# Howe's Critique of Presuppositionalism



## Scott (Jun 15, 2005)

Just passing this along for comments. I am a presuppositionalist and don't agree with it. 

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In response several things might be said. First, much of the argument that Van Til and Bahnsen make seems more fitting as a transcendental argument for the necessity and unavoidability of logic rather than a transcendental argument for the necessity and unavoidability of Trinitarian theism. No one could argue that logic is not the case, since, in order to make the argument that logic is not the case (or that logic does not apply to reality) the arguer would have to use logic. This is so because acknowledging that the notion of "being not the case" is different from "being the case" demonstrates the antecedent truth and unavoidability of the logical law of non-contradiction. If the law of non-contradiction is not so, then there could be no distinction between being the case and not being the case. Since logic is necessary even to argue against logic itself, this shows that logic is transcendentally necessary.

But somehow, Van Til thinks that this is the case with a full-blown Trinitarian Christian theism. While it is clear to me how logic is transcendentally necessary for there to be an argument against God, it is not clear to me how God is transcendentally necessary for an argument against God. In fact, though Van Til throughout his writings repeatedly asserts that one must presuppose the God of Christian theism before he can know anything else, I have yet to encounter one instance where Van Til actually makes this argument.

What the Presuppositionalist has confused here is the difference between the order of knowing and the order of being; or, if you will, the difference between a certain metaphysical consideration and a certain epistemological consideration. Take as an example the illustration of a map to Fayetteville. In the order of being, there would have to be the city of Fayetteville before there could be a map showing one how to get to Fayetteville. Thus, in the order of being, Fayetteville is first. However, in order to find one's way to Fayetteville, one might need a map. Thus, in the order of knowing, the map is first. In the theistic argument debate, the theist certainly sees that in the order of being God is first, since, if God is the creator of all things besides Himself, then, if there was not a God, there would be nothing else at all, not even an argument for God. But in the order of knowing, it might be the case that one would need a "map" to God, i.e., a theistic argument. Just as using a map to find Fayetteville says nothing amiss about the metaphysical priority of Fayetteville to the map, likewise, to use a theistic argument to find God says nothing amiss about the metaphysical priority of God to the argument. Van Til is wrong to think that if an argument leads on to a belief in the existence of God, this God could not be the God of Christianity. He is wrong in thinking that this would make God subservient to the argument. The fact that the argument for God's existence comes first means that it only does so in the order of knowing. It does not imply that somehow the being of God is secondary. Presuppositionalists mistakenly assume that to have the argument first in the order of knowing is to tacitly deny that God is first in the order of being. It does not.

Second, Van Til seems to confuse knowing something truly and knowing something exhaustively. He seems to think that unless the nonbeliever correctly links the elements of his knowledge of the world to the Creator of those elements, he has not understood any of those elements at all. This seems to me to be clearly false. Surely, even if there were a God one who disbelieves in the existence of God could still have some degree of truth. An atheist can learn agriculture (to use Van Til's example) as well, if not better in some cases, than the theist. In fact, Van Til's point seems to prove too much. Even he himself would have to admit that the theist does not exhaustively know certain elements of his world. Van Til would have to admit that no human is omniscient. Thus, if the theist lacks a certain degree of knowledge, then it would seem that the difference between the atheist and theist is merely a matter of degree. But if it is only a matter of degree, then Van Til's system breaks down and those principles in his system that would militate against the legitimacy of the theistic arguments no longer hold.

Third, even if one granted that Van Til was right in claiming that human beings are estranged from God by virtue of mankind's rebellion against God, it does not follow from this that human beings are totally estranged from reality itself. Surely even the most extreme Calvinist or Presuppositionalist would admit that gravity still affects the sinner as much as the saint. It is from this common ground of reality that the classical tradition has built its natural theology. Van Til seems to miss that fact that the nonbeliever participates within reality and that his reference to reality itself could serve as a starting point to find God. Indeed, some might argue that it is the classical tradition that is more God honoring, since it refuses to acknowledge that there is any aspect of reality that does not rightly point to God as its creator or that fails to do so perspicuously. For Van Til to summarily reject rational argument as a viable source to discover God seems tacitly to say that there is a part of reality, viz., human reason that is independent of God.

Last, and perhaps most serious, while Bahnsen asserts that the laws of logic can be known to be valid only if one presupposes the Christian world view, he goes on to use the laws of logic in his attempt to demonstrate that this is the case. Throughout his debate with Sproul, as well as throughout out his writings, Bahnsen utilizes a stock phrase that he gleaned from Van Til. He encapsulates the Presuppositionalist approach by saying that Christianity can be shown to be true by demonstrating the "impossibility of the contrary." But there is something very wrong with this line of reasoning vis-Ã -vis the Presuppositionalist/Classical debate. Van Til and Bahnsen are assuming that a world view and its contrary cannot both be false. They are asserting that if the contrary to Christianity can be shown to be impossible, then Christianity necessarily is true. But this could only be the case if the laws of logic hold antecedently. However, Bahnsen has already argued that the laws of logic cannot be known to be valid unless Christianity is presupposed. Thus, he cannot demonstrate this very point by any argument of the "impossibility of the contrary" since there would only be a difference between Christianity and its contrary if the laws of logic were valid.

Some Critical Thoughts on Presuppositionalism
Â© 2004 Richard G. Howe, Ph.D.


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jun 15, 2005)

I'll give my  later. No time right now.


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## Myshkin (Jun 15, 2005)

The full article comes from here: http://members.mailaka.net/richardghowe/richardghowe.html


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## WrittenFromUtopia (Jun 16, 2005)

I love Paul.


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## Scott (Jun 16, 2005)

I notice in the CV that his first reference is Norm Geisler.


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jun 16, 2005)

> Too bad. Can any one answer me why people who critique Van Til don't even bother to do it properly?



Its because they don't take the time to read ALL his writings.
That's why I've decided to write something substantial later after _finishing _ *everything*. Its coming Paul. Give me some time...I know you can't wait.


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## RickyReformed (Jun 17, 2005)

> _Originally posted by webmaster_
> 
> 
> > Too bad. Can any one answer me why people who critique Van Til don't even bother to do it properly?
> ...





That's a great attitude, Matt. I've seen the same modus operandi in Gordon Clark's critics - they don't bother to read all his works, and many wind up misrepresenting him when they critique him.


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## JohnV (Jun 17, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> What would be cool to is if people would take their head out of the books, tone done the intramural debate, and try their apologetic methodolgy in the real world. Sure, your view may sound good in theory, and you may impress other Christians with you critiques of non-Christian positions, even though they may be straw men you've demolished; but what about getting in the trenches? What's the point of studying apologetics if you're not going to use it? Test your metal. Test your grit. Go and empirically verify if you have an apologetic method that works
> 
> Btw, I don't think you need to read ALL of someones works.



I agree, Paul. Well, except for the last statement. I would whole-heartedly recommend reading all of God's works, as I'm sure you'll agree. 

Take someone by the hand and introduce him to God. Don't just look for the fingerprints on His works, see His hands on it. And show that to others by example, by conversation, and by how you present God's truth to them.


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## Peters (Jul 31, 2005)

> What would be cool to is if people would take their head out of the books, tone done the intramural debate, and try their apologetic methodolgy in the real world. Sure, your view may sound good in theory, and you may impress other Christians with you critiques of non-Christian positions, even though they may be straw men you've demolished; but what about getting in the trenches? What's the point of studying apologetics if you're not going to use it? Test your metal. Test your grit. Go and empirically verify if you have an apologetic method that works


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