# Deduction/Induction



## Poimen (Apr 24, 2007)

Could someone please give me a really simple example of the difference between deductive and inductive reasoning? 

Thank you.


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## InChains620 (Apr 24, 2007)

I found a great site with simple examples to help you with your question:
Here  
I hope this helps you. I found it helpful.


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## Poimen (Apr 24, 2007)

InChains620 said:


> I found a great site with simple examples to help you with your question:
> Here
> I hope this helps you. I found it helpful.



Excellent! Thank you Alex.


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## InChains620 (Apr 24, 2007)

Not a problem, I just joined the site. Glad I could be of some benefit, I hope it answers your questions.


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## Civbert (Apr 24, 2007)

I was going to post a nice detailed explanation, but the Nathaniel Bluedorn does a much better job than I would have. I also recommend their books. They are written for kids, but adults need help with logic too. You let your kids read these books without you and they are going to be teaching you a thing or two. 

I'm one of the moderators on the Christian Logic Forum. But don't let that deter you.


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## MW (Apr 24, 2007)

The important thing to remember is that the terms relate to formal logic. In reality there is no genuine distinction between deduction and induction. Looking at the referenced article, the two examples result in probability or certainty because the author has chosen to represent his arguments in specific ways. In reality the deductive argument depends upon the certainty of its premises. Hence the deductive argument does not lead to any more certainty than an inductive argument.


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## Civbert (Apr 24, 2007)

In _reality_ there is a genuine distinction between induction and deduction. Looking at the referenced article we see:


> Comparing these two types of reasoning: inductive reasoning starts with many pieces of evidence and comes up with a probable conclusion, while deductive reasoning begins with a few trustworthy statements and ends with a necessary conclusion.
> 
> Logic Comes in Two Flavors



The distinction is internal to the argument form. Argument forms are really real.  

A deductive argument:

Premise 1: All cows have utters.
Premise 2: Betsy is a cow.

Conclusion: It is necessarily true that Betsy has utters.​
An inductive argument:

Premise: All the crows I have ever witnessed are black.
Conclusion: Therefore, all crows are probably black.​
This clear distinction (probable conclusion verses necessary conclusion) is the key between the two forms of argument. Whether the premises are reliable true does not effect the form of the argument. The premises could be entirely false and this will not remove the distinction. And this is speaking from the perspective of "reality". 

What Nathaniel Bluedorn has shown is how beneficial inductive reasoning is. Inductive reasoning, when it limits it's claim to probabilities is still very useful and even necessary. We use induction when analyzing the Bible all the time. And we use induction is indispensable for daily life. But this does not mean we are to confuse induction with deduction. 

It is also important to note that the "formal" in logic, while abstract is also very real. To say otherwise would lead to the strange assertion that 2 + 2 does not "really" equal 4.


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## smhbbag (Apr 24, 2007)

> The important thing to remember is that the terms relate to formal logic. In reality there is no genuine distinction between deduction and induction.



There is quite a big and important distinction.



> Looking at the referenced article, the two examples result in probability or certainty because the author has chosen to represent his arguments in specific ways. In reality the deductive argument depends upon the certainty of its premises. Hence the deductive argument does not lead to any more certainty than an inductive argument.



Of course both types of argumentation depend on the accuracy of the premises. That is not the issue.

The distinction comes in that, *if we grant all the premises*, does the conclusion follow with certainty? With deductive reasoning, it does. With inductive, it does not. 

If someone comes at me with an inductive argument, I can respond: "Well, I grant all your premises, and that you formulated your argument well....but you're still wrong and here's why."

If they come at me with a deductive argument, no such option exists, because if the premises are true, and the formulation valid, then the conclusion is certain.

So as far as:


> In reality the deductive argument depends upon the certainty of its premises.



Nobody ever denied that.


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## Civbert (Apr 24, 2007)

smhbbag said:


> ...
> If someone comes at me with an inductive argument, I can respond: "Well, I grant all your premises, and that you formulated your argument well....but you're still wrong and here's why."
> ...



I'd be careful not to say they were wrong, only that their conclusion is not _necessarily_ true. It is _possible _they are right as inductive arguments are always possible right. 

But if someone give a valid deductive arguments, and you agree with his premises, then his conclusion is undeniable. It must be right if his argument is formally valid. That's the beauty of deductive logic - we can actually determine truth when we apply it to truth premises. This is why the Westminster Confession of Faith extends knowledge beyond just the actual propositions of Scripture and includes those things the follow by "good and necessary consequence".



> WCF 1:6 The whole counsel of God, concerning all things *necessary *for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or *by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture*: unto which _nothing_ at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or _traditions of men _(Gal_1:8, Gal_1:9; 2Th_2:2; 2Ti_3:15-17).
> 
> (emphasis added)


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

That's right, the distinction is internal to the "argument form." But everyone knows the argument form is external to the facts. Deductive argument: All cows have udders; Betsy is a cow; Betsy has udders -- depends upon the inductive argument: All cows I have ever witnessed have udders; therefore, all cows probably have udders. Likewise the inductive argument -- All the crows I have ever witnessed are black; therefore, all crows are probably black -- can be made a deductive argument with a slip of the quill: All crows are black; Jackson is a crow; therefore Jackson is black. Logic is woopy doop!


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## smhbbag (Apr 25, 2007)

> That's right, the distinction is internal to the "argument form." But everyone knows the argument form is external to the facts. Deductive argument: All cows have udders; Betsy is a cow; Betsy has udders -- depends upon the inductive argument: All cows I have ever witnessed have udders; therefore, all cows probably have udders.



No, it does not depend on that inductive argument.

"All cows have udders" is not a conclusion from previous induction, but simply part of a definition, which is used as a premise. You can argue whether it's a good or bad definition, but it remains just that.



> Likewise the inductive argument -- All the crows I have ever witnessed are black; therefore, all crows are probably black -- can be made a deductive argument with a slip of the quill: All crows are black; Jackson is a crow; therefore Jackson is black. Logic is woopy doop!



What was the point in this example?

That argument can be "made" deductive with the slip of the quill.....so what?

When changed, even slightly, into a deductive argument, it's entire nature and substance is altered radically. Because changing it didn't take much ink, that means it's not very different?

Yes, there's only a "slip of the quill" difference between 'can' and 'can't' - but they still mean very different things.


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> That's right, the distinction is internal to the "argument form." But everyone knows the argument form is external to the facts. Deductive argument: All cows have udders; Betsy is a cow; Betsy has udders -- depends upon the inductive argument: All cows I have ever witnessed have udders; therefore, all cows probably have udders.


The premise for all cows have udders depends only on the definition of cows. It doesn't follow from observing cows. An animal without utters is not a cow by definition.



armourbearer said:


> Likewise the inductive argument -- All the crows I have ever witnessed are black; therefore, all crows are probably black -- can be made a deductive argument with a slip of the quill: All crows are black; Jackson is a crow; therefore Jackson is black.



Your "slip of the quill" changed an inconclusive premise into a universal statement that does not follow. To say "all crow are black" means_ each and every_ crow is black. And this does not follow from a the particular "All the crows I have ever witnessed are black". 

Some (A is B) 
does _not_ imply 
All (A is B)​
And in fact, not all crows are black. 



armourbearer said:


> Logic is woopy doop!


 I hope you don't mind if I quote you on that.


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## Chris (Apr 25, 2007)

Civbert said:


> I'm one of the moderators on the Christian Logic Forum.




Christians and logic? 

Now there's something desperately needed.  

I think our understanding of Theology, as a whole, would be greatly increased simply by having a grasp (collectively)of logic.


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## Jerusalem Blade (Apr 25, 2007)

Here in Cyprus the crows are black and grey.


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## VirginiaHuguenot (Apr 25, 2007)

Jerusalem Blade said:


> Here in Cyprus the crows are black and grey.



I am reminded of Shakespeare:



> Lawn as white as driven snow,
> *Cyprus black as e'er was crow,*
> Gloves as sweet as damask roses,
> Masks for faces and for noses,
> ...





> Welcome to Cyprus.
> - William Shakespeare, _Othello_ (Iago at IV, i) (quoted by Leon Uris in _Exodus_)



Now back to your regularly scheduled programme...


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

Yes, there is a distinction so far as formal logic is concerned -- that has already been accepted; but formal logic is a rhetorical not a rational tool. It is simply an argumentative device. I inverted the two examples to show that the logical structure is not tied to the facts, but to the manner in which the person wishes to present their case. A deductive argument does not yield any more real certainty than an inductive argument because its premises depend upon induction even though its structure does not.

The responses I received show this is the case. smhbbag says, "You can argue whether it's a good or bad definition, but it remains just that." Hence he acknowledges deductive arguments do not produce certainty because they depend upon the truthfulness of the premises. Civbert says, "To say 'all crow are black' means each and every crow is black. And this does not follow from a the particular 'All the crows I have ever witnessed are black.' Hence he shows that particulars are made a universal in the first premise of the deductive argument.


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## smhbbag (Apr 25, 2007)

> A deductive argument does not yield any more real certainty than an inductive argument because its premises depend upon induction even though its structure does not.



This has already been addressed. Deductive arguments do not ultimately rest upon induction, in most cases. _Definitions are not inductive arguments._

The argument:

P1: All cows have udders.
P2: Betsy is a cow
C1: Betsy has udders.

_Does not, in any way at all, even remotely rely on induction._



> Hence he acknowledges deductive arguments do not produce certainty because they depend upon the truthfulness of the premises.



No one here has questioned that deductive arguments only produce certain conclusions when the premises are certainly true.

Yes, I acknowledge that, and already explicitly said so, when I said "Of course both types of argumentation depend on the accuracy of the premises." Is that unclear somehow?

The mammoth difference is that if you have 100% certainty of the premises in an inductive argument....your conclusion may still be false. 

If you have 100% certainty of the premises in a deductive argument, *your conclusion cannot be false.*



> A deductive argument does not yield any more real certainty than an inductive argument



Yes, it does. If I have certainty in my premises, my conclusion from valid deductive argumentation is 100% guaranteed to be true. If I take similar premises that I am also 100% sure of and argue inductively, my conclusion may still be wrong. That means deductive argumentation gives me more certainty. 

I may have to jump off this merry-go-round soon...


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> ... Civbert says, "To say 'all crow are black' means each and every crow is black. And this does not follow from a the particular 'All the crows I have ever witnessed are black.' Hence he shows that particulars are made a universal in the first premise of the deductive argument.


 What?!? I'm speechless.


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## smhbbag (Apr 25, 2007)

Yeah, I was gonna let you try and tackle that one.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

smhbbag said:


> This has already been addressed. Deductive arguments do not ultimately rest upon induction, in most cases.



IN MOST CASES.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

smhbbag said:


> No one here has questioned that deductive arguments only produce certain conclusions when the premises are certainly true.



Then it should be as plain as day that the deductive argument does not yield certainty, contrary to the referenced article. You want to argue for formal certainty, that is, so far as the structure of the argument is concerned, and I keep saying, Sure, no problem, as long as it is understood that it does not yield real certainty.


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## smhbbag (Apr 25, 2007)

It does yield real certainty, if you have real certainty about the premises.



> IN MOST CASES.



Is that supposed to invalidate anything I said, or is it just for rhetorical effect?


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

smhbbag said:


> It does, if you have real certainty about the premises.



First, then the reality does not depend on the argument. Second, where is the real certainty of a generalisation when men only know particulars?


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

smhbbag said:


> It does, if you have real certainty about the premises.



Like the propositions of Scripture.


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## smhbbag (Apr 25, 2007)

> First, then the reality does not depend on the argument. Second, where is the real certainty of a generalisation when men only know particulars?



I'm sorry, but I honestly don't know what you're asking.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

smhbbag said:


> I'm sorry, but I honestly don't know what you're asking.



Then I'm not sure why you responded negatively to my critique of the article that deductive arguments yield certainty. In order to establish certainty the argument must be couched in universals. If there is a sphere in which the premise is not true it does not yield certainty. Now man's knowledge is limited to a particular sphere. Hence he should really only be saying, "... I have seen." Yet he passes his knowledge off as something universally true in and of itself when he says, "All ... are ..."


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> ...Now man's knowledge is limited to a particular sphere. Hence he should really only be saying, "... I have seen." Yet he passes his knowledge off as something universally true in and of itself when he says, "All ... are ..."



This is the most telling flaw in your understanding - you claim that man's knowledge it limited to particulars. If that is the case, then Scripture is meaningless because it's propositions _are _universals. But I suspect your understanding of the differences between universals and particulars must be defective because you would not deny universals like "all men are sinners" and "Jesus was crucified". Rather you will deny these are universals. This is a very fundamental error in your understanding of logic. I'm sorry to criticize you so directly - but I can't think of any other way to point out the error than to be direct.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

Civbert said:


> This is the most telling flaw in your understanding - you claim that man's knowledge it limited to particulars. If that is the case, then Scripture is meaningless because it's propositions _are _universals. But I suspect your understanding of the differences between universals and particulars must be defective because you would not deny universals like "all men are sinners" and "Jesus was crucified". Rather you will deny these are universals. This is a very fundamental error in your understanding of logic. I'm sorry to criticize you so directly - but I can't think of any other way to point out the error than to be direct.



The defect is in the person who makes a claim of universal knowledge and does not quote the authority for it. The proposition should include, the Bible teaches, or, God says. Then it will be clear Who the person is relying on for his knowledge of universals, and his claim can be tested accordingly. As it stands, Civbert has not shown that man himself knows the universal, only that the man is relying on the testimony of a higher authority in his claim of a universal fact.


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> The defect is in the person who makes a claim of universal knowledge and does not quote the authority for it. The proposition should include, the Bible teaches, or, God says. Then it will be clear Who the person is relying on for his knowledge of universals, and his claim can be tested accordingly. As it stands, Civbert has not shown that man himself knows the universal, only that the man is relying on the testimony of a higher authority in his claim of a universal fact.


I'm a Scripturalist. The God's Word _is_ the athority because God spoke it. 

If man _only_ knows particulars - he can not know what God's says in Scripture since Scripture makes universal statements.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

Civbert said:


> If man _only_ knows particulars - he can not know what God's says in Scripture since Scripture makes universal statements.



No, he cannot know based on a rationalist justification of belief. He can know based on a relation justification of belief. I.e., I trust God, therefore I believe what the Holy Spirit speaks to me in the Word.


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> No, he cannot know based on a rationalist justification of belief.


 Which I never made.



armourbearer said:


> He can know based on a relation justification of belief. I.e., I trust God, therefore I believe what the Holy Spirit speaks to me in the Word.


 And I never said otherwise.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

So do you agree knowledge is fundamentally relational, not propositional?


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> So do you agree knowledge is fundamentally relational, not propositional?


 I don't know what you mean by these terms. But but by my understanding of the terms it is not either or, but both.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

Civbert said:


> I don't know what you mean by these terms. But but by my understanding of the terms it is not either or, but both.



You accepted the either/or above when you said "Which I never made" and "And I never said otherwise." Are you now saying that knowledge is based on a rationalist justification of belief?


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> You accepted the either/or above when you said "Which I never made" and "And I never said otherwise." Are you now saying that knowledge is based on a rationalist justification of belief?


No, I'm not saying that. I didn't say it the first time, and I'm not saying it this time either. 

But you still have not explained what you mean by relational and propositional.

And since the second part of you statement did not contain an "only" clause, it did imply an either|or situation. 


> He can know based on a relation justification of belief.


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## MW (Apr 25, 2007)

Please tell me, Civbert, if you cannot know universals how you can justify beliefs based on rational considerations? If you are dependent upon the testimony of Another, how are you not affirming that the justification for your beliefs are entirely dependent upon your relationship to (trust in) the One who gives that testimony?


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## Civbert (Apr 25, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> Please tell me, Civbert, if you cannot know universals how you can justify beliefs based on rational considerations?


 But one _can_ know universals. I never said otherwise.



armourbearer said:


> If you are dependent upon the testimony of Another, how are you not affirming that the justification for your beliefs are entirely dependent upon your relationship to (trust in) the One who gives that testimony?


 It does. It depends on the testimony of God through His Word. I base knowledge on my faith in the truths of Scripture as testified by the Holy Spirit which enables me to both understand and believe God's Word.


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## sotzo (Apr 25, 2007)

Armourbearer's point, if I understand him correctly, is that premises in deductions are essentially the conclusions of inductive reasoning. Therefore, conclusions of deductions, though 100% certain if the premises are true, cannot, themselves be 100% certain.

Civrbert's point is, if I understand him correctly, is that we *can* be 100% certain of certain premises based on the authority of Scripture.

Couldn't peace be made by simply saying:

All knowledge, whether arrived at inductively or deductively, regardless of its degree of certainty, is communicated and received via propositions...and that these propositions are communicated and received via relationship between recipient and object. If the object (giver of the proposition) is God, then the recipient is justified in believing that deductions on such premises/propositions, are100% certain.

If so, it seems we are squarely in Van Tillian territory (ie, that God can and does communicate, that we can receive it and understand such communication, that the Bible is the locus of such communication, etc)...or perhaps we are squarely back at the first line of Calvin's Institutes:
"Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed true and solid Wisdom, consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes and gives birth to the other."

Apologies if I am making for more confusion....


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## MW (Apr 26, 2007)

Civbert said:


> But one _can_ know universals. I never said otherwise.



Only One can know universals, and that is the God Who is everywhere present to know them. If you know anything it is only because God tells you. You do not know the universal, but the God Who knows the universal -- there is a fundamental difference. If you only know things because God tells you it is quite obvious that your knowledge is based solely upon trust in His testimony. So let's not hear any more nonsense about a piece of dust knowing universals.


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## MW (Apr 26, 2007)

sotzo said:


> If so, it seems we are squarely in Van Tillian territory (ie, that God can and does communicate, that we can receive it and understand such communication, that the Bible is the locus of such communication, etc)...or perhaps we are squarely back at the first line of Calvin's Institutes:
> "Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed true and solid Wisdom, consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes and gives birth to the other."



If we can forget about the VanTillian addition, the insight of Calvin is priceless. Thankyou.


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## sotzo (Apr 26, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> If we can forget about the VanTillian addition, the insight of Calvin is priceless. Thankyou.



But to the point of my post, you don't get away from the facts that ultimately all truth is founded upon the presupposition that God can/desires to communicate, that we can understand His communication, that the Bible is able to be interpreted aright.

And if you can't get away from those facts, then ultimately, universals are cannot be demonstrably proven, only received and believed. Hence, it is a waste of time to debate whether induction or deduction renders knowledge more certain.


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## MW (Apr 26, 2007)

sotzo said:


> But to the point of my post, you don't get away from the facts that ultimately all truth is founded upon the presupposition that God can/desires to communicate, that we can understand His communication, that the Bible is able to be interpreted aright.
> 
> And if you can't get away from those facts, then ultimately, universals are cannot be demonstrably proven, only received and believed. Hence, it is a waste of time to debate whether induction or deduction renders knowledge more certain.



The knowledge of the things of which you speak in the first paragraph depends entirely upon the character of the God Whom you trust. At that point you are worshipping at His footstool because He is holy, Ps. 99:5. On the basis that we trust a holy God it is redundant to ask whether induction or deduction yields certainty. The certainty is guaranteed by the character of the God Whom we trust. Our presuppositon is one of relation -- an insight Calvin gives us, but Van Til seeks to extend into the regions of rationality.


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## Me Died Blue (Apr 26, 2007)

I recently learned that David Hume had critiqued induction in general as ultimately having no reasonable foundation on which to stand or demonstrative justification for being believed.

What initially came to mind when I heard that is that it is a good illustration of a humanist philosopher admitting that his worldview cannot account for such assumed continuity, in nature or logic.


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## sotzo (Apr 26, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> The knowledge of the things of which you speak in the first paragraph depends entirely upon the character of the God Whom you trust.



But the knowledge of the God I trust is gained *itself* within the pages of Scripture...at least the sort of knowledge about Him that tells me He is a God whom I can trust, which general revelation cannot do. In other words, I can't start with a God Whom I trust without first learning about Him from the pages of Scripture. So Scripture first, then comes the trust that I am rightly interpreting based on His promise that those who believe will rightly interpret (Rom 1). Thus where I end and He begins insofar as my epistemic ground is a very difficult thing to separate. 

If I may move the discussion to an apologetics arena momentarily:
Based on the above, from an apologetics standpoint, "because the Bible tells me so" is the ultimate end. The difficulty is I would not buy "because the Koran tells me so" from a Muslim or "because Dawkins says so" from the atheist. It seems then our hope in discussion with the unbeliever (at least at the point when it comes down to the battle of respective presuppositions which cannot be "logically" defended) is that he/she will see Christ crucified, raised and ascended as the only remedy for their malady.

Perhaps you would agree and that is why you take issue with Van Til and, perhaps, Bahnsen?


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## MW (Apr 26, 2007)

Me Died Blue said:


> I recently learned that David Hume had critiqued induction in general as ultimately having no reasonable foundation on which to stand or demonstrative justification for being believed.
> 
> What initially came to mind when I heard that is that it is a good illustration of a humanist philosopher admitting that his worldview cannot account for such assumed continuity, in nature or logic.



Yes, at the end of the day worldly-wisemen are reduced to the irreducible complexity that in denying God they know nothing!


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## MW (Apr 26, 2007)

sotzo said:


> But the knowledge of the God I trust is gained *itself* within the pages of Scripture...at least the sort of knowledge about Him that tells me He is a God whom I can trust, which general revelation cannot do. In other words, I can't start with a God Whom I trust without first learning about Him from the pages of Scripture. So Scripture first, then comes the trust that I am rightly interpreting based on His promise that those who believe will rightly interpret (Rom 1). Thus where I end and He begins insofar as my epistemic ground is a very difficult thing to separate.
> 
> If I may move the discussion to an apologetics arena momentarily:
> Based on the above, from an apologetics standpoint, "because the Bible tells me so" is the ultimate end. The difficulty is I would not buy "because the Koran tells me so" from a Muslim or "because Dawkins says so" from the atheist. It seems then our hope in discussion with the unbeliever (at least at the point when it comes down to the battle of respective presuppositions which cannot be "logically" defended) is that he/she will see Christ crucified, raised and ascended as the only remedy for their malady.
> ...



My concern here is with the idea that the knowledge of the God we trust is assumed to be first of all in Scripture. I would echo Augustine, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find rest in Thee. We already have a conception of the trustworthy God, as Rom. 1 notes. Our problem is that we hold this truth in unrighteousness. When we knew God, we glorified Him not as God. When we came to trust in God it was because God Himself shone in our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, that is, the gospel. The Scriptures were instrumental, but they were not the efficient cause. Hence our trust in the Scriptures was subsequent to our trust in God.


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## MW (Apr 26, 2007)

To make an attempt to apply this apologetically -- it means that there should be coherence between the God Whom we trust and the Scriptures as the testimony of God. In the Scriptures we find the perfect copy of that image of God we see in creation and which natural man holds but corrupts. Hence we can appeal to their majesty, purity, unity, and power (Larger Catechism, answer 4). The natural man will refuse to come into the light lest his evil deeds are reproved; but the man whose heart is opened by the Blessed Spirit will receive the things of God and rest in the testimony of Scripture.


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## Civbert (Apr 26, 2007)

armourbearer said:


> Only One can know universals, and that is the God Who is everywhere present to know them. If you know anything it is only because God tells you.


 Right. Scripturalism in a nutshell.



armourbearer said:


> You do not know the universal, but the God Who knows the universal -- there is a fundamental difference.


And we know universal because God speaks to us in his Word.



armourbearer said:


> If you only know things because God tells you it is quite obvious that your knowledge is based solely upon trust in His testimony.


 OK. So what's you objection?



armourbearer said:


> So let's not hear any more nonsense about a piece of dust knowing universals.


 This does not make any sense. I suppose you are speaking of man, but we agree I think that man, made in God's image, and having God's revelation, does indeed know universals.

You still have not defined relational knowledge.

You still have not explained how knowledge is anything but propositional.


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## Semper Fidelis (Apr 26, 2007)

Civbert said:


> You still have not explained how knowledge is anything but propositional.



Interesting, I read the explanation.


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## Civbert (Apr 26, 2007)

sotzo said:


> ... And if you can't get away from those facts, then ultimately, universals are cannot be demonstrably proven, only received and believed. Hence, it is a waste of time to debate whether induction or deduction renders knowledge more certain.



If we believe that God's Word is true, then universals are easily demonstrated: Given any universal premise _P_, if _P_ is revealed in Scripture, then _P_ is true. And this is a deductive argument so it is necessarily true. 

I can put it in more traditional form.

P1: All Scripture is True
P2: P is Scripture.
:.
C: P is True.​


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## Civbert (Apr 26, 2007)

SemperFideles said:


> Interesting, I read the explanation.



Then maybe you can define the terms he is using.

Relation knowledge is ...

Propositional knowledge is ...

and then​

Propositional knowledge is contrary to relational knowledge because ...​


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## Semper Fidelis (Apr 26, 2007)

Civbert said:


> Then maybe you can define the terms he is using.
> 
> Relation knowledge is ...
> 
> ...



I'll let him flesh it out but the specific issue is that you said he didn't say what "relational knowledge" is but he's said this in many different ways:



> Only One can know universals, and that is the God Who is everywhere present to know them. If you know anything it is only because God tells you. *You do not know the universal, but the God Who knows the universal...*


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## Semper Fidelis (Apr 26, 2007)

Incidentally, I don't think he would say that propositions are "contrary" to the relation but simply that our knowledge begins in the knowledge of Him who sought us out.

[bible]1 John 4:19[/bible]


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