe Scripturalism departs from the reformed faith. WHAT the Bible teaches is only the "form" of knowledge. When one knows WHOM they have believed, then they have true knowledge, with the power thereof. Blessings!


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> This is the point at which I believe Scripturalism departs from the reformed faith. WHAT the Bible teaches is only the "form" of knowledge. When one knows WHOM they have believed, then they have true knowledge, with the power thereof. Blessings!



No, that is where you believe _Anthony_ departs from the reformed faith. What I wrote was not Scripturalism itself, but a position that I believe is coherent with Scripturalism. That is why I added the P.S..

Now the rest is getting further off track, but I am curious what you believe it means to know a person. 

I am also curous what you mean by the ""form" of knowledge". What is this "form", and how is it that "what" the Bible teaches it is _not _knowledge. 

For that matter, what is your definition of "knowledge"?

Finally, how can it be that one can believe "WHAT" the bible teaches and escape then believing in the WHOM of the bible. It seems to me that if you dont' believe in the whom the bible is speaking of, then ipso facto you don't really believe "what" the bible is teaching. Because what the Bible teaches is nothing if it is not Jesus Christ.

You're not one of these guys who goes around saying "you need to experience a personal relationship with Jesus" are you? 

Jesus Christ _is_ the Word of God. Scripture is the Word of God. I see no departure from the reformed faith here. What it means to "know" a person is up for debate.


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## MW

Anthony, though you think your view is an addendum to Scripturalism, I would regard it as the heart of the position. It is only on the assumption that revelation is entirely propositional that an assimilation with idealism can be made.

Concerning the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM, please consider the apostle's discussion of the Jews' "form of knowledge" in Rom. 2:17-24. Blessings!


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## Magma2

> This is the point at which I believe Scripturalism departs from the reformed faith. WHAT the Bible teaches is only the "form" of knowledge. When one knows WHOM they have believed, then they have true knowledge, with the power thereof. Blessings!



Hardly a blessing if Scripturalism is a departure from the Reformed faith. Of course, if what you call the Reformed faith is a departure from the Scriptures then a blessing it is! After all, there are many men calling themselves Reformed who have departed in one place or another from Scripture, some even deny justification is by belief alone. So without something more substantial, your objection really has no force. It amounts to name calling.



> Concerning the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM, please consider the apostle's discussion of the Jews' "form of knowledge" in Rom. 2:17-24. Blessings!



So is the Scripturalism of Gordon Clark guilty of a form of Phariseeism? You will need to do considerably more to back up this charge. The Reformed faith in the form of the Westminster Confession posits the Scriptures, the Word of God, first and necessarily prior to all that follows, so is the WCF guilty of a form of Phariseeism? I hardly think so. 

You assert the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM which is undeniable, but a form of knowledge is not knowledge. It has the appearance of wisdom, but denies the truth. Paul also talks about those who are ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. Many of these are religionists too, some even posing as Christians. So what? You still haven’t shown there is a “whom” to know apart from knowing at least something of what he thinks. To know Christ -- to come to know any person -- is to know what He thinks and to know what Jesus thinks is to come to know the propositions of Scripture, the mind of Christ. Can anyone come to know Jesus Christ apart from Scripture? If so, I’d love to see your demonstration. Yet, Paul says the message the gospel, these very propositions, is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes. Jesus said His very words are spirit and they are life. John 20:31; “But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.” To come to know that Jesus is the Christ is to know what is written. 

Just as an aside, and not directed at you, despite those who want to greatly lower the epistemic threshold from logically sound arguments to nebulous, questionable, poorly defined and even fallacious “reliable processes,” knowledge is justified true belief. Ironically, Paul Manata who claims not to hold to the archaic idea that knowledge is justified true belief, when doing apologetics and when confronting atheists like Dan Barker, attacked the **reasons** for their non or anti-Christian beliefs. Maybe he doesn't do that now, but he certainly did in the debates I've listened to and read. He didn’t seem content to allow Barker for example the comfort of maintaining his beliefs even if they were the result of a reliable, albeit a non-Christian, belief-forming process.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> P.P.S. To *tewilder *and *polemic_turtle*,I did answer your questions, I don't want you to miss them since this thread has grown long and it was earlier on that I replied. I'd like others to participate and maybe help us clear up some of the questions I'm a little fuzzy on. Any Scripturalists out there want to add some comments?? Paul and I could easily dominate this thread but others may have more interesting comments and insights than I do.



I asked about classical foundationalism, because that is something that has come under a lot of critique, and is widely rejected today, by people who are still a sort of foundationalist, e.g. the Reformed Epistemology people. 

In your answer, you just talk about foundationalism, which suggests to me that you are not in touch with the literature of the last twenty years. 

I also asked about the "old saw" that "You don't know unless you know you know.", which is a typically classical foundationalist distinctive, as a way, really, of repeating my first question. 

I take it from the answer to both that you are not engaged with these issues. But that reinforces my impression of Scripturalism, and in fact of the apologetics wars in general. That impression is that it lost touch with the intellectual universe decades ago, and has became a side show for those who, for no good reason, continue to be preoccupied with Cartesian standards of knowledge.

I have come to the conclusion that the whole concept of apologetics as this sort of system building is misconceived. The problem I have with Scripturalism in particular, though, is that the writers say so little, and with such little clarity, that it is impossible to attribute exact epistemological views to them.


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## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Anthony, though you think your view is an addendum to Scripturalism, I would regard it as the heart of the position. It is only on the assumption that revelation is entirely propositional that an assimilation with idealism can be made.


I'm really not following you. What is this idealism you speak of and how is it a departure from reformed thought. And I still see no reason to claim my view of revelation (revealed knowledge) as propositional is a problem.




armourbearer said:


> Concerning the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM, please consider the apostle's discussion of the Jews' "form of knowledge" in Rom. 2:17-24. Blessings!


I look up the verses and they were interesting - especially verse 20.



> an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of babes, having the form of knowledge and truth in the law.
> (Rom 2:20 nkj)



I read this is a confirmation of Scripturalism. The Bible both the truth, and the start of knowledge (form of knowledge). Paul seems to be asserting that Bible is a foundation for knowledge. The truths of the Bible are also the pattern on which more knowledge can be derived. From Scriptural truths, more knowledge can be deduced. 

see Romans 15:4, Proverbs 22:19-21, Luke 1:3-4

[bible]Romans 15:4[/bible]
[bible]Proverbs 22:19-21[/bible]
[bible]Luk 1:3-4[/bible]


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> I asked about classical foundationalism, because that is something that has come under a lot of critique, and is widely rejected today, by people who are still a sort of foundationalist, e.g. the Reformed Epistemology people.
> 
> In your answer, you just talk about foundationalism, which suggests to me that you are not in touch with the literature of the last twenty years.


Maybe so. I can't say that I am really up on contemporary philosophy. But from what I've read about the historical developments in philosophy (and logic), I don't think the field has necessarily progressed - especially recently. I don't assume the field is evolving - it does seem more obscure.

I would like to better understand modern philosophies (e.g. existentialism) just so I can better engage people who have been corrupted by it - but it is more important to engage the common man rather than the academics and intelligentsia. 



tewilder said:


> I also asked about the "old saw" that "You don't know unless you know you know.", which is a typically classical foundationalist distinctive, as a way, really, of repeating my first question. I take it from the answer to both that you are not engaged with these issues. But that reinforces my impression of Scripturalism, and in fact of the apologetics wars in general.


That's fine. Would you care to explain your concerns (if any) and how they relate to foundationalism? If there's an "issue" I should be engaged in, I'd really like to know what it is. No ones really raised any clear problems with Scripturalism so if there is something that could be a problem with it, I'm all ears. 



tewilder said:


> That impression is that it lost touch with the intellectual universe decades ago, and has became a side show for those who, for no good reason, continue to be preoccupied with Cartesian standards of knowledge.


Really? How so? What's the new-and-improved that has developed in the last decade? 



tewilder said:


> I have come to the conclusion that the whole concept of apologetics as this sort of system building is misconceived. The problem I have with Scripturalism in particular, though, is that the writers say so little, and with such little clarity, that it is impossible to attribute exact epistemological views to them.


Wow! That's harsh. I think one of the strength of Scripturalism is that it is speaks with great clarity. I really have trouble with this kind of declaration - given without any supporting reasons or evidence. You may be right, but you have given me very little to judge your conclusion on.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> Maybe so. I can't say that I am really up on contemporary philosophy. But from what I've read about the historical developments in philosophy (and logic), I don't think the field has necessarily progressed - especially recently. I don't assume the field is evolving - it does seem more obscure.
> 
> I would like to better understand modern philosophies (e.g. existentialism) just so I can better engage people who have been corrupted by it - but it is more important to engage the common man rather than the academics and intelligentsia.
> 
> 
> That's fine. Would you care to explain your concerns (if any) and how they relate to foundationalism? If there's an "issue" I should be engaged in, I'd really like to know what it is. No ones really raised any clear problems with Scripturalism so if there is something that could be a problem with it, I'm all ears.
> 
> 
> Really? How so? What's the new-and-improved that has developed in the last decade?
> 
> 
> Wow! That's harsh. I think one of the strength of Scripturalism is that it is speaks with great clarity. I really have trouble with this kind of declaration - given without any supporting reasons or evidence. You may be right, but you have given me very little to judge your conclusion on.



You could get Plantinga's three volume work on warranted belief and come up with something comparable for Scripturalism, and then we could see whether it held up. 

As it is, we have no clue about what Scripturalism would look like. All Biblical exposition, commentaries, etc. (including Clark's) are done on the basis hermeneutics that grasps the meaning of language from a full cultural life experience, in order to get back of the metaphor to separate out what is the intended meaning. 

No on has ever done Scripturalist exegesis to get to those axioms of Scripture. If you take the language of Scripture as it is, it is full of metaphor and contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language, which is useless as an axiomatic system. If you go for the meaning, you are immediately beyond the metal processes of logic. 

Since all Biblical interpretation that has ever been done presupposes the reality of prior human knowledge including a pretty good grasp of what the world it like, so that we bring a competence with language to the reading of Scripture, we don't know what Scripturalism as useful knowledge would even begin to look like.


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## Civbert

*Rant on the "Experts"*

I want to add that I find it suspect when people use technical jargon and references to highly specialized concepts and theories, but have a great deal of trouble explaining themselves or speaking in familiar terms. I know, sometimes this is due to simple laziness and lack of time and energy to explain things one considers "basic knowledge", but I find this kind of elitism questionable. 

No one wants to challenge the expert for fear of being belittled. There is a fear that the expert will make them look silly and you know why? Because so many of the experts, when asked a difficult question often resort to demeaning the non-expert rather than admit the difficulty. They might tell you to get a degree or read the writings of some _other_ expert. Basically implying you can't grasp these higher concepts because you have not read so-in-so. Don't believe them. 

Then there is the case of the new expert - the person who has recently learned the jargon and the "expert" arguments, but does not really understand them. They borrow capital from the true experts, but they are really pretenders. They present other peoples arguments as their own, but when they are challenged to explain them, they resort to making disparaging remarks about the intelligence to the challenger. You will rarely see these people admit that their grasp of the arguments is tenuous. 

But from my studies and experience, I find that there is little that is really to difficult or deep to understand in these specialized fields of knowledge. It is almost always a matter of learning the language and becoming familiar with the general principles. Which means that those who refuse to "translate" their jargon into regular parlance, are often hiding their ignorance and are pretenders. True experts - those that really understand their fields of knowledge usually have little trouble explaining things in ways that are reasonably easy to understand. Of course, a real expert can also be an arrogant elitist - but never let him intimidate you. 

If you ever run into "the expert" - don't be afraid to admit your own unfamiliarity with the issues - and ask him to explain something. If they can't then maybe they are pretenders or are simply arrogant. You will find though the risk is worth it when you find an expert who really knows his stuff and is willing to teach you something new. And sometimes you'll find a somewhat lazy expert. He might not have the energy to explain it all - but he will refer you to some article or post that answers your question perfectly. He won't tell you that you have to become an expert to understand the issues. 

Well that's my rant-of-the-day. If you (the reader of this post) think I am writing this about you, there's a good chance I am. It would take that kind of arrogance I mentioned for someone to make such an assumption. But fear not, you're not the only one.


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> You could get Plantinga's three volume work on warranted belief and come up with something comparable for Scripturalism, and then we could see whether it held up.



Whoops! I sent my prior post before I read this. I wasn't picking on you in my rant on experts. Just bad timing. Plantinga is on my reading list (and my Amazon wish list). What I've read of his work is very interesting. 

I also noticed that contemporary philosophers don't seem to talk about knowledge - but "belief". I don't know if Plantinga considers a "warranted belief" to be knowledge - or if he even thinks real knowledge is possible. Maybe he doesn't. Someday I'll get to reading his work. 

Some many books, so little time.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> I want to add that I find it suspect when people use technical jargon and references to highly specialized concepts and theories, but have a great deal of trouble explaining themselves or speaking in familiar terms. I know, sometimes this is due to simple laziness and lack of time and energy to explain things one considers "basic knowledge", but I find this kind of elitism questionable.



So if these can't be condensed to a few paragraphs in an internet post, then they are bunk?

Warrant: The Current Debate, by Alvin Plantinga, 240 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (May 27, 1993)

Warrant and Proper Function, by Alvin Plantinga, 256 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (May 27, 1993)

Warranted Christian Belief, by Alvin Plantinga 528 pages, Oxford University Press, USA (January 27, 2000)

For my part, I take them as the measure of credibility. Scripturalism and Vantillianism, for lack of anything like this, don't have a dog in the epistemology race.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> Whoops! I sent my prior post before I read this. I wasn't picking on you in my rant on experts. Just bad timing. Plantinga is on my reading list (and my Amazon wish list). What I've read of his work is very interesting.
> 
> I also noticed that contemporary philosophers don't seem to talk about knowledge - but "belief". I don't know if Plantinga considers a "warranted belief" to be knowledge - or if he even thinks real knowledge is possible. Maybe he doesn't. Someday I'll get to reading his work.
> 
> Some many books, so little time.



And I replied before I read this.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> I also noticed that contemporary philosophers don't seem to talk about knowledge - but "belief". I don't know if Plantinga considers a "warranted belief" to be knowledge - or if he even thinks real knowledge is possible. Maybe he doesn't. Someday I'll get to reading his work.
> 
> Some many books, so little time.



Since there is so much controversy over what knowledge is (is it justified true belief? Then want justifies a belief? What is truth?) it is possible to get a lot further with the preliminary question of the nature of warrant and deal with that before you insist on what knowledge is. 

That is the big problem anyhow. "Justified" on the face of it, is an ethical term. Most epistemologists want to claim that there is some other sense of "justified" proper to epistemology itself, in which they use the term "justified". But what is it. By what norm is a belief justified so as to be knowledge? What is compelling about that norm (i.e. why does every normal person accept the belief as knowledge when the appreciate that the norm has been met)? 

What this epistemic justification could be remains mysterious. So the nature of this mystery of warrant is what people concentrate on. One you get that you can go on to work on when and how warrant and belief relate so as to be knowledge.

As for the "Some many books, so little time.", that is the value of Plantinga's three volumes. You don't have to collect all the journal articles and monographs coming out over decades. He sums it up for you in an organized way and saves you a lot of time.


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> As it is, we have no clue about what Scripturalism would look like. All Biblical exposition, commentaries, etc. (including Clark's) are done on the basis hermeneutics that grasps the meaning of language from a full cultural life experience, in order to get back of the metaphor to separate out what is the intended meaning.


I don't' think this is necessarily the case. The Scriptures themselves do not require a "full cultural life experience" to understand them. And it is the understand of the word that begins the process of knowledge. The truths of Scripture are true for all times, place, and peoples. A Scriptural truth understood in 1650 is the same exact scriptural truth understood in 2050. One may have trouble reading the exegesis written by a person in 1650, but that does not mean we are further from knowing the same truths from the same Word of God.



tewilder said:


> No on has ever done Scripturalist exegesis to get to those axioms of Scripture. If you take the language of Scripture as it is, it is full of metaphor and contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language, which is useless as an axiomatic system. If you go for the meaning, you are immediately beyond the metal processes of logic.


Read the Westminster Confession of Faith. That is Scripturalist exegesis. You will find many of the axioms in the Confessions and other reformed creeds and catechisms. 

I strongly object to the statement that the language of Scripture is full of contradiction. There are no contradictions in Scripture. There are no metaphors. The Scriptures are the propositional truths behind the metaphor in the written text. A metaphor points to a truth, it is not a truth in itself. 

You are not going beyond to metal processes of logic when you go for the meaning. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Sometimes we start with what we believe the meaning is without using formal logical processes, and then we use logic to test the meanings. This is also known as systematic theology. A good systematic theology text is Scripturalism in action. 



tewilder said:


> Since all Biblical interpretation that has ever been done presupposes the reality of prior human knowledge including a pretty good grasp of what the world is like, so that we bring a competence with language to the reading of Scripture, we don't know what Scripturalism as useful knowledge would even begin to look like.



I think you are confusing logical and temporal priority. Of course one should have a grasp of language prior to employing Scripturalism (such as systematic theology). And a grasp of the culture at the time the text is written is helpful. But the Scripturalist epistemology is looking at logical priorities, not temporal. Scripture is the foundation knowledge. "The Scriptures alone are the Word of God" is the epistemological axiom. From there, you can test if something is knowledge or opinion. You don't start with a blank slate. You start with the revelation of God. 



> WCF 1:6 The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture:


 That's the epistemology of Scripturalism in a nut shell.


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## Magma2

tewilder said:


> That impression is that it lost touch with the intellectual universe decades ago, and has became a side show for those who, for no good reason, continue to be preoccupied with Cartesian standards of knowledge.



I suppose an appeal to logic would be an antiquated preoccupation with Aristotelian standards, after all, Manata likes to talk about logics as if the Law of Identity, Excluded Middle and Contradiction were mere creations in his deteriorating Van Tilian universe. Regardless, where and when did Anthony assert anything like a self-evident axiom or truth? While the truths of the Christian faith are certainly self-authenticating (except of course for the Van Tilian, since they hold to an analogical view of truth and an incoherent doctrine of Scripture), they're hardly self-evident. So I don't think your condescension is really called for. I expect that kind of patronizing from Manata. 

Of course, if you can demonstrate that Plantigna, Wolterstorff and others have not lowered the epistemic bar and are not more concerned with making theism intellectually respectable, I'll withdraw my comments. Simply because a person is naturally inclined to believe something doesn't mean that those beliefs are cognitive, even if some consider them to be properly basic. Respectability or not, hell is filled with theists. If epistemology is no longer concerned with truth and how it might be known, then what good is it? Has truth become a carnival sideshow too? Seems so, even among men who fancy themselves Christian not to mention Reformed.



> I have come to the conclusion that the whole concept of apologetics as this sort of system building is misconceived.



Well, if you're either a teaching or ruling elder, or even a deacon, please inform your Session right away. But maybe you didn't have to vow to uphold the Confessional Standards as containing the system of doctrine taught in Scripture. I realize that would be passé. I'm sure those who did didn't realize they had lost touch with the intellectual universe and were merely engaging in an irrelevant comical amusement.


----------



## Civbert

tewilder said:


> Since there is so much controversy over what knowledge is (is it justified true belief? Then want justifies a belief? What is truth?) it is possible to get a lot further with the preliminary question of the nature of warrant and deal with that before you insist on what knowledge is.



Well to get started - a proposition is justified true if it is deducible from prior true propositions.


----------



## tewilder

Civbert said:


> I don't' think this is necessarily the case. The Scriptures themselves do not require a "full cultural life experience" to understand them.



It is exactly what they require. Otherwise infants would understand them.



> The truths of Scripture are true for all times, place, and peoples.



True, and it makes my point. To get at this truth for all times and peoples you have to come to terms with the language and metaphor.



> Read the Westminster Confession of Faith. That is Scripturalist exegesis.



It is not exegesis. It is a creed. It is so far from exegesis the Parliament required the addition of proof texts.



> You will find many of the axioms in the Confessions and other reformed creeds and catechisms.



Maybe, but derived from Scripture by humanistic scholarship, not Scripturalist methodology. It is this human linguistic and epistemic competence that is needed to show the derivation of the creeds from the language of Scripture. Leave that out, and the claim that these creeds contain the axioms of Scripture is just simply a wild claim.



> I strongly object to the statement that the language of Scripture is full of contradiction. There are no contradictions in Scripture.



Object all you like, but the language of Scripture says than man cannot see God and live, but that Moses and the elders saw God, and so on. Those don't realize that you have to get beyond the language of Scripture to the theological truths preach lots of bad, contradictory sermons on these texts. 



> There are no metaphors.



How about "I am the door." Was Jesus made of wood? Did he swing on hinges?



> The Scriptures are the propositional truths behind the metaphor in the written text. A metaphor points to a truth, it is not a truth in itself.



So now we have a Bible beyond the Bible. The infra-Bible we have only "points to" this meta-Bible. Can Karl Barth be far away?



> You are not going beyond to metal processes of logic when you go for the meaning. In fact, it is quite the opposite.



Which you contradict yourself in the next sentence.



> Sometimes we start with what we believe the meaning is without using formal logical processes, and then we use logic to test the meanings.



But this believing that you start with before you apply the test of systematic theology! Almost the whole of linguistic competence and hermeneutics is hidden in that simple phrase!



> This is also known as systematic theology. A good systematic theology text is Scripturalism in action.



Between "Scipturalism in action" and the linguistic phenemena of the Bible, what a great gulf there is!



> I think you are confusing logical and temporal priority. Of course one should have a grasp of language prior to employing Scripturalism (such as systematic theology). And a grasp of the culture at the time the text is written is helpful. But the Scripturalist epistemology is looking at logical priorities, not temporal. Scripture is the foundation knowledge. "The Scriptures alone are the Word of God" is the epistemological axiom. From there, you can test if something is knowledge or opinion. You don't start with a blank slate. You start with the revelation of God.
> 
> That's the epistemology of Scripturalism in a nut shell.



Kierkegaard once compared Hegel to a man who builds a magnificent castle and then proceeds to life in a rude hut outside. The system is a marvelous theoretical edifice, but not reachable from real lived experience. 

The same could be said of Scripturalism. There are those axioms of Scripture, the eternal truths that the metaphors of the Bible "point to". But there is no way into that castle of axioms unless to storm the castle by the methods of humanist scholarship: the competence of human knowledge before the axioms of Scripture have be derived.


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> That is the big problem anyhow. "Justified" on the face of it, is an ethical term. Most epistemologists want to claim that there is some other sense of "justified" proper to epistemology itself, in which they use the term "justified". But what is it. By what norm is a belief justified so as to be knowledge? What is compelling about that norm (i.e. why does every normal person accept the belief as knowledge when the appreciate that the norm has been met)?


If someone objects to the term because they associate justified with ethical connotation, then we can substitute something that carries less baggage. I have not object to saying knowledge is warranted true belief. However, that term is taken and might cause confusion. 

I've said before that justified is accountable. If one can give an account of how some proposition is true, then the truth of the proposition is justified.

I can think of nothing that gives a better accounting than basic Aristotelian deductive logic. It seems a compelling norm has been around for a few thousand years. 




tewilder said:


> What this epistemic justification could be remains mysterious. So the nature of this mystery of warrant is what people concentrate on. One you get that you can go on to work on when and how warrant and belief relate so as to be knowledge.


Consider it done. It's not so mysterious. It does make it difficult to justify empiricism and that really sticks in the craw of worldly philosophies - but why should that concern us. We are not of this world. 




tewilder said:


> As for the "Some many books, so little time.", that is the value of Plantinga's three volumes. You don't have to collect all the journal articles and monographs coming out over decades. He sums it up for you in an organized way and saves you a lot of time.


I've heard high praise of his work and I think it would go a ways to getting me up to speed in contemporary philosophy - which will make it all that much easier to shoot down contemporary worldly philosophies. 

Do consider the effect empiricism has played in contemporary and world philosophy. The Gettier problems that attempt to defeat the traditional formulation of knowledge really presume that sensory based observations are enough to justify a truth. 

I saw Joe in a room, therefore Joe is in the room. But Gettier comes along and says, you were looking at a Joe manikin - not Joe at all, so your knowledge is unjustified. But he adds a cute wrinkle by saying Joe was hiding under a table in the room, so "Joe is in the room" is true. I think what Gettier has done was not demolish the JTB model of knowledge - but raise questions about the reliability of the senses for justifying anything is true. The problem is not in the traditional formulation, but the assumptions that perceptions can give an account for truth.


----------



## tewilder

Civbert said:


> Well to get started - a proposition is justified true if it is deducible from prior true propositions.



Really?

Suppose there is a proposition, Q that is deducible from proposition P and proposition L.

Suppose P and L happen to be true, but you think that P and L are false. Suppose you decide to believe Q anyway. Is your belief in Q justified, and it therefore knowledge?


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> It is exactly what they require. Otherwise infants would understand them.



Sorry. I did not understand your point. I thought you were referring to the culture of the time the text was written. 




tewilder said:


> True, and it makes my point. To get at this truth for all times and peoples you have to come to terms with the language and metaphor.
> 
> ...



I'll try to come back and answer in more detail, but I want to add that it is not simply human reasoning involved, it all depends on the Spirit. That is one of the requirements for any sound Christian epistemology. If all we had to work with was the human ability to reason and understand, then knowledge would be impossible to justify.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> I saw Joe in a room, therefore Joe is in the room. But Gettier comes along and says, you were looking at a Joe manikin - not Joe at all, so your knowledge is unjustified. But he adds a cute wrinkle by saying Joe was hiding under a table in the room, so "Joe is in the room" is true. I think what Gettier has done was not demolish the JTB model of knowledge - but raise questions about the reliability of the senses for justifying anything is true. The problem is not in the traditional formulation, but the assumptions that perceptions can give an account for truth.



This sort of philosophy is done by people who share a certain world view, which they don't think they have to go into and justify. So what they are thinking is that belief has to be causally related to the things that it is about, and that this happens in a metaphysically materialistic scenerio. 

So then they jump right into discussing what this causal relationship has to be like to be sufficient for belief to be knowledge.


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## Civbert

tewilder said:


> Really?
> 
> Suppose there is a proposition, Q that is deducible from proposition P and proposition L.
> 
> Suppose P and L happen to be true, but you think that P and L are false. Suppose you decide to believe Q anyway. Is your belief in Q justified, and it therefore knowledge?



First, if I believe P and L are false, and I believe Q is deduced correctly from P and L, then I will not believe Q unless I am irrational. Justification by "good and necessary consequences" only works with true premises. False premises imply nothing regarding truth.

So my belief itself is not justified, but JTB does not look at justifying believing Q. What is in question is if Q is justified true. Since it is justified (due to P and L actually being true), then I know Q. I don't know I know Q, because I can't personally account for Q, so unless I am irrational, I would not say or be aware that I know Q, much less say I am justified in believing Q. 

Recall that all men have the knowledge of the existence of God. This is knowledge we are born with. It's not that they simply believe in God, they know God exists. How, because this knowledge is justified true and they believe it is true, but have suppressed that knowledge. 

It is one thing to justify believing a proposition. It is another for a proposition to be justified true.


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## tewilder

Civbert said:


> First, if I believe P and L are false, and I believe Q is deduced correctly from P and L, then I will not believe Q unless I am irrational. Justification by "good and necessary consequences" only works with true premises. False premises imply nothing regarding truth.
> 
> So my belief itself is not justified, but JTB does not look at justifying believing Q. What is in question is if Q is justified true. Since it is justified (due to P and L actually being true), then I know Q. I don't know I know Q, because I can't personally account for Q, so unless I am irrational, I would not say or be aware that I know Q, much less say I am justified in believing Q.
> 
> Recall that all men have the knowledge of the existence of God. This is knowledge we are born with. It's not that they simply believe in God, they know God exists. How, because this knowledge is justified true and they believe it is true, but have suppressed that knowledge.
> 
> It is one thing to justify believing a proposition. It is another for a proposition to be justified true.



You seem to be saying that you can have knowledge which it is irrational for you to believe.


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## Don

Civbert said:


> Well to get started - a proposition is justified true if it is deducible from prior true propositions.



Just a quick comment: Actually deductive inference does not generate justification, it only transfers it. So if your prior propositions are true but not justified, then your inferential beliefs will not be justified either.


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## MW

Magma2 said:


> Hardly a blessing if Scripturalism is a departure from the Reformed faith. Of course, if what you call the Reformed faith is a departure from the Scriptures then a blessing it is! After all, there are many men calling themselves Reformed who have departed in one place or another from Scripture, some even deny justification is by belief alone. So without something more substantial, your objection really has no force. It amounts to name calling.



Sean, I imagine nearly every reformed theologian has denied that justification is by belief alone. They generally maintain that faith includes trust.



Magma2 said:


> So is the Scripturalism of Gordon Clark guilty of a form of Phariseeism? You will need to do considerably more to back up this charge. The Reformed faith in the form of the Westminster Confession posits the Scriptures, the Word of God, first and necessarily prior to all that follows, so is the WCF guilty of a form of Phariseeism? I hardly think so.



I haven't accused Gordon Clark of Pharisaism. The reference to Rom. 2 was for the purpose of showing Anthony that it is quite possible to have the form of knowledge without the power thereof. There was no charge made against Clark or Scripturalism in making that reference.



Magma2 said:


> You assert the possibility of knowing the WHAT without knowing the WHOM which is undeniable, but a form of knowledge is not knowledge. It has the appearance of wisdom, but denies the truth. Paul also talks about those who are ever learning and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. Many of these are religionists too, some even posing as Christians. So what? You still haven’t shown there is a “whom” to know apart from knowing at least something of what he thinks. To know Christ -- to come to know any person -- is to know what He thinks and to know what Jesus thinks is to come to know the propositions of Scripture, the mind of Christ. Can anyone come to know Jesus Christ apart from Scripture? If so, I’d love to see your demonstration. Yet, Paul says the message the gospel, these very propositions, is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes. Jesus said His very words are spirit and they are life. John 20:31; “But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.” To come to know that Jesus is the Christ is to know what is written.



Your challenge is irrelevant, Sean. I would never maintain that Christ can be known apart from His Word. I fully agree that revelation is propositional. But I do not maintain that it is entirely propositional. It is also deeply personal. An individual could have a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures and still not know Christ.


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## MW

Civbert said:


> I'm really not following you. What is this idealism you speak of and how is it a departure from reformed thought. And I still see no reason to claim my view of revelation (revealed knowledge) as propositional is a problem.



Anthony, as I said, I am not intending to enter into a critique of the position. However, for the sake of clarification, Scripturalism replaces Plato's forms with the axioms of revelation. It teaches one can have no knowledge of anything without these forms, and that to know these forms is true knowledge.

Regarding the statement about revealed knowledge as propositional, I cannot see a problem with it. The problem rests in saying that it is ONLY propositional.


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## Magma2

tewilder said:


> No on has ever done Scripturalist exegesis to get to those axioms of Scripture. If you take the language of Scripture as it is, it is full of metaphor and contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language, which is useless as an axiomatic system. If you go for the meaning, you are immediately beyond the metal processes of logic.



If you mean by "contradiction on the literal form of expression of the language" a literary paradox, then it is simply false that biblical metaphor and literary paradox are useless as part of an axiomatic system, for they only have meaning as part of that same axiomatic system. The meaning of Scripture, after all, is one. 

In addition, while the Scriptures are the axiom of the Christian faith, the axiom itself is not deduced from anything prior otherwise it would cease to function as an axiom. As far as the exegetical and biblical support for the claim that the bible has a monopoly on truth, this would be no different than the typical defense against all enemies of the faith who would attack the principle of _sola Scriptura._ 2 Timothy 3:15-17 is a good place to start, followed by John 17:17; Acts 20:26-27, 32; 1 Cor. 4:6 and we also have Acts 15 and the account given of the Jerusalem council. While there are others, Isa 8:20 is a good OT verse that can be adduced in support of the axiom of Scripture; To the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.




> . . . we don't know what Scripturalism as useful knowledge would even begin to look like.



This is just an incredible thing to say. Please tell that the T. E. in your sig is your name and not your title?


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## Magma2

armourbearer said:


> Your challenge is irrelevant, Sean. I would never maintain that Christ can be known apart from His Word. I fully agree that revelation is propositional. But I do not maintain that it is entirely propositional. It is also deeply personal. An individual could have a thorough knowledge of the Scriptures and still not know Christ.



Then, with all due respect, you either miss how the word knowledge is being use (which is justified true belief) or you are simply equivocating on the word unknowingly (no pun intended). Of course, you could be equivocating knowingly, but I simply would not expect that from you (I've long ago come to expect it from Manata, but he isn't talking to me). The point of Rom. 2:20 is that the teachers needed to be taught. As Gill says; "they had not a true knowledge of the law; only a draught and scheme, the outward form of the law, and a mere shadow and appearance of the knowledge of the truth of it." Calvin says much the same thing; "Paul in these words detects the wickedness of hypocrites; for the more detestable they were, as they were thus inflated with false glory; they profaned the name of God, while they pretended to be his heralds, and as it were his prophets." And, again, in his commentary on Romans:



> "I take what follows, having the form of knowledge, as a reason for the preceding; and it may be thus explained, — “because thou hast the form of knowledge.” For they professed to be the teachers of others, because they seemed to carry in their breasts all the secrets of the law. The word form is put for model (exemplar — pattern); for Paul . . . intended, I think, to point out the conspicuous pomp of their teaching, and what is commonly called display; and it certainly appears that they were destitute of that knowledge which they pretended."



What could be said of the Pharisees could be said of papists and every other false teacher. They have the form or the appearance of knowledge, but not the truth. Knowledge, if it means anything (at least as far as epistemological discussions and study) has to do with the knowledge of the truth and nothing less (even if some so-called "Reformed" epistemologist don't want to look like sideshow freaks for young sophisticates at Harvard, or, more to the point, Notre Dame). 

As to what part of revelation is not propositional, ("I do not maintain that it is entirely propositional") I have no idea what you're driving at? Is it a feeling? A hunch? An existential sense of dread? What does non propositional revelation consist of and how would you know it?


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## MW

Sean, the point you seem unwilling to accept is that the Scriptures themselves use the word "knowledge" with an equivocation, sometimes referring to true spiritual knowlege, sometimes only to an understanding of mere facts.

Yes, the Scriptures inculcate feelings as well as thoughts: "Rejoice in the Lord alway." They muse on themes which are in themselves "unspeakable." The revelation of God should strike us to the core of our being and bring us to tremble at His Word, not simply to nod our head in theoretical approval.

Now do not mistake me. I am not saying the revelation of Scripture is irrational. Scripture always speaks coherently with the system of truth taught in Scripture. Hence there can be no personal revelation which contradicts the propositional content of divine revelation. But the Scriptures address more than our minds, and they lead us to seek out and rest in personal communion with the Lord Jesus Christ, not in a mere proposition.


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## Magma2

armourbearer said:


> Sean, the point you seem unwilling to accept is that the Scriptures themselves use the word "knowledge" with an equivocation, sometimes referring to true spiritual knowlege, sometimes only to an understanding of mere facts.



I am not unwilling in the least. I absolutely affirm and maintain that the Scriptures do indeed use the word "to know" in different senses. But the point you seem unwilling to accept is the sense of the word under discussion. 



> Yes, the Scriptures inculcate feelings as well as thoughts: "Rejoice in the Lord alway." They muse on themes which are in themselves "unspeakable." The revelation of God should strike us to the core of our being and bring us to tremble at His Word, not simply to nod our head in theoretical approval.



No one has denied that the Scriptures inculcate feelings, the question is whether feelings themselves are cognitive. This you haven't shown. 



> Now do not mistake me. I am not saying the revelation of Scripture is irrational. Scripture always speaks coherently with the system of truth taught in Scripture. Hence there can be no personal revelation which contradicts the propositional content of divine revelation. But the Scriptures address more than our minds, and they lead us to seek out and rest in personal communion with the Lord Jesus Christ, not in a mere proposition.



I honestly don't think we're far apart, but if the Scriptures address more than our minds you simply haven't made the case. So far you've adduced that Scripture commands we rejoice in the Lord always, and indeed we should. However, minds rejoice, and, if they're rejoicing in the Lord that presupposes at least some knowledge of the Lord we're supposed to be rejoicing in. Further, personal communion, at least in the Christian sense, presupposes thought as well and not the absence of thought as in some sort of mystical attempt to empty the mind in order to become one with the universal void. Ommmm. To commune with the Lord generally refers to prayer (hardly non-propositional) and meditating on His word (again, hardly non-propositional).

As for things being "unspeakable," Paul speaks of being "caught up into paradise and hearing "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." However, none of what Paul describes suggests anything which is unintelligible. What was revealed to Paul, what he heard, was more than he was lawfully allowed to speak.


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## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> I'm going to see if I can ignore Sean and just talk to Anthony,



Thank goodness. Who really has the time to wade through all that anyway. You'll kill him with volume. For a man who keeps promising and threatening to drop out and wash his hands of the whole Scripturalist thing, good riddance and all, you certainly have a lot to say.

However you did say something earlier which again points to the bankruptcy of your own position (which is probably the reason you just can’t leave this discussion). You said:



> The cognitive factulty that produces alethic beliefs should be a reliable one. Does Sean deny that? But, that's not sufficient for warrant. For example, a thermometer stuck at 74 degrees, if placed in San Diego, would be a reliable indicator of the temp here (since it's 74 degrees here 350 out of the 365 days of the year). One's belief based on this reliability, though, would not be warranted. Or, a brain lesion that reliably produces the belief that one has a brain lesion, and this doxastic input obtains upon seeing red objects, does not count as knowledge. That's because the cognitive faculties aren't functioning properly.



First, it seems to me that a thermometer stuck at 74 degrees in San Diego would indeed provide sufficient warrant for the belief that it's 74 degrees for the very reason you state, the temperature in San Diego is normally 74 degrees. What might be more difficult to determine is that your thermometer is actually stuck. Alaska, not so much. So, while you may not have warrant asserting that the temp is 74 degrees due to your busted thermometer, up until such time as you realize the bleeding thing is busted, if ever, you would have had just as much warrant as your local weatherman to look at your thermometer and reliably assume it's right. It seems to me that warrant is a purely subjective standard since what might constitute warrant one day might not the next.

In addition, how do you know that the beliefs produced due to brain lesions are unreliable? Perhaps brain lesions render the “doxastic input” obtained all the more reliable, not less so. Perhaps what you consider an improper functioning brain is really the proper one and more people should have brain lesions? Maybe you’re just a bigot when it comes to brain lesions?


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## Pergamum

Hey guys;

Sorry to barge in on your apologetics party, but I have a question that may pertain - though bear with me because I do not know much jargon:


If all knowledge must be from Scripture or deduced from Scripture (like it appears that some say), how would one respond to me if I were to say that I know a potentially infinite number of items apart from Scripture..mainly that 2 +2 = 4 and 4+4=8 and 8+8=16 and on to eternity? This bit of knowledge appears very knowable, even outside of anything from Scripture.


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## Magma2

> Anyway, in regards to your claim about the thermometer, it's not sufficient for warrant because it's broken. It isn't functioning properly. So, in this case, if you looked at it and concluded that it was 74 degrees, and it was 74 degrees, it still would not be warranted since it was by *accident* that you believe it is 74 degrees. Epistemologists usually try to rule out lucky guesses, accidents, coincidences, and the like, as 'knowledge.'



Point of order. You’re talking to me. While no crime, you miss the point. Ersatz Epistemologists might *usually* try to rule out lucky guess, etc., but that is hardly a guard or even a method by which to exclude them. Also, it seems to me that they (you) open the door to virtually every sort of question begging provided it's couched in the right, subjective, framework. 



> Second, I grant one would be *justified* if he didn't know that it was broken, since he'd be flouting no epistemic dutues in believing the thermometer, but not warranted. And so this would be a Gettier case. He'd have JTB, but not knowledge.



It seems to me you’ve flouted your epistemic duties from the get go. Per your own examples warrant rests on subjective standards and modes of reliability which would seem to make warrant very easy to obtain for almost any claim to knowledge – including those claims which result from ignorance (i.e., not realizing that your thermometer is stuck). After all, weathermen are generally reliable and I’m sure most in San Diego would have warrant to believe every day it’s going to be 74 degrees in paradise, but even with fully functioning thermometers the best weatherman are often wrong (in most other places besides San Diego, more often than not). Yet, the dutiful Epistemologist maintains reliability gives rise to warrant which, when combined with belief, even those beliefs which may in fact be true, results in knowledge. By your definition science then is a cognitive enterprise for its methods, are, if nothing else, reliable. The problem is they’re also completely fallacious as more than a few even non-Christian philosophers of science pointed out long ago. While nothing new, it does seem that the packaging has changed. 



> Lastly, regarding the brain lesions, I actually said the belief produced by the lesion, i.e., that upon being appeared to redly (by a red object) the lesion causes your brain to produce the belief that you have a lesion, *is reliable.* It does this everytime, though you don't know why you now suddenly feel a strong urge to believe that you have a brain lesion. So, I *am* claiming that they are reliable. My point, though, is that this belief is not warranted, since, again, we have malfunction. So, even though it is true, caused by a reliable process, we don't have knowledge.



I misunderstood you, albeit “upon being appeared to redly” doesn’t seem to be remotely grammatical. No bother, it still doesn’t answer the objection why beliefs stemming from a reliable malfunction do not or cannot give rise to knowledge? Certainly you can't call something a malfunction if don't know that it is, therefore it seems to me that you can't ignore the possibility. If conclusions to properly functioning formally fallacious arguments can be reliable and provide warrant, malfunctions can provide adequate warrant in order for any dutiful Epistemologist to call it “knowledge.” 

Again, it seems to me that RE lowers the epistemic bar in an effort to make Christian theism, or perhaps theism in general, respectable at Yale, or, more fittingly, Notre Dame. And while I will not argue with T. E. Wilder that I should be better read, what I have read leads me to suspect that RE is nothing but a veiled form of Thomism and nobody does Thomism better than the Fighting Irish. 



> And so all I was pointing out, was that I'm not merely "reliabilist." My position avoids these counter examples. I defined my position on page 1 of this thread. If you had red it, you'd see I wasn't a mere reliabilist. You pegged me wrong. You don't know my position. That's what I was saying, Sean.



One thing at a time Paul, one thing at a time.


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## Magma2

trevorjohnson said:


> If all knowledge must be from Scripture or deduced from Scripture (like it appears that some say), how would one respond to me if I were to say that I know a potentially infinite number of items apart from Scripture..mainly that 2 +2 = 4 and 4+4=8 and 8+8=16 and on to eternity? This bit of knowledge appears very knowable, even outside of anything from Scripture.



Hi Trevor. Knowledge strictly speaking requires an account. The point is that most Christians do not believe that Scripture has a monopoly on truth (more properly, the truth which can be known) or even that the truth claim of any proposition needs even any account. It is a dark age. Those who do would say for any proposition to rise to the level of knowledge it must be accounted for per the Scriptures. After all, all scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: That the man of God may be perfect (complete, lacking nothing), thoroughly furnished unto all good works -- not just some good works -- and if arithmetic is a good work, then I would agree Scripture must have something to say about this as well. Fortunately it does. For a good place to start see J.C. Keister's Math and the Bible at http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=55 .


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## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> Sean, are you promoting alethic Scripturalism here? Even Coghill agres that alethic Scripturalism is self-referentially incoherent:
> 
> [1] No extra-biblical proposition is true. (Alethic Scripturalism Thesis)
> [2] [1] is an extra-biblical proposition.
> Therefore
> [3] [1] is not true.




I don't want you to make a complete fool out of yourself, so you need to take time to read what I've said and stop jumping to conclusions. I never said that no extra-biblical proposition is true. We know there are many extra-biblical propositions that are true, see my response to Rev. Winzer for starters. Stop trying to build straw men. It makes you look even more desperate.


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## Magma2

> Let's note that this thread is about Scripturalist Epistemology. You can feel free to start another one. T'would be a shame to escape scrutiny by going on the offensive. Anyway...



Oh, don’t worry, I haven’t even read your tome yet. I figure Anthony can handle you. I did happen to catch your repetition of the old saw that one’s own salvific state doesn’t rise to the level of knowledge. Scary stuff. Do yourself a favor, don’t read Edwards. 




> A belief obtained by a lucky guess does not count as knowledge. A belief obtained by an accident does not count as knowledge. I really don't even understand your criticism here. Are you trying to argue that reliable cognitive faculties are sufficient to furnish us with knowledge?



I thought I was being very plain. I’ll try again and hopefully even more simply, since I didn’t think I was being cryptic in the least. I’ll put it in the form of a question; By what method do you determine proper functionality in every situation? And, how do you know that proper functionality can or will contribute to knowledge of anything whatsoever? And, none of this really has to do with brain lesions or even reliable cognitive faculties, whatever they might consist of. I’m happy to stick with your broken thermometer. I realize that asking how you know something is old hat for "epistemologists" these days, but call me old fashion. However, given a reliablistic component to knowledge acquisition, knowledge itself would appear to be an ever moving target. 



> iii) I'm not commmitted right now to scientific realism or anti-realism. Still studying the issue. But since I could go either way and not have my views on warrant change, to bring this up is really just a red herring. Now, if you think that my view of warrant (given on page 1) necessarily entails scientific realism, then show me the deduction.



I was just going by your definition of knowledge:



> Knowledge: Warranted true belief, where warrant is defined as that quantity, enougn of which turns true belief into knowledge. A belief B has warrant for S if B is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, functioning in an epistemic environment sufficiently similar to the one S's cognitive faculties were designed for, the design plan governing the production of B has as a function or purpose the production of true beliefs, the design plan is a good one, and S has no undefeated-defeaters D for B.



By your criterion, science would appear to be a cognitive enterprise. Don’t take it personal, I’m just trying to apply what you’re saying. 




> Standard analytic language. Inded, if yougoogled it, you'd see that language employed myriad times. It's not just 'redly' either. I could be appeared to treely, orangly, horsely, etc



Redly didn’t give me problems, it was “upon being appeared to redly” sounded fragmented and nonsensical. Still does. NB.



> Well I don't think that the ravages of sin are the way God intended us to function properly. Now, certainly the tumor has a function, but is it an *epistemic* function? But, again, I don't see the point of your critique. Maybe you could spell it out for us. You've shown no formal fallacies. You not undermined my position. You've merely asserted so much. Furthermore, given my critique above, and your theory of knowledge, you don't *know* any of the things you're charging me with.



Of course the ravages of sin includes first and foremost sin's noetic effects as well. I don’t know how to make it plainer for you, but, and by way of a positive example, would you agree that the scientific method comports quite nicely with your definition of warrant? Yes or no should cover it.



> Well, you're free to hold that unjustified opinion. Anyway, your bar doesn't allow you to know your own position. It's not really a problem if one "lowers the bar" and put the bar where it was supposed to be. So it "seems to me" that you're just begging a lot of questions here.



I’m just asking questions. Is that too much from you? BTW, I’m not offended in the least by the idea that the Scriptures provide the necessary condition and account for knowledge. For in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, even if you refuse to accept or believe it.


----------



## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> Since all truth is known, and since Scripture has a monopoly on it, then is all truth in Scripture?



All truth is certainly known, for God the omniscient Lord God of Truth and what He thinks is true simply because He thinks it, however even my 8 year old son can see it doesn't follow that all truth is therefore in Scripture. Your argument is fallacious and putting it in the form of a question doesn't help.



> Or, what about the statement itself? Do you know it? Is it true? What you said is not "in Scripture" and so either it's not true or you don't know it. I tried for a few minutes to deduce "monopoly" from Scripture, no luck. Perhaps you could help?



See what I mean by looking foolish? Funny, you won't find the word Trinity in the Scriptures either, but I don't think even you'd be so silly as to suggest that the idea of the Trinity is not a valid inference from Scripture. As for the idea of Scripture having a monopoly on truth, please see my reply to T.E. Wilder above for biblical passages that will help point you in the right direction. For what it's worth I would love to see you attempt to defend the principle of _sola Scripture_ someday. Maybe you can let me know when you're ready to take on even a half-competent Romanists? 



> At any rate, I do appreciate your concern for me. That I not come off looking like a fool. That I not build strawmen. That I not look "even more" desparate. Thanks!



I don't want you to look like a fool, so you're welcome.


----------



## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> Hi again Sean,



For a guy who just a day ago swore he wouldn't talk to me, now I can't shut you up.  



> If your salvific state can be known, then according to what you and Anthiny have stated above, please deduce it from Scripture. Let me see the deduction. And, just a little historical detail, Edwards wasn't a Scripturalist.



You need to slow down, you obviously are getting ahead of yourself and attributing things to me which I have never said. That would be rude. 

I only commented that I noticed in your tome where you assert; "The confession and the Bible says that we may know that we are saved" and that this is proof that Scripturalism fails. Blah, blah, blah. Well, you're wrong, neither the Bible nor the Confession state that we can know we are saved. Take some time and study WCF XVIII. 

As for Edwards not being a Scripturalist, he was certainly closer to Gordon Clark on a number of issues, including this one, than you are. 

While it is true that no man can deduce his own salvific state from Scripture [apart from those who are specifically named as being part of the beloved in Scripture], it doesn’t follow that assurance is impossible nor is this position unique to Scripturalism. But assurance isn't knowledge. Jonathan Edwards wrote:



> "It appears also that the affection which is occasioned by the coming of all text of Scripture must be vain, when the affection is founded on something that is supposed to be taught by it, which really is not contained in it, nor in any other Scripture; because such supposed instruction is not real instruction, but a mistake and misapprehension of the mind. _As for instance, when persons suppose that they are expressly taught by some Scripture coming to their minds, that they in particular are beloved of God, or that their sins are forgiven, that God is their Father, and the like. This is a mistake or misapprehension; for the Scripture nowhere reveals the individual persons who are beloved, expressly; but only by consequence, by revealing the qualifications of persons that are beloved of God: and therefore this matter is not to be learned form Scripture any other way than by consequence, and from these qualifications, for things are not to be learned from the Scripture any other way than they are taught in the Scripture."_ [emphasis mine -- Religious Affections pg 194]



The Westminister Confession of Faith states concerning the doctrine of assurance; "This infallible assurance _doth not so belong to the essence of faith,_ but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties, before he be partaker of it . . . ." As Edwards states above, coming to an assurance that we are the Lord's beloved is arrived at by "consequence" as opposed to something that is inferred from the propositions of Scripture. Unless someone is going to claim special revelation quite apart from Scripture as their source for knowledge, assurance is a consequence or a fruit of faith, not an object of knowledge.

So your objection against Scripturalism, on this point, is completely without merit. And, frankly that's pretty much all I've read so far since I haven't had a chance to read your tome yet. You won't give me a break.  



> You're all over the place. Shifting goal posts. Our discussion will end if you continue to act in an underhanded way.



And,



> i) Anyone reading this thread knows I've patiently been answering *all* of your questions.



Hardly. While some of that might be my fault, because you say you don't understand my objections, most of it isn't. For example my question concerning whether or not YOUR definition of knowledge comports and supports the methods of science. This couldn't have been more straight forward. I can't see why it wouldn't answer it, but it appears you haven't answered at all. I even gave you a yes/no option.



> Sean, if you contionue to interact in this way, we're done.



Interact in what way? I wish you would stop threatening, it is really getting tiresome.


----------



## Civbert

tewilder said:


> You seem to be saying that you can have knowledge which it is irrational for you to believe.



Sure.  

To everyone who has posted since I last checked in, I'll try to respond to comments directed at me - but if I miss anything critical please point it out.

Thanks.


----------



## Civbert

Don said:


> Just a quick comment: Actually deductive inference does not generate justification, it only transfers it. So if your prior propositions are true but not justified, then your inferential beliefs will not be justified either.



Is that a fact, or just a position you are taking?

One thing I believe is true is that all rational epistemic systems require some sort of axiom or starting point. Nothing is logically prior to the axiom, so the axiom must be assumed. Strictly speaking, the axiom is not "justified". However, that does not mean you can not defend your axiom. If you can't defend your axiom, it's not a very good axiom to adopt. But that being said, starting with your system's axiom, if it is true, then anything you can deduce from the axiom is justified true. Justification is not transfered from proposition to proposition from premise to conclusion. Rather, if the premises are true, then the truth of the conclusion is also true. 

So for the epistemology of the WCF (a.k.a. Scripturalism), whatever is Scripture, or deduced by good and necessary consequences, is justified true belief. But the axiom, that the Bible is the Word of God, this must be taken ultimately without proof. 

The Westminster Divines recognized that the Bible's ultimate authority is derived from God, not man's reasoning. 



> 1:4 The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man, or Church; but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is to be received because it is the Word of God (1Th_2:13; 2Ti_3:16; 2Pe_1:19, 2Pe_1:21; 1Jo_5:9)



Therefore the Holy Scriptures are the foundational axiom for a Christian's knowledge. 

We believe the Scriptures are God's inerrant revelation due to the testimony of the Holy Spirit:


> yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts. (WCF 1:5 )



We do have evidence for the Bible that we should use to defend it as our axiom:


> We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture (1Ti_3:15). And the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God: (WCF 1:5)



But we are to consider all it says, and all that can be deduced from it as justified truth:


> The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture:



Nothing else is necessary for the Christian's knowledge. All he requires for his whole life, faith, salvation, and God's glory, is perfectly accounted for by God's revelation.


----------



## MW

Anthony and Sean, do you agree with this statement by John Owen (Works 4:64, 65) concerning the work of the Spirit?



> He gives unto believers a spiritual sense of the power and reality of the things believed, whereby their faith is greatly established... And on the account of this spiritual experience is our perception of spiritual things so often expressed by acts of sense, as tasting, seeing, feeling, and the like means of assurance in things natural. And when believers have attained hereunto, they do find the divine wisdom, goodness, and authority of God so present unto them as that they need neither argument, nor motive, nor anything else, to persuade them unto or confirm them in believing.



Owen states that this spiritual experience "cannot rationally be contended about, seeing those who have received it cannot fully express it, and those who have not cannot understand it, nor the efficacy which it hath to secure and establish the mind.”

Consider also Thomas Goodwin (Works 4:297):



> Therefore, now, if you ask me what it is the saints know, which another man knows not? I answer you fully, he himself cannot tell you, for it is certain, as to that impression which the Holy Ghost leaves upon the heart of a man, that man can never make the like impression on another; he may describe it to you, but he cannot convey the same image and impression upon the heart of any man else.


----------



## Civbert

There's a lot in the post I am referring to from Paul, and I haven't finished reading it all - so I'm just giving my response to the beginning to start. 

Also, please follow the link to Paul's post for his quotes since they do not embed themselves. These are the ABC quotes:



Anthony said:


> (A) The epistemology of Scripturalism is (once again) that knowledge is the propositions of Scripture and that which can be deduced from Scripture by "good and necessary consequences".





Cheung said:


> (B) Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview, so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best.





Anthony said:


> (C) It is sufficient to say that if one can demonstrate that P is scripture or deducible therefrom, then S is justified in claiming to know P. That seems self evident. Do you agree?




And the following is my comments to Paul's post. 



Paul manata said:


> Anthony, right now I'm trying to nail your position down. So, bear with me.
> 
> *The Analysis of Scripturalism*
> 
> I. Is (A) claiming that it is necessary and sufficient that to know that P, P mys be true, P must be believed, and P must be shown to be deduced from Scripture, or Scripture itself?


 Nope. I said P must be deducible from Scripture. I didn't say it must be deduced or shown. 



Paul manata said:


> II. Or, is (A) claiming that someone S can know what is deduced from true scriptural propositions, and S can also know things that are not deducible from Scripture?


 Still no, this is not a good start. Notice you went from (A) "must be deduced," to (B) "not deducible." These are not mutually exclusive. The answer is "must be deducible". 

Also notice the scope of C is different than A and B. C is looking at how _a person _may demonstrate some belief is justified as knowledge. A and B are looking at knowledge in general and how a proposition is justified true belief. 



Paul manata said:


> (B) denies (II) above. Does Anthony deny (II) as well, or does he deny (B)?


 I deny both (I) and (II). I didn't write B. You have my definition of Scripturalism. Are you planning on showing how my presentation differs from Cheung? I can only give you my understand of Scripturalism. If you have a beef with Chueng, have at it. But my view does not have to mirror Cheungs for it to be valid, or for his to be valid. 



Paul manata said:


> Take (C), now. All this is saying is that if someone has validly deduced a proposition from scriptural propositions, then one knows his conclusion. But (C) cannot be "Scripturalism" because then almost every orthodox Christian would have been a Scripturalist! Surely this can't be correct.


 Surprise! That is correct. (C) is not a definition of Scripturalism, it is Scripturalism in practice. Scripturalism is simply a restatement of the principles put forth in the Westminster Confession of Faith. The name "Scripturalism" is modern, the principle dates back to the beginning of the Christian faith. 



Paul manata said:


> Indeed, if *this* was all Scripturalism was claiming, then one wonders what anyone has been debating about.


 I often wonder that myself. You are putting imputing more utility to the statement than was intended. I did not make the statement as being "all Scripturalism claimed". It was a simple an answer to a question you asked. 



Paul manata said:


> (C) says nothing about *other* ways of obtaining knowledge.


 Nope. It doesn't. 



Paul manata said:


> Furthermore, if (C) is "Scripturalism" then you'll notice that (B) isn't. Or, at least, (B) is not logically entailed by (C).


 At least. (C) is not Scripturalism per say. It was not offered as a definition of Scripturalism, (A) was. (C) was a simple common sense answer demonstrating the principle of Scripturalism. Ironically, it shows how basically Christian the principle of Scripturalism is. 



Paul manata said:


> For example, if I claim that: "if you want to go to the store, then you can take your car," I have not said that this is the *only* way to get to the store.
> 
> (A) seems to be saying that knowledge *is* what is deduced from Scripture, or Scripture itself. And so (A) seems to be closer to (B). That is, if you have not deduced P from scripture (or, it is not deducible from Scripture), then you don't know that P.


 It seems that your parenthetic comments are a bit more correct than your direct statements. If it is not deducible from Scripture, then is can not be shown to be knowledge. But read that slowly. I did not say you could not "know" P, I only said an individual could not justify that P is knowledge. 

I've been beating that  for a while now.  



Paul manata said:


> But Anthony's first definition of Scripturalism is closer to (C).


 You mean my only definition. But it is no surprise that it is closer to (C). After all, I did write both statements. Is it a crime to be consistent? 

That's all for now Paul. I hope the rest doesn't hang on your misunderstandings shown in (I) and (II). But you clearly spent a lot of effort on the rest of the post so I will return to it.


----------



## Don

Civbert said:


> Is that a fact, or just a position you are taking?



A basic rule of inference. If I unjustifiedly accept P1 as my axiom (and as true) and deduce P2, P3, and P4 from this proposition, how is justification created for me believing that P2, P3, and P4 are true (even though they may be true). I may justifiedly believe that P2, P3, and P4 deductively follow from P1, but this does not give me justification for believing the content of P2, P3, and P4 as being true. You have neither knowledge nor justification for P1 and hence, none for the others. This is why Descartes attempted to go back to a belief that was indubitable for him and transmit that justification to his other beliefs. 




Civbert said:


> One thing I believe is true is that all rational epistemic systems require some sort of axiom or starting point. Nothing is logically prior to the axiom, so the axiom must be assumed. Strictly speaking, the axiom is not "justified". However, that does not mean you can not defend your axiom.



You are switching positions now. If you can defend your axiom, then how is it not justified (in some sense)? Justification is broadly considered as giving reasons for one's beliefs. 




Civbert said:


> If you can't defend your axiom, it's not a very good axiom to adopt. But that being said, starting with your system's axiom, if it is true, then anything you can deduce from the axiom is justified true. Justification is not transfered from proposition to proposition from premise to conclusion. Rather, if the premises are true, then the truth of the conclusion is also true.



See above. I agree that *if* the premises are true then the truth of the conclusion follows, but you are attempting to sneak justification (and knowledge) of those premises in there as well.


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Anthony and Sean, do you agree with this statement by John Owen (Works 4:64, 65) concerning the work of the Spirit?


Honestly, I can't say that I agree with it. He has not explained what "spiritual experience" means. To me, this is pious sounding nonsense. But that's nothing new for Christians. It is always good to sound "spiritual" .




armourbearer said:


> Owen states that this spiritual experience "cannot rationally be contended about, seeing those who have received it cannot fully express it, and those who have not cannot understand it, nor the efficacy which it hath to secure and establish the mind.”


 More of the same. 



armourbearer said:


> Consider also Thomas Goodwin (Works 4:297):


 Mystical nonsense. Sorry.


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> Honestly, I can say that I agree with it. He has not explained what "spiritual experience" means. To me, this is pious sounding nonsense. But that's nothing new for Christians. It is always good to sound "spiritual" .
> 
> 
> More of the same.
> 
> Mystical nonsense. Sorry.



Anthony, I think you should at least pause before you speak of the glorious work of the Holy Spirit as pious sounding and mystical nonsense.


----------



## Magma2

armourbearer said:


> Owen states that this spiritual experience "cannot rationally be contended about, seeing those who have received it cannot fully express it, and those who have not cannot understand it, nor the efficacy which it hath to secure and establish the mind.”



I'm not quite sure what Owen is talking about in the first quote you provided, so I suppose I would have to read more, but this latter quote would seem to apply to any experience someone might be unable to account for or explain, religious or otherwise. Why he would attribute an inexplicable feeling that secures in the mind of some a certain conviction to the Holy Spirit is a bit puzzling. It might be and it just as easily might not be. John Wesley waxed on about having his heart strangely warmed, yet came to deny many of the central doctrines of the faith. Even the great Edwards was convinced the Spirit was moving as evidenced by the emotional experience of those who heard him preach during the Great Awakening. As it turned out, at least per letters I've read subsequent to that time, Edwards was wrong and many of those same people ended up kicking the man out of his own church and he lamented that the state of religion was worse in New England only two years after the supposed Great Awakening then it was prior.

Let me ask you, in your church when and if you ask people for a profession of faith, let's say when seeking church membership or as a communicant, would you accept in its place; "I cannot tell you, but I'm certain that the Holy Ghost left an impression upon my heart. I can't explain it to you, but I felt the Spirit work. I had an experience and while I can't describe it to you, I know I am a Christian."


----------



## Civbert

Don said:


> A basic rule of inference. If I unjustifiedly accept P1 as my axiom (and as true) and deduce P2, P3, and P4 from this proposition, how is justification created for me believing that P2, P3, and P4 are true (even though they may be true).


Indeed, but your are talking about justifying believing something. I am speaking of justifying the truth of something. If P1 is true, and P2 is validly deduced from P1, then P2 is justified true. But P2 is not knowledge unless P2 is deduced from my epistemic axiom. And since I am starting with God's Word, then I think I can both justify the truth of a P2, and justify believing P2, and justify saying I know P2. Do you agree?



Don said:


> You are switching positions now. If you can defend your axiom, then how is it not justified (in some sense)? Justification is broadly considered as giving reasons for one's beliefs.


Because my defense for the axiom not a justification in the sense of justified in "justified true belief". My justification for all that follows from the axiom is a deductive proof. The laws of logic and rules of inference are the tools that justify a proposition is knowledge. The axiom is taken on faith. It can not be proven true logically. But everything that follows from the axiom is proven true by deductive logic. 



Don said:


> See above. I agree that *if* the premises are true then the truth of the conclusion follows, but you are attempting to sneak justification (and knowledge) of those premises in there as well.


I'm not sneaking anything. I am trying to clarify why when it comes to knowledge, the justification is based on simple deductive principles. The axiom is not. The axiom is defended on many grounds, but never proven. And this is true for all rational epistemic systems. If this is not the case, then knowledge is impossible to justify.


----------



## Civbert

armourbearer said:


> Anthony, I think you should at least pause before you speak of the glorious work of the Holy Spirit as pious sounding and mystical nonsense.



I don't assume that emotional experiences are the work of the Holy Spirit no matter how pious sounding the words are. And it was the _words_ that apear to be pious sounding and mystical nonsense. You are assuming they were are genuine works of the Holy Spirit - maybe because the words sound so pious.


----------



## MW

Magma2 said:


> Let me ask you, in your church when and if you ask people for a profession of faith, let's say when seeking church membership or as a communicant, would you accept in its place; "I cannot tell you, but I'm certain that the Holy Ghost left an impression upon my heart. I can't explain it to you, but I felt the Spirit work. I had an experience and while I can't describe it to you, I know I am a Christian."



Sean, you seem to have missed the point of both Owen and Goodwin. You continually speak about justification and account. Puritan Scripturists speak of the demonstration of the Spirit as transcending rational argumentation. Every argument requires its own type of proof. Ethical, historical, rational arguments require different kinds of proof to substantiate them. A spiritual truth requires a demonstration of the Spirit. This, reformed theology contends, cannot be rationally proved.

Now to come to your question -- we believe in the visible church. Membership in the visible church requires a profession of faith. Not faith per se, but a profession of it. Only God knows who are His elect and who are not. It is quite possible for a person to provide rationally coherent statements as to what they profess to believe and still not believe what they are saying. Your system does not allow for this. Your system is not reformed or presbyterian.

May I suggest that you do a Bible study on such passages as speak of Jesus as God's unspeakable gift, of the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, of joy unspeakable and full of glory, of peace which transcends all undertanding, I am afraid that you are bordering on saying that we have the same knowlege as God has even in respect of quantity.


----------



## MW

Civbert said:


> I don't assume that emotional experiences are the work of the Holy Spirit no matter how pious sounding the words are. And it was the _words_ that apear to be pious sounding and mystical nonsense. You are assuming they were are genuine works of the Holy Spirit - maybe because the words sound so pious.



I maintain with the reformed tradition that the work of the Holy Spirit is mysterious. I am sorry to hear, Anthony, that you do not follow the reformed faith in this instance, but it should still give you pause before condemning it as mystical nonsense. I hope you can come to say with Calvin that the Spirit's testimony is something you feel engraved like a seal upon your heart.


----------



## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> Bullocks! Scripturalism is the claim that one can only know what it deducible from the Bible. If P is not deducible from the Bible, then it is not knowable. You know it. Why are you guys being so shady.


You're not really interested in a discussion. You say if P not deducible, it's not _knowable_. I never said that. You are carefully wording things so you can have your line of attract. But I carefully worded my definition because it removes that line of attack. 

I very specifically said P can not be _shown_ to be knowledge. I made it very clear that that does _not_ imply you can not _know_ P. This is why you keep trying to force me to that one specific point. It is the lynch pin of your refutation. But since I pulled it out, you have no reason to refute Scripturalism. You declare it "Bullocks" and try to tell me what Scripturalism _really_ means and then provide a formulation you can knock down. That's called a straw man argument. 

You seem to be committed to refuting Scripturalism even if it means ignoring all sound reasoning in it's defense. 

Are you ready to go on or are you committed to the strawman that Scripturalism means that S can not _know _P unless it's deduced from Scripture.


----------



## Civbert

Paul manata said:


> ... and so does Robbins.



John Robbins has said that one can know propositions without deducing them from Scripture.


----------



## Don

Civbert said:


> Indeed, but your are talking about justifying believing something. I am speaking of justifying the truth of something. If P1 is true, and P2 is validly deduced from P1, then P2 is justified true. But P2 is not knowledge unless P2 is deduced from my epistemic axiom. And since I am starting with God's Word, then I think I can both justify the truth of a P2, and justify believing P2, and justify saying I know P2. Do you agree?.



No I don't agree because even if it is 'justified true' (whatever that means) there is still no justification for me to believe the truth of any propositions that are deduced unless I am justified in believing the truth of my axiom (or premises). As I said earlier, I may be justified in believing that some conclusions follow from particular premises based on deduction, but so what? In other words,, I have no reason to believe their truth, only that they follow from a particular axiom (or set of premises). It's like you say one thing and then turn around and say the opposite - compare the first sentence with the next to last sentence. How is the justification for *believing the truth* of P2 created since it's not transferred from your axiom (and not just being justified in believing that it follows from your axiom)? 

Also, for your inferential beliefs to constitute knowledge, your axiom would have to be knowledge as well (and not just have justification). But once you claim to have knowledge or justification for your axiom, you fall prey to Dr. Sudduth's critiques. 




Civbert said:


> Because my defense for the axiom not a justification in the sense of justified in "justified true belief". My justification for all that follows from the axiom is a deductive proof. The laws of logic and rules of inference are the tools that justify a proposition is knowledge. The axiom is taken on faith. It can not be proven true logically. But everything that follows from the axiom is proven true by deductive logic.



Well I don't know how you are using 'faith', but if you are using it in a manner to connote that it doesn't have justification or is not knowledge, then you don't create either of them by deductive inference. 




Civbert said:


> I'm not sneaking anything. I am trying to clarify why when it comes to knowledge, the justification is based on simple deductive principles. The axiom is not. The axiom is defended on many grounds, but never proven. And this is true for all rational epistemic systems. If this is not the case, then knowledge is impossible to justify.



I never intimated that an axiom is an inferential belief, so I'm not sure how this is relevant.


----------



## Magma2

armourbearer said:


> Sean, you seem to have missed the point of both Owen and Goodwin. You continually speak about justification and account. Puritan Scripturists speak of the demonstration of the Spirit as transcending rational argumentation.



Then "Puritan Scripturists" weren't interested in developing a biblical epistemology, so you miss the point and your citations are irrelevant to this discussion.



> Now to come to your question -- we believe in the visible church. Membership in the visible church requires a profession of faith. Not faith per se, but a profession of it. Only God knows who are His elect and who are not.



Indeed. Maybe you can explain this to Paul since he believes a man can know his own salvific state, not in the sense of coming to an unwavering confidence or assurance, but rather one's one elect state is an object of knowledge which we acquire quite apart from God's revelation in Scripture. If that were the case then it would not follow that "only God knows who are His elect and who are not."



> It is quite possible for a person to provide rationally coherent statements as to what they profess to believe and still not believe what they are saying. Your system does not allow for this. Your system is not reformed or presbyterian.



Then you don't understand the system I'm defending and the one Gordon Clark advanced throughout his career. But, of course, instead of asking for clarification you dogmatically conclude "your system is not reformed or presbyterian." Hogwash. More importantly, you will not accept feeling or subjective experience in place of a profession, nor should you. Hypocrites notwithstanding. So, again, you have failed to demonstrate that feelings, emotions and experiences are cognitive. 

Like I said, your objections are irrelevant to this discussion.


----------



## MW

Magma2 said:


> Then "Puritan Scripturists" weren't interested in developing a biblical epistemology, so you miss the point and your citations are irrelevant to this discussion.



You are correct, they were not interested in developing a biblical epistemology, but in simply accepting the one that is taught there. They understood that men believe because of the ineffable work of the Holy Spirit. They were convinced -- on the basis that men are not regenerated by believing propositions, but believe propositions because they are regenerated -- that no rational argument can be given to account for the new creature in Christ.


----------



## Magma2

> Howdy Sean!



Too bad, I was hoping you’d finally make good on your threats. 



> And so what does it mean to say that Scripture has a "monopoly" on it? If there is more truth, and more truth that can be known, that it outside Scripture (which, ther epropably is, since God knows many more propositions than are in the Bible), then what does it mean to say that Scripture has a "monopoly" on truth, or the truth that can be known. I've offered no argument on this point, yet.



Many do not think that the Bible alone is the Word of God. Many, like you, think truth can be found in many different places through various different sources quite apart from Scripture. So, if the Bible alone is not the Word of God, where else might it be found? Well, while you won't tell me, Van Til thought that science was cognitive. Many think that truth can be garnered through feelings, experience, sensation or by any number of other means. Look at Rev. Winzer’s post. I’m open to argument, but so far you really haven’t provided any, and, at least from what I can tell, your definition of knowledge can provide sufficient warrant to almost any truth claim. Plus, rather than maintaining the definition which Clark operated on, i.e., knowledge as justified true belief, you constantly equivocate. Hence, your "critique" falls flat.



> See what I mean by looking foolish? Funny, you won't find the word Trinity in the Scriptures either, but I don't think even you'd be so silly as to suggest that the idea of the Trinity is not a valid inference from Scripture. As for the idea of Scripture having a monopoly on truth, please see my reply to T.E. Wilder above for biblical passages that will help point you in the right direction. For what it's worth I would love to see you attempt to defend the principle of sola Scripture someday. Maybe you can let me know when you're ready to take on even a half-competent Romanists?
> 
> The passages you cited don't have the word "monopoly" and since it's a vague term, how could I possibly see that it is logically inferred from the verses you cited. I don't even know what you mean by that, yet.



You won’t find the word Trinity either. Big deal. As for monopoly, since when is that a “vague term”? Is something that is exclusively possessed difficult for you to grasp?



> I have no problem defending sola Scriptura. What's funny is that one of our members, D. T. King, has co-authored a fine series on the issue of sola Scriptura. Nothing remotely resembling Scripturalism is in there. James White's book on sola Scriptura also doesn't have any Scripturalist implication. Nether does Sproul's or Mathison's edited volume. I agree that Scripture is the final authority for all matters pertaining to life and godliness. I agree that Scripture is sufficient. But this does not mean that "knowledge consists only of biblical propositions or propositions deduced therefrom."



I never said all defenders of sola Scriptura were Scripturalists in epistemology, Sproul for example is a Thomist. I do however think that Scripturalism is applying the principle of sola Scriptura to epistemology. The fact that others prior to Clark failed to recognize this foundational principle as having philosophic import, is something to lament not praise. Further, to quote Dr. Gary Crampton, who is a Scripturalist:



> . . . Paul, in Timothy 3:15-17 restricts knowledge to the complete canon of the 66 books of the Old and New Testaments. Not only the “sacred writings” . . . of the Old Testament (verse15), but “all Scripture,” both the old and the New is God-breathed (verse 16) and thoroughly equips us for “every good work (verse 17)." Thus, if knowledge were available to us outside of Scripture, Paul’s statement would be false and misleading.



And, again, in response to the two-source theory of truth held by Morton Smith:



> Unfortunately, Dr. Smith has adopted the all too prevalent “two-source” theory of truth, wherein it is asserted that science, history, and psychology furnish men truth in addition to the Word of God. This contradicts the many statements in Scripture that the wisdom of the world is foolishness. The Bible claims to have a monopoly on truth: “Your Word is truth” (John 17:17). As the Westminster Confession of Faith says: “The whole counsel of God concerning all things [note the universal “all things”] necessary for his glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing [including science, history, and psychology] at any time is to be added” (1:6).



Scripture has a monopoly on truth. 

So far all you’ve demonstrated is that you do not hold to the principle of Scripture alone when it comes to epistemology. As you can see you're not alone. You constantly ridicule those who think that Scripture alone is our only source for truth. Yet, the Scriptures say, "if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." Not that there is some light in them, or that there might be some truth in what they say, but no light at all. The Scriptures say the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. Paul asks; “ hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?” Evidently not for some.



> Lastly, I see you've yet again chosen to reason fallaciously. You trie to poison the well against my position by implying it denies sola Scriptura. You argue ad bacculum by implying that someone who holds my position couldn't even win a debate with a "half-competent" RC apologist.



I apologize, that wasn’t my intent. What I did intend to say is that the same arguments used in defense of the principle of Scripture alone in opposition to the so-called Magisterial or teaching authority of the Roman church/state and extra-biblical claims to the truth of “church teaching,” can be used in support of the idea that Scripture has a monopoly on truth. Sometimes when a person can apply a principle in one area doesn’t mean they consistently apply it in others. You've provided some good examples.



> It is you who needs to slow down. My critique said that on your temrs, we can't know that we're saved. Now you admit that. So my critique was spot on. I never said "Scripturalism failes" because of that. I merely said that this was a problem.



Not a problem at all. I suppose you think it a problem for Edwards and the Confession too? 




> As far as the Bible saying we can know that we are saved, 1 John 5:13 tells us,
> 
> "I write these things to you who believe in the name of the Son of God that you may know that you have eternal life."



“. . . And this is the confidence that we have in him, that, if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us: And if we know that he hear us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of him.” 

I don’t know why you stopped where you did, but, no, the bible doesn’t say little Timmy or your Grandmother know in the strict sense they are saved -- in the sense I've used the word which you constantly ignore. Granny and Timmy might be deceived? After all, the Confession asserts; “Although hypocrites, and other unregenerate men, may vainly deceive themselves with false hopes and carnal presumptions of being in the favour of God and estate of salvation . . . .” If assurance is synonymous with justified true belief deception would be impossible for they would be able to provide an account for the truth they claim to know. Knowledge, at least if we're going to do epistemology, requires an account. Instead, the passage teaches that those who believe in the name of the Son of God may know that they have eternal life in the sense of having confidence in those things which are written. Otherwise the Confession would be in error since it says that this “infallible assurance” or unwavering confidence “doth not so belong to the essence of faith,” but you say it does! 

The word that is translated “know” is eido which means to see, perceive, discern, to understand and, while it can mean to have knowledge, it also means to cherish as in 1 Th. 5:12. For example, an argument which you oddly attribute to “neophyte Scripturalists” (must be a real neophyte) is;

P1. All who call upon the name of the Lord are saved.

P2. I call upon the name of the Lord.

C1. Therefore I am saved

Then you pull apart this argument by saying that P2 is a problem for everyone for P2 cannot be inferred from Scripture. You’re correct. How do you arrive at P2? Well, not from 1 John 5:13. 1 John could be used to support P1, but not P2. Two different propositions entirely. Instead the Confession and the Scriptures exhort us that it is our duty “to give all diligence to make his calling and election sure.” You confuse assurance with knowledge. The Confession writers evidently weren’t so easily confused. 



> And, the context of the book is that we can "know" these things by looking at our life, and the internal witness of the Holy Spirit.



Yet the Confession states that the “true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties, before he be partaker” of biblical assurance. If assurance were an object of knowledge instead of a state of mind, it would no longer be assurance and Edwards couldn’t say “this matter is not to be learned . . . any other way than by consequence.” 

The only way you can advance your argument is by NOT maintaining knowledge as JTB, but rather saying that knowledge is assurance too. If that were the case self-deception and hypocrisy would be impossible. Truth would be acquired. Your entire argument hangs on an equivocation. 



> And if you can't know that your life is honoring to God, how can you know that you can have assurance?



See what I mean. Assurance is not knowledge, yet you continually confuse the two. To think you have the nerve to accuse others of being “sophomoric.”


----------



## Magma2

> Sean, you don't think the Bible alone is the word of God. Remember, you said the Bible is made up of arbitrary marks on a page. Scripture is different, you said.



You do make it difficult to interact respectfully when you intentionally say such stupid things and seemingly just for effect.



> But, yes, I do think the Bible is the word of God. It is God's sole written revelation to man. But, God said many other words that were not recorded in the Bible, Sean. And those are His words just the same.



No doubt He did, but irrelevant to the discussion.



> Many, like you, think truth can be found in many different places through various different sources quite apart from Scripture.
> If a truth can be found in "different places" than Scripture, then there is extra-Scriptural truth. But you apparently think there is no truth to be found that is not found in Scripture. But this statement, is not true, for it is not found in the Bible! If it is true, what source did it come from? Anyway, it appears that you are an alethic Scripturalist, and therefore you hold to a self-referentially incoherent position.



Again, it’s very hard to take you seriously when you insist on making unthinking and asinine remarks. If Scripture is God's sole written revelation, and we can even agree (unlike papists and charismatics) that former ways of God's revealing his will to his people have ceased, then if one is going to come to a knowledge of the truth, then it would follow that Scripture alone is the only means possible. The search for truth by other means is, and has been, vanity. 

Those like you who insist on a two-source theory of truth must provide an account for whatever your preferred additional source(s) might be. It's not enough to simply say; I think I have a pain, therefore it is true I have a pain. That's not an argument. It's an assertion.

Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its truth. I realize you do not accept the idea that knowledge requires an account, but then you are a hypocrite for demanding it from others including atheists like Dan Barker. Frankly, you owe the man an apology and I mean that sincerely.



> But, here's an extra-biblical truth: I'm experiencing a pain. Since that is an immediate deliverance of one of my mental states, it is undeniable. It is true. And it is not a deliverance of Scripture.



So, let me be clear, is every immediate deliverance of one of your many mental states true because to you they’re undeniable? How do you know it’s true you are experiencing a pain? Please provide an account of how you know this? Perhaps you’re still in bed and dreaming you’re experiencing a pain. Maybe it’s one of your brain lesions causing you to think you’re experiencing a pain. But why restrict knowledge to just subjective experiences, after all your headache is not my headache. Perhaps every thought that pops into your mind is an immediate deliverance of one of your mental states. I’m quite sure Paul Manata as God sounds quite appealing and all the propositions you think are true are true for no other reason than you think them. 



> Second, you haven't shown that my definition of knowledge can provide sufficient warrant to almost any truth claim. The only attempt you made was your straw man argument which assumed I was simply a reliabalist. I addressed those critiques and you've let it fade away into archive history.



Regardless of what you think I’ve shown or not, I have shown that your definition is not mine, Gordon Clark’s, nor does it have anything to do with what a Scripturalist or biblical epistemology is concerned with yet you continually confuse the two. You’ve already provided a nice example that what you think is true is true because you think it. While I’m sure you’re quite happy believing this, I find it hard to believe you’ll find many adherents to your philosophy of knowledge. But, hey, Jim Jones had some success. Go for it!

I realize you keep trying to pin so-called Alethic Scripturalism on me (the only place where your so-called "critique" of Scripturalism, if in fact AS had anything to do with Scripturalism, would carry any weight), but I’ve already, and repeatedly, refuted your attempts and have done so again above. At this point it's safe to say you’ve abandoned argument and have simply resorted to liable. More signs of desperation Paul.




> Further, to quote Dr. Gary Crampton, who is a Scripturalist:
> 
> . . . Paul, in Timothy 3:15-17 restricts knowledge to the complete canon of the 66 books of the Old and New Testaments. Not only the “sacred writings” . . . of the Old Testament (verse15), but “all Scripture,” both the old and the New is God-breathed (verse 16) and thoroughly equips us for “every good work (verse 17)." Thus, if knowledge were available to us outside of Scripture, Paul’s statement would be false and misleading.
> 
> I don't see where Paul "restricts knowledge" to the "completed canon" in II Tim. 3:16.



Neither do Romanists. Actually, most use the exact same subterfuge. I guess you’ve found a new home. Clearly you don’t take the universals Paul uses like “all”, “every”, “perfect” seriously. 




> I don’t know why you stopped where you did, but, no, the bible doesn’t say little Timmy or your Grandmother know in the strict sense they are saved -- in the sense I've used the word which you constantly ignore.
> Yeah, I know that they don't know in the sense you're using it. But you haven't shown the Bible uses it in your sense.



Indeed I have and many times. Do the truths of Scripture just bounce off your mind or do they just fall through one of the many lesions you mentioned? Besides the verses already adduced, according to Paul, “We are destroying speculations and every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God, and we are taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ . . . .” To the law and the testimony . . . not to every and any thought that might pop into your head. Not only is the axiom of Scripture necessary for knowledge of God, it is the only basis for any knowledge of anything whatsoever (see Timothy and not Timmy above), for God alone is truth itself. Clark was correct when he said:



> ". . . it may be pointed out that if God is supreme, as we claim, there can be no higher source than self-disclosure. God cannot be deduced from any superior principle. Therefore the same conclusion follows: either revelation must be accepted as an axiom or there is no knowledge of God at all."



And, since God alone is truth (want me to prove that too from the Scriptures?) and knowledge is concerned with how truth might be obtained, not only is the axiom of Scripture necessary for knowledge of God, it follows that it is the only basis for any knowledge of anything whatsoever for there is no truth apart from God. Apart from the axiom of Scripture, Clark correctly argued that knowledge is simply not possible on any other basis at all. Thankfully, and to date, you have done precisely nothing to prove him wrong. 

You need to try harder Paul. 




> Quote:
> Then you pull apart this argument by saying that P2 is a problem for everyone for P2 cannot be inferred from Scripture. You’re correct. How do you arrive at P2? Well, not from 1 John 5:13. 1 John could be used to support P1, but not P2. Two different propositions entirely.
> 
> I think we can know it by watching our lives, growing in or sanctification, and the internal witness of the holy Spirit.



The problem with your supposition is that assurance, which is possible, is not knowledge. Otherwise it could not be shaken, diminished, and intermitted. You keep forgetting that knowledge is concerned with the acquisition of truth, not with opinions which may or may not be true. The point is you might be wrong just like those who will cry 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in Your name, and in Your name cast out demons, and in Your name perform many miracles?' These men obviously were watching their lives very closely and they could even point to impressive and even great works as evidence of their sanctification. They even cried Lord, Lord so I’m quite sure they thought they had the internal witness of the Holy Spirit as well. Yet the Lord will say; 'I never knew you; DEPART FROM ME, YOU WHO PRACTICE LAWLESSNESS.' 

If the truth of our salvific state could be arrived at as you describe then Paul was talking nonsense when he commands us; Test yourselves to see if you are in the faith; examine yourselves! He tells us to work out your salvation with fear and trembling. If we could validly infer our eternal blessedness from our subjective experience, then such commands would be without meaning. They would be superfluous. Biblical assurance is rooted in the promises and propositions of God, we are to have confidence in them not in ourselves. Assurance is not a source of knowledge, nor should the two be confused as you have done.


----------



## Magma2

> Given the concept, our knowledge is immediate, but the given is, itself, mediated by sensory information processing.



While there is little doubt that I’ve wasted enough time refuting you, I thought I would just point out just a few more examples of your inability to effectively deal with the issues at hand. Notice the above by which you come to assert the epistemic import of “sensation,” yet if knowledge is mediated it is not immediate. You contradict yourself and glaringly so.

<snip blabbering on about Cheung, who, incidently, and as far as I can tell, doesn’t even consider himself a Scripturalist. Why don’t you save that drivel for your blog?>



> And so for the Scripturalist, the written word is superfluous.



Since I had used Scripture and the Bible interchangeably, I guess I provided you an opportunity to go off on a screed about ink marks and the like. That’s fine. Yet, as anyone can see from your post, not only is knowledge immediately mediated (huh?), you also nowhere demonstrate how you arrive at, say, justification by belief alone, starting form ink marks? Nope, you don’t even attempt it, yet you assert sensation has a cognitive function. Pathetic. 



> what do you mean by "an account?"



A rational argument. For example, if you think truth can be gleaned from sensing black ink marks on a page, you need to start by, at the very least, defining what you mean by sensation and from there demonstrate how arbitrary black marks on a page can give rise to universal and true propositions like “all men have sinned.” Outside of that, you’re just begging the question. 



> Moreover, you'll note that I said these beliefs are immediate.



Uh, no you did not. You said the “given” in your theory is that knowledge itself is “mediated by sensory information processing.” Well, I don’t see it as a given at all. Something cannot be both mediated and immediate. It is either one or the other. You can’t have it both ways even in that Van Tilian world you inhabit of contradictions and antinomies. So, it looks to me that you’ve opted for the latter since you say it’s a given that knowledge is mediated by sensory information processing. But, what is this “sensory information processing”? Well, you haven’t told us. You need to start by defining sensation and then provide some demonstration of how this information processing might give rise to knowledge as requested above. Let’s see your argument? Let’s see your account.

For what it's worth and just an aside, I’ve met many pew sitters and even those who have spent lifetimes studying the ink marks in the book called the Bible who have never come to a knowledge of the truth and remain in their sins even to this day. Perhaps if you could explain this sensory information processing method you’re putting forth for the acquisition of knowledge, they too might come to know the truth?



> Well, who knows what *you* mean by an account. Considered broadly enough, my definition of knowledge fits with this. Furthermore, I already corrected you about the Dan Barker thing. I'd appreciate you not calling me a hypocrite



No, I think you are a hypocrite and I would ask you to listen to your debate with the man again. You had no problem whatsoever challenging the man to account for the many assertions he made given his worldview. Now you pretend to have no idea what is meant by an account! It must be one of those vague terms like monopoly. 



> you're somehow thinking that because *some* beliefs do not require an "account" (e.g., basic ones), then I must think that *no* beliefs require an account? But that's fallacious.



That’s not what I think at all, I think you do and say whatever is convenient. No account needed for your phantom pain which you assert is “undeniable” hence true sans any account whatsoever. OTOH an account is needed if you’re an atheist. Don’t worry, I get it.



> That's what proper functioning epistemic agents made in the image of God should do.



I guess people with brain lesions and imbeciles need not apply. As to little lost Timmy, even as infants my kids could sing; Jesus loves me this I know, for the Bible tells me so. Oddly and ironically (given your extreme hostility), that’s pretty much the Scirpturalism of Gordon Clark in nutshell. I couldn’t say it better myself little Timmy.  



> If I was dreaming I was experiencing a pain, it would still be true that I was experiencing a pain, albeit the experience took place in my dream. And, if it a were brain lesion causing the pain experience, it is still true that I am *experiencing* a pain.



I have no doubt you’re experiencing pain right about now, but what you have not done is shown that your experience of pain is cognitive. I would think a person will experience pain when he puts his hand on a burning stove, a leper probably not so much, but it doesn’t follow from this that his pain – or lack thereof -- provides an epistemological process by which the truth of any given proposition might be obtained. You seem to keep forgetting that only propositions can be true or false and you most certainly haven’t show how the pain in your head (and I guess I'm just a pain in your ____) gives rise to knowledge. All you’ve done is assert and beg the question. 



> They are immediately present. And therefore I deny your request for an "account."



Well isn’t that convenient. 

<snip meandering>



> Of course, if you hold that knowledge must be infallible, certain, and indubitable, then I can see where you're coming from.


 
Good. Finally. Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and today, and forever. Amen!


----------



## JWJ

Just wanted to pass on a quick note to Civbert: You are doing a good job in holding your view and stating your point. What I have read only reinforces my Scripturalism. I wish I had the time to engage in this conversation but I am too busy with a church plant. 


Jim


----------



## Don

> P.S. Oh, and for all you know, your planting a new McDonalds franchise, not a church.


----------



## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> P.S. Oh, and for all you know, your planting a new McDonalds franchise, not a church.



 Me too, but for a completely different reason.


----------



## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> Too bad you don't know it's for completely different reasons.



At least I'm not foolish enough to label begging the question "knowledge".  



> Oh, and is it *true* that it is for "completely different reasons?" If so, what about your claim that "truth" is "exclusively possessed in the Scriptures. For some odd reason, I don't recall the verse which says, "Me too, but for a completely different reason." Could you point out where that is?



Since I've already provided ample Scriptural evidence that the Scriptures are the only source of truth and " unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, *or traditions of men*," including the imagined "truths" arising from the current epistemic and philosophic traditions you're so enamored with, I fail to see the need to keep leading you by the hand. So rather than follow you and make the Apostle Paul a liar, I'll stick with Scripture. 

As for the rest of your chest thumping, that pretty much sums up the rest of your impotent "critique" of Scripturalism. Can you spell 
*E Q U I V O C A T I O N*?

If I were to tell you on my honeymoon I knew my wife, you'd ask me to deduce that from Scripture too.  

Pathetic.


----------



## Vytautas

Is Scripture only true because the creation, such as Paul's pain, has only derived being, thus is less real than God and his word which have absolute being?


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## Vytautas

Paul manata said:


> I don't know what you mean. Seems a bit like Plotinus to me.



I asked: Is Scripture only true because the creation, such as Paul's pain, has only derived being, thus is less real than God and his word which have absolute being?

The unclear terms are derived being and absolute being. Absolute being is eternal, unchanging, and infinite. These are the incommunicable attributes of God. Derived being is temporal, changing, and finite which describes the creation of which I gave Paul’s pain as an example. There is a clear difference between these two types of being or reality. Since derived being is lesser than absolute being, then creation is less real than God. So knowledge of creation cannot come from creation because of its inferiority. Is this distinction of reality important in the rejection of extra-biblical knowledge?


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## Cheshire Cat

PM sent Paul.


----------



## Vytautas

Paul manata said:


> I deny your gnostic assumptions and implore you to study the history of philosophy. I deny Plotinus and the great chain of being. Unless your prepared to argue for your position, and deduce it from Scripture, then you're just giving your unjustified opinion.



I think by Gnostic assumptions you mean that the creation is less real than God. A healthy dose of philosophy will cure me, perhaps the idea that all of realty is one, and thus all is equally real. I think Plato’s dialogues are what semenated Plotins and his ideas of being, so you might deny some of Plato’s ideas of reality.

I must prove that the creation is less real than God by Scripture. But before doing the proof, I must know what ‘less real’ means. Of course God is the ultimate reality and exists on a different plane than does the creation. For example, God lives outside of time, but we are timely creatures. So in what way are we different than God other than our being?



Paul manata said:


> Indeed, if you know your position, it is extra-biblical knowledge. The bible no where says that we are "less real" than God. That our existence is contingent upon him , doesn't mean we're less real. Yeah, there's a clear difference between Creator and creature. Doesn't mean we're less real.



You deny that we are less real than God because you cannot think of a Scripture verse that would affirm this. I am not saying you are ignorant of the Bible, but that the verses are just not available right now.



Paul manata said:


> And, your question doesn't change the fact of the truth of my immediate mental states, i.e., how I'm being appeared to, experiencing pain, etc. If I have an immediate report of being appeard to in a green way, even if it's a dream, a trick by an evil demon, a blue thing appearing to me as green, etc., that still doesn't change the fact that it's true that I'm being *appeared to* in that way. That was the context of my pain example.



It may very well be true, but how real is it?




Paul manata said:


> Anyway, why do these Scripturalists continue to make claims, statements, arguments, etc., that are clearly not deducible from Scripture? Why do they think we should bow down to their *unjustified opinions?*



Well, years more of Scripture research might clear the matter as more of the ideas of the Bible are understood more. But really I think this is a matter of the will, not inteligence.


----------



## Vytautas

Instead of 'less real' we can use 'lesser being' which sounds more mild but essencially the same. Psalm 8:5 contains the notion that man is lesser in being than the angels. So man < angles. If angles < God, then man < God. Would you grant that angles are lesser beings than God?


----------



## Vytautas

Paul manata said:


> That "all of reality is not one," does not entail the claim "some of reality is less real." Try again.



I agree.




Paul manata said:


> You used the term, you should know what it means.




Let’s use yours: distinction.



Paul manata said:


> God is timeless is a better phrase than "God exists 'outside' time."



No doubt.




Paul manata said:


> I couldn't list all the ways that we're different than God. But difference doesn't entail "less real." Now, I know the gnostics and the Platonists thought the physical world was "less real" that the world of the unchanging forms, but of course the Christian doctrine of creation, and Jesus taking on a temporal and changing body sort of refuted that doctrine, huh? Unless, Jesus was partially "less real" than God?



Jesus is not less real than God.




Paul manata said:


> No, because of positive doctrines, based on Scripture, which speak to the contrary, namely, the incarnation. There's plenty of Christians who have refuted Plotinus and great chain of being philosophy/theology. You might want to get aquainted with their works.



Very well.




Paul manata said:


> Well, (a) you just disagreed with Sean Gerety a fellow Scripturalist, and to ask 'how real it is' presupposes your (as of yet) unproven gnosticism.



So all of reality is equal in some way but distinct.




Paul manata said:


> Right. It's because of my "less real" sinful will that I'm denying your gnosticism. Calling someone sinful, always a sure way to win a debate.



Seems that I concede.


----------



## Vytautas

Paul manata said:


> If it's "essentially the same," then no "we" can't grant that. Unless you want to grant that the God-man was somehow "less real" (which, for you, is the same as "less real" than God). You're treading on thin ice here.



Concepts like 'less real' are false just as something that is 'less true' is false.


----------



## Magma2

Paul manata said:


> I've interacted with every argument you've put up.



Indeed you have, I'm sure everyone who suffers through these posts will recall some of your "argumentation" like these representative gems:

_"Who says I "need to" do that? Who elevated you to the Pontif of Argumentation?"

"They are immediately present. And therefore I deny your request for an "account.'"_



> You've not bothered to deal with them. Feel free to continue the debate and show where my arguments err.



Bald assertions and question begging aren't arguments. Not much to interact with. 



> Anyway, you said that Scripture "exclusively possessed the truth." I gave my argument from California and the orange freeze crisis (you never interacted with that, btw).



You've also said that ink scratches in a black book have a cognitive role, but refuse to provide any account at all. Instead I get; "I deny your request for an "account." 




> If your sentence is true, is it "exclusively possossed in Scripure?" That is, is it "exclusively possessed in Scripture that Sean Gerety has done such and such?" If it is not true, then it's fasle that "Sean gerety has provided ample Scripural evidence that truth is exclusively possessed by Scripture?" If it's false, why post it like it's a true statement? If it is true, and since it's not "exclusively possessed by Scripture" then where is its source? Inquiring minds want to know.




For a man who postures himself as a philosophical and modern epistemological sophisticate it has become increasingly evident that you use contemporary jargon to hide behind. One would have assumed that if Emperor Manata really did have some clothes on, he would realize that the account for knowledge, i.e., the demonstration that you know doesn't also require the demonstration that you know that you know. If that were the case then you would have to show that you know that you know that you know and into the spiraling drain of infinite regress we go. 

You deny that Scripture has a monopoly on truth and that the Bible alone is the Word of God. So what? Someone on a different thread argued that "Sola scriptura is the belief that Scripture contains sufficient teaching for the man of God in matters of faith and morals." However the Confession asserts; "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added . . . ." To artificially restrict the sufficiency and authority of Scripture to matters of faith and morals is to contradict the Confession and sola Scripture -- at least as defined by the Confession. You share this person's two-source theory of truth implied above, but when asked to account for this other source or sources of yours, you reply; "I deny your request for an "account." 



> P.S. Btw, people still want to know how you don't render the written word superfluous, as unconfessional idea as any.



I've never said the written word is superfluous, just that black marks on white pages of a black book have no cognitive value. OTOH, I have maintained that the whole counsel of God, concerning all things which can be known are either expressly set down in scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from scripture. I have also maintained that if anyone is going to to know anything at all they must accept a word from God, which is why the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts is indispensable. The Scriptures are the thoughts of God. As such, the propositions of Scripture are spiritually discerned, something impenetrable to the carnal mind (and evidently the minds of some Christians as well). 

You assert that ink marks play a role in the acquisition of knowledge and when I asked for you to account for this you deny me. OK, not much more I can do. Therefore I will have to drop out of this discussion with you. However, before I do, I'll leave you with a quote from Gordon Clark written in response to Robert Reymond from the posthumously published book; "Clark Speaks from the Grave" (a fun book to have to read around campfires). Reymond, who Clark admired greatly, also held to the widely accepted view that sensations must play a role in the learning process. 



> One could say that eating food plays a role in the learning process, since if one starves to death he can no longer learn. Most college students would say, contrary to Augustine's _De Magistro_, that the college professor plays a role in their learning process, if even a minor role. But what role? Then too, remember how sensation or perception played a role in Plato's theory. As one sees a harp and is reminded of a certain musician, so when one sees a crude square drawn in the sand, one remembers the perfect square in the World of Ideas. Sensation is thus a stimulus to reminiscence. Is this what Reymond meant? Hardly possible. Then, what role? In the intellectual arena an empiricist is under strict obligation to show how sensations produce knowledge. That is what empiricism is. Here one can only guess what the critic has in mind. The guess will probably be incorrect, for perhaps the critic has nothing in mind. In reviewing the several apologetes who oppose Clark, one gets the impression that some are subconsciously Kantian. One of them at least explicitly denies being an empiricist. But if this is so, these apologetes are under obligation to show how a set of categories can inform a mass of chaotic sensation. They escape this obligation by refusing to define sensation, and by skipping from beginning to end without passing through the intervening distance. In order to make their point they should have defined sensation and should have shown clearly and explicitly how it produces knowledge. Far from doing this, they do not explain even how sensation can produce perception. Much less do they describe the process of manufacturing abstract ideas from perception. Hence these objections to Clark are empty fallacies.



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