# "God wills His nature"



## Confessor (Jun 23, 2009)

How does this work? I have always thought that God wills in perfect accordance with His nature, so I simply don't know what it means to say that God wills His nature. Is that even correct? If so, does it follow that God ultimately makes decisions based on...nothing?

I saw on a reply to a post on Triablogue (the very last one) that one man speaks of Calvin and Augustine as "locat[ing] ultimacy in God's will not in the sense that nothing lies behind God's will but in the sense that we are not privy to God's own reasons that he has kept to himself." I hope that is of some assistance.


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## Whitefield (Jun 23, 2009)

Wow ... will separated from nature .. I guess that takes idealism to an exponential level.


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## OPC'n (Jun 23, 2009)

My ::: God cannot will His nature for the very fact that His nature is eternal. It has always been in existence. To will "something", is to determine that "something" to happen. God's nature never happened since it's always been. Now God allows His nature to preside over all situations and so we see His nature happening within time (someone kills another person and the murder isn't struck down by God's wrath....we see His nature of grace at work in time).


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## Whitefield (Jun 23, 2009)

TranZ4MR said:


> My ::: God cannot will His nature for the very fact that His nature is eternal. It has always been in existence. To will "something", is to determine that "something" to happen. God's nature never happened since it's always been. Now God allows His nature to preside over all situations and so we see His nature happening within time (someone kills another person and the murder isn't struck down by God's wrath....we see His nature of grace at work in time).



That observation is worth more than !


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## rbcbob (Jun 23, 2009)

Confessor said:


> How does this work? I have always thought that God wills in perfect accordance with His nature, so *I simply don't know what it means to say that God wills His nature*. Is that even correct? If so, does it follow that God ultimately makes decisions based on...nothing?
> 
> I saw on a reply to a post on Triablogue (the very last one) that one man speaks of Calvin and Augustine as "locat[ing] ultimacy in God's will not in the sense that nothing lies behind God's will but in the sense that we are not privy to God's own reasons that he has kept to himself." I hope that is of some assistance.



Ben, I am not sure of the context of your question and in reading just a few of your posts I am certain that this old guy cannot keep pace with you! That being said I will toss out a thought or two.

God's Will is what *is*. That is, in all of *created* reality what *is* exactly matches God's will. It makes no sense (to me) for anyone to say that God wills His own nature. God's nature is uncaused; eternal. His attributes are co-eternal with and inseparable from His being. One of His attributes is omnipotent, holy, volition. It would be circular and self refuting to posit that He wills His nature.

WCF 2.1 There is but one only(1) living and true God,(2) who is infinite in being and perfection,(3) a most pure spirit,(4) invisible,(5) without body, parts,(6) or passions;(7) immutable,(8) immense,(9) eternal,(10) incomprehensible,(11) almighty,(12) most wise,(13) most holy,(14) most free,(15) most absolute,(16) working all things according to the counsel of His own immutable and most righteous will,(17) for His own glory;(18) most loving,(19) gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin,(20) the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him;(21) and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments;(22) hating all sin,(23) and who will by no means clear the guilty.(24)


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## Brian Withnell (Jun 23, 2009)

TranZ4MR said:


> My ::: God cannot will His nature for the very fact that His nature is eternal. It has always been in existence. To will "something", is to determine that "something" to happen. God's nature never happened since it's always been. Now God allows His nature to preside over all situations and so we see His nature happening within time (someone kills another person and the murder isn't struck down by God's wrath....we see His nature of grace at work in time).



It gets complicated with God though....


> God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.



Now we accept that God ordained from all eternity, and that he did so from the council of his will, so his will has to be eternal as well. Ack! Brain hurts from contemplation of the infinitude of the all the attributes of God. Ack!

God's will must always "be" as well as his nature, if for no other reason than his will counsels his ordination, and his ordination is eternal and unchangeable. So it would seem to follow that his will is unchangeable as well (he certainly isn't going to change his mind because something "surprised" him!) From a logical perspective, his "will" has to precede his decree. Not from a time perspective, but from a logic perspective. I would think that from a logic perspective, his nature would include his will, but like I said, my brain hurts from contemplation of the infinitude of the attributes of God.


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## OPC'n (Jun 23, 2009)

Brian Withnell said:


> TranZ4MR said:
> 
> 
> > My ::: God cannot will His nature for the very fact that His nature is eternal. It has always been in existence. To will "something", is to determine that "something" to happen. God's nature never happened since it's always been. Now God allows His nature to preside over all situations and so we see His nature happening within time (someone kills another person and the murder isn't struck down by God's wrath....we see His nature of grace at work in time).
> ...



 I agree His will and nature are eternal....what came first the chicken or the egg....well in this case neither! Both were always in existence only difference is that His will has a time table where as His nature does not.  So I would think His nature take precedence??? My brain hurts too!


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jun 23, 2009)

Confessor said:


> How does this work? I have always thought that God wills in perfect accordance with His nature, so I simply don't know what it means to say that God wills His nature. Is that even correct? If so, does it follow that God ultimately makes decisions based on...nothing?
> 
> I saw on a reply to a post on Triablogue (the very last one) that one man speaks of Calvin and Augustine as "locat[ing] ultimacy in God's will not in the sense that nothing lies behind God's will but in the sense that we are not privy to God's own reasons that he has kept to himself." I hope that is of some assistance.


Have you read _Platinga's Does God Have A Nature?_ wherein he attacks the doctrine of the simplicity of God by arguing _reductio ad absurdum_ against the classical doctrine of Divine Simplicity, ultimately claiming that it reduces to the proposition God is a _property_, precluding the possibility of that God is a person? He begs the question: can a _simpliciter_ possess a nature?

AMR


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## py3ak (Jun 23, 2009)

The divine willing is the divine nature.


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## P.F. (Jun 23, 2009)

TranZ4MR said:


> My ::: God cannot will His nature for the very fact that His nature is eternal. It has always been in existence. To will "something", is to determine that "something" to happen. God's nature never happened since it's always been. Now God allows His nature to preside over all situations and so we see His nature happening within time (someone kills another person and the murder isn't struck down by God's wrath....we see His nature of grace at work in time).



a) God does not will his nature. God's nature is a logical predicate to his will. Speaking only analogically, we say that God's will follows his nature, such that in the first logical place God's nature exists and God knows himself, then God decrees what else will be via the exercise of his will, and finally God knows what will be because he willed it to be.

b) That understanding of God's will, however, is merely analogical. God's decrees, as the catechism reminds us, are his eternal purpose. They do not have a starting point. God has always willed from all eternity what he currently wills. The priority of nature to will then is simply logical and analogical, not actual or temporal.


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## Confessor (Jun 23, 2009)

Whitefield said:


> TranZ4MR said:
> 
> 
> > My ::: God cannot will His nature for the very fact that His nature is eternal. It has always been in existence. To will "something", is to determine that "something" to happen. God's nature never happened since it's always been. Now God allows His nature to preside over all situations and so we see His nature happening within time (someone kills another person and the murder isn't struck down by God's wrath....we see His nature of grace at work in time).
> ...



Would this suffice?






-----Added 6/23/2009 at 11:52:42 EST-----

I always thought that God's nature logically preceded His will, simply because it would make no sense to say His will preceded His nature. But I had seen somewhere on this board that "God wills His nature" (might it have to do with voluntarism?), and that is what prompted my question.

Thank you all for soothing my fears!


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## Whitefield (Jun 23, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Whitefield said:
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> > TranZ4MR said:
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but...but... that's only worth about  now.


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## Confessor (Jun 23, 2009)

Fine then, take this:


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## py3ak (Jun 23, 2009)

Don't be too relieved yet. Consider Heppe's remarks in _Reformed Dogmatics_:



> In and for itself the divine will is absolutely single, absolutely independent, eternal, infinite, immutable and absolutely active. The "affections" of the divine _voluntas_ were pretty unanimously set out by the dogmaticians. According to Mastricht (II, xv, 9-16) God's _voluntas_ "is (1) independent; its essence is the first cause of all things, Rev. 4. 11; (2) most single; it is God Himself willing; (3) unchangeable, Mal. 3. 6, I Sam. 15. 29, Ps. 33. 11; so that he not only wills now this, now that, but wills everything He wills always at one and the same time; (4) eternal, Eph. I. 4; it is God Himself willing, so He does not begin to will what He did not will previously; nor does He will one thing before another; although from the order which we observe in our own _voluntas_ we conceive that God wills the end before the means in order of intention, and the means before the end in the order of sequence; (5) infinite; God himself is infinite, not indeed because He wills all things willable to exist, as He understands all things intelligible, but because He wills Himself infinite and on His own account wills all things partly to exist and partly not; (6) free and most free; freedom is of the essence of will.





> The divine will is the being of God Himself, so far as it is active actuosity in relation to Himself and to everything outside Himself.





> We have to distinguish the way in which God wills Himself and that in which He wills things outside Himself. Himself God wills necessarily; since He is the highest good and goal of all things, He cannot not will Himself. Things on the other hand God wills freely, because as creatures they are not necessary but for God contingent; so that He wills all things in such a way that He might also not will them. —Riissen, III, 28: "God wills some things necessarily, some freely. Himself He wills necessarily; He is the final end and the highest goal, which He cannot not will and love, because He cannot not will His own glory or deny Himself. All other things He wills freely; nothing created is necessary as regards God, but contingent, since because He could have done without them, He wills them all in the sense that He might not have willed them".


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## Confessor (Jun 23, 2009)

What does it mean that God wills Himself?


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## Peairtach (Jun 24, 2009)

*Quote from py3ak*
_The divine willing is the divine nature._

What about the divine mind and emotions? And when I say emotions, don't get me wrong. I don't mean that God's moods swing. 

He is always happy and blessed. To the extent that He has emotions they are endogenous rather than exogenous. God's emotions are always under the control/in harmony with His intellect (including knowledge and pre-knowledge) and will. There is no disharmony in the divine essence or intra-Trinitarian communion.

I am just pointing out that it is not enough to reduce the divine nature to the divine will.


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## py3ak (Jun 24, 2009)

God is fully self-actualized. It is no _reduction_. Consider Heppe again:



> ...Hottinger, p.44: "The attributes are distinguished neither from the essence nor from each other but only by our conceiving".—Hence, since every attribute is a manifestation of the same absolutely simple essentiality of God, it may justifiably be said (Braun, I, ii, 2, 19) that "God's righteousness is His goodness, is His knowledge, is His will; or His mercy is His righteousness, etc. But it would be wrong for me to say that the concept I have of the righteousness is the same concept which I have of the deity, mercy or eternity."


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## Confessor (Jun 24, 2009)

Confessor said:


> What does it mean that God wills Himself?



^^^


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## MW (Jun 24, 2009)

Confessor said:


> What does it mean that God wills Himself?



God chooses to be. His will approves Himself as the highest good and the chief end of all action.


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## Confessor (Jun 24, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> > What does it mean that God wills Himself?
> ...



When I hear that "God wills His nature," I think of the fact that God is omniscient, omnipotent, etc., because He chooses to be. Is that correct?


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## Whitefield (Jun 24, 2009)

Confessor said:


> armourbearer said:
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> > Confessor said:
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If God chooses to be, could He then choose not to be?


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## Confessor (Jun 24, 2009)

Whitefield said:


> If God chooses to be, could He then choose not to be?



According to the quotations above, no. But it still seems odd to hear that, for instance, God chooses to be omniscient, in that (1) it implies contingency, at least in the language used, and (2) it is hard to conceive how God could will without a nature (in terms of logical priority).


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## Whitefield (Jun 24, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> > If God chooses to be, could He then choose not to be?
> ...



And what is the meaning of the term _choose_ when there is but one choice, namely, to be?

P.S. Ben, I looked again at the Euro ... how do you fit that into your pocket? It is huge.


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## Confessor (Jun 24, 2009)

1. You're asking the wrong guy.  I'm trying to understand these things!

2. I'm not sure how to fit that in my pocket, but I still thought that Sarah's comments were worth it.


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## MW (Jun 24, 2009)

See the last quotation from post 14 -- God wills Himself necessarily.


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## Whitefield (Jun 24, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> See the last quotation from post 14 -- God wills Himself necessarily.



And what necessity requires Him to will Himself?


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## MW (Jun 24, 2009)

Whitefield said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> > See the last quotation from post 14 -- God wills Himself necessarily.
> ...



He cannot deny Himself; therefore the necessity is Himself. If there is existence then there must be a summum bonum.


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## Whitefield (Jun 24, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> > armourbearer said:
> ...



Seems odd to speak in terms of God choosing to be. If He could not choose to not be, then what is the substance of the choice? He just is. There is no choice here where He might contemplate, "To be or not to be, that is the question." He declares Himself to be the "I Am", not "I chose to Be". And I would venture to say that one must be before one can choose.


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## MW (Jun 24, 2009)

Whitefield said:


> Seems odd to speak in terms of God choosing to be. If He could not choose to not be, then what is the substance of the choice? He just is. There is no choice here where He might contemplate, "To be or not to be, that is the question." He declares Himself to be the "I Am", not "I chose to Be". And I would venture to say that one must be before one can choose.



God is eternal, which was and is and is to come; there is no temporal priority.


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## Confessor (Jun 25, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> > Seems odd to speak in terms of God choosing to be. If He could not choose to not be, then what is the substance of the choice? He just is. There is no choice here where He might contemplate, "To be or not to be, that is the question." He declares Himself to be the "I Am", not "I chose to Be". And I would venture to say that one must be before one can choose.
> ...



But there still can be a logical priority. That is implied when you say that He chooses to be, correct?


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## Whitefield (Jun 25, 2009)

Confessor said:


> armourbearer said:
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> > Whitefield said:
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I guess so, but the same logical priority says that an actor must exist prior to or contemporary to acting.

-----Added 6/25/2009 at 12:19:16 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> Whitefield said:
> 
> 
> > Seems odd to speak in terms of God choosing to be. If He could not choose to not be, then what is the substance of the choice? He just is. There is no choice here where He might contemplate, "To be or not to be, that is the question." He declares Himself to be the "I Am", not "I chose to Be". And I would venture to say that one must be before one can choose.
> ...



Then why use a verb such as "choose" which carries not only a causative connotation but also an action which presupposes an already existing actor prior (logical or temporal) to the action?


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## Confessor (Jun 25, 2009)

Lance, I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm trying to understand how this all works, and right now i don't think I comprehend how God could will His nature or will Himself to be. It would seem that His existence or nature would have to (logically) precede any choice He makes.


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## MW (Jul 7, 2009)

The word "choose" is used on the understanding that creaturely limitations do not apply to God.

It is the power of choice which makes a being personal. To say that God simply exists would make him a mere impersonal force without the power of self-realisation, and this would prejudice the fact that He is not self-sufficient and blessed within Himself.


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## Confessor (Jul 8, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> The word "choose" is used on the understanding that creaturely limitations do not apply to God.
> 
> It is the power of choice which makes a being personal. To say that God simply exists would make him a mere impersonal force without the power of self-realisation, and this would prejudice the fact that He is not self-sufficient and blessed within Himself.



So because God is not human, He can choose without having His existence be logically prior?

Couldn't it be said that He has always been "choosing" from eternity and therefore He's not an impersonal force (one who exists but does not choose at some specific instant)?

And would it really challenge His self-sufficiency to say that choice does not undergird His existence? He is still eternally blessed.


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 8, 2009)

Isn't is better to say that everything, including Himself, 
is the way it is _because He *would not *have it any other way_?

In such a way, everything about God is purposeful and intentional.


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## MW (Jul 8, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Couldn't it be said that He has always been "choosing" from eternity and therefore He's not an impersonal force (one who exists but does not choose at some specific instant)?
> 
> And would it really challenge His self-sufficiency to say that choice does not undergird His existence? He is still eternally blessed.



Of course the choosing is from eternity. He ever chooses to be!

Yes it does challenge His self-sufficiency because if God's existence is reduced to mere nature, or the bare state of things, then God Himself is bound to nature and derives His sufficiency therefrom.

Bruce's statement, God would not have it any other way, obviously translates to the positive that God would have it this way.


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## Confessor (Jul 9, 2009)

Okay, what I'm trying to apprehend at the moment is how we can say that God wills to exist without positing a contradiction. You said that it's just a human limitation that one must exist in order to act, but that would seem to apply to God. Are there any ways to explain this further?


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 9, 2009)

The fact that we must "be" before we can "do" is a logical entailment of "createdness".

If God is uncreated, then this is not a logical entailment.

Not that MW or I have said that for God, "do" comes _prior to_ "be" existentially.

What we mean to avoid is predicating the will of God absolutely upon his essence. His will is not any less eternal than his essence. And so, rather than understanding God as having a "foundation" in being, it appears preferable in the logical sense to understand the will of God as economically foundational.

Ask: "Can God, if he so desired, will himself out of existence?" If so, how? If not, why?

Man, in seeking to exercise his WILL either 1) subordinately as an image bearer, or 2) rebelliously as an idolater, desires that which supremely expresses divinity. Mindless existence cannot so express, as though there were an "eternal substance" that could generate mind. Does this not entail atheistic evolution?

There's obviously a legitimate and an illegitimate way to pursue divine imagery. In the Garden, man evilly wanted to be like God, how? by *willing* (thus determining for himself what is right and wrong).

For a creature, to will cannot be prior or even simultaneous to be (at least with respect to being). Every one of his desires must arise from his nature, or be imparted or taught. For God, the will can be nothing less than everlastingly active, making every scintilla of being--even divine being--purposeful.

Insofar as this inverts a human "order", it only emphasizes the Creator/creature distinction.


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## Confessor (Jul 9, 2009)

If one wants to say that "God wills His nature," then he must posit a causal relationship. And if he does that, then he cannot say that they are _simultaneous_; doing so would be positing two causes and zero effects.

Thus, even if we're talking about God *from eternity*, we can still can speak of logical priority -- and if we can't, then we can't even utter the statement "God wills His nature"! The question then becomes, Which is logically prior: God's existence or His will?

Right now, I'm definitely leaning towards the former. I cannot apprehend how one could will one's own existence. It seems to be an absolute contradiction that simply cannot be attributed to God.


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## Jimmy the Greek (Jul 9, 2009)

Exodus 3:14 -- I am that I am.


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> If one wants to say that "God wills His nature," then he must posit a causal relationship. And if he does that, then he cannot say that they are _simultaneous_; doing so would be positing two causes and zero effects.
> 
> Thus, even if we're talking about God *from eternity*, we can still can speak of logical priority -- and if we can't, then we can't even utter the statement "God wills His nature"! The question then becomes, Which is logically prior: God's existence or His will?
> 
> Right now, I'm definitely leaning towards the former. I cannot apprehend how one could will one's own existence. It seems to be an absolute contradiction that simply cannot be attributed to God.


How can you have "logic" absent an active mind/will?

Logic as we understand it reflects the order God imposes, thinking His thoughts after Him, etc.

Logic is a part of the world, so it isn't dependent on any human mind, so it may be universal, etc. But where does it come from?

I'm positing the Absolute, fundamental _rationality_ of the divine.

Doesn't Descartes speak most hubristically when he claims:
"I think/doubt, therefore I am" (cotigo ergo sum)?


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## Confessor (Jul 9, 2009)

I don't know if Descartes was being hubristic when he uttered the _cogito_. He was merely positing that existence is a necessary cause of thinking. (I.e. one cannot think without existing.)

Otherwise, regarding logic, are you basically arguing that logic requires a will, and therefore a will must be before logic, and therefore I cannot appeal to the logical priority of existence to willing?


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## MW (Jul 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> It seems to be an absolute contradiction that simply cannot be attributed to God.



I think your contradiction arises from the fact that human rationality can only conceive of being in its created form, and as being dependent on the will of another. God is independent, which does not mean He merely exists, but He has His being in and of Himself, Larger Catechism 101. If He has it of Himself then He must be the cause of His own being, and if He is the cause of His own being then He must will to be. If it were otherwise God Himself would not be the fount of all being, which would entail positing another creative force in the world that can account for all existence.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales (Jul 9, 2009)

I tend to agree with Ben. It seems somewhat counter-intuitive to speak of God "willing his nature" since God is _by nature_ volitional. That is, God wills because God is God. 

This citation from Heidegger would seem to give priority to nature:
"Things are not good, holy, and righteous in themselves, because God willed and ordered them. He willed and ordered them _because they ought to agree with the holiness of His most pure nature and essential righteousness_. With respect to us indeed the source of all righteousness is to be sought nowhere else than in His will, which as most perfect is thus the rule of all righteousness and holiness. But with respect to God, although in those things which have free and positive goodness, as in ceremonies so instituted as also to admit of abolition, God's will is the first rule of righteousness; in those, however, which have innate goodness, _the actual will of God derives a rule from no other source than from His essential holiness, righteousness and goodness or from His most Holy nature _[emphasis added]" (cited in Heppe, _Reformed Dogmatics_, 95).​


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## MW (Jul 9, 2009)

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> This citation from Heidegger would seem to give priority to nature:



He is answering a slightly different question -- whether God wills because it is good, or it is good because He wills. The earlier tradition maintained the latter: "The supreme rule of righteousness is His most perfect and infallible will. God is a law to Himself." (P. 94.) Heppe notes "the later dogmaticians let this idea drop." (Ibid.) Heidegger is summoned as a most full and precise witness to this later thought. (P. 95.)


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales (Jul 9, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> Dr. Bob Gonzales said:
> 
> 
> > This citation from Heidegger would seem to give priority to nature:
> ...



Matthew,

Thanks for the clarification. I must confess, though, that when he writes, "The actual will of God derives a rule from no other source than ... from His most Holy nature," he seems to give the divine nature logical priority.But I may be mistaken.Is the earlier tradition connected at all with nominalism? Did nominalists believe that God wills his nature?


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> I don't know if Descartes was being hubristic when he uttered the _cogito_. He was merely positing that existence is a necessary cause of thinking. (I.e. one cannot think without existing.)


Let's think about this, though. D proposes to answer the question, "am I here or not?" He _*assumes*_ the fundamental priority of being, and that: out of simple being comes every predication.

But what does he rely on to establish the alleged fundamental principle of being? His actual fundament---> namely his will, his thought.

In the end he has ultimate faith in "doubt," for he cannot doubt his doubting. So, he uses his final/first certainty to establish (to will) that "he" has an anterior existent. So, he pretends to deity.

As we, for our part as reliant on revelation, quit bothering with man, and seek after the revealed God, we can dispense with the anterior groping for existent priority and simply accede to God's will as the logical starting point.



> Otherwise, regarding logic, are you basically arguing that logic requires a will, and therefore a will must be before logic, and therefore I cannot appeal to the logical priority of existence to willing?


If you are talking about logic _vis a vis_ the Ultimate, then yes. But see my above, and compare with VT.


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## MW (Jul 9, 2009)

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Is the earlier tradition connected at all with nominalism? Did nominalists believe that God wills his nature?



I take this to be a discussion on "being" rather than "knowing," which would make nominalism irrelevant.


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## Confessor (Jul 9, 2009)

Contra_Mundum said:


> Let's think about this, though. D proposes to answer the question, "am I here or not?" He _*assumes*_ the fundamental priority of being, and that: out of simple being comes every predication.
> 
> But what does he rely on to establish the alleged fundamental principle of being? His actual fundament---> namely his will, his thought.



Are you saying that because Descartes had to think of the _cogito_ with his mind, it follows that existence is not a necessary precursor to thought? The fact that he used his thought/will to come up with the _cogito_ does not imply that thinking comes before existence.

Think of it this way. Even if we were to say that God's willing preceded existence, we would have to concede that His will itself _exists_, right? It seems that existence must be primary.



Contra_Mundum said:


> In the end he has ultimate faith in "doubt," for he cannot doubt his doubting. So, he uses his final/first certainty to establish (to will) that "he" has an anterior existent. So, he pretends to deity.



His deducing that he exists is not some weird attempt to "will" himself into existence. (Remember that Descartes is saying not that thinking is a sufficient cause of existence, but rather that existence is a necessary cause of thinking. Both of those statements take the propositional form, "If thinking, then existence.")



Contra_Mundum said:


> As we, for our part as reliant on revelation, quit bothering with man, and seek after the revealed God, we can dispense with the anterior groping for existent priority and simply accede to God's will as the logical starting point.



What are some pertinent Bible verses on the subject, other than the principles in general that He is self-sufficient etc.?


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Are you saying that because Descartes had to think of the _cogito_ with his mind, it follows that existence is not a necessary precursor to thought? The fact that he used his thought/will to come up with the _cogito_ does not imply that thinking comes before existence.


1) I'm criticizing Descartes' _project_, his quest for truth (about himself, to begin with) without reference to revelation. Compare D's ultimate _pou stow_ with the opening words of the Institutes.

And _because_ he takes the tack he does, _therefore_ he does not accept his basic existence (which IS properly basic to a human!) _because_ he is created, but because he cannot doubt his own mind.

Think Vantilian with me. What is D's _ultimate_, unargued for axiom? Is it his existence? He might like you to think that, however it clearly is not. It is his mind/will. So, instead of postulating (axiomatically) his existence, which would be closer to the revelational reality of a created existence, he assumes (furtively) the primacy of his will.

But that position is only allowable to God.



Confessor said:


> Think of it this way. Even if we were to say that God's willing preceded existence, we would have to concede that His will itself _exists_, right? It seems that existence must be primary.


But you need to take infinite, uncreated being into account. It isn't proper to speak about God's existence under species proper to created being. At the least, you need to argue that the meaning of "the will exists" necessitates the term "a will-less will existed, first," with respect to divine essence to make it work against the primacy of the will (which seems nonsensical). We have already spoken of the divine will and being as existentially co-eternal. So the question quickly returns us to the logical priority.



Confessor said:


> Contra_Mundum said:
> 
> 
> > In the end he has ultimate faith in "doubt," for he cannot doubt his doubting. So, he uses his final/first certainty to establish (to will) that "he" has an anterior existent. So, he pretends to deity.
> ...


But that is not my assumption of what his intent is. My argument is that he sneaks us past that which is truly "fundamental" to his argument, and gropes (with his eyes closed, pretending he is in the dark) for the ground he is certain must lie behind it. And he "finds" it; but he found it because he's created, not because he was successful at the shell game.

So, his QUEST itself is that which is hubristic, and he makes his will ultimate (actually) even though he "reaches back" for existence. We can manipulate that "equation" like mathematics, and simply recognize that axiomatically D is putting his will as the ultimate, unargued for assumption.

Now, suppose God himself is in Descartes' shoes. Does he "reach back" groping for his existence? Or can we dispense with that nonsense, and simply move forward logically?



Confessor said:


> Remember that Descartes is saying not that thinking is a sufficient cause of existence, but rather that existence is a necessary cause of thinking. Both of those statements take the propositional form, "If thinking, then existence."


 As I said, I am fully cognizant of what D is "doing". I am trying to analyze his _effort_ as CVT might. The fact that he "works back" to existence is no help. His "logic isn't even correct, but fallacious.

If A-> B
B
:.A
This is fallacious. Affirming the consequent.
If Detroit leads at the All-Star break, they win the pennant
(go ahead, assume the necessity)
Detroit wins the pennant.
Therefore, they led at the All-Star break.

There could be another necessity, that if they are 2nd or 5th at the ASB, they also must win the pennant.

One must deny the consequent (or affirm the antecedent).
If A-> B
/=B
:./=A

So, the cotigo actually has the form:
If I am (antecedent), then I think (consequent).
I think
Therefore I am. Affirming the consequent. FAIL.

So, D hasn't even given us logical certainty about his existence.



Confessor said:


> Contra_Mundum said:
> 
> 
> > As we, for our part as reliant on revelation, quit bothering with man, and seek after the revealed God, we can dispense with the anterior groping for existent priority and simply accede to God's will as the logical starting point.
> ...


Ps.111.

That's all that I can come up with on a shoestring. Sorry. Perhaps Matthew Winzer can offer you more tonight.


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## TeachingTulip (Jul 9, 2009)

Contra_Mundum said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> > Are you saying that because Descartes had to think of the _cogito_ with his mind, it follows that existence is not a necessary precursor to thought? The fact that he used his thought/will to come up with the _cogito_ does not imply that thinking comes before existence.
> ...



Is it even accurate to say God "exists"?

Does not all "existence" proceed from who God IS and WILLS?


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## Confessor (Jul 9, 2009)

Rev. Buchanan,

1. Alright, I understand your point about Descartes's autonomous assumption.

2. You said, _"We have already spoken of the divine will and being as existentially co-eternal. So the question returns us to the logical priority."_ If we cannot talk about the divine will without talking about something that exists, then existence is a logical priority, right?

3. The _cogito_ is not fallacious.

If I were to say that A is necessary for B to occur, then I would be saying that whenever B occurs, A had to accompany it ==> If B, then A. Likewise, Descartes is saying that since existence is necessary for thought to occur (a reasonable statement in my estimation), it follows that if he thinks, then he exists. It's only affirming the consequent if Descartes thinks that existence is a sufficient (and not a necessary) cause of thinking.

Seriously, I heard Norm Geisler try to say that Descartes got it backwards, and I was angered to hear that a person who writes so many books for Christian apologetics and sometimes philosophy would make such an elementary error. Descartes did not invert the _cogito_. Descartes got many things wrong, but he was certainly correct on the logical order of the conditional proposition that is the _cogito_.

I may be absolutely, 100% wrong on the "God wills His nature" thing, but I guarantee that I know what I'm talking about with the order of the antecedent and consequent in the _cogito_. I apologize if I come across as arrogant.

-----Added 7/9/2009 at 11:29:16 EST-----

I'm going to bed. I have a splitting headache. (Please pray!) Blessings, everyone, and thank you for contributing to this thread.


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## MW (Jul 10, 2009)

Consider Isa. 57:15, inhabiting eternity and dwelling in transcendence. He is not these things in a passive sense, as something He merely possesses, but He actively wills and works them. Again, 1 Tim. 6:16, "Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto." It is what He determinately resides in as a man taking up residence in His own house.


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 10, 2009)

Ben,
I don't know what Geisler's argument was, against Descartes. And strictly philosophical objections aren't that important to me. My objections start with Christian theological expectations on the nature of reality. I don't attempt to prove them, so much as argue from those bases.

**************
So, in order for Descartes to be logical, he has to affirm the antecedent, Correct?

Ok, then let's try to put the cotigo into that form:

If I think (antecedent), then I am.
I think
:. I am.

OK! What has just assumed *ultimate priority* in this equation, existence or thought? In this form _thought_ is _logically prior._ The form yields a valid conclusion, but while the claim is formally valid, one can't help but notice that in the process D has attempted to prove one irreducible precondition (existential antecedent) for his thought.

I think its a switcheroo to say, that with thought in the logically prior position, he has therefore *proven* the existential priority of being.

Once again, it is his unargued assumption that his being is the (sole) necessary condition for his thought. I happen to AGREE that as a creature, his being IS necessary to his thought.

Again, I ask that you make God into the one asking D's question. If correct logic is reflective of the ultimate rationality of God, then this shouldn't be objectionable. So, does God say (as D certainly does): "I think, therefore I am," and *reach backward* to find his existence?

Let me ask that another way: Does God need a "reason" why he thinks/wills? Something more ultimate than his will? Something that grounds his "reason"?

I've been arguing that D's argument can ONLY be true with respect TO GOD. Only God properly MAY put thought ahead of essence. And only GOD does not then grope blindly backwards and settle assured in his being thinking "well, I _thought_ that should necessarily be there; sure am glad I'm right."

No, but the _logical_ priority *with respect to God* is the proper way for us to think about the relation of his will and being. Both are equally ultimate as essential. Thought is _logically_ antecedent, AND there is no reason for God to grope backward. He has no need to conclude: "I have therefore demonstrated the existentially antecedent quality of my being." Nonsense. He simply moves forward.

*********************
So, if Descartes does what I said at first, then he blunders logically. If he is permitted to put "thought" in the logically antecedent position, then he pretends to deity, while maintaining a sham humility. He can't doubt his existence, actually because he's a creature. But he thinks he can reason back to his essence without reference to God. It is an idolatrous quest.


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## Confessor (Jul 10, 2009)

Contra_Mundum said:


> OK! What has just assumed *ultimate priority* in this equation, existence or thought? In this form _thought_ is _logically prior._ The form yields a valid conclusion, but while the claim is formally valid, one can't help but notice that in the process D has attempted to prove one irreducible precondition (existential antecedent) for his thought.



No, that's not what he has done. As I said earlier, if you take the proposition "If A, then B," then you know either (1) that A is a _sufficient cause_ of B or (2) that B is a _necessary cause_ of A. You could only say that Descartes is making that mistake if he is affirming (1), but he's not. In my estimation it's rather clear that he is affirming existence as a necessary cause of thinking. ("I can't think think without existing [i.e. existence is necessary to thinking]; therefore if I think, I am.")



Contra_Mundum said:


> 've been arguing that D's argument can ONLY be true with respect TO GOD. Only God properly MAY put thought ahead of essence. And only GOD does not then grope blindly backwards and settle assured in his being thinking "well, I _thought_ that should necessarily be there; sure am glad I'm right."



Are you saying that God's thought precedes His _essence_? Or do you also think that it precedes His _existence_ (i.e. that it precedes both His existence and His essence)? I would be much more inclined to accept the former than to accept the latter.

Furthermore, as God is omniscient, it's not as if He won't know that He exists until He "thinks" of the _cogito_. He is exhaustively self-conscious from all eternity.



Contra_Mundum said:


> No, but the _logical_ priority *with respect to God* is the proper way for us to think about the relation of his will and being. Both are equally ultimate as essential. Thought is _logically_ antecedent, AND there is no reason for God to grope backward. He has no need to conclude: "I have therefore demonstrated the existentially antecedent quality of my being." Nonsense. He simply moves forward.



It appears that you are saying the following: If God's existence were logically prior to His thought, then He would have to learn that He exists. He cannot learn that He exists; therefore it is false that God's existence is logically prior to His thought.

But as I said above, it is not the case that God would have to learn that He exists. This is logical, not temporal priority.

-----Added 7/10/2009 at 10:38:05 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> Consider Isa. 57:15, inhabiting eternity and dwelling in transcendence. He is not these things in a passive sense, as something He merely possesses, but He actively wills and works them. Again, 1 Tim. 6:16, "Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto." It is what He determinately resides in as a man taking up residence in His own house.



Are you saying that God's "house" is His nature/essence that He chooses?

If so, wouldn't that still mean that He _exists_ in order to choose them? (I'm sorry; I just can't get past the "choosing prior to existing" concept.)


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales (Jul 10, 2009)

Brothers,

I've enjoyed this discussion. Some of you are much more versed in logic and philosophy than I. But I continue to lean towards Ben's position. I think all agree that volition is essential to God's very nature. So he cannot exist except as a volitional God. Nevertheless, to say that God somehow wills himself to exist, that is, to be a volitional Being by nature seems, in my mind, to make existence as a God's volitional Being contingent on God's existence as a volitional Being, which is to introduce, at the very least, a conundrum of sorts. 

Are there any clear passages of Scripture that unambiguously support the notion that _God wills his nature_?


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 10, 2009)

Ben,
I had corrected several places where I typed "essence" instead of "being" (for clarity's sake). I missed that one.

***************
I think we're just going to have to end up on opposite sides of this one. God isn't like we are. You wrote (#52);


> Descartes is saying that since existence is necessary for thought to occur (a reasonable statement in my estimation),


OK. To me, that implies you are intuiting the notion, and its a notion _I'm willing to grant_ with respect to *creatures*.

However, I am not willing to grant: the reality that grounds US, also grounds GOD. That what is reasonable for us, with respect to our being and thought, must therefore also be predicable of deity.


As for Descartes: so far, I'm not sure you've really grasped the point of my objection. And we probably won't get to any resolution of this soon.

I postulated a formally true representation of his argument (as well as the first, false one). It just "matter of fact" that in this way, the formal logical priority is assigned to the antecedent. Show that either 1) I'm wrong, or 2) you can possibly structure HIS argument differently, so that being is logically antecedent. Please express the argument in a valid form so it can be evaluated.

For instance, 
A. I think
B. I am

A _IFF_ B
A _:._ B

Does the above accurately represent D's argument? Obviously, there's no problem with this formula, except that it doesn't actually purport to *show* the necessity of the relation; it merely presupposes it. D expects us to go along with it. Intuitively it seems plausible, but WHY?

My answer to that question is: because we are creations, which demands Creator.

But the problem is that D is seeking an ultimate starting point, from which to reason outward and upward. He self-consciously excludes Creator as fundamentally requisite for predicating his existence. He relies on his own MIND to firmly establish that predication.


My point is, that I find in what D attempts a close connection to this question of what is logically antecedent with respect to God, mind or being. With Descartes, it is an illegitimate quest. With God, there is no quest at all. But I find that third (valid) form of the equation (above) somewhat irreverent, with respect to God. That's MY intuitive stance.

And if we are not in agreement on that, then (as I said) I think we are just going to end up disagreeing.


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## MW (Jul 10, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Are you saying that God's "house" is His nature/essence that He chooses?



That is what those passages of holy Scripture teach, together with those which refer to God clothing Himself with His divine perfections. The only way these passages could be understood otherwise is if the qualities of eternity, transcendence, and perfection exist outside of God's nature, which would be contrary to the biblical testimony that there is only one God.


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## Confessor (Jul 10, 2009)

Rev. Buchanan,

I'll just say this: if one wants to argue that existence is not prior to willing for God, then it must be shown or deduced from the Bible. If not, it still seems _impossible_ for God to will logically prior to existing. This is not an idolatrous argument from creature to Creator; this seems like an innocent application of logic. *What about God makes Him such that His willing can logically precede His existence?* If this question cannot be answered adequately, then either (1) it is the case that His existence logically precedes His willing (if there is evidence leaning in that direction), or (2) it should remain a Deut. 29:29 concept (if there is no evidence leaning either way). If the bolded question cannot be answered adequately, then it would be improper to say that God wills His nature.

Otherwise, after I wrote a response to your statements on Descartes, everything seemed to boil down to what I said in the first paragraph.

-----

As a side note, Descartes is not positing "I think if and only if (iff) I exist." He is rather positing "I think only if I exist," which can be transformed into the conditional proposition, "If I think, then I exist." If he used _iff_, then he would be saying that existence is both a necessary cause and a sufficient cause to thinking, which would be false considering that (e.g.) rocks exist and do not think.

-----Added 7/10/2009 at 10:45:35 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> > Are you saying that God's "house" is His nature/essence that He chooses?
> ...



This would mean only that He chooses His _essence_, not necessarily His _existence_, though. Right?


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## py3ak (Jul 10, 2009)

God's essence is His existence, Ben.


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## MW (Jul 10, 2009)

It is as Ruben has emphasised and is assumed by the ontological argument.


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## Confessor (Jul 10, 2009)

py3ak said:


> God's essence is His existence, Ben.



I've heard this statement before but I don't know what exactly it means. If we take God's essence to mean "the totality of His attributes" (not as if He is composite, but I digress), and if we take His existence to mean "the bare fact of His existence," then how are they identical?


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## py3ak (Jul 10, 2009)

Does Heppe's citation of Polanus answer your question?



> Polan (II, 5): "God's essence is Deity itself, by which God is and exists absolutely a se and per se". At the same time the concept of "God's essence" is not made properly clear, until the difference between it and the concept of creaturely truth is visualized. Three points require consideration here. "(1) Essence and _ho wn_, he who is, differ in creatures: God alone is that which He is and is who He is, i.e., an _ousia_ which does not depend on another. (2) Though essence and existence differ in creatures, they do not do so in God. (3) Essence and substance differ in the same way in creatures, because essence is contained in substance, and besides the essence itself, all the things that naturally inhere in the essence. But in things divine they mean that same thing."


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## Confessor (Jul 10, 2009)

Ruben, I just read that over a few times and I do not understand what it means. I apologize.

However, I think this may be getting further from the central topic, for even if I grant that His existence and essence are identical, there still seems to be a problem in saying that He wills His existence. We cannot talk about His will without presupposing His will as _something that exists_. And if we can't do that, then it follows that existence is logically prior.


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## py3ak (Jul 10, 2009)

We'll have to take it up later, as I'm out of time. If you can, check out Aquinas, _Summa_, Pt. 1, Q.3, A.3,4,6. You might also read, if you are going to be up late anyway, Boethius, _De Trinitate_, sec. II.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales (Jul 11, 2009)

I don't mean to sound like a biblicist, but what are the primary proof texts used to prove or ground the proposition that God wills his nature? 

Rev. Winzer offered Isaiah 57:15, and added the explanatory comment, "It is what He determinately resides in as a man taking up residence in His own house." That verse in its entirety reads,
For thus says the One who is high and lifted up, who inhabits eternity, whose name is Holy: "I dwell in the high and holy place, and also with him who is of a contrite and lowly spirit, to revive the spirit of the lowly, and to revive the heart of the contrite.​Here we have a beautiful contrast and comparison of God's transcendence and immanence. Since transcendence and immanence are relational terms, I'm inclined to read this verse not as teaching that God determines his relationship vis-a-vis the created/fallen/redeemed world. It doesn't seem to support the idea that God wills his own nature or existence. 

Besides, God exists as and is by nature a personal being. To posit a divine will as the logical cause of God's personhood would be to posit an impersonal force as logically prior to that which is personal. This seems tenuous at best and precarious at worst.


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 11, 2009)

Ben,
I'm quoting you here:


> He [Descartes] is rather positing "I think only if I exist," which can be transformed into the conditional proposition, "If I think, then I exist."


We have gotten noplace. Just going in circles.

You've just accepted my second (and first valid) form. I asked you before if you had a problem with how I was expressing D's argument, how you would say it differently.

So, you acknowledge that D affirms the antecedent, correct? This means that he prioritizes his MIND. He makes his THINKING logically prior in order to "prove" that his EXISTENCE is existentially prior. Which you then say is the "logically prior" position, because, well... existence has to be for anything else.

But this is simply arguing in circles! In the syllogism, THOUGHT is prior! It just IS! Look at the syllogism, please. Look at it. If you don't want to "go there," then please express the thought in a logically valid form that you DO prefer.

There is this axiomatic belief that is absolutely foundational to the whole set up: Being is ground for every other act. 

Why? 
If that axiom is properly "basic" then there is no "why." It is an invalid question.

But as a Christian, I can't accept that answer. That's not my fundament. The Creator is. Because he created me, then my thinking is a fairly strong evidence for my being.

Is Descartes arguing from the axiom of the absolute existence of God to his own existence? Nope. His aim is to establish his own being without external reference.

Is anyone other than God ALLOWED to do this? No, it is a sinful quest. God alone establishes his own being apart from external reference because he ALONE is uncreated.

So God can say this: "I think, therefore I am." It is a "God-like" statement.

Now the only question is: has God (by affirming the antecedent, thus making MIND logically prior in the statement) established the existential priority of his BEING?

It seems as though you would agree he has. Because you have accepted the postulate is true: that even with respect to God, being itself must precede and ground all. God's thought (goes the proposal) is _conditional._ One condition perhaps, but a condition nonetheless.


I believe a better way to commit the matter is to rephrase Descartes' proposal with respect to God: "I think THAT I am." Not making that a statement of _wonder_ or _confusion,_ but propositional.

And I think it fits well with God's statement to Moses at the burning bush, Ex.3:14: literally: "I will be that/who I will be.” The future tense of the terms implies the INTENT of God for this reality (in actuality eternal existence). Thus, he wills everything, including himself.

***************
I can't keep this up. But I have appreciated the interaction.


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## Dr. Bob Gonzales (Jul 11, 2009)

Contra_Mundum said:


> > And I think it fits well with God's statement to Moses at the burning bush, Ex.3:14: literally: "I will be that/who I will be.” The future tense of the terms implies the INTENT of God for this reality (in actuality eternal existence). Thus, he wills everything, including himself.
> 
> 
> Reverend Buchanan,
> ...


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## Confessor (Jul 11, 2009)

Contra_Mundum said:


> So, you acknowledge that D affirms the antecedent, correct? This means that he prioritizes his MIND. He makes his THINKING logically prior in order to "prove" that his EXISTENCE is existentially prior. Which you then say is the "logically prior" position, because, well... existence has to be for anything else.
> 
> But this is simply arguing in circles! In the syllogism, THOUGHT is prior! It just IS! Look at the syllogism, please. Look at it. If you don't want to "go there," then please express the thought in a logically valid form that you DO prefer.



Thinking is logically prior in the conditional proposition, but it doesn't follow that Descartes posits it as causing existence into...existence. Thought is prior in the syllogism because existence is a necessary cause, and necessary causes are always consequents of conditional propositions (i.e. always Q in "If P, then Q"). It is not the case that thought causes existence.



Contra_Mundum said:


> Is Descartes arguing from the axiom of the absolute existence of God to his own existence? Nope. His aim is to establish his own being without external reference.



Yes, I agree that much of Descartes's philosophy was wrong, because autonomous. But it doesn't follow that the _cogito_ is invalid.



Contra_Mundum said:


> So God can say this: "I think, therefore I am." It is a "God-like" statement.
> 
> Now the only question is: has God (by affirming the antecedent, thus making MIND logically prior in the statement) established the existential priority of his BEING?
> 
> It seems as though you would agree he has. Because you have accepted the postulate is true: that even with respect to God, being itself must precede and ground all. God's thought (goes the proposal) is _conditional._ One condition perhaps, but a condition nonetheless.



I am not trying to say God is "trapped" or "under the sovereignty of" some independent concept called *BEING*. I am simply saying that God's being/existence must logically precede God's thought; for, as I already said, if one wants to speak of His thought as logically prior to His existence, then one is still speaking of a thought *that exists*, and in such a case existence is logically prior anyway.



Contra_Mundum said:


> I believe a better way to commit the matter is to rephrase Descartes' proposal with respect to God: "I think THAT I am." Not making that a statement of _wonder_ or _confusion,_ but propositional.
> 
> And I think it fits well with God's statement to Moses at the burning bush, Ex.3:14: literally: "I will be that/who I will be.” The future tense of the terms implies the INTENT of God for this reality (in actuality eternal existence). Thus, he wills everything, including himself.



In case you're arguing that Exodus 3:14 proves your position (I'm not sure), I would disagree. The fact that God will be who He will be simply establishes Himself as the _summum bonum_, the ultimate standard; it doesn't necessarily demonstrate that His thought logically precedes His existence.

EDIT - I just realized how much more thoroughly Dr. Gonzales treated Ex. 3:14 than I did. Never mind.


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## Contra_Mundum (Jul 12, 2009)

Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> Contra_Mundum said:
> 
> 
> > And I think it fits well with God's statement to Moses at the burning bush, Ex.3:14: literally: "I will be that/who I will be.” The future tense of the terms implies the INTENT of God for this reality (in actuality eternal existence). Thus, he wills everything, including himself.
> ...


Thanks, Bob. I was simply following Calvin at this point. I would not question (nor do I suppose would he) the ordinary manner in which our translations render the expression.

But he thought it noteworthy to point it out, and to draw out more subtle inferences from the observation. So, me too.


Dr. Bob Gonzales said:


> So Exodus 3:14 makes a great proof-text for God's covenantal presence and faithfulness. But the reader will need to look elsewhere for a convincing proof-text to support the notion that God's will is logically prior to his existence or nature.


I really am done with my input in the thread. Thanks, all.

I recommend CVT for his critical evaluation of Descartes and the cotigo, and the rest of the Rationalists. Bahnsen's "Van Til's Apologetic" will readily supply references, just look in the index. And some of his own comments also, often in the footnotes.

I recommend Charnock in various chapters of "The Existence and Attributes of God" for showing the interplay between all the infinite and eternal attributes of God. Here are literally hundreds of pages dealing with the co-extensive principle of Absolute economy, showing how vain it really is to try to choose a "beginning" when talking about God. It ends up being (largely) an arbitrary selection.


Lastly, I ask: is God's being "necessary"? I would say yes, but...
if so, what makes it so? Can there be any necessity outside himself? No, or else that necessity would be "God," and not himself, making God (whatever he now be) necessary.

So what makes God "necessary" within himself? Does HE demand it? If this is a demand, then it must come of the will, or it is not volitional, but a mute insistence. Is the latter concept commensurate with the divine perfections? I say it is not.

We are not arguing that God does not have an eternal being, or that his being is in any sense contingent on some one or another "better" perfection in his nature. We only wish to determine which is logically prior. Which is preferable to state?

If God makes himself necessary, then it must be an intentional act. Not simply the combustion of energy. God absolutely is, and he makes himself absolutely necessary.

At the very least, I think it would be foolish to *deny* that God wills his nature.


Peace.


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