# Reformed Epistemology



## Brian (Oct 28, 2004)

Is there any population here at the Puritan Boards of Reformed Epistemologists? I am curious to see what sort of reception it has here. Thoughts, favorite philosophers?

[Admins: I hope I have posted under the correct subject. Please feel free to move this thread. However, I am more curious in Reformed Epistemology as such, and not in the more apologetic field in competition with, say, presuppositionalism or classical apologetics. Thanks for all you do! Brian]


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## johnny_redeemed (Oct 29, 2004)

I would concider myslef in the camp of Reformed Epistomology. Further, if you are presuppositionalist, I do not see how you can avoid RE.


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## crhoades (Oct 29, 2004)

For what it's worth:

Interesting comparison and contrast between Plantinga and Van Til
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/cvt_ap_comp.html


If Knowledge Then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/papers/IfKnowledgeThenGod.pdf

Faith Without Reasons?
A Review of Warranted Christian Belief by Alvin Plantinga
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/wcbreview.html


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## Brian (Nov 1, 2004)

Johnny Reformed says:


> I would concider myslef [sic] in the camp of Reformed Epistomology [sic]. Further, if you are presuppositionalist, I do not see how you can avoid RE.



I think that is very interesting, and an excellent discussion piece. Thanks for showing your allegiances! I myself find both presupp. and RE very exciting, being raised in a very old-school foundational atmosphere. I would definitely conclude with you, JR.

Paul Manata:

Pardon my deficiency, but is revelational epistemology the same as reformed epistemology? How are they similar, how are they different?



> First, Plantinga holds to a version of Reid's commens sense epistemology.



I would be very, very curious to hear what makes you think so, Paul. I am very unaware of any strain of this Old Princeton philosophy in his corpus. What leads you to this conclusion?



> Thirdly, I don't see how (and Plantinga has basically admited as much) 'proper basicality' CAN'T be employed as warrenting belief in, say, Allah and so compromises an absolutness proof for Christianity as well the embarrassing fact that proper basicality can be employed for contradictory conclusions.



Agreed (except for the end about contradictory conclusions) but Plantinga never claims to prove more than this. Not even Van Til thinks he can prove Christianity correct, nor should we, since validated intellectual proof seems to be contradictory to faith at many levels. However, are you familiar with Plantinga's Calvin/Aquinas Model (C/A Model), which goes from theism to Christianity? What are your thoughts on its validity/efficacy?

May all of Christ's blessings be yours,
BRIAN


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## Me Died Blue (Nov 1, 2004)

> _Originally posted by Brian_
> Not even Van Til thinks he can prove Christianity correct, nor should we, since validated intellectual proof seems to be contradictory to faith at many levels.



I'm not familiar with the arguments by other authors you're discussing, but I must say I definitely disagree with this statement, particularly the second half. Validated proof is absolutely _not_ contradictory to faith, for God is not a God of confusion (1 Cor. 14:33), but the truth of His nature has rather been clearly perceived ever since the creation of the world (Romans 1:20). The reason Christianity is not universally accepted is not that it is a-logical or unprovable in any sense, but because the sin nature of fallen man causes him to suppress and flee from that truth that absolutely _can_ be proven in an absolute and objective sense. And presuppositional apologetics maintains that fact, all the while taking into account total depravity and its effects on fallen man's intellect.


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## Brian (Nov 1, 2004)

Me Died Blue:

I think I must ask of you a humble apology, in that I may not be using my terms correctly. If you would gracious, let me push on some of our terms a little bit.


> for God is not a God of confusion (1 Cor. 14:33), but the truth of His nature has rather been clearly perceived ever since the creation of the world (Romans 1:20).


Absolutely, positively, 100% agree. I could never have said it as well as that. Thank you for giving us good bedrock to procede from.


> The reason Christianity is not universally accepted is not that it is a-logical or unprovable in any sense...


 I would like to push on you a little bit here, MDB. What do you mean by a-logical and unprovable? How are the Reformed to understand the Trinity? The dual nature of Christ? I agree with you that Christianity is not a-logical, but I would want to contend that Christianity is _supra_-rational. As far as unprovable, what do you mean by this? What would it take to prove Christianity? Do you mean we can prove that Christianity is the only true religion, that Jesus Christ is the only true God? Part of the problem with this is that I started the conversation using terminology like _proof, proves_ etc. So I am sorry. However, I would like to hear what you think is _provable_ within Christian dogma.

Let me comment on another point we agree on.


> The reason Christianity is not universally accepted... [is] because the sin nature of fallen man causes him to suppress and flee from that truth that absolutely can be proven in an absolute and objective sense.


 I think you are correct here, but let me say a few things about this. First, I do not think this exhausts man's unbelief. Let me state unequivocally that I agree that God is reality. Nothing is more real, or in your terms, absolute and objective, than God (Jesus Christ). However, I affirm that sinful man does not live in reality in the full. In other words, there are noetic categories that inform the physical creation that so affect our biological and geo-physical space-time continuum, that we sinful humans live in sub-real creation. (I'm drawing here on decreation ideas from C. S. Lewis' _The Great Divorce_ and _The Problem of Pain_.) So yes, MDB, I agree that a huge problem is suppressed truth due to unrighteousness. However, this is not our only problem. We have ontologically and fundamentally changed as post-lapsarian individuals AND communities/societies. All right, sorry, I got a bit winded there. Should be plenty to affirm/disagree with!

Finally...


> And presuppositional apologetics maintains that fact, all the while taking into account total depravity and its effects on fallen man's intellect.


 Van Till and the Tillians do maintain YOUR point, but I don't think they maintain mine, namely, that Christianity and the need for all men everywhere to repent and believe in Jesus Christ is _in tota_ able to be shown as corresponding to a correct view of reality. This, which is what I call faith, is only the work of the Holy Spirit upon dead men's souls, and is something that I am thankful that presuppositionalists like Van Til firmly espoused.

I hope all of this was somewhat clear (like mud). I earnestly desire to be faithful to the truth, and not correct, so all contentions are warmly welcomed. Thank you in advance for your input.

All God's grace, His shalom,
BRIAN


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## Me Died Blue (Nov 1, 2004)

> _Originally posted by Brian_
> 
> 
> > The reason Christianity is not universally accepted is not that it is a-logical or unprovable in any sense...
> ...



I probably shouldn't have used the term "a-logical." I was just trying to think of another word to elaborate, but really I guess I didn't need one and it just blurred what I meant, which is that Christianity is totally and objectively _provable_. I mean that in the same sense that Van Til talked about it in the quotations Paul provided above, and in the sense that you described it at the end of your post: "Christianity and the need for all men everywhere to repent and believe in Jesus Christ is _in tota[l]_ able to be shown as corresponding to a correct view of reality."



> _Originally posted by Brian_
> Let me comment on another point we agree on.
> 
> 
> ...



I fully agree with you that, due to the remnants of the fall even after our regeneration on this earth--and even due to our very nature as sub-Creator creatures--we are certainly not able to understand everything in full. I do hold, however, that one thing we _can_ be totally sure of in a provable sense is the truth of Christ as Lord as I already mentioned by pointing to your statement and Van Til's.



> _Originally posted by Brian_
> Finally...
> 
> 
> ...



But again, the point that you list here as your belief is also precisely the point I was also trying to make. As Paul described, the nature of the argument is such that it is perfectly consistent to call it _provable_ in every sense of the word and yet at the same time only attainable by regeneration granting us saving faith.



> _Originally posted by Brian_I hope all of this was somewhat clear (like mud). I earnestly desire to be faithful to the truth, and not correct, so all contentions are warmly welcomed. Thank you in advance for your input.



Amen! I further welcome your comments and questioning as well.


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## Brian (Nov 1, 2004)

Paul:


> RevE is basically Van Til's anological model. Thinking God's thoughts after Him. Man's knowledge must be a reproduction, on a creaturly scale, of God's original knowledge.


A thousand pardons! I somehow misread your previos post, and got to thinking there was some substrand of RefE that contained RevE, or that they were in apposition or something! Now all is clear. Thank you for your patience. Alas, these frail, sin-full, capabilities. One day, dear friend, one Day, and all will be made new. Marana tha!



> Really, I think it is pretty much accepted by most that Plantinga agrees with CS and Reid. Plantinga argues in all his books that all men's minds behave in a certain way. This is right out of Reid's philosophy... Second, It can be found in his warrant trilogy and here are some quotes from an interview...



First of all, I have to confess, Paul, that I did not do the google search. You busted me! I'll have to take your word on that. However, based on the quotes you gave and my own reading, I still want to venture that there are still some important differences. For instance, even though Plantinga wants to maintain that things _seem true_ or that _one's inclined to believe something is true_ I wish to argue this has more to do with properly functioning cognitive faculties than with CSR. In fact, I think that is MORE in line with presupp. than with CSR. I could be wrong. In fact, it could very well be that I have a low view of CSR. Maybe you can let me know. In any case, I'm not overly concerned with this issue. I'm sort of falling on a semantics issue. Tell me what you think.



> I'm confused? If PB (proper basicality) can be employed as warranting Chritian belief, as well as, warranting Islamic belief how can you not say that this *same* procedure can be employed for controdictory conclusions, i.e., contradictory conclusions are both warranted?


 Hmm.. Good question. I think what I, and Plantinga, are trying to say is that PB warrants _theism_, of which Christianity and Islam are both shades of. I agree they are mutually exclusive, but does this clear that up?



> Well, that's the genius of Van Til. Transcendental proof can be employed while staying faithful. Furthermore, I think you may be mistaken about what Van Til thinks.


That I may be mistaken about Van Til is an excellent observation!  However, let me try a little harder. Tell me what you think of this. 
I have misled the discussion because I have been switching in and out of realms. I have been mixing epistemology (philosophy) with soteriology (theology). I am not disagreeing with Van Til on his epistemology, but perhaps his soteriology. In other words, I have been talking about showing Christianity as true in the salvific sense, as in getting a sinful person to assent (_assensus_ from Turretin on faith) to the truthfulness of Christianity. This has most undoubtedly been my fault, as it is evident that you (Paul) and Me Died Blue are talking about truth-ladenness in the epistemological realm (the realm in which we all, except for sometimes MYSELF, have been discussing in). So I am sorry. Just for the record, yes, Christianity is able to be shown as true to the unregenerate. No, Christianity is not able to be shown as true to unregenerate in such a way so that they are converted. Am I clear in my distinction? I'm sure your replies will let me know.



> Maybe not as familar as you are. I would say that I do not disagree with Plantinga on everything. I would say that I do think his has some very helpful insights. but as far as the C/A model I will still have to say that I do not believe that you can get to the God of Chritian theology by natural theology. And I think Plantinga is *way more* specific on what things man knows about God than Calvin was in his institutes. I would also disagree with some of his interpretations of the sensus divinatus.


I think I agree with everything here, Paul. Well said. As far as the A/C model (I had it backwards), check out _Warranted Christian Belief_ p. 248. Actually, to be technical, this is the *Extended* A/C model, to differentiate from its shorter kind.

Hopefully this puts everything in order. Thank you for your patience. Let me know how we're doing.

May the love of God in Christ Jesus rest on you richly,
BRIAN


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## Brian (Nov 1, 2004)

*Further mutterings on my own errors...*

Sorry, Me Died Blue, I posted without realizing you beat me to it. Also, as soon as I posted I began to think mine was not sufficient in my position with regards to Van Til. So here I go again (is there a word limit?!)

Before I do, let me quickly say to MDB:
I think I totally agree with everything you said, and it sounds like we are for the most part on the same page. Let me know as new things appear.

Just to show how muddle-headed I am

My problem is lack of clarity. An important part of saving faith is _assensus_, i.e., agreeing with the truth-ladenness of Christianity. This saving faith (fides salvifica) is brought about only by the Holy Spirit, playing His bow of grace across the violin made with strings of sinful men's souls. At the same time, thanks to the work done by those in the presupp. camp, we can *prove* Christianity to an unregenerate man and that man still not come to faith. So here, I am using _ prove_ in the sense of: Jack now sees that Christianity is true, but is not trusting Christ for righteousness. Hence, Jack has seen Christianity *proven* to him, but does not yet possess _fides salvifica_.

There is another sense, though, where Jack has not had Christianity *proven* to him. In this sense, he is not saved, he has not yet *proven* Christ and all the promises made in covenant in the gospel. This is what I mean when I say I have confused philosophy with theology. So again, sorry, and hopefully now we are back to the discussion. 

Now, where there is still meaninful argument, is whether or not Van Til can take a person farther than Plantinga?
Also, does Van Tillian apologetics differ from the gospeling (keruxing) that must occur following RefE apologetics?
Also, just to show my hand: the main reason I think RefE is utterly necessary for thinking Christians (obviously the Reformed) is because of dealing with men like Kant, Husserl/Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Hume. Plantinga, Merold Westphal, Nick Wolterstorff, et al are invaluable. Ok, 1, 2, 3, ...quit!

Thanks for your patience,
BRIAN


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## Me Died Blue (Nov 1, 2004)

Brian, we seem to agree now, particularly with regard to the difference in epistemological proof and saving faith, and how sin prevents the former from necessitating the latter. Thanks for the warm spirit in this discussion!


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## Brian (Nov 1, 2004)

*For the love...*

Seriously, this is my last post tonight. You guys are too fast! Thanks for the excellent discussion.

Paul,

_On dealing with PFCF and externalism..._

Yes, I do hold to a hardcore view of externalism. I had to do a paper on Plantinga and externalism, revolving on his account of epistemically viable defeaters clause. One things that was telling for me, though, was when you said *an externalist account _of_ warrant.* I think most externalists I've read would want to put it, an externalist account _for_ warrant, in that our externalism helps us to rationally deal with warrant and skepticism.


> I think this disagrees with Romans 1. Paul doesn't say that they know "a" god (generic theism) but rather that they know "the" God (Christian theism). Also, if they are *warranted* in believing in Allah then how are they "without an excuse?" So I think the "clearing up" brings new problems into the picture.


I think it might be helpful to be concise. Paul is not worried about whether or not people are *warranted* about how they know God exists against atheistic critique (Paul has no clue what *warrant* per our discussion even is). Paul is not worried about how Granny Susie Mae responds to Professor A. Theist who insists that believing in ANY god is irrational. This, I contend, IS Plantinga's project. He's trying to show that it is not irrational to believe as Granny does, and that it may in fact be the Professor thinking irrationally (as Paul and presupps argues).


> I'll look over it again. Correct me if I'm wrong, though. Doesn't Plantinga's revised model still allow for natural theology?


Yes I think it does.

As always, Paul, its been a pleasure.

For the everlasting glories of King Jesus, who holds all of our ruminating philosophical thoughts together by the word of His glorious power,
BRIAN


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## Brian (Nov 1, 2004)

*Breaking my promise*

Thank you, Chris. The pleasure has been all mine.

BRIAN


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## Brian (Nov 2, 2004)

Paul, 

By way of intro., excellent thoughts. Let me give it my best shot under sovereign grace.


> Sounds like he's conceded the Skeptics argument for the ego-centric predicament.


 Yes, it may sound that way, but I don't think his remarks necessitate that view. It may help by explaining what I mean by internalism/externalism (and then I promise to move forward with your post). By internalism I mean

that belief b is to be epistemically justified if and only if all the factors necessary for belief for a given person be _cognitively accessible_ for that person;
where;
cognitively accessible is understood in that ideas obtain internally through introspection or reflection.

All I mean by externalism is 

that at least some of the justifying factors need not be thus accessible [that is, cognitively], so that they can be _external_ to the believer's cognitive perspective, i.e., beyond his ken.

At risk of bringing up our previous debate, I think I can maintain a theocentric view of this, and still maintain that I do not know how my mind functions as it does, and that there is a good deal that resides in the noumenal that I simply have no access to. E.g. Merold Westphal, another terrific Reformed philosopher, shows how sin can function as a Kantian lens. Now, on to your post.


> Does he know the identity of the winner?


 See, I think the answer is of course he knows the winner. The main problem Internalists/Externalists want to answer is: was he _warranted_ or _justified_ in knowing who the winner was. So while you were concerned with epistemic responsiblitity (ER), I am more concerned with Truth Conductivitiy (TC). While I agree that (especially given my presupps.) that the clairvoyant was flawed and failed ER, I think he was justified in regards to TC. I think the beauty of RefE is that, when coupled with Presuppositionalism, it escapes Source suspicion that even the most avowed atheist would have to grant. I think Michael Bergmann, a well known atheist/internalist, would be seriously put to task by a combination of the two theories. Also, both ER and TC are maintained in a way that is impossible given one without the other.


> Well, I don't think it is irrational for granny-Smith to believe in God. But I think you missed my point. How can a Muslim be warranted in believing in Allah when the Bible says that they believe in Jehovah. How can they be without an excuse? Could they say, "Well, Alvin Plantinga argued pretty persuasively that I was warranted in believing in Allah?" Put differently, how can anyone be warranted in believing in deities that don't exist?


Good, I'm glad you don't think Granny Smith is irrational. But I want to press on this, Paul. WHY isn't she irrational? What sustains her?

Secondly, lets be clear about what we mean when we say Muslims are warranted to believe in Allah. For Plantinga, warrant is that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. I do not think either term is what Paul is arguing for in Romans. Paul says that God and His communicable attributes are *revealed* (apokalupto; Rom 1.18), *manifest* (phaneroo; 1.19), et al (known, clearly seen, all from NKJV). But lets not forget that man's response is one of *suppression* (katechonton; 1.18) and futile thinking (dialogismois; 1.21), which included darkened hearts. I don't think all the warrant in the world is the biblical *knowing* Christ requires.

So, lets say I meet a man named Mohammed at Washington and 7th (they all seemed to be named Mohammed). He may be totally warranted in his belief in Allah. And he would absolutely sinful at the same time. What do you think?


> Well again, as I said, I do not believe that one can get to the God of the Bible by natural theology.


Why do you think so?




_Common Sense Realism, Reid, and Plantinga_
Sorry if this is
I must admit I am not fully familiar with Reid but wouldn't he say that all of this hinges on *reliable belief-producing faculties* while Plantinga would maintain *properly functioning cognitive faculties?*

Finally, Plantinga alludes to Reid on 18 different pages (_Warranted Christian Belief_). As near as I can tell, he disagrees with him on all except one instance. There, on p. 147-148, he cites a good sized block quote concerning *natural credulity,* and even then wishes Reid had taken it a step farther.
The biggest chunk devoted to Reid is pp. 218-227. Here it is subtitled *Sin and Skepticism,* and mostly concerns Reid/Hume arguments. Here, Plantinga shows that Reid's own rebuttal of Hume CANNOT fully deliver us from the skeptic's defeater. That we cannot prove our faculties trustworthy without Presuppositionalism seems self-evident. 

Well, I'm done now. Thank you for bearing with me. I hope you all have a wonderful day.

May the Holy Spirit make each of us more willing to serve Him,
BRIAN


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## Brian (Nov 4, 2004)

Paul,

I am sorry I have taken so long to reply, but: 1) I have been swamped and behind in every area of my life, and 2) I was significantly confused by your last post so I'm trying to take my time to really sort out where all of this is at. I am not so sure I am any less confused, perhaps just more determined to take a stab at it.


*Epistemology Proper*
The problem of ego-centrism (as it refers to epistemological sureity and skepticism) as well as our debate (which feels, at least to me, like it is quickly evolving into the classic internalist/externalist debate) I want to broadly address here. First, with regards to egocentrism, I think RevE combined with RefE totally and adequately removes the problem. I don't see the ego-centric predicament with God as God. So in other words, no, I don't think I can get outside my faculties and see if I am objectively typing this post, or anything, but since God is at the center of everything, I don't need to either. The egocentric problem does not, for me, exist. It cannot obtain in a world where Jesus Christ is YHWH.

Secondly, I feel that our discussion concerning ER and TC has led us into the gridlock of internalism/externalism. Also, when you say that PCFC have an ethical dimension to them, I am not so sure. I heartily love your example of loving the Lord, but I want to insist that what we have been talking about as *mind* that can fulfill ER or TC, cannot also *love.* Perhaps my anthropology differs from yours on this plane. Finally,


> Also, reliabalist's, in my opinion, have not solved the problem of generality nor the fact that reliabalism allows for accidental beliefs to be called justified/warranted. This has serious implications for knowledge.


 I agree, and its those serious implications that I want to uphold. At least until you reply and give me reasons to doubt it! 

So instead of rehashing our internalism/externalism (of which I do not object and would find frutiful), I am perhaps more interested in what *leads* you to your convictions of internalism. What about that brand of epistemology seems right to you (biblical evidence, RevE, etc)?


*Religious Epistemology*
There are a few things that at first I was just so confused about, so forgive me if I mis -apply or -interpret you; I'll do my best to render you judiciously.

First, Granny Smith (by the way, I took *PB* to mean _proper belief_. Am I correct?). You say:


> ...I say that that PB is only Christian theism as opposed to general theism. I hold that when she looks at creation, for example, she is immediately aware of God. She is disposed in such a way, by her creator, that she cannot but help to recognize His stamp on all that exists.


I was surprised by this, and perhaps I shouldn't be, so you can clear it up. How does she see God (capital G, triune YHWH) in creation? Aren't we confusing natural/special revelation? Perhaps my views are skewed, but in my view if Granny can see YHWH (Jesus Christ) in creation, than she could be saved, and this apart from the special revelation of the Gospel.

My response here is fairly similar to our example of a Muslim (hey, c'mon, I'm just trying to make it easier for you to respond, ok? You know, two birds with one stone...). Of course both Granny Smith and Mohammed on 7th ST. are condemned by looking at the clouds and nature and not worshipping YHWH (Jesus Christ), but all they can get to is god. I think that is all sinful man can derive from natural revelation. So in THIS sense, I think Mohammed is *warranted* in believing in a god. I think that is all RefE is attempting to show. I think.


Finally, I think I see where you are coming from on Reid and CSR, so I'm not really going to push that whole thing anymore. But in answer to your question, probably no, that won't work, but I think I would say there was a time when you were warranted to believe the earth was flat, and yet you were wrong.

All God's grace to you and yours,

BRIAN


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