# Is Van Tillianism Foundationalist?



## RamistThomist

I wonder how much this issue has been explored. Ignoring the fine distinctions between ancient and modern foundationalisms, does VTianism posit properly basic beliefs, and if so, what are they?

Foundationalism is often tied to internalism and justified true belief. Bahnsen explicitly affirmed such in CVT: R&A, p. 178. I debated a certain cultist on this passage and he refused to own up to it. Not sure why, since I wasn't actually attacking his system.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

What is your opinion? I have found from your posts that your questions posed often belie a strong unstated opinion that emerges only later in the discussion. Given that you have debated the matter, I would rather have it all out in the open before innocently wading into _Whack-A-Mole_ tactics.


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## RamistThomist

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> What is your opinion? I have found from your posts that your questions posed often belie a strong unstated opinion that emerges only later in the discussion. Given that you have debated the matter, I would rather have it all out in the open before innocently wading into _Whack-A-Mole_ tactics.



Sorry. I meant no duplicity. I do think it is a sorts of foundationalism. I myself hold to a moderate foundationalism. Bahnsen tends to lend toward a foundationalist reading of Van Til, given his explicit statements on epistemological internalism and justified, true belief.

I don't hold to Bahnsen's internalism, but I think we are on the same page with regard to at least a basic form of foundationalism. I'm honestly asking with no hidden motivations. I haven't seen this come up in Van Tillian literature.


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## jwright82

You seem to be making a fallacy of either or. Either one is a foundationalist or a non foundationalist. There are more options than that. Plus why does believing that knowledge is "justified true belief" makes you foundationalist? Foundationalists, as I understand, says that there certian self evident beliefs upon which all other beliefs are based.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> You seem to be making a fallacy of either or. Either one is a foundationalist or a non foundationalist. There are more options than that.



Which is why I hinted at some presupps being coherentist. 




> Plus why does believing that knowledge is "justified true belief" makes you foundationalist?



Because in the literature all of them are. Most foundationalists are epistemological internalists. I suppose it's not logically necessary, but this area hasn't been explored.




> Foundationalists, as I understand, says that there certian self evident beliefs upon which all other beliefs are based.



That's true of later foundationalists. It's debatable whether Aquinas, for example, phrased it like that. Wolterstorff (1983) said Aquinas did. Eleanor Stump said he didn't. Plantinga (2003) seemed to think he didn't, either.

I am a moderate foundationalist and I don't believe that we have to have self-evident beliefs which serve as the foundation. 

*Coherentism*

Coherentists say a belief is true if in coinheres with one's system. I've had Clarkian friends, and Norman Geisler seems to think that Clark said this, affirm coherentism. But, Clark also posited Scripture as the foundational axiom of all beliefs, hence a certain form of foundationalism--something coherentists generally don't do. 



jwright82 said:


> You seem to be making a fallacy of either or. Either one is a foundationalist or a non foundationalist. There are more options than that.



I don't think I was doing that. I was exploring options (and allowing for more than an either/or). It's just that in the literature on epistemology that is how the discussion reduces to.


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## Ask Mr. Religion

Jacob,

Perhaps a definition of what you consider "foundationalism" to mean is needed.

But, see this first:
http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/all-presuppositions-priori-71486/


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## RamistThomist

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Jacob,
> 
> Perhaps a definition of what you consider "foundationalism" to mean is needed.
> 
> But, see this first:
> http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/all-presuppositions-priori-71486/




Foundationalism of any sorts will have a basic belief which serves as a foundation upon which other beliefs are. In this sense I am not criticizing Van Tillianism. I would assume that both CvT and Clark would be foundationalist (starting with either Scripture, Creation, or the Trinity as the basic belief). That seems to be the case (and I would probably be really close to CvT on this point) but I haven't seen a Van Tillian say this in print. (To be fair, I read Oliphint 8 years ago and can't remember what he would have said, if he dealt with this).


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## jwright82

I think the whole discussion here is dependent upon the difference between a properly basic belief (PBB) and a presupposition (P). For Foundationalism a PBB is is some beleif that some how needs no justification or warrant but it is assumed to build other true beliefs. A P is much more organic in nature, we form them from our nature plus experience and everything else involved in being human. This is why Van Til didn't get into the technicalities of epistemology, he didn't need to. A P is not some first premise in an argument it is who we are and our deepest and most religious beliefs. Foundationalism makes a PBB basically a first premise. The actual logical forms of the differences between the two are striking. P. F. Strawson is great here. But I think this is what your getting at?


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## jwright82

For the record no Clarkian or Vantillian has ever espoused Foundationalism. We may be guilty of it, which remains to be shown, but we do not espouse it. I don't think we are guilty of it but I've been wrong before.


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## jwright82

I want to be clear here here though, there is much writing on what a P is logically speaking. So a P does play a role in certain types of formal arguments, to anyone who may be not be familiar with formal arguments it is the lovely statements like "if X is true than Y is true". They are the form of an argument and can get very tedious to follow if you read stuff with that stuff in it. There are different forms of logical arguments. 

Back to the matter at hand. As I understand it Jacob if the truth value of a PBB is located outside itself than it cannot be a PBB. Although the truth value of a P can be located outside itself. For instance if I say "my wife is no longer sick" than the P of that statement is that I'm married but in fact I'm single so the P is not true. So the statement "I have a wife" is the P of "my wife is no longer sick" but it is not strictly a PBB because it depends on other statements being true. A PBB cannot be a PBB if it depends on other statements being true. 

By internalist I don't exactly know what you're getting at here. I would assume that all epistemologies are in some way internalist.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I think the whole discussion here is dependent upon the difference between a properly basic belief (PBB) and a presupposition (P). For Foundationalism a PBB is is some beleif that some how needs no justification or warrant but it is assumed to build other true beliefs. A P is much more organic in nature, we form them from our nature plus experience and everything else involved in being human. This is why Van Til didn't get into the technicalities of epistemology, he didn't need to. A P is not some first premise in an argument it is who we are and our deepest and most religious beliefs. Foundationalism makes a PBB basically a first premise. The actual logical forms of the differences between the two are striking. P. F. Strawson is great here. But I think this is what your getting at?



Kind of, except I am not using foundationalism in the Cartesian sense. I agree that Van Til didn't get into it that much. He was trained in the Idealist school, which would have been more coherentist in outlook. His two best students, Bahnsen and Frame, were analytic philosophers. While Bahnsen didn't go into foundationalism specifically, he did talk about justified, true belief, which every foundationalist espouses (or warranted belief).


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I want to be clear here here though, there is much writing on what a P is logically speaking. So a P does play a role in certain types of formal arguments, to anyone who may be not be familiar with formal arguments it is the lovely statements like "if X is true than Y is true". They are the form of an argument and can get very tedious to follow if you read stuff with that stuff in it. There are different forms of logical arguments.
> 
> Back to the matter at hand. As I understand it Jacob if the truth value of a PBB is located outside itself than it cannot be a PBB. Although the truth value of a P can be located outside itself. For instance if I say "my wife is no longer sick" than the P of that statement is that I'm married but in fact I'm single so the P is not true. So the statement "I have a wife" is the P of "my wife is no longer sick" but it is not strictly a PBB because it depends on other statements being true. A PBB cannot be a PBB if it depends on other statements being true.
> 
> By internalist I don't exactly know what you're getting at here. I would assume that all epistemologies are in some way internalist.



internalism: true belief is accessed via a source in the mind. The ground of justification is internal to the subject. Typically speaks of knowledge in justificationist terms. While Bahnsen didn't use the specific terminology of internalism, he specifically espoused JTB in _Van Til: Readings & Analysis_, p. 178. 

externalism: the grounds of knowledge are not internally accessible to the subject.

EDIT:

However, to be fair to Bahnsen, I think he was about to interact with Plantinga, Warrant, and Externalism before he died. I actually got to go to one of Bahnsen's friends filing cabinets and behold a number of almost-finished mss on epistemology and ethics!


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## Nicholas Perella

From what I understand from reading Van Til and taking a course from a professor who walked with Van Til around Westminster Theological Seminary is that the presupposition of Van Til is answered by this question, "What is the starting point?". For Van Til this is God Himself, and then for man what God reveals about Himself and man. We presuppose there is a God and we are made in His image. This natural revelation of God we are to know without excuse (Romans 1). Yet due to the fall and sin God has revealed His Word to us now in the form of the Holy Scriptures and during those 33 years that the Word became Flesh over 2000 years ago, which obviously the Word in the form of Scripture is what we have now. Natural revelation is no longer there for us uncorrupted without God's special revelation of Himself to us by His written Word made effectual by the Holy Spirit. Why? Because of the fall and the noetic effects of sin. Calvin's special revelation glasses put on in order to see God's natural revelation, Psalm 19.

Professor Richard Gamble, "The Bible provides the theoretical or complex foundation for that which we know beyond our presuppositions." [Gamble, Richard. The Whole Counsel of God, (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R Publishing), 266.]

I quote Dr. Gamble here because he footnotes Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 63 to this sentence: "All knowledge that any finite creature of God would ever have, whether of things that pertain directly to God or of things that pertain to objects in the created universe itself would, in the last analysis, have to rest upon the revelation of God." (Ibid., 266.)

Eventually for anything meaningful to come about whether in this discussion or working in the saw mill there must be a revelation from God as to Who He says He is and what God reveals of man as to who man is by His Holy Scriptures even by necessary consequences. Thus to infer what the true, certain meaning is, is revealed by God, or else, ambiguity sets in, of course this is my opinion.


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## jwright82

By the way I'm jealous of you having access to Bahnsen's notes but that is another discussion. I think I see where your going but keep in mind that just because Vantillians and Foundationalists both agree on true knowledge being JTB doesn't mean they have everything in common. To be fair you haven't said that but I think the two POV have enough differences between them to qualify as different POV. That Vantillians are not Foundationalists and vice versa.


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## jwright82

Nicholas Perella said:


> From what I understand from reading Van Til and taking a course from a professor who walked with Van Til around Westminster Theological Seminary is that the presupposition of Van Til is answered by this question, "What is the starting point?". For Van Til this is God Himself, and then for man what God reveals about Himself and man. We presuppose there is a God and we are made in His image. This natural revelation of God we are to know without excuse (Romans 1). Yet due to the fall and sin God has revealed His Word to us now in the form of the Holy Scriptures and during those 33 years that the Word became Flesh over 2000 years ago, which obviously the Word in the form of Scripture is what we have now. Natural revelation is no longer there for us uncorrupted without God's special revelation of Himself to us by His written Word made effectual by the Holy Spirit. Why? Because of the fall and the noetic effects of sin. Calvin's special revelation glasses put on in order to see God's natural revelation, Psalm 19.
> 
> Professor Richard Gamble, "The Bible provides the theoretical or complex foundation for that which we know beyond our presuppositions." [Gamble, Richard. The Whole Counsel of God, (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R Publishing), 266.]
> 
> I quote Dr. Gamble here because he footnotes Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, 63 to this sentence: "All knowledge that any finite creature of God would ever have, whether of things that pertain directly to God or of things that pertain to objects in the created universe itself would, in the last analysis, have to rest upon the revelation of God." (Ibid., 266.)
> 
> Eventually for anything meaningful to come about whether in this discussion or working in the saw mill there must be a revelation from God as to Who He says He is and what God reveals of man as to who man is by His Holy Scriptures even by necessary consequences. Thus to infer what the true, certain meaning is, is revealed by God, or else, ambiguity sets in, of course this is my opinion.



First off welcome to the PB! Second nice post. I agree but with one qualification Van Til insisted that due to our finite creaturnes Adam still needed special revelation before the fall.


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## Nicholas Perella

jwright82 said:


> First off welcome to the PB! Second nice post. I agree but with one qualification Van Til insisted that due to our finite creaturnes Adam still needed special revelation before the fall.



Hi. Thank you.
When it comes to pre-Fall, and I did not make this very clear at all, yes God, being supernatural, did condescend to Adam and Eve and therefore a special revelation, meaning a direct communication from God or a walk with God was necessary in order for there to be proper interpretation and being, etc.... What is different is that pre-Fall natural revelation had no corruption. God still had to provide a special revelation in order for natural revelation to make any sense Pre-Fall, so much the more now (post-Fall), but all of nature was very good and glorifying God in Eden as opposed to now (post-Fall). There is disorder in the world now. Sickness, death, man not glorifying God, and what we know from Scripture, e.g. Job, in which Satan tempts and does evil upon the world: all the wages of sin. Of course even by Satan in the broad sense God is glorified for His will is never deterred and all is to His good pleasure. Yet now we can know, by special revelation, not only that there is evil, evil does not mirror God, and is blasphemy against Him; but also, our total depravity is not a state of nature that is exclusive and absolute in how to interpret and understand reality. By the work of salvation in Christ we may change and know of a reality that is much more than those in Adam will ever know and enjoy. Pre-Fall 'things in nature', our sin, or what Satan may do was not present and so all was very good so natural revelation in the strict sense always did glorify Him. Post-Fall, sin, in the strict sense, does not glorify God but rebels against Him. There was none of that Pre-Fall corrupting natural revelation. All pointed to Him. God was clearly revealed specially and naturally pre-fall and strictly speaking there was no sin misleading and not glorifying God. I do not know how much of this, what I just said, reflects Van Til, for these are my thoughts, but to affirm what you said about Van Til I quote him below:

Van Til, "Moreover, in paradise, supernatural revelation, that is, thought-communication on the part of God accompanied God's revelation in the created universe. Natural revelation therefore required supernatural revelation as its supplement even apart from the fact of sin. Even in paradise Adam had to regard all the facts of his natural environment in the light of the goal that God set for man in his supernatural revelation." [Van Til, Cornelius. The Defense of the Faith, (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P &R Publishing, 2008), 205.]


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## jwright82

I


Nicholas Perella said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> First off welcome to the PB! Second nice post. I agree but with one qualification Van Til insisted that due to our finite creaturnes Adam still needed special revelation before the fall.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hi. Thank you.
> When it comes to pre-Fall, and I did not make this very clear at all, yes God, being supernatural, did condescend to Adam and Eve and therefore a special revelation, meaning a direct communication from God or a walk with God was necessary in order for there to be proper interpretation and being, etc.... What is different is that pre-Fall natural revelation had no corruption. God still had to provide a special revelation in order for natural revelation to make any sense Pre-Fall, so much the more now (post-Fall), but all of nature was very good and glorifying God in Eden as opposed to now (post-Fall). There is disorder in the world now. Sickness, death, man not glorifying God, and what we know from Scripture, e.g. Job, in which Satan tempts and does evil upon the world: all the wages of sin. Of course even by Satan in the broad sense God is glorified for His will is never deterred and all is to His good pleasure. Yet now we can know, by special revelation, not only that there is evil, evil does not mirror God, and is blasphemy against Him; but also, our total depravity is not a state of nature that is exclusive and absolute in how to interpret and understand reality. By the work of salvation in Christ we may change and know of a reality that is much more than those in Adam will ever know and enjoy. Pre-Fall 'things in nature', our sin, or what Satan may do was not present and so all was very good so natural revelation in the strict sense always did glorify Him. Post-Fall, sin, in the strict sense, does not glorify God but rebels against Him. There was none of that Pre-Fall corrupting natural revelation. All pointed to Him. God was clearly revealed specially and naturally pre-fall and strictly speaking there was no sin misleading and not glorifying God. I do not know how much of this, what I just said, reflects Van Til, for these are my thoughts, but to affirm what you said about Van Til I quote him below:
> 
> Van Til, "Moreover, in paradise, supernatural revelation, that is, thought-communication on the part of God accompanied God's revelation in the created universe. Natural revelation therefore required supernatural revelation as its supplement even apart from the fact of sin. Even in paradise Adam had to regard all the facts of his natural environment in the light of the goal that God set for man in his supernatural revelation." [Van Til, Cornelius. The Defense of the Faith, (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P &R Publishing, 2008), 205.]
Click to expand...


Amen brother.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> By the way I'm jealous of you having access to Bahnsen's notes but that is another discussion. I think I see where your going but keep in mind that just because Vantillians and Foundationalists both agree on true knowledge being JTB doesn't mean they have everything in common. To be fair you haven't said that but I think the two POV have enough differences between them to qualify as different POV. That Vantillians are not Foundationalists and vice versa.



Let's look at it another way. Is the presupposition of the Christian God (ontological trinity; doctrine of creation, what have you) the presupposition upon which all knowledge is possible? I have the TAG in mind.


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## jwright82

Well if christianity were false would knowledge be possible or anything else for that matter? The ontological Trinity is not some first premise in an argument. But yes I would say that the presupposition of anything is the truth of christianity. This is the theological truth that Van Til tried to tease out into an apologetical method.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Well if christianity were false would knowledge be possible or anything else for that matter? The ontological Trinity is not some first premise in an argument. But yes I would say that the presupposition of anything is the truth of christianity. This is the theological truth that Van Til tried to tease out into an apologetical method.



That's why I see VTianism as a loose sort of foundationalism.


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## Justified

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Well if christianity were false would knowledge be possible or anything else for that matter? The ontological Trinity is not some first premise in an argument. But yes I would say that the presupposition of anything is the truth of christianity. This is the theological truth that Van Til tried to tease out into an apologetical method.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That's why I see VTianism as a loose sort of foundationalism.
Click to expand...

Building on what Jacob is saying, if you are saying that the truth of Christianity is the presupposition on which every belief is based, that is almost definitional of what foundationalism is. Foundationalist epistemologies base their beliefs on certain foundational beliefs, from which all other beliefs come and are justified. What you are calling a presupposition is really no different than what a foundational belief is. 

That doesn't mean Vantillianism is wrong at all. It just seems apparent to me that Vantillianism is some form of a foundationalist epistemology.


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## jwright82

Not in the same sense. If Foundationalism is defined in such a wide sense than I guess all POV are Foundationalist but that makes the term useless in practice. Just because an epistemology favors certain beliefs as being more central than others doesn't make those beliefs PBB. Vantillian apologetics is transcendental in nature, so pressupositions can and do provide the spectacles through which we view the the world without being PBB. Foundationalism suffers from the POV that you are either a Foundationalist or a skeptic but there are other POV that can possibly account for our knowledge, Rorty is great here.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> Not in the same sense. If Foundationalism is defined in such a wide sense than I guess all POV are Foundationalist but that makes the term useless in practice.



Only if we assume modern foundationalisms began with Descartes. If we can find foundationalist elements in earlier thinkers (like Aquinas) and note they aren't using basic beliefs in the Cartesian or Cliffordian sense, then it's fine.



> Just because an epistemology favors certain beliefs as being more central than others doesn't make those beliefs PBB.


True, Clarkians favor coherentist models and Iw ouldn't say they hold to PBB.



> Vantillian apologetics is transcendental in nature, so pressupositions can and do provide the spectacles through which we view the the world without being PBB.



True, but as Bahnsen was fond of saying (correctly, I think) that you don't prove your ultimate authority (presupposition) by another authority. If that is so, then presuppositions are acting like PBB.



> Foundationalism suffers from the POV that you are either a Foundationalist or a skeptic but there are other POV that can possibly account for our knowledge, Rorty is great here.



Cartesian/Lockean models, yes. Alston and others, however, have run Rorty through the gauntlet (not to mention Plantinga's classic answer to Rorty).


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## Shawn Mathis

Sorry for being late to this fascinating discussion, but James mentioned "there is much writing on what a P is logically speaking"--could you point to some of this please? I did find a book of essays on similar topics (one of them by Strawson) but I was not able to find more about presuppositions beyond Van Til, Bahnsen, et. al.

thanks,


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## Toasty

ReformedReidian said:


> I wonder how much this issue has been explored. Ignoring the fine distinctions between ancient and modern foundationalisms, does VTianism posit properly basic beliefs, and if so, what are they?
> 
> Foundationalism is often tied to internalism and justified true belief. Bahnsen explicitly affirmed such in CVT: R&A, p. 178. I debated a certain cultist on this passage and he refused to own up to it. Not sure why, since I wasn't actually attacking his system.



I remember Bahsen saying in one of his lectures that one must have beliefs that are self-justifying or else there will be an infinite regress of justifying one's beliefs. The process of justifying one's beliefs cannot go on forever so there must be a belief that is self-justifying. Bahnsen believes that this statement is self-justifying: The Bible is the word of God.

There are some similarities between foundationalism and Van Tillianism. Both foundationalism and Van Tillianism agree that there must be some beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs or else there will be an infinite regress of justifying one's beliefs. 

Obviously, Van Tillianism says that the ultimate authority is God, but foundationalism does not say what the ultimate authority is.


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## Toasty

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> By the way I'm jealous of you having access to Bahnsen's notes but that is another discussion. I think I see where your going but keep in mind that just because Vantillians and Foundationalists both agree on true knowledge being JTB doesn't mean they have everything in common. To be fair you haven't said that but I think the two POV have enough differences between them to qualify as different POV. That Vantillians are not Foundationalists and vice versa.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Let's look at it another way. Is the presupposition of the Christian God (ontological trinity; doctrine of creation, what have you) the presupposition upon which all knowledge is possible? I have the TAG in mind.
Click to expand...


I think so. 
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (Proverbs 9:10).


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## Justified

Toasty said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> I wonder how much this issue has been explored. Ignoring the fine distinctions between ancient and modern foundationalisms, does VTianism posit properly basic beliefs, and if so, what are they?
> 
> Foundationalism is often tied to internalism and justified true belief. Bahnsen explicitly affirmed such in CVT: R&A, p. 178. I debated a certain cultist on this passage and he refused to own up to it. Not sure why, since I wasn't actually attacking his system.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I remember Bahsen saying in one of his lectures that one must have beliefs that are self-justifying or else there will be an infinite regress of justifying one's beliefs. The process of justifying one's beliefs cannot go on forever so there must be a belief that is self-justifying. Bahnsen believes that this statement is self-justifying: The Bible is the word of God.
> 
> There are some similarities between foundationalism and Van Tillianism. Both foundationalism and Van Tillianism agree that there must be some beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs or else there will be an infinite regress of justifying one's beliefs.
> 
> *Obviously, Van Tillianism says that the ultimate authority is God, but foundationalism does not say what the ultimate authority is.*
Click to expand...

 I don't think that is the case. Certain forms of foundationalism would definitely say what the ultimate source of authority is. For instance, a rationalist would say that human reason as the highest authority, and an empiricist would say the same about sense experience.


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## RamistThomist

Toasty said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> I wonder how much this issue has been explored. Ignoring the fine distinctions between ancient and modern foundationalisms, does VTianism posit properly basic beliefs, and if so, what are they?
> 
> Foundationalism is often tied to internalism and justified true belief. Bahnsen explicitly affirmed such in CVT: R&A, p. 178. I debated a certain cultist on this passage and he refused to own up to it. Not sure why, since I wasn't actually attacking his system.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I remember Bahsen saying in one of his lectures that one must have beliefs that are self-justifying or else there will be an infinite regress of justifying one's beliefs. The process of justifying one's beliefs cannot go on forever so there must be a belief that is self-justifying.
Click to expand...


That is correct and is no different from Plantinga and Wolterstorff.



> Bahnsen believes that this statement is self-justifying: The Bible is the word of God.



That sounds more like Clark than Van Til. Van Til would say either creation or the ontological Trinity is our foundation. Such a statement, while self-justifying, is open to defeaters. It is in defeating the defeaters that the presup sees how close (or far away) he is to foundationalism.



> There are some similarities between foundationalism and Van Tillianism. Both foundationalism and Van Tillianism agree that there must be some beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs or else there will be an infinite regress of justifying one's beliefs.



I agree, though there are differences between Cartesian/Lockean foundationalism and Reidian Foundationalism.



> Obviously, Van Tillianism says that the ultimate authority is God, but foundationalism does not say what the ultimate authority is.



That isn't what foundationalism sets out to do. Foundationalism tries to give an account of belief-formation and whether those beliefs are justified/warranted. It doesn't intend to give a theistic argument. It's like I go and yell at my plumber because he doesn't know how to do my taxes.


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## jwright82

Shawn Mathis said:


> Sorry for being late to this fascinating discussion, but James mentioned "there is much writing on what a P is logically speaking"--could you point to some of this please? I did find a book of essays on similar topics (one of them by Strawson) but I was not able to find more about presuppositions beyond Van Til, Bahnsen, et. al.
> 
> thanks,


Google Don Collett on this. He has written some excellent stuff.


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## jwright82

ReformedReidian said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not in the same sense. If Foundationalism is defined in such a wide sense than I guess all POV are Foundationalist but that makes the term useless in practice.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Only if we assume modern foundationalisms began with Descartes. If we can find foundationalist elements in earlier thinkers (like Aquinas) and note they aren't using basic beliefs in the Cartesian or Cliffordian sense, then it's fine.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Just because an epistemology favors certain beliefs as being more central than others doesn't make those beliefs PBB.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> True, Clarkians favor coherentist models and Iw ouldn't say they hold to PBB.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Vantillian apologetics is transcendental in nature, so pressupositions can and do provide the spectacles through which we view the the world without being PBB.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> True, but as Bahnsen was fond of saying (correctly, I think) that you don't prove your ultimate authority (presupposition) by another authority. If that is so, then presuppositions are acting like PBB.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Foundationalism suffers from the POV that you are either a Foundationalist or a skeptic but there are other POV that can possibly account for our knowledge, Rorty is great here.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Cartesian/Lockean models, yes. Alston and others, however, have run Rorty through the gauntlet (not to mention Plantinga's classic answer to Rorty).
Click to expand...


What I mean is if Foundationalism is defined in such a wide sense as to include Van Til than the term becomes meaningless in practice. Because than anyone would be a foundationalist but no one criticism of Foundationalism would be applicable to anyone nor would any useable analysis of what Foundationalism is would be possible because you would have to qualify everything to point of death. Why not make Foundationalism one thing and pressupositionalism another just to clarify things, because in practice you have to this anyway. This is to say that I could admit fine Van Til is a Foundationalist of sorts than some one could say "aha than you believe in PBB and your wrong for this reason" and I would reply no I'm not that kind of Foundationalist but this kind, which amounts to nothing.

I don't know if Clark counts as a coherentist because there are other options than just that in the epistemological game. Both Van Til and Clark sought a Christian view of things. Also what Bahnsen meant was that a P cannot be directly proven but indirectly proven, he said that often. I mean you raise excellent questions but what is the end game? What difference would it make if one could define Van Til as a Foundationalist? 

On the question of authority yes you again cannot directly prove that your P of what is an ultimate authority is ultimate but indirectly prove it by how it explains the possibility of everything around us.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> Not in the same sense. If Foundationalism is defined in such a wide sense than I guess all POV are Foundationalist but that makes the term useless in practice.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Only if we assume modern foundationalisms began with Descartes. If we can find foundationalist elements in earlier thinkers (like Aquinas) and note they aren't using basic beliefs in the Cartesian or Cliffordian sense, then it's fine.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Just because an epistemology favors certain beliefs as being more central than others doesn't make those beliefs PBB.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> True, Clarkians favor coherentist models and Iw ouldn't say they hold to PBB.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Vantillian apologetics is transcendental in nature, so pressupositions can and do provide the spectacles through which we view the the world without being PBB.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> True, but as Bahnsen was fond of saying (correctly, I think) that you don't prove your ultimate authority (presupposition) by another authority. If that is so, then presuppositions are acting like PBB.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Foundationalism suffers from the POV that you are either a Foundationalist or a skeptic but there are other POV that can possibly account for our knowledge, Rorty is great here.
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> Cartesian/Lockean models, yes. Alston and others, however, have run Rorty through the gauntlet (not to mention Plantinga's classic answer to Rorty).
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> 
> What I mean is if Foundationalism is defined in such a wide sense as to include Van Til than the term becomes meaningless in practice. Because than anyone would be a foundationalist but no one criticism of Foundationalism would be applicable to anyone nor would any useable analysis of what Foundationalism is would be possible because you would have to qualify everything to point of death.
Click to expand...


Not necessarily. Even my wide definition of foundationalism excludes a lot of major thinkers (Putnam, Rorty, all of postmodernism, Gordon Clark)



> Why not make Foundationalism one thing and pressupositionalism another just to clarify things, because in practice you have to this anyway.



My interest was in seeing what the two have in common. I do not think they are synonyms.



> This is to say that I could admit fine Van Til is a Foundationalist of sorts than some one could say "aha than you believe in PBB and your wrong for this reason" and I would reply no I'm not that kind of Foundationalist but this kind, which amounts to nothing.



I hold to PBB. There is nothing wrong with it. I just reject the modern construals of it. I don't fault CvT for holding to PBB (though that is more true of Bahnsen than CvT).



> I don't know if Clark counts as a coherentist because there are other options than just that in the epistemological game. Both Van Til and Clark sought a Christian view of things.



Most Clarkians told me that to the degree they keep up with modern discussions, they hold to something like Coherentism. That was Geisler's reading of Clark, anyway.



> Also what Bahnsen meant was that a P cannot be directly proven but indirectly proven, he said that often.



That is interesting about indirectly provingit.



> I mean you raise excellent questions but what is the end game? What difference would it make if one could define Van Til as a Foundationalist?



Why do research at all, then? But to find the answer to a question.


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## Nicholas Perella

ReformedReidian said:


> Toasty said:
> 
> 
> 
> Bahnsen believes that this statement is self-justifying: The Bible is the word of God.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That sounds more like Clark than Van Til. Van Til would say either creation or the ontological Trinity is our foundation. Such a statement, while self-justifying, is open to defeaters. It is in defeating the defeaters that the presup sees how close (or far away) he is to foundationalism.
Click to expand...


Quotes below from: Van Til, Cornelius. The Defense of the Faith. Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 2008.

From Van Til's in the foreward by K. Scott Oliphint as follows:

page x-xi:


> ...the reader should be aware that 'presupposition' for Van Til is just another way of saying what Kuyper, Bavinck, and behind them the Reformed scholastics had always said with regard to the principia of theology.



Secondly, God is Van Til's 'presupposition'. God's written Word is just that - God's Word. When the preacher preaches God's Word the preacher is doing that, preaching - God's Word. That is Him. God is His Word. God is simple (no division in God: God has unity in Himself).

Thirdly, I quote Van Til from the same book:

page 127-128:


> For better or for worse the Protestant apologist is committed to the doctrine of Scripture as the infallibly inspired final revelation of God to man.... The Protestant apologist cannot be concerned to prove the existence of any other God than the one who has spoken to man authoritatively and finally through Scripture.... So if the whole debate in apologetics is to be more than a meaningless discussion about the 'that' of God's existence and is to consider 'what kind' of God exists, then the question of God's revelation to man must be brought into the picture. Even before the entrance of sin...



Yes God is the 'presupposition', but to know who that God is, or in other words, what kind of God He is, involves God's revelation to man, i.e. Holy Scriptures. So in order to presuppose about God and to begin a discussion of God's true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness for His creature, i.e. man, man therefore has to go to His now written Word to bring any meaning, not only to the discussion, but to reality itself. A reality, by the way, created by God who is literally the starting point of all of this. 'This' being not only creation but God's work of redemption by Christ Jesus.

More Van Til:

pg. 139:


> ...we obtain the Christian principle of reasoning by presupposition. It is the actual existence of the God of Christian theism and the infallible authority of the Scripture which speaks to sinners of this God that must be taken as the presupposition of the intelligibility of any fact in the world.



pg. 374:


> It is from Bavinck as much as from Kuyper that we have learned to stress the Scriptures as the principium unicum (sole principle or source) of the Christian. 'The true concept of revelation can only be taken from revelation itself; if no revelation has ever taken place, then all reflection on its concept is labor expended in vain; if revelation is a fact then it alone must provide us with its concept and indicate the criterion to be employed in our research with respect to religions and revelations' (Gereformeerde dogmatiek, 1:309). The ground of faith, says Bavinck, is identical with is content and cannot be separated from it (ibid., 644). When the believer is asked why he thinks of the Bible as the Word of God, he may point to the notae (marks) and criteria of Scripture.



pg. 374n43: [This footnote is to what I quote directly above on pg. 374],


> As Van Til notes, among the notae (marks) and criteria of Scripture that Bavinck mentions (taking his cue both from Calvin and the Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.5) are 'the majesty of its style, the sublimity of its content, the depth of its ideas, the abundant fruit it has borne, etc.'


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## RamistThomist

Thanks for the principia quote. That's what I was looking for.

I wonder, though, since Van Til is saying his view of principia is that of Bavinck, and Bavinck followed Turretin, would Van Til hold to the same principial epistemology? This is quite interesting, since I debated this issue with some cultists at the Facebook Level-Headed (sic!!!!!) Christian Reconstruction group, and they scorned Turretin.


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## Shawn Mathis

Jacob, I can see some in Reconstructionism scorning Turretin. What exactly was the context? Did they claim he was a rationalist?


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## Nicholas Perella

ReformedReidian said:


> Thanks for the principia quote. That's what I was looking for.
> 
> I wonder, though, since Van Til is saying his view of principia is that of Bavinck, and Bavinck followed Turretin, would Van Til hold to the same principial epistemology? This is quite interesting, since I debated this issue with some cultists at the Facebook Level-Headed (sic!!!!!) Christian Reconstruction group, and they scorned Turretin.




There is much about this in "Defense of the Faith" not only a comparing between Van Til and Amsterdam (Bavinck) but Old Princeton (Warfield). Van Til is more strict about this principle than the other two from the writing.

pg. 374:


> In spite of this stress on the Scripture as self-attesting and as such the primary principle for the interpretation of man and the world, Bavinck too [Kuyper] sometimes reverts to the idea that man can without this principle interpret much of experience truly. In his 'Philosophy of Revelation' as well as in his work on dogmatics, Bavinck stresses the fact that the idea of revelation must spring from revelation itself (Wysbegeerte der openbaring [Kampen, 1908], 21). Yet when defending this Christian idea of revelation against various forms of philosophy, Bavinck sometimes leaves this high ground and argues neutrally with them. He wants to reason philosophically with modern philosophers and therefore starts with them from the fact of self-consciousness as such, without at once setting this fact, as he does elsewhere, in the contest of its relation to God and Christ.



pg. 351:


> It is not, of course, that Warfield himself entertains any doubts about the plenary inspiration of Scripture. He was one of its greatest advocates. Nor is it that he disagrees with Calvin in maintaining the clarity of natural revelation or in holding that all men have the sense of deity. It is only that , in apologetics, Warfield wanted to perate in neutral territory with the nonbeliever. He thought that this was the only way to show to the unbeliever that theism and Christianity are objectively true.



Outside of scriptural certainty is probability. John Gerstner who broadly approaches apologetics like Warfield and Bavinck, which R.C. Sproul broadly does as well, do so by starting not with God and His revelation, but they start with 'reason'. By starting with 'reason' or anything outside of scriptural certainty the conclusion is always one of 'probably'. Which is not necessarily terrible in everyday life, but when it comes to God and His Word which He has given for our certainty to certain things in our life (whatever God has revealed for sure in the Holy Scriptures) is well - certain.

As an aside, I am comfortable with how science operates in 'probability' or 'statistically' or even to what will happen when I cut the grass. There are probabilities to consider even when we drive a car and that is ok. God has revealed certainties and then other things God has kept them unrevealed from us. Apologetically speaking, I am comfortable with these understandings because outside of scripture certainty even other self-proclaimed Christian apologetics as to 'what reality is' and 'what kind of God is He' admit, as Gerstner did, that in the end their apologetic starting point only goes to 'probably' and then after all that reasoning if they want to share the certainty of God's revelation they will have to go to the scriptures. Van Til starts at the scriptures. Even other apologetic methods have to end up there anyways in time. Van Til's case on this matter is that those who by not starting with God and His revelation the uncertainty opens the door to defenselessness (which is not being apologetic) which for Van Til compromises Christianity [see Van Til's chapter six on "Christian Apologetics: The Problem of Method"]. I know Van Til also discusses science and technology in his writings to demonstrate how a Christian understanding is the only understanding for the interpretation of the science and technology of yesterday and today which Van Til calls "borrowed capital" and my professor called "stolen capital".

pg. 27: Van Til,


> My business is to teach apologetics. I therefore presuppose the Reformed system of doctrine.



Footnote to the quote directly above:

pg. 27n1:


> As we noted in the introduction, this statement is highly significant, bears repeating here, and should be noted. Van Til never saw himself as doing anything other than applying the Reformed system of doctrine to the specific concerns of apologetics. Because of this methodology, what Van Til was advocating was both old and new. It was old in that he was applying the basic tenets of Reformed dogmatics to apologetics; he was not attempting self-consciously to change any of the basic content or loci of that theology. It was new in that apologetics, prior to Van Til, had taken less notice of theology as the springboard for its tasks and more notice of philosophy. The radical nature of this methodology should be kept in mind.


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## RamistThomist

Shawn Mathis said:


> Jacob, I can see some in Reconstructionism scorning Turretin. What exactly was the context? Did they claim he was a rationalist?



I asked the question whether the Transcendental Argument necessitated an internalism with regard to basic beliefs. we then got onto the subject of Turretin and a writer for American Vision said, "Too bad for Turretin." Granted, it wasn't the mos scathing critique, but it does show the danger of doing theological reflection independent of, and sometimes with arrogance to, our betters.

There were other things but I can't remember the exact conversation. I think I have it on my email somewhere.


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## Toasty

How would you respond to someone who asks this: How do you know that the belief that the Bible is the word of God is self-justifying? 

Do you respond by saying that everyone has to have self-justifying beliefs and that everyone is living off the borrowed capital of Christianity?


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## jwright82

I can agree that there are similarities but there are also, don't mind the pun  , foundational differences such that they can't be considered to be in the same group. 

To indirectly prove something is one area where I see massive differences between the two. A direct proof is more along the lines of a deductive or inductive argument. An indirect argument is more transcendental in nature in that the presuppositions of Christianity must be assumed in order to make sense out of our experience. A deductive or inductive method may or may not use PBB as premises to directly prove some sort of conclusion.

As far as being internalist or externalist, I never really thought about it honestly. I would say though, off the top of my head, probably in some ways both. But that is a very interesting line of questions, thanks for bringing that up. I'll have to think about it. Good thread Jacob.


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## jwright82

Toasty said:


> How would you respond to someone who asks this: How do you know that the belief that the Bible is the word of God is self-justifying?
> 
> Do you respond by saying that everyone has to have self-justifying beliefs and that everyone is living off the borrowed capital of Christianity?




Yes and no. The method is to show as persuasively as possible how nothing in life makes sense without the truth of our faith. So the method is to indirectly show how the bible is self authenticating by directly showing how nothing in life makes sense unless Christianity is true.


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## RamistThomist

jwright82 said:


> I can agree that there are similarities but there are also, don't mind the pun  , foundational differences such that they can't be considered to be in the same group.
> 
> To indirectly prove something is one area where I see massive differences between the two. A direct proof is more along the lines of a deductive or inductive argument. An indirect argument is more transcendental in nature in that the presuppositions of Christianity must be assumed in order to make sense out of our experience. A deductive or inductive method may or may not use PBB as premises to directly prove some sort of conclusion.
> 
> As far as being internalist or externalist, I never really thought about it honestly. I would say though, off the top of my head, probably in some ways both. But that is a very interesting line of questions, thanks for bringing that up. I'll have to think about it. Good thread Jacob.


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## RamistThomist

Toasty said:


> How would you respond to someone who asks this: How do you know that the belief that the Bible is the word of God is self-justifying?
> 
> Do you respond by saying that everyone has to have self-justifying beliefs and that everyone is living off the borrowed capital of Christianity?



I almost typed a response to this, but then I realized there were more issues under the surface. Good question.


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## Shawn Mathis

ReformedReidian said:


> Granted, it wasn't the mos scathing critique, but it does show the danger of doing theological reflection independent of, and sometimes with arrogance to, our betters.



That is certainly a danger for us all. I was curious because I have found some on those circles to readily dismiss non-Reconstructionist views as being rationalistic or unbiblical or some such dismissive language. A view akin to fundamentalism's old view of the bible: whatever prima facia reading offered is the only true reading.


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## RamistThomist

Shawn Mathis said:


> ReformedReidian said:
> 
> 
> 
> Granted, it wasn't the mos scathing critique, but it does show the danger of doing theological reflection independent of, and sometimes with arrogance to, our betters.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That is certainly a danger for us all. I was curious because I have found some on those circles to readily dismiss non-Reconstructionist views as being rationalistic or unbiblical or some such dismissive language. A view akin to fundamentalism's old view of the bible: whatever prima facia reading offered is the only true reading.
Click to expand...


I don't want to speak for everyone in that group, because I know some good guys there, but that was my own mindset over ten years ago when I ran with the recon crowd. Not knowing Turretin's approach to theology, and how he solved many future problems (albeit riding a few hobby horses of his own), almost led me to despair of Protestantism. It was when I reread Turretin that my theology got (mostly) straightened out.

Some of the hyper Recons begin with the approach that if a thinker isn't immediately pushing the unbeliever to epistemological self-consciousness, then he has compromised with autonomy. That's the plain and simple of it. If we approach epistemology in such a way that we have to write off men like Charles Hodge, then we have already lost. Gary North has an article where he suggests that systematic theology should be written around the Klinean 5 Point Model and Van Til's epistemology. I cant find the article, though. It's worth reading (and like all Gary's stuff, quite entertaining).


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## Shawn Mathis

Well, since my philosophy and apologetic books are packed (for, Lord willing, a move to a new home) I only have the internet. But the discussion thus far here included the definition of presupposition. I found this (although not about presupposition as such, it is intimately related): 

"Transcendental arguments are partly non-empirical, often anti-skeptical arguments focusing on necessary enabling conditions either of coherent experience or the possession or employment of some kind of knowledge or cognitive ability, where the opponent is not in a position to question the fact of this experience, knowledge, or cognitive ability, and where the revealed preconditions include what the opponent questions. Such arguments take as a premise some obvious fact about our mental life—such as some aspect of our knowledge, our experience, our beliefs, or our cognitive abilities—and add a claim that some other state of affairs is a necessary condition of the first one. Transcendental arguments most commonly have been deployed against a position denying the knowability of some extra-mental proposition, such as the existence of other minds or a material world. Thus these arguments characteristically center on a claim that, for some extra-mental proposition P, the indisputable truth of some general proposition Q about our mental life requires that P." (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The latest book on Presuppositional Apologetics (from Westminster if I recall), had an article specifically about the formulation of a transcendental argument and the propositions/presuppositions involved. Again, my books are packed :-(


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