# Clark: Scientific Reasoning is fallacious



## RamistThomist (Jan 31, 2005)

I read this and was wondering what ye think of it. It seems, and I don't disagree that much, that Clark is trying to say that all scientific reasoning is fallacious, especially when it is set up as affirming the consequent.

If Hypothesis H is true, then Experiment E will produce results R.
Experiment E does produce results R.
Therefore, Hypothesis H is true.

What do you think?


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## LaMontre (Jan 31, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Draught Horse_
> I read this and was wondering what ye think of it. It seems, and I don't disagree that much, that Clark is trying to say that all scientific reasoning is fallacious, especially when it is set up as affirming the consequent.
> 
> If Hypothesis H is true, then Experiment E will produce results R.
> ...



I think science has it's uses. However I think it is far too often used to judge Gods word. And form that perspective it is terribly wanting.

How often has the church embraced a scientific discovery as truth only to discover later that this has been disproven and thereby the church has been teaching a lie?

Some things are undeniable observable and provable and those are science. 

Somethings are scientifically unprovable and those are beliefs. 

We should beware the difference.

(My second post and I'm already being controversial? So be it.)


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

I'm not sure I would agree with that Paul. Last year I read everything Clark wrote. I don't ascribe to his ideas, but I did find that his arguments around some of the scientific method stuff was helpful.

Science, at its best, is just guessing. Overall, that was his point. Not that he, you or I are afraid of science. But scientists have such a hard time beleiving that point that its worthy to press.

For example, I went to the doctor because my tailbone was killing me about 5 years ago. I couldn't sit down. He told me what was wrong and then he said that is where our "tails" used to be. I laughed. He smiled. I rbought him to the place where he had to confess, "yes, its hypothesis, and no, I dont' really know." As a matter of fact, he had to say, "You're right, I am guessing at everything." Then, I told him I knew someone who had all the facts, and who was there in the beginning - God. God knows everythings, yada yada yada.

So i like the argument that sciencne is fallacious even in things that you deem "necessary." Are they necessarily so on Saturn? Venus? Or in another galaxy? Are they necessary so given an infinitude of various probabilities in the experiement? Not really.

Helpful? Yes, science is. Exact? Not even close.


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## RamistThomist (Jan 31, 2005)

On face value I really like Clark's argument. I am going to look at Van Til on science as well--Paul, where would you recommend I start?


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## ChristianTrader (Jan 31, 2005)

So Paul, what did you think of John Byl?

CT


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## fredtgreco (Jan 31, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> Fourth, when did scienctific reasoning start? Please don't tell me you have bought into the myth that it started with the Greeks.



What do you believe is the answer to this question Paul? Just curious, not really that interested in this thread.


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## ChristianTrader (Jan 31, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by webmaster_
> ...



One problem is that on many/most fronts scientific arguments are purported to be necessary. Hey this theory helps to do X, Y and Z. Therefore it must be right (or at the very least more right than the theory that it replaced). This is seen everyday in scientific fields.

CT

[Edited on 1-2-2005 by ChristianTrader]


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## ChristianTrader (Jan 31, 2005)

> _Originally posted by fredtgreco_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> ...



Has anyone defined scientific reasoning yet?

CT


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## Ianterrell (Jan 31, 2005)

Hermonta, why don't you do so...aren't you going to be a Scientist?


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

Paul, 

I was speaking to this:



> so they just find it easier to say that all scientific reasoning is fallacious.



So I guess you didn't mean what you said?



> you can still be an anti realist without saying that 'all scientific reasoning is fallacious'



That's why I said what I said.



> I'd like to see a rebuttle to what i said about Adam. Unless "science" is predjudicially defined so as to exclude Adam then you'd have to say that Adam reasoned fallaciously before the fall.



I didn't know Adam took God out of the equation. Aren't we all talking about "science" as in "secularism applied to empiricism?"



> Fourth, when did scienctific reasoning start? Please don't tell me you have bought into the myth that it started with the Greeks.



It started with the Greeks because I buy into all myths.


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

> And, we aren't talking about "science" as in "secularism applied to empiricism?"



Oh, OK.



> Matt, do you believe that "science" means "to take God out of the equation?" So, based on this info you can see why I said the above.



Ahhhhhhh, no. Did I say that? Paul, you can be so difficult sometimes -REALLY. I thought you paid attention to words? 

I agree, though, Clark is refuted by not only Adam, but also the saints in heaven. There is quite alot of reasoning going on there, and lots of experimental relationalism.

[Edited on 2-1-2005 by webmaster]


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

You would have to believe in common grace for that to be the case. I'd rather say God's indicriminate providence.

Do they occasionally get things right? Yes, but only from our worldview that houses truth. One must make a distinction between secular science, and science.


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## JohnV (Jan 31, 2005)

I'm with Paul on this one, in the main. On what basis does one deny the validity of science? On science? I mean, you have to show me the proofs that science is invalid, don't you? Well, that's science too. 

I see, though, that we're working with different ideas of what "science" means. I would agree with Matt that the doctor was wrong in his statements, but I would not call his view scientific by a long shot. I think Matt showed well that its not science as much as it is merely generally accepted speculation. So its popular, and most everyone beleives it; but that doesn't make it right. Nor does it make it science just because scientists are the ones giving us such theories. Science is the small amount of actual work on the facts that is supposed to undergird that speculation that man used to have tails. What it is is one part factual, and ninety-nine parts extrapolation, fantasy, and extrapolation on fantasy. But that ninety-nine parts is not science just because the one part is. 

Real science got us to the moon; and the lack of it got us into trouble. Now we're back to doing the real science to make space exploration safe again. We're not playing with theories, but with facts, and real logic, and solid and tested conclusions. Otherwise we would not dare send men up again.

All this talk about the ancient past is nothing more than a lot of hoopla with only a very little oomph to it. (Just thought I'd keep the jargon very scientific.) 

When did it start? I agree with Paul: it started already in the garden of Eden.


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## RamistThomist (Jan 31, 2005)

I need to clarify one thing on both sides;

When I said *ALL* I was quoting from Boa & Bowman's book on apologetics, _Faith Has its Reasons_. I have yet to make up my mind on this. On face value I do like the attack on *secularistic science, as I have seen this line of reasoning used by evolutionists. On the other hand, it does appear that Adam used induction in the garden. I am enjoying the discussion, though. Thanks CT and Paul.


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

They aren't infinitely omniscient.


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

Your right. I'm punchy. The weather here changed and sinus' are blaring with a headachae. I'll slow down.


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by webmaster_
> ...



You miss my point I think. think through it this way: Science must have a philosophy of life. If it does not, then it cannot furnish anyone with any real information about anything at all. How could it? A statement of fact is not an explanation. It is the very thing that needs to be explained. In this way, science explains nothing at all. 

Scientists have attempted to rid themselves of the dilemma that science explains nothing. Some embraced the mechanistic model to cover their tracks. This taught that the universe worked a certain way and as a result of this “mechanistic” model, universal laws could be established. But that goes back to asking, can science establish the truth of anything? Would it be right or wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence? If this is true, then how can science possibly ascertain the sum total of a given “thing” (whatever that “thing” may be) in order to verify it? If science is contained in a laboratory setting, how can it possibly give universal laws of nature an absolutism? How can they possible describe how nature works as a whole? Actually, the scientists knows he cannot, but he gives his best guess. 

Paul, think of this, even in mathematical equations about a given “fact” the actual weight of an object or length of a measurement is never perfect. It is always plus or minus some amount, no matter how small that measurement may be. That was what we learned when we took a straight ruler and dropped it on the grounf once. It still looks straight, but its not. Its crooked. As a matter of fact, it was crooked before we dropped it because its not perfect. So science is never working with a perfect environment, not a universal environment. Can science tell me anything? They can guess, but can they factually tell me that what they conclude is universally true - infinitely omnisciently true? Not really. Scientists simply choose from an infinite number of possibilities what they think is best for the situation at hand. If mathematical equations alone could describe nature, for instance, the chance that the scientist will choose the correct formulation is one in infinity (or zero). Therefore, in reality, all the laws of physics are false. They are guesses.

Because of this great conundrum of absolutes, science does not claim to have “absolute truth.” This is especially true of the 21st century secular thinker. There is that word "secular" I was referring to. If earlier scientists would have claimed to found absolute truth, and it was verified in some way, then science today would not continually be revamping laws and ideas to suit new information. Einstein’s law of relativity now replaces Newton’s law of inertia. Mechanistic determination, then, is not, nor ever was, based on scientific observation, but on some other a priori idea. This sounds more like philosophy 101 than science 101. 

What do you think?


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## C. Matthew McMahon (Jan 31, 2005)

Ok, I follow you.

Careful on the presup thing, I may just be moving a bit closer......but not too far.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by webmaster_
> ...



Can't one come up with something good but still be reasoning fallaciously? Not trying to defend Clark in particular here, but trying to follow your "exact" wording. Been burned by ignoring such before 

CT

[Edited on 1-2-2005 by ChristianTrader]

[Edited on 1-2-2005 by ChristianTrader]


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## JWJ (Feb 1, 2005)

Paul,

Pardon my Clarkian slowness  but are you saying that inductive reasoning is more than just useful... it is also valid as long as one works within the one and only correct worldview?


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by JWJ_
> ...



When you say that Adam reasoned inductively in the garden before the fall, what are you referring to?

Also how do you differentiate between a strong and a weak inductive argument?

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 1. C'mon, Adam wasn't a Clarkian, CT. I'm referring to the dominion mandate. I'm referring to the naming of animals.



The issue is that I am not seeing how induction comes into play with naming the animals. Perhaps it is due to my present sleep deprivation.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > Also how do you differentiate between a strong and a weak inductive argument?
> ...



How do you know what "might" be responsible?



> 2. We should _actively_ look for disconfirming as well as confirming instances of an inductive generalization.



Fair enough.



> 3. We should consider whether a link between S and P is plausible in light of other knowledge we posses (i.e., inductive arguments are best used within contexts of broader knowledge).



So if your broader knowledge has falsehoods then your in a world of hurt?



> All the texts I have seen admit that in an inductive argument the truth of the conclusion is not in the premises, i.e., the premises do not guarantee the conclusion (i.e., so stop treating them according to the rules of deduction).



Where is the truth if not in the premises?

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...



I don't think I remember talking about Adam and naming previously. Perhaps I just forgot. I am still not quite sure how Adam went beyond any premises in his naming of animals.



> As far as the naming goes: We musn't think that everyone else in the world thinks and uses language like Americans. There were thousands of years were names meant something, they were important, that is. Just read the Bible and see how important names were. Well, Adam didn't just arbitrarally sit down and see a hippo and say, "hmm, I think I'll just call that thing a hippopotomus." No, the names had to do with their essence, i.e., what marked them appart from the other animals, what made their *kind* different. To know this Adam had to study the animals. He saw particular characteristics and generalized about, say, hipponess.



But Adam had all cases in front of him from which to generalize. I thought induction had issues when went beyond the premises (all swans are black etc.) If Adam had all cases then he could not go beyond his premises.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...



If you are talking biological classification, then I do understand such, if there is a different meaning in logic, then I wouldnt.

I dont care if you are in a bind or not. If you are correct and I am wrong, then I wish to be in a bind where I have to choose the truth to get out of it.



> p.s. still waiting for your argument which proves that ALL inductive arguments are fallacious. I answered your question above and you never bothered to respond to mine but continued your sophistic tactic. I don;t mind playing, but I'm not in the mood for lawyering today.



I doubt such an argument can be given that proves such. I would not even know where to begin with such. My current issue with this is finding out how anti-realism intersects with induction. Once I figure that out, then I think I can get back to where inductive arguments fit into my system.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...



I did talk about dominion mandate and how one does not need to be a realist in order to realise such a mandate. I was getting weirded out about talking about naming animals.

I am still trying to figure out how Adam reasoned inductively (going beyond premises)



> Adam did not have all cases in front of him, I don't believe. Indeed, the hebrew word there is talking about a local place as opposed to the whole earth.



Let me restate. All relevant cases. I agree that there were other animals in order places. An argument could go like this.

1)God brought me all relevant cases
2)All cases of this animal (that I have seen) have X
3)X is an general characteristic of this type of animal.
4)Therefore the name must somehow include this characteristic.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> I'm not saying I'm in a bind. I'm saying you're trying to get me in one rather than conversing.



Fair enough. If one thinks that they see a problem with another's viewpoint, such tends to occur.



> If you can't give an argument for why you believe that all inductive reasoning is fallacious then do you believe it based on, what, faith?



At this point, I am just attempting to see if it is somehow necessary to allow the validity of Inductive arguments to get us something beyond "useful" views.

One last thing. You are saying that Inductive arguments could lead to something that is true but one could also be incorrect. So in the case of Adam, he could have simply got some animal name wrong?

CT

[Edited on 1-2-2005 by ChristianTrader]


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 1. Did you not say that inductive reasoning was useful in helping us to have dominion over creation; in the other thread?



Yeah. It doesnt have to be true in order to be useful. (unfortunately that which we think is useful now may turn out to be deadly in a few years) Are we talking past each other?



> 2. I don't get what your point is???



I am trying to figure out how Adam was arguing inductively.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 1, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "Are we talking past each other?"
> 
> 1. We must be because I'm dealing with calling it a FALLACY. If you admit, which you just did, that Adam reasoned inductively then you admit that he reasoend fallaciously before the fall. Am I clear now?



Where exactly did I admit that Adam reasoned inductively? I am not clear on that point. Can you give me an example of an inductive argument that you think he would have made?



> 2. You just admitted that he did, above.



Where? I am not trying to be funny here. One question, is all generalization considered inductive? Even if you know you have seen all relevant cases?



> 3. We can move on, or deal with other issues, but I've been on the same point since page one, I'm arguing against the idea that: 1. ALL inductive arguments are fallacious. 2. ALL scientific reasoning is fallacious. Have I made my case? If not, then respond. if so, then say-so and then bring up the next topic you'd like to discuss.
> 
> [Edited on 2-2-2005 by Paul manata]



1) So what you are saying is not fallacious is when someone says I did X, Y and Z experiments and therefore I think something might be the case? I would agree fully.

2)If this is just a restatement of 1, then I think I agree with you.

CT


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## RickyReformed (Feb 2, 2005)

Hi Paul, I saw this post and couldn't resist.



> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> As far as the naming goes: We musn't think that everyone else in the world thinks and uses language like Americans. There were thousands of years were names meant something, they were important, that is. Just read the Bible and see how important names were. Well, Adam didn't just arbitrarally sit down and see a hippo and say, "hmm, I think I'll just call that thing a hippopotomus." No, the names had to do with their essence, i.e., what marked them appart from the other animals, what made their *kind* different. To know this Adam had to study the animals. He saw particular characteristics and generalized about, say, hipponess.



I've gotta ask, how do you know this, Paul? All I read in the Scriptures is:



> Gen 2:18 Then the LORD God said, "It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him."
> Gen 2:19 So out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the heavens and brought them to the man to see what he would call them. And whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name.
> Gen 2:20 The man gave names to all livestock and to the birds of the heavens and to every beast of the field. But for Adam there was not found a helper fit for him.



Your assertion above does not seem to me to be justified *by the inspired text*. Perhaps you can justify your claim _about Adam_ from other scriptures (if so can you please tell us which?), but this seem *to me* like special pleading to justify your conclusion that Adam reasoned inductively pre-Fall.

Thanks!
Ricky


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## RickyReformed (Feb 2, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> btw, he brings up some interesting "apparent contradictions" in the natural world (e.g., electrons having both wave and particle attributes, and yes, he calls them apparent contradictions). I'll be continuing my reductio and salvation of Van Til by proving that there are paradoxes in general revelation, i.e., the natural order so stay tuned....



Me again, Paul.  As one of the resident Cheungians on the board, let me offer this quote from Vincent Cheung's "Systematic Theology", pg 18, http://www.rmiweb.org/books/theology2003.pdf




> But it is popular to encourage a tolerance toward contradictions in theology. Alister
> McGrath writes in his Understanding Doctrine:
> 
> _The fact that something is paradoxical and even self-contradictory
> ...



I'm not expecting to change anybody's mind though; just thought I'd offer a different perspective.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 2, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> through the thread I gave the arguments.
> 
> The importance of names was supported by the entire Bibel's emphasis on it (he named his son... they called the place, etc). Also, this concept is held by almost every theologian I know of.



I'm just trying to understand your argument; is it because other individual's in the Scriptures named places and persons with names that had some of their characteristics, then Adam did so with the animals also? 

As far as the theologians go, I know John Gill would agree with you, but John Calvin is silent on the matter. But I still don't see how **from the text** this conclusion is reached. 



> Also, are you seriously implying that when Adam went about having dominion he reasoned deductively about everything. Honestly, I'm tired of Clarkians. They're just silly. Wouldn't he have learned about his field and how best to grow things by inductive reasoning?



Are those the only two options - induction or deduction? For example, concerning Adam's field, I can offer a third option - revelation. (After all, he had the LORD with him, didn't he?) Also, if I named my cats "Flim" and "Flam" for no reason (within them), which method would this fall under?



> Ricky, you still have never defined knowledge for me. I think you tried in the Cheung thread but I showed it to be a horrible definition. Until you do I have no clue what you're talking about.



To be honest, I'm still trying to sort it all out. Tentatively, I hold that knowledge is true belief. (I answered your question in good faith; I hope it wasn't a 'red herring'. At the moment, I would rather not go down some rabbit trail on whether knowledge is "true belief with an account" or "justified true belief" or whatever else contemporary epistemologists are debating. I hope you understand.)



> To be honest with everyone, I pray for the day that the naive views of Clark et al are nothing but an embarrassing memory for reformed Christianity.



I think your prayer will be answered; for I believe in heaven Clark, Van Til, and Aquinas' views will be nothing but distant memories; instead we will learn at The Master's feet. 

your brother in Christ,
Ricky


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## JohnV (Feb 2, 2005)

Just to put my two cents in again, just so you know I'm still here (sometimes):

In High School the antagonists to my Christian faith said that science and history had proven that the Bible was not trustworthy on matters of science and history; therefore there was no basis upon which to show that the Bible was trustworthy for spiritual or religious guidance. What they were saying, by extension, was that if the Bible is not trustworthy for its truthfulness in any one area then it betrays that trustworthiness in all areas. The Bible says of itself, "Thy word is truth." And they knew it said that. 

Now, be assured that they were refuted in their error quite effectively at that time. It got to the point that all that had to be said was "Piltdown man" and they were defeated in whatever they tried to put forward. In other words, their own argument was brought down upon themselves, showing that they were putting their complete and and unquestioned confidence in men who lie and believe the lie to sustain their theories (and that's all they had, theories, not science) to try to show that the Bible was not trustworthy. That was their whole argument at that time. 

The significant thing about this is that in part of their assertion they were utterly right: if the Bible is not trustworthy in matters of science and history, then it breaks down the confidence we can have in the Bible's trustworthiness in areas of spiritual or religious guidance. In effect, it puts the Bible on an equal basis with all other religions. All we have to do to keep the wholeness of the Bible, then, is to deny any error, just the same as any other religion does. And who is there to say anything is wrong? If the Bible is not trustworthy in truth, then we can make of it what we want instead of what God says. 

For example, we get the mystical Jesus, but a denial of a historical Jesus; we get the witness of miracles to Jesus' divinity, but not the actual miracles being done; we get the idea of God creating the world, but not a creation; etc., etc., ad nauseum. 

We can say the same about science. That was how their argument was effectively refuted; if science is not trustworthy as a discipline, then how can it be called a science? It becomes no more than children's stories, only with sophistication. And to quite a degree that is exactly what it had become. Someday ordinary people, not just scientists, are going to laugh at our generation for believing in a flat universe, with all the false tales that go along with that. A person who claims to be scientific, asserting that the reality he is dealing with is filled with contradictions, is really only denying his own ability to reason it out. After his mind falls apart, the reality is still there unbroken and unscathed. His real problem is that he is not admitting to the reality of a true unifying factor to truth itself, within which reality exists. 

As a point of interest, after grade twelve, almost all of these antagonistic unbelievers became believers, when they came face to face with their two faced-ness. They had tried to call Christians to truthfull integrity only to find their own duplicity.

[Edited on 3-2-2005 by JohnV]

[Edited on 3-2-2005 by JohnV]


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## RickyReformed (Feb 2, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Ricky, I guess you're right. The senses cannot be trusted ever. Because you obviously didn't read what I said!



My friend, I haven't not said, nor did the quote from Cheung, say otherwise (in this thread.) I believe what was being discussed was whether science was fallacious or not.




> I never said there were contradictions. I said... APPARANT
> 
> Do you get the difference???? Your quote from Cheung had NOTHING to do with my argument, AT ALL.



Perhaps the large font just makes it look like your shouting, but this is just a friendly conversation, brother. I know you said apparent; but until a resolution is offered, there is the real possibility that the contradiction is actual. 



> Why would you call yourself a resident Cheungian? I think that's silly. Or, let me take something from Cheung: "This is nonsense."



My comment was tongue in cheek, brother. I don't believe your silly when you categorize yourself as a Van Tillian, though. I know your working toward apologetic uniformity on this board, brother. I applaud your efforts. But I hope you don't think that because someone doesn't follow Dr. Van Til's method that they are somehow denying Reformed orthodoxy.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 2, 2005)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Just to put my two cents in again, just so you know I'm still here (sometimes):



John, I can't speak for anyone else, but I always appreciate your input.



> A person who claims to be scientific, asserting that the reality he is dealing with is filled with contradictions, is really only denying his own ability to reason it out. After his mind falls apart, the reality is still there unbroken and unscathed. His real problem is that he is not admitting to the reality of a true unifying factor to truth itself, within which reality exists.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 2, 2005)

> _Originally posted by RickyReformed_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> ...



Oops, sorry, I just got it! That's pretty funny! See I told you the senses couldn't be trusted!


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## JohnV (Feb 3, 2005)

Paul:

Would you agree that, if all deductive reasoning is fallacious, then it follows that all deductive reasoning is fallacious too? Why or why not? Just interested in what you think here. 

Ricky:

Maybe I can be of help here. At least let me try:

What is induction? 

If you say of that tree over there that it has branches (which it does have) then you have made a deduction. If by the evidence of these branches on this tree you say that all trees must have branches, then that is an induction. You are applying your observation of a particular instance to something of a wider scope than your observation strictly allows for. By your observation you only know about this tree. 

Its like Mark Twain on the train with an elderly gentleman, who observed that the sheep in the pasture they were passing were remarkably all white. Mr. Twain replied that he could not possible know that the sheep were all white, because he could only know that the side facing him was white of each sheep; he could not see the other side of the sheep. 

The man was inducing from what he could see that the sheep were as white on the other side as they were on the side he could see. That is induction; stating a general principle to a wider scope of observation than is actual. 

So next we take up Adam. God told him to name the animals. Here comes a bear. What does Adam say and do? Does he read the manual God supplied, "Naming Animals for Dummies"? Does he have an innate PhD. from Waterloo University. Biology Dept.? Does he have the ability to know, but God takes him on a world tour and paints instructions on various cave walls, of which Adam takes all kinds of notes? No matter how you say it, God did give Adam the tools to work with; but it was Adam that named the animals. 

If Adam had asked, "What's this?" and God said, "Well, that's a bear." then it would be God naming the animals. If God had put it into Adam's head, "This is a bear", or if God had carefully educated Adam, or given him the equivalent of an authoritative biologist, no matter how you slice it, Adam did this thing with knowledge of what he was doing. We do not suppose that he did it arbitrarily, just coming up with sounds that became names, but did it knowing what he was doing, however it was that he had this knowledge. 

So, if Adam did this thing of naming the animals, whether with knowledge or by revelation, it does not matter, for he did it rightly, applying the revelation as he would the knowledge. And he classified things to a wider scope than the particular instance. So it must be that Adam used induction to name the animals. It really could be no other way. 

How was that?


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## JohnV (Feb 3, 2005)

Precisely!

That's why I'm having a hard time understanding what some people, like Clark, are saying. What are they questioning? It can't be the validity of inductive reasoning, because induction is presupposed in doing that. How does one question induction in science without using induction in science? It doesn't make sense.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 3, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 4. My turn for a question: Give me an argument which proves that ALL inductive/scientific reasoning is fallacious?
> 
> [Edited on 2-3-2005 by Paul manata]



In as much as arguments using incomplete induction use the form "some x are y, therefore all x are y", they are invalid. To quote Copi & Cohen, *"And if a syllogism is invalid, any other syllogism of the same form will be invalid."* Arguments using this form are not a reliable method for discovering truth. Take John's example, "Some of the sheep (the side that is facing you) is white, therefore all of the sheep is white." Seems reasonable doesn't it? Now replace the "white" with "have no scars (or 'is scarless' if you prefer)" or "is clean"; Would you be willing to say that because all the sheep in the world who have no scars or mud on their right side, they therefore don't have any mud or scars on their left side? The same goes for your argument regarding Adam, "because the scriptures declare that some men named objects or persons after some characteristic in the object or person, therefore all men (in the scriptures) who named objects (such as animals) or persons did so because of some characteristic in the object or person."

The same applies to scientific reasoning *in as much as* it follows the following form, "if x, then y; y, therefore x". I don't have to examine every scientific argument that uses this form; it is invalid according to the canons of logic. Remember, from false premises we can deduce a true conclusion. Should I therefore use fallacious arguments simply because the conclusion happens to be true? Since these methods are *not* reliable in furnishing us truth, why build an apologetic on it? Am I not back at the probablistic arguments that I had in Thomism?

So with the introduction of "apparent contradictions" (a possible inference being that they are real contradictions) and by conceding the validity of the scientific method to the unbeliever, I believe it is Dr. Van Til who has hindered the apologetic endeavor. And this without denying that TAG can be a devastating argument against unbelief.

As for knowledge, what I understand you to say is that truth known accidentally (as in the hypothetical example: "My backyard has 2,000,000 ants.") cannot be knowledge? Is this correct?


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## RickyReformed (Feb 4, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> Now let me quote from Copi/Cohen:
> 
> "The preceding chapters have delt with deductive arguments, which are valid if their premisses establich the truth of their conclusion demonstartively, but invalid otherwise. Not all arguments are deductive, however *A great many arguments are not claimed to demonstrate the truth of their conclusion as following *necessarily* from their premises, but are intended merely to support their conclusion as probable, or probably true.* Arguments of this latter kind are generally called inductive arguments and are _radically different from the deductive variety_." (Copi/Cohen, p. 452).



So you admit these arguments are probabilistic?



> Furthermore, has Ricky shown that _all_ scientific arguments take this form? No, he said that: in as much as they do. So, I asked him to prove that _all_ scientific arguments are fallacious and he didn't do that.



Yes, this is correct. Scientific arguments that proceed from true premises, using valid form, give us true conclusions. Can you show us one, Paul?




> I have given arguments for how real contradiction are _impossible_.



Yes, but this does not mean that individuals cannot *believe* real contradictions and claim they are "apparent". Arminians and Amyraldians use this appeal all the time.

For example (assume this proposition is true):

X: "My backyard has 2,000,000 ants."

X is not knowledge (when you believe this accidentally)
X is knowledge (when you count the ants or if God reveals this to you)

So x is k and x is non-k. 

If I use this appeal: "Now this may appear contradictory, but trust me, it is resolved in God's mind." does that make the contradiction go away?



> That's right, me _and every epistemologist in the world_. I'd read a book or two on the subject before I respond. I have been in a detailed study of epistemology for the past 6 months and have went through 5 books (which are considered the top) on the subject. Just take my word for it, you're wrong.



You got me, my friend. :bigsmile: How could I disagree with you and *every* epistemologist in the world?


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## RickyReformed (Feb 4, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 1. Yeah, they are. Why even ask that? I mean, who in the world thinks that inductive arguments are not!? I thought this was assumed. Ricky, don't throw the baby out with the Thomistic bath water. Proobability is wrong, I admit, when proving God's existence, but within a worldview that provides the transcendental for meaning they are fine when dealing with more periphial things.



Because as Christians, we should be concerned with speaking the truth. Why should we endorse a method that is unreliable, by its own testimony and rules, in discovering truth?



> 2. No no no, Ricky. Sorry friend, you made the claim. You said that *all* scientific reasoning was fallacious. You need to prove this claim. What you just did is teetering on argumentum ad ignorantum. That is, even if I couldn't it doesn't mean there isn't. Furthermore, please define science for me, then I can better analyze what's going on here.



I don't have a strict definition for science, brother; I was using the term as it is commonly used (something along the lines of "the observation, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of phenomena." Perhaps you can give us a more precise definition and we'll run with that. What do you say?



> 3. So. What does that have to do with me saying they are impossible? Moreover, you are confusing a *psychological* state of affairs with a *metaphysical* one. Just because one could *believe* P does not mean that and real P's obtain. Furthermore, and this will hurt a bit, your position allows for actual contradcitions! How?, well in the Cheung thread I showed that the silly view that everything is revealed from God (according to your construct) allows for contradictions. That is, person X sees a barn and person Y sees a mailbox (barn at a distance). Now you said God revealed that contradictory info. I said this was a problematic, you said it wasn;t because you held to active reprobabtion. ...Fine, whatever. The point is that your "story" has God revealing contradictions! If you'd like to change then please go back and deal with all the questions I brought up since you accepted my reductio just to save Clareungianism.



This is a straw man, my brother. Here is the original quote:



> > _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> > I'm saying that if you say this is a universal claim for everyone: "divine logos communicates all the knowledge that He wants my mind to comprehend" then God communicated lies! ... God says X and ~X are both true.
> 
> 
> ...



So, if you want to accurately represent my view in your example, the object seen is either: a) a barn b) a mailbox c) something else (a wall with a picture of a barn or mailbox, a hologram, illusion, etc.) However, it is the LORD that causes these individuals to believe what they believe.



> Clareungianism



Now that's funny! How 'bout this one:

_Bahn-tillianism_

Waddaya think? 

(Just trying to keep this light and friendly, Paul. In the past we've produced too much heat when we should have been producing more light. Love ya, man.)


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## JohnV (Feb 4, 2005)

Can we get back to the main question? 

Jacob wrote:


> Clark: Scientific Reasoning is fallacious
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Now we know that science doesn't work that way. Experiment E has to produce result R every time, and independent of other possible contingencies. And even then hypothesis H is not considered as absolute. And besides this, Clark is pressing on induction the rules of inference for deduction, and that itself is not proper. We know that the rules apply to deductive reasoning, even when one of the premises include an inducted generalization. That's how we check inductions; if the particular in one premise is true, and the conclusion appears true, then the induction is verified, to the degree that the conclusion appears true. 

Again, science and theory on science are two different things. Experiment E produced result R: that's the science; result R tends toward the theory T, by extrapolation of the pattern, or by induction: that the theorizing. Then theory T is tested to a wider range of applications: science again. Two different things going on here. 

Science is the actual experimentation or observation going on, but cannot be entirely disconnected from the theorizing. They are two different things, but are together part of doing science. 

But is it not that way with all knowledge? We certainly did not know everything by syllogism. Some things we were told (the story of Jesus); some things we observed (the sound of a car going by); and some things we figured out (what is the answer to a certain puzzle). Maybe the mind does syllogism so automatically that we don't even know it; that's why the simple things seem so immediate to our minds when in actuality they may be mediate. Man did not figure out that God exists, He revealed Himself to us in various ways. Man cannot say that he does not know of God, for God has sufficiently revealed Himself so that no man has an excuse. Nor can one presuppose a tree, much less God, out of existence, no matter how hard he tries. The facts themselves do not change just because someone may have a different concept of understanding them. 

So man knows in various ways. He is able to apprehend that he cannot escape certain inducted generalizations. They are undeniable, even if they remain unprovable in his own mind. The lengths people will go to to try to get out from under the necessities of truth are phenomenal. So there is that aspect to knowledge too, an unwillingness to bow the mind to truth. 

Add to that, now, that in logic the word "fallacious" does not mean that the answer is wrong, but that it was gotten to without proper support. So we have to be carefull not to equate "fallacious" in logic to "wrong" in theory or thinking. Our intuitive minds, it seems, can sometimes know the answers long before we can make the connective syllogisms. For example, we have long known with absolute certainty that God exists, but who has come up with the syllogism to express what he knows? Each time he will be answered with the charge that the syllogism is "fallacious". Somehow we all knew that the moon was not eighteen feet deep in loose dust before Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldren landed on it; but the actual proof was their landing. 

Just a few thoughts to restart our thinking on this again. Not that I begrudge you two the right to battle this out between you, but you already tried that, and it seems that you're just going over old ground again. So let's work with each other instead. I have a few things to think through here, and I don't want to be excluded from this thread just yet. Is this OK with you?


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## RamistThomist (Feb 5, 2005)

THank you John for your post. It was very informative. I need to reread it several times, though.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 5, 2005)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Can we get back to the main question?



Yes, of course, John. I echo Jacob's reply - I need to reread it a few times to be able to glean more from your post. 


Let me say for now that I find it helpful if I think of these things in terms of certainty. If we apply the scientific method rigorously, can we be certain of that our conclusions are true? Working in the medical field, I'm always hearing that product x has been shown effective in treating y, only to discover a short time later that product x is now longer believed to be beneficial for treating y. Science does not have a very good track record when it comes to determining causality, either. For the sake of argument, let us assume that science sometimes is correct in discovering truth. Yet at other times, when the scientific method is utilized just as rigorously it yields false conclusions. Witness the currently popular hot big bang model. Christian scientist Hugh Ross states that if 1) Einstein's theory of relativity* is correct (he says that it should be called the law of relativity instead of the theory, since it is so well attested scientifically); and if 2) the universe has mass; then it is irrefutable that earth is old (at least several millions years old if not older).

Most of us on this board would disagree, correct? But why? 

I can't speak for anyone else, but I disagree because the Lord, the Creator of the universe, has told us otherwise, and he cannot lie. 

So here are two things that I believe are certain (and I would hope that no one on this board would disagree with this):
1. The statements found in God's Holy Word are true, because God cannot lie.
2. Conclusions determined from true premises, using valid form, are always true, because logic reflects the Mind of God.

So while everything else that I know may or may not be false, I can at least know this with certainty: What God reveals in His Word and anything that that can be deduced from Holy Writ by - to quote the Westminster Divines** - "good and necessary consequence" is true.

This is not to deny that there are extra biblical truths. For example, the following statement is true, "Sally is either a nurse or not a nurse." Yet I do not find this statement in the Bible.


*It has been pointed out to me by a friend that Einstein's theory of relativity is contradictory: according to the theory if a twin got on a space vessel that travelled away from the other twin at the speed of light, the twin on earth would age normally while the twin in space would age at a much slower rate. Yet according to this theory, it is equally correct to say that the twin on earth moves away from the twin in space at the speed of light as it would be to say vice versa. So the twin on earth should age slower than the twin in space, hence the contradiction. But can it be that it is only an "apparent" contradiction, especially since it is so 'well attested'? Or put another way: in this case, does logic trump science or does science trump logic?

**Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter I, sect. VI

[Edited on 6-2-2005 by RickyReformed]


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## JohnV (Feb 6, 2005)

> Or put another way: in this case, does logic trump science or does science trump logic?


The problem with this concept, Rick, is that you're using logic to try to trump logic. The science really doesn't have anything to do with it. That's why I said that science consists of two parts necessary to each other. We have to be careful here to keep them distinct, though they are both integral parts of doing science as a whole. 

Here is another scenario. It goes back to point one in your post, namely that God cannot lie. 

Person _X_ knows of person _Z_, but person _Y_ knows person _Z_. Which is better, to know of or to know? I mean, Mr. _X_ has heard of Mr. _Z_, but Mr. _Y_ goes to bowling with him every Thursday, and hangs out with him afterward, and on weekends they go boating and fishing together. They have lots of time to talk. Mr. _X_ has only heard of him because he needs to beat his bowling average to become he new champ. Which knowing is to be preferred? 

Well there are those who know of God, but it is much better for those who know God. But how did these latter get to know God? Was it not primarily because they were known by God first? Person _X_ may be able to prove God exists, but person _Y_ knows him personally, even though he never was one to think through a problem philosophically. And it is quite likely that, were he asked to provide a proof that God exists, that his so-called proof would be deemed fallacious. Yet there is no one more certain that God does indeed exist than he. 

Does his failure to avoid fallacious argumentation mean that God does not exist? Certainly not; it means he can't argue his points adequately, that's all. Does he make a leap of faith in his belief in God? Certainly not, because otherwise he is mistaken that he really knows God; he has been fooling himself. Does his belief in God change the nature by which men know, some things as if immediate and some things as if mediate? Of course not. He uses more than syllogism in order to know, or it may be that he uses syllogism so automatically that he does not even discern it. (Think of the sound of a car going by, and contemplate which came first, the sound or the syllogism? Or were they simultaneous? Or does he know before he reasons? )

Now Mr. _X_ and Mr. _Y_ are both working at Johns Hopkins Research laboratory. One comes up with a study that shows that remedy _a_ alleviates symptom _s_, while the other comes up with a study that shows remedy _b_ alleviates symptom _t_. Is one study better than the other because one knows God and the other does not? No; it depends more on God's blessing the work than the person doing the study. And God is more likely to bless a believer than a non-believer, according to His Word. But that is not proof that the study was done well. 

The mistake often made in our day is that there is a lot of money tied up in putting things forward on a scientific basis. And this monetary pressure too often gets people jumping to conclusions. We see it all the time. The government gets in on it too. They ride the gravey train on tobacco for as long as they can, and when the tide turns against tobacco use, they then pillage the gravey train with higher taxes because now it is wrong to smoke. So on subjects like these the real science hardly counts in on the problems we face with what studies seem to show. The problem seems to be laxness in the disciplines, not science itself. 

About Einstein's "theory" of relativity, I cannot say anything about that. I've tried to understand it, but I find that the idea of a theory's contingency upon itself is too much for me to comprehend. I'm not a science expert. There still has to be something unchangeable behind the relativity for there to be any solid proof of it, it seems to me. They should actually have the same difficulty in proving Relativity as we do proving God's existence. The problem is, Relativity cannot reach down and know the seekers first. That's my problem with it. I need something that's not relative to show and prove that everything is relative. 

This is the argumentative strength behind the TAG, if I'm not mistaken. Whether this is right or wrong of me, it yet is something that needs more thought. But for me, I take modern scientific endeavours with a grain of salt. If they were really serious about their science, than they would do really serious scientific work. But what we're getting is apologetic after apologetic, ad nauseum, on the validity of the billions-of-years concept, and we still don't really have anything to hang it on. It really has a much worse track record than even the simplest proof of God's existence. It is mostly extrapolation and fantasy, and extrapolation on fantasy; and science has really earned the reputation of being a quack discipline. It really isn't a quack discipline, because it is science that refutes that "science"; but I think that future generations are going to laugh at ours as being the most gullible of any generation. After all we're supposed to be one of the most educated of generations, with the most resourses available to individuals, in spite of rank, than any previous one. I can buy a 7 X 50 pr. of binoculars and have the same scientific advantage that Galileo had. 

And as difficult as it may be to prove God's existence, it is certainly infinitely more difficult to prove He does not exist. The Presuppositional argument is that logic and reason don't make sound sense in any other framework than that God exists. The Ontological argument is that even the arguments against God's existence presuppose that God exists; its unavoidable. Is one right and the other wrong? We should be careful here that we don't assume too much, thinking that the argument itself is wrong when it is only the arguer that is wrong, or rather that he is inadequate to the argument itself. We don't want to make the same mistake in our theology that scientists do in their science.



[Edited on 7-2-2005 by JohnV]


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## gwine (Feb 6, 2005)

> It has been pointed out to me by a friend that Einstein's theory of relativity is contradictory: according to the theory if a twin got on a space vessel that travelled away from the other twin at the speed of light, the twin on earth would age normally while the twin in space would age at a much slower rate. Yet according to this theory, it is equally correct to say that the twin on earth moves away from the twin in space at the speed of light as it would be to say vice versa. So the twin on earth should age slower than the twin in space, hence the contradiction. But can it be that it is only an "apparent" contradiction, especially since it is so 'well attested'? Or put another way: in this case, does logic trump science or does science trump logic?



Actually there is no paradox as far as to which one will age. If there were a set of twins living in Chicago and one of them moved to Dallas then only one of them moved relative to the earth. Even watching from Dallas only one of them moved. Relativistic effects are dependent on the speed of the object referenced to the speed of light, so twin B that leaves earth for another star is the only one traveling at near light speed. Someone living on a planet circling another star would ‘see’ twin B approaching at near light speed but twin A would still be stationary, since earth’s motion relative to light speed is so little. Thus only twin B would experience the relativistic effect (i.e. slowing down of the aging process.)

The effect is real and has been measured. In 1971 an atomic clock was placed on a airplane and flown twice around the world and compared to another atomic clock left on the earth. The experiment was repeated flying the plane the opposite direction. The results were in close agreement with theory. But it is still only a theory, not an absolute. 

Interestingly enough, relativity was needed to account for the location of the planet Mercury. Mercury actually moves fast enough to create its own relativistic effect and using standard Newtonian mechanics was not enough to predict exactly where is should have been.

I enjoy reading about science and I am amazed at the precision and order of creation. Those who see only random chance are truly living the lie. God has granted us the gift of science to use and I am glad He did, else I would probably not be alive today. To God alone be praises and honor and glory!


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## JohnV (Feb 7, 2005)

> _quoted from Gerry_
> Those who see only random chance are truly living the lie.



I read somewhere that Darwin had nightmares at the end of his life. I can really imagine that he did. Here's why:

Man is born or created into this vast working of things working reasonably. Things aren't working against each other, or only for themselves, but together make up a unified whole. It was all running before he began to understand. But Darwin not only has man coming out of the animals, but has life itself coming out of non-life. What if he is right? Imagine that for a moment: life came out of non-life, and intelligent man (able to discover his origins from non-life and his descent from animals) descending from non-reasoning animals. If he is right, then he has undermined everything that is a subject of objective knowledge. In other words, if he is right in his discoveries of truth, then he has discovered absolutely nothing, and rendered all other discoveries as mere nonsense and jibberish. If he is right, then he is wrong; in fact more wrong than those who believe in a Creator. Much more wrong. Infinitely wrong!

And it gets worse from there. 

Descartes at least was able to figure out that, out of complete skepticism, there was yet a firm undeniable grounding for objective knowledge. It was inescapable. One could say, I suppose, that for every negative movement in knowledge/objectivity there was an opposite and equal reaction to the positive in knowledge/objectivity, so to speak. But he assumed that there was a God at the beginning of all things, so for him there was always a solid ground, even if he doubted man's intellect to an extreme degree. Darwin had no such cushion or hope. The mere suggestion of skepticism to his theory became, after a while, a wild headlong landsliding catastrophy, completely out of control, and with no end to it. 

If this were my theory, and I had to live with the widely distributed publishing of it, I would have gone out of my mind thinking about it. Even for Darwin, man's intellect is introduced into the factual existence of things, and not the other way around. And that's a horrendous, horrifying thought for an Evolutionist, when it finally comes to him. But it's everyday for those who know God, and it is their comfort and encouragement in trying to understand. 

The ideal "Darwin" has utterly destroyed science for himself, and despairs; and the unscientific believer in God keeps on going discovering God's truth in both His Word and in the creation, and rejoices.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 7, 2005)

Gerry, John, and Paul, 

Please be patient with me though. I\'m not sure if you guys know that my wife and I have a new baby girl (two weeks old yesterday!) But I would like to address all three of the posts you guys posted yesterday. I\'ll try to get to at least one of your posts later today, if time permits.

Thanks fellas!
Ricky


Paul, 

Before I address your post though; I would like to know if this is a point of agreement or if you have some caveat that prevents you from affirming this. Thanks, brother!



> So here are two things that I believe are certain (and I would hope that no one on this board would disagree with this):
> 1. The statements found in God\'s Holy Word are true, because God cannot lie.
> 2. Conclusions determined from true premises, using valid form, are always true, because logic reflects the Mind of God.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "Where exactly did I admit that Adam reasoned inductively? I am not clear on that point. Can you give me an example of an inductive argument that you think he would have made?"
> 
> Okay, I'm really confused here. Am I in the twilight zone? Here is what I asked you: "1. Did you not say that inductive reasoning was useful in helping us to have dominion over creation; in the other thread?"
> ...



My issue is if Adam reasoned inductively in order to name the animals. He may have done so in another context, but I see no reason to believe induction was used in animal naming.



> CT asks:
> "One question, is all generalization considered inductive? Even if you know you have seen all relevant cases?"
> 
> How would you know if you've seen *all* relevant cases?



Somehow God would have to be involved intimately. In the case of Adam, we have God bringing him animals and telling him to name them. In order to justify the belief that Adam reasoned inductively here, You would have to say that the particular instances of rhino etc did not contain all the rhino characteristics necessary for correct naming. I think you would basically have to accuse God of some form of deceit.


> I would also say that it is a very high percentage that our generalizations are known via induction.



I would agree.


> So, take a categorical syllogism: All M are P. All S are M. Therefore, all S are P. I would say that, in a great many cases, the premises are known or proved via inductive arguments. All ants are colony dwellers. All the bugs in my farm are ants. Therefore, all the bugs in my farm are colony dwellers. (This was an example, I'm not an ant expert.)



No problems there either. I just dont like the use of the phrase "inductively proven". I am way happier with inductively justified etc. (I am working on how to use the term warrant)



> Ct clarifies:
> 
> "1) So what you are saying is not fallacious is when someone says I did X, Y and Z experiments and therefore I think something might be the case? I would agree fully."
> 
> Well, it'd be more complicated, but yes. Also, I would say that "I have strong reason to believe P is the case." Now, "strong reason" could be considered a form of justification. Hence, I would have justified it, believed it, and if it were true I would know it.



If it were true you would know it? Are you saying that knowledge is only as far as something corresponds to the truth? So the best you can say on most things is that "I think it corresponds to the truth" or "I think I know it"?



> Knowledge by induction. Now, you may have a different view of justification and so I'd need to see that. This has been Clark's and Robbin's problem, though. That is, their failure to fulfill the analytic requirment of the word "knowledge."
> 
> [Edited on 2-2-2005 by Paul manata]



I need to find out how closely Vincent adhere's to Clark on certain things as well as Clark's view. So that I can become a proper semi-clarkian 

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "My issue is if Adam reasoned inductively in order to name the animals. He may have done so in another context, but I see no reason to believe induction was used in animal naming."
> 
> Lets attack the less ambiguos, less problematic, concept. You have admitted that induction is useful to gain dominion. So, I contend that Adam reasoned inductively to have dominion. Unless you're postulating that post-fall reason inductively and pre-fall didn't?



Adam reasoned inductively to gain dominion. No problem there.



> "Somehow God would have to be involved intimately. In the case of Adam, we have God bringing him animals and telling him to name them. In order to justify the belief that Adam reasoned inductively here, You would have to say that the particular instances of rhino etc did not contain all the rhino characteristics necessary for correct naming. I think you would basically have to accuse God of some form of deceit."
> 
> 
> 
> Huh? A particular rhino containing *all* the characteristics of rhinoness??? So it was multi colord? It was short and long? light and heavy? what do you mean here?



Where are you getting that God brought Adam ONE Rhino? The claim is that how ever many rhino's Adam was brought, the set contained all the info to correctly classify, or there are serious underlying assumptions that need to be addressed.

[/quote]
"I just dont like the use of the phrase "inductively proven". I am way happier with inductively justified etc. (I am working on how to use the term warrant)"

That's fine.
[/quote]

Cool. I guess we now need a percentage system like you have with Fred. 

75%





> "If it were true you would know it? Are you saying that knowledge is only as far as something corresponds to the truth? So the best you can say on most things is that "I think it corresponds to the truth" or "I think I know it"?"
> 
> 
> Knowledge: belief, truth, justification, or the right kind of justification, or justification with warrant.



Okay. I think.



> "I need to find out how closely Vincent adhere's to Clark on certain things as well as Clark's view. So that I can become a proper semi-clarkian "
> 
> No, just become a Van Tilian. it's okay. I don;t know whay all you college students need to be rebels



But Van Til was a realist. So I would be a semi-Van Tillian. So semi-VanTil and semi-Clark. That is my view currently.

CT


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## gwine (Feb 7, 2005)

> So I would be a semi-Van Tillian. So semi-VanTil and semi-Clark.



This sounds like smorgasboard apologetics, where you choose what is true according to the Word of God.

I am curious. How did you determine which parts of each were Biblical?

Keep going you two. I am mostly lost but I am finding the thread most fascinating.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "Where are you getting that God brought Adam ONE Rhino? The claim is that how ever many rhino's Adam was brought, the set contained all the info to correctly classify, or there are serious underlying assumptions that need to be addressed."
> 
> I thought you meant one. But I'm glad we agree. Adam reasoned from *particulars* to a *generalization.* That's inductive reasoning!



It is inductive when your conclusion goes beyond the premises. All the information of his conclusion could be derived from his premises. Hence it would be considered deductive reasoning.

Normally a generalization would be inductive because we cannot be sure that there is not more info out there that we just missed. However if we are confident that our three rhino's are indicative of all rhino's then all is cool. Because the One who knows all is involved, then we can make turn our problem into a deductive one.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "But Van Til was a realist. So I would be a semi-Van Tillian. So semi-VanTil and semi-Clark. That is my view currently."
> 
> I'm afraid that I must renig on my U2U. I listend to Butler's series. I need to go through again. But I'm a realist.



Fair enough. I just listened to the one on realism in particular, was there more on other ones?

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "Adam reasoned inductively to gain dominion. No problem there."
> 
> Before the fall now?



Before or After, I dont have an issue either way.

Induction is a formal fallacy, not just a fallacy carte blanke.

CT


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## JohnV (Feb 7, 2005)

Hermonta:



> It is inductive when your conclusion goes beyond the premises. All the information of his conclusion could be derived from his premises. Hence it would be considered deductive reasoning.



It seems to me that if Adam collected all the particulars, then all he would have is a collection of particulars. That doesn't provide a generalization. A syllogism from particulars yields only a particular; you need a generalization in there somewhere. 



> Induction is a formal fallacy


Can you explain this for me? Isn't "formal fallacy" part of logic? Are you saying that induction can involve only logic, but is not logical? If it is confined to only logic, then why do the rules not apply, or rule it out altogether? Why is Induction a formal fallacy?


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## JohnV (Feb 7, 2005)

Oops! I just doubled up on Paul's post. He put it much better.


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## JohnV (Feb 7, 2005)

I agree, Paul. I remember your post. I was trying to get Hermonta to think through his objection to induction. But you were doing the same thing at the same time, but in a different way. 

Its not that I don't understand. I can't see how Adam could have avoided induction; it's just not a possibility, it seems to me. And saying "induction is a formal fallacy" is a contradiction in and of itself. It says that it is and it isn't part of logic at the same time and in the same sense. It really doesn't say anything when you stop to analyze it. So I agree with you.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "It is inductive when your conclusion goes beyond the premises. "
> 
> No, there's different types of inductive arguments (analogy).
> ...



Did he know it??? I am not so sure. Did he need to deviate from it in naming the animals? I dont think so.



> "However if we are confident that our three rhino's are indicative of all rhino's then all is cool. "
> 
> So God told Adam that He brought him a perfect sampeling??? Doesn't God know more about the rino's than Adam??/ So, ADAM reasoned inductively since *HE* didn't have *ALL* the facts. if he did then I think you've deified Adam's mind. So, you're confusing Adams and God's mind here.



Why should I need to deify Adam's mind? God knows more about Rhino's than Adam of course. This would be true if Adam had seen all rhino's throughout history. Do you need all the facts in order to reason deductively? For example, you may have some premises but do not quite know all the implications of it. Do you cease to reason deductively because you do know some of the implications?

Why does Adam need all the facts about rhino's that God knows in order to name them in a deductive fashion? We dont have all the facts concerning plenty of things in the Bible, but we can deduce various things from the facts we are given.

Also are you saying that God willfully left out some information from the sample of rhino's that he brought to Adam to name?



> "Because the One who knows all is involved, then we can make turn our problem into a deductive one."
> 
> No you can't.



Why not. What is the difference from adding the premise (God has signed off on this sample being sufficient) and deductive reasoning?




> But, why waste time with this animals thing? My goal was to argue that not all inductive reasoning was fallacious. You said Adam reasoned inductively to have dominion. So Adam would have committed fallacies before the fall. Case over. QED



Huh? What Case? Inductive reasoning is not fallacious if you hold that your conclusions are only as good as your sample is sufficient or complete. I believe that is all we need in order to live successful lives and have dominion. We do our best and when we make mistakes (or learn about past mistakes) then we make changes and move on again.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by ChristianTrader_
> ...



No.



> Also, I already delt with this formal fallacy idea in my response to Ricky. You're judging induction by the rules of deduction. Like calling someone out in baseball for face-masking! So, when you do this you comit the fallacy of bifurcation.



I am not committing a fallacy. I am just pointing out that it is only wrong when people do induction and then act as if they had done deductive reasoning.

For a person to even attempt to attack the Bible with "science" they have to commit this fallacy.

CT


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 7, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> "I am not committing a fallacy. I am just pointing out that it is only wrong when people do induction and then act as if they had done deductive reasoning."
> 
> You said : "Induction is a formal fallacy"
> ...



It is not a formal fallacy to act as if induction is induction? What is it then?
It has to be a fallacy of some sort.


> Also, I don't do that, so why are we arguing.



Beats me as far as that issue goes.



> "For a person to even attempt to attack the Bible with "science" they have to commit this fallacy."
> 
> I wouldn;t agree. I would say that they can't *philosophically* account for it but if they say that the conclusions are not necessary then they could say that the Bible is *probably* untrue.



But what does that mean? If they assume uniformitarianism, if they assume their sample is complete etc. (I could go on with the assumptions)
then they can say that the Bible is "probably" untrue. But that is a lot of question begging. You really cant attack God unless you attempt to play on his level. Otherwise it is just nonsense.



> But, they can;t account for probability. So, they still don't have a leg to stand on but their not committing a "formal fallacy."



I would need to see more of how they are not attempting to make a deductive statement. For even when you say I have a probability of 52%, that God is not there, then at a certain level, you are saying that some X is true without a doubt. Now you may have some Y and Z that are kinda iffy.



> "I believe that is all we need in order to live successful lives and have dominion. We do our best and when we make mistakes (or learn about past mistakes) then we make changes and move on again."
> 
> CT, can you tell me how instrumentialism is consistant with a Christian worldview?



Now that is an interesting question. I would ask that you give me some reason that you believe that it is inconsistent. I think realism just is unnecessary and that God there are certain things that God does not reveal to us.

CT


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## JohnV (Feb 8, 2005)

Hermonta:

You said above,


> It is not a formal fallacy to act as if induction is induction? What is it then?
> It has to be a fallacy of some sort.


I get the idea that you don't trust induction as valid. Now I know that you must not mean this above statement in the same way as to say, "It is a formal fallacy to call a horse a horse, and then to expect to be able to ride it." So can you explain your view of induction for me? Is induction part of reason, but also of a bigger mental capacity, or is it only of reason? Or is it that it is no part of reason? Why does induction have to be a fallacy of some sort? 

I think we are all agreed that, if you applied the rules of inference to induction, the rules would fail to account for what is supposedly inducted. Some of us say that these rules don't apply to induction, but rather they apply to induction when what has been inducted is tested in a syllogism. It is the syllogism that falls under the rules of inference, and hence also the deduction which results. But every syllogism must have at least two premises, even if the one is only assumed instead of asserted. These premises are propositions in themselves, and hence are deducted from elsewhere. These elsewhere premises are again from other deductions, etc., etc. Is it an infinite regress? Or is there some solid foundation to this somewhere? Is certainty a possibility in knowledge, whether induced or deduced? 

As I said, it seems to me that you mistrust induction.


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## ChristianTrader (Feb 8, 2005)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> Hermonta:
> 
> You said above,
> ...



I mistyped. I meant act as if induction is deduction. I was not trying to be deep 



> I think we are all agreed that, if you applied the rules of inference to induction, the rules would fail to account for what is supposedly inducted. Some of us say that these rules don't apply to induction, but rather they apply to induction when what has been inducted is tested in a syllogism. It is the syllogism that falls under the rules of inference, and hence also the deduction which results. But every syllogism must have at least two premises, even if the one is only assumed instead of asserted. These premises are propositions in themselves, and hence are deducted from elsewhere. These elsewhere premises are again from other deductions, etc., etc. Is it an infinite regress? Or is there some solid foundation to this somewhere? Is certainty a possibility in knowledge, whether induced or deduced?
> 
> As I said, it seems to me that you mistrust induction.



I do to a certain extent. But I do not mistrust that we must use induction in order to live day to day. The issue is how much do we trust it? Are we open to various things being shown to be wrong after we have accepted them to be true for many years. That happens in science all the time.

CT

[Edited on 8-2-2005 by ChristianTrader]


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## JohnV (Feb 8, 2005)

Here we are all in agreement: induction is not deduction. So then to call induction a formal fallacy is not actually the objection you're looking for. 

So far we are in agreement. I think the question is more than on how we verify it; or perhaps better, when do we trust it? I agree that not all inductions are valid. Some are just stupid, but that doesn't keep people from believing it. I have no idea what kind of induction would justify a belief, for example, that man descended from apes. That really blows the mind. I think we will find that it is not really an induction but a blind leap of faith; or, if you will, and anti-induction. 

So in those cases in which induction is to be trusted, and those cases in which it is not, how do you tell the difference?

[Edited on 8-2-2005 by JohnV]


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## RickyReformed (Feb 8, 2005)

Gerry,

Let me address your post first. You said:




> Actually there is no paradox as far as to which one will age. If there were a set of twins living in Chicago and one of them moved to Dallas then only one of them moved relative to the earth. Even watching from Dallas only one of them moved. Relativistic effects are dependent on the speed of the object referenced to the speed of light, so twin B that leaves earth for another star is the only one traveling at near light speed. Someone living on a planet circling another star would ‘see’ twin B approaching at near light speed but twin A would still be stationary, since earth’s motion relative to light speed is so little. Thus only twin B would experience the relativistic effect (i.e. slowing down of the aging process.)



Perhaps Microsoft Bookshelf 98 isn't the best interpreter of Einstein, but it reads:



> In 1905 Einstein published a paper in which he proposed that absolute motion does not exist- no object in the universe is suitable as an absolute frame of reference. Thus, it is equally correct to say that a train moves past a station, or that a station moves past a train.



From which I inferred that (twin A) the twin is space in my example can be considered stationary while (twin B) the twin on earth _and the earth, etc._ can be considered as traveling away from the other twin at the speed of light. Since the twin A can be considered stationary, and twin B - and the earth, etc. - is moving away at the speed of light, why doesn't twin B, etc. age _slower_ than the twin in space?



> Interestingly enough, relativity was needed to account for the location of the planet Mercury. Mercury actually moves fast enough to create its own relativistic effect and using standard Newtonian mechanics was not enough to predict exactly where is should have been.



Gerry, the Ptolemaic model worked for for over 1,000 years in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies. It was later overthrown by Copernican model. Just because a theory can make predictions does not mean that the theory is true. I can hypothesize that a rooster causes the sun to rise and test this prediction every day!




> I enjoy reading about science and I am amazed at the precision and order of creation. Those who see only random chance are truly living the lie. God has granted us the gift of science to use and I am glad He did, else I would probably not be alive today.



I'm not denying that science can be very useful; I have previously posted in another thread an example of an antibiotic curing cows from milk fever by injecting the antibiotic into the udders. Did that mean that milk fever is caused by bacteria? That hypothesis seemed plausible until it was determined that injecting boiled water did the same. Later it was found out that even injecting air worked. Were the cows cured of milk fever by the antibiotic? Yes. Was the original theory correct? No.

To quote another author:
*Science is successful when one understands its purpose, and when one understands that false theories sometimes work. Newtonian science, for example, worked for years. It has been replaced by Einstein’s theory. But even though he believed his theory to be a better approximation of the truth than Newton’s, Einstein declared that his own theory was false.*

By the way, I agree that those who see only chance are living a lie.




> To God alone be praises and honor and glory!



Yes indeed, brother!


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## RickyReformed (Feb 8, 2005)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> 
> 
> > Or put another way: in this case, does logic trump science or does science trump logic?
> ...



John, I missed your point here. What are the two distinct parts that are necessary to each other and integral to doing science?



> Here is another scenario. It goes back to point one in your post, namely that God cannot lie.
> 
> Person _X_ knows of person _Z_, but person _Y_ knows person _Z_. Which is better, to know of or to know? I mean, Mr. _X_ has heard of Mr. _Z_, but Mr. _Y_ goes to bowling with him every Thursday, and hangs out with him afterward, and on weekends they go boating and fishing together. They have lots of time to talk. Mr. _X_ has only heard of him because he needs to beat his bowling average to become he new champ. Which knowing is to be preferred?
> 
> Well there are those who know of God, but it is much better for those who know God. But how did these latter get to know God? Was it not primarily because they were known by God first?...



John, I would really like to ask more questions concerning what you said here, but I'm afraid we'll open up another:
 
Questions like: what does it mean to know one personally? (Didn't Judas know Christ personally? Yet he was not one of the elect.) Also, does knowing someone personally not also involve verbal communication (as in words, ideas, propositions, truths; not necessarily _spoken_ words) also? (After all, if I sit in the presence of someone and we just stare at each other, is that getting to know someone personally?) Doesn't knowing God also mean that we communicate with him (like when we offer our prayers - even though he knows what we're going to say before we say it) and he with us (via his revelation)? 

You think we can save this one for another day?



> Person _X_ may be able to prove God exists, but person _Y_ knows him personally, even though he never was one to think through a problem philosophically. And it is quite likely that, were he asked to provide a proof that God exists, that his so-called proof would be deemed fallacious. Yet there is no one more certain that God does indeed exist than he.
> 
> Does his failure to avoid fallacious argumentation mean that God does not exist? Certainly not; it means he can't argue his points adequately, that's all. Does he make a leap of faith in his belief in God? Certainly not, because otherwise he is mistaken that he really knows God; he has been fooling himself. Does his belief in God change the nature by which men know, some things as if immediate and some things as if mediate? Of course not. He uses more than syllogism in order to know, or it may be that he uses syllogism so automatically that he does not even discern it. (Think of the sound of a car going by, and contemplate which came first, the sound or the syllogism? Or were they simultaneous? Or does he know before he reasons?



I think I get the gist of this. As I told Paul, I presently hold that knowledge is true belief. Therefore, if a person believes that Word of God is true, and that God is, but cannot account for those beliefs; he still knows God. In fact, God caused him to believe that his Word is true, because God loves him in that special way that God loves his elect. The person who purports to prove that Triune God exists, but is not one of his elect, believes that God is also (Rom 1:19*) but does not believe what God says is true, neither does he believe what he says he believes. (He is in fact a liar, and the truth of God is not in him. see 1 John 2:4**) 



> Now Mr. _X_ and Mr. _Y_ are both working at Johns Hopkins Research laboratory. One comes up with a study that shows that remedy _a_ alleviates symptom _s_, while the other comes up with a study that shows remedy _b_ alleviates symptom _t_. Is one study better than the other because one knows God and the other does not? No; it depends more on God's blessing the work than the person doing the study. And God is more likely to bless a believer than a non-believer, according to His Word. But that is not proof that the study was done well.



I don't necessarily disagree with you here, but as I told Gerry, just because science is useful does not mean that the theory used to derive the desired result is true. If I propose that "remedy A alleviates symptom S", what happens to my proposal when we have an instance of remedy A not alleviating sympton S? Even supposing that in that study, remedy A alleviated symptom S in all 100 patients which participated in that study, how can I be certain that remedy A will alleviate *every* instance of sympton S when administered? 



*Rom 1:19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them.

**1Jo 2:4 Whoever says "I know him" but does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him,



[Edited on 9-2-2005 by RickyReformed]


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## gwine (Feb 8, 2005)

> From which I inferred that (twin A) the twin is space in my example can be considered stationary while (twin B) the twin on earth and the earth, etc. can be considered as traveling away from the other twin at the speed of light. Since the twin A can be considered stationary, and twin B - and the earth, etc. - is moving away at the speed of light, why doesn't twin B, etc. age slower than the twin in space?


Because there is a frame of reference - the speed of light. The clock experiment showed that. I have some links I will track down and send you if you would like.


> Gerry, the Ptolemaic model worked for for over 1,000 years in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies. It was later overthrown by Copernican model. Just because a theory can make predictions does not mean that the theory is true. I can hypothesize that a rooster causes the sun to rise and test this prediction every day!


And Einstein's *theory* may someday be proved false. That's ok with me. All I was trying to point out is that it works better than the previous *theories*. Definitely there are theories that make predictions that are based on faulty reasoning. Look at the sunspot "correlations" that people see in <name your theory>.

I am not saying that science is always right or that it has a correct world view because I know it doesn't. But many things work well enough that people get healed and space craft get to Saturn and a myrid of other events happen as predicted, within the limits of necessity. And sometimes they don't.

I don't know which theory the quote was about but I do know Einstein's attempt to create a Grand Unified Theory was not sucessful because he stubbornly refused to let go of his biases. But, he was operating outside the Christian world view.

BTW, I wasn't really trying to get into the discussion you were having with Paul. All I wanted to do was correct a misconception you had about the twin paradox. You two can carry on.


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## RickyReformed (Feb 9, 2005)

> _Originally posted by gwine_
> 
> 
> > From which I inferred that (twin A) the twin is space in my example can be considered stationary while (twin B) the twin on earth and the earth, etc. can be considered as traveling away from the other twin at the speed of light. Since the twin A can be considered stationary, and twin B - and the earth, etc. - is moving away at the speed of light, why doesn't twin B, etc. age slower than the twin in space?
> ...



Sure! You can u2u me the links or my email is in my profile too.




> > Gerry, the Ptolemaic model worked for for over 1,000 years in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies. It was later overthrown by Copernican model. Just because a theory can make predictions does not mean that the theory is true. I can hypothesize that a rooster causes the sun to rise and test this prediction every day!
> 
> 
> And Einstein's *theory* may someday be proved false. That's ok with me. All I was trying to point out is that it works better than the previous *theories*. Definitely there are theories that make predictions that are based on faulty reasoning. Look at the sunspot "correlations" that people see in <name your theory>.
> ...



Oh, okay. I think we're in basic agreement here. Because something is useful does not necessarily make it true.




> BTW, I wasn't really trying to get into the discussion you were having with Paul. All I wanted to do was correct a misconception you had about the twin paradox. You two can carry on.


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## JohnV (Feb 9, 2005)

> _Originally posted by RickyReformed_
> 
> 
> > _Originally posted by JohnV_
> ...



In order to do science one must do the actual observation of particulars, and one must theorize concerning these observations, from which further experiments can be made to test those theories. Observation and theorizing are two fundamental parts of doing science. 



> John, I would really like to ask more questions concerning what you said here, but I'm afraid we'll open up another:
> 
> Questions like: what does it mean to know one personally? (Didn't Judas know Christ personally? Yet he was not one of the elect.) Also, does knowing someone personally not also involve verbal communication (as in words, ideas, propositions, truths; not necessarily _spoken_ words) also? (After all, if I sit in the presence of someone and we just stare at each other, is that getting to know someone personally?) Doesn't knowing God also mean that we communicate with him (like when we offer our prayers - even though he knows what we're going to say before we say it) and he with us (via his revelation)?
> 
> You think we can save this one for another day?


This is very a important aspect to induction and knowledge, but we can discuss it later. By then we will have moved along to quite an extent into an ontological necessity, as opposed to proposing theories.



> I think I get the gist of this. As I told Paul, I presently hold that knowledge is true belief. Therefore, if a person believes that Word of God is true, and that God is, but cannot account for those beliefs; he still knows God. In fact, God caused him to believe that his Word is true, because God loves him in that special way that God loves his elect. The person who purports to prove that Triune God exists, but is not one of his elect, believes that God is also (Rom 1:19*) but does not believe what God says is true, neither does he believe what he says he believes. (He is in fact a liar, and the truth of God is not in him. see 1 John 2:4**)



The question about this latter person is how is he able to prove God's existence if the truth of God is not in him? We have two basic choices: first that things can be proved without precise fidelity to truth; or two, that even if the truth is not in him, yet he is unable to escape the necessities of truth which are indeed in him. In other words, 1. he does not need total truth to find truth, or 2. necessity is laid upon him in such a way that he cannot escape that necessity, even though he may not have the truth. 



> I don't necessarily disagree with you here, but as I told Gerry, just because science is useful does not mean that the theory used to derive the desired result is true. If I propose that "remedy A alleviates symptom S", what happens to my proposal when we have an instance of remedy A not alleviating sympton S? Even supposing that in that study, remedy A alleviated symptom S in all 100 patients which participated in that study, how can I be certain that remedy A will alleviate *every* instance of sympton S when administered?



By "useful" do we mean that it is a working model that helps for a time? How do we know it stops being useful? I suppose when it no longer works. So it is science, in the end, which defeats it as a theory. That's all I really wanted to show, but there is so much more now that the can has been opened. But I don't want to go that way. I want to keep on the topic of induction.

But my main concern with your latest post is this: is certainty possible?


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## JohnV (Feb 9, 2005)

> _from Christian Trader_
> I do to a certain extent. But I do not mistrust that we must use induction in order to live day to day. The issue is how much do we trust it? Are we open to various things being shown to be wrong after we have accepted them to be true for many years. That happens in science all the time.
> 
> CT


I share this same trepidation, Hermonta. But I also have a certainty. Some things I am quite fearless about. There is no way, for example, that Islam or Budhism can overthrow Christianity on a mere intellectual level, never mind spiritual, authoritative, or any other sphere. It's just not an intellectual possibility. These can be reduced, eventually, to the same dictum equal to, "It is absolutely true that there is no such thing as absolute truth." Christianity is the only belief that does not have that failing. 

That much I know. My own intellect may come up short a lot, but that does nothing to the truth itself. 

But back to your point. Do we, then, suppose the Christian basis for faith to be finally a theory, a presupposition, or an inducted 'ism'? One would hope that it is more than these. It is inducted, and it is a presupposition, and it is a theory, to be sure, but that is not all it is. It is also a revelation; this cannot be discounted. It stands far above those meagre inductions or presuppositions or theories that unbelievers have or hold to. And we find, I would suggest, at least two significant things about this: first, that it is impossible for anyone to integrate truth on any other basis, so that we can see that everyone must assume God's revelation of truth whether they will or not; and second, that integrity to truth is closely related to integrity of character, or, in other words, to a humble and submissive spirit. 

So it would be my suggestion that induction itself is related to a submission to truth both in mind and in practice. So there is more to it than a mere inducted syllogism. Induction is not a superimposing of invented theories, but rather a recognition of truth that exists in relationships and characteristics of things, whether seen or unseen. It is wider than the premises because we presume wider premises than we are willing to admit of. This makes induction itself wholly trustworthy; but it also recognizes how untrustworthy we as knowers can be to the truth. We live by truth to the degree we must, but where we feel we have the freedom to wander into our own myths and lies we infallibly take the liberty to do so. So I trust induction; I just don't trust myself. I trust truth; but I also know that I am a long way from apprehending it rightly in respect to the things in which my mind is still fumbling.

I would insist that objectivity must not only be possible, but that it is fundamental. (To say that there is absolutely no objectivity is to make an objective statement. ) And for that we need an impeachable authority. And the Bible is the only one that has stood up to impeachment trials in every sort of sphere of discipline and integrity, without relying on a leap of faith in the process. That is to say, all the charges against have come to nothing in the end, and it has not stood upon the unfailing faith of its believers, but upon its own integrity and nobility.


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## Arch2k (Feb 10, 2005)

> You're judging induction by the rules of deduction. Like calling someone out in baseball for face-masking! So, when you do this you comit the fallacy of bifurcation.



I am not sure how to show that inductive reasoning is fallacious if we aren't to compare it to the rules of deduction. We surely can't compare it to the rules of induction for reason of defeating our own argument by circular reasoning. If there are some "other" standards to compare this type of reasoning to, I would like to know what they are.

An inductive argument is "not valid even though their premises provide some support for their conclusions" (David A. Conway/Ronald Munson, The Elements of Reasoning). An argument that isn't valid means that the conclusion doesn't NECESSARILY follow from the premises. This is why all inductive arguments are fallacious. By _definition_, they commit the fallacy. One need not prove that they are fallacious, for that is embedded in the definition.

As for science, it operates under the fallacy of induction, and therefore cannot lead to truth (truth being defined as absolute, 100% true). Not only are we mutible, but nature is mutable as well. Only the Word of God and what is logically deduced from it can lead to truth.

"I call that knowledge, not what is innate in man, or what is by diligence acquired, but that which is delivered to us by the Law and the Prophets" John Calvin on Jer 44:1

I would like to add that I am brand new to these message boards, and would like to say hi to everyone.

Thanks for the discussions!


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## Scott Bushey (Feb 10, 2005)

Jeff,
Feel free to post in the welcome area.........


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## JohnV (Feb 10, 2005)

Welcome Jeff. 

Maybe we're going about this all wrong. You know, I could admit that induction is always fallacious and achieve the very same thing that I said above. That's because to say that induction is fallacious is really not saying anything about induction. It might be better to say that induction is always saying more than it has a right to, and that might serve the point better. Induction assumes more in its conclusion than are found grounds for in the premises. Like assuming that both sides of the sheep are white when all you can see is the one side. 

But are we just saying that inducted syllogisms are not solid proof? Or are we saying that all inductions are invalid? I would agree with the former, but not the latter. Paul and I have been saying that it is valid to make inductions, but that they can't be counted the same as deductions. There are no rules for induction like there are for deduction. At least none that I know of. We apply the rules of deduction as a guide, but induction by definition trangresses the bounds of deduction. But we are also saying that an inducted conclusion can be tested by the rules of deduction. We can do that by observing the conclusions, to see if they are true. We can apply inducted conclusions as premises with a deducted conclusion as the other premise and see if the conclusion turns out as true. That's how science does its thing. 

So as has been pointed out, some theories have been adopted as true, though it is still well known that they may yet test as unfaithful theories sooner or later. But science needs a working model from which to work outward. And these are inducted. 

This is altogether different than 'inducting' a religious tenet. For that we have Revelation. We aren't theorizing there. And we aren't theorizing about God's existence either. To discount a proof of God's existence on the basis of syllogistic incompletion is a fallacy. It does not take into account that there are more ways of knowing than by syllogism. It must be so, for otherwise we could not begin to syllogize, could we?

Again, welcome a-Board, Jeff.


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## JohnV (Feb 11, 2005)

I was thinking through this last night, and pondering the concept of 'necessary inference', and I just about changed my mind. I got the idea that induction is invalid for unbelievers, but valid for believers; but that then it no longer is mere induction anymore. So I think I need to ask more questions than try to give answers.

Why do you who believe induction to be fallacious think so? And what do you mean by 'fallacious'? Do you mean that it is not proof? Or do you mean it is wrong? Or do you mean that it isn't valid? And what do you say about deduction then?

I had two thoughts running through my mind, and the first is, that if truth, goodness, and love are self-evident, and these are attributes of God's character, then why isn't God self-evident even more so? And the second is that we have revelation, so we have the premises upon which to make deductions, which unbelievers would call inductions because they think that our belief came before the declaration of revelation. We say we believe in God, and they say that is an induction from creation. Without the Word it would be; but we have revelation, so proof from creation is not inducted, and is not invalid but is rather necessary inference. 

I couldn't get past that. It was tough stuff to think through. 

What do you think?


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## Arch2k (Feb 11, 2005)

> But are we just saying that inducted syllogisms are not solid proof? Or are we saying that all inductions are invalid? I would agree with the former, but not the latter.



It seems to me that definitions at this point are in order.

Validity: An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows from the conclusion. It does not deal with the truths of the premises, but merely that the conclusion is logically deduced from them.

Using this definition, it renders all induction invalid. 

Sound: An argument is considered "sound" when not only is the argument VALID (see above), but the premises are also true.

Using this definition, it renders all induction unsound, because they are invalid.

I belive that the dichotomy you have suggested (between solid proof and invalidity) is a false one (granting that the premises are true). If the arguement is valid (and the premises are true), it will be solid proof. The conclusion of an induction do NOT necessarily follow from the premises.

The formal name for this fallacy is called "Asserting the consequent" and it's form is
1: If A, then B.
2: B.
Conclusion:Therefore A.

The standard example is:
1: When it rains, the streets get wet.
2: The streets are wet.
Conclusion: It must have rained.

Using this example, there are many other reasons the streets are wet aside from it raining. The conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from the premises and renders the _form_ invalid (using the above definition).

Thanks for the warm invite, and nice to meet you!


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## Arch2k (Feb 11, 2005)

It also seems to me that there is insuffiecient evidence (biblically) to suggest that Adam "reasoned" inductively before the fall. There is a large difference between using the senses, and reasoning from them.

The way I look at the subject of pre-fall sense use is similar to how the law is used biblically. If used correctly, the Christian man is obedient to God, and therfore loves him. If used incorrectly, man seeks justification before God by means of the law. Similarly, I suggest that Adam used correctly used the senses for the purposes of naming the animals and subduing the earth. However, he did not use them to gain knowledge, for this is fallacious not only after the fall, but before it as well.

In fact, John Robbins would argue that the first time Adam used his senses to gain knowledge was at the fall. The syllogism would go something like this (Adam speaking):
1: I see that Eve has eating the forbidden fruit.
2: I see that she did not die as God said she would.
Conclusion: I will not die either.

This argument is in the same form as all science, and cannot lead to truth because of it's invalidity. By relying on his senses, over and above God's Word, Adam fell.

Any thoughts?


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## JohnV (Feb 11, 2005)

Jeff:

I won't answer your second post just yet; lets concentrate on the first. Besides, I guess you never heard how the hoe got its name  Eve left it laying in the grass in the Garden, beside the beans; and when Adam stepped on it he said, "HO!!!!!!" Its been called that ever since. 

But that's a supra-apocryphal account, I think.

The juxtaposition of solid proof and validity was intentional, and not so as to present a dichotomy. I see your point, I think. 



> _ from your post above_
> Validity: An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows from the conclusion. It does not deal with the truths of the premises, but merely that the conclusion is logically deduced from them.
> 
> Using this definition, it renders all induction invalid.
> ...



OK, I won't restate what I said before about the difference between induction and deduction, and confusing the two. I'm think we agree here. I just want to ask which of these two you are advocating: 

1. that induction is not valid or sound because it is not deduction; or
2. that the Christian's knowledge of God and His Word makes what is normally called 'induction' (by unbelievers and by some who make a leap of faith before they believe) is in reality deduction from revealed premises, revealed from eternity. 

Number Two would mean that induction while disclaiming God's existence is unsound and invalid; while believing on His Word because He has revealed Himself to you is valid and sound. Number One denies induction eventually, and would have to assume that we get at Revelation through our own reasoning deductive abilities. Or, to say it entirely differently, the Presuppositionalist would say we presuppose Revelation, while the Classicalist would say that we could not presuppose it if it weren't there prior to the presupposing of it.

An example: 
The teacher tries to convince the students that he has blue socks. One student just will not believe him. So the teacher jumps up on his dests and pulls up his trouser legs. But the student refuses to look; as he does not trust his senses. Everyone else now knows that the teacher is wearing blue socks. 

If Revelation is there, whether admitted of or not, then it is there equally for the believer as for the unbeliever. And it is firm on its own, not relying on belief. It is a matter of either accepting it or not accepting it. By disbelieving one cannot merely discount it. That would be an invalid induction. 

In form now, another example:
Revelation is a given, and is a valid premise; and, 
We have discovered a Piltdown man again;
conclusion:
There must have been a different man or race of men living in this area, one that was not normal to the created original man. Or, another hoax.

Some would say that the first premise is inducted, and therefore invalid. I say that I know God, and that His Word is trustworthy, and is more than sufficient as a firm premise, even for the person who thinks it is an induced premise. Knowing God in not inducted, because He revealed Himself to me, it is not that I discovered Him; He came to me, I did not go to Him, so to speak. 


I'm just trying to think through this thing a bit more. It may yet be that the idea of induction is a mere invention by man, a sanitized version of a leap of faith in the negative sense. If Revelation is truly seen as Revelation, then it may well be that what some call induction is really mothing more than the inescapability of Revelation in nature and Scripture upon all men in their reasoning. So the question that gets to me is not whether induction is valid, but whether it really exists at all? 

This, however, does not account for theorizing, extrapolating from a peceived pattern. Yet behind such extrapolation is the innate (it seems) knowledge that there is a unified field of knowledge that allows for extrapolation without exceeding the bounds of reason altogether. In other words, there are unspoken premises in everyone's knowledge underlying even such extrapolations and theorizings. 

If we see a tree with branches, it may be deemed as induction from that narrowed point to conclude that all trees have branches. But it does not exceed the bounds of reason to think that all trees may indeed have branches; so it is a theory to work with in order to study trees. This, then, bespeaks of an unuttered premise that justifies theorizing about trees. It is created in man, or it is revealed to him, but he did not get it out of his own reasoning. 

So, in short, there is a witness of God's existence in every man that reasons. That's why induction is invalid for disbelievers, but valid for believers. Or, that is why induction does not really exist after all, but is just an excuse for unbelievers to jump to invalid conclusions. I'm not sure which it is.

Anyways, Jeff, what do you think? Can you follow my jumbled reasoning here? If not, give me a few days or weeks and I'll have it a bit more refined. I don't know if this is clear, as I'm still working through this and trying to put my thoughts together on this. Or, as some are wont to say, to wrap my brain around this.


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## Arch2k (Feb 11, 2005)

> _Originally posted by JohnV_
> I just want to ask which of these two you are advocating:
> 
> 1. that induction is not valid or sound because it is not deduction; or
> ...



I would have to say that I am definately advocating #1. I do hold to the presuppositionalist doctrine of apologetics. That stated, I believe that inductive arguments are invalid because they by definition _are_ invalid. If you were to take a course in logic, they would talk of the deductive and inductive arguments, and the validity or invalidity of each. 




> So the question that gets to me is not whether induction is valid, but whether it really exists at all?



I would like to discuss your syllogism, but I simply don't have time at this point. I like the thought that you are putting into it though.

I'll simply try to address the above statement that you made from a presuppositionalist standpoint. One idea that Clark argues is that existence is a meaningless term. If a word can be applied to everything, then it means nothing. He argues that everythings exists. The question is not whether something exists or not, but _what is it?_ Unicorns for example...do they exist? They are an imaginary horse with a horn on its head. They exist as _that_. Inductive arguments, do they exist? Certainly they do...whether as a conceived hypothesis, or an invalid syllogism, either way they exist.

The same is for God. Of course God exists. The Westminster Shorter Catechism doesn't answer if God exists, but pressuposes in asking:
Q. 4. What is God?
A. God is a Spirit,infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

I know this doesn't answer all of your questions, but I will try to answer them at some point. I am heading off to a conference on "Reformed Worship."

Thanks for your thoughts!


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## JohnV (Feb 12, 2005)

Jeff:

You said, 


> I would have to say that I am definately advocating #1. I do hold to the presuppositionalist doctrine of apologetics. That stated, I believe that inductive arguments are invalid because they by definition are invalid. If you were to take a course in logic, they would talk of the deductive and inductive arguments, and the validity or invalidity of each.


OK, #1 was induction is not deduction. So why would the laws of deduction apply to induction? Therefore, to say that induction is invalid is merely to say that induction is not deduction, and does not really make a judgment on induction's own form validity.

I think we need to separate whether doing induction is a valid practice from whether the results from inducted conclusions are always reliable. We have to be careful that we leave validity and soundness out of induction, because otherwise it would be judged as a deduction. 

But, you see, that's the problem, isn't it? Are we really making an induction when we assume that all trees have branches when we base it on one tree? We do know something more, and to take one tree as the only experience is far too abstract for us to really contemplate. We're not only assuming uniformity and sense, but we're assuming that there are other trees as well. So we really didn't have just that one tree experience no matter how hard we try to define it into our syllogisms. 

It is the same with God's existence. It is impossible to contemplate just a physical world, because the contemplation itself bespeaks of a wider world of thought, reason, and spirit, as well as extending that uniformity of thought into those areas. In fact, all men reason as if these are prior. In short, man cannot reason without assuming God's existence. (That is the Presuppositionalist view as well. ) But further, to deny God's existence cannot be done without overtly assuming His existence. (That's the Ontological Necessity. In other words, to deny His existence is really an admission of not desiring His existence, but an undeniable admission that He does indeed exist. ) Thus, some things normally thought to be the result of induction are really a result of deduction, but are classed as inductions because of man's stubbornness rather than because of reason. 

Just thinking out loud.



> I'll simply try to address the above statement that you made from a presuppositionalist standpoint. One idea that Clark argues is that existence is a meaningless term. If a word can be applied to everything, then it means nothing. He argues that everythings exists. The question is not whether something exists or not, but what is it? Unicorns for example...do they exist? They are an imaginary horse with a horn on its head. They exist as that. Inductive arguments, do they exist? Certainly they do...whether as a conceived hypothesis, or an invalid syllogism, either way they exist.
> 
> The same is for God. Of course God exists. The Westminster Shorter Catechism doesn't answer if God exists, but pressuposes in asking:
> Q. 4. What is God?
> A. God is a Spirit,infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.



I'll leave the "Clark who?" thing to someone else; I think that pretty well takes care of his equivocating observation. I want to pursue something else. Existence is indubitably more than idea, when we speak of God. He does not exist in the same respect as a unicorn exists. And it is not a meaningless distinction. The question is, does the WSC presuppose, assume, assert, or confess God's existence? There is a mighty difference between presuppose and confess, strictly speaking. If it is not confessed prior to presupposing, then it is nothing more than an assertion of a possibility, or a suggested paradigm. Anselm says (and I agree) that this is a contradiction: it is impossible for God to be merely an idea. 

This is the Ontological Necessity, and it appears to be simply indisputable. Critiques that I have read seem to reduce finally to an inapplicable critique because they don't really address the argument. They assume that the rules of deduction apply without an admission of all that is involved in the deduction. In other words, the Ontological syllogism is ruled as an invalid argument by virtue of the fact that God's existence is assumed in the premise. But that reduces God to an idea, which is impossible to do without making a greater error. We confess God's existence whether we ilke it or not, we can't merely assume it without confessing it in some sort of form. 

So what I am saying is that there is always in inevitable objectivity to induction which justifies it, even if the conclusions seem to go beyond the explicit premises. Inductions, instead of being deemed fallacious, are rather a lesser part of doing deduction, except in the area of the sciences whose goal is to go beyond the known to discover whatever it may in the observation of various phenomena, experience, or abtractions of the mind. In which case it is an invaluable tool for discovery. The validity comes from the degree to which inductions can be affirmed by deductive disciplines. 

So to those who deny God's existence we can give the same reply as one would make to Clark above: God who? And then let them fumble around with their meanings to show that it is really an unwillingness to confess Him rather than an argument opposed to His existence. 

(I guess I ended up with the "Clark who?" thing anyways. To understand what I said above I have to present it. So here goes:



> One idea that Clark argues is that existence is a meaningless term. If a word can be applied to everything, then it means nothing. He argues that everythings exists. The question is not whether something exists or not, but what is it? Unicorns for example...do they exist? They are an imaginary horse with a horn on its head. They exist as that.



Q. Clark who?
A. The Clark whose thesis we are discussing.

Q. But does he exist? 
A. Sure he does. He wrote the book we're talking about. 

Q. But is his existence meaningless or meaningfull? Does he exist as a unicorn exists? 
A. Its not a question of whether he exists. Of course he does. And a unicorn's existence is meaningful to the degree its existence is thought. It is meaningful in thought only, because it exists in thought only. But Clark exists, in fact. 

Q. But he said that it is meaningless to speak in reference to existence, without discriminating between the two. He says that the question is not whether it exists but rather of what it is. What does he mean by, "is"?... ) 


Well, I could go on, but this is enough for the point I was making above when someone argues against God's existence. We just have to back him against the wall, so to speak, as gently as we may, and get him to define what he's talking about. Eventually he has to admit that, in order to deny Him he has to affirm Him; it is really a matter of choice to deny Him, not of sound argument. But the point would be that we won't convince an unwilling heart if we beat him over the head with arguments. We have to tear down his defences slowly, so as not to make him feel as if he is meaningless, but so as to improve his awareness of his meaningfulness as a creature created in God's image, and as an object of His love, if possible. 

[Edited on 12-2-2005 by JohnV]


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## RickyReformed (Feb 15, 2005)

> _Originally posted by Paul manata_
> 
> Ricky, please tell me where "its own testamony and rules" call inductive reasoning _unreliable_? This was your comback to me admitting that inductive arguments are probablistic. So, it appears that your argument (with the hidden premises) looks like this:
> 
> ...



You won't like this but let me quote Cheung:

*Some seek to rescue induction by saying that, although it cannot conclusively establish any proposition, at least it can establish a claim as probable. However, if probability is "the ratio of the number of outcomes in an exhaustive set of equally likely outcomes that produce a given event to the total number of possible outcomes,"28 even if we grant that empirical methods can discover the numerator of the fraction – although I deny even this to empiricism – to determine the denominator requires knowledge of a universal, and omniscience is required to establish it in many cases. Since empirical methods cannot know universals, to say that it can come to probable knowledge is nonsense.*




> Secondly, no one has ever said that an inductive argument cannot yield truth! It may very well be the case that some inductive arguments have true conclusions. Indeed, I'm saying that in some instances this is the method of reasoning we should use to get closer to the truth. Since we are finite we must use induction in certain instances.



Yes, some inductive arguments have true conclusions, just like some fallacious arguments have true conclusions. Should we use fallacious arguments for the Trinity simply because their conclusion is true?



> Lastly, we should endorse the method because God expects us to use this method to have dominion and learn about his creation.



How do you know this, brother? Until you can prove this, it remains an assertion. Your argument that Adam, pre-fall, used induction to name the animals is an argument from silence, because scripture DOES NOT tell us that Adam used induction to name the animals. If you are going to appeal to commentators, etc., at least give their argument(s) so that we may examine them. Le me concede that SOME men and objects (in the bible) were named because of characteristics that they possessed - so does this *necessarily* imply that ALL men and objects (in the bible) were named ofter some characteristic they possessed? Even if I grant your premise that "_the importance of names was supported by the entire Bible's emphasis on it (he named his son... they called the place, etc)_", how do you know that the animals were named for some characteristic that *they* possessed (ex. 'rhino-ness')? Ichabod, for instance, was NOT named after some characteristic that *he* possessed (see 1Sam 4:21-22). 





> Tell me how you know that all unborn humans are persons, Ricky?



By definition, my friend: the Bible defines unborn humans as children; children are persons. see Exo 21: 22-23.




> > Your equivocating on my use of "communicated"; all I am saying is God causes everything, even your false beliefs. You use communicated as "telling". There is a world of difference between saying "God caused Bill to believe X and John to believe Non-X" and saying "God says X and non-X" Doesn't God cause Joe Christian to believe the gospel and Penny Pagan to not believe the gospel? Again, is Penny's belief that the gospel is false determined by her own free will? By spontaneous generation? By _________?
> 
> 
> 
> To answer the ______? It is not just that God caused it be she also chose not to believe, according to her nature. Do you deny secondary causality?



By saying "_it is not just that *GOD CAUSED*_" etc., are you not admitting that I am correct? Furthermore, what caused her to choose according to her nature? I don't deny secondary causality, but what (or more accurately, who) 'creates' and 'sustains' these secondary causes? Spontaneous generation? ___________?



> I find it interesting that you said that *I* equivocated on your use of "communicate." You said you're using it as "cause." I find that cause is not in the lexical range of the word "communicate." So, I didn't equivocate but you did.



I said God "communicated" (i.e. "conveyed", which is within the lexical use according to Microsoft Bookshelf) this belief because the idea - i.e. "the Gospel is false" (which is itself false) - that Penny Pagan believed was not original to Penny Pagan. Now God did not believe this idea was true, but in his unsearchable Counsel, he purposed that Penny Pagan believe that this false idea (i.e. "the Gospel is false") is true. Or did this idea originate with Penny Pagan? Then did God not also 'cause' Penny Pagan to believe this lie?

Remember when Dr. Bahnsen said something along the lines that even if Dr. B wrote a new, original novel that the world had never seen, it would still not be a new novel because God knew every word before Dr. B wrote it? Now did God look forward in time to know what Dr. B wrote, but the book did after all originate in Dr. B's mind? Or did God orchestrate Dr. B's life around the 'raw material' but Dr. B composed the final draft? Or __________­?



> Now, I'd like to know how you have a rational justification for any of your beliefs. When I ask you upon what *epistemic* basis you believe X, what can you tell me? Moreover, this is a causal approach to justification when we are asking for *epistemological* reasons for belief. I don't even remember reading this but now I'm very scared for you. So, I'm going to push on this causal account for belief. I'll start by asking the two questions I did above. Seriously, brother, I don;t think you know what you're saying or you wouldn;t have said what you did.



I don't have rational justification for *every one* of my beliefs. I had a belief that my house was mouse free - until I found a bar of soap that had bite marks on it. Perhaps everything you believe is rationally justified. What I can be certain of, though, is that whatever God reveals to me in the Bible and anything that follows by good and necessary consequence from it is true. Every other belief may or may not not be true. If I may borrow a quote from a certain hymn writer, "All other ground is sinking sand." Perhaps you can rationally justify *without appealing to Scripture* that you are not a deluded solipsist or that you are not stuck in the Matrix, but I can't. Since I can't 'rationally justify' without appealing to Scripture that I am not in the Matrix, is my belief that I am not hooked up to a machine knowledge? If Sophie the washwoman believes that God is Triune because her sunday school teacher told her so, is her belief rationally justified? If it is not, is this belief that God is Triune knowledge?




> Fine by me, at least they were'nt philosophical hacks and epistemological children.



Brother, in this thread I have been called silly, dishonest, naive, and a sophist already so this does not bother me either; I hope the persons who are following along are not prejudiced by this language, but that instead, they be persuaded by the strength (or lack thereof) of the arguments. My concern is not whether I am philosophically naive vs philosophically sophisticated, but rather "What is biblical?" 

Col 2:8 *See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ. *


Though your bias and presuppositions will not allow you to agree with me, I believe Lee Iron's makes the case that Dr. Van Til's theology was affected negatively by his dependence on idealist epistemology. (If anyone is interested, I can email the article "Van Til's Idealist Epistemology" provided you agree not to post it on the internet, per the author's wishes.)

I believe Vincent Cheung makes a good case from scripture for his biblical metaphysics and epistemology. I would be happy to repost it, if you'd like.


I remain your friend and brother in the Lord,
Ricky


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## JohnV (Feb 15, 2005)

Rick:

I am not a reader of Cheung. I am not familiar with his views. I appreciate that you posted the actual argument from his work, and then applied it to your own understanding. 

Also, I cannot answer for the Presuppositionalist view, since I am not officially a Presuppositionalist. I hold to some of its arguments, but do not think them to be exclusive to Presuppositionalism. I think that to be classified as a Presuppositionalist one must be convinced of exclusive Presuppositionalism. And that I adamantly disagree with. So I cannot answer for that position. 

So, to turn a corner, I think we need to start over in rethinking the idea of induction. At least, that is what I have done for myself. I still believe that Adam used induction in the Garden, but my opinion of that is greatly altered from my original opinion. But I can't just lay it out before you why I changed my mind. It requires of me, at least, to explain things right from the beginning, if I am able. It still involves why I believe that Cheung is wrong on this count, if it is that he means precisely what is posted above. Please remember that we are talking about opinions here. I need to develope my understanding, so I am not afraid to expose my ignorance. 

I think we should begin with deduction. What is it, and what does it entail? 

I think we can simply portray it this way:

- It must consist of at least three propositions, though often one of them is an implied proposition, not specifically stated. 

- two of these are called premises, and one called a conclusion. 

- the premises can consist of propositions stating either particulars or generalizations, which would determine the nature of the conclusion.

- to make propositional statements of particulars, these must be the result of previous deductions. 

- it is impossible to make statements regarding particulars without assuming generalizations of some sort. ("A car went by." assumes the relationship of observation with knowledge. To make a statement presupposes the viability of communication of concepts of the mind. etc. )

- it is unmistakable that axioms and maxims are revealed, and not merely of observation alone. They were first proposed by the One who is omniscient, and not by man. 

- therefore induction is not the suggestion of eternal principles to our reason, but of smaller and narrower principles (or generalizations, in keeping with my first use of the term), which fall under the eternal principles of revelation. 

- therefore, again, induction is not groundless, but is only not deductively validated. But that does not mean that all induction remains invalid. This would undermine many principles of the Reformed faith, which takes in trust that which has been revealed to us in God's Word as infallibly true. To say that induction is not valid or sound is merely to say that it is not deduction, nothing more. It does not infer that the practice of induction is invalid. In fact, it is unavoidable. 

Here is a challenge: uphold the invalidity of induction without the use of it in your argumentation. But further, make a valid deductive statement that can be maintained without induction. Remember, I do not consider God's existence or His Word, or belief and faith in them, as inducted, but rather as revealed. They did not originate from man's thinking, and are more valid than the clearest deduction of man's reasoning powers.


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