# Why John Locke does not successfully explain general ideas



## Claudiu (Apr 3, 2011)

John Locke in his "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" says that our ideas are like images in our mind. He also believes our ideas are made of particular things (i.e. John, Peter, etc.) but that we also have general terms (i.e. mankind or human beings).


> "How, Locke asks in Book III, chapter iii, do we get these general terms? Since words refer to ideas, general terms, naturally, refer to general ideas. General ideas are produced through a process of abstraction. We take our ideas of Frisky, Tiger, Felix, and Snowball, and we attend to what is similar in all of these, discarding what is different. From what is common to all of them (fur, soft, meow, arched shape, etc.), we form a new idea. This is our abstract general idea of cat (also sometimes referred to as a "partial idea"), and we attach to it the general name "cat."" [1]



Does he succeed? I don't think he does. The reason why, I think, is because he is an "imagist" (that is he believes that all ideas are images) and his process of abstraction as an explanation for our general ideas doesn't seem plausible. 

However, I need some insight on how to formulate an argument on why John Locke does not succeed in explaining how we can think about not just this or that particular person but mankind or human beings in general.

Any ideas?

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Sources:

[1] SparkNotes: Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Book III, chapter iii, sections 1-9: General Terms


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## VictorBravo (Apr 3, 2011)

One approach is to realize that the formation of general ideas from a few specific observations involves intuition. If you are consistently empirical, you should concede that a general idea, if it were to be true, would require observations of all elements in the set.

Locke seems to acknowledge implicitly that humans have some sort of intuitive sense of how to form categories from observation, but his system does not account for where this capability comes from. It cannot come from observation because we do not have the ability to make enough observations to establish that we are entitled to make general ideas from those observations (or images).


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## Claudiu (Apr 4, 2011)

Mr. Raymond, I appreciate your post. I think I get what you're saying but could you elaborate some more on it? What about an example?


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## MW (Apr 4, 2011)

The "imaging process" requires a "device driver" to run the hardware. At the end of the day, the only way to account for the reason why the machine keeps arriving at the same outcomes is the belief in "a priori" equipment. Of course, "creative design" is what the autonomous philosopher can never accept.


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## MLCOPE2 (Apr 4, 2011)

Did anyone else expect this to be about "Lost"?


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## athanatos (Apr 4, 2011)

VictorBravo said:


> humans have some sort of intuitive sense of how to form categories from observation, but his system does not account for where this capability comes from



Why not? Even a blank slate is, by nature, a slate. He does talk about physical matter being fitly disposed to having intellectual powers, doesn't he account for the intellectual powers more specifically?


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## VictorBravo (Apr 4, 2011)

I like Matthew's analogy a lot. That is right on, I think.

Using the cat example, let's say you have never seen a cat in your life. The first time you see a cat, your mind quite naturally thinks, "what *kind* of animal is that?"

When you see another cat, you immediately realize it is in the same category of animals--even though it likely is a different color and size.

Locke cannot account for this desire or ability to categorize. It does not come from accumulated images because humans have an immediate desire and ability to categorize all observations. In our experience it is innate. It is there before you begin to acquire observations about anything, including cats.


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## jwithnell (Apr 4, 2011)

From a philosophical perspective, this is the difficulty of accounting for both universals and particulars on an observational basis.

From a medical perspective, the difficulty is often huge among autistic people like my son. Some think almost entirely in pictures and in the process, can be brilliantly observant. But if the picture leads to a wrong categorical conclusion, it creates panic: my picture of a cat is a black animal with long hair. Why do you call this yellow creature with long hair a cat?


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## Philip (Apr 4, 2011)

I've recently been noting the similarity between Locke's "ideas" and Thomas Aquinas's "intelligible species." The difference is that for Thomas, we abstract away all accidental properties of a thing until we're left with the essence. David Hume ended up deconstructing this, arguing that there are no universals and all objects are just bundles of properties.

However, Thomas Reid pointed out that in matter of fact, the trouble is in thinking of the mind as a _tabula rasa_. In matter of fact, the normal healthy mind has particular patterns of thought. I think Mrs. Withnell has brought up an excellent point: her autistic son is closer to being a _tabula rasa_ than an ordinary human being. Unless there is a pre-existing framework ready to organize the data given by the senses, it's unintelligible.


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## Claudiu (Apr 4, 2011)

Why does Locke's theory that ideas are like images create a problem when he tries to explain how we go from particulars to universals? This is what I'm still trying to get my head around.


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## Philip (Apr 4, 2011)

Claudiu said:


> Why does Locke's theory that ideas are like images create a problem when he tries to explain how we go from particulars to universals? This is what I'm still trying to get my head around.


 
Well first, because he has no proof for the existence of ideas. As Reid points out, they really don't explain anything and they aren't the objects of thought---actual objects are. Now, we may have impressions and misperceptions of objects, but when I think of (for example) the desk, I am not thinking of an image of the desk. Positing this intermediary entity isn't helpful.

Further, it creates problems with universal concepts: when I think of, for example, the concept of a cow, what I've done is simply to look at the kinds of things that are classified as cows. That is to say, when I look into a field, I have an innate ability to recognize that one animal belongs in the category of "cow" and another in the category of "horse." As we learn and become familiar with various things, we are able to sort them automatically using our cognitive equipment. But notice that in this account, there is no need for ideas---saying that we have ideas of cows or horses simply adds another step. Occam's Razor alone should give us warrant for rejecting the way of ideas here.

As for problems, David Hume pointed out that given Locke's theory of ideas (the idea of this desk or that cow, for instance) means that the universal concepts we create are arbitrary since we don't have any pre-existing ideas or thought patterns with which to sort them.

The real question here is why we should reject Reid's common-sense explanation in favor of one that has a more complicated ontology. What does Locke's system explain that Reid's does not?


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## jwright82 (Apr 4, 2011)

I haven't read that book in years, I have it somewhere. But the general problem he is going to have no matter what is that he is attempting to make sense impressions the foundation for all knowledge whatsoever, empiricism. There is nothing wrong with saying that we can gain knowledge through our senses only that we only gain knowledge through our senses. Although Reid is right to criticize Hume for his radical criticisms Hume's arguments still dismantle empiricism as a viable epistomology. In my opinion you can show that all empiracisms in their logical development lead to logical positivism. How would Locke ever show that moral beleifs are grounded in emirical ideas? This is why Logical Positivism regects moral beleifs as nonsense. So I would locate a set of beleifs, moral ones, that could never have ever been based on empirical observations alone?


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## CharlieJ (Apr 4, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Well first, because he has no proof for the existence of ideas. As Reid points out, they really don't explain anything and they aren't the objects of thought---actual objects are. Now, we may have impressions and misperceptions of objects, but when I think of (for example) the desk, I am not thinking of an image of the desk. Positing this intermediary entity isn't helpful.





P. F. Pugh said:


> As we learn and become familiar with various things, we are able to sort them automatically using our cognitive equipment. But notice that in this account, there is no need for ideas---saying that we have ideas of cows or horses simply adds another step. Occam's Razor alone should give us warrant for rejecting the way of ideas here.



So, does that make Reid a nominalist, or is that category out-of-date for this discussion?


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## Claudiu (Apr 4, 2011)

What about this?


> Locke does not really give much of an argument for his theory of abstract general ideas, and so it is difficult to come up with objections to the argument itself. On the face of it, though, there does seem to be a problem with his account of how we get general ideas. When attending to the ideas of Frisky, Snowball etc., is there really anything exactly the same about them? Cats, like all particular things, are individual in all of their properties. If the mind is sifting through particular ideas looking for matches between them, it will be hard pressed to find any. Locke, however, could probably give a satisfactory response to this worry. The mind attends to things that are similar enough. The mind is not a precision machine and has lots of room for judgment calls, and it is therefore capable of attending to similarities while ignoring the particular features that distinguish even these. [1]


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[1] SparkNotes: Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Book III, chapter iii, sections 1-9: General Terms


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## MW (Apr 4, 2011)

Claudiu said:


> The mind is not a precision machine and has lots of room for judgment calls, and it is therefore capable of attending to similarities while ignoring the particular features that distinguish even these. [1]



"Judgment calls," similarities," "particular features," "distinguish," are all a priori equipment which the response is simply assuming and failing to give an account of.


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## Philip (Apr 5, 2011)

CharlieJ said:


> So, does that make Reid a nominalist, or is that category out-of-date for this discussion?



Probably more along the lines of an Occamist or conceptualist. The idea is that universals are concepts that result from our recognizing real similarities and distinctions out there. 



jwright82 said:


> Although Reid is right to criticize Hume for his radical criticisms Hume's arguments still dismantle empiricism as a viable epistomology.



Reid's happy to help you there. He dismantles Locke and Descartes in similar fashion, arguing that the whole problem is that they are privileging certain of our God-given faculties over others and thus ignoring huge swathes of stuff we know.



Claudiu said:


> Locke, however, could probably give a satisfactory response to this worry. The mind attends to things that are similar enough. The mind is not a precision machine and has lots of room for judgment calls, and it is therefore capable of attending to similarities while ignoring the particular features that distinguish even these.



Why is this account unique to Locke? Why do we need ideas for this to work? A Reidian or Occamist can agree to this without signing on the bloated ontology.


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## jwright82 (Apr 5, 2011)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Reid's happy to help you there. He dismantles Locke and Descartes in similar fashion, arguing that the whole problem is that they are privileging certain of our God-given faculties over others and thus ignoring huge swathes of stuff we know.



As you know that is where I agree with you and Reid. I may not agree with his positive philosophy in entirty but I definantly agree with his critical philosophy. I don't understand him as much as you do so I am open to reconsidering my suspicions but I am quite critical of any form of foundationalism, which as I understand it he advocated.

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Claudiu said:


> What about this?
> 
> 
> > Locke does not really give much of an argument for his theory of abstract general ideas, and so it is difficult to come up with objections to the argument itself. On the face of it, though, there does seem to be a problem with his account of how we get general ideas. When attending to the ideas of Frisky, Snowball etc., is there really anything exactly the same about them? Cats, like all particular things, are individual in all of their properties. If the mind is sifting through particular ideas looking for matches between them, it will be hard pressed to find any. Locke, however, could probably give a satisfactory response to this worry. The mind attends to things that are similar enough. The mind is not a precision machine and has lots of room for judgment calls, and it is therefore capable of attending to similarities while ignoring the particular features that distinguish even these. [1]
> ...


 
How would Locke ever account for moral or aesthetic beleifs? Even love for that matter? There are whole sets of beleifs that he could never account for.


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