# Presuppositionalism Q&A



## Confessor

Post your objections/questions, and I'll answer them to the best of my abilities.


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## Reformed Rush

Confessor said:


> Post your objections/questions, and I'll answer them to the best of my abilities.



Ben,

We are uninformed about such things, and therefore are having trouble grasping exactly what the "presuppositional" apologetic really is. 

Would you mind going back to square-one and explaining your foundational premise?


Thank you,


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## Confessor

Mr. and Mrs. Rush,

Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.

Ben


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## chbrooking

1. God created the world
2. Man sinned, and became corrupt through and through. 
a. This includes his thinking. He is now at war with God in his thinking, and cannot submit to him.
b. Rom 1 describes this as suppressing the truth. Fallen man knows God, God has not left Himself without witness. He has made himself known to sinful man such that man cannot escape the knowledge of God. But he so does not like God that he suppresses the truth of God in unrighteousness.
3. Sinful man is committed to being the supreme interpreter of reality. That is, he reasons autonomously (as a law unto himself, or as Judges would put it, "everyone as he sees fit".)
4. Presuppositional apologetics recognizes that because of the preceding points, any non-Christian worldview will be in contradiction with itself or at least with reality. So...
5. It shows that the unbeliever cannot account for his actions, his arguments . . . for anything, really. 
6. This is NOT to say that unbelievers don't reason. They may do reason and science quite well. But their worldview does not give them warrant for the reason or science that they are doing. So presuppositional apologetics calls them on it, showing them that they act one way (because they live in God's world) while speaking another (denying God).

That's not a very good or complete analysis, but as a nutshell version it's probably okay.


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## Philip

1. Why presuppose presuppositional epistemology over common sense?

2. How is presuppositionalism different from platonist epistemology?

3. Does presuppositionalism assume a Kantian epistemology?

I'm asking specific questions in order to better understand the philosophical underpinnings. The description given above assumes a particular epistemology that I am still trying to understand.


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## MW

Confessor said:


> Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.



If the following statement were true there could be no such field as Christian apologetics:



> Presuppositionalists believe that, because of contrary presuppositions that permeate to affect one’s entire belief-structure, believers and unbelievers have absolutely no common ground in principle.



What has happened to the imago Dei as providing common ground?


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## Reformed Rush

Confessor said:


> Mr. Rush,
> 
> Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.
> 
> Ben





Being a newcomer, seeing you offer a Q and A, I hoped for a direct and simple answer, but thanks for this much. 

I will start plowing through it all . . .


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## chbrooking

P. F. Pugh said:


> 1. Why presuppose presuppositional epistemology over common sense?
> 
> 2. How is presuppositionalism different from platonist epistemology?
> 
> 3. Does presuppositionalism assume a Kantian epistemology?



1. Because fallen common sense will never arrive at the biblical God. It cannot.

2. This is a big question. But for one thing, Platonism, like all pagan philosophy reasons autonomously and univocally, whereas we reason theonomously and analogically. For another, Plato cannot account for changing particulars. His abstract universals may work well, but as Van Til used to say, it's a highway in the sky. That is, there's no exit ramp from abstract universal to concrete particular. This is hardly an adequate answer to the question, and will probably lead to more questions, but that's what this thread is about, right?

3. No. No. A thousand times, no.

-----Added 6/14/2009 at 10:50:17 EST-----

Imago dei provides an ontological point of contact, but not epistemological common ground.


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## MW

chbrooking said:


> Imago dei provides an ontological point of contact, but not epistemological common ground.



Precisely, so it is incorrect to say there is absolutely no common ground. Further, presuppositionalism requires an ontic foundation for its epistemic claims -- God exists therefore man is rational. Hence the ontological point of contact is fundamental.


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## Confessor

Philip,

Clark got em for the most part. Additionally,

1. Assuming your view is "common sense" begs the question. I would say that accepting the Bible on its own authority is common sense.

2. In _Van Til's Apologetic_, Van Til personally shows faults in the epistemologies of many big-time thinkers in the history of philosophy, going from Plato to Aristotle to the rationalists and empiricists to logical positivism, etc.

Otherwise, the singlemost distinctive of presuppositionalist epistemology from all secular philosophies (including Platonic and Kantian philosophy) is that it is not autonomous. It starts with God's interpretation of the world, Biblical philosophy, rather than assuming man has that prerogative.

Rev. Winzer,

As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that _on the unbeliever's principles_ he will have a 100% different worldview. The _imago Dei_ is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.


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## ChristianTrader

Reformed Rushs said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Mr. Rush,
> 
> Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.
> 
> Ben
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Being a newcomer, seeing you offer a Q and A, I hoped for a direct and simple answer, but thanks for this much.
> 
> I will start plowing through it all . . .
Click to expand...


I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.

CT


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## Confessor

I never know where to draw the line between brevity and full explanation.


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## MW

Confessor said:


> As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that _on the unbeliever's principles_ he will have a 100% different worldview. The _imago Dei_ is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.



The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.


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## chbrooking

ChristianTrader said:


> I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.
> 
> CT



Is it just me, or did this have a little sting in it?


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## Philip

1. You misunderstood my question, Clark. I wasn't asking apologetic methods, but in terms of a theory of knowledge. What is our criterion for knowledge? Is it reasonable certainty, or indubitability?

2. In terms of a theory of knowledge, Plato said that knowledge must meet two criteria: it must be justified, and it must be true. Does presuppositionalism hold to such an epistemology?

3. Van Til and Clark have no problem using Kant when arguing against classical apologetics, so is there an inconsistency here?



chbrooking said:


> Imago dei provides an ontological point of contact, but not epistemological common ground.



What is meant by epistemological common ground? In plain language it would seem to mean knowledge held in common by two or more people regardless of professed presupposition. In other words, it's common presupposition.


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## chbrooking

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that _on the unbeliever's principles_ he will have a 100% different worldview. The _imago Dei_ is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.
Click to expand...


The world he lives in is the same; the God whose image he bears is the same. He cannot help acting to some degree in conformity with the world God made and put him in. But his worldVIEW is wholly at odds with this.


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## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that _on the unbeliever's principles_ he will have a 100% different worldview. The _imago Dei_ is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.
Click to expand...


If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the _imago Dei_ cannot be eradicated.

Also, keep in mind Rev. Winzer that we can speak of different ontologies. Although it is an ontological fact that the unbeliever bears the image of God, this is only the case on a Biblical presupposition.


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## chbrooking

I apologize for misunderstanding. Yes, knowledge is justified true belief. But presuppositionalism shows that a non-believer cannot justify his belief. This is precisely where the attack is focussed.

By reasonable certainty do you mean probable-ness? We would argue that the nonbeliever cannot even arrive at reasonable certainty because they cannot account for reason. But indubitably, the Christian God exists, and the proof is the impossibility of the contrary.

The thing is, Kant and classical apologetics are arguing in the same arena, with the same autonomous footing beneath them, so it is quite fair to use Kant to critique classical apologetics.


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## Reformed Rush

ChristianTrader said:


> Reformed Rushs said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Mr. Rush,
> 
> Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.
> 
> Ben
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Being a newcomer, seeing you offer a Q and A, I hoped for a direct and simple answer, but thanks for this much.
> 
> I will start plowing through it all . . .
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


Uh . . .

So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?

He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?


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## MW

chbrooking said:


> The world he lives in is the same; the God whose image he bears is the same. He cannot help acting to some degree in conformity with the world God made and put him in. But his worldVIEW is wholly at odds with this.



I don't think his view is wholly at odds, otherwise a believer could not identify for the unbeliever what the unbeliever regards as unknown, Acts 17.


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## Pergamum

The unbeliever of Romans 1 seems fully able to know many things about God...can we call this a common ground?


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## MW

Confessor said:


> If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the _imago Dei_ cannot be eradicated.



Then one should not speak of the noetic effects of the fall as if the fall eradicated the imago Dei and left believers and unbelievers with no common ground.


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## chbrooking

Reformed Rushs said:


> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Reformed Rushs said:
> 
> 
> 
> Being a newcomer, seeing you offer a Q and A, I hoped for a direct and simple answer, but thanks for this much.
> 
> I will start plowing through it all . . .
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.
> 
> CT
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Uh . . .
> 
> So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?
> 
> He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?
Click to expand...


Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.


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## Beth Ellen Nagle

Confessor said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that _on the unbeliever's principles_ he will have a 100% different worldview. The _imago Dei_ is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the _imago Dei_ cannot be eradicated.
> 
> Also, keep in mind Rev. Winzer that we can speak of different ontologies. Although it is an ontological fact that the unbeliever bears the image of God, this is only the case on a Biblical presupposition.
Click to expand...



It is the case because of Creation. Creation is Revelation. It is clear in this context and rationally defensible in this context. This is why an unbeliever is held accountable in the context of a clear general revelation. The Bible need not be presupposed for this to be reality.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> 1. You misunderstood my question, Clark. I wasn't asking apologetic methods, but in terms of a theory of knowledge. What is our criterion for knowledge? Is it reasonable certainty, or indubitability?
> 
> 2. In terms of a theory of knowledge, Plato said that knowledge must meet two criteria: it must be justified, and it must be true. Does presuppositionalism hold to such an epistemology?
> 
> 3. Van Til and Clark have no problem using Kant when arguing against classical apologetics, so is there an inconsistency here?



1. I'd say reasonable certainty. I'm not a Clarkian, and the infallibilist constraint seems artificial and leads to skepticism.

2. That is not an epistemology. It is a small subset of epistemology which has no bearing on presuppositions. It's like asking, "Did you and that unbeliever agree that you had eggs for breakfast this morning?"

Anyway, in _Van Til's Apologetic_ Bahnsen classifies knowledge as justified, true belief. The example he uses against the notion of knowledge as only true belief is this one: suppose someone says he believes that the president during the 1980's had the initials R.R. because he believed the president's name was Robert Robertson (Bahnsen used another name ). He would not really _know_ in that case that the president's initials were R.R.

3. What do you mean they "used" Kant? Employed transcendentalism? It's not wrong to use some concepts made throughout the history of philosophy; the entire apologetic is against autonomous reasoning as a presupposition.



> What is meant by epistemological common ground?



In principle, the unbeliever has an entirely different worldview from the believer (no epistemological common ground). In practice, the unbeliever is actually made in the image of God as a being in God's creation (tons of metaphysical common ground).


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## chbrooking

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the _imago Dei_ cannot be eradicated.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Then one should not speak of the noetic effects of the fall as if the fall eradicated the imago Dei and left believers and unbelievers with no common ground.
Click to expand...


No EPISTEMOLOGICAL common ground. We do not have an archimidean point of agreement on the basis of which to argue. But we do live in the same world, and bear the same God's image. That's why the unbeliever is living in contradiction.


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## Confessor

Pergamum said:


> The unbeliever of Romans 1 seems fully able to know many things about God...can we call this a common ground?



Yes, but it would be a common ground in practice and not in principle. Unbelieving worldviews deny that they have this knowledge.


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## Reformed Rush

chbrooking said:


> Reformed Rushs said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.
> 
> CT
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Uh . . .
> 
> So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?
> 
> He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.
Click to expand...


Really?

If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?


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## chbrooking

sorry Ben, cross posting with you.


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## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the _imago Dei_ cannot be eradicated.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Then one should not speak of the noetic effects of the fall as if the fall eradicated the imago Dei and left believers and unbelievers with no common ground.
Click to expand...


The unbeliever _believes_ he is not made in the image of God and therefore the worldviews do not have common ground (epistemological) at that point.



And thanks, Beth.

-----Added 6/14/2009 at 11:26:34 EST-----



chbrooking said:


> sorry Ben, cross posting with you.



No prob, I consider us a tag team.


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## chbrooking

Reformed Rushs said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Reformed Rushs said:
> 
> 
> 
> Uh . . .
> 
> So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?
> 
> He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Really?
> 
> If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?
Click to expand...


Well, for starters, you missed the word "aright"
But consider that Romans 1 indicates that God "makes known to him" his eternal power and divine nature. It is in them and God has made it plain to them. He does not have to reason to God. He knows God. But he suppresses that truth. So he's living a lie. We are merely showing him that he cannot live consistently with his lie, since the lie is not consistent with the world he lives in or the God he knows but suppresses.


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## MW

chbrooking said:


> No EPISTEMOLOGICAL common ground. We do not have an archimidean point of agreement on the basis of which to argue. But we do live in the same world, and bear the same God's image. That's why the unbeliever is living in contradiction.



First, I'm speaking to Ben, who only made a distinction between principle and practice, and has made an absolute denial which does not recognise your distinction. Secondly, I've already responded to your distinction by noting that the presuppositional view of epistemology is dependent on the ontological reality presupposed; therefore your distinction is artificial and has no practical relevance.


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## Confessor

Reformed Rushs said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Reformed Rushs said:
> 
> 
> 
> Uh . . .
> 
> So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?
> 
> He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Really?
> 
> If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?
Click to expand...


The distinction between _natural revelation_ and _natural theology_ is crucial here. Everyone has a _non-inferential_ knowledge of Jehovah as Creator and Judge, but they always suppress it (Romans 1:18 ff.) (natural revelation). It does not follow from this, however, that humans are capable of _inferentially_ deducing from nature things about God on an autonomous basis (natural theology).


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## MW

Confessor said:


> The unbeliever _believes_ he is not made in the image of God and therefore the worldviews do not have common ground (epistemological) at that point.



This response requires you to assume of all unbelievers what might only be true of some of them. And already you are modifying your absolute statement to be applicable only at certain points.


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## chbrooking

I apologize for horning in. I'll desist. But I would suggest that it does have practical relevance. We do not share the same view of the world. We see the same world, but we see it very differently. We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.



armourbearer said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> No EPISTEMOLOGICAL common ground. We do not have an archimidean point of agreement on the basis of which to argue. But we do live in the same world, and bear the same God's image. That's why the unbeliever is living in contradiction.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> First, I'm speaking to Ben, who only made a distinction between principle and practice, and has made an absolute denial which does not recognise your distinction. Secondly, I've already responded to your distinction by noting that the presuppositional view of epistemology is dependent on the ontological reality presupposed; therefore your distinction is artificial and has no practical relevance.
Click to expand...


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## Turtle

Beth Ellen Nagle said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the _imago Dei_ cannot be eradicated.
> 
> Also, keep in mind Rev. Winzer that we can speak of different ontologies. Although it is an ontological fact that the unbeliever bears the image of God, this is only the case on a Biblical presupposition.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> 
> It is the case because of Creation. Creation is Revelation. It is clear in this context and rationally defensible in this context. This is why an unbeliever is held accountable in the context of a clear general revelation. The Bible need not be presupposed for this to be reality.
Click to expand...


Yes... creation is revelation. But we presuppose that to be the case. 

Just kidding. I agree creation is revelation. One can deny revelation ad infinitum and claim it merely presupposition but actually that is just choosing to be irrational. Unless of course we presuppose that all belief is on equal footing which leaves us only with dialectic truth, which denies truth and revelation. That brings us back to one can choose to be irrational and deny revelation. Which of course is suppressing the truth in unrighteousness.


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## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> The unbeliever _believes_ he is not made in the image of God and therefore the worldviews do not have common ground (epistemological) at that point.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This response requires you to assume of all unbelievers what might only be true of some of them. And already you are modifying your absolute statement to be applicable only at certain points.
Click to expand...


Unbelievers believe they are not made in the image of God (as the Bible teaches it) by definition. I guess there could be someone who acknowledges the truth of the Bible and hates it, but for all intents and purposes that person is a "believer," intellectually speaking.

How am I modifying my statement to be applicable only at certain points? I said there was no common ground at all; you replied that the _imago Dei_ counted as common ground; and I replied that it was not. I was simply attempting to rebut a defeater to my claim, not limiting its scope.


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## MW

chbrooking said:


> We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.



Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.


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## Reformed Rush

chbrooking said:


> Reformed Rushs said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Really?
> 
> If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Well, for starters, you missed the word "aright"
> But consider that Romans 1 indicates that God "makes known to him" his eternal power and divine nature. It is in them and God has made it plain to them. He does not have to reason to God. He knows God. But he suppresses that truth. So he's living a lie. We are merely showing him that he cannot live consistently with his lie, since the lie is not consistent with the world he lives in or the God he knows but suppresses.
Click to expand...


Well, we guess we are extremely unsophisticated and thus too theologically radical, for we believe that reprobates who suppress God's truth are sovereignly left to do so, without moral excuse.


And all the apologetics in the world cannot reverse God's decrees to leave some souls in such a state of denial and hatred of His truth.

The only thing that can reverse sinners' natural enmity to the truths of God, is divine mercy and grace.

And that mercy and grace comes only by the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which should be our primary emphasis and interest in this life.

J&R
(Simple believers)


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## Confessor

J&R,

We are not trying to classify you as simpletons or anything of the sort. Nor do we do believe that apologetics can in itself resurrect the hearts of unregenerates.

However, what apologetics can do is show more vividly just how _wrong_ the unbeliever is. He can acknowledge this fact intellectually without having his heart turned morally. The Spirit provides the moral change. (And of course God in His providence provides the intellectual ammunition anyway; it's not wholly "of ourselves.")

Ben


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## chbrooking

armourbearer said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.
Click to expand...


Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.


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## Confessor

Alright, I'm going to bed. I shall return to this surprisingly lively thread in the morning. I hope it's less than 5 pages long.


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## ChristianTrader

chbrooking said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.
Click to expand...


Needing the spirit in order to response favorably does not imply that there are no proper "neutral" presuppositions that you can share with the unbeliever. It just implies that they will refuse to go from point A to point B.

CT


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## Beth Ellen Nagle

Confessor said:


> Alright, I'm going to bed. I shall return to this surprisingly lively thread in the morning. I hope it's less than 5 pages long.




Rest well. God bless you. I wish I had more time to engage the Natural Theology aspect and clarity of General Revelation.


----------



## Confessor

Beth Ellen Nagle said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Alright, I'm going to bed. I shall return to this surprisingly lively thread in the morning. I hope it's less than 5 pages long.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Rest well. God bless you. I wish I had more time to engage the Natural Theology aspect and clarity of General Revelation.
Click to expand...


You can make a new thread and link it here so that I see it tomorrow morning if you want.

But anyway, good night (seriously).


----------



## chbrooking

That wasn't my claim.
My claim is that we don't both stand on A.
The unbeliever begins his thinking where I cannot go -- autonomously. It is the autonomy in all of his presuppositions which a) distinguishes them from ours and b) which prohibits him from arriving at the Christian God.

Feel free to respond. I will pick up the thread in the morning. But it's late for me, too.



ChristianTrader said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> 
> Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Needing the spirit in order to response favorably does not imply that there are no proper "neutral" presuppositions that you can share with the unbeliever. It just implies that they will refuse to go from point A to point B.
> 
> CT
Click to expand...


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> Unbelievers believe they are not made in the image of God (as the Bible teaches it) by definition. I guess there could be someone who acknowledges the truth of the Bible and hates it, but for all intents and purposes that person is a "believer," intellectually speaking.



Deists and Pantheists are not Atheists and Agnostics.



Confessor said:


> How am I modifying my statement to be applicable only at certain points? I said there was no common ground at all; you replied that the _imago Dei_ counted as common ground; and I replied that it was not. I was simply attempting to rebut a defeater to my claim, not limiting its scope.



First, Your defeater is only applicable if it defeats the true concept that the unbeliever is made in the irrepressible image of God. What the unbeliever believes about the image of God is irrelevant. Secondly, your defeater spoke to the point of one who does not believe in the image of God in man, but there are numerous unbelieving theologies which do believe in it. Remember, reformed presuppositionalism does not simply start with God, but with the God of holy Scripture.


----------



## MW

chbrooking said:


> Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.



Very true. If he understands then he is epistemically equipped to know what is presented to him; it is just that his rebellious worldview will not allow him to submit to what he understands. His problem is therefore moral, not necessarily intellectual.


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> By reasonable certainty do you mean probable-ness?



No. When we talk in ordinary parlance about someone being "reasonable", we simply mean that he is not being overly skeptical or discounting possibilities unnecessarily. For example, I am reasonably certain that I am having a debate right now (though if I was Gordon Clark, I would be calling that into question). Reasonable certainty is skeptical of skepticism and asks for a good reason to believe other things.



> The thing is, Kant and classical apologetics are arguing in the same arena, with the same autonomous footing beneath them, so it is quite fair to use Kant to critique classical apologetics.



No, because they do not share the same presuppositions. Their epistemology is quite different (and there are gaping holes in Kant). Also, assuming autonomous reasoning, even for the sake of a _reductio ad absurdum_ should be rejected, if you are going to be a really consistent Christian presuppositionalist.

Here I am distinguishing between presupp as a Christian epistemology and presupp as a method of critiquing. I maintain that the two are anathema to one another, because, on the one hand, you maintain that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, yet on the other, you reason autonomously (or force your opponent to do so) in order to disprove his presuppositions. It's inconsistent to say that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, and then, even only for the sake of a _reductio_, reason autonomously. The only way that a consistent Christian presuppositionalist can critique is for him to do so using only his own presuppositions.

On the other hand, you also have implicitly given yourself an out into the realm of classical apologetics by assuming general revelation. General revelation (common sense) may therefore be used to prove the truth of Christianity. All revelation implicitly assumes the truth of Christianity, according to presuppositionalism, and may therefore be used in its defense.



Confessor said:


> Assuming your view is "common sense" begs the question. I would say that accepting the Bible on its own authority is common sense.



No, the Bible is, as Chesterton put it, "Uncommon sense for the world's common nonsense."



> That is not an epistemology. It is a small subset of epistemology which has no bearing on presuppositions. It's like asking, "Did you and that unbeliever agree that you had eggs for breakfast this morning?"



Actually, I would argue that the question of whether or not we agree that I had eggs for breakfast this morning is relevant (in fact, I had a bagel). If we both agree that there is an external reality and are reasonably certain of our facts, we can reason from there. There is no possible way to reason, unless some presuppositions are held in common by all involved (eventually, I need to outline my theory of the hierarchy of presuppositions).

I would also say that we need to take Biblical precedent into consideration. Was Elijah a presuppositionalist? No. He didn't try to logically disprove arguments for pagan worldviews, instead he said "Back it up. If Baal is so powerful, have him call fire from heaven. Can't do it? Here, let Jahveh show you how it's done." He didn't give a negative proof for the existence of Baal, but a positive one for the existence of Jahveh.



> In principle, the unbeliever has an entirely different worldview from the believer (no epistemological common ground).



I would argue that we do have epistemological common ground here. We both have physical senses and powers of reasoning. These are God-given (ie: God-presupposing) methods of knowledge.



> What do you mean they "used" Kant? Employed transcendentalism? It's not wrong to use some concepts made throughout the history of philosophy



Those concepts carry presuppositions with them. In Kant's case, his transcendentalism is a reaction to "enlightenment" (ie: endarkenment) thinking, which presupposes a deistic theology. Kant is presupposing autonomy and therefore, according to consistent Christian presuppositionalism, should be rejected.


----------



## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Deists and Pantheists are not Atheists and Agnostics.



They don't believe they are made in the image of God with the full Biblical ramifications of it -- most notably, they believe that autonomous philosophy is the correct approach to understanding the world.

In other words, deists talk about being made in the image of God _in the context of a natural religion_. This is completely different from the Christian perspective, especially enough to change one's view when interpreting evidence and attempting to reason to God's existence.



armourbearer said:


> First, Your defeater is only applicable if it defeats the true concept that the unbeliever is made in the irrepressible image of God. What the unbeliever believes about the image of God is irrelevant. Secondly, your defeater spoke to the point of one who does not believe in the image of God in man, but there are numerous unbelieving theologies which do believe in it. Remember, reformed presuppositionalism does not simply start with God, but with the God of holy Scripture.



1. I was responding to your defeater, not making one of my own. (You were saying that Christians have common ground in principle with others who believe they were made in the image of God.)

What the unbeliever believes is absolutely relevant. The "principles" that I refer to when I say that believers and unbelievers disagree on everything _in principle_ is that according to their espoused worldviews they have nothing in common. The presuppositional apologist would never deny that the unbeliever is not actually made in the image of God.

2. As I said above, believing that man is made in the image of God in the context of another worldview does not equate to having common ground in principle. When a Muslim or deist or pantheist says he is made in the image of God, he means something with totally different ramifications than when a Reformed Christian says it.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 10:28:28 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> Here I am distinguishing between presupp as a Christian epistemology and presupp as a method of critiquing. I maintain that the two are anathema to one another, because, on the one hand, you maintain that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, yet on the other, you reason autonomously (or force your opponent to do so) in order to disprove his presuppositions. It's inconsistent to say that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, and then, even only for the sake of a _reductio_, reason autonomously. The only way that a consistent Christian presuppositionalist can critique is for him to do so using only his own presuppositions.



If you talk to your kids about the consequences of premarital sex, would you be sinning? No. Likewise, it is perfectly fine to discuss _what happens_ when autonomous reasoning is presupposed, or what would happen if autonomy rather than theonomy were correct. When the presuppositionalist steps in the shoes of the unbeliever to show him where his reasoning leads, he is not actually committing himself to rebellion against the Bible. He is merely telling the unbeliever how bad of an idea that is.



P. F. Pugh said:


> On the other hand, you also have implicitly given yourself an out into the realm of classical apologetics by assuming general revelation. General revelation (common sense) may therefore be used to prove the truth of Christianity. All revelation implicitly assumes the truth of Christianity, according to presuppositionalism, and may therefore be used in its defense.



The non-inferential knowledge given by natural revelation (Romans 1:18 ff.) does not give way to _natural theology_, the discursive method of interpreting reality in an attempt to reason to God's existence. General revelation is not "common sense." All revelation does implicitly assume the truth of Christianity -- but only when viewed in the right light! To revert to an analogy Van Til enjoyed employing: although everything illumined by a light "proves" that light indirectly (everything illumined "implicitly assumes" a light source), you cannot somehow "prove" the light by assuming it's dark! Likewise, you cannot show how everything implicitly assumes Christianity by assuming that God is not sovereign over human reasoning; you cannot show how everything implicitly assumes Christianity by assuming that Christianity is _false_.



P. F. Pugh said:


> If we both agree that there is an external reality and are reasonably certain of our facts, we can reason from there. There is no possible way to reason, unless some presuppositions are held in common by all involved (eventually, I need to outline my theory of the hierarchy of presuppositions).



When you say that you had a bagel for breakfast, you are implying that you had a bagel created and sustained by the God of the Bible. When the unbeliever says that he had a bagel, he is implying something _completely different_. This is not common ground in principle.

However, seeing as this actually _is_ God's world, and the unbeliever actually would have been eating a bagel created by God, it follows that there is _metaphysical_ common ground.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I would also say that we need to take Biblical precedent into consideration. Was Elijah a presuppositionalist? No. He didn't try to logically disprove arguments for pagan worldviews, instead he said "Back it up. If Baal is so powerful, have him call fire from heaven. Can't do it? Here, let Jahveh show you how it's done." He didn't give a negative proof for the existence of Baal, but a positive one for the existence of Jahveh.



Would his evidence have made sense at all in the context of a non-Christian worldview, in which knowledge is impossible? Furthermore, I am not directly opposed to evidence as long as they are used presuppositionally, essentially "backwards" to how evidentialists use them. Elijah did not imply, "Look at this fire neutrally and autonomously reason to what you think is a reasonable conclusion," but rather, "This fire makes sense if we presuppose the living God rather than Baal."

Honestly, this is no problem, but it could take me a long time to explain, as I would have to explain "immutable facts" from before. Maybe a separate thread?



P. F. Pugh said:


> I would argue that we do have epistemological common ground here. We both have physical senses and powers of reasoning. These are God-given (ie: God-presupposing) methods of knowledge.



Since they _are_ God-given, this is actual common ground, but since the unbeliever does not _believe_ they are God-given, it is not common ground _in principle_. (I think the "metaphysical" and "epistemological" descriptors are only confusing the issue.)



P. F. Pugh said:


> Those concepts carry presuppositions with them. In Kant's case, his transcendentalism is a reaction to "enlightenment" (ie: endarkenment) thinking, which presupposes a deistic theology. Kant is presupposing autonomy and therefore, according to consistent Christian presuppositionalism, should be rejected.



If a presuppositionalist were to use Kantian concepts autonomously, then they should be rejected. Using transcendental argumentation while recognizing God's prerogative to interpret the world (theonomy) is not contrary to presup in the least.

If an unbeliever says, "I can use my senses!" does that mean the presuppositionalist must abandon speaking of sensory experience in his worldview?


----------



## chbrooking

P. F. Pugh said:


> No. When we talk in ordinary parlance about someone being "reasonable", we simply mean that he is not being overly skeptical or discounting possibilities unnecessarily. For example, I am reasonably certain that I am having a debate right now (though if I was Gordon Clark, I would be calling that into question). Reasonable certainty is skeptical of skepticism and asks for a good reason to believe other things.



And my point was that the non-believer cannot ground his request (for a good REASON).



P. F. Pugh said:


> The thing is, Kant and classical apologetics are arguing in the same arena, with the same autonomous footing beneath them, so it is quite fair to use Kant to critique classical apologetics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No, because they do not share the same presuppositions. Their epistemology is quite different (and there are gaping holes in Kant). Also, assuming autonomous reasoning, even for the sake of a _reductio ad absurdum_ should be rejected, if you are going to be a really consistent Christian presuppositionalist.
> 
> Here I am distinguishing between presupp as a Christian epistemology and presupp as a method of critiquing. I maintain that the two are anathema to one another, because, on the one hand, you maintain that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, yet on the other, you reason autonomously (or force your opponent to do so) in order to disprove his presuppositions. It's inconsistent to say that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, and then, even only for the sake of a _reductio_, reason autonomously. The only way that a consistent Christian presuppositionalist can critique is for him to do so using only his own presuppositions.
Click to expand...


Well, CA and the unbeliever certainly pretend to share the same presuppositions. Both start with man's reasoning as ultimate. And you should recognize that we do not assume autonomous reasoning. We merely observe and point out where such reasoning would lead. We never actually adopt it. By saying we reason his way "for the sake of argument" MEANS that we are recognizing its futility and demonstrating that to him.



P. F. Pugh said:


> On the other hand, you also have implicitly given yourself an out into the realm of classical apologetics by assuming general revelation. General revelation (common sense) may therefore be used to prove the truth of Christianity. All revelation implicitly assumes the truth of Christianity, according to presuppositionalism, and may therefore be used in its defense.



First, general revelation is not the same as common sense, as your parentheses would have it. Secondly, revelation cannot assume anything. But if you mean that Christianity presupposes both natural and special revelation, you are correct. But because it embraces special revelation, it cannot consistently believe that men are permitted to reason autonomously. I simply cannot begin with the unbelieving frame of reference -- one in which the human mind reigns supreme -- and think that I will arrive at a point of submission to God. The former and the latter are antithetical.



P. F. Pugh said:


> No, the Bible is, as Chesterton put it, "Uncommon sense for the world's common nonsense."



Think about your Chesterton quote and you will see that it supports our side of this discussion rather than yours.



P. F. Pugh said:


> ... There is no possible way to reason, unless some presuppositions are held in common by all involved (eventually, I need to outline my theory of the hierarchy of presuppositions).



Philip, I’m still not convinced that you understand what we mean by presuppositions. We are not referring to the world the unbeliever lives in. And we would maintain that man (even fallen man) cannot BUT reason, made as he is in the image of God. What we are claiming is that he makes CLAIMS that do not comport with his use of reason. He claims the world is one way. But we point out that, if it were in fact as he says it is, then he couldn’t even make those claims, since predication itself depends on the truth of the Bible. Further, I don’t understand what you mean by a hierarchy of presuppositions. Presuppositions are like axioms. They are pre-logical, pre-scientific. They are assumptions on the basis of which logic and science are done. If there is a hierarchy, are you saying that lower level presuppositions can be proved by higher level ones? If so, the former are not presuppositions at all. But perhaps you are saying that some presuppositions are held more tenaciously than others -- I’d have to think about that, but I don’t think I’d have a problem with it. Nevertheless, I don’t see how that would help your case.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I would also say that we need to take Biblical precedent into consideration. Was Elijah a presuppositionalist? No. He didn't try to logically disprove arguments for pagan worldviews, instead he said "Back it up. If Baal is so powerful, have him call fire from heaven. Can't do it? Here, let Jahveh show you how it's done." He didn't give a negative proof for the existence of Baal, but a positive one for the existence of Jahveh.



Okay, but since neither of us can call down fire from heaven, we might have a better model for our approach in Acts 17, where Paul’s approach is presuppositional.



P. F. Pugh said:


> In principle, the unbeliever has an entirely different worldview from the believer (no epistemological common ground).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would argue that we do have epistemological common ground here. We both have physical senses and powers of reasoning. These are God-given (ie: God-presupposing) methods of knowledge.
Click to expand...


Here you show your misunderstanding of presupposition. You are equating God-given with God-presupposing. Are you saying that the unbeliever presupposes the biblical God? Undoubtedly the Christian God gave him being and the ability to speak and reason, etc. But the unbeliever sinfully uses these tools, given as a gift, to hurl insults at God. They do not presuppose the Christian God. But, since these things are God-given and constitutive for them, they cannot help but live in contradiction with their presuppositions.



P. F. Pugh said:


> What do you mean they "used" Kant? Employed transcendentalism? It's not wrong to use some concepts made throughout the history of philosophy
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Those concepts carry presuppositions with them. In Kant's case, his transcendentalism is a reaction to "enlightenment" (ie: endarkenment) thinking, which presupposes a deistic theology. Kant is presupposing autonomy and therefore, according to consistent Christian presuppositionalism, should be rejected.
Click to expand...


Once again, I’m afraid you are misunderstanding what a presupposition is. A concept does not carry a presupposition with it. A presupposition is a frame of reference. Presuppositions are determinative of concepts that flow from them. Hence, no frame of reference that begins with the human mind as ultimate arbiter will later submit to God as ultimate arbiter.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 11:14:58 EST-----

Once again, Ben, you're too quick on the draw. As a "tag-team partner", I'm always just a few seconds too slow


----------



## Confessor

Haha, don't worry about. I enjoyed your commentary on Chesterton's quote.

Regarding what you told Philip about hierarchical presuppositions, there is a sense of hierarchy with the term "presupposition," but that is of course different from the denotation that presuppositionalists are using. For instance, I may say that on the PB, I _presuppose_ that everyone else is adhering either to the WCF, TFU, or LBC. But this is using a different denotation of "presupposition" than when we talk about the difference between autonomy and theonomy.


----------



## Confessor

Rev. Winzer,

I think I can clear up the problem you brought up in your first post of the thread:



armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the following statement were true there could be no such field as Christian apologetics:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Presuppositionalists believe that, because of contrary presuppositions that permeate to affect one’s entire belief-structure, believers and unbelievers have absolutely no common ground in principle.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What has happened to the imago Dei as providing common ground?
Click to expand...


The distinctions between metaphysical and epistemological common ground are essentially _actual_ and _espoused_ common ground. But as they stand, "metaphysical" and "epistemological" are misnomers. Metaphysical common ground would seem to imply that both believer and unbeliever agree on a specific metaphysic, but that is denied by presuppositionalists. Epistemological common ground would seem to imply that both believer and unbeliever agree on a specific epistemology, but that is obviously denied as well.

In other words, the terms "metaphysical common ground" and "epistemological common ground," as their names imply, appear to both be distinctions of _espoused_ common ground -- i.e. "Your espoused metaphysic is equivalent to my espoused metaphysic." This is a problem with using the terms "metaphysical common ground" and "epistemological common ground." Therefore I will only employ the terms _actual_ and _espoused_ common ground (and I will ask Clark to do the same (please)).

Seeing then, as unbelievers' espoused worldviews would not agree on anything when properly understood, we can say there is a full antithesis _in principle_. For instance, both believers and unbelievers may believe in the laws of logic, but believers see these as reflections of the Creator's mind, whereas unbeliever see these as self-existing, necessary principles "inherent to matter" (for instance).

The objection that the _imago Dei_ is still common ground between believer and unbeliever is therefore not harmful to the fact that believer and unbeliever have no espoused common ground. Neither atheists nor deists espouse belief in the _imago Dei_ as understood in Christian doctrine; therefore neither of them have any _espoused_ common ground with the Christian. However, since it is still true that they _are_ made in the image of God, it follows that the _imago Dei_ is *actual* common ground.

Please tell me if that was unclear. I hope that resolves any perceived inconsistencies regarding common ground and the _imago Dei_.


----------



## cih1355

What would you say if an unbeliver were to ask you, "How do you know that the Bible is inspired by God?"


----------



## Confessor

cih1355 said:


> What would you say if an unbeliver were to ask you, "How do you know that the Bible is inspired by God?"



Excellent question. I would say it's self-evident. I find it overwhelmingly obvious that I should accept the Bible on its authority immediately.

Generally, this will get two responses: (1) that it is unfair, or (2) that it would open the floodgates to other ridiculous propositions (e.g. affirming Santa Clause as self-evident).

(1) If he thinks it is unfair, I would respond that he is in fact presupposing that Christianity can never be true. For if the questioner assumes that the Bible cannot be self-evidently accepted on its own authority, then he is presupposing that the Bible can _never_ be accepted on its own authority, which would make his choice just as "unfair" as mine. In other words,, I would reply that there is no neutrality; autonomy is not the "fair" position.

(2) It would only open the floodgates if people were allowed to blatantly lie about whatever presupposition they want to hold as self-evident. But in such a case, it would not _actually_ be self-evident, and therefore no flood gates would be opened in the first place.

Tell me if I left anything uncovered.


----------



## cih1355

Confessor said:


> cih1355 said:
> 
> 
> 
> What would you say if an unbeliver were to ask you, "How do you know that the Bible is inspired by God?"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Excellent question. I would say it's self-evident. I find it overwhelmingly obvious that I should accept the Bible on its authority immediately.
> 
> Generally, this will get two responses: (1) that it is unfair, or (2) that it would open the floodgates to other ridiculous propositions (e.g. affirming Santa Clause as self-evident).
> 
> (1) If he thinks it is unfair, I would respond that he is in fact presupposing that Christianity can never be true. For if the questioner assumes that the Bible cannot be self-evidently accepted on its own authority, then he is presupposing that the Bible can _never_ be accepted on its own authority, which would make his choice just as "unfair" as mine. In other words,, I would reply that there is no neutrality; autonomy is not the "fair" position.
> 
> (2) It would only open the floodgates if people were allowed to blatantly lie about whatever presupposition they want to hold as self-evident. But in such a case, it would not _actually_ be self-evident, and therefore no flood gates would be opened in the first place.
> 
> Tell me if I left anything uncovered.
Click to expand...


If the unbeliever were to ask, "How do you know that the Koran or some other book other than the Bible is not inspired by God?", how would you answer?


----------



## Confessor

cih1355 said:


> If the unbeliever were to ask, "How do you know that the Koran or some other book other than the Bible is not inspired by God?", how would you answer?



In the very first place, it lacks all the _indicia divinitatis_ (marks of divinity) that the Bible has. But seeing as this is a type of knowledge that cannot be shown discursively, since it is necessarily non-inferential, the presuppositionalist would show inconsistencies within the Islamic worldview, or whatever worldview results from the book they ask about.


----------



## chbrooking

Which is why the method is sometimes described as indirect.


----------



## Philip

Part of the reason that I don't like presuppositionalism as a method for proving Christianity is because, ultimately, it cannot. The transcendental argument (which is, In my humble opinion, the ontological argument used in reverse) cannot hope to prove God's existence for one reason: no human can critique every worldview under the sun. It's like trying to prove that there's no gold in China: success takes nearly forever. I would submit that only God Himself is capable of validating the TAG and when God enters the room, there is no more need of any other argument.

Classical Apologetics, on the other hand, understands that if Christianity is true, then all other religions are false. Therefore if one can demonstrate the truth of Christianity, then all else falls by default: there is no need for further argument.



Confessor said:


> It would only open the floodgates if people were allowed to blatantly lie about whatever presupposition they want to hold as self-evident. But in such a case, it would not actually be self-evident, and therefore no flood gates would be opened in the first place.



How does an unbeliever know that you're not lying. The trouble here is that what is self-evident for one person is not self-evident to another. It is self-evident to me, for example, that we are not, in fact, living in the Matrix. However, to a Cartesian, this is not self-evident as his theory of knowledge depends on undubitability. Thus, to a Cartesian (or Gordon Clark) we don't really know whether or not we are living in the Matrix.



> Therefore I will only employ the terms actual and espoused common ground



These are just as confusing. Descartes espoused the laws of logic, mathematics, and the necessary existence of God, yet Descartes was not (I think) a Christian. Here's common ground aplenty, and all espoused.



> Elijah did not imply, "Look at this fire neutrally and autonomously reason to what you think is a reasonable conclusion," but rather, "This fire makes sense if we presuppose the living God rather than Baal."



No, he's not:



1 Kings 18:21 said:


> And Elijah came near to all the people and said, "How long will you go limping between two different opinions? If the LORD is God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him." And the people did not answer him a word.



Here Elijah is saying, "look at the evidence and see who is really God here. Choose whichever God can back it up." He's calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, challenging them to actually back up their claims. He's proving God empirically, in a sense.



chbrooking said:


> Philip, I’m still not convinced that you understand what we mean by presuppositions. We are not referring to the world the unbeliever lives in.



A presupposition is, to my mind, any sort of unprovable or tautologous preconceived notion. Materialism is a presupposition. The laws of logic are presuppositions. Every language is a whole set of presuppositions. Supernaturalism is a presupposition.

When I talk of Richard Dawkins sharing presuppositions with myself, what I mean is that both of us are speaking the same language and both of us interpret reality similarly enough to allow communication. In other words, a presupposition is any proposition that is a) assumed (or proved tautologously) rather than proved b) acted upon, either intellectually or practically. That is, to think is to presuppose. To speak is to presuppose. To act is to presuppose.

I cannot have this debate with you unless I presuppose that doing so is worth my time, that you are in fact there, and that I am not, in fact, in the Matrix.



> Once again, I’m afraid you are misunderstanding what a presupposition is. A concept does not carry a presupposition with it. A presupposition is a frame of reference. Presuppositions are determinative of concepts that flow from them.



I would argue not necessarily. Arminians and Calvinists both presuppose the truth of the Bible and yet they derive quite different concepts from it. Your presuppositions do not determine the outcome any more than the battleground determines the course of the battle. There are too many other factors at play (individual temperaments and emphases, cultural background, upbringing, etc).



> Okay, but since neither of us can call down fire from heaven, we might have a better model for our approach in Acts 17, where Paul’s approach is presuppositional.



Quoting pagan poets and using pagan practices to make his point? You call that presuppositional?

Recently, my reading has been Augustine's _City of God_, where Augustine, in the first part, compares paganism and Christianity and demonstrates, using pagan authors, how Christianity is superior. To me, this is as classical an apologetic as one gets. Granted Augustine is not Paul, yet I think that this kind of approach is what Paul is using. He's finding common ground and claiming, "This isn't yours, it's God's. You have always known what God is, now let me tell you _who_ God is. It's what you've been waiting for, if only you knew it."


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> They don't believe they are made in the image of God with the full Biblical ramifications of it



Here is the problem -- who does? Must one have all-knowledge in order to know anything truly? Surely not. If the unbeliever is inexcusable it is because of what he knows but suppresses; if he is credited with knowing then he obviously possesses the epistemic equipment necessary to know. It is that point of irrepressible rationality which forms the common ground on which apologetics is carried out. If one denies that common ground then there can be no apologetics -- rational defence of Christianity.


----------



## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> The transcendental argument (which is, In my humble opinion, the ontological argument used in reverse) cannot hope to prove God's existence for one reason: no human can critique every worldview under the sun.



Yes, this is a common objection. As long as the presuppositional apologist can deconstruct whatever worldview the unbeliever has, the unbeliever will be forced to accept Christianity or accept another worldview. If he accepts another worldview, the apologist can tear that down as well. Obviously not every possible worldview can be disproved, but that doesn't really matter anyway -- the apologist's job is to simply leave the unbeliever without a choice. (The unbeliever doesn't have the option of "waiting out" for a worldview in the future to make sense, as he would have to "wait out" on an intelligible presupposition.)



P. F. Pugh said:


> How does an unbeliever know that you're not lying. The trouble here is that what is self-evident for one person is not self-evident to another.



First, it's fairly obvious when someone is trying to posit a childish objection to presuppositionalism by saying, "Well, what if I presuppose Santa Clause? har har"

And second, I never said the conversation ended at self-evidence. Once the two sides have their presuppositions established, transcendental warfare begins. If someone sincerely takes Qur'anic authority as his presupposition (or for all intents and purposes _appears_ to sincerely take it), then you explode that presupposition.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Therefore I will only employ the terms actual and espoused common ground
> 
> 
> 
> 
> These are just as confusing. Descartes espoused the laws of logic, mathematics, and the necessary existence of God, yet Descartes was not (I think) a Christian. Here's common ground aplenty, and all espoused.
Click to expand...


Not at all. At the beginning of his philosophy he did not assume Biblical doctrines. He assumed autonomy. At the outset his entire worldview was tinted in an anti-Christian flavor. Sure, he may have claimed to reach the conclusion that God necessarily exists, but unless he's referring to the God of the Bible, he will still have provided a completely different lens.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Here Elijah is saying, "look at the evidence and see who is really God here. Choose whichever God can back it up." He's calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, challenging them to actually back up their claims. He's proving God empirically, in a sense.



Noticed you said, "in a sense" -- I would presume it's because _the God of the Bible cannot be proven empirically_. The only reason fire from heaven would cause people to turn to God is because they realize that is intelligible only on Biblical presuppositions, not because they can actually reason from fire==>Biblical authority. It's not logically possible.



P. F. Pugh said:


> A presupposition is, to my mind, any sort of unprovable or tautologous preconceived notion. Materialism is a presupposition. The laws of logic are presuppositions. Every language is a whole set of presuppositions. Supernaturalism is a presupposition.



Yes, the word "presupposition" can mean more than just the way that presuppositionalists are employing it when it comes to apologetics. But when we use we are denoting the choice between autonomy and theonomy.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Okay, but since neither of us can call down fire from heaven, we might have a better model for our approach in Acts 17, where Paul’s approach is presuppositional.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Quoting pagan poets and using pagan practices to make his point? You call that presuppositional?
Click to expand...


Paul was not a pagan.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 10:32:28 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> They don't believe they are made in the image of God with the full Biblical ramifications of it
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Here is the problem -- who does? Must one have all-knowledge in order to know anything truly? Surely not. If the unbeliever is inexcusable it is because of what he knows but suppresses; if he is credited with knowing then he obviously possesses the epistemic equipment necessary to know. It is that point of irrepressible rationality which forms the common ground on which apologetics is carried out. If one denies that common ground then there can be no apologetics -- rational defence of Christianity.
Click to expand...


I did not imply an exhaustive knowledge and a fully, 100% correct Biblical worldview when I spoke of placing the _imago Dei_ within the confines of a Biblical worldview. The contrast I was trying to note was that unbelievers might claim to believe they are made in the image of God, but they mean something different from the Christian conception.

And lastly, _I am not denying common ground_. I am denying an _espoused_ common ground but not an _actual_ common ground. Atheists deny the _imago Dei_ in principle but are actually made in God's image; therefore, because of the actual common ground, apologetics can take place.


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> Atheists deny the _imago Dei_ in principle but are actually made in God's image; therefore, because of the actual common ground, apologetics can take place.



Then the thesis submitted in a previous thread requires amendment.


----------



## Craig

P. F. Pugh said:


> Part of the reason that I don't like presuppositionalism as a method for proving Christianity is because, ultimately, it cannot. The transcendental argument (which is, In my humble opinion, the ontological argument used in reverse) cannot hope to prove God's existence for one reason: no human can critique every worldview under the sun. It's like trying to prove that there's no gold in China: success takes nearly forever. I would submit that only God Himself is capable of validating the TAG and when God enters the room, there is no more need of any other argument.



I'm not 100% sold on TAG as irrefutable proof...but I don't think you're really understanding it. TAG does not rest in destroying other worldviews...though it does that quite well. It does demonstrate that the "common ground" enjoyed by belivers, and unbelievers alike, comports with the Christian worldview, and conversely, cannot be supported by an unbelieving worldview. There's no need to disprove all other views.



P. F. Pugh said:


> A presupposition is, to my mind, any sort of unprovable or tautologous preconceived notion. Materialism is a presupposition. The laws of logic are presuppositions. Every language is a whole set of presuppositions. Supernaturalism is a presupposition.



There are many kinds of presuppositions, but when Presuppers talk about Christian presuppositions, he doesn't mean "unproveable notions". Language is not itself a set of presuppositions as language is used to convey propositions.



P. F. Pugh said:


> When I talk of Richard Dawkins sharing presuppositions with myself, what I mean is that both of us are speaking the same language and both of us interpret reality similarly enough to allow communication. In other words, a presupposition is any proposition that is a) assumed (or proved tautologously) rather than proved b) acted upon, either intellectually or practically. That is, to think is to presuppose. To speak is to presuppose. To act is to presuppose.



I don't believe presuppers would limit a presupposition to conscious intellectual thought. Dawkins, for example, touts materialism then acts as if logic and morality exist even though his very worldview denies their existence...and even consciously he downplays morality by reducing it to a result of memetics, yet castigates religion for the "evil" it wreaks.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I would argue not necessarily. Arminians and Calvinists both presuppose the truth of the Bible and yet they derive quite different concepts from it. Your presuppositions do not determine the outcome any more than the battleground determines the course of the battle. There are too many other factors at play (individual temperaments and emphases, cultural background, upbringing, etc).



Even though Arminians and Calvinists may agree that the Bible is inerrant, that is not necessarily a controlling presupposition. It may be a peripheral presupposition submitting to something else.


----------



## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> Atheists deny the _imago Dei_ in principle but are actually made in God's image; therefore, because of the actual common ground, apologetics can take place.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Then the thesis submitted in a previous thread requires amendment.
Click to expand...


In that thread I explicitly stated that no common ground existed "in principle," not in actuality.


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> In that thread I explicitly stated that no common ground existed "in principle," not in actuality.



But you have set forth a "principle" in which common ground exists -- the imago Dei. A better distinction would be subjective and objective. The subject knowing may not actively recognise that his rationality depends on the imago Dei, but it remains an objective criterion for rationality which govers all discussion.


----------



## Confessor

armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> In that thread I explicitly stated that no common ground existed "in principle," not in actuality.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But you have set forth a "principle" in which common ground exists -- the imago Dei. A better distinction would be subjective and objective. The subject knowing may not actively recognise that his rationality depends on the imago Dei, but it remains an objective criterion for rationality which govers all discussion.
Click to expand...


Rev. Winzer, my distinction would be unclear only if you equivocate on "principle" as you have here. When I say "in principle" I am referring to (the lack of) espoused common ground, not actual common ground, and of course the _imago Dei_ is the latter.


----------



## MW

Confessor said:


> Rev. Winzer, my distinction would be unclear only if you equivocate on "principle" as you have here. When I say "in principle" I am referring to (the lack of) espoused common ground, not actual common ground, and of course the _imago Dei_ is the latter.



I think you are using "principle" in an unusual way, but it is your thesis, and if you desire to use words in an unusual way that is your prerogative, but don't be surprised if people misunderstand you.


----------



## cih1355

Confessor said:


> cih1355 said:
> 
> 
> 
> If the unbeliever were to ask, "How do you know that the Koran or some other book other than the Bible is not inspired by God?", how would you answer?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In the very first place, it lacks all the _indicia divinitatis_ (marks of divinity) that the Bible has. But seeing as this is a type of knowledge that cannot be shown discursively, since it is necessarily non-inferential, the presuppositionalist would show inconsistencies within the Islamic worldview, or whatever worldview results from the book they ask about.
Click to expand...


What are the marks of divinity and do they authenticate the Bible?


----------



## Confessor

cih1355 said:


> What are the marks of divinity and do they authenticate the Bible?



If you read the Bible and ever just "know" that it's God's Word, then you have recognized some marks of divinity.

There has to be some sense in which the Bible is non-inferentially known by everyone (believers and unbelievers); otherwise, unbelievers could not be held responsible for denying the voice of their Creator, nor could the Early Church have actually recognized the canonical books.


----------



## Philip

Again, my trouble here is that presuppositionalism seems to be taking the longest route possible to come to the conclusion that Christianity is true. Whereas, if one can only prove Christianity to be true, then all other worldviews are proved false by default.



Confessor said:


> the apologist's job is to simply leave the unbeliever without a choice.



Then he will fail. There's always a choice. For one, he might find fault with your reasoning.



> First, it's fairly obvious when someone is trying to posit a childish objection to presuppositionalism by saying, "Well, what if I presuppose Santa Clause?



The objection isn't so childish, actually. What if a person does presuppose Santa Clause? It sounds ridiculous, but it's actually valid.



> If someone sincerely takes Qur'anic authority as his presupposition (or for all intents and purposes appears to sincerely take it), then you explode that presupposition.



You can't do that unless there is common ground: ie, you must both agree to certain terms of the debate. You can't defeat an enemy if he's on another battleground (assuming medieval warfare here). What you're really battling over is, which one adequately explains the truth that both of us acknowledge.



> The only reason fire from heaven would cause people to turn to God is because they realize that is intelligible only on Biblical presuppositions, not because they can actually reason from fire==>Biblical authority. It's not logically possible.



Well, seeing as there (probably) wasn't a Torah in the house, I have to agree that they couldn't reason to biblical authority.

However, what Elijah is doing here is calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, so as to point out to the observers, "Look, Baal can't deliver the goods here. Either he's weak or he doesn't exist. Now I'll show you what Jahveh can do." Elijah is actually playing off of common cultural presuppositions here.



> Yes, the word "presupposition" can mean more than just the way that presuppositionalists are employing it when it comes to apologetics. But when we use we are denoting the choice between autonomy and theonomy.



And when I am using it, I refer to any sort of preconceived notion. Autonomy and theonomy are not actually presuppositions in this sense because they are _ways_ of thinking, not starting points for thought.



> Paul was not a pagan.



No, but he quoted pagan poets to prove Christianity true (you notice that he doesn't directly attack paganism--his apologetic is completely positive).



> And lastly, I am not denying common ground. I am denying an espoused common ground but not an actual common ground.



And I say that they do espouse common ground. I have given several examples (Descartes, Dawkins, etc) which you have done logical somersaults to get around. Basically, what you are denying is that we speak the same language. It is my contention that we do both espouse some of the same things: 

I went out and got coffee yesterday at lunch. My coworkers are not Christians, but they will agree that I did. We have differing metaphysical views to account for that coffee, but we both acknowledge that it's there (unless one of them is a Cartesian/Gordon Clark). 



> There has to be some sense in which the Bible is non-inferentially known by everyone



I am going to make a statement here that some will deem heretical: the Bible is not inherently true. The Bible itself rests on God's authority. Unless one acknowledges God's authority, there is no rational reason to accept the truth of the Bible. Fallen humanity is not held responsible for not accepting the Bible, but for rebellion against the creator.



Craig said:


> It does demonstrate that the "common ground" enjoyed by belivers, and unbelievers alike, comports with the Christian worldview, and conversely, cannot be supported by an unbelieving worldview. There's no need to disprove all other views.



Hmm, that's what I was about to say about Classical Apologetics.



> Language is not itself a set of presuppositions as language is used to convey propositions.



Actually it is, because language shapes thinking. I friends who are multilingual who will acknowledge that their thinking changes when they are thinking in another language.



> I don't believe presuppers would limit a presupposition to conscious intellectual thought. Dawkins, for example, touts materialism then acts as if logic and morality exist even though his very worldview denies their existence



That's because he is also presupposing logic and morality (logic is necessarily true, regardless--morality, though, is a problem, I agree). They are both part and parcel of his set of presuppositions.

I would like to ask at this point that all terms used be taken at face value. That is, presuppositions include _all_ presuppositions, not just autonomy and theonomy. If we can't speak in plain language to one another, then we certainly can't speak in plain language to an unbeliever.


----------



## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> Again, my trouble here is that presuppositionalism seems to be taking the longest route possible to come to the conclusion that Christianity is true. Whereas, if one can only prove Christianity to be true, then all other worldviews are proved false by default.



This is not a matter of preference over shorter or longer paths, but whether we are using a Biblical form of apologetics. If the Bible is to be taken on its own authority -- as Christianity has historically understood -- then any apologetic which denies that in practice must be rejected. If classical apologetics adopts autonomy at the outset, then it cannot possibly prove that the Bible should be taken on its own authority.

Also, since the Bible is to be taken on its own authority, it follows that Biblical authority cannot be established upon some other basis; therefore it is the case that one cannot "only prove Christianity to be true." It can't happen.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Then he will fail. There's always a choice. For one, he might find fault with your reasoning.



Not always a rational choice. He cannot _legitimately_ find fault with my reasoning if it is good reasoning.



P. F. Pugh said:


> The objection isn't so childish, actually. What if a person does presuppose Santa Clause? It sounds ridiculous, but it's actually valid.



Did you happen to see my response to it immediately after I pointed out that it's childish? Really, Philip, I'm getting the impression that you're trying to defeat "those silly presuppositionalists" rather than actually understand the system.



P. F. Pugh said:


> You can't do that unless there is common ground: ie, you must both agree to certain terms of the debate. You can't defeat an enemy if he's on another battleground (assuming medieval warfare here). What you're really battling over is, which one adequately explains the truth that both of us acknowledge.



There is where you show the opponent's inconsistency, namely how the actual common ground you have does not align with his consistently espoused worldview. You draw out the implications of his worldview and show that it cannot be reconciled with the ineradicable _actual_ common ground that exists.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Well, seeing as there (probably) wasn't a Torah in the house, I have to agree that they couldn't reason to biblical authority.
> 
> However, what Elijah is doing here is calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, so as to point out to the observers, "Look, Baal can't deliver the goods here. Either he's weak or he doesn't exist. Now I'll show you what Jahveh can do." Elijah is actually playing off of common cultural presuppositions here.



I knew you were going to get worked up over the word "Biblical." Do you really not know what I was referring to? Those people, after seeing the fire, would be drawn to change their allegiance from Baal to Jehovah -- but not because the fire somehow "proved" Jehovah's authority, but rather because Baal's authority was inconsistent with the clearly perceived event whereas Jehovah's was not.

I'm telling you, this is not a problem at all for presuppositionalism. Are you familiar at all with "immutable facts," or have I not mentioned those to you?



P. F. Pugh said:


> And when I am using it, I refer to any sort of preconceived notion. Autonomy and theonomy are not actually presuppositions in this sense because they are _ways_ of thinking, not starting points for thought.



Well, when you're asking a presuppositionalist questions about his own system, I think it would be best to allow him to define what he means rather than assume that I cannot use a word because you choose to use it differently in your non-presuppositional apologetic.

And autonomy and theonomy in the sense I am using them are preconceived notions about how to think -- the former is the notion that man has the prerogative to self-consciously construct a worldview, and the latter is the notion that God alone has that prerogative and we are to submit to it. These are the _very bases_ of a worldview; if you wanted to restrict the definition of "presupposition" at all, you would only remove other notions, leaving autonomy and theonomy to remain.



P. F. Pugh said:


> No, but he quoted pagan poets to prove Christianity true (you notice that he doesn't directly attack paganism--his apologetic is completely positive).



Notice that he _assumes_ God's existence. He doesn't prove it from anything.



P. F. Pugh said:


> And I say that they do espouse common ground. I have given several examples (Descartes, Dawkins, etc) which you have done logical somersaults to get around. Basically, what you are denying is that we speak the same language. It is my contention that we do both espouse some of the same things:
> 
> I went out and got coffee yesterday at lunch. My coworkers are not Christians, but they will agree that I did. We have differing metaphysical views to account for that coffee, but we both acknowledge that it's there (unless one of them is a Cartesian/Gordon Clark).



The perceived common ground would be superficial and coincidental. An atheist might say he knows he drank a cup of coffee with you, but he would do that only because he believes his memory is reliable as a "thing-in-itself," rather than because the faithful God of the Bible created his memory faculties. At root, his entire worldview is different and in rebellion towards God, and (importantly to the apologist) his more basic views do not support the other views -- e.g. his "root" atheistic views contradict his belief in a reliable memory faculty. In other words, _the only reason that you can converse with atheists is because they are borrowing Christian concepts_. It is not *because* of, but *despite* their atheism, that they can converse with you. This is an act of kindness on God's part to restrain them from consistent rebellion.

This is not doing logical somersaults. This is retaining the historic doctrine of Total Depravity rather than positing the Romanist nature/grace distinction. When you say that men can be right about natural things and simply need to have their knowledge supplemented by "divine" knowledge, you are adhering to a Romanist view of unbelievers.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I am going to make a statement here that some will deem heretical: the Bible is not inherently true. The Bible itself rests on God's authority. Unless one acknowledges God's authority, there is no rational reason to accept the truth of the Bible. Fallen humanity is not held responsible for not accepting the Bible, but for rebellion against the creator.



First, it's hard to make a distinction between God and the Bible, seeing as we know God only as He reveals Himself. (And then you'd be in dire straits to say that "God=knowledge from natural revelation" while the Bible is simply an historical document with some words in it.)

Second, there's no way to hold your view if you at all believe that men are punished for not accepting the Gospel.

Third, you are absolutely right when you say, "Unless one acknowledges God's authority, there is no rational reason to accept the truth of the Bible." Keep that in mind.


----------



## chbrooking

Philip,
You might be interested in Van Til's Paul at Athens, or _My Credo_, which is published in Jerusalem and Athens, and may be found here: Reformed Apologetics

In the latter he says, 


> In his address on the Areopagus Paul proclaims the name of the resurrected Christ to the Gentile covenant-breakers, would- be fugitives from divine judgment. Paul does not place himself on their level in order with them to investigate the nature of being and knowledge in general, to discover whether the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob might possibly exist. He tells them straight out that what they claim not to know, he knows. He tells them that their so-called ignorance is culpable, for God is as near to them as their own selves. He tells them, therefore, to repent of their worship of idols, to turn to the living God, lest they stand without the robes of righteousness before the resurrected Lord Christ on the day of judgment.



You may also be interested in 
PA045-- Ó Covenant Media Foundation – 1-800/553-3938
or 
Paul'S PURPOSE AT ATHENS AND THE PROBLEM OF COMMON GROUND
or even
The Areopagus Address

It would be good to understand what your opponents maintain before arguing against them. And on that note, I can appreciate your frustration with the indirect approach of presuppositional apologetics. It is true that our approach requires more of us than yours. The CA method only requires understanding or memorizing a handful of arguments. The PA method requires listening carefully to recognize where your opponent grounds his position in order to find the discrepancy between what he claims is the case and what he knows to be true. But, as we have been trying to maintain, CA overlooks the real gulf between us, permitting -- even condoning -- his sinful autonomous thought. The PA method, on the other hand, calls the unbeliever to wholesale repentance.


----------



## steven-nemes

What is your response to the "Father, Son, Spirit, and Dog" objection?


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> What is your response to the "Father, Son, Spirit, and Dog" objection?



I addressed an objection having the same structure in a separate thread. This quote is regarding someone who wants to presuppose a Santa Clause worldview:



Confessor said:


> Third, even if Santa Clause were formulated somehow to be a presupposition -- e.g. a presuppositional Santanian wrote out a "Book of Santa" and claimed that the deity known as Santa Clause had the prerogative to interpret reality -- it would be a presupposition only if the followers were sincere. For if no one would actually hold to such a worldview, then the foundational tenet (presupposition) of that worldview is worthless from the start. To invoke a worldview that no one would ever hold and pretend you are arguing presuppositionaly is a category error.
> 
> For whatever reason, presuppositionalist TAGsters such as Michael Butler have not picked up on the fact that a presupposition must be sincerely held (or more accurately, sincerely hold-able) for it to be a presupposition in the first place.



If you want to see your exact objection answered, imagine that the Santanian worldview has a "quadrune" God in it.


----------



## steven-nemes

Thank you for the reply, and I have just a small quibble to make. It seems as if you are missing the point of the objection. If there is another worldview X that can account for the essential phenomena of reality and make human experience meaningful, then Christianity is not necessarily true.


----------



## chbrooking

steven-nemes said:


> What is your response to the "Father, Son, Spirit, and Dog" objection?



I'm not familiar with the objection, but I can take a guess at what it is.

My objection is the same as those who would posit a great big bubble-gum machine God in the sky. You know, a beneficent grand-daddy figure who has no requirements or expectations. One who just loves everybody (without loving himself, by the way). One for whom the very notion of hell would be anathema ...

For starters, my response is: On what basis do you posit such a being? If you are just making it up, then it's radically subjective, and so has no applicability to the objective world. This position misses the whole point. The question of epistemology is, "How do we know?" I'm claiming that we can only know if we accept what God has said about the nature of things and how we can know. To add in the dog is to begin with a scriptural presentation and then add to it. But if we have the scriptural presentation, adding to it is impossible. And if we don't have the scriptural presentation, we're right back where we started -- in skepticism.


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Thank you for the reply, and I have just a small quibble to make. It seems as if you are missing the point of the objection. If there is another worldview X that can account for the essential phenomena of reality and make human experience meaningful, then Christianity is not necessarily true.



My point is that if there is no actual presupposition which allows for that, then there actually is no such worldview. The quadrune god did not reveal himself.


----------



## steven-nemes

It still seems to me irrelevant if anyone holds to it or no. It seems to me that so long as _another_ worldview besides Christianity can account for human experience, then Christianity is not necessarily true--the main purpose of presuppositional argument being to prove this.


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> It still seems to me irrelevant if anyone holds to it or no. It seems to me that so long as _another_ worldview besides Christianity can account for human experience, then Christianity is not necessarily true--the main purpose of presuppositional argument being to prove this.



Okay, in order for a worldview for to be a worldview, it has to have a presupposition. Usually this involves an autonomous presupposition, but as with Christianity, it can involve submission to a particular revelation. That is, a presupposition is not merely some hypothetical proposal, it is an actual core commitment to a particular view of the world.

Therefore, if something is not "commit-able," then it follows that it's not a presupposition, and if something is not a presupposition, then it doesn't yield a worldview at all, and if it doesn't yield a worldview, then it doesn't account for human experience. The quadrune worldview is not possible until its presupposition is commit-able. There's no other definition of presupposition. We're talking about this actual world that we're in; therefore we will not deal with things that are not presuppositions for this actual world.


----------



## steven-nemes

Let's say someone writes a book detailing an entire epistemology, metaphysic, etc., and this system accounts for human experience and phenomena common to everyone everywhere. Now, let's say that the final lines of this book (no doubt a long and tiresome one to read) are along the lines of, "The presupposition of this here system I have so carefully and critically designed, that thing which is assumed to be true and is the guide of interpretation under this system, is this book here which you the reader have in your hands." Now in that case it is an actual worldview with a presupposition that can make human experience meaningful and so on--and no doubt this seems _possible_. If that is the case, then Christianity is not necessarily true.


----------



## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Let's say someone writes a book detailing an entire epistemology, metaphysic, etc., and this system accounts for human experience and phenomena common to everyone everywhere. Now, let's say that the final lines of this book (no doubt a long and tiresome one to read) are along the lines of, "The presupposition of this here system I have so carefully and critically designed, that thing which is assumed to be true and is the guide of interpretation under this system, is this book here which you the reader have in your hands." Now in that case it is an actual worldview with a presupposition that can make human experience meaningful and so on--and no doubt this seems _possible_. If that is the case, then Christianity is not necessarily true.



Well, here's the thing. If that book is atheistic or otherwise immanentistic, i.e. if that book is autonomous and assumes that man has the prerogative to interpret reality, then it falls under the same criticisms as the rest of autonomous thought. (Speaking of which, the scenario you outline is not that weird; if one were to conjoin all the writings of one philosophical school of thought he'd have basically one book.)

If the book is more explicitly religious and attempts to posit that a universal mind, a deity, has given that interpretation of reality authoritatively, i.e. if the book is a purported divine revelation, then the sincerity issue arises again.

Still, you might claim that such a book (a philosophically rigorous divine revelation) is conceivable and therefore possible; and Christianity is therefore not absolutely necessary. In that case, though, we would have to make distinctions involving how each worldview views necessity, etc., and I'm not sure I'm ready to dive into that right now. In other words we'd have to ask if "necessity" can be viewed in an abstract way apart from Christian presuppositions.


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## steven-nemes

Well when I say that Christianity is necessarily true, I mean it is true in every possible world; the denial of it leads to absurdity. That's what I mean. If the denial of it does not lead to absurdity--as in the case I have described in that paragraph--then it is possibly not true in a possible world, potentially this one, and so is not necessarily true.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,

I believe steven-nemes is making a very good observation concerning the strong modal claim of presuppositionalism. The strong modal claim is simply the claim that the Christian worldview is necessary for human intelligibility - or something along these lines. The claim to neccessity is a very strong claim indeed. It really is the conjunction of two claims...

*(1)* The Chrisitian worldview is a sufficient condition for intelligibility.
*(2)* There is no other worldview sufficient for intelligibility.

In order for the Christian worldview to be necessary for intelligibility, then _both_ (1) and (2) must be true. I accept both (1) and (2) as true, and ultimately the basis for my acceptance is faith. On the other hand, there are those presuppositionalists who hold to the strong modal claim that believe they have a certain proof of this. Their obligation is to demonstrate (1) and (2) in a certain manner. In practice, they are undable to demonstrate either (1) or (2) in a certain manner. I argue for this here...

*Van Tillian Presuppositional Apologetics – A Critique Concerning Certainty*

With that said, I believe the argument is a strong argument if you drop the strong modal claim to certainty. One last point regarding this is that I am unable to put forth an argument that would disqualify a worldview that in all things is essentially the same wordview as the Christian worldview, but rather than a trinity there is a quadrinity. In fact, as to what the Christian worldview entails, we are limited to God's revelation and our epistemic inabilities to understand this revelation. Because of these limits (the scope of revelation and our epistemic challenges) strong modal claims to certainty feel arrogant to me. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Peairtach

Dear Ben,

Is evidential apologetics easier for the average person to understand and so more useful in many cases? Given that the Holy Spirit uses imperfect arguments, sermons and evangelism, surely it's important in a good argument that the individual you are talking to understands it.

What is your view of the use of evidences alongside presuppositional arguments?

What about arguments that compare Scripture with Scripture e.g. unfulfilled prophecy with fulfilled prophecy? They are appealing to nothing higher than Scripture. I suppose they'd have to be backed up by a presuppositional argument if they were rejected, to show the individual that human reason can't sit in judgment on God's Word.

Is there a hierarchy of evidentialist arguments from more sound to less sound, depending on how close they stay to Scripture?

-----Added 6/20/2009 at 03:47:00 EST-----

*Quote from Brian*
_One last point regarding this is that I am unable to put forth an argument that would disqualify a worldview that in all things is essentially the same wordview as the Christian worldview, but rather than a trinity there is a quadrinity_

But is there any even moderately plausible revelation/religion out there that advocates this?

The _Vestigia Trinitatis_ may be of use here; I'm not philosophically sophisticated enough to know. See no.2 on this John Frame page:-

Trinitarian Analogies


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## steven-nemes

The question of whether or not there _is_ some quadrinarian worldview out there is irrelevant; the possibility of there being such a worldview makes the claim to Christianity's necessity false.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Richard,



Richard said:


> But is there any even moderately plausible revelation/religion out there that advocates this?



No. However, this is not a legitimate argument for someone who holds to a strong modal version of TAG. As Steven implied, in Possible World Theory (modal logic) the claim of necessity goes beyond the actual state of affairs. It is a claim encompassing all possible states of affairs. So, the elimination of the actual state of affairs where there is no quadrinity worldview says nothing about the remaining possible worlds where there may be one with a quadrinity. Our actual world is one of a large number of possible worlds. The TAG proponent must be able to say a quadrinity cannot exist in any possible world to establish the claim that a quadrinity is impossible. If he cannot eliminate all of these possibilities, then he has no logical (epistemic) right to claim to have provided the proof for the necessity of Christianity. 

Brian


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## Confessor

steven-nemes said:


> Well when I say that Christianity is necessarily true, I mean it is true in every possible world; the denial of it leads to absurdity. That's what I mean. If the denial of it does not lead to absurdity--as in the case I have described in that paragraph--then it is possibly not true in a possible world, potentially this one, and so is not necessarily true.



Now, we're addressing a different topic than what you originally brought up, or at least that's what it appears. You first were asking about the legitimacy of a "quadrune god" presupposition, and now you're asking about necessity.

We cannot have conceptions of "possibility" or "necessity" apart from a presupposed worldview. We cannot talk about them autonomously without having to deal with all the contradictions of autonomous thoughts. We have to be standing on firm ground in order to discuss possibility in the first place. And therefore if someone asks about the possibility of an epistemologically cogent worldview (e.g. some purported divine revelation that does this), they would have to ask the question, "Possible by what standard?" Considering that's it certainly not possible on Christian standards ("I am the LORD, and there is no other; apart from me there is no God" (Isa. 45:5)), and that no other presupposition can be made to ask the question; it truly follows that Christianity is _necessarily_ true. Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false; therefore it is a necessary truth.

In other words, the question about possible legitimate presuppositions is only permitted if a metaphysics of ultimate Chance is posited, and that can only be posited if man is granted autonomy. Therefore the objection, in presuming autonomy, begs the question.


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## chbrooking

steven-nemes said:


> The question of whether or not there _is_ some quadrinarian worldview out there is irrelevant; the possibility of there being such a worldview makes the claim to Christianity's necessity false.



Not so fast. The Christian worldview provides the requisite preconditions. But a quadrinian worldview cannot be said to do so without examination. Do you think that you can add a fourth member of the godhead without radically changing other doctrines? As soon as you disrupt the system, you have no guarantee of meeting those preconditions. Since we are relying on a revealed system, which can be shown to work, any such hypothetical system that you want to suggest will have to be shown to meet those preconditions. We can't just assume that it does, as that's the matter under examination. Why bother trying to just change a point of Christian theism. Why not just say, "I posit the possibility of a worldview that does meet the requisite preconditions"? After all, that's essentially what you are doing when you suggest a quadrinian worldview. It's a worldview that doesn't exist unless spelled out. And I assure you that you will not be able to spell out a quadrinian worldview that is the same as a trinitarian one. So, since the trinitarian worldview works, and autonomous thought does not meet the preconditions of intelligibility, and since a quadrinian worldview is a figment -- unless spelled out and examined, I don't see the objection's merit.


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## Peairtach

It would mean that this hypothetical Quadrinity wasn't communicating with us by special revelation; whereas a Trinity is, by the self-attesting revelation of the Bible.

The choice is clear. If someone chooses a hypothetical Quadrinity over the One but Plural Trinity of the Bible Who is communicating to us by special revelation as well as general revelation - even though you are saying that the specific number of persons in the Godhead is not revealed in general revelation - they are rejecting a sound argument.

Besides we have the _Vestigia Trinitatis_. Maybe now we know from the salvific Bible that God is Triunity we can start to see how the Three-in-One and One-in-Three _is after all_ revealed in the general revelation? Do the Quadrinians have anything like that?


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## steven-nemes

Confessor said:


> Now, we're addressing a different topic than what you originally brought up, or at least that's what it appears. You first were asking about the legitimacy of a "quadrune god" presupposition, and now you're asking about necessity.



My understanding of the Quadrinity Objection is that it argues against the claim to the necessity of Christianity.



> We cannot have conceptions of "possibility" or "necessity" apart from a presupposed worldview. We cannot talk about them autonomously without having to deal with all the contradictions of autonomous thoughts. We have to be standing on firm ground in order to discuss possibility in the first place. And therefore if someone asks about the possibility of an epistemologically cogent worldview (e.g. some purported divine revelation that does this), they would have to ask the question, "Possible by what standard?" Considering that's it certainly not possible on Christian standards ("I am the LORD, and there is no other; apart from me there is no God" (Isa. 45:5)), and that no other presupposition can be made to ask the question; it truly follows that Christianity is _necessarily_ true. Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false; therefore it is a necessary truth.



Things in this paragraph are not entirely clear to me, so I will respond with the disclaimer that it is possible I missed the point or misunderstood you.

The presuppositionalist's claim is that Christianity is true because its denial entails absurdity, and so it is necessary. If the denial of Christianity does _not_ entail absurdity, if it is possible, then Christianity is not necessarily true. Now we are speaking of standards of truth and possibility and necessity that are of course transcendental of Christianity. To argue that Christianity is true by Christian standards is clearly fallacious and unconvincing. Your claim that I need to account for my standard of what is possible and necessary (though I think we are mixing things up here) is off the mark and irrelevant. What I am claiming is that if the denial of Christianity is possible, which seems to me to be by my intuition the case, also a thing which no Christian has ever proved to be false, then Christianity is not necessarily true.


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## Confessor

Richard Tallach said:


> Dear Ben,
> 
> Is evidential apologetics easier for the average person to understand and so more useful in many cases? Given that the Holy Spirit uses imperfect arguments, sermons and evangelism, surely it's important in a good argument that the individual you are talking to understands it.



First off, if there's a method that we _know_ is wrong, then using it for pragmatic reasons is wrong too. The Spirit uses imperfect arguments, sermons, and evangelism, to be sure; but it doesn't follow that someone who intentionally uses what he thinks is a false school of apologetics is thereby justified. The imperfection of those three things arises from human finitude and unintended sinfulness, not from an intentional use of a falsity.

Also, regarding clarity, I would say presuppositionalism can very easily be stated in a clearer way. (Certainly Van Til did not help with that.) I don't think a presuppositionalist apologetic is by definition less clear than an evidentialist one, especially when one considers arguments such as William Lane Craig's three-point resurrection argument. Both presup and evidentialism can go in-depth, and both can be clear and simple, depending on the audience.



Richard Tallach said:


> What is your view of the use of evidences alongside presuppositional arguments?
> 
> What about arguments that compare Scripture with Scripture e.g. unfulfilled prophecy with fulfilled prophecy? They are appealing to nothing higher than Scripture. I suppose they'd have to be backed up by a presuppositional argument if they were rejected, to show the individual that human reason can't sit in judgment on God's Word.
> 
> Is there a hierarchy of evidentialist arguments from more sound to less sound, depending on how close they stay to Scripture?



Typical arguments from prophecy and from the resurrection are used in the offensive sense and generally assume, "If the Bible is correct on prophecy, then the Bible is authoritative." And this failure to have the Bible be authoritative on its own authority is what is destructive in such an apologetic. That is, arguments from fulfilled prophecy to support Biblical authority are not appealing to "nothing higher than Scripture."

However, this does not make such arguments worthless, for (1) they can strengthen the faith of believers who understand prophecies and the resurrection in the context of a presupposed Christian worldview, and more importantly (2) they can be used defensively to counter claims against the Christian worldview; e.g. if a critic were to say that the prophecy "Out of Egypt I called my son" was never fulfilled, an apologist could defensively show how this prophecy is interpreted Biblically and fulfilled in Jesus. In other words, the second function of evidential apologetics is to show how specific evidences are interpreted within the Christian worldview as a defensive apologetic.

I see this error regarding the apologetic use of evidences as analogous to the error I saw when I discussed baptism with Campbellites (who generally believe that baptism by immersion is necessary unto salvation). After I told them that I did not believe baptism was salvifically necessary, they thought I was being insane and asked, "Well then, what can it be for?" -- implying that baptism must be what they thought it was, simply because that's always how they have viewed it. Essentially these Campbellites were begging the question and making a false dichotomy: either baptism is useful and salvifically necessary, or it is useless. Likewise, some people can think the same of prophecy: according to them, either prophecy is useful and utilized in offensive, constructive apologetics to prove Biblical authority, or it is useless.

And lastly, no, I would not say there is a hierarchy or continuum of evidentialist arguments. They either take the presupposition of theonomy or they don't. And if they're evidentialist, then they don't, and they should therefore be rejected.

-----Added 6/20/2009 at 06:46:46 EST-----



steven-nemes said:


> Things in this paragraph are not entirely clear to me, so I will respond with the disclaimer that it is possible I missed the point or misunderstood you.



Sorry about that. I'll try to be clear in addressing this last paragraph you wrote:



steven-nemes said:


> The presuppositionalist's claim is that Christianity is true because its denial entails absurdity, and so it is necessary. If the denial of Christianity does _not_ entail absurdity, if it is possible, then Christianity is not necessarily true.



Realize that the presuppositionalist does not just start autonomously and say, "Okay, here are the conditions; let's see what worldview meets them." If he were to do that and then argue that non-Christian worldviews necessarily entail skepticism, then he would have to inductively disprove all possible ones, which is impossible. (He would also have to deal with the problem of presupposing autonomy in the first place.)

But the presupper does not start "neutrally" and ask for various worldviews to be presented to see if they match the real world. That is an autonomous approach, and it assumes man stands as ultimate judge. Rather, the presupper starts with the self-evident authority of Scripture and sees that he now has a non-contradictory basis for intelligibly speaking about "possibility." Otherwise he cannot even ask the question in the first place.

In other words, the presupper realizes that even possibility as a concept relies on God, and therefore God is necessary. To speak abstractly about possibility, as if some non-Christian worldview could possibly be true, is to posit that man autonomously interprets the world. And when that is posited, it follows that the universe is generally "open" to unlimited possibilities (a metaphysics of Chance). _That is the basis from which you ask your question._ Your objection therefore begs the question.


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## Confessor

Steven, this quote might be helpful (Bahnsen, _Van Til's Apologetic_, pp. 487-488, n. 41):
John W. Montgomery trips himself up with this misconception of presuppositional apologetics when he writes: "And even if it were possible in some fashion to destroy all existent alternative world-views but that of orthodox Christianity, the end result would still not be the necessary truth of Christianity; for in a contingent universe, there are an _infinite_ number of possible philosophical positions, and even the fallaciousness of infinity-minus-one positions would not establish the validity of the one that remained (unless we were to introduce the gratuitous assumption that at least one _had_ to be right!)" ("Once upon an A Priori... ," 387-88).

But if that "gratuitous assumption" were not made, then the entire argument between the believer and unbeliever would make no sense. [...]

Montgomery imagines that this opponent [a defeated unbeliever] could now argue that "this is a contingent universe, so the philosophical options are infinite." But in a completely contingent universe, in which there would be no logic, causality, or morality, this very declaration would not be intelligible. *The finite and fallible unbeliever has no intellectual authority to make declarations about a range of possibility* (much less about what is "infinite"!). He cannot continue to argue against Christianity in any meaningful way (even by placing his trust in hypothetical possibilities) without assuming the Christian worldview.​


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Confessor said:


> Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false; therefore it is a necessary truth.



Confessor's argument is essentially along the lines of:

*Premise 1:* Only Christianity provides the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry. (“It must be true for someone to ask if it is possibly false.”)
*Premise 2 (assumed):* Rational inquiry is necessary. 
*Conclusion:* Therefore, Christianity is necessary. (“Therefore, it is a necessary truth.”)

Premise 2, even though not stated by Confessor is necessary for the argument to go through. Playing the skeptic, I ask the Christian to prove premise 1 to me _based on his worldview_. Namely, I ask that he prove: *(1)* Christianity provides the sufficient preconditions for rational inquiry, and *(2)* that there are no other possible worldviews that can do so.



Clark said:


> Do you think that you can add a fourth member of the godhead without radically changing other doctrines? As soon as you disrupt the system, you have no guarantee of meeting those preconditions…and since a quadrinian worldview is a figment -- unless spelled out and examined, I don't see the objection's merit.



If a Christian is making the absolute claim of necessity, then the burden falls to him to demonstrate that the metaphysical reality of a quadrinity is such that it is unable to provide the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry. All of the metaphysical realities I might appeal to in order to account for things like, induction, identity over time, the laws of logic, the problem of the one and the many, etc…(all preconditions to rational inquiry) seem to be met equally as well with a quadrine God as with a triune God. So, if the Christian wants to make a claim to necessity, then he must have an answer why a quadrine God fails to account for the necessary preconditions whereas the trinity does not fail. If the Christian does not have an answer, then his claim to necessity is undermined. 

In the end, TAG does not provide an answer. It simply asserts that it is so. Again, the objection is based firmly within the Christian worldview. Given the Christian worldview, can it demonstrate both *(1)* and *(2)*? I do not believe it can. 

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Confessor

Brian,

Your critique is valid only if "possibility" can be conceived of on autonomous terms, which I have already explained is question-begging. As long as the presuppositionalist disproves all present options, he has proved the necessity of Christianity. And I have already demonstrated that positing the quadrinity (or Fristianity, etc.) as a presupposed worldview is a category mistake.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Confessor,



> Your critique is valid only if "possibility" can be conceived of on autonomous terms, which I have already explained is question-begging.



Good. You do not want to allow "question-begging." Then prove without assuming your position, that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Here is a layout of what the proof would need to cover:

*(1)* Prove the necessity of a particular theory of knowledge that makes explicit all preconditions for rational inquiry. (If you do not know what these preconditions are, then how can you determine whether or not a particular worldview can account for them? Also, if this theory of knowledge is not demonstrated to be necessary, then claims concerning this theory of knowledge - like Christianity is the necessary precondition for rational inquiry - are not necessary. So, not only do you have to posit a theory on knowledge, you must prove that it is necessary. Using your rule above, please do all of this without begging the question.) 

By the way, if you really do get this far, kudos to you. You have done something that no philosopher in history has done. 

*(2)* Prove that the Christian worldview can justifiably account for each of the preconditions identified in the proof of (1). 

At this point you have only demonstrated that Christianity is a sufficient condition for knowledge. Let's look at the last thing that needs to be demonstrated.

*(3)* Prove that there are no other conceivable worldviews (like the quadrinity worldview) that can justify the necessary preconditions indentified in the proof of (1).

*Note:* Actually, there is one more piece required to make this argument go through. That piece is to establish the necessity of rational inquiry. I'll grant this being that you already have a lot on your plate! 

Only at this point is your claim that the Christian worldview is necessary established. Dr. Bahnsen knew this quite well. If you carefully read the section in _Van Til's Apologetic_ that you yourself referenced you can see that he was trying very hard to establish (3). (If you doubt this, then we can take what he wrote point-by-point and discuss it, or you can read my paper that I referenced earlier.) In the end, when you clear the smoke away, all Bahnsen did was to assert his position. To quote Bahnsen himself, "Assertion is not proof."



> As long as the presuppositionalist disproves all present options, he has proved the necessity of Christianity.



I agree that the demonstration of the failure of present options is a strong argument for Christianity. Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to establish in any certain manner the necessity of Christianity. 



> And I have already demonstrated that positing the quadrinity (or Fristianity, etc.) as a presupposed worldview is a category mistake.



A category mistake?  Are forms of naturalistic materialism as worldviews category mistakes? Is Islam or Judiaism as worldviews category mistakes? If not, then why is a worldview where there is a quadrinity instead of a trinity a category mistake? Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity? My guess is that twenty-five hundered years ago all of the presuppositionalists argued that God was one in being and one in person - they didn't have to deal with Islam nor did they understand the problem of the one and the many. Just kidding.  

Brian


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## Confessor

Brian Bosse said:


> prove without assuming your position, that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Here is a layout of what the proof would need to cover:



Brian, I think you misunderstand presuppositionalism -- or, more accurately, I think you're critiquing an error of presup that I do not myself hold. It does not entail "accounting for" every possible precondition of knowledge. Rather, I would say that any person is justified in accepting autonomy or theonomy as self-evident in their worldview, and then the apologist points out _contradictions_ between an unbeliever's commitment to autonomy and other aspects of his worldview.

In other words, presup does not involve the apologist telling the unbeliever to account for a huge amount of information, but rather that the unbeliever's worldview is contradictory -- i.e. the unbeliever's presupposition contradicts other aspects of his unbelieving worldview.

As a result, the presuppositional apologist is not obliged at all to account for everything in his own worldview.



Brian Bosse said:


> As long as the presuppositionalist disproves all present options, he has proved the necessity of Christianity.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree that the demonstration of the failure of present options is a strong argument for Christianity. Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to establish in any certain manner the necessity of Christianity.
Click to expand...


You're not understanding what I'm saying.

If an unbeliever has had his presupposition defeated by the apologist, and then he tries to "hold out" for a worldview in the future, claiming that Christianity has not been proven to be necessary, I would ask him what he means by "necessary." If he said that he meant "necessary" in some autonomous way (i.e. on an autonomous presupposition), then I'd show him that that would make his worldview a contradiction. He can't argue that there is a "possible" presupposition that could exist in the future except on a Christian standard of possibility, in which case there would no possible worldview in the future. Therefore, if the unbeliever can't hold out for a possible worldview in the future now, then there is no possibility at all, period.

Brian, when you ask Christianity to "prove" that it provides the preconditions for intelligibility, you are arguing autonomously. That is what I said about begging the question. I wasn't just bringing up that the fallacy is a pet peeve of mine.



Brian Bosse said:


> A category mistake?  Are forms of naturalistic materialism as worldviews category mistakes? Is Islam or Judiaism as worldviews category mistakes? If not, then why is a worldview where there is a quadrinity instead of a trinity a category mistake?



Because there's no presupposition to state it. See what I said about sincerity above. Any purported presupposition that would entail a presupposition is not an actual presupposition, because it's not "commit-able."



Brian Bosse said:


> Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity? My guess is that twenty-five hundered years ago all of the presuppositionalists argued that God was one in being and one in person - they didn't have to deal with Islam nor did they understand the problem of the one and the many. Just kidding.



Because He's revealed to be a Trinity.


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## Peairtach

*Quote from Brian Bosse*
_(3)Prove that there are no other conceivable worldviews (like the quadrinity worldview) that can justify the necessary preconditions indentified in the proof of (1)._

I suggest you present your "quadrinity" riddle to Vern Poythress at his page. He is a presuppositionalist and mathematician.

Things like Flying Spaghetti Monsters and Quadrinity's are known to be made up by the proponents. What evidence do you have for a quadrinity? 

We have evidence from the creation for the One yet Plural Personal Absolute. Only revealed religion and those religions associated with it posit a Personal Absolute i.e. Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Only Christianity posits a Plurality within Unity. The Plurality within Unity of Christianity is a Trinity. If I can't philosophically prove a Triunity rather than a Quadriunity, it can be proved from the only revealed religion that posits a Personal Absolute One-in-Many. 

If your Quadriunity can't be shown to exist in his four-in-oneness from creation and philosophy (i.e. presuppositionalism) and has given us no special revelation of his four-in-oneness there is no evidence for his existence, whereas special revelation associated with the Personal Absolute One-and Many - at least special revelation - proves the existence of the Three-in-Oneness of the God that has been shown to exist by presuppositionalism. 

Unless you posit that God wants us to believe things without any evidence whatsoever e.g. quadrinity/quadriunity then your case is scuppered.


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## Mushroom

Is it possible that Brian Bosse, AKA 'The Brain', has emerged from the sea of mind-bending contemplation to contribute to the edification of his ol' PB buds? Kewl!

Good to see you're still steamin' along Brian. Miss your brain teasers. Hope all is well with you and yours. As you know, I have nothing to add to this discussion, it flies right over my head, but I accidentally clicked on it and saw your name and wanted to say hello.

Now back to your regularly scheduled program.


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## Philip

Ben, I would like to ask whether, in presenting the choice of autonomy or theonomy, you are failing to provide a basis for the decision? Take a hypothetical atheist and suppose that (somehow) you have torn his worldview apart. Now, he has a choice, he can start from square one with autonomy (Descartes-style), or he can accept theonomy. On what basis will he make that decision? I think you are, in fact, assuming a scale of some kind here that both you and the unbeliever will agree on.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> Ben, I would like to ask whether, in presenting the choice of autonomy or theonomy, you are failing to provide a basis for the decision? Take a hypothetical atheist and suppose that (somehow) you have torn his worldview apart. Now, he has a choice, he can start from square one with autonomy (Descartes-style), or he can accept theonomy. On what basis will he make that decision? I think you are, in fact, assuming a scale of some kind here that both you and the unbeliever will agree on.



The choice of who has the prerogative to interpret reality is itself the basis of an espoused system. Sure, people must be able to think, perceive, reason, etc. in order to make the decision, but that doesn't mean they have to have a common _espoused_ basis.


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## Philip

Confessor said:


> The choice of who has the prerogative to interpret reality is itself the basis of an espoused system. Sure, people must be able to think, perceive, reason, etc. in order to make the decision, but that doesn't mean they have to have a common espoused basis.



But isn't this just saying that you don't know what basis they will use to make that decision? In other words, you have given them a choice, but without a common _espoused_ ground for choice, there is no real decision: they will stay with the default. You have given them no reason to make that switch from autonomy to theonomy because you have denied any espoused common ground.

However, I will continue to maintain that we do, in fact, have espoused common ground with the nonbeliever. If I am debating a Cartesian, I am going to do my best to argue _logically_. Why? Because we both espouse a belief that logical thought is a) possible b) can lead to true conclusions.

In fact, there are certain philosophies that, I would argue, could lead to Christianity, if it could be proven. As an example, Camus argued that, given that God does not exist, life is absurd. However, if it could be proved that life is not absurd, the existence of God would be proved. In other words, a logical critique may not be necessary to disproving a worldview.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> But isn't this just saying that you don't know what basis they will use to make that decision? In other words, you have given them a choice, but without a common _espoused_ ground for choice, there is no real decision: they will stay with the default. You have given them no reason to make that switch from autonomy to theonomy because you have denied any espoused common ground.



What the apologist points out is that unbelieers are using a theonomous presupposition all along, because their autonomous presupposition if carried out consistently would destroy knowledge, meaning that they must be holding to some presupposition without overtly recognizing it. The point is then whether they want to accept that fact or not, which is purely ethical.

However, you do make a good point that reinforces the actual/espoused common ground distinction: if unbelievers were consistent in their autonomy, then they would not be able to "move" to a theonomous presupposition.



P. F. Pugh said:


> However, I will continue to maintain that we do, in fact, have espoused common ground with the nonbeliever. If I am debating a Cartesian, I am going to do my best to argue _logically_. Why? Because we both espouse a belief that logical thought is a) possible b) can lead to true conclusions.



This would not be espoused common ground unless you believe that the unbeliever can hold a belief in logic _consistently with his unbelieving presupposition._



P. F. Pugh said:


> In fact, there are certain philosophies that, I would argue, could lead to Christianity, if it could be proven. As an example, Camus argued that, given that God does not exist, life is absurd. However, if it could be proved that life is not absurd, the existence of God would be proved. In other words, a logical critique may not be necessary to disproving a worldview.



If Camus were arguing for a generic god, then it wouldn't prove Biblical authority. But if Biblical authority were implicit in the proposition "If ~God, then absurd," then he wouldn't be able to prove that proposition anyway.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Ben,



Confessor said:


> …presuppositionalism…does not entail "accounting for" every possible precondition of knowledge. Rather, I would say that any person is justified in accepting autonomy or theonomy as self-evident in their worldview, and then the apologist points out contradictions between an unbeliever's commitment to autonomy and other aspects of his worldview.



Fine. But what you described in the above quote does not establish Christianity as necessary for rational inquiry. On a side note it appears you are assuming that all non-Christian worldviews are committed to autonomy. This is just asserted, and is not at all self-evident. 



Confessor said:


> Brian, when you ask Christianity to "prove" that it provides the preconditions for intelligibility, you are arguing autonomously.



Ben, I am not asking Christianity to prove anything at all. In fact, I believe that the God of Christianity is ontologically necessary for there to be rational inquiry. I am simply asking _you_ to provide proof for the claims _you_ are making. Now, if asking for this is too much, then I am not sure what to say other than “assertion is not proof.”



> *Confessor said:* And I have already demonstrated that positing the quadrinity (or Fristianity, etc.) as a presupposed worldview is a category mistake.
> 
> *Brian asked:* Why is a worldview where there is a quadrinity instead of a trinity a category mistake?
> 
> *Confessor responded:* Because there's no presupposition to state it.



I do not understand this. A category mistake would be the claim that Tucson, Arizona is a worldview. Tucson, Arizona is a place – not a worldview. A worldview that posits a quadrinity as an ontological necessary being is a worldview by its very definition! It may be a flawed worldview, but nevertheless it is a worldview. So, what catagory mistake is being made? 



> *Brian asked:* Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity?
> 
> *Confessor answered:* Because He's revealed to be a Trinity.



I agree that the Scriptural evidence that we have points in this direction. Yet, Scripture does not contain all truths about the nature and being of God. So, we cannot say with certainty that God is a trinity, any more than Israel 2500 years ago could have claimed with certainty that God is a unity. The point is that your appeal to the Scriptures does not eliminate the _possibility_ of a quadrinity. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## chbrooking

Brian Bosse said:


> Your critique is valid only if "possibility" can be conceived of on autonomous terms, which I have already explained is question-begging.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Good. You do not want to allow "question-begging." Then prove without assuming your position, that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Here is a layout of what the proof would need to cover:
Click to expand...


First, all reasoning is circular. The real question has to do with whether the circle is vicious.



Brian Bosse said:


> *(1)* Prove the necessity of a particular theory of knowledge that makes explicit all preconditions for rational inquiry.



There are only two alternatives: an autonomous epistemology and a theonomous epistemology. After about 2500 years, I think it’s fair to conclude that the autonomous approach is bankrupt. But there is a reason for this -- we don’t have to rely on history alone. 

You are quite right that no *anti-theistic* philosopher has been able to meet this challenge. 

I would suggest that the preconditions include a solution to the one and many problem, a means for man to participate intellectually in that unity, a worldview in which change (and so chance) is not ultimate, and a reason to believe that we are not deceived.



Brian Bosse said:


> *(2)* Prove that the Christian worldview can justifiably account for each of the preconditions identified in the proof of (1).



Christian theism, and Christian theism alone has a God who contains unity and plurality. Christian theism alone has man created in God’s image. Only the sovereignty and providence of the Christian God eliminate mystery and chance, allowing for logic and science. And the goodness of the Christian God permits us to conclude that we are not self-deceived.



Brian Bosse said:


> At this point you have only demonstrated that Christianity is a sufficient condition for knowledge. Let's look at the last thing that needs to be demonstrated.
> 
> *(3)* Prove that there are no other conceivable worldviews (like the quadrinity worldview) that can justify the necessary preconditions indentified in the proof of (1).



I do not have to meet this challenge. All autonomous systems fail to account for intelligibility. As for other systems, which claim to be theonomous,
1. They must be revealed religions, or they are autonomous.
2. They must, themselves, be shown to account for intelligibility. Islam, for instance, cannot. It’s monism prohibits a solution to the one and many problem, and its radical transcendence would prohibit man’s ability to know, even if it could solve the one and many problem in the mind of its god. 
3. Fristianity is not a revealed religion, and can, therefore, not claim to be theonomous.
4. Once the Christian theistic system is altered, it is no longer Christian theism, and must, therefore, be reassessed for its ability to meet the preconditions for intelligibility. You will recall, that everything from creation to fall to redemption to consummation is part of a system that accounts for intelligibility. Remove any component of that system, and you have ruined the whole.
5. The moment you suggest a possibility, you borrow from the Christian system. Evidence of this is not far away. The fact that you want to make only a slight alteration of the system, to see if you can confound the argument, shows that you recognize the strength of the system for answering the question. But, as there is, nor can there ever be, another system ‘like’ Christianity, all other systems fail.



Brian Bosse said:


> *Brian asked:* Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity?
> 
> *Confessor answered:* Because He's revealed to be a Trinity.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree that the Scriptural evidence that we have points in this direction. Yet, Scripture does not contain all truths about the nature and being of God. So, we cannot say with certainty that God is a trinity, any more than Israel 2500 years ago could have claimed with certainty that God is a unity. The point is that your appeal to the Scriptures does not eliminate the _possibility_ of a quadrinity.
Click to expand...


Scripture does tell us all that it is necessary for us to know about God. It also makes clear that God is incomprehensible. But, as special revelation is complete, we know with certainty that God is not quadrinian.

If you want to posit a Fristian God, you will have to present revelation to support that view -- complete, of course, with a full historical outworking of the redemption portrayed in it--since it is not just a development or adjustment of Christianity, but a whole new system. And, of course, you may not disrupt the system in any way. That is manifestly impossible. 

Besides, the preconditions of intelligibility require us to know a good God, to ensure that we are not deceived. As the Fristian God has not revealed himself, it seems you're still borrowing from the only system that works -- the one you know is right (Rom. 1) to assert that there may be another system to overthrow it.


----------



## Confessor

Brian Bosse said:


> Fine. But what you described in the above quote does not establish Christianity as necessary for rational inquiry. On a side note it appears you are assuming that all non-Christian worldviews are committed to autonomy. This is just asserted, and is not at all self-evident.



First, I don't believe all non-Christian worldviews must be consigned to autonomy, for some could essentially be submitting to (e.g.) Allah's interpretation of reality. But generally, autonomy vs. theonomy is a very useful distinction because (1) the intellectual enemy of Christianity is almost always secularism, and (2) when the intellectual enemy is some other religion, they usually try arguing autonomously too (e.g. a Muslim "classical apologetic").

Second, I ask you: What do you mean by the fact that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry? Do you mean that there are no other possible worldviews that can satisfyingly accomplish some criterion X? If so, you're operating off a metaphysic of Chance which is concomitant with an autonomous presupposition, and manifold problems arise with that.

See my responses to Steven above regarding what the presuppositionalist means when he says something is necessary. Presup does not involve finding the criteria for rational inquiry and then testing out several presuppositions to see if any of them "match." That's a misconstrual. Rather, presup involves understanding that people have different presuppositions which affect their entire belief-structure and then testing the consistency of people's worldviews by comparing their presuppositional beliefs with other beliefs that person has.

It's all this language of some presuppositions being "necessary" and some being "possible" *apart from a Christian presupposition* that is bothersome. When claims like that are made, they must be made on autonomous presuppositions and therefore beg the question.



Brian Bosse said:


> I do not understand this. A category mistake would be the claim that Tucson, Arizona is a worldview. Tucson, Arizona is a place – not a worldview. A worldview that posits a quadrinity as an ontological necessary being is a worldview by its very definition! It may be a flawed worldview, but nevertheless it is a worldview. So, what catagory mistake is being made?



Did you see what I said about sincerity and a presupposition having to be commit-able?



Brian Bosse said:


> I agree that the Scriptural evidence that we have points in this direction. Yet, Scripture does not contain all truths about the nature and being of God. So, we cannot say with certainty that God is a trinity, any more than Israel 2500 years ago could have claimed with certainty that God is a unity. The point is that your appeal to the Scriptures does not eliminate the _possibility_ of a quadrinity.



The point of presup is that we go off of what God says about reality as the only reliable means of understanding the universe. So if there is some truth that we do not know about God -- which is guaranteed, seeing as He is incomprehensible -- then it doesn't really make a problem for the presuppositionalist.

Brian, the two main points here are the sincerity aspect of a presupposition and the fact that possibility and necessity cannot be spoken of apart from a presupposed worldview. Please look at the above posts (you won't have to go past this one) to understand my position.

EDIT - I realize a problem. One of the places where I addressed this issue, perhaps more explicitly than here, is in a separate thread (look at the third point near the bottom of that post). Sorry about that.


----------



## Peairtach

Dear Brian,

If there is no evidence for a god/God we can safely ignore him/it/her.

(a)There is no evidence from general revelation for a quadrinity i.e. for the specific _fourness _of the subsistences.

(b)There is no special/revealed evidence for a quadrinity i.e. for the specific _fourness _of the subsistences.

Re the Trinity

(1) There is evidence from general revelation that God is Personal.

(2) There is evidence from general revelation that God is Absolute.

(3) There is evidence from general revelation that God is One.

(4) There is evidence from general revelation that God is Plural.

(5) _You dispute that there is evidence from general revelation for the exact number of subsistences in God. _Lets assume for the time being that this isn't revealed by general revelation.

(6) But there_ is _special revelation for the God that has qualities (1) to (4), and only one special revelation - the Bible. Therefore this must be the God that Man has been "searching for" and feeling after, while at the same time hiding from, because Man is both made in God's image and knows God and is also a sinner at the same time.

(7) When we go to the Bible we find that this Personal, Absolute, One and Plural God that we have always known - revealed for instance in our use of logic, morality and science - is a *Triunity.*

(8) There is no possibility of God being a Quadrinity because there is no evidence for such and in the special revelation that speaks of a Personal, Absolute, One and Plural God, He is a Trinity. Therefore He must of necessity be a Trinity.

Richard.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Confessor said:


> First, I don't believe all non-Christian worldviews must be consigned to autonomy, for some could essentially be submitting to (e.g.) Allah's interpretation of reality.



Fair enough. 



Confessor said:


> What do you mean by the fact that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry?



In an effort to be very clear: When _you_ make the claim that the Christian worldview is necessary for rational inquiry, then I take _you_ to mean that the contrary is impossible.



Confessor said:


> Presup does not involve…Rather, presup involves…



Fine. Taking _your_ definition of what it is that TAG does, it ceases to be an objective, certain proof for the necessity of the Christian worldview.



Confessor said:


> Did you see what I said about sincerity and a presupposition having to be commit-able?



Yes. If you want to limit the domain of possible worldviews to those worldviews that are “sincerely held,” then you cannot _sincerely_  claim to have a proof for the necessity of the Christian worldview.



Richard said:


> (8) There is no possibility of God being a Quadrinity because there is no evidence for such and in the special revelation that speaks of a Personal, Absolute, One and Plural God, He is a Trinity. Therefore He must of necessity be a Trinity.



Let’s flesh this argument out a little. Your conclusion is…

*Conclusion:* There is no possibility of God being a quadrinity. 

Your reasoning for this (indicated by ‘because’) is:

*Premise 1:* There is no evidence for a quadrinity.
*Premise 2:* The Church infers from special revelation based on certain exegetical rules of hermeneutics that God is a trinity.

I grant both premises 1 and 2. Please explain to me how God being a quadrinity entails a _logical_ contradiction with premises 1 and 2. In actuality, your argument against a quadrinity is an inductive argument, and therefore loses all logical necessity. 

Warm Regards,

Brian


----------



## Peairtach

You're on the ball at logic and argumentation, Brian.

I would try Vern Poythress or John Frame. They may have something up their sleeves to surprise you.


----------



## Confessor

Brian Bosse said:


> Fine. Taking _your_ definition of what it is that TAG does, it ceases to be an objective, certain proof for the necessity of the Christian worldview.



No, I just reject the autonomous concepts of certainty and necessity that view "possibility" as an abstract notion that is more ultimate than God Himself.And the *autonomous* notion is what your entire argument depends on. You're attacking a straw man.

As it stands, as long as a person cannot offer a contrary presupposition to even state that it is "possible" that another presupposition could offer a notion of possibility, then _Christianity is necessary_. It's really not that complicated.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Richard said:


> I would try Vern Poythress or John Frame. They may have something up their sleeves to surprise you.



I am familiar with both of these scholars. In fact, John Frame and I have personally corresponded concerning Van Til’s understanding of apparent contradiction. I have never corresponded with either of them regarding the topic at hand. Perhaps, one day I will. 



Confessor said:


> I just reject the autonomous concepts of certainty and necessity that view "possibility" as an abstract notion that is more ultimate than God Himself. And the autonomous notion is what your entire argument depends on. You're attacking a straw man.



I will grant you that the laws of logic are not more ultimate than God Himself. Yet, the laws of logic are a very real part of the Christian worldview you are presupposing. As such, asking you to provide support for your assertions according to these very laws is completely consistent with the Christian worldview. Ben, you seem to be trying very hard to convince me and others that you do not have to comport with these laws of logic. Why is it again that these laws originating with God do not apply to your assertions?



Confessor said:


> As it stands, as long as a person cannot offer a contrary presupposition to even state that it is "possible" that another presupposition could offer a notion of possibility, then Christianity is necessary. It's really not that complicated.



The conclusion to your “non-complicated” argument is…

*Conclusion:* Christianity is necessary. 

Your reasoning for this is…

*Premise 1:* No person can articulate a possible contrary worldview.

The missing premise to make your argument go through (again, these are the Christian worldview laws of logic and are therefore applicatory) is…

*Premise 2 (assumed):* If no person can articulate a possible contrary worldview, then Christianity is necessary.

Now, the argument form here is _Modus Ponens_. It is a valid argument, and as such, if the premises are true, then the conclusion necessarily is true. Here are the problems with the truth of the premises…

*(1)* Premise 1 is false. I have articulated the quadrinity worldview. You have no answer to this other than to disqualify it on the basis that it is not “sincerely held.” However, this requirement of yours is not a logical requirement. It is subjective and arbitrary.

*(2)* Premise 2 is not logical in the sense of being part of the laws of logic. Again, it is subjective and arbitrary. Ironically, it smacks of autonomy. What makes Christianity necessary is the impossibility of it being otherwise (the impossibility of the contrary). To make this “standard of impossibility” man’s ability to articulate something is absurd, and appears to be the epitomy of human autonomy. Based on this, I reject premise 2.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Confessor

Brian Bosse said:


> I will grant you that the laws of logic are not more ultimate than God Himself. Yet, the laws of logic are a very real part of the Christian worldview you are presupposing. As such, asking you to provide support for your assertions according to these very laws is completely consistent with the Christian worldview. Ben, you seem to be trying very hard to convince me and others that you do not have to comport with these laws of logic. Why is it again that these laws originating with God do not apply to your assertions?



I did not speak of the laws of logic at all, but of the notions of possibility and necessity.



Brian Bosse said:


> *(1)* Premise 1 is false. I have articulated the quadrinity worldview. You have no answer to this other than to disqualify it on the basis that it is not “sincerely held.” However, this requirement of yours is not a logical requirement. It is subjective and arbitrary.



If no one would actually hold such a presupposition as applies to this world (i.e. if sincerity is absent), then it is not a viable presupposition.



Brian Bosse said:


> *(2)* Premise 2 is not logical in the sense of being part of the laws of logic. Again, it is subjective and arbitrary. Ironically, it smacks of autonomy. What makes Christianity necessary is the impossibility of it being otherwise (the impossibility of the contrary). To make this “standard of impossibility” man’s ability to articulate something is absurd, and appears to be the epitomy of human autonomy.



I'll outline the argument briefly and post the objection that you would bring up:

The apologist's essential argument against the unbeliever is that if he wants to make a claim against Christianity, he must presuppose Christianity. You would probably object that the consequent of the previous statement ("he must presuppose Christianity") implies that all conceivable competing worldviews must be rejected, which the apologist can't demonstrate. But that is not true.

As long as the apologist defeats all _presently existing_ presuppositions (which is comprised primarily of autonomy and secondarily of other revealed religions), then it is absolutely, 100% necessary for anyone to presuppose Christianity, and here's why: If someone wanted to claim (as you are doing) that there might be a possible presupposition in some possible world that could be held in non-contradictory fashion, they would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy, in which case they would have to prove that autonomy is viable *right now* in order to even make such a claim. Therefore, if there are not other viable presuppositions in the _present_, then there are not any _possible_ viable presuppositions apart from Christianity at any point in the future.

This is not just a matter of man's being able to articulate something, but of an actual proposition being itself intelligible. I'm not playing a word game.


----------



## chbrooking

Brian Bosse said:


> *(1)* Premise 1 is false. I have articulated the quadrinity worldview.



No, you have not articulated the quadrinity worldview. You've articulated Christianity and then corrupted it, just enough that you think it won't affect the preconditions of intelligibility. But that's problematic for the reasons I posted above, but I'll remind you.

Revelation is completed (Heb. 1:1-2). God has revealed himself as trinity.
Therefore, if you want to posit a quadrinity, you will have to present revelation to that effect. Without revelation, quadrinity is autonomous. 
To meet the preconditions of intelligibility, a quadrinian worldview would have to have all the elements of a Christian worldview that make intelligibility possible. But since you've altered God's nature, it is certainly impossible that you will be able to produce a Fristian 'revelation' identical with Christianity. 

Even if you sit down and copy out the Bible, making whatever changes you think you can get away with to accomplish your ends, you still have the problem that revelation isn't merely words. The words interpret historical actions. So, you've got to provide an alternate history to go along with your alternate account of that history. 

But you've overlooked the fact that trying to alter the Christian worldview so that you can account for intelligibility without it is itself proof of the position. You have to use what you KNOW to be true to try to prove that it isn't. THAT'S the point of the TAG!

-----Added 6/22/2009 at 05:16:08 EST-----

This is one thankless thread 
Over a thousand views with only just over 100 posts, and no thanks being distributed. What an ungrateful bunch you lurkers are ...  j/k

-----Added 6/22/2009 at 05:40:44 EST-----



Richard Tallach said:


> Unless you posit that God wants us to believe things without any evidence whatsoever e.g. quadrinity/quadriunity then your case is scuppered.



Was reading back through the thread and caught this word: "Scuppered" -- Nice!

I'm going to have to remember that one. I love picking up new vocab.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Ben,



> I did not speak of the laws of logic at all, but of the notions of possibility and necessity.



Making assertions regarding ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ presupposes an underlying logic. In fact, it is called Modal Logic. 



> If no one would actually hold such a presupposition as applies to this world (i.e. if sincerity is absent), then it is not a viable presupposition.



Your conditional statement is not a logical statement in the sense of it being a law of logic. The concept that someone must actually hold to ‘X’ for ‘X’ to be viable is arbitrary, and as I intimated in my last post it is the epitome of human autonomy. From now on I will refer to your dubious assertion as  *Ben’s Law* . (I like the symbolism. It captures the idea of autonomy quite nicely. ) The metaphysical viability of a worldview is independent of whether or not a human “sincerely” holds it. 



> The apologist's essential argument against the unbeliever is that if he wants to make a claim against Christianity, he must presuppose Christianity.



Yes, I understand this assertion. But let me make a subtle distinction that you seem to be missing. There is no one here making a claim against Christianity. You have claimed that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry, and in addition to this you claim to have an objective certain proof for this. Now, I, a Christian who believes this claim, have simply asked you to show me this proof. 



> If someone wanted to claim (as you are doing) that there might be a possible presupposition in some possible world that could be held in non-contradictory fashion, they would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy, in which case they would have to prove that autonomy is viable right now in order to even make such a claim. Therefore, if there are not other viable presuppositions in the present, then there are not any possible viable presuppositions apart from Christianity at any point in the future.



Let’s break this argument down. 

*Premise 1:* For ‘X’ to assert a possible worldview, then ‘X’ would have to use a “notion of possibility” that presupposes autonomy. 
*Premise 2:* For ‘X’ to be able to use a “notion of possibility,” then ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.
*Conclusion:* If ‘X’ is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview, then it is impossible for there to be a viable non-Christian worldview in the future.

There are a couple of problems with this argument. The first being that it is not valid - it is formally incorrect. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. This judgment of mine is based on the laws of logic as founded upon a Christian worldview. Now, let’s look at your premises. 

Premise 1 is a universal assertion. As such, it should apply to you. When you claim that the Christian worldview is necessary, at the very least you are asserting that the Christian worldview is possible. According to premise 1, you would have to use a “notion of possibility” that presupposes autonomy. Do you really think this, or are you exempt from this rule? Also, premise 1 is not logical in the sense that it is entailed by the laws of logic. It is simply an arbitrary assertion.

Premise 2 is a universal assertion. Once again, it should apply to you. Since your claim entails the possibility of the Christian worldview, then you would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. My guess is you do not want to do this.  Premise 2, just like premise 1, is not a logical law. It is an arbitrary assertion. 

Now, you may object to all of this by saying that I have not properly represented your argument. This is a real possibility. I was doing the best I could to understand your argument, but it was not easy to follow. So, if I misunderstood your argument, can you put it into a more explicit logical form so that we may be able to see it clearly? 

Ben, TAG is a good argument, but you undermine your apologetic method when you insist it says more than is logically entailed.

Your Brother In Christ,

Brian


----------



## steven-nemes

I am still a bit confused about things here. To say that an unbeliever cannot make a critique or an inquiry against Christianity without presupposing it is to say that Christianity is a necessary precondition of rational inquiry. But to say it is a necessary precondition is to say firstly that we even are making rational inquiries and not just uttering noises and sounds as machines (I mean, perhaps to us it seems as if we are making meaningful statements but perhaps that is all illusory, and we are just uttering noises and not actually communicating), and if we are making rational inquiry, it is saying that the contrary is absurd: which clearly it is not, because, as I outlined in a thought experiment above, and what I think the whole point of the Quadrinity objection even is that, it is possible that there be another worldview X which also allows for rational inquiry. If that is true, which seems clear enough for me, then to say that a critic of Christianity must presuppose it to make rational inquiry is clearly false.


----------



## Confessor

Brian,

Before getting to the issue, let me just say that I really appreciate your putting things into syllogistic form. Otherwise...

1. You can't talk about modal logic on an autonomous presupposition, as you are.

2. "Ben's law" so-called is not arbitrary at all. As I said above when I responded to your assertion that I must list all the preconditions for knowledge and show how Christianity fulfills those, a presupposition is a self-evident proposition regarding who has the prerogative to interpret reality. Therefore, if something cannot be held sincerely, then it's not self-evident to anybody, and therefore it does not fit the definition of presupposition, and therefore it cannot yield a viable worldview. (You can put that in syllogistic form if you want. )

3.


Brian Bosse said:


> You have claimed that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry



Claims like this are false, assuming that presuppositionalism entails "objectively" looking at what the preconditions for knowledge are and seeing which presuppositions "fit." I have already said that I reject that. You are not critiquing my position but a camp that you think I am in. And, admittedly, I should have revealed my disagreements.

4. I would construct my argument thusly:

*Premise 1*: If ‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview, then ‘X’ would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy. [Given]
*Premise 2*: If ‘X’ is able to use such a notion of possibility, then ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. [Given]
*Premise 3*: If 'X' asserts such a possible worldview, then 'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. [hypothetical syllogism: 1,2]
*Premise 4*: If ‘X’ is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview, then 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview. [contraposition: 3]
*Premise 5*: 'X' is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview. [Given]
*Premise 6*: 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview. [_modus ponens_: 4,5]
*Premise 7*: If 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview, then there is no such possible worldview. [Given]
*Conclusion*: There is no such possible worldview. [_modus ponens_: 6,7]

This argument is valid unless you want to get antsy on the tenses and moods used in the various premises (e.g. "would have to" vs. "is able to" in premises 1 and 2), and therefore it's only a matter of soundness.

-I would say premise 1 is true, for such a claim presumes a basically "open" and contingent universe, i.e. a metaphysic of Chance. And such a metaphysic always accompanies autonomy and the supposedly "neutral" inquiry presumed by autonomists.
-Premise 2 is true, for the truthfulness of an autonomous concept certainly requires that autonomy itself be viable.
-Premise 5 would seem to be true, given the various fatal critiques by Van Til.
-Premise 7 seems true as well. 'X' basically represents any rational being, and therefore if 'X' cannot assert such a possible worldview, then it is objectively unintelligible for such a thing to be asserted.

I hope we're making progress.


----------



## chbrooking

For you fans of modal logic, can I just ask you one question . . .

Who determines what is possible?


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> For you fans of modal logic, can I just ask you one question . . .
> 
> Who determines what is possible?





Hence my #1, above.


----------



## chbrooking

Yes. But a mind like mine sometimes requires simple prose


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## Confessor

I was just stating my agreement.


----------



## chbrooking

Oh, I got that 

Maybe I was just trying to simplify things for those who are evidently having trouble understanding our argument.


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## Confessor

Gotcha.


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> Who determines what is possible?



Anything that has contingent or necessary existence is possible. Flying pink unicorns are possible. Spherical cubes are not possible. As long as the idea is not a contradiction in terms, it is possible.


----------



## chbrooking

I asked WHO. You answered WHAT ...

So then, YOU determine what is possible?

You see, I maintain that necessity or contingency is determined by the mind of God. What determines it for you? Whatever it is, it must exist independently of God, which makes it ultimate. Ultimate contingency is precisely what we are telling you this autonomous position yields -- i.e., skepticism.

But you aren't a skeptic. So you can't really be consistent with this notion of free and independent contingency.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Clark said:


> Who determines what is possible?



The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think? 

Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds. Here are some rough definitions… 

*Possible World (def.):* A world is a _possible world_ if and only if it is logically coherent. 

*Necessary (def.):* ‘X’ is _necessary_ if and only if ‘X’ exists in all possible worlds.

*Possible (def.):* ‘X’ is _possible_ if and only if ‘X’ exists in at least one possible world. 



> *Brian said:* You have claimed that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry.
> 
> *Ben responded:* Claims like this are false…



Ben, in post #87 you said, “Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false.” The only way for this to be true is if Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry. As such, my claim is not false. 



Ben said:


> *Premise 1:* If ‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview, then ‘X’ would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy. [Given]



Let’s assume that ‘X’ is committed to atheism. Let’s also assume that ‘X’ presupposes the laws of logic. I will even grant that ‘X’ does not have the philosophical foundation to support his presupposition. Nevertheless, ‘X’ is able to properly apply the laws of logic, and when he does he comes up with valid arguments. His use of these laws of logic is no different than your use of them. Both of you will get the same answers if you both properly apply these laws. 



Ben said:


> * Premise 2:* If ‘X’ is able to use such a notion of possibility, then ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. [Given]



‘X’ is able to properly apply the laws of logic and use his imagination _even if_ he is not able to meet some arbitrary requirement that you want to impose. 



Ben said:


> *Premise 3:*If 'X' asserts such a possible worldview, then 'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. [hypothetical syllogism: 1,2]



My pretend atheist friend who happens to be an armchair logician…(What nerve!?! Doesn’t he know that his worldview cannot account for this?)…pointed out to me that premise 3 is a conclusion based on the prior two premises. Since premise 2 is arbitrary, then your conclusion is arbitrary. 



Ben said:


> *Premise 4:* If ‘X’ is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview, then 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview. [contraposition: 3]



My atheist armchair logician friend is telling me that premise 4 is not the _contraposition_ of premise 3. He says that the consequent of premise 3 speaks of “would have to…,” and the antecedent in premise 4 speaks of “able to.” This is more than “getting antsy on the tenses and moods.” Premise 4 should read, “If ‘X’ does not have to prove right now that autonomy is viable…” I tried to convince my atheist friend that he was not allowed to point these things out, but he is so stubborn in his own human autonomy. What is a Christian to do?  



Ben said:


> *Premise 5:* 'X' is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview. [Given]



I have let you slide on this for several posts now. Let’s clear this up. I know of no worldview called ‘autonomy.’ Now, I know of some worldviews that have as a key feature of their system some type of human autonomy. You need to define what you mean by ‘autonomy’ and ‘human autonomy,’ and then use these terms consistently throughout.



Ben said:


> *Premise 6:* 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview. [modus ponens: 4,5]



Ouch! There is that pesky ‘can’ versus ‘would’ distinction popping up. Too bad. When you correct your premise 4, then Premise 6 does not follow. 



Ben said:


> *Premise 7:* If 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview, then there is no such possible worldview. [Given]



 *Ben’s Law*  

I like the fact that you are calling this a given. It goes well with the human autonomy thingy. I remember Bahnsen in a debate with Edward Tabash talking about the silliness of a little child who does not like spinach insisting that because he does not like it, it is not real. This was an illustration Bahnsen used to expose Tabash’s argument as simply being that because Tabash does not like the God of the Old Testament, He therefore cannot be real. Bahnsen was such a good debater. I miss him.  Your premise 7 has a similar form. If 'X' cannot do 'Y', then 'Y' doesn't exist. 



Ben said:


> *Conclusion:* There is no such possible worldview. [modus ponens: 6,7]



We reach the grand conclusion - a conclusion based both on  *Ben’s Law*  and a faulty premise 6. 



Ben said:


> I hope we're making progress.



Ben, I really do appreciate you being willing to lay out your argument as explicitly as you did. Not many are willing to do this. In fact, overall I think you did a very good job. I did point out some hic-ups in your argument. If you want to go back through and shore those points up, I would be happy to look at your revised argument. 

Warm Regards,

Brian


----------



## Confessor

Ahh!!! This is becoming a snippet-reply-repeat type of thread. We must avoid this at all costs. 

Oh, and in your next reply, if you would drop all the "my atheist friend" commentary, I'd appreciate it. I don't mean that sarcastically; but when I am confronted with sarcastic replies to my own arguments, I generally get angry. I'm not saying it's a righteous anger, but I nonetheless would appreciate it if as a brother in Christ you heeded my request.

But let's get down to business:

-Premise 2 is not arbitrary. A claim involving an autonomous notion of possibility would require dealing with the contradictions of autonomy. (I realize you would dispute a difference between a Christian notion of possibility and an autonomous one; I will answer that at the end, as I think that is the main issue here. (I also think we are approaching agreement.))
-There really isn't a problem with premises 3 and 4, for the consequent of 3 can easily be " 'X' must be able to prove that autonomy is viable," in wh
-I apologize for not defining "autonomy" before. I figured you were familiar with it. Autonomy is essentially the belief that man has the prerogative to interpret reality, to self-consciously construct a philosophy or worldview. This is a common feature to all worldviews not based on revelation (for submission to revelation is a belief that someone else has the prerogative to interpret reality).
-I'm not sure that premise 7 is "Ben's law" (because I don't see what it has to do with sincerity), but anyway...yeah, you're right. I spoke of 'X' as if that comprised the totality of rational beings, which is simply false -- the apologist only deals with one unbeliever (usually) at a time, and it's far from a guarantee that this one person is the "ideal" rational being who would know of all possible worldviews. I'm not sure why I would say something so wrong. 

Now for the important part:

There is one big thing here: the definition of "necessity"/"possibility." (This issue here affects my error in premise 7, I think.) I wrote out a two-person dialogue to help me understand these problems (you can skip the parts about autonomy and the small universe if you want):

*(1)* Can one speak of what is possible as what is conceivable and non-contradictory?
*(2)* Yes, that is the definition.
*(1)* Therefore, if I were to say that a non-Christian worldview is possible, I must show that it is conceivable and non-contradictory?
*(2)* Correct.
*(1)* Okay, I guess that would imply that autonomy is out of the question, then.
*(2)* Not necessarily, for the universe could be quite a different one where each person knows the whole universe. Imagine a “universe” created by a god which was immensely small (the size of one room). This universe contained one man, and exhaustive knowledge of this room was granted to the man by the creator. Autonomy would therefore be perfectly viable.
*(1)* Ah, but in that case autonomy would not have an accompanying metaphysic of Chance, for there would be nothing unknown to the human. And in such a case, it wouldn’t really be autonomy, for man would become God (for he would have exhaustively comprehensive and intuitive knowledge of God), which is contrary to the essence of autonomy -- and it'd be impossible to have more than one god.
*(2)* Good point. I guess autonomy, as already defined, is truly impossible. For one to be able to appropriately interpret reality, one must be omniscient, and therefore one must be divine—in which case it’s not autonomy at all.
*(1)* Exactly. Now, the only hindrance at this point would be another revealed religion. Can another revealed religion be considered conceivable and non-contradictory?
*(2)* I can conceive that a revelation exists which is identical to the Bible except in having a slight variation, perhaps the omission or addition of a verse or a chapter, or even a book. In such a case we would have a different presupposition that would not be the distinctly Christian God.
*(1)* I would have to agree with that: it is certainly conceivable that a mild alteration could be made in a revealed worldview that would allow for the possibility of a non-Christian presupposition. Therefore it would follow that Christianity is not absolutely necessary.
*(2)* True, but such a revealed religion does not exist on Earth, and if it did, we would know nothing about it: it could be buried in some unknown depths of history. Of course, this does not make much sense with a sovereign deity, but it could be nevertheless possible.
*(1)* But for all intents and purposes, as long as the apologist can defeat autonomy and every revealed religion that unbelievers can offer, then all unbelievers who come into contact with the apologist's arguments are rationally obliged to take Christianity, correct?
*(2)* Yes. He just has to ensure that he does not overstate his case and claim to defeat worldviews that the unbeliever does not claim for himself. That is unnecessary and can be unprovable, as with the case of possible revealed religions. (Note here my agreement with you.) 
*(1)* Perfect. How then should the apologist state his case? Should he just claim that his worldview is tenable and that he doubts the unbeliever's worldview is tenable?
*(2)* That would seem appropriate.
*(1)* Awesome. But I have one last question: what do we make of the fact that Jehovah is the one who makes things possible? Van Til repudiated any probabilistic argument for God because according to him, God was "back of" possibility; possibility was not "back of" God. He asserted that the notion of fate or possibility as ultimate is a pagan notion and should be resisted by Christians.
*(2)* I have no idea, unnamed person 1. Let's ask Brian.

So, Brian, if you could answer number 1's question, I'd appreciate it. You can also provide commentary on my schizophrenic thought process outlined in the dialogue above.  Thank you for your critiques, and good night.

*BEN HAS SPOKEN*

-----Added 6/23/2009 at 01:37:49 EST-----

I have a feeling this thread might be of some importance.

Good night furrealz this time.


----------



## chbrooking

Brian Bosse said:


> Clark said:
> 
> 
> 
> Who determines what is possible?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think?
> 
> Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds.
Click to expand...


I'm assuming by your answer, that God is the one who determines what is possible. So why, then, to you go on to determine it by rational consistency? Are you identifying God with rational consistency?...HUMAN rational consistency? Are you putting an equal sign between human logic and God's being? THIS is why it is so essential that we recognize a qualitative distinction between God's knowledge and ours. And this is why divine simplicity is crucial. You cannot abstract God's rationality and then set it over against his existence.

The moment you say "God" in answer to my question, I'm going to make sure that you mean the Christian God, since no other conception of deity accounts for the preconditions of even asking, let alone answering the question. But if, as I think is the case, the Christian God determines what is possible, that which is possible is coterminus with his eternal decree. And by that decree he determines whatsoever comes to pass. So, tell me again what the definition of a possible world is? ... Your definition of possibility does not make sense against a Christian worldview, and yet you need the Christian worldview to offer your definition. My friend, you are not being consistent here.

To be clear, possible world theory itself is an autonomous affront to the living God.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,



Ben said:


> Oh, and in your next reply, if you would drop all the "my atheist friend" commentary, I'd appreciate it.



Ben, please forgive me. I should not have done this, and will refrain from it in the future. The point I was trying to drive home with my rude sarcasim was that an atheist (or anyone for that matter) can properly use the laws of logic bringing valid arguments to the table even though his worldview may not provide the philosophical foundation for such thinking. As such, it is not rational to ignore his arguments just because he does not have a philosophical foundation to present those arguments. The validity of an argument is independent of the person bringing the argument. Now onto other things. 

Because we make so many mistakes in our thinking, it is vital for us to be as precise as possible. The contrapositive of (A → B) is (¬B → ¬A). If one begins to introduce stylistic variances in his interpretation of these symbols he may do so, but he must be very careful that he don’t actually change the meaning in the least. With that in mind, here is your premise 3…

If 'X' asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview, then 'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.

A=“‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview.”

B=“'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.”

Before applying any stylistic variants, the contrapositive of premise 3 (¬B → ¬A) is the following:

If it is not the case that ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable, then it is not the case that ‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview.

Now, take a look at the consequent of our conditional statement. The consequent is an action performed by ‘X’; namely, the act of asserting some proposition. What you are saying in this premise is that ‘X’ does not perform this act unless ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. But this is absurd. Whether or not ‘X’ asserts a proposition is not tied to ‘X’s ability to prove anything. ‘X’ asserts a proposition by an act of his will. What are the consequences of this? Because this premise is logically equivalent to your premise 3, and because premise 3 is the logical conclusion of premises 1 and 2, then premise 1, premise 2 or both are false.

Here are some thoughts on your conversation…



Ben said:


> Therefore, if I were to say that a non-Christian worldview is possible, I must show that it is conceivable and non-contradictory?



I am going to remain neutral to the proposition above. However, I want to point out that it is the Christian who asserts that their worldview is necessary. As such, if the Christiain wants to take this beyond mere assertion it is the Christian’s obligation to demonstrate that all non-Christian worldviews are not possible. In other words, if you assert that Christianity is necessary and someone asks you about a potential competitor, (1) to simply say they have no basis to ask this, or (2) to simply say “prove to me that this competitor is possible” is not intellectually honest and is not proof. You should be giving an answer for why the competing worldview is not possible. 

Ben, you have a lot in your last post that I want to be sure to cover. However, I think it would be better to take smaller chuncks. As such, I am going to stop here and let you comment on what I have written.

By the way, I loved the  *Ben Has Spoken* . 



Clark said:


> I'm assuming by your answer, that God is the one who determines what is possible.



The logic of necessity and possibility is like the logic of the syllogism or propositional calculus. They are codifications of rational thought. I believe these codifications come from God. I believe these logics reflect the rationality of God’s mind. So, in this sense it is God who determines what is possible. These models of logic reflect His thinking.



Clark said:


> So why, then, to you go on to determine it by rational consistency?



Is it God or man who determines the validity of an argument? If God is the one who determines the validity of an argument, then why do you assume argument forms like _Modus Ponens_ and the syllogism to determine whether or not an argument is valid? My point is this: there is nothing wrong or unChristian with using the rational tools God has given us to draw conclusions about validity and/or possibility.



Clark said:


> Are you putting an equal sign between human logic and God's being?



I am not quite sure where you are going with this (sounds like you want to resurrect the Clark-Van Til debate), but I will answer this. Simply put, the laws of logic are our attempts to create a model of rationality that we think reflects the thinking of God. It is possible that our models are flawed in various ways. But that is the human condition. By the same token, I think our models do in some way accurately reflect the way God thinks. In the end, we have two tools for truth: revelation, and our rationality. We need both - one of which is flawed. 



Clark said:


> The moment you say "God" in answer to my question, I'm going to make sure that you mean the Christian God, since no other conception of deity accounts for the preconditions of even asking, let alone answering the question.



I meant the triune-God of Christianity. However, there remains the pesky quadrinity that seemingly accounts for the preconditions of rational inquiry.



Clark said:


> But if, as I think is the case, the Christian God determines what is possible, that which is possible is coterminus with his eternal decree. And by that decree he determines whatsoever comes to pass. So, tell me again what the definition of a possible world is?



Clark, are you willing to say that God _had_ to create the earth as it actually is? Are you willing to say that _all_ of God’s actions are determined? If so, then there is only one possible world, i.e., our actual world. If you are not willing to say this, and God could have created something different, then that different creation would be a possible world. This latter situation where God could have created something different is considered the orthodox position – but I am sure you were already aware of this - and justifies the logic of necessity and possibilty. 



Clark said:


> Your definition of possibility does not make sense against a Christian worldview, and yet you need the Christian worldview to offer your definition.



If the orthodox position regarding God’s freedom in creation is correct, then the model of the logic of necessity and possibility is consistent with the Christian worldview. 

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## ChristianTrader

chbrooking said:


> Brian Bosse said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clark said:
> 
> 
> 
> Who determines what is possible?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think?
> 
> Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> I'm assuming by your answer, that God is the one who determines what is possible. So why, then, to you go on to determine it by rational consistency? Are you identifying God with rational consistency?...HUMAN rational consistency? Are you putting an equal sign between human logic and God's being? THIS is why it is so essential that we recognize a qualitative distinction between God's knowledge and ours. And this is why divine simplicity is crucial. You cannot abstract God's rationality and then set it over against his existence.
> 
> The moment you say "God" in answer to my question, I'm going to make sure that you mean the Christian God, since no other conception of deity accounts for the preconditions of even asking, let alone answering the question. But if, as I think is the case, the Christian God determines what is possible, that which is possible is coterminus with his eternal decree. And by that decree he determines whatsoever comes to pass. So, tell me again what the definition of a possible world is? ... Your definition of possibility does not make sense against a Christian worldview, and yet you need the Christian worldview to offer your definition. My friend, you are not being consistent here.
> 
> To be clear, possible world theory itself is an autonomous affront to the living God.
Click to expand...



The problem with creating a gap between human rationality and God's rationality is that eventually you will want to refute someone else's view of God. You will want to say that "such and such is a contradiction and irrational etc." and the response is just "God is higher and has a different rationality than we do".

Even if you want to say that God determine possibility etc. you still need a framework in which to understand what He is telling you and be able to refute erroneous views.

CT


----------



## Confessor

Brian,

Although I think I could offer a stylistic modification of premise 3 to retain that part of the argument, the syllogism still breaks down at a more crucial point (premise 7), rendering the argument as a whole invalid. Therefore, since I see the issue of necessity and possibility within the confines of a Christian worldview as most important, I will deal only with that and with the feedback you provided thus far for the dialogue.

However, I right now am going to do some yardwork, so I'll respond later. Thanks for giving me food for thought during my boring job!


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello CT and Ben



CT said:


> The problem with creating a gap between human rationality and God's rationality is that eventually you will want to refute someone else's view of God. You will want to say that "such and such is a contradiction and irrational etc." and the response is just "God is higher and has a different rationality than we do".



I appreciate your observation. This relates to my problem with Van Til's "apparent contradictions". If one is allowed to appeal to this within their worldview, then pandora's box is left wide open. By the same token, I do want to acknowledge that my mind is finite and effected by sin, and as such my judgments are not perfect. If Scripture clearly asserts something that I deem inconsistent, then because of my view of Scripture I will embrace it believing that in God's mind there is no contradiction. I guess Pandora's box is left open afterall. I once cooresponded with Frame about this. He is a gracious man. 



Ben said:


> Therefore, since I see the issue of necessity and possibility within the confines of a Christian worldview as most important, I will deal only with that and with the feedback you provided thus far for the dialogue.



No problem, Ben. I might not be able to post anything more until tomorrow. So, take your time.

Brian


----------



## chbrooking

Brian said:


> The logic of necessity and possibility is like the logic of the syllogism or propositional calculus. They are codifications of rational thought. I believe these codifications come from God. I believe these logics reflect the rationality of God’s mind. So, in this sense it is God who determines what is possible. These models of logic reflect His thinking.



Agreed so far



Brian said:


> Is it God or man who determines the validity of an argument? If God is the one who determines the validity of an argument, then why do you assume argument forms like _Modus Ponens_ and the syllogism to determine whether or not an argument is valid? My point is this: there is nothing wrong or unChristian with using the rational tools God has given us to draw conclusions about validity and/or possibility.



The difference is that I recognize my limitations. The only reason I have for reasoning at all is the Christian God. This is where CVT's illustration of the little girl on her grand-dad's lap comes from. If she slaps his face, it is only because he holds her up. The idea that we can use an analogue of God's thinking to destroy the ontological foundation of our analogous epistemology is ludicrous. 



> I am not quite sure where you are going with this (sounds like you want to resurrect the Clark-Van Til debate), but I will answer this. Simply put, the laws of logic are our attempts to create a model of rationality that we think reflects the thinking of God. It is possible that our models are flawed in various ways. But that is the human condition. By the same token, I think our models do in some way accurately reflect the way God thinks. In the end, we have two tools for truth: revelation, and our rationality. We need both - one of which is flawed.



Yes, the Clark-Van Til debate is relevant here. If you concede that our models are flawed, and you concede that only God can determine what is possible, it is an extreme form of hubris to use a potentially flawed system to rule out, with a potentially flawed possibility, what we have already determined was a perfect necessity. In other words, you could not offer a potential other world except on the foundation of God's revelation. 



> I meant the triune-God of Christianity. However, there remains the pesky quadrinity that seemingly accounts for the preconditions of rational inquiry.



But it doesn't. In fact, there's no such thing as quadrinity. The only reason it has been proposed is because people recognize the gravity of the TAG, and want to cop just enough of the system to get the tools to destroy the system. If that's not analogous to Van Til's little girl on her grandfather's lap, I don't know what is. But until Quadrinity meets the requirements to be taken seriously as anything but an autonomous speculation, it shouldn't raise its head again. Autonomy leads to skepticism. So Quadrinity leads to skepticism unless and until it can be shown to be theonomous, and even then it will need to meet the preconditions of intelligibility -- but we've gone over this.



Brian said:


> Clark said:
> 
> 
> 
> But if, as I think is the case, the Christian God determines what is possible, that which is possible is coterminus with his eternal decree. And by that decree he determines whatsoever comes to pass. So, tell me again what the definition of a possible world is?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clark, are you willing to say that God _had_ to create the earth as it actually is? Are you willing to say that _all_ of God’s actions are determined? If so, then there is only one possible world, i.e., our actual world. If you are not willing to say this, and God could have created something different, then that different creation would be a possible world. This latter situation where God could have created something different is considered the orthodox position – but I am sure you were already aware of this - and justifies the logic of necessity and possibilty.
Click to expand...


Yes, but by that "had to" I do NOT mean that there was some principle existing apart from God which had authority over him such that he was forced to obey it. I have no problem saying that God CANNOT lie. Why? Because that is out of accord with who he is. God is not duplicitous. So, YES, there is only one possible world. And it is the best possible world. How do I know? Because God doesn't make mistakes or settle for second best. How do I know? Because he has revealed himself to us.



brian said:


> Clark said:
> 
> 
> 
> Your definition of possibility does not make sense against a Christian worldview, and yet you need the Christian worldview to offer your definition.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the orthodox position regarding God’s freedom in creation is correct, then the model of the logic of necessity and possibility is consistent with the Christian worldview.
Click to expand...


God being free has nothing to do with this. I am fully persuaded of God's aseity. He did not have to create anything whatsoever. But the moment you appeal to this to prove possibilities of alternative worlds, you make a huge mistake. Any such possible worlds would ONLY have their potentiality in the mind of God. They do not then get separated from God's being such that they can stand opposed to him. This is why simplicity is crucial. You continue to try to use God's rationality against him, as though it stood as a co-ultimate. But as gets demonstrated over and over again in this discussion, if logic is ultimate (and apart from God), then God is no longer ultimate. God is not God. There cannot be two ultimates.


----------



## Philip

Clark, I think that when we speak of possible worlds, we are speaking of worlds that it is possible that God could have (or has--God knows, He may have created them) created.

I also think we need to define "intelligibility", which I have always understood as being, "the quality of being able to be understood by a rational being." As such, anything that is able to be articulated is intelligible. The idea of a spherical cube is intelligible, if it were not, we would not immediately understand that such a figure is impossible.

"Twas brillig and the slithey toves did gyre and gymbol in the wabe."--this sentence is logical, but unintelligible, because we do not understand it. We have no notion here of whether slithey toves can gyre or gymbol because the terms are nonsense (though delightful nonsense--nonsense has its proper place in the created order, I think).

And I would argue that logic is ultimate because it is part and parcel of God's nature.



chbrooking said:


> So, YES, there is only one possible world. And it is the best possible world. How do I know? Because God doesn't make mistakes or settle for second best.



Here you assume that God could not have created multiple worlds that are equally good. God created man both male and female--difference in character does not entail difference in quality. It is certainly possible that other worlds have been created and we have simply not been told about them.

Question: are Christian writers of fantasy and sci-fi novels blaspheming (regardless of inclusion of magic)? Is P&R publishing sinning when it publishes L. B. Graham's fantasy novels? If no, then it must be admitted that possible worlds are permissible within the sphere of Christian orthodoxy.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Clark!

Earlier you accused me of not being consistent. I do make that mistake from time to time. In light of this, consider this latest exchange between me and you…



Brian said:


> Clark, are you willing to say that God had to create the earth as it actually is? Are you willing to say that all of God’s actions are determined?





Clark said:


> Yes, but by that "had to" I do NOT mean that there was some principle existing apart from God which had authority over him such that he was forced to obey it.



It appears from this that you are saying that creation was necessary. In fact, you even claimed that this was revealed to you on the basis that “God does not make mistakes or settle for second best.” This is an interesting argument that will be fun to get into, but I digress. In the very next paragraph you say…



Clark said:


> I am fully persuaded of God's aseity. He did not have to create anything whatsoever.



This seems to contradict what you said before. Can you clarify matters for me? By the way, you might want to consider this quote from Thomas V. Morris’ _Our Idea of God_...


> Throughout the centuries, it has often been seen as central to the Christian conception of creation to affirm two other propositions about the scope of God's freedom with respect to the activity and products of creation:
> 
> (1) God was free to refrain from creating any universe at all.
> (2) In choosing to create, God was free to create some other universe instead of our universe.



Do you affirm or deny this?

Lastly, Clark, do you have a proof that establishes the necessity of the Christian worldview for rational inquiry, or are you just asserting it? If you do, can you explicitly lay out the argument step-by-step for all to see? *Note:* My request does not question the truth of the assertion itself. My question has to do with the basis upon which _you_ hold this assertion to be true. My guess is that _you_ want to say that the basis upon which _you_ hold your assertion to be true is objective and certain. Let’s see.

Brian


----------



## chbrooking

Philip,
To articulate anything requires that the diversity about us be unifiable. That unity is only accounted for by Christian theism. 

Brian and Philip,
There is no such thing as bare possibility. I spoke too fast in ruling out possible worlds. I'm certainly not suggesting that fantasy literature is sinful. And I would have to admit that our ability to fantasize is an analogue of something in God's thinking. And, given the CONSEQUENT of consequent absolute necessity, I suppose speculation of what might have been is permissible. But, be that as it may, there is no such thing as bare possibility. Possibility, as a fact, has God as its interpreter. 

This is where the Clark-Van Til debate really matters. As you admit, God determines what is possible. But my access to that notion of possibility is analogical. Possibility itself resides in the mind of God. We cannot abstract the notion of possibility, assume that our analogue, itself, has aseity, and use that notion -- which we only have BECAUSE of Christian theism -- and which notion is not equivalent to possibility as thought by God--, to rule out Christian theism. Why is that difficult to understand?

What I'm saying is that you can't just posit something as truly, ontologically possible, simply because it doesn't conflict with human language. And the reason is simple. YOU don't determine what is, or is not, possible. God does. And since God is incomprehensible, you are stuck with what he reveals. And as the scriptures plainly declare, he reveals himself in THIS world. 

Beware of the sin of Babel. Man, since the fall, has never been content with the finite. He has always attempted to go beyond his appointed realm. Once you start saying that because you can think it, and it doesn't conflict with your reason, therefore it is possible, you usurp what belongs to God alone. You cannot start with the statement, "The God of Christian theism determines what is possible" and end with the statement, "A quadrinity is possible." 

Let me be as clear as 'possible': God could not destroy himself. God could not create a world in which he doesn't exist. God could not create another God to take his place. How, then, does your notion of 'possible worlds' make Christianity anything BUT necessarily true?

-----Added 6/23/2009 at 09:43:36 EST-----



ChristianTrader said:


> The problem with creating a gap between human rationality and God's rationality is that eventually you will want to refute someone else's view of God. You will want to say that "such and such is a contradiction and irrational etc." and the response is just "God is higher and has a different rationality than we do".



sigh ...

We aren't saying that logic or science or language isn't true or useful. We're saying that, if you reject Christian theism, you have no reason to expect it to be true or useful.

God's rationality is to ours as time is to eternity, or as space is to omnipotence, or as ability is to omnipotence. It is infinite, ours is finite. But without the infinite version, the finite version has no reason for confidence. I can speak of "dogs", because the unifying concept -- the perfect unifying concept, which not only includes all that fit within the category dog, but relates each individual to every other individual and the whole -- I can speak of dogs because that unifying concept exists in the mind of God. I can speak truly of dogs, but not exhaustively. Humility ought to be inherent in finite beings. Since the garden, it hasn't been. 

But again, I'm not saying "God has a higher, different logic, so human logic is all wrong and can't be relied upon." Quite the contrary. I'm saying that human reason is a true reflection of God's thought. But two things need to be quickly added. A) it's finite, and therefore cannot delve into the infinite -- that's not its realm. And B) we're fallen. We cannot run rough shod with our minds and think that we will arrive at truth. We need the scriptures to teach us (and to limit our idle speculations).


----------



## Philip

chbrooking said:


> To articulate anything requires that the diversity about us be unifiable.





> I can speak of "dogs", because the unifying concept -- the perfect unifying concept, which not only includes all that fit within the category dog, but relates each individual to every other individual and the whole -- I can speak of dogs because that unifying concept exists in the mind of God.



How is this different from Platonism again? This is exactly what Plato taught. 



> That unity is only accounted for by Christian theism.



I would argue that our hypothetical quatrinitarian worldview might be able to account for it. Many things may be able to _account_ for the world around us. The question is whether or not they actually correspond to the world around us.

You see, here's where classical apologetics starts: we say, look we have diversity and yet there is a unity--might there be a more reasonable explanation than the one that the unbeliever has posited? In fact, this reality corresponds to Christian theism, especially in the doctrine of the trinity. In other words, we try to build on truths that the unbeliever is already aware of and we show how they point toward the True Truth of Christianity (and you can't deny that general revelation does point toward it).



> This is where the Clark-Van Til debate really matters. As you admit, God determines what is possible. But my access to that notion of possibility is analogical.



So your point is that we really have no knowledge of possibility whatsoever. In fact, though, I do have knowledge of possibility--just not infinite knowledge. My knowledge of possibility extends as far as my conception does. That is, in terms of everything I can conceive, (cars, flying pink unicorns, spherical cubes, etc) I can know which of them are possible (cars are possible, flying pink unicorns are possible, spherical cubes are not possible).

What we cannot know in terms of possibility are things that are utterly beyond our conception--that is, things that only God can fully conceive. Some of these things may be in the realm of the numinous (which is non-propositional), but the vast majority would be beyond it.

God has given man dominion within his realm of conception so that man might better understand God. Of course, in doing this, God allowed man to be capable of rebellion.



> it's finite, and therefore cannot delve into the infinite -- that's not its realm.



That's because the infinite is beyond our comprehension.


----------



## Confessor

Philip,

If you could do me a _huge_ favor and not at the moment argue for the superiority of classical apologetics based on this in-house dispute on possibility, I would deeply thank you. I think this in-house presuppositional dispute is near resolution, and I would really, really appreciate it if we avoid a two-front war presently.

But by all means, please bring up that point if/when we resolve this, or better yet, make a new thread so your argument does not get buried or silenced by my request.

-----Added 6/23/2009 at 11:56:57 EST-----

Brian,

First of all, you are correct in that the apologist would have the onus to establish the impossibility of a non-Christian worldview. I should have made that more clear in the dialogue. However, I don’t think the rest of the dialogue really is affected by that error, for either scenario would result in the same thing: person 2 conceiving of a possible revealed religion different from Christianity—and therefore of a possible worldview different from Christianity. And that is where the issue is.

Now, regarding both of your (i.e. Clark’s and Brian’s) arguments, I will have to say the typical, “You make a lot of good points,” seriously. I am having difficulty reconciling these issues. So I’m going to attempt to lay out both your arguments (and my extensions thereof) and posit a solution.

*Brian*—You say that modal logic is derived from more basic logic, which is simply a propositional reflection of God’s thought. Therefore discussing possibility and necessity is permissible. Right now, it is conceivable (and therefore possible) that a quadrinity could exist; therefore it is possible that a non-Christian worldview could be viable. I would take this a little further and say that it is conceivable that a single Bible verse (or chapter) could be omitted from the Bible, and therefore it is conceivable that a slightly different god could exist, _viz._ one with such a nature that he would desire to omit that section of his revelation.

*Clark*—You say that since the living God (the Triune God of the Holy Bible) alone decrees what is possible, it is nonsense to say that His nonexistence is possible. Doing so would be taking a God-given tool (the concept of possibility) and using that to slap the giver of that tool in the face. It would be not only unwise but morally wrong. You also argue that this world is the only possible one and therefore to speak of other possibilities—especially to consider the “possibility” of Jehovah’s nonexistence—is nonsensical. You argue against the quadrinity because it hasn’t been shown to be sufficient for knowledge yet, but this argument is in my opinion flawed because it’s not the onus of another to prove that; if the apologist claims that Christianity is necessary, then he must himself demonstrate why a quadrinitarian worldview is _impossible_, not merely unproved. And insofar as it is not proved to be impossible, Christianity is not proved to be philosophically necessary. But this brings us back to the immoral case of using possibility against the God who gave it to us -- and therein lies the dilemma: possibility seems appropriate to talk about in one sense and inappropriate in another sense.

I think the discussion of God's possibly being different can help lead us to our resolution: while we can, as humans, conceive of God being of a different nature, we do not know if God Himself can conceive of that—i.e., our conception of God’s alteration might be due to our ignorance and finitude rather than due to its objective possibility. However, it still stands that we _are_ human, and therefore, as far as it goes, we must not act as if we can prove that it is not possible. *But here’s the important distinction*: _although we cannot necessarily have rational certainty of certain things, we can have infallible assurance of those things (by the Holy Spirit)_. There are some things you can know but just can’t share. Therefore, although it might be the case that God’s nonexistence (or God’s alteration, same thing) is inconceivable to those who have enough knowledge, it cannot be proven right now by our human arguments. Therefore we cannot claim to unbelievers that we know this by pure rational argument.

Likewise, although we might know that Christianity is necessarily true by the Holy Spirit, it is not necessarily the case that we can prove this by discursive argument. And if we can’t prove it in that way, then we must not claim it is necessary as if we can do so. We can still state that any worldview the unbeliever offers will be defeated, but we don’t want to start making claims about worldviews that the unbeliever does not have to offer—otherwise we will have the onus to provide and disprove all other possible worldviews. We can state that any tenable worldview will be defeated, and only Christianity will succeed; and while we can have an infallible assurance from the Holy Spirit that no contrary presupposition will arise, we simply cannot, as humans, have infallible rational certainty for our position. That belongs to Him who alone has omniscience.

Therefore, Clark, I think this reconciles the correct point you are making about using God-given tools against Him with the seemingly evident case that a competent revealed religion other than Christianity is conceivable. Since the impossibility of a quadrinity (or some other slight alteration in God’s nature) cannot be proven philosophically, the presuppositional apologist cannot state that it is philosophically impossible. We know that it can’t occur because we already have a Spirit-given knowledge that Christianity is true and therefore another revealed religion will not present itself, but we do know that as a rational argument—and therefore we should not state it as if it’s rationally provable. It must remain “in-house.”

As a result, it would appear that the apologist should reduce his claim from “Christianity is philosophically necessary” to “No worldview presented against the Christian worldview can stand,” which for all practical reasons is just as strong. But this does not weaken his view that God decrees possibility; it is just an admission that he cannot rationally prove such a thing. Therefore, the apologist can slightly weaken his claim without betraying some sinful view of possibility.

I really hope that does the trick.


----------



## chbrooking

Philip, 
With all due respect, you are refusing to listen and really engage what I'm saying. 

What I said about intelligibility is indeed found in Plato. The problem is, Plato tried on all three grounds (a priori, a posteriori, and a hybrid epistemology) to find that unity. He was unable to. And the history of philosophy (a footnote to Plato) has failed ever since. Christian theism, and Christian theism alone, provides the preconditions for intelligibility. We couldn't be having this conversation if Christian theism were not true.

I've handled Fristianity. But I'll do this once more. Please pay attention.
1. Autonomy yields skepticism.
2. There's no such thing as Fristianity.
3. If there were such a thing, it would have to be revealed to avoid the charge of autonomy. It is not revealed, so, go back to number 2 or admit that it is autonomous and go back to number 1.
4. If there were such a thing, and it were revealed, and it were vying to be a theonomous system accounting for the preconditions of intelligibility, it would have to have every single component of Christian theism. The lack of any doctrine would destroy the whole.
5. Adding a member to the godhead would certainly alter the doctrine (significantly).
6. So -- IF THERE WERE -- which there isn't, a worldview such as Fristianity, it too would fail have to account for intelligibility. It couldn't.
7. Go back and review our comments on possibility. Or at least answer the question at the end of this response.

You would profit from reading Van Til's Mr. White, Mr. Grey and Mr. Black -- I can't remember where it is found. But I'm sure someone reading this can tell you. The moment you say that Christianity is probably true, you confess that it is probably false. 

I notice that you never answered WHO determines what is possible. Is possibility something that has existence apart from God? Is God swallowed up by the possible?

-----Added 6/24/2009 at 12:11:05 EST-----

No, Ben. I believe Quadrinity to be impossible. I'll work on showing you that it's so. But not tonight.
I'll go further and say that Frame is wrong, Van Til and Bahnsen are right. Christianity is philosophically necessary. I suppose it's a pile on now for me to prove it.
By the way, once again, Quick Draw, you beat me to the post


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## Confessor

Clark,

The Fristianity argument in this context is that it is conceivable that a quadrinitarian revelation could exist (therefore it wouldn't be autonomous), and you would yourself have to _prove_ that it is impossible in order to prove that Christianity is rationally necessary. This would require your proving that whatever doctrinal variations can possibly exist in such a worldview are necessarily false -- which I'm not sure you can do without begging the question.

As for letting unbelievers "off the hook" (by claiming that Christianity is only probably true), I really don't think that would happen by lowering the claim the small extent that I am proposing. It still is the case that unbelievers have no choice but to rest on Christian presuppositions, for the apologist can defeat every opposing worldview. And, of course, unbelievers already know non-inferentially that they're condemned (Romans 1).

What's important is that the apologist not claim that he can prove that Christianity is philosophically necessary -- because in that case he would have to prove that any single possibility of a contrary revealed religion cannot be. And there's no way he could do that.


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## chbrooking

I disagree. And the reason I disagree is that positing what is possible requires the CHRISTIAN worldview. But I'll try to make this clear tomorrow or so.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Ben,

I just deleted what I wrote after reading your latest post. I really appreciate the thought you have put into it, and at first blush have come to many of the same conclusions you have come to. I will comment in detail soon.

Sincerely,

Brian


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## Confessor

Clark,

Even if you could disprove a Fristian worldview, that wouldn't help your case that much. The problem with asserting that Christianity is philosophically necessary is that it requires proving the impossibility of non-Christianity. And proving the impossibility of non-Christianity would require disproving both (1) autonomy (which isn't really a problem) and (2) every conceivable revealed religion that is not Christianity. (2) entails not only that you disprove everything brought your way, but that you yourself _provide_ every other conceivable variation of non-Christian revelation and disprove *all* of those. But that is sheerly impossible.

This really shouldn't be a problem, though. I don't know if I'm thinking too highly of myself, but I want to know if I posited a resolution to this issue. Our lowering the claim from "Christianity is philosophically necessary and certain" to "I can defeat any unbelieving worldview offered against Christianity" does not give any hope to the unbeliever either way. But it does help the apologist by giving the onus over to the unbeliever to provide a cogent worldview.


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## chbrooking

The problem is this, though.

One cannot speak of bare possibility. This line of argumentation is guilty of reification. And unless and until it is determined at what point logic meets reality: "to talk about what can or cannot exist according to logic is but to swing a sword in the sky". 

You see, Ben, the problem is in your concession on what is conceiveable. Once we determine that what is conceiveable to finite (and fallen) human reason is determinative for what exists (or what we know), we have sold Christian theism down the river. You can't divide how we know from what we know. Notice that it is unbridled logic that is driving this anti-theistic bus. It isn't the revelation that is going to be proposed. It's an autonomous argument. Positing a non-existent future worldview as determinative of the validity of Christian theism is, itself, autonomous. 

Van Til used a microscope illustration. I can't remember it. But let me use an inferior one: You see a piece of rice with micro-writing on it. You put it under a microscope and find that it says, "microscopes do not exist." Are you going to believe it? This isn't really so different from our impasse. Human reason, on the Christian understanding, is founded on the thought of the Christian God. For human reason, then, to will God out of existence, or even posit the possibility of his non-existence,-- is not only irrational, it is sinful. Now the unbeliever will not agree with this. But he cannot rest his logic (and possibility) in some potential future worldview -- as that would envelop everything in chance. To permit this argument is to allow reason to operate independent of God, in which case the human mind becomes the ultimate reference point, the ultimate arbiter of truth. 

This line of reasoning is not alternative-theonomous. It is autonomous. I assure you that the notion of bare possibility will say, loud and clear, "God doesn't exist." After all, if possibility exists independent of God, then God is going to be swallowed up by chance. What I'm getting at is that 'brute possibility' requires the very same autonomy we recognizes leads to skepticism.

Here's the problem with refusing to say that Christianity is philosophically necessary: It concedes that sophos itself exists apart from the Christian God and that it may philethenai apart from the worship of the trinitarian God of the scriptures. Christianity is philosophically necessary because only Christianity accounts for philosophy. 

So, I'd say you were on a better track when you were arguing for a present worldview. Quadrinity isn't a present worldview. It doesn't, in fact, exist. And since no worldview exists by which the possibility of a worldview arising that could dispatch the necessity of Christianity, Christianity is necessary.

Anti-theistic thought defines possibility by conceivability or consistency or articulability. But they cannot ground their definition. And once you suggest, from a non-Christian foundation, that what is 'possible' speaks to what is, you have at the very least committed the fallacy of reification. Never mind the fact that, on non-Christian grounds, you cannot get from epistemology, where this brute possibility is located, to ontology. You have divided how we know from what we know, and that is, to use Van Til's phrase,--to swing a sword in the sky. 

I can appreciate what you are trying to say, I think. You are saying that you cannot construct a reasonably limited number of propositional arguments to establish the truth of Christianity. But you've removed yourself one step from the TAG. Christianity is true (and philosophically necessary) because its alternative cannot construct ONE argument without assuming the truth of Christianity. Yes, that may require us to work for many years demolishing the foundations of anything that is thrown up at us. After all, man is going to be very resourceful in his attack on the truth. But the fact that anti-theistic thought is most vicious in the throws of death does not mean that it isn't mortally wounded.


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## Confessor

Clark,



chbrooking said:


> You see, Ben, the problem is in your concession on what is conceiveable. Once we determine that what is conceiveable to finite (and fallen) human reason is determinative for what exists (or what we know), we have sold Christian theism down the river.



This is the important distinction I was talking about. Since it is conceivable _to the unbeliever_ that an alternative revelation could exist that rivals Christianity, then make sure that you, the apologist, are not the one who mentions such a notion of possibility.

When you start making statements like this:



chbrooking said:


> Christianity is philosophically necessary because only Christianity accounts for philosophy.



You are obliged to prove them. And to prove the philosophical necessity of Christianity is to prove the philosophical impossibility of non-Christianity against any type of doubt, which includes disproving both autonomy and other revealed religions. Therefore, insofar as another revelation apart from Christianity is _conceivable_, *you* have to be the one who provides all these possible worldviews and defeat them yourself.

However, if you lower the claim to say that you can defeat any unbelieving worldview offered, then the unbeliever cannot appeal to a possible revelation without showing the revelation. If you don't lower it, then you have to bring up all possible non-Christian revelations and demonstrate how they can't possibly be true. In this case, then, _the unbeliever still has no choice but to hold to Christianity_; you just give him the burden of proof.

But the best part about this is that it doesn't result in the immoral utilization of God-given tools against Him. It merely recognizes that we can't ourselves philosophically prove the absolute necessity of Christianity. We can give no choice for the unbeliever to accept Christianity, but we can't actually disprove all conceivable non-Christian worldviews. Yet, at the same time, when we have Christians talking to each other who agree on theonomy, we can discuss possibility in a God-honoring way: what is conceivable _to God_.

And here is where the distinction between infallible assurance and rational certainty comes in. You already _know_ that possibility entails only what is conceivable to God, but yet you can't actually _show_ this discursively; therefore such discussion should remain in-house.

Presumably, you could tell the unbeliever that any claim to a possible revelation does not work, because "possibility" can be asserted only with a Christian presupposition, but in that case you would still be starting with a claim of "I will disprove everything thrown at me" rather than "Christianity is philosophically necessary."



chbrooking said:


> So, I'd say you were on a better track when you were arguing for a present worldview. Quadrinity isn't a present worldview. It doesn't, in fact, exist. And since no worldview exists by which the possibility of a worldview arising that could dispatch the necessity of Christianity, Christianity is necessary.



The problem here is that when you state that Christianity is necessary, you mean "necessary" in the sense of "you are forced to do this" rather than "we know this with philosophical certainty." Thus, when you make claims that convey "necessity" in the latter sense, it becomes impossible to prove. That's why you should slightly lower the claim and convey "necessity" in the former sense.


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## chbrooking

First, I'm swamped today, and have not had time to adequately read your response. I'll do that, but it will have to be later.

But why are you asking me to prove a negative? By saying "No other worldview works", I don't have the duty to raise up every worldview to prove my point. One exception would destroy my position, but it is not incumbent on me to raise them. I cannot prove a negative. And of all people, those wanting me to be logical shouldn't expect it of me. The onus isn't on me. I can show that Christianity accounts for the preconditions of intelligibility. I can also show that autonomy can't. I can also show that deism, polytheism, pantheism, panentheism or any alternative theism can't. But if someone says, "the speed of light cannot be broken," he does not have to build every imaginable device to attempt to refute his position. 

Besides, all this is nonsense, really. We don't operate in 'potential worlds'. If the engineer designing your plane told you, "Well, I didn't use our present rules of physics, because it's quite possible that others exist," I dare say you would not get on that plane.

But I'll give your response a read later -- probably tonight, and respond.

Incidentally, I hope you notice that our method is the same. I just don't have a problem making a clear declaration. And I don't think asking me to prove a negative in order to substantiate it is fair or logical.


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## The Calvin Knight

Here is the article on Mr. Black, Mr. White, and Mr. Grey:
A Defense of Reformed (biblical) Presuppositional Apologetics by Cornelius VanTil


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## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> But why are you asking me to prove a negative? By saying "No other worldview works", I don't have the duty to raise up every worldview to prove my point. One exception would destroy my position, but it is not incumbent on me to raise them. I cannot prove a negative.



That is exactly why you shouldn't claim a negative, then -- or, rather, a negative you can't prove. If I were to say I could prove (with certainty) that unicorns did not exist, I would not be able to prove it. I could establish that it's not reasonable to believe in them, but I could not establish that they do not exist with 100% certainty. And Clark, while you can establish that it's foolish and unreasonable to believe in a non-Christian presupposition -- in fact, you can even establish that unbelievers have no choice but to do so -- you still cannot prove it with certainty.



chbrooking said:


> Besides, all this is nonsense, really. We don't operate in 'potential worlds'. If the engineer designing your plane told you, "Well, I didn't use our present rules of physics, because it's quite possible that others exist," I dare say you would not get on that plane.



This has to do with what is reasonable to believe, not what we know with 100% certainty. I do admit that a lot of possible world talk can be useless, but that doesn't change the fact that the presuppositionalist ought not to claim philosophical certainty for his position.



chbrooking said:


> Incidentally, I hope you notice that our method is the same. I just don't have a problem making a clear declaration. And I don't think asking me to prove a negative in order to substantiate it is fair or logical.



Our disagreements are usually small.  But I think this is important for our methodology, as such a claim will often sidetrack one from actually showing the unbeliever why he is without excuse. The unbeliever will be looking for the philosophical certainty implicit in your claim.

----------

By the way, the white, gray, and black conversation does not really touch base on this issue. That has to do with probabilistic evidentialism/classical apologetics, not my current proposal to lower the apologist's clam from philosophical certainty.


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## chbrooking

Define philosophical certainty for me.

-----Added 6/24/2009 at 03:17:51 EST-----

It would seem to me that, since we cannot speak without a certain underpinning, by having the debate we prove the Christian position. And unless we claim philosophical certainty, we are stuck with probability. In which case White, Grey and black do apply. This is why I want to know your definition of philosophical certainty. I have to assume that this is where we are hung.


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## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> Define philosophical certainty for me.
> 
> -----Added 6/24/2009 at 03:17:51 EST-----
> 
> It would seem to me that, since we cannot speak without a certain underpinning, by having the debate we prove the Christian position. And unless we claim philosophical certainty, we are stuck with probability. In which case White, Grey and black do apply. This is why I want to know your definition of philosophical certainty. I have to assume that this is where we are hung.



Certainty would be established if the contradictory is impossible/inconceivable.

At this point you would probably ask what I mean by "inconceivable," in which case you would say that I am relying on man's perception rather than God's. But then we return to a comment I brought up earlier:

I think the discussion of God's possibly being different can help lead us to our resolution: while we can, as humans, conceive of God being of a different nature, we do not know if God Himself can conceive of that—i.e., our conception of God’s alteration might be due to our ignorance and finitude rather than due to its objective possibility. However, it still stands that we are human, and therefore, as far as it goes, we must not act as if we can prove that it is not possible. *But here’s the important distinction*: _although we cannot necessarily have rational certainty of certain things, we can have infallible assurance of those things (by the Holy Spirit)_. There are some things you can know but just can’t share. Therefore, although it might be the case that God’s nonexistence (or God’s alteration, same thing) is inconceivable to those who have enough knowledge, it cannot be proven right now by our human arguments. Therefore we cannot claim to unbelievers that we know this by pure rational argument.​
Clark, although you would claim (and I would agree) that, for instance, a quadrinity is not conceivable from God's perspective, we simply cannot establish that with rational argument. One must already fully accept Biblical revelation to accept this fact. And the only way to show the unbeliever that he already accepts Biblical revelation is to show him that he has _no choice but to do so_, in which case you've already lowered the claim.

Another way of stating my argument is that when you say Christianity is necessary, you are appealing to an autonomous notion of possibility (!).


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## chbrooking

Confessor said:


> Since it is conceivable _to the unbeliever_ that an alternative revelation could exist that rivals Christianity, then make sure that you, the apologist, are not the one who mentions such a notion of possibility.



But he cannot ground his conception. That's the point. I am making a statement of what is true, founded as it is on the Christian worldview. How is he to open his mouth without the Christian worldview, in order to posit something as possible. I will immediately ask him who determines what is possible? Is possibility something that just exists 'out there'? If so, I will show him that not only is God swallowed up by that brute possibility -- an ontology of radical chance, but all hope of knowing or discussing is also swallowed up by it. 

This is why I don't have a problem with saying that it is philosophically necessary. Because necessity and possibility are concepts which only make sense in a Christian worldview. If someone wants to claim that they can make sense of them with a different worldview, then they are trying to disprove my claim. In a sense, I don't know what the fuss is about. This is what the TAG has claimed all along -- impossibility of the contrary. Show me a contrary, and I'll show you it is impossible. 

If by this you mean that I cannot make such a claim because such a claim will be judged by the canons of logic, then I'm going to ask you to ground your canons of logic. The only worldview which makes sense of logic is the Christian one. And since possibility is a category that only makes sense in that worldview, you can't even raise it with another worldview. If you try, I will show you that it doesn't work. 

And before you jump in here, Brian, you haven't explained what Fristianity is. It's not a worldview that presents a challenge, because it's not spelled out. Where is its revelation? In your mind? 

I fear that you are still working with the notion of possibility as though it were neutral. It's not. I'm using it, but not in a neutral way. Once someone else uses it in an anti-theistic way, I'm going to attack the underpinnings of his notion of possibility first of all. If he presents me with a revelation that purports to answer the challenge of intelligibility, I'll undercut it. But I have no problem saying that Christianity is philosophically necessary, since philosophy itself depends on it, necessity depends on it. Even this discussion depends on it -- when viewed from my foundation it makes sense. 



> When you start making statements like this:
> 
> 
> 
> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> Christianity is philosophically necessary because only Christianity accounts for philosophy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You are obliged to prove them.
Click to expand...


But I prove them on Christian grounds. If you want to argue that my grounds do not account for the proof, or that you can account for intelligibility on other grounds, or that you can disprove my grounds, go for it. But my proof is sound, once you assume my foundation. And since we all have a foundation, that's only a problem for someone who wants to reason autonomously. TAG has always been about foundation vs. foundation. You're aiming at a flag, when you talk about possibility as if it were brute. I'm not using "possible" that way. I'm using possibility with the Christian theistic reference point. Let's not aim at flags, but foundations beneath them.

-----Added 6/24/2009 at 03:43:29 EST-----

Okay, I think we're on the right track now. I just read your last post. 

This is what it comes down to. You think my claim is autonomous. It's not (per my previous post).

I'm claiming that any notion of possibility that is non-Christian is autonomous. 

This, I think, is the heart of our disagreement.

I'm not crawling out of the Christian framework to declare the "impossibility of the contrary." I'm assuming it in my claim.


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## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> This, I think, is the heart of our disagreement.
> 
> I'm not crawling out of the Christian framework to declare the "impossibility of the contrary." I'm assuming it in my claim.



You're right, that is the heart of our disagreement. Really, this has shown to be quite a minor disagreement.

You believe that the necessity of Christianity is nothing more than the fact that an unbeliever, in trying to object against Christianity, must presuppose it. But when you say that Christianity is necessary _without making this qualification_, then you are in fact "crawling out of the Christian framework." If you just state that Christianity is necessary, then you are obliged to provide and disprove all possible non-Christian worldviews; if you state that Christianity is necessary _in the sense that any worldview the unbeliever can offer can be defeated_, then he is obliged to provide a non-Christian worldview. Therefore the apologist ought to make this qualification. If you agree that he should make this qualification -- and by all signs it seems that you do -- then we should be in agreement.

Besides, Clark, it appears we're in agreement on the fact that the burden of proof to show a non-Christian worldview is the unbeliever's, hence your statements such as the following:



> But he cannot ground his conception.





> If someone wants to claim that they can make sense of them with a different worldview, then they are trying to disprove my claim.





> And since possibility is a category that only makes sense in that worldview, you can't even raise it with another worldview. If you try, I will show you that it doesn't work.





> you haven't explained what Fristianity is. It's not a worldview that presents a challenge, because it's not spelled out. Where is its revelation? In your mind?





> Once someone else uses it in an anti-theistic way, I'm going to attack the underpinnings of his notion of possibility first of all.



Now it's just a matter of making this onus evident when we say things such as "Christianity is necessary." When we say that, we don't mean it in an autonomous sense, but in a presuppositional sense; thus the qualification (that the unbeliever will not offer a cogent non-Christian presupposition) is needed.


----------



## chbrooking

Okay, I see your point. I suppose I can leave it at that.

But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say. I cannot use the term "God", since an unbeliever may have a different conception of that. I can't use the term "creation" for the same reason. I can't use the term "logic" or "reason" or "proof". Come to think of it, I cannot use ANY term without issuing the disclaimer that I'm using that term with the assumption of Christian theism behind it. Perhaps that would be a good thing. Who knows what it would do for evangelism?

But seriously. I cannot make any claim on an autonomous foundation. And if the unbeliever starts in on me after making what is a TRUE claim (impossibility of the contrary), thinking that my claim does not rise to his autonomous notion of the possible, then we have a good starting point for our discussion. I guess I'm trying to say: Why do we have to guard our language, when we're the only ones using language right?


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say. I cannot use the term "God", since an unbeliever may have a different conception of that. I can't use the term "creation" for the same reason. I can't use the term "logic" or "reason" or "proof". Come to think of it, I cannot use ANY term without issuing the disclaimer that I'm using that term with the assumption of Christian theism behind it. Perhaps that would be a good thing. Who knows what it would do for evangelism?



I don't think that would be an implication. This is a special case in which saying "Christianity is necessary" is an example of an attempted "trans-worldview" statement. If you say that, you are necessarily stepping outside the bounds of a Christian presupposition and thereby attempting to posit an autonomous claim. In fact, saying "Christianity is necessary" is a tautology if it must be stated on a Christian presupposition; therefore for it not to be tautological it must be used autonomously -- quite a dilemma.

Consequently, I now propose we drop the talk of Christianity being necessary. On Christian presuppositions it is trivial; on non-Christian presuppositions it is false. We should only mention that whatever worldview the unbeliever offers can and will be defeated. Once we start talking about things that the unbeliever does not necessarily have to offer (e.g. "All non-Christian worldviews fail" rather than "All proposed non-Christian worldviews can be shown to fail"), we start talking autonomously thereby betraying our position.


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## chbrooking

Yes, as I use it, it is a tautology (I don't regard that as a problem). I can see what you mean about its usefulness, or lack thereof. 

I'm not sure I'm willing to abandon it, however. I don't see why I must. It is true. I'm the one using language correctly. The fact that it leads to misunderstanding -- or the wasting of valuable time put elsewhere, MAY persuade me. On the other hand, I'm not sure that your statement in its lieu is definitive enough -- maybe I'm just wanting something a little more, I don't know, "in your face." Maybe that's wrong. I've got to think about it.

At any rate, I think we are in agreement on foundations and method -- even if not on the formulation of the argument at the start.

Where does that put Brian and Philip, who were politely silent while we hand an internecine battle 

From Brian's last post, does that mean he's on our side of this debate? I don't see how, since when he last spoke, he still seemed to be talking about brute possibility.

What say you Brian? What say you Philip?
Are we all in agreement yet? I hope so. I'm not getting NEARLY enough work done.

*****
Incidentally, though. Wouldn't a trans-worldview statement require epistemological common ground? I'm still wrestling with this. I'm just not sure I can agree that my language must be constructed as if it were brute, when it's not -- nor can it be. I'll think about it.


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## Philip

First, if I get off-track here, I apologize--I always look for connections between ideas and possible consequences. I see everything as interconnected, which means that I go off on rabbit trails (I'm still doing some research into historical roots and fruits of presuppositionalism, fyi--I didn't realize Doug Wilson was a presuppositionalist).

Clark,

I think that when we are talking of possibility, we are always talking in terms of what we as humans can conceive--that is, the finite. I think that we can pass judgment within this realm over whether spherical cubes, unicorns, horses, etc can or cannot exist. Where we cannot talk of possibility is the realm where God is: that is, the infinite. There may be glimpses here and there (e.g. the numinous), but no rational comprehension (and this is where I take issue with Gordon Clark).

I do think, though, that there needs to be a distinction between _how_ we know and _why_ we know. How we know, which is epistemology's main focus, deals with the exact means by which we know things. For example, I know that Barack Obama is president because I read it in the news; I know that it didn't rain today because I have eyes and ears. In other words, epistemology deals with two questions: what is knowledge? and how do we know what we know?

Van Til, though, was answering the question of _why_ we know what we know. In other words, what accounts for the reliability of the senses, rationality, etc? His epistemology, therefore, focused so much on God as the source of rationality, that it ended up answering the other questions (I think) wrongly (I think there's a whole historical thing that goes with it, but I'll save it for later).

I would also say that Christianity is necessarily true, but for different reasons.

1. Any absolute system of thought is either absolutely true (ie: every aspect of it is true) or absolutely false.
2. Christianity is an absolute system of thought.
3. Aspects of Christianity are true.
4. Christianity is absolutely true.

Brian, a critique?



chbrooking said:


> But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say.



Here I think you've reached one of many logical conclusions of presuppositionalism (others that I won't go into, but that I know you disagree with). If we are to communicate at all with the unbeliever, we do have to do it on his terms, not ours. It's God's business to dictate the terms of salvation, etc to him, not the business of the apologist.

It wouldn't have been a good idea for Paul to have spoken in Aramaic or Hebrew in Athens because the Athenian philosophers spoke Greek. Likewise, we can't speak Christianese to the unbeliever because it will confuse him further.


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## chbrooking

So we should speak atheist??? There's no such thing as neutralese. 

By the by, the not so subtle reference to Wilson should be brought forward for what it is . I'm surprised that you would try such a sophistic ploy. Bahnsen was a theonomist. I'm not. Wilson is a FV proponent. I'm not. You're not going down a slippery slope or guilt by association road are you? (not that I'm equating theonomy with FV either -- for those of you out there who might be offended.)

What do you mean by absolute? What's an aspect? What's the standard of truth?


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Gentlemen,

A lot of dialogue has taken place. I am way behind. 



Clark said:


> What say you Brian?



Clark, let me quote something from a recent post of yours and from Ben’s last post. 



Clark said:


> I guess I'm trying to say: Why do we have to guard our language, when we're the only ones using language right?



When you make the claim that “we’re the only ones using language right,” then you have just assumed the burden of proving this if you want the claim to be more than assertion. Now, it is no bother for me to say to an unbeliever it is assertion; yet, I am more than happy to give reasons why I believe it is true. So, this will take it beyond mere assertion, but my reasons in the end do not constitute an objectively certain proof. Rather, my reasons provide rational justification for believing the claim to be true. But for some reason a lot of TAG proponents find this to be anathema, and want to speak of these things as if they have an objectively certain proof. (Actually, I think the main reason they find this to be anathema is they harshly criticize other apologetic methods that only provide rational justification. They do not want to be the kettle calling the pot black – so to speak.) So, for this group of people (the Strong Modal TAG guys), I ask them to show me their objectively certain proof. In all my years discussing these things no one has been able to rise to the challenge. Normally, they present arguments as to why they don’t have to, and then claim they did.



Ben said:


> Consequently, I now propose we drop the talk of Christianity being necessary. On Christian presuppositions it is trivial; on non-Christian presuppositions it is false…Once we start talking about things that the unbeliever does not necessarily have to offer (e.g. "All non-Christian worldviews fail" rather than "All proposed non-Christian worldviews can be shown to fail"), we start talking autonomously thereby betraying our position.



I think Ben gets this right. So, Clark, if you agree with this, then we have found common ground. If this is the case, then we should start another thread and explore the consequences of this. I think that discussion would be very edifying. 

Warm Regards,

Brian


----------



## chbrooking

As you should be able to see from subsequent posts, I think we are in agreement. But I'm still not quite persuaded that we are wrong to use the strong language. Both you and Ben seem to be missing the point that when I use a term like "impossibility", I absolutely HAVE to use that term from my reference point. If the unbeliever misunderstands that, that is no different, really, than him misunderstanding my saying that Christianity is rational. He's going to say, "What! Rational! You call 1 is 3 and 3 is 1 rational!" I know that the term "impossible" will be misunderstood. So will the term "God". That's okay. That's what discussions are for. But he won't be able to make sense of what is, how you know, or how we ought to behave apart from the Christian worldview. He can try, but he will fail. Why? Because the Christian worldview is true.

I still do not see how my statement (which must be understood within my presuppositional framework to be understood truly) should put the onus on me to adopt an infinitie number of OTHER frameworks to try to disprove my position. As Ben noted, within my framework, my statement is so true, it's tautologous. If you'd like to bring a different framework to bear, and see if it holds up, feel free.

I'm not sure I know what you mean by modal TAG guys. I'm assuming you mean guys who use words like "impossibility of the contrary." And if your challenge is for me to adopt an autonomous view of possibility to prove a theonomous ontology and epistemology, I'll bet nobody has answered the call. It's an impossible one (not to mention unfair). But on my own framework, it makes sense. And I'd be happy to discuss other frameworks and how they fail.


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## Brian Bosse

Hello Philip,



Philip said:


> I would also say that Christianity is necessarily true, but for different reasons.
> 
> 1. Any absolute system of thought is either absolutely true (ie: every aspect of it is true) or absolutely false.
> 2. Christianity is an absolute system of thought.
> 3. Aspects of Christianity are true.
> 4. Christianity is absolutely true.
> 
> Brian, a critique?



Philip, I do not think the argument is sound. Change the term 'Christianity' to 'Judiasm'. The argument goes through. The problem is with premise 1. An absolute system of thought can have some aspects that are true and other aspects that are false. 

Brian


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## steven-nemes

Brian Bosse said:


> Philip, I do not think the argument is sound. Change the term 'Christianity' to 'Judiasm'. The argument goes through. The problem is with premise 1. An absolute system of thought can have some aspects that are true and other aspects that are false.
> 
> Brian



I think his point is that for the whole of a system of thought to be true, every individual assertion must be true. So, for Islam to be true, every individual critical assertion of Islam must be true. Islam can have some things right, like the universe being created by God, but if it has other things wrong, like the resurrection of Christ, then it is as a whole wrong.


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## Confessor

Clark,

If it's a tautology then it can't be useful. For if you tell an unbeliever that Christianity is necessary using a Christian notion of possibility and necessity, then you're really stating nothing about his worldview. If understood your statement as using an autonomous notion of possibility, then he could ask you to prove your claim (which would be impossible). If he understood your statement as using a Christian notion of possibility, then he would ask what that means for his worldview. And that that point you would say, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail." So, then, rather than going through the confusing and tautological nature of saying "Christianity is necessary," I think it would be wiser to immediately tell the unbeliever, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail."

Regarding that your statement was of a "trans-worldview" nature: I was just trying to say that using "Christianity is necessary" in an argumentatively meaningful (non-tautological) way would require that you attempt to posit epistemological common ground, in which case you'd be faking neutrality and being autonomous. In other words, I tried to say that "Christianity is necessary" is useful only if taken in a "trans-worldview" way, and the "trans-worldview" way would necessitate that it is autonomous. (By the way, this "trans-worldview" stuff is in essence the exact same thing we are discussing in the first paragraph of this post. It's not a separate issue at all.)



chbrooking said:


> (not that I'm equating theonomy with FV either -- for those of you out there who might be offended.)



I would have been.  I think Theonomy is a logical implication of epistemogical theonomy. But that's another topic.

----------

Philip,

I don't know if it's just my lack of exposure, but from what I have seen of Douglas Wilson, he is not much of a presuppositionalist. I saw him basically use the moral argument for God in an autonomous way. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Here I think you've reached one of many logical conclusions of presuppositionalism (others that I won't go into, but that I know you disagree with). If we are to communicate at all with the unbeliever, we do have to do it on his terms, not ours.



Here again comes the distinction between _actual_ and _espoused_ common ground. Christians and unbelievers will sometimes have identical meanings of certain terms superficially, but that will be _in spite of_ the unbeliever's presupposition.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I would also say that Christianity is necessarily true, but for different reasons.
> 
> 1. Any absolute system of thought is either absolutely true (ie: every aspect of it is true) or absolutely false.
> 2. Christianity is an absolute system of thought.
> 3. Aspects of Christianity are true.
> 4. Christianity is absolutely true.



I know you asked Brian, but I thought I might give my input:

First of all, if you mean to starkly separate systems of thought, so that an aspect of Christianity such as "the senses are reliable" cannot be used in any other worldview, then your syllogism would be valid but it would be tougher to prove. If you don't mean to starkly separate systems of thought (i.e. if there is espoused common ground), then your first premise is false, in that it is not the case that a false system must be false in every aspect (if that is what you implied). Otherwise, if you didn't imply that, then you would have a _non sequitur_, for you can't show that all aspects are true from the fact that some are.


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## Philip

chbrooking said:


> By the by, the not so subtle reference to Wilson should be brought forward for what it is . I'm surprised that you would try such a sophistic ploy.



I'm not doing any guilt by association here. What I'm trying to figure out is the connection of why so many presupp folks end up as theonomists and why so many theonomists end up going toward Catholicism (I'm holding back on names here). The last thing I want is to go down a path that could lead in a direction that I don't like.



> So we should speak atheist??? There's no such thing as neutralese



No, we should speak plain English, like everyone else. The problem I find with presuppositionalism is that it can't speak to the layman, only to the philosopher. Any apologetic that cannot be understood equally by a layman and an academic is useless. If you have to define every term so precisely, then you'll end up boring your audience to tears. An impractical apologetic is a useless apologetic.

As for my syllogism, I suppose I need to clarify the criteria for what I would call an "absolute system."

1. A claim to absolute exclusive truth.
2. No "out" for those who do not subscribe.
3. If any part of the whole is true, then the whole is true.

I submit that no worldview except Christianity satisfies these three criteria. Islam comes close, but it's hard to ignore the Koranic passages that prescribe the second level of heaven for "peoples of the book" (ie: Jews and Christians). In addition, in Islam, there is no certainty, due to Allah's nature.

Atheism is absolute, it could be argued, since it's a universal negative. Yet, in fact, atheism is not a system, but a proposition. Thus, it fails to meet my criteria.

I submit, that no other worldview is absolute. One should argue, not from the truth of Christianity (which begs the question) but from the uniqueness of Christianity and of Christ.

In fact, I wonder if we haven't been neglecting what should be the center of our apologetic: Christ himself. Who is Jesus? That's the question that the unbeliever has to answer.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say. I cannot use the term "God", since an unbeliever may have a different conception of that. I can't use the term "creation" for the same reason. I can't use the term "logic" or "reason" or "proof". Come to think of it, I cannot use ANY term without issuing the disclaimer that I'm using that term with the assumption of Christian theism behind it. Perhaps that would be a good thing. Who knows what it would do for evangelism?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think that would be an implication. This is a special case in which saying "Christianity is necessary" is an example of an attempted "trans-worldview" statement. If you say that, you are necessarily stepping outside the bounds of a Christian presupposition and thereby attempting to posit an autonomous claim. In fact, saying "Christianity is necessary" is a tautology if it must be stated on a Christian presupposition; therefore for it not to be tautological it must be used autonomously -- quite a dilemma.
> 
> Consequently, I now propose we drop the talk of Christianity being necessary. On Christian presuppositions it is trivial; on non-Christian presuppositions it is false. We should only mention that whatever worldview the unbeliever offers can and will be defeated. Once we start talking about things that the unbeliever does not necessarily have to offer (e.g. "All non-Christian worldviews fail" rather than "All proposed non-Christian worldviews can be shown to fail"), we start talking autonomously thereby betraying our position.
Click to expand...


But is not Paul's claim in Romans 1, one which should be construed as to apply to all people and their worldviews, Christian and non Christian?

I can have an excuse for not accepting your position even if I cannot rebut it as of right now or even ten years from now.

CT

-----Added 6/24/2009 at 09:09:35 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> By the by, the not so subtle reference to Wilson should be brought forward for what it is . I'm surprised that you would try such a sophistic ploy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not doing any guilt by association here. What I'm trying to figure out is the connection of why so many presupp folks end up as theonomists and why so many theonomists end up going toward Catholicism (I'm holding back on names here). The last thing I want is to go down a path that could lead in a direction that I don't like.
Click to expand...


Um, if you look at normal high level philosophy, you will find almost no orthodox Reformed people. So I do not see your point in critiquing presuppositionalism over and above the other viewpoints.

CT


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## chbrooking

Ben,

Once we have shown that the Christian theistic worldview does actually account for intelligibility, is not saying, "Any worldview that is not the Christian theistic worldview will fail to account for intelligibility" the functional equivalent of saying, "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility"?

And if so, isn't "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility" the same as "Christian theism is necessary." -- that is, if we grant that intelligibility is possible. And if it's not, why are we having this conversation?


----------



## Philip

CT said:


> Um, if you look at normal high level philosophy, you will find almost no orthodox Reformed people. So I do not see your point in critiquing presuppositionalism over and above the other viewpoints.



Sadly true. Things have sure changed since the days of R. L. Dabney, Jonathan Edwards, and Thomas Reid.


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## Myshkin

Confessor-

When you have the chance, considering this thread started as a Q&A on presuppositionalism in general, would you mind answering another (different) question or three?

1. Can you please demonstrate exactly why/how classical apologetics (CA hereafter) starts with "autonomy" ("self-law", or 'law-unto-oneself"), as presuppostionalism so often asserts?

-As one who takes the CA position, I fail to understand how CA acknowledging the truth of _scripture_(the "theonomic" starting point) in Romans 1 is "autonomy". If CA gets its view from _scripture_ ("theonomy"), how is this "autonomy"?

2. May I ask from what sources you get your understanding of CA? This would be very helpful for me, because like most presuppostionalist statements of CA I hardly recognize CA for what it truly is. I know it is controversial to suggest, but I am of the opinion that Van Til exaggerated/misunderstood CA and built Presupp. on this faulty understanding. Everytime I find myself agreeing with a presupp. I think to myself "that is exactly what CA says and has always said". To twist a presupp. comment about unbelievers having any true knowledge, I would say: "any truth the presupp. position has it has borrowed from the very source it rejects (CA)." 

-To be fair, my understanding of presupp. mostly comes from Van Til, Frame, Gordon Clark, and Sproul/Gerstner.

3. I learned in Logic class that a circular argument is a logical fallacy. Then I am exposed to Presupp. which says that all arguments are circular. I ask how can this be, and the answer isn't ever given to me in the form of "well, circular arguments are not logical fallacies", but rather "yes, presupp. is circular, but it is a _glorious_ circle".

Am I being "autonomous" in my thinking that circular arguments are logical fallacies since this contradicts the presupp. ("theonomous") assertion that all arguments are circular? 

Thanks.


----------



## steven-nemes

lol, "glorious circle"


----------



## Confessor

Just to let everyone know, I'm about to leave but I will respond to everything everyone has said since my last post later tonight.


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## chbrooking

CT,
I'm not sure I understand what you mean about Romans 1 and my position leaving the unbeliever with an 'out' based on the future. Could you elaborate.


----------



## ChristianTrader

chbrooking said:


> CT,
> I'm not sure I understand what you mean about Romans 1 and my position leaving the unbeliever with an 'out' based on the future. Could you elaborate.



My response was to a response to your post. 

CT


----------



## chbrooking

Sorry, I still don't get it. Romans 1 is explicit that nobody has an excuse.


----------



## Confessor

Philip,



P. F. Pugh said:


> The problem I find with presuppositionalism is that it can't speak to the layman, only to the philosopher. Any apologetic that cannot be understood equally by a layman and an academic is useless.



Both classical and presuppositional apologetics can be either simple or complex. Have you seen William Lane Craig's new book on the theistic proofs? It's extremely in-depth. Mistaken, in my opinion, but in-depth nonetheless.

Also, regarding your revised syllogism, when you say, "If any part of the whole is true, then the whole is true," are you referring to the "vital" parts of Christianity, the parts that no other worldview would have, e.g. the resurrection? If so, I would agree, but I would have two observations: (1) it is no different from the typical evidential apologetic, and (2) it doesn't result in a necessary truth (unless this vital aspect can be proven with certainty).

----------

CT,



ChristianTrader said:


> But is not Paul's claim in Romans 1, one which should be construed as to apply to all people and their worldviews, Christian and non Christian?
> 
> I can have an excuse for not accepting your position even if I cannot rebut it as of right now or even ten years from now.



If the unbeliever wants to just "hold out" for a future presupposition, then he must affirm an autonomous presupposition (one which makes such holding out intelligible). If the apologist is a good presuppositionalist, he will demonstrate that the unbeliever has no choice but to attempt to hold out while using a Christian presupposition to do so -- in which case he's not holding out at all.

----------

Clark,



chbrooking said:


> Once we have shown that the Christian theistic worldview does actually account for intelligibility, is not saying, "Any worldview that is not the Christian theistic worldview will fail to account for intelligibility" the functional equivalent of saying, "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility"?



Those are equivalent, and I would reject both, because they both make claims about worldviews that the unbeliever is not obliged to offer in his own defense (the apologist would have to offer them), in which case the apologist's claim becomes either trivial or impossible to prove.



chbrooking said:


> And if so, isn't "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility" the same as "Christian theism is necessary." -- that is, if we grant that intelligibility is possible. And if it's not, why are we having this conversation?



Both of those make implicit claims about worldviews that the unbeliever is not obliged to offer as well. When the apologist makes a claim, he has to ensure that he makes claims only about those worldviews that the unbeliever has to himself provide and put to the test.

----------

Allan,



RAS said:


> Can you please demonstrate exactly why/how classical apologetics (CA hereafter) starts with "autonomy" ("self-law", or 'law-unto-oneself"), as presuppostionalism so often asserts?



Autonomy is the idea that oneself has the prerogative to interpret reality, to self-consciously construct a philosophy about the world. This is contrary to the belief that Jehovah has the prerogative, in which case we would submit to the Bible on its own authority. CA presumes that natural men are essentially right in their philosophy of the world and just need to add a few facts -- or at least they argue as if that is the case -- whereas PA presumes that natural men are completely wrong (in principle) in their entire worldview and need to drop their autonomous presupposition.



RAS said:


> As one who takes the CA position, I fail to understand how CA acknowledging the truth of scripture(the "theonomic" starting point) in Romans 1 is "autonomy". If CA gets its view from scripture ("theonomy"), how is this "autonomy"?



If you're implying that the cosmological argument or some other theistic proof is taught as valid in Romans 1, then I would strongly disagree with that. (If you're talking about something else, please say so.)



RAS said:


> May I ask from what sources you get your understanding of CA?



My first exposure to apologetics in general was Norm Geisler's and Frank Turek's _I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist_, which was thoroughly CA/evidentialist. I also used to be a big fan of William Lane Craig's apologetic and read his arguments. And I have read through a good amount of Josh McDowell's _The New Evidence that Demands a Verdict_, which is evidentialist.

Also, I wouldn't recommend Sproul or Gerstner in understanding presuppositionalism. From the excerpts I have seen in their _Classical Apologetics_, they misunderstand it.



RAS said:


> I learned in Logic class that a circular argument is a logical fallacy. Then I am exposed to Presupp. which says that all arguments are circular.



In the way I do presuppositional apologetics, I don't even think the circularity issue would come up. The way I see it, everyone has a belief that is self-evident to him regarding who has the prerogative to interpret reality (autonomy/theonomy), and the presuppositionalist points out contradictions between this presupposition and other beliefs that the unbeliever has. The apologist then points out how his doesn't contradict. I think circularity would come up only if the argument is construed weirdly.

Personally, I don't like all the talk of circularity that has emerged in the presuppositional camp. It, like rabbit trails regarding the necessity of Christianity, only diverts from the important point: that the unbeliever is without excuse.


----------



## chbrooking

Confessor said:


> Clark,
> 
> If it's a tautology then it can't be useful. For if you tell an unbeliever that Christianity is necessary using a Christian notion of possibility and necessity, then you're really stating nothing about his worldview. If understood your statement as using an autonomous notion of possibility, then he could ask you to prove your claim (which would be impossible). If he understood your statement as using a Christian notion of possibility, then he would ask what that means for his worldview. And that that point you would say, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail." So, then, rather than going through the confusing and tautological nature of saying "Christianity is necessary," *I think it would be wiser to immediately tell the unbeliever, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail."*






Confessor said:


> Clark,
> 
> 
> 
> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> Once we have shown that the Christian theistic worldview does actually account for intelligibility, is not saying, "*Any worldview that is not the Christian theistic worldview will fail to account for intelligibility*" the functional equivalent of saying, "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility"?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Those are equivalent, and I would reject both.
Click to expand...


 I guess your only quibble is that you insist on the words, "that you attempt to offer". Is that right?


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> I guess your only quibble is that you insist on the words, "that you attempt to offer". Is that right?



That's _exactly_ right. If you don't specify that then the triviality/impossibility dilemma strikes again.


----------



## chbrooking

Okay. Fine. I'll leave you with the last word on that one.


----------



## Confessor

Amazing that we had that much discussion over such a small change, huh? God granted us understanding in the end.


----------



## chbrooking

So, the proof of the Christian God is the impossibility of you presenting any contrary worldview that can undergird our reasoning and experience.

How's that?


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> So, the proof of the Christian God is the impossibility of you presenting any contrary worldview that can undergird our reasoning and experience.
> 
> How's that?



Didn't realize we had more to cover. 

The point is that one cannot claim that the Christian God is objectively provable. Given that transcendental argumentation is indirect, it follows that a truly objective proof ("Given premises 1-5, which are necessarily true, it necessarily follows that 6") is impossible. We can't tell the unbeliever that God is provable _per se_, but we can show him that he has no choice but to accept His revelation.


----------



## ChristianTrader

Confessor said:


> CT,
> 
> 
> 
> ChristianTrader said:
> 
> 
> 
> But is not Paul's claim in Romans 1, one which should be construed as to apply to all people and their worldviews, Christian and non Christian?
> 
> I can have an excuse for not accepting your position even if I cannot rebut it as of right now or even ten years from now.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the unbeliever wants to just "hold out" for a future presupposition, then he must affirm an autonomous presupposition (one which makes such holding out intelligible). If the apologist is a good presuppositionalist, he will demonstrate that the unbeliever has no choice but to attempt to hold out while using a Christian presupposition to do so -- in which case he's not holding out at all.
Click to expand...


But the only way to reasonable make the claim that he is using a Christian presupposition is to prove that there can be no rational non Christian presupposition. But you say that such cannot be done.

But as an aside, do you believe that a person can defeat all unbelieving worldviews without first seeing Christianity? For example, let say that someone lives in some far out jungle, and has never seen a Bible etc. Someday a Muslim missionary comes out to his tribe and proselytizes him. Would he be able to refute him? Or would that imply that autonomy is possible?

CT

-----Added 6/25/2009 at 05:15:10 EST-----



chbrooking said:


> Sorry, I still don't get it. Romans 1 is explicit that nobody has an excuse.



I agree.

As I said above, my response was not to your post, but instead to a different post that was made in response to yours.

CT


----------



## Philip

Confessor said:


> Also, regarding your revised syllogism, when you say, "If any part of the whole is true, then the whole is true," are you referring to the "vital" parts of Christianity, the parts that no other worldview would have, e.g. the resurrection?



No, I am referring to _any_ part. That would include the ten commandments.

One thing that's unique about Christianity is precisely that it makes absolute exclusive claims to truth (another unique part is the grounding in history). My contention about Christianity is that there are two options 1) It's completely entirely true 2) It's utterly false--every bit of it. Why? Because Christianity is an absolute system. Only an absolute system can possibly be true.


----------



## chbrooking

Confessor said:


> The point is that one cannot claim that the Christian God is objectively provable. Given that transcendental argumentation is indirect, it follows that a truly objective proof ("Given premises 1-5, which are necessarily true, it necessarily follows that 6") is impossible. We can't tell the unbeliever that God is provable _per se_, but we can show him that he has no choice but to accept His revelation.



This is inconsistent. 
I believe our disagreement is more significant than we imagined.

-----Added 6/25/2009 at 10:06:43 EST-----

Ben,
I’m concerned that you may have structured the TAG in an autonomous fashion.

The TAG has never sought to construct a syllogistic proof of the Christian God. That would require that we be bigger than God. The incomprehensibility of our God prohibits it. In other words, if we were to be able to construct such a syllogism, we would be proving that the Christian God does NOT exist. To attempt such a syllogism is to take common (epistemological) ground with the autonomist. 

But this does NOT mean that Christianity is not OBJECTIVELY true. It is. How do we know? Well, ultimately we know by faith, through the ministry of the Holy Spirit. 

And since Christianity is objectively true, we claim as much. And then we take all comers who would dispute that claim. I have no problem whatsoever claiming the impossibility of the contrary. I do not regard it as my obligation to prove this claim on autonomous grounds, as those grounds are ruled out by the claim itself.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Clark and Ben,

There is a difference between proving the claim "The Christian worldview is necessary for rational inquiry" and what TAG _actually_ does. In practice, TAG takes a particular precondition regarding rational inquiry (for instance: induction), shows how the competing worldview (for instance: atheism) fails to account for this, and shows how Christianity is successful at accounting for it. Based on this, the Christian draws some conclusions. However, the conclusion that Christianity is necessary is not a necessary consequence of this. Rather, the apologetic is inductive in nature - it is falls short of certainty and ends up in the realm of probablilities.

Historically, TAG propponents have highly criticized those apologetic methods that provide "mere probability". In the end, this is all that TAG, itself, provides. (Yes, I know Bahnsen is rolling over in his grave.) Now, I do not hesitate to assert to the unbeliver that Christianity is necessary. In fact, I use TAG to support this claim. I just do not make the claim that TAG proves my assertion with certainty. *Here is the main point:* The following propositions are not the same...

*(1)* The Chrisitain worldview is necessary for rational inquiry.
*(2)* I can prove in an objective certain manner that the Christian worldview is necessary for rational inquiry. 

The truth of proposition (1) is grounded in the Christian God, and I have no problem trumpeting this from the house tops. It is not dependent on whether or not I have a proof for it. However, the truth of proposition (2) is dependent on the one making the claim. The apologist loses nothing by affirming (1) and denying (2). In fact, the apologist is not telling a truth when he asserts (2).

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## chbrooking

Brian, 
I don't think you and I disagree. The difference is, I don't believe that _anything_ can be proven in the manner in which you are suggesting. That is, when you say that it cannot be proven "in an objective certain manner", I would agree, if by "objective certain manner" you mean "on a non-Christian epistemological foundation." I wouldn't try to do so. That would undermine the very foundation from which I speak.


----------



## Confessor

CT,



ChristianTrader said:


> But the only way to reasonable make the claim that he is using a Christian presupposition is to prove that there can be no rational non Christian presupposition. But you say that such cannot be done.



No, all that I would have to prove is that every worldview the unbeliever _offers_ is not rational. In that case he has no choice to but to accept Christianity. If he attempts to hold out, he must hold out on the basis of some presupposition, and if the only one left to him is Christianity, then Christianity he must affirm. (If you'll look earlier at Clark's and my exchange, I was discussing the importance of not making claims about any worldviews other than those the unbeliever has to offer himself.)



ChristianTrader said:


> But as an aside, do you believe that a person can defeat all unbelieving worldviews without first seeing Christianity? For example, let say that someone lives in some far out jungle, and has never seen a Bible etc. Someday a Muslim missionary comes out to his tribe and proselytizes him. Would he be able to refute him? Or would that imply that autonomy is possible?



It doesn't require autonomy to "step inside the shoes" of another worldview and draw out its implications, so that'd be possible. That being said, it'd be rare and impressive.

----------

Philip,



P. F. Pugh said:


> No, I am referring to any part. That would include the ten commandments.



Do you mean any part in the Bible? That still would seem to be a problem. Take, for instance, "Jesus existed." Most secularists and all Muslims affirm His existence on earth.

You have to do something to limit the category if you want a single part of the system to imply the truth of the whole system.

----------

Clark,



chbrooking said:


> The TAG has never sought to construct a syllogistic proof of the Christian God. That would require that we be bigger than God. The incomprehensibility of our God prohibits it. In other words, if we were to be able to construct such a syllogism, we would be proving that the Christian God does NOT exist. To attempt such a syllogism is to take common (epistemological) ground with the autonomist.
> 
> But this does NOT mean that Christianity is not OBJECTIVELY true. It is. How do we know? Well, ultimately we know by faith, through the ministry of the Holy Spirit.



I totally agree with this. Remember my distinction before between infallible assurance and rational certainty? We can _know_ Christianity is true without any doubt, but we can't _how_ it without any doubt. Hence we cannot prove that God is objectively necessary against all humanly conceivable options; but we can show that the unbeliever has no choice but to accept Him.

----------

Brian,

That is an excellent summation. My problem was in refusing to claim what I knew the unbeliever could ask to prove, even though we know the truth of that claim by the Holy Spirit.

But I still don't know if "Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry" really means what we think it means. If we have to use the Christian notion of necessity and possibility, then that seems to be nothing more than a tautology, in which case we're revealing no new information to the unbeliever.

Or are we?


----------



## chbrooking

Why would we be willing to say, *in house*, that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry, but not be willing to say that to the non-Christian?

I fear that we've committed his fallacy by radically dividing ontology from epistemology. The fact of the matter is, the non-believer lives in the believer's world. Why can we not use language that belongs to the world the non-believer lives in? I'm not going to compromise the absolute certainty of Christian theism, simply because he wants to reason as if God didn't exist. Either Christianity is certain or it isn't. I believe it is. I believe having this discussion would not be possible if it weren't. So, I have no problem saying that Christianity is a necessary foundation for rational inquiry. I'm not going to then agree to a non-Christian interpretation of that statement and try to structure autonomous propositions to autonomously prove it. But that doesn't change the fact that what I said is true.

Why should we say this in house, but not to the non-believer? Seems disingenuous. 

I'll stick with the impossibility of the contrary. If they want to prove me wrong? Fine. Let them give it a shot.


----------



## Confessor

chbrooking said:


> Why would we be willing to say, *in house*, that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry, but not be willing to say that to the non-Christian?



I think Brian solved this. We don't have to keep it "in house"; we just have to make sure we don't claim to be able to _prove_ objective certainty. We *know* it by the Spirit but we can't *show* it via discursive argument. We can show that any worldview the unbeliever offers will crumble.



chbrooking said:


> I'll stick with the impossibility of the contrary. If they want to prove me wrong? Fine. Let them give it a shot.



Well, if you want to say, "I'll take position X and it can't be disproved," then you're committing the fallacy of ignorance. In the realm of apologetics, you can't offer the witness of the Spirit as a rational argument, so you shouldn't claim the impossibility of the contrary _as if you can prove it_. You have to make the claim that you are willing to prove slightly lower, namely that any worldview the unbeliever will offer will be destroyed.


----------



## cih1355

Could someone explain why atheism cannot account for the laws of logic?


----------



## Confessor

cih1355 said:


> Could someone explain why atheism cannot account for the laws of logic?



It's not really a matter of being unable to "account for" them. Rather, it is contradictory for atheists to believe that the universe is basically open and contingent ("anything can happen") and also that it is rationally structured by universal, immaterial laws of logic.


----------



## cih1355

> No, we should speak plain English, like everyone else. The problem I find with presuppositionalism is that it can't speak to the layman, only to the philosopher. Any apologetic that cannot be understood equally by a layman and an academic is useless. If you have to define every term so precisely, then you'll end up boring your audience to tears. An impractical apologetic is a useless apologetic.



In the book, _Faith Has Its Reasons_, there is a fictitious conversation between a presuppositionalist and some unbelievers. The following link has the chapter that contains that conversation: http://www.kenboa.org/downloads/pdf/FHIR15ReformedAuthorityofRevelationrevisions.pdf


----------



## chbrooking

Confessor said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> 
> I'll stick with the impossibility of the contrary. If they want to prove me wrong? Fine. Let them give it a shot.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Well, if you want to say, "I'll take position X and it can't be disproved," then you're committing the fallacy of ignorance. In the realm of apologetics, you can't offer the witness of the Spirit as a rational argument, so you shouldn't claim the impossibility of the contrary _as if you can prove it_. You have to make the claim that you are willing to prove slightly lower, namely that any worldview the unbeliever will offer will be destroyed.
Click to expand...


You are saying the same thing in different words.

You hold me to a standard of proof that, not only don't I accept, were I to accept it, it would disprove my position. I don't mind saying "impossibility of the contrary", since the contrary would involve a view of possibility that won't stand up to scrutiny. I don't mind saying "impossibility of the contrary" -- even if you regard it as tautologous, since the non-believer is actually going to function in accord with the world he actually lives in--not the one he purports to live in. When he tries to demand a proof based on autonomy, I will refuse. When he says that I'm being illogical, we'll pursue that. But you and I are running in circles. We agree on methodology. I'm not so interested in this formulation dispute -- particularly when there are people with matters of substance to attend to.


----------



## Confessor

Sounds good to me, Clark.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Gents,

For the most part, this thread has been profitible for me. I think we all have found some common ground, and it blesses me that this happened. With that said, I want to throw two things out that will probably open a can of worms. Even though they are related to all that we have been discussing, they may deserve seperate threads in and of themselves (probably in the philosophy section). If you think they do, then let me know and I will start a new thread. Here we go...



*(1)* The criticisms regarding human autonomous reasoning _as framed at various points in this thread_ apply to everyone - even those who say they have a theonomic worldview. As such, too sharp a distinction has been drawn. 

I believe in the distinction between worldviews that assert "Man is the measure of all things" and those that assert "We must submit our rationality to God's revelation." However, I think there is some confusion as to what this really means.



*(2)* In terms of the revelation that God has chosen to give mankind, we cannot eliminate the possibility that God is a quadrinity. 

Now, I do not believe that God is a quadrinity. I believe Scripture clearly has revealed to us that God is a Trinity. Yet, our understanding of this is fallible. I think there is a parrallel to Judiasm's view of God. Even though one can reasonably argue that the revelation of the OT taken by itself asserted a unity, it did not do so in an absolute sense. The idea is that mankind cannot eliminate the possibility that God in His infinite wisdom has chosen not to reveal the fourth person of the Quadrinity. 

OK, please do not skewer me. I just throw these ideas out to see if anyone is interested in discussing them. Both (1) and (2) relate to what was discussed in this thread.

Sincerely,

Brian


----------



## Confessor

Brian,

Do you still want me to address (1)? I thought I answered that adequately in our email exchange.

Regarding (2), I have been looking through a relevant thread, and I agree that we cannot have philosophical certainty on...anything, which includes the Trinity. But this is distinct from an infallible assurance, as Rev. Winzer put it. I'm still unsettled on the issue.

Nonetheless, I can say that if it is true, it would be a distinctly _Christian_ quadrinity. It would not be a separate worldview at all.

-----Added 6/25/2009 at 03:51:13 EST-----

May I add that in that thread Davidius makes a good post:

The point some have been making is that the explanation begs the question. I don't see how the claim that the Holy Spirit guides true believers into the truth proves anything. It simply leaves the matter open to assertion. Clark and Robbins specifically pointed this out when critiquing Lewis' "Mere Christianity." In order to know the true believers, you have to know whether Consubstantialism or Subordinationism is true. To know which is right, you have to know which group the Holy Spirit led. It's a giant circle. If it makes plain sense to some, I wish it made as much plain sense to me, but that doesn't mean I'm being purposefully ignorant or maliciously contrary.​
To this I would reply that the Trinity is derived from Scripture and therefore true (it's not based on the authority of the interpreter). We have reason to believe the Bible is true self-evidently, on its own authority. Therefore the Trinity follows linearly from the Bible. The fact that the Trinity has existed for two millennia provides probabilistic evidence for its veracity as well.

However, dealing with philosophical certainty, I have a few things to say, but they are contingent on whether the Bible teaches (1) that God is no more than three persons or (2) that God is at least three persons. I would heavily lean towards the former, but I honestly don't know enough to say that.

If (1) is true, then we have as much certainty that God cannot be a quadrinity as that our senses are reliable. This does mean there is a possibility we are wrong, but it is kind of a worthless possibility.

If (2) is true, then we have less certainty, but we still can know with good certainty that we ought to think of God as triune.


----------



## Brian Bosse

Hello Ben,

I will respond to your email. I think some people's conception of human autonomy is problematic. As such, it might be helpful to discuss this point and make everything very explicit.

As far as the other thread went, Rev. Wizner is wrong. I see in Scripture where it speaks of the Holy Spirit leading us into all truth, but yet we do not enjoy unity of doctrine. Sure, we may enjoy essential unity, but this does not amount to the claim that "it is impossible for the Trinity to be false." I doubt you will find this kind of appeal being made at Nicea. If you notice from the thread, I spent time defining in clear terms my assertions, in return I was questioned as to whether or not I was even a Christian. The reponse was personal when instead it should have been dealing with my arguments. 



> Nonetheless, I can say that if it is true, it would be a distinctly Christian quadrinity. It would not be a separate worldview at all.



I agree that if it (quadrinity) were true, then it would be _THE_ Christian worldview. But I disagree with you that it would not be a seperate worldview. Either God is a trinity or He is not. He cannot be both.

Brian


----------



## Confessor

Brian,

Looking through that thread, I don't think people were questioning your Christianity as much as trying to draw implications from the fact that you actually were a Christian. When Rev. Winzer asked if you were, he immediately preceded it with "Dear brother," implying that he viewed you as a fellow Christian.

Also, the quadrinitarian worldview would definitely be a different worldview; perhaps I should have said it would not be a non-Christian worldview (it wouldn't stand as an "opponent" to the presuppositionalist). That's what I meant by "a separate worldview"; I was unclear.


----------



## Philip

Part of my personal trouble here is that I always insist on being more or less consistent with any presuppositions (defined broadly here) that I have, which is why I am always critical of a system where I see a logical conclusion that I know is wrong. The problem that I am seeing with presupp is precisely theonomy. If theonomy (as you have defined it--ie, no epistemological common ground) is true philosophically, then it is true politically, because I would then have to reject all natural law theory as autonomous. I have serious doubts about this and feel much more comfortable not adopting presuppositions that lead in a direction where the logical conclusion is false.



Confessor said:


> Do you mean any part in the Bible? That still would seem to be a problem. Take, for instance, "Jesus existed." Most secularists and all Muslims affirm His existence on earth.



Yes, I do mean that. Christianity is grounded in history, after all. That's the thing with the Bible: you can't take one part as true and leave the rest. It leaves no middle ground.



> You have to do something to limit the category if you want a single part of the system to imply the truth of the whole system.



No, I really don't. A premise that I have come to accept is that no worldview can possibly be true unless it claims absolute exclusivity. I maintain that even Islam does not do this, since it never really claims _knowledge_ of Allah. 

Atheism comes close, in its assertion of a universal negative, but ends up being (practically) agnosticism, where it simply asks to be proven wrong. Atheism does claim exclusivity in theory, while in practice it never does, instead falling back on claiming that theism has a burden of proof (granted, it does, but taken together, the arguments for theism present more than adequate proof--provided that the atheist is _really_ listening, which he usually isn't). Plus, there's always Plantinga's evolutionary proof for God's existence (essentially proving that the theory of evolution assumes God's existence in practical terms).

Again, I'm trying to avoid some errors here. I've already stated some of my issues with theonomy. I also can't help but think that there's a path from presuppositionalism through fideism to straight-out neo-orthodoxy. I'm not saying it's a necessary path, I just have to do research on Van Til. Specifically, I'm hoping to determine how far he followed Kuyper and how much influence from Kant there is.

Part of it also is that I tend more toward analytic philosophy (Gordon Clark, Thomas Reid, etc) than continental philosophy (Kuyper, Van Til, Kant, Barth, etc). A presuppositional position on my part would tend to lean more toward Clark than Van Til for that reason alone (though I have clear disagreement with Clark--I think that God has non-rational aspects).

As for quadrinity, Brian, your argument is starting to sound somewhat like my argument that God has a feminine aspect (note: I do not think I am heretical in saying this: woman was created in God's image. I would say that in His relation to us, God is most definitely masculine. For the feminine to exist, it must have its source in God, though--it's a separate issue, though, so I won't go into details).


----------



## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> If theonomy (as you have defined it--ie, no epistemological common ground) is true philosophically, then it is true politically, because I would then have to reject all natural law theory as autonomous. I have serious doubts about this and feel much more comfortable not adopting presuppositions that lead in a direction where the logical conclusion is false.



I apologize, but this seems nothing else than an appeal to undesirable consequences. You are not positing a conclusion that is false (in which case you'd be using a _reductio ad absurdum_), but rather one that you dislike (e.g. belief that homosexuals ought to be executed).

I say this unless you actually have an argument against Theonomy, in which case we can discuss that elsewhere. But for now, it's certainly far from a given that Theonomy is outright false. (By the way, I capitalize "Theonomy" to help distinguish it from epistemological theonomy.)



P. F. Pugh said:


> Yes, I do mean that. Christianity is grounded in history, after all. That's the thing with the Bible: you can't take one part as true and leave the rest. It leaves no middle ground.



What do you make of the proposition "Jesus existed"? Muslims believe that too. There are many things in the Bible that could be true without implying the complete truthfulness of it.


----------



## AThornquist

Presuppositionalism Q&A? Sweet.

Here's my Q: If there were two or three books I should read to have a basic grasp of presuppositionalism, what would they be? I was going to study the topic at a later time but a pastor has asked me to be a part of an Ethics class he teaches at a local JC (class starts this next semester in about a month and a half). He says it will be primarily a debate class and, as the conservative Christian, I will be _vastly_ opposed. I can dig it, but I need to be preparing.

Thank you


----------



## chbrooking

Philip,

Yes, please discuss theonomy elsewhere. Ben and I agree on presuppositional apologetics, but disagree on theonomy. They are two discrete topics. Going there will certainly derail the thread.

Also, you missed Ben's point about "Jesus existed". You seemed to define an absolute system as a system in which any one part's truth implies the whole system's truth.  Ben's point was that, since there are non-Christian systems that affirm that Jesus existed, would their whole system, then, be true? That's what it sounded like you were saying. And that's why Ben brought in the Jesus existed thing.

-----Added 6/26/2009 at 01:20:06 EST-----

Andrew,
My opinion would be, in this order,

Pratt's Every Thought Captive (because it was written for 8th graders, I think, it's a pretty good overview that avoids a lot of prerequisites in terms of philosophical training).

Then, Van Til's Why I Believe in God (a small pamphlet, but very good)

Then, and here's where you'll really get an advanced study, Bahnsen's big book on Van Til (can't remember title)

That said, I actually got my initial grasp of Van Til from a few Bahnsen tapes. He was teaching apologetics to a bunch of laymen in upstate New York. He was sick when they were recorded, so the quality is awful. I don't think they are commercially available. I found them in the basement of WTS' (East) library. That's what gave me the "aha" moment.

The three I suggested are all quite different. I don't think you'll fully get it from Pratt. Van Til's pamphlet will let you see it in action. Having read Pratt, it will probably make sense to you. But when you get into Bahnsen, be prepared to read pages two or three times -- and there are a LOT of pages. Keep some ice handy for your brain.





AThornquist said:


> Presuppositionalism Q&A? Sweet.
> 
> Here's my Q: If there were two or three books I should read to have a basic grasp of presuppositionalism, what would they be? I was going to study the topic at a later time but a pastor has asked me to be a part of an Ethics class he teaches at a local JC (class starts this next semester in about a month and a half). He says it will be primarily a debate class and, as the conservative Christian, I will be _vastly_ opposed. I can dig it, but I need to be preparing.
> 
> Thank you


----------



## Confessor

AThornquist said:


> Presuppositionalism Q&A? Sweet.
> 
> Here's my Q: If there were two or three books I should read to have a basic grasp of presuppositionalism, what would they be? I was going to study the topic at a later time but a pastor has asked me to be a part of an Ethics class he teaches at a local JC (class starts this next semester in about a month and a half). He says it will be primarily a debate class and, as the conservative Christian, I will be _vastly_ opposed. I can dig it, but I need to be preparing.
> 
> Thank you



Well, if you want a good presuppositionalist critique of secularist ethics, I heartily recommend Bahnsen's _Theonomy in Christian Ethics_. You don't even have to accept Theonomy to benefit from the chapter that critiques secularist ethics. I believe the chapter is "The Failure of Autonomy" or something similar.

If you want a good primer for presuppositionalism in general, I would recommend _Always Ready_ by Bahnsen. I have not read the book but I have heard good things. Personally I love _Van Til's Apologetic_ by Bahnsen, but that is significantly longer. I think you can easily tackle _Always Ready_ in a month and a half. And of course you can always return to this thread if you have questions. 

And Clark's recommendations are good as well. (His third rec is in fact _Van Til's Apologetic_ in case there might be confusion on that.)


----------



## chbrooking

Thanks, Ben. I was just in it yesterday, but couldn't remember the title.


----------



## Brian Withnell

Hmmm. I'd like to add my  and  a little.

What I think of in terms of presupposition apologetics is that it is using the inconsistency of the unbeliever's life with his stated presuppositions to show that from a practical viewpoint, he denies his own thesis.

What I think of from a classical apologetic approach is attempting to argue the unbeliever into believing based on some common ground.

The presupposition apologist would say that there isn't any logical common ground that will make any difference ... the full set of presuppositions of the unbeliever include "there is no god" and he will reject any argument that contradicts that presupposition.

The classical apologist would believe that the unbeliever has enough common logical ground to be convinced of the truth of Biblical Christianity if the argument is properly applied.

I might be wrong on that, but I'm sure someone would point it out if I am.

My take: no individual will be convinced by argument into the Kingdom of God by either method, but God will by the power of the Holy Spirit, use both methods to call to himself those that he chose from before the foundation of the world to himself. He will also use proclaimation of the Word, without apology, to convict the elect of sin, convince them of the need for Christ, and cause them to be regenerated by his Holy Spirit so they embrace Christ and live. By the same token, he will use all these things to condemn more thoroughly the reprobate for not only suppressing the truth in unrighteousness, but trampling underfoot the grace of the the Lord Jesus, and counting the blood of Christ as an unholy thing.

The reprobate do not reject God for lack of knowledge. The reprobate reject God for lack of ability to accept him, and the blackness of their sin. It is a moral issue, not an issue of knowledge.


----------



## AThornquist

Well then for now I am all set! Thanks, guys! $70 spent at WTS Books and I got just about all you suggested and another book I wanted as well. That _Van Til's Apologetic_ looks like it is going to be a beast though.


----------



## Confessor

AThornquist said:


> Well then for now I am all set! Thanks, guys! $70 spent at WTS Books and I got just about all you suggested and another book I wanted as well. That _Van Til's Apologetic_ looks like it is going to be a beast though.



To hear that someone thought enough of my (and Clark's) advice to immediately spend that kinda cash brightens my day. Unfortunately it is nearing 3 AM here in Ohio so my day will not last much longer.


----------



## Brian Withnell

Confessor said:


> Unfortunately it is nearing 3 AM here in Ohio so my day will not last much longer.



Light-weight! 

I will have to go to bed sometime tonight, but for now ... fun!


----------



## Confessor

Brian Withnell said:


> I might be wrong on that, but I'm sure someone would point it out if I am.



You're not, as long as when you said, _"the full set of presuppositions of the unbeliever include 'there is no god' and he will reject any argument that contradicts that presupposition,"_ you meant of course that the unbeliever is behaving perfectly consistently with his presupposition. (And I'm pretty sure you do mean that.)



Brian Withnell said:


> The reprobate do not reject God for lack of knowledge. The reprobate reject God for lack of ability to accept him, and the blackness of their sin. It is a moral issue, not an issue of knowledge.



You're absolutely right. This fact, combined with the fact that most people who are so-called "intellectually opposed" to the Gospel are in fact more morally opposed than others, has led me to regard apologetics much less as a means to evangelism than as a way to strengthen present believers' faith and to protect the Church from intellectual enemies.

Please note that this does not mean that I wouldn't use kindness (the best I can) in offering my apologetic in hopes of bringing unbelievers to repentance. Nor does it mean that I don't attempt to bring unbelievers to repentance via apologetics. I am merely stating my goals for it in light of the circumstances.

(By the way, when I mention my attempt to bring unbelievers to repentance via apologetics, I mean my attempt to be one of God's appointed second causes in bringing someone to repentance. I obviously do nothing of myself throughout the entire process.)


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## Brian Withnell

Confessor said:


> Brian Withnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> I might be wrong on that, but I'm sure someone would point it out if I am.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You're not, as long as when you said, _"the full set of presuppositions of the unbeliever include 'there is no god' and he will reject any argument that contradicts that presupposition,"_ you meant of course that the unbeliever is behaving perfectly consistently with his presupposition. (And I'm pretty sure you do mean that.)
> 
> 
> 
> Brian Withnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> The reprobate do not reject God for lack of knowledge. The reprobate reject God for lack of ability to accept him, and the blackness of their sin. It is a moral issue, not an issue of knowledge.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> You're absolutely right. This fact, combined with the fact that most people who are so-called "intellectually opposed" to the Gospel are in fact more morally opposed than others, has led me to regard apologetics much less as a means to evangelism than as a way to strengthen present believers' faith and to protect the Church from intellectual enemies.
> 
> Please note that this does not mean that I wouldn't use kindness (the best I can) in offering my apologetic in hopes of bringing unbelievers to repentance. Nor does it mean that I don't attempt to bring unbelievers to repentance via apologetics. I am merely stating my goals for it in light of the circumstances.
> 
> (By the way, when I mention my attempt to bring unbelievers to repentance via apologetics, I mean my attempt to be one of God's appointed second causes in bringing someone to repentance. I obviously do nothing of myself throughout the entire process.)
Click to expand...


Changed the color to red in the part I have a question about. I would think that the reprobate live _*inconsistently*_ with their presupposition that there is no God ... they borrow from the Christian world-view any time they even mention right and wrong, good and bad, or complain about someone giving them a raw deal. Yes?


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## Philip

Confessor said:


> I apologize, but this seems nothing else than an appeal to undesirable consequences. You are not positing a conclusion that is false (in which case you'd be using a reductio ad absurdum), but rather one that you dislike (e.g. belief that homosexuals ought to be executed).



I have biblical reasons for disliking it, but this isn't the thread, methinks. There's some intuitive knowledge at play here as well--in addition to directions that I have seen most theonomists (with the notable exception of Bahnsen) moving in.



chbrooking said:


> Also, you missed Ben's point about "Jesus existed". You seemed to define an absolute system as a system in which any one part's truth implies the whole system's truth. Ben's point was that, since there are non-Christian systems that affirm that Jesus existed, would their whole system, then, be true?



No. For the simple reason that they are not absolute systems. Islam, Judaism, etc leave an out. Judaism, as practiced today, no longer claims exclusivity in any form whatsoever. As for Islam, they end up claiming to know nothing. They both fail to pass my litmus test for an absolute system.


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## chbrooking

With all due respect, Philip, I don't really find that you have questions that you would like a presuppositionalist to answer (see original post). You seem to just want to vent against (a shallow and erroneous view of) PA. As a general rule, you completely ignore the substance of our posts in your replies. Maybe you should start your own thread, like "Classical Apologetics Q&A".


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## The Calvin Knight

Bahnsen's "Pushing the Antithesis" is also quite good (Bahnsen didn't actually write it I believe, I'm pretty sure it was based off a series of lectures he did). It gives a good overview of the presuppositional approach and you don't need much knowledge of philosophy to understand it (he does a fairly good job of defining and explaining the philosophical terms that are used). Bahnsen also has a series of lectures on youtube that may be helpful. 
YouTube - gregbahnsen's Channel
Here is also a cite that has a bunch of articles written by and about Van Til on a number of topics: www.vantil.info
Otherwise the books mentioned above by Clark and Ben are must reads.


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## chbrooking

Yes. They borrow from the Christian worldview (which they know deep down is true) whenever they do or say ANYTHING.



Brian Withnell said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Brian Withnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> I might be wrong on that, but I'm sure someone would point it out if I am.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You're not, as long as when you said, _"the full set of presuppositions of the unbeliever include 'there is no god' and he will reject any argument that contradicts that presupposition,"_ you meant of course that the unbeliever is behaving perfectly consistently with his presupposition. (And I'm pretty sure you do mean that.)
> 
> 
> 
> Brian Withnell said:
> 
> 
> 
> The reprobate do not reject God for lack of knowledge. The reprobate reject God for lack of ability to accept him, and the blackness of their sin. It is a moral issue, not an issue of knowledge.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> You're absolutely right. This fact, combined with the fact that most people who are so-called "intellectually opposed" to the Gospel are in fact more morally opposed than others, has led me to regard apologetics much less as a means to evangelism than as a way to strengthen present believers' faith and to protect the Church from intellectual enemies.
> 
> Please note that this does not mean that I wouldn't use kindness (the best I can) in offering my apologetic in hopes of bringing unbelievers to repentance. Nor does it mean that I don't attempt to bring unbelievers to repentance via apologetics. I am merely stating my goals for it in light of the circumstances.
> 
> (By the way, when I mention my attempt to bring unbelievers to repentance via apologetics, I mean my attempt to be one of God's appointed second causes in bringing someone to repentance. I obviously do nothing of myself throughout the entire process.)
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Changed the color to red in the part I have a question about. I would think that the reprobate live _*inconsistently*_ with their presupposition that there is no God ... they borrow from the Christian world-view any time they even mention right and wrong, good and bad, or complain about someone giving them a raw deal. Yes?
Click to expand...


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## Confessor

Brian Withnell said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> 
> You're not, as long as when you said, _"the full set of presuppositions of the unbeliever include 'there is no god' and he will reject any argument that contradicts that presupposition,"_ you meant of course that the unbeliever is behaving perfectly consistently with his presupposition. (And I'm pretty sure you do mean that.)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Changed the color to red in the part I have a question about. I would think that the reprobate live _*inconsistently*_ with their presupposition that there is no God ... they borrow from the Christian world-view any time they even mention right and wrong, good and bad, or complain about someone giving them a raw deal. Yes?
Click to expand...


Yes, I agree with that. I meant that regarding the specific situation where they "weigh the evidence" for God's existence, if they were consistent in their unbelief in that pinpointed instance, then they would reject the conclusion that God exists.

-----Added 6/26/2009 at 12:26:03 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> [Regarding Jesus' existence]
> 
> No. For the simple reason that they are not absolute systems. Islam, Judaism, etc leave an out. Judaism, as practiced today, no longer claims exclusivity in any form whatsoever. As for Islam, they end up claiming to know nothing. They both fail to pass my litmus test for an absolute system.



I'm not quite understanding your criteria for what an "absolute system" is, and why something has to actually make a _claim_ to exclusivity in order to be one.

It seems as if you're defining a category that only Christianity can fit into, and then you impose a superfluous criterion (if one part is true, then the whole is true) in order to make your case. But if Christianity is the only worldview in that category, then there's no point in having such a criterion.


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## Philip

Clark, it may just be that my understanding of presupp (or any system) is always filtered through what I see as its logical conclusions. For example, I critique atheism by filtering through what I would be like as an atheist (amoral and selfish). If the conclusion is manifestly false, then the premises were false.



Confessor said:


> I'm not quite understanding your criteria for what an "absolute system" is, and why something has to actually make a claim to exclusivity in order to be one.



My criterion for an absolute system is that it must claim to be exclusive--precisely because truth is always exclusive. If the truth isn't sure of itself enough to claim that it is absolutely true, then it's not True Truth.

The thing about an absolute system is that it's either true or it isn't. "God exists" is either true or false. There are, in fact, no shades of possibility around it (possible world theory doesn't apply to God, because He has necessary existence). In fact, this could be said of any absolute statement except that many (ie: unicorns exist) are ones on which we would have to suspend judgment for lack of evidence. 

At any rate, I'm leaving tomorrow for vacation and will be back after the 4th of July. Hopefully by then I'll have read Calvin's _Institutes_ and have thought out a more complete epistemological alternative to presuppositionalism. I have a respect for presupp--I just see it leading in directions I can't go.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> Clark, it may just be that my understanding of presupp (or any system) is always filtered through what I see as its logical conclusions. For example, I critique atheism by filtering through what I would be like as an atheist (amoral and selfish). If the conclusion is manifestly false, then the premises were false.



That's perfectly fine -- so long as the conclusions you think are false are actually false. Again, this would signify the importance of espousing your views on some other thread; if you have good reason to believe why Theonomy is wrong I want to hear it. Let's not keep our views all to ourselves. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> My criterion for an absolute system is that it must claim to be exclusive--precisely because truth is always exclusive. If the truth isn't sure of itself enough to claim that it is absolutely true, then it's not True Truth.



Do you mean it has to have a revelation which claims this? I know a lot of atheists who claim absolute truth for their position.



P. F. Pugh said:


> The thing about an absolute system is that it's either true or it isn't. "God exists" is either true or false. There are, in fact, no shades of possibility around it (possible world theory doesn't apply to God, because He has necessary existence). In fact, this could be said of any absolute statement except that many (ie: unicorns exist) are ones on which we would have to suspend judgment for lack of evidence.



That propositions are either true or false does not necessitate that a system of propositions is either wholly true or wholly false.

I hope you enjoy your vacation (especially the _Institutes_ part )!


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## Philip

Real quick.



Confessor said:


> Do you mean it has to have a revelation which claims this? I know a lot of atheists who claim absolute truth for their position.



Not necessarily a revelation. Don't forget that atheism is a proposition, not a system. Existentialism is a system that may or may not be atheistic, but atheism itself is a proposition.



> That propositions are either true or false does not necessitate that a system of propositions is either wholly true or wholly false.



An absolute system, where the truth of one proposition is inextricably tied with the truth of all the others (such as Christianity), would be either wholly true or wholly false. With Christ, there are two options: acceptance or rejection. The idea is to get the unbeliever to a point where those are his options. We're eliminating the middle ground (as opposed to common ground).

Anyway, I'm gone.


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## Confessor

P. F. Pugh said:


> Not necessarily a revelation. Don't forget that atheism is a proposition, not a system. Existentialism is a system that may or may not be atheistic, but atheism itself is a proposition.



In that case there are still atheistic _systems_.



P. F. Pugh said:


> An absolute system, where the truth of one proposition is inextricably tied with the truth of all the others (such as Christianity), would be either wholly true or wholly false. With Christ, there are two options: acceptance or rejection. The idea is to get the unbeliever to a point where those are his options. We're eliminating the middle ground (as opposed to common ground).



It is true that an absolute system "where the truth of one proposition is inextricably tied with the truth of all the others" would be either wholly true or wholly false, but I don't see how Christianity is one such system. Again, take the proposition "Jesus existed." Other worldviews share this. They might view it in a different light (e.g. "The God-man existed" versus "That hippie from Nazareth existed"), and they might not be able to say that Jesus existed without contradicting their presupposition; but nonetheless that proposition is in fact present in worldviews other than Christianity.


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## chbrooking

I'm not sure that I understand the "proposition" versus "system" statement. It seems to me that this "proposition" controls all evaluation of evidence, which would suggest that it is, in fact, an underlying assumption or "systemless system" if we can imagine such.

If an atheist were giving a lecture and a prophet stood up and said, "Here's proof", and subsequently the atheist's notes began to levitate and flew across the room, apart from the quickening of the Holy Spirit, the atheist would have to conclude (based on his system of ultimate contingency) that there is some physical force at work heretofore undiscovered. In other words, a naturalistic explanation must be behind the event. That is, his atheism governs his evaluation of evidence. That's pretty systemic, don't you think? 

On the other hand, you are right. He's asserting the proposition (which he then takes as his system), but he can only make that assertion by first assuming the Christian system. Otherwise, his assertion doesn't make sense. Language doesn't make sense in his espoused world of ultimate contingency.


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## AThornquist

So my books came today!  I have been flipping around in Van Til's Apologetic by Bahnsen and even at first glance there is some great information. This book is no joke though. I'm kind of happy I'll be starting with the smaller ones (probably Van Til's pamphlet "Why I Believe in God" even though it smells funky). Thanks again for the suggestions!


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## chbrooking

> even though it smells funky



Is that metaphor? Are you talking about the argument or the pages?


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## AThornquist

chbrooking said:


> even though it smells funky
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Is that metaphor? Are you talking about the argument or the pages?
Click to expand...


Well, I opened _Van Til's Apologetic_ and flipped through and it had that lovely new book smell. I opened Van Til's little pamphlet and it smelled almost medicinal and made my nostrils tingle.


----------

