# Middle-Knowledge Article, Wherein Also is Discussed Counterfactual Desires in God



## Prufrock (May 1, 2009)

Dr. R. Scott Clark posted a wonderful short article on his blog entitled _Ping-Pong Evangelicals and Middle Knowledge,_ regarding Middle Knowledge and its relationship to Confessional orthodoxy in the modern evangelical climate. It's well worth the few minutes it will take you to read it here.


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## sgtdabney (May 1, 2009)

*Thank For the Post*

Great article. I recently followed a discussion of MK on James White's site by Turretinfan, which was good as well. The recent fascination with MK is, quite frankly, pretty hard for me to understand. I read Craig's explanation of it some time ago after attending one of his lectures and was really disappointed by the lack of exegesis offered to support the position. It was mainly philosophical and really seemed geared more to 'get God off the hook' for any responsibility for evil than to explain what we have presented to us in Scripture. But what do I know?

Thanks for the post.


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## MW (May 1, 2009)

The blog post denies the existence of any such species as reformed middle knowledge, and it appeals to reformed history to substantiate the denial; but one of the fundamental elements of middle knowledge is the concept of non-volitional dispositions in God or the desire in God for things to happen which He knows will not come to pass. Dr. Clark has gone on record as defending this concept. I hope Dr. Clark's refusal to allow sub-reformed concepts like middle knowledge will also lead him to a decided stand against the sub-reformed concept of non-volitional dispositions in God.


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## Marrow Man (May 2, 2009)

sgtdabney said:


> Great article. I recently followed a discussion of MK on James White's site by Turretinfan, which was good as well. The recent fascination with MK is, quite frankly, pretty hard for me to understand. I read Craig's explanation of it some time ago after attending one of his lectures and was really disappointed by the lack of exegesis offered to support the position. It was mainly philosophical and really seemed geared more to 'get God off the hook' for any responsibility for evil than to explain what we have presented to us in Scripture. But what do I know?
> 
> Thanks for the post.



Sgt. Dabney, thanks for this insightful response. I see you are new to the PB; hopefully many more will be coming!

Also, I must ask you to please fix your signature. You can find the requirements by clicking on the link in my signature below.

I look forward to seeing many more posts by you on the PB!


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## R. Scott Clark (May 2, 2009)

Methinks the brother refers to this essay:

"Janus, the Well-Meant Offer of the Gospel, and Westminster Theology."

In this volume:

The Bookstore at WSC: Pattern of Sound Doctrine by VanDrunen, David M.

Without rehearsing the entire essay, I reply: Unless Herman Hoeksema, John Gerstner and a few others represent "Reformed" theology on the free offer, then I do not hold a sub-Reformed view. The view I defend in the essay was the mainstream, historic view of the Reformed theologians and churches, including the Synod of Dort. 

I hope readers will look at the essay and the evidence presented for themselves and come to their own conclusions. I think the historic evidence for the free offer is quite strong. 



armourbearer said:


> The blog post denies the existence of any such species as reformed middle knowledge, and it appeals to reformed history to substantiate the denial; but one of the fundamental elements of middle knowledge is the concept of non-volitional dispositions in God or the desire in God for things to happen which He knows will not come to pass. Dr. Clark has gone on record as defending this concept. I hope Dr. Clark's refusal to allow sub-reformed concepts like middle knowledge will also lead him to a decided stand against the sub-reformed concept of non-volitional dispositions in God.


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## Prufrock (May 2, 2009)

Dr. Clark,

Did the _Janus_ paper of yours used to be available on-line? I am almost _certain_ I have read it, but I know I haven't laid my hands on the Pattern of Sound Doctrine volume. I want to know if I am already going senile in my supposedly prime years.


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## MW (May 3, 2009)

R. Scott Clark said:


> Unless Herman Hoeksema, John Gerstner and a few others represent "Reformed" theology on the free offer, then I do not hold a sub-Reformed view. The view I defend in the essay was the mainstream, historic view of the Reformed theologians and churches, including the Synod of Dort.



The denial of counterfactual desires in God is easily marginalised by reference to the names of Hoeksema and Gerstner. Hence I strongly recommend readers consult John Owen's Display of Arminianism, chapter 3, which deals with the Arminian rejection of the Prescience of God. Let it be noted that Dr. Owen is generally recognised as standing in the mainstream of catholic and reformed tradition; that he specifically rejected counterfactual desires in God as an Arminian error; and that he was one who maintained the free offer of the gospel with great boldness. He writes:



> They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire
> divers things which yet never come to pass. “We grant,” saith Corvinus,
> “that there are desires in God that never are fulfilled.” Now, surely, to
> desire what one is sure will never come to pass is not an act regulated by
> ...


The advocacy of counterfactual desires in God is sub-reformed and can only be maintained on the basis of the sub-reformed teaching of middle knowledge.


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## chbrooking (May 3, 2009)

Perhaps I'm ignorant here -- a VERY real possibility, but I'm wondering if you two (Rev. Winzer and Dr. Clark) aren't talking past one another. I know Dr. Clark maintains the Creator/creature distinction. Wouldn't it be fair to say that Rev. Winzer is correct that there are no counterfactual desires in God, and yet equally fair to say that, as God has revealed himself to finite minds, it appears that there are because of condescension? In other words, we are told two things that our finite minds cannot reconcile, but we are told both things by God himself. Therefore we affirm both as equally true, while admitting that reconciling them is now, and always will be, beyond us. And isn't this true of just about every major doctrine of the faith (Trinity, hypostatic union, Sovereign God not the author of sin, etc.)? I guess I'm asking whether we are talking about the same thing, or whether one of you is looking at this from one side of the coin and the other from the other.

What have I missed?


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## MW (May 3, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> Therefore we affirm both as equally true, while admitting that reconciling them is now, and always will be, beyond us.



If one consults the statement of Owen provided above, it will be seen that the reformed tradition has reconciled these apparently contradictory statements by acknowledging that counterfactual desires in God is an example of anthropopathism. It has only been since the advent of Van Tillian paradox that reformed theologians have found it acceptable to speak in terms of deliberate irreconcilable contradiction in theology; prior to that time all things were tested by the analogy of faith, which requires logical consistency in the human statement of truth.


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## MW (May 3, 2009)

Additionally, if one wants to resort to paradox to explain counterfactual "desires" in God, he leaves himself without any reasonable basis for rejecting counterfactual "will" or "knowledge" in God. One cannot have his paradoxical cake and eat it too.


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## chbrooking (May 4, 2009)

Rev. Winzer,
I don't believe there is any real distinction between calling something anthropopathism and calling something accommodation. The question is, is there some genuine ontological counterfactual desire in God. The answer is no. But by resorting to anthropopathism to explain it is no different, I believe, than saying there is apparent tension. Some anthropo-x-isms are more easily assimilated to our minds than others. For instance, when God "goes down" "to see" the tower of Babel, we know God to be omnipresent and omniscient, and so recognize that he does not actually move, nor does his attention need to be focussed as ours does, nor does he lack information that he seeks to gain.

But when we come to the will of God, it is very clear that God works all things according to the counsel of his will (Eph. 1:11), and yet it is also clear that things occur that violate his precept. It is also clear (and an anthropopathic explanation is perfectly reasonable here) that God does not will (μὴ βουλόμενος) that any should perish.

I don't see how I'm contending anything different than you are. Anthropopathism is a form of accommodation to our finite minds. I'm just saying that it is necessary because we cannot reconcile Eph 1:11 and 2 Pet. 3:9 in our finite minds, yet affirm them both as true and God as simple. In other words, I'm saying that counterfactual desires do NOT exist in God, but that, because of accommodation, they appear to. We must affirm that they do not, but heuristically, we distinguish the will of decree from the will of precept. Otherwise, we eliminate one side of the biblical data.

Do we disagree? I don't see it. Enlighten me. I mean that genuinely. I have come to very much respect you -- I actually look for your posts. So I'm certainly not looking for a fight. I'm just unable to see a difference in substance between us on this issue.


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## MW (May 4, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> I'm just saying that it is necessary because we cannot reconcile Eph 1:11 and 2 Pet. 3:9 in our finite minds, yet affirm them both as true and God as simple.



We definitely agree on the fact that God does not have counterfactual desires, but we do not seem to agree that the Scriptures themselves do not literally present God as having them. 2 Peter 3:9 in no way suggests it, since Peter's readership are being treated with the judgment of charity as the elect, and it is this readership who are assured concerning God's unwillingness that they perish.

As to the identification of accommodation with anthropopathism -- they cannot be regarded as the same for the simple reason that the accommodated revelation of God sometimes speaks literally and sometimes figuratively. "God is a spirit" is literal; "the hand of the Lord" is figurative; both are accommodated to human capacity. By conflating the two the distinct category of anthropomorphic expression is negated, thus opening the door to a human God. I hope that clarifies the issue.


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## chbrooking (May 4, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> We definitely agree on the fact that God does not have counterfactual desires, but we do not seem to agree that the Scriptures themselves do not literally present God as having them. 2 Peter 3:9 in no way suggests it, since Peter's readership are being treated with the judgment of charity as the elect, and it is this readership who are assured concerning God's unwillingness that they perish.



Yes, I can see how you might limit the reference in 2P3. However, Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11 do not seem to be quite as easily limited. Surely it would offend the simplicity of God to divide his affection from his volition. I'm not sure I agree with you yet on 2p3, but you've definitely given me pause to think and consider this. Thank you.



armourbearer said:


> As to the identification of accommodation with anthropopathism -- they cannot be regarded as the same for the simple reason that the accommodated revelation of God sometimes speaks literally and sometimes figuratively. "God is a spirit" is literal; "the hand of the Lord" is figurative; both are accommodated to human capacity. By conflating the two the distinct category of anthropomorphic expression is negated, thus opening the door to a human God. I hope that clarifies the issue.



Yes, you are correct. I even sensed it as I was typing my previous post -- I am conflating the two. All scripture is accommodated. But this goes right to the heart of my point. We are arguing about what the will of God is _an sich_, but we only have access to what is revealed about him, where we are presented with, at the very least, affectation apparently opposed to volition, are we not forced to regard this as being beyond the bounds of the finite mind to reconcile? 

I don't see how I have opened the door to a human God. On the contrary, I am very cautious about treating this doctrine as though I had univocal knowledge. If anyone seems to be in danger of that, it is you. Please do not take offense at that, but respond to it. Feel free to give me whatever thrashing you like ... I am sure I deserve it. But understand while doing so that I am not making that as an accusation and mean no offense -- I'm only trying to put a fine point on the discussion.

Thank you for the clarity of thought in your response. It has helped me see where my thinking was sloppy.

P.S. I do have to ask, though, why the anthropopathism card was played at all? Of course, any time God is said to desire anything, we can call it anthropopathism. But on your reading of 2P3, God is really saying, "not willing that any [of you] should perish".


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## MW (May 4, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> However, Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11 do not seem to be quite as easily limited. Surely it would offend the simplicity of God to divide his affection from his volition.



On Ezek. 18, 33, if we don't impose our theological questions on the text, but let it teach what it intended to teach, we see that these passages are concerned with the dynamic of the prophet-hearer relationship in the context of Ezekiel's ministry to a people who are suffering covenant curses as a result of Israel's long history of abandoning the word of the Lord. Where does the fault lie when people do not repent? The prophet is clear of guilt when he delivers God's message. The hearer is absolved when he receives the prophet's message, and is assured that God will not be pleased to inflict death on the wicked, that is, the wicked one who has turned from his wickedness, as the context makes clear. As for those who do not hear the prophet's message, their guilt is entirely their own, and they will be punished irrespective of the righteous heritage they previously lived. When taken in context and allowed to speak for itself the Ezekiel passages are seen to have nothing to say to the theological question as to God's attitude towards wicken men whom He intends to punish for their sins. They are dealing with response and accountability to the prophetic word on the hearer's part. The exegete is not at liberty to read the idea of "affection" in God into the text.

Theologically, yes, we must maintain the simplicity of God, and this entails rejecting any notion that God relates to or acts towards the sinner in any other way than what He has determined by the counsel of His will.




chbrooking said:


> where we are presented with, at the very least, affectation apparently opposed to volition, are we not forced to regard this as being beyond the bounds of the finite mind to reconcile?



The teaching which concludes that the "apparent" contrariety between affection and volition is "literal" has taken "logical" steps to create a problem which the finite mind cannot reconcile. Let's be clear -- counterfactual desires in God is a conclusion which human minds are drawing from the special revelation of God given to us in the Bible. The Bible nowhere states that God literally has desires which are contradictory to His eternal purpose. The human reader draws that conclusion. Presumably he uses reason to draw that conclusion. But on what reasonable basis can he do so when the conclusion he draws involves him in a contradiction which reason cannot accept? Using reason to violate reason is not reasonable.


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## chbrooking (May 4, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> > where we are presented with, at the very least, affectation apparently opposed to volition, are we not forced to regard this as being beyond the bounds of the finite mind to reconcile?
> ...



Yes, I agree. I'll think about your take on Ezek. You haven't convinced me yet, but I'm teachable. I'll go back to them and see if we're on the same page there, too. But in this last paragraph, you are affirming precisely what I intended. I'm not sure about your last few sentences. I don't see holding two things that I cannot reconcile as using reason to violate reason. I do this with the hypostatic union and a host of other doctrines. I believe it is a matter of faith in God and his word. It is not that I'm using reason to deduce that there is an apparent tension. The apparent tension is there. You are using reason to reconcile them. I'm using reason to recognize that He's God and I'm not. His word, even as accommodated for my understanding, reveals things that my finite mind cannot reconcile (e.g., the trinity, the hypostatic union, the genuine offer and election/reprobation, etc.). I'm okay with that. I think it's a matter of knowing my place as a creature.

I appreciate your precision, and as always, you have helped to clarify my thoughts here. I think we are in basic agreement -- there are not conterfactual desires in God. If we stop there, we can stop in agreement . At least for now. You've given me some study to do.


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## MW (May 4, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> I don't see holding two things that I cannot reconcile as using reason to violate reason. I do this with the hypostatic union and a host of other doctrines. I believe it is a matter of faith in God and his word. It is not that I'm using reason to deduce that there is an apparent tension. The apparent tension is there. You are using reason to reconcile them.



Interesting observation. The teaching of the hypostatic union starts with two facts -- (1.) Jesus is divine and Jesus is human, and (2.) Jesus is one. It reconciles these two facts, not by holding them in tension, but by explaining that divinity and humanity only refer to the category of "nature," while Jesus remains essentially one "person." The doctrine therefore stands upon rational categories which are designed to remove the rational tension. Undoubtedly, the concept that Jesus is divine and human in one person is beyond the power of reason to prove, but it does not go against reason to believe it. OTOH, the teaching of counterfactual divine desires introduces rational tension because it contradicts the teaching that God does all His pleasure, does whatsoever pleases Him, and works all things after the counsel of His own will. The tension is removed by traditional reformed theologians by explaining that the appearance of counterfactual desire is a use of figurative language to express God's immanence in the history of salvation, and that it is not to be taken literally as if God is conflicted in Himself. Where traditional reformed theology is denied the right to remove the tension and explain the appearance in this way, the contradiction is left unremoved, and is therefore a violation to the ministerial function of reason in systematising the revelation of God.


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## chbrooking (May 5, 2009)

Ah, now I think I see the nature of our disagreement, and it is real. I believe my view of the place of logic is lower -- and this goes to the univocal/analogical distinction. I am afraid I see a danger of intruding upon the incomprehensibility of God in your approach. On the counterfactual desires, we are in agreement insofar as we both deny that there can be counterfactual desires in God. We differ in our response to that. Your very high view of reason demands that you reinterpret the one strand of evidence in light of the other. It is one thing to say that it is a figure. It is quite another to say that it really has no significance or is even deceptive. I do not believe that there is tension in the mind of God. The tension exists solely in the mind of the creature, who by virtue of his status as creature, can never approach a univocal understanding with God. Far from leading to a human God, I am staunchly demanding that we maintain a human man. I am also content to say, "I don't understand but I believe", taking an Augustinian position over a Thomist one. 

You are right that something that goes beyond reason to prove does not necessarily violate reason, but the ONLY reason that is true is that godly and pious reason knows its place, and knows that God alone grounds reason. Apart from our faith in the Christian God, and our maintaining of the Creator/creature distinction, we cannot account for logic. That is an ultimate commitment. We just deal with the disparate evidence in two different ways. You try to reconcile the hypostatic union, trinity, etc. I'd love to know how, given the canons of logic, you evade the challenge to the law of identity in the Trinity without swerving into heresy. My approach is different, in that I believe our logic REFLECTS the thought of God, but only analogically so. Therefore, when something is in apparent tension, I will strive for reconciliation, but not demand it. It appears that you demand that God's revelation submit to the bar of logic -- that was deliberately provocative, sorry --

Now that I understand our difference, I can either leave it at that, or, if you like, we could continue to hash out our differences. But if we do, it should probably be in the Apologetics forum.

Thanks for taking the time to wade through my muddy thinking to bring clarity to the issue. It is always a pleasure talking with you.


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## ChristianTrader (May 5, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> Ah, now I think I see the nature of our disagreement, and it is real. I believe my view of the place of logic is lower -- and this goes to the univocal/analogical distinction. I am afraid I see a danger of intruding upon the incomprehensibility of God in your approach.



One must remember that the classical view of incomprehensibility of God was formed using Rev. Winzer's view of logic. So it is not about intruding upon the incomprehensibility of God but actually changing what it means.



> On the counterfactual desires, we are in agreement insofar as we both deny that there can be counterfactual desires in God. We differ in our response to that. Your very high view of reason demands that you reinterpret the one strand of evidence in light of the other. It is one thing to say that it is a figure. It is quite another to say that it really has no significance or is even deceptive. I do not believe that there is tension in the mind of God. The tension exists solely in the mind of the creature, who by virtue of his status as creature, can never approach a univocal understanding with God. Far from leading to a human God, I am staunchly demanding that we maintain a human man. I am also content to say, "I don't understand but I believe", taking an Augustinian position over a Thomist one.



I do not think you can believe what you don't understand. Now perhaps you are saying something along the lines of "I trust God even though I do not understand exactly what he means here or there." Also having a high view of reason does not imply that one is trying to make a human God or transcend the creature/creator distinction. It is something more along the lines of reason being ontological and not just epistemological.



> You are right that something that goes beyond reason to prove does not necessarily violate reason, but the ONLY reason that is true is that godly and pious reason knows its place, and knows that God alone grounds reason. Apart from our faith in the Christian God, and our maintaining of the Creator/creature distinction, we cannot account for logic. That is an ultimate commitment. We just deal with the disparate evidence in two different ways. You try to reconcile the hypostatic union, trinity, etc. I'd love to know how, given the canons of logic, you evade the challenge to the law of identity in the Trinity without swerving into heresy. My approach is different, in that I believe our logic REFLECTS the thought of God, but only analogically so. Therefore, when something is in apparent tension, I will strive for reconciliation, but not demand it. It appears that you demand that God's revelation submit to the bar of logic -- that was deliberately provocative, sorry --



I would respond provocatively in this fashion. "If one does not submit something that claims to be God's revelation (or an interpretation of some doctrine claimed to be found in the Bible) to the bar of reason then they will just submit it to something else, from gut feeling/reaction, etc."

CT


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## py3ak (May 5, 2009)

Pastor Brooking, I apologize if I'm importing something into your statement that it won't bear. It seemed like you might be thinking that Mr. Winzer is something of a Clarkian: I don't believe he'll mind if I state that this is (rather emphatically) not the case.


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## MW (May 5, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> I do not believe that there is tension in the mind of God. The tension exists solely in the mind of the creature, who by virtue of his status as creature, can never approach a univocal understanding with God.



The problem is (1.) that the tension is not claimed to exist "solely in the mind of the creature," but in the mind of the Holy Spirit as given in the special revelation of God called holy Scripture. Yet the very purpose of ectypal theology is to give the knowledge of God to man in words and forms which he can "understand," not to make him confused so he knows not when to affirm a truth and when to negate it. (2.) That the idea of irreconcilable paradox fails to deal with the inescapable reality that all theological interpretation is a "rational" abstraction of Scripture teaching, and therefore requires reason to arrive at the paradox in the first place. It is not a case of Scripture speaking against reason but of reason speaking against reason, which is inherently unreasonable.


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## chbrooking (May 5, 2009)

ChristianTrader said:


> I do not think you can believe what you don't understand. Now perhaps you are saying something along the lines of "I trust God even though I do not understand exactly what he means here or there." Also having a high view of reason does not imply that one is trying to make a human God or transcend the creature/creator distinction. It is something more along the lines of reason being ontological and not just epistemological.



Am I to assume you understand the trinity and the incarnation? Of course not. But we are told in Scripture that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, that the Father is not the Son, that the Father is not the Spirit, that the Spirit is not the Son, and that there is but one God. How is that to be understood? It isn't. It's to be believed. We are told that Jesus is fully man and fully God, yet there are not two persons but one. What I am driving at is that when we come to infinite realities our logic is out of its depth. 



ChristianTrader said:


> I would respond provocatively in this fashion. "If one does not submit something that claims to be God's revelation (or an interpretation of some doctrine claimed to be found in the Bible) to the bar of reason then they will just submit it to something else, from gut feeling/reaction, etc."



So you are maintaining that there is some impersonal law to which even God must submit?



py3ak said:


> Pastor Brooking, I apologize if I'm importing something into your statement that it won't bear. It seemed like you might be thinking that Mr. Winzer is something of a Clarkian: I don't believe he'll mind if I state that this is (rather emphatically) not the case.



Thank you for clearing that up. Your intuition was correct. I'm not sure I yet see how that is not the case, but I will happily take your word for it.



armourbearer said:


> The problem is (1.) that the tension is not claimed to exist "solely in the mind of the creature," but in the mind of the Holy Spirit as given in the special revelation of God called holy Scripture. Yet the very purpose of ectypal theology is to give the knowledge of God to man in words and forms which he can "understand," not to make him confused so he knows not when to affirm a truth and when to negate it.



Okay. I'm affirming both that truths that God reveals. It is reasonable to do so, because of the authority of the One who said it. If I can reconcile them through reason, great. But if I can't, It may be because I'm not smart enough. But it may also be because how those two things can be true without contradiction is beyond the finite mind to know, as is the case with the incarnation/hypostatic union.



armourbearer said:


> (2.) That the idea of irreconcilable paradox fails to deal with the inescapable reality that all theological interpretation is a "rational" abstraction of Scripture teaching, and therefore requires reason to arrive at the paradox in the first place. It is not a case of Scripture speaking against reason but of reason speaking against reason, which is inherently unreasonable.



Don't misunderstand me. I'm not disparaging reason. You are quite right that we cannot think, interpret, speak, etc. without reason. I'm not maintaining that there is a genuine paradox. I'm maintaining that the paradox is apparent. I'm maintaining that it is reconciled with no difficulty whatsoever in the mind of God. But since at no point can my mind think univocally with his, the solution to the paradox may well be beyond me -- as is the case with the trinity and incarnation.

This is why I repeatedly say that I agree with you that there are no counterfactual desires in God. And to whatever degree two texts can be reconciled without doing violence to reason, they should be. But I am not willing to run to special pleading to get them to agree. If I were to do that, then I would have to do the same to eradicate the doctrine of the trinity, by explaining this text away in light of the one more palatable to my theology. But we cannot do that. If a reasonable explanation exists, great. And I'll look at your 2P3 take. But if we end up twisting a passage to mean what it cannot mean, just so that we don't do violence to another passage, that's special pleading. I would rather maintain both propositions as true, and while the vanishing point is beyond me, I believe they come together in the mind of God.

-----Added 5/5/2009 at 09:53:18 EST-----

By the way, I just remembered that the title of this thread is "middle knowledge article". Since I seem to be the one on the defensive here , I'd like it to be on another thread, since I DO NOT hold to middle knowledge .


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## MW (May 5, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> But it may also be because how those two things can be true without contradiction is beyond the finite mind to know, as is the case with the incarnation/hypostatic union.



But it obviously is not beyond the finite mind to reconcile how Jesus can be one and two at the same time. Reason concludes from the revelation of God that He is one is person but two in nature -- that is the hypostatic union. It is the office of reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit to understand the revelation of God.



chbrooking said:


> I'm maintaining that it is reconciled with no difficulty whatsoever in the mind of God. But since at no point can my mind think univocally with his, the solution to the paradox may well be beyond me -- as is the case with the trinity and incarnation.



If all tensions with respect to interpreting Scripture are not the product of the revelation of God but of the mind which interprets Scripture then the individual setting forth the paradox has no right to claim that the paradox is a part of the the revelation of God; the individual has no right to arrive at an interpretation which requires him to believe an irreconcilable contradiction.


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## chbrooking (May 5, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> > But it may also be because how those two things can be true without contradiction is beyond the finite mind to know, as is the case with the incarnation/hypostatic union.
> ...



We are in total agreement here. It is not irreconcilable. It is reconciled in the mind of God.


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## Prufrock (May 5, 2009)

chbrooking said:


> By the way, I just remembered that the title of this thread is "middle knowledge article". Since I seem to be the one on the defensive here , I'd like it to be on another thread, since I DO NOT hold to middle knowledge .



As creator of the thread, I officially now subtitle it: "_Wherein Also is Discussed Counterfactual Desires in God and the Nature of Accommodated Revelation_"


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## chbrooking (May 5, 2009)

Prufrock said:


> chbrooking said:
> 
> 
> > By the way, I just remembered that the title of this thread is "middle knowledge article". Since I seem to be the one on the defensive here , I'd like it to be on another thread, since I DO NOT hold to middle knowledge .
> ...



But I don't believe in those either


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## py3ak (May 6, 2009)

Evidently subtitling a thread is an excellent way to kill it. Moderators, take note.


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