# The end of classical apologetics?



## jwright82

This will be a very controversial thread but I think it is a question worth asking. If classical apologetics is philosophically linked to modernism/enlightenment concepts and those movements are dead than is classical apologetics on the way out to? If you think about it like this, if modernism/enlightenment is sinking like the Titanic and CA is inseprable from its philosophical assumptions than is it also sinking away?


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> This will be a very controversial thread but I think it is a question worth asking. If classical apologetics is philosophically linked to modernism/enlightenment concepts and those movements are dead than is classical apologetics on the way out to? If you think about it like this, if modernism/enlightenment is sinking like the Titanic and CA is inseprable from its philosophical assumptions than is it also sinking away?



CA predates modernism by a good while, so no. Both Presuppositional and Classical apologetics have their roots in the medieval debates between the Franciscans and the Dominicans.


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## jwright82

I would disagree, if you look at common evangelical apologetics you will see them hitching our cart to the enlightment. Most western thinking has been autonomous in some way, I think that CA rests on the same foundation.


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## J. Dean

Just because it happened to come about at the time of the Enlightenment does not mean it was necessarily a bad thing.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I would disagree, if you look at common evangelical apologetics you will see them hitching our cart to the enlightment. Most western thinking has been autonomous in some way, I think that CA rests on the same foundation.



Historically, though, Thomas Aquinas is considered the thinker _par excellence_ for CA.


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## jwright82

J. Dean said:


> Just because it happened to come about at the time of the Enlightenment does not mean it was necessarily a bad thing.



True but if the enlightenment was a bad thing than ergo it is a bad thing. The problem is that it rests on autonomous foundations, the same foundations as the enlightenment.

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P. F. Pugh said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> I would disagree, if you look at common evangelical apologetics you will see them hitching our cart to the enlightment. Most western thinking has been autonomous in some way, I think that CA rests on the same foundation.
> 
> 
> 
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> Historically, though, Thomas Aquinas is considered the thinker _par excellence_ for CA.
Click to expand...


Yes and it is recognized that the roots of the enlightenment go back further than the 1700's.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Yes and it is recognized that the roots of the enlightenment go back further than the 1700's.



The Enlightenment is considered to have begun in the 18th Century as an outgrowth of the Age of Reason. Yes, the roots go back, but that's a case of the genetic fallacy: the Enlightenment was bad, therefore all reasoning before it is suspect. Van Tillians like to blame Thomas for the Enlightenment when in reality he's operating under the same Anselmian framework as Calvin, Luther, and (honestly) Van Til.

I'm not particularly concerned with defending all uses of CA, merely the proper use.


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## ChristianTrader

I think we need to have someone clearly lay out what they mean by classical apologetics, before we can definitively say that it is good or bad, right or wrong.

CT

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jwright82 said:


> I would disagree, if you look at common evangelical apologetics you will see them hitching our cart to the enlightment. Most western thinking has been autonomous in some way, I think that CA rests on the same foundation.



A number of Roman Catholics would say that evangelicals attempt to autonomously interpret Scripture and therefore end up in a lot of trouble. One could also make the argument that without the Enlightenment there would not have been a Reformation.


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## Philip

ChristianTrader said:


> One could also make the argument that without the Enlightenment there would not have been a Reformation.



You're thinking the Renaissance (15th-16th century) not the Enlightenment (18th century)


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## jwithnell

I would contend that the theologians/philosophers of the medieval period were engaging in a synthesis of a Christian perspective (changing over time with the error of the Roman church) and the Greek world view so carefully preserved by the church. (As an example, challengers to the earth-centric universe were running into Aristotelian science when disputed by the church.) The full effect of this synthesis came into bud with the renaissance and full flower with the enlightenment (and, arguably, with the classical apologetic.)


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## ChristianTrader

P. F. Pugh said:


> ChristianTrader said:
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> 
> 
> One could also make the argument that without the Enlightenment there would not have been a Reformation.
> 
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> You're thinking the Renaissance (15th-16th century) not the Enlightenment (18th century)
Click to expand...


Thanks for the correction.


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## Philip

James, in answer to your original question, what is under attack right now is modernism, not the medieval synthesis that produced both presuppositional and classical approaches to apologetics. The roots of both approaches are found in thinkers like Augustine, Anselm, and even Thomas Aquinas. Classical apologetics is no more a product of the Enlightenment than Presuppositionalism is a product of Post-Kantianism.


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## MW

jwright82 said:


> This will be a very controversial thread but I think it is a question worth asking. If classical apologetics is philosophically linked to modernism/enlightenment concepts and those movements are dead than is classical apologetics on the way out to? If you think about it like this, if modernism/enlightenment is sinking like the Titanic and CA is inseprable from its philosophical assumptions than is it also sinking away?



Classical apologetics does not appear to be effective even for modernists. Once presuppositions are brought into the arena evidence is not going to function in a simplistic way. And I doubt we are beyond modernism yet. When a sick person goes to the doctor he is still only interested in what is wrong with him and how he can get better. He couldn't care less about the nature of the instruments being used to check his signs.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> James, in answer to your original question, what is under attack right now is modernism, not the medieval synthesis that produced both presuppositional and classical approaches to apologetics. The roots of both approaches are found in thinkers like Augustine, Anselm, and even Thomas Aquinas. Classical apologetics is no more a product of the Enlightenment than Presuppositionalism is a product of Post-Kantianism.



I would agree. Except that I don't like to label Van Til a Presuppositionalist because his dinstinctives in mind come from Reformed Theology and not Post-Kantianism, but he did use that to his own ends. I never said it was a product of the E/M worldview but that is has for better or worse hitched its cart to that horse. I mean when you have people in CA camp who are defending certian theories autonomous theories of truth, among other autonomous philosophical ideas, and resting the truth of God on that than that is a bad thing in opinion. 






armourbearer said:


> Classical apologetics does not appear to be effective even for modernists. Once presuppositions are brought into the arena evidence is not going to function in a simplistic way. And I doubt we are beyond modernism yet. When a sick person goes to the doctor he is still only interested in what is wrong with him and how he can get better. He couldn't care less about the nature of the instruments being used to check his signs.



Some have argued that Post-modernism is just an advanced stage of Modernism. I don't exactly know how accurate that is but there is some truth to it.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I never said it was a product of the E/M worldview but that is has for better or worse hitched its cart to that horse. I mean when you have people in CA camp who are defending certian theories autonomous theories of truth, among other autonomous philosophical ideas, and resting the truth of God on that than that is a bad thing in opinion.



As I said, I'm not defending this improper use and application of CA. I'm maintaining that this use is not the only one and that there is a proper context and use for it.

I would also maintain that Post-modernism is dead and that we are now in the age of pluralism.


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## Loopie

Wasn't pluralism (at least in the sense of moral/religious pluralism) the norm during the time of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries AD? I mean, Roman pagans called Christians 'atheists' because Christians would not acknowledge the existence of any other gods (and they wouldn't acknowledge the emperor as deity either). There is nothing new under the sun, and the terms post-modernism or pluralism are just as reflective of man's fallen nature as other terms were used to describe the same concept back in the day.


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## Theogenes

Hume, Kant and Gordon Clark have all shown that the classical arguments for God's existence to be fallacious and therefore should be abandoned.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> As I said, I'm not defending this improper use and application of CA. I'm maintaining that this use is not the only one and that there is a proper context and use for it.



Yeah I am open to the idea in theory of a workable CA, I think in practice it will end up being essentially VanTillian, but I have yet to see it. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> I would also maintain that Post-modernism is dead and that we are now in the age of pluralism.



Yeah I agree, I believe that I started a thread on the whole post-postmodernist idea. I will look for it here and maybe it can help us here. 




Loopie said:


> Wasn't pluralism (at least in the sense of moral/religious pluralism) the norm during the time of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries AD? I mean, Roman pagans called Christians 'atheists' because Christians would not acknowledge the existence of any other gods (and they wouldn't acknowledge the emperor as deity either). There is nothing new under the sun, and the terms post-modernism or pluralism are just as reflective of man's fallen nature as other terms were used to describe the same concept back in the day.



Yeah I think that you are right in essence. Although I think their (the Postmodernists) arguments are different and far more complex than ancient Roman thinkers, but you are right that they reach the same conclusions. 




Theogenes said:


> Hume, Kant and Gordon Clark have all shown that the classical arguments for God's existence to be fallacious and therefore should be abandoned.



I would agree with you but I do think that they can be "reconstructed" along VanTillian lines. I also think that a person can indentify with CA and be just fine. If that works apologetically speaking for you than keep it up. If we set aside, not throw out, absolute logical proof for our arguments and adopt a more persuasive approach than I can see a place for CA in our apologetical arsenal.


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## Philip

Theogenes said:


> Hume, Kant and Gordon Clark have all shown that the classical arguments for God's existence to be fallacious and therefore should be abandoned.



Honestly, they haven't. I've looked at their critiques and all of them miss the point.



jwright82 said:


> Yeah I am open to the idea in theory of a workable CA, I think in practice it will end up being essentially VanTillian, but I have yet to see it.



I wouldn't go that far, simply because I don't think Van Tillianism is going to last much longer as a system. I think we'll be seeing more study of Van Til as a Christian philosopher and great use made of his work, but I think Plantinga's work on epistemology and the work of other reformed epistemologists are providing more of a model. The larger movement of reformed epistemology (or the "Aquinas/Calvin" model of belief) will most likely take over where Van Tillianism left off.


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## MW

Theogenes said:


> Hume, Kant and Gordon Clark have all shown that the classical arguments for God's existence to be fallacious and therefore should be abandoned.



All they have proven is that the arguments for human rationality are fallacious and should be abandoned. In so doing they have also disproven their right to be regarded as rational.


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## SolaSaint

I don't know about all the academics on classical apologetics, but that is how I defend and advocate the faith with others. I feel it is the best method of apologetics. If it is dead, it hasn't made a difference in my conversations. lol-- By the way R C Sproul doesn't seem to know either.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> I wouldn't go that far, simply because I don't think Van Tillianism is going to last much longer as a system. I think we'll be seeing more study of Van Til as a Christian philosopher and great use made of his work, but I think Plantinga's work on epistemology and the work of other reformed epistemologists are providing more of a model. The larger movement of reformed epistemology (or the "Aquinas/Calvin" model of belief) will most likely take over where Van Tillianism left off.



I see a place for Plantinga's work to suppliment Van Til's but since two of the best Reformed seminaries are VanTillian than I don't see it being eclipsed. Plus if one feels that Van Til's work is the logical conclusion of Reformed theology than that probably will stay the same to.


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> I see a place for Plantinga's work to suppliment Van Til's but since two of the best Reformed seminaries are VanTillian than I don't see it being eclipsed. Plus if one feels that Van Til's work is the logical conclusion of Reformed theology than that probably will stay the same to.



I would say that Van Til is one of several possible outworkings of Reformed theology---it is not a necessary conclusion of it any more than Bahnsen's theonomy is a necessary conclusion of Van Tillianism.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> I see a place for Plantinga's work to suppliment Van Til's but since two of the best Reformed seminaries are VanTillian than I don't see it being eclipsed. Plus if one feels that Van Til's work is the logical conclusion of Reformed theology than that probably will stay the same to.
> 
> 
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> I would say that Van Til is one of several possible outworkings of Reformed theology---it is not a necessary conclusion of it any more than Bahnsen's theonomy is a necessary conclusion of Van Tillianism.
Click to expand...


Just out of curiousity why is Van Til going to be eclipsed anyway?


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## Peccavi

I am not entirely sure I am comfortable with the implication that modernism is dead. While the movement of modernism has had its influence substantially reduced by the rising popularity of post- modern thinking, I am certainly not willing to concede that modernism is on the way out as such. I mean to say, militant atheism is alive and well (modernism epitomized)


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## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Just out of curiousity why is Van Til going to be eclipsed anyway?



As the two aforementioned seminaries cease to dominate the reformed world and as Reformed epistemology broadens.


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> jwright82 said:
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> Just out of curiousity why is Van Til going to be eclipsed anyway?
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> As the two aforementioned seminaries cease to dominate the reformed world and as Reformed epistemology broadens.
Click to expand...


Well you can imagine that I hope you are wrong.

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Peccavi said:


> I am not entirely sure I am comfortable with the implication that modernism is dead. While the movement of modernism has had its influence substantially reduced by the rising popularity of post- modern thinking, I am certainly not willing to concede that modernism is on the way out as such. I mean to say, militant atheism is alive and well (modernism epitomized)



Your'e right about militant atheism being modernism epitomized. It does seem that science is becoming a new mode of modernism but this may also be the rise of something called by some "transmodernism". I read a paper in a book from a decidedly CA viewpoint praising transmodernism as being more favorable to religion, and that was suppossed to be a good thing.


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## Philip

Peccavi said:


> I mean to say, militant atheism is alive and well (modernism epitomized)



I'd say that Dawkins et al are actually just the death throes of scientism and modernism.


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## Loopie

I am not sure about death throes, they seem to be growing in popularity (Hitchens, Loftus, included).


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## Alan D. Strange

It would be nice if Dawkins's approach were it in its death throes, but I seriously doubt that scientism is and there's little evidence to support that. Most mainstream scientists are naturalistic and scientistic and nothing that I know suggests a change in that any time soon.

As for Plantinga replacing Van Til, I don't think so, because their projects are not the same. Van Til is an apologist who uses and also occasionally does philosophy. Plantinga is a philosopher who also practices a mild form of apologetics sometimes. Those who follow Plantingna and do apologetics do it so mildly as scarcely to be recognized as such. Frame is, I believe, correct in his analysis of this in Cowen's _Five Views of Apologetics_. Reformed epistemologists who do apologetics make the weakest sort of claim, even compared to classicalists, evidentialists, cumulative casers, etc. 

Plantinga has sought to argue the warrant of faith so as to give Christianity a place at the table with all other worldviews. Van Til has argued that worldviews other than Christianity are internally inconsistent and incoherent and necessarily reduce to nonsense. Only the Christian worldview furnishes the necessary preconditions for intelligibility and thus, properly, not only deserves a place at the table but is the only one that does. This sounds, and is, audacious (and I realize that you, P.F., don't buy it), but it's not the audacity of the unbeliever rejecting God and His Word; rather it is the conviction and assurance of God's child humbly bowing before Him and His revelation, without which we cannot make sense of the world and with which we can joyfully serve our God and king.

Formally speaking, Van Til is about much more than philosophy as a discipline. He's about the theological project that sees God's revelation (general and special) as all-embracing and all-encompassing, forming the necessary foundation for all knowledge, confessing not only the soteric Lordship of Christ but also the epistemic Lordship of Christ. Typically, Plantinginians are quite wary and contemptous of all this and don't regard it as philosophy at all. Scott Oliphint's dissertation from WTS engages Plantinga's approach in light of Van Til's project. I think that it is quite good, as well as his engagement of Plantinga's attempted theodicy in _Reasons for Faith_.

Here's a little something I wrote, reviewing John Stackhouse's _Humble Apologetics_, which comes from the perspective of Plantinga and which , I think, quite misses the point and presents an apologetic laden with uncertainty and scepticism:http://www.midamerica.edu/resources/journal/14/reviews.pdf. These are all the reviews from this issue. Look under Stackhouse (which mistakenly, in this pdf, follows Stewart).

One last point: I am reading Plantinga's _Where the Conflict Really Lies : Science, Religion, and Naturalism_--as usual, brilliant in so many ways, and first-rate in deconstructing naturalism (or better showing how it deconstructs itself). But at what price? Total capitulation (though I realize it's not necessary, but it's what Plantinga does) to the substance of what the naturalist comes up with while rejecting naturalism. Maybe the book should be titled: What the price really is--to be thought respectable by the Academy. 

Peace,
Alan


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## Philip

Alan D. Strange said:


> It would be nice if Dawkins's approach were it in its death throes, but I seriously doubt that scientism is and there's little evidence to support that. Most mainstream scientists are naturalistic and scientistic and nothing that I know suggests a change in that any time soon.



Scientism of the kind that Dawkins espouses is indeed in its death throes. Yes, it's prevalent in the hard sciences, but about nowhere else. Even in analytic philosophy, scientistic thinking is seen as something of an embarrassment.



Alan D. Strange said:


> Only the Christian worldview furnishes the necessary preconditions for intelligibility and thus, properly, not only deserves a place at the table but is the only one that does. This sounds, and is, audacious (and I realize that you, P.F., don't buy it), but it's not the audacity of the unbeliever rejecting God and His Word; rather it is the conviction and assurance of God's child humbly bowing before Him and His revelation, without which we cannot make sense of the world and with which we can joyfully serve our God and king.



Here's my concern: in theory, I see how a transcendental argument could work. However, the claim it makes will always come across as arrogance for this reason: the claim made is such that the burden of proof required to establish it would take several lifetimes. The impossibility of the contrary may be established either by a direct argument from logical necessity, or an indirect argument from a) logical coherence (and consistency with reality), which always ends up being an argument from lack of unanswerable objections b) deconstruction of all other possible worldviews.

In theory, the contrary is impossible, but one is forced, as a creature with limits on time, energy, and reasoning abilities, to find arguments that are less cumbersome. If you can prove that Christianity is, indeed, the only possible academically-respectable view, then do so. But if you're going to make this claim in the academy, then a demonstration is necessary.

My problem with it is that it's a burden of proof that is impossible to actually fulfill. It's a claim so strong as to be not demonstrable.

The other problem, of course, is that this isn't how anyone comes to faith. People come to faith because the Holy Spirit illumines their hearts, reveals Christ, and regenerates them---that's the epistemic basis for our knowledge of God. A transcendental argument wouldn't convince me out of any position, only to nuance it---and that would only be if I admitted that such an argument was both interesting (difficult) and necessary (more difficult).


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## Alan D. Strange

My point, Philip, was not to argue the TA as such with you (I referred to literature on that and it's been done elsewhere) but to make the points about Plantinga, who, with his followers, are no apologists, in my estimation. And he, in a number of places, willingly puts his theology in the service of his philosophy. That is quite backwards. As you acknowledged, our philosophy should be in the service of our theology. The category we are in here, after all, is not philosophy as such but apologetical methods.

And, Philip, the scientism of Dawkins and company has little respectability among philosophers. Rightly so and happily granted. But you really need to get out a bit more. It's alive and well in biology and the other "hard" sciences. Your wishing it dead (and I heartily join you in that) does not make it so. Have you seen the stats on this in scientific journals? Within a certain segment of the scientific community it is stronger than ever. Naturalism, as a fundamental dogma, enjoys revisionary immunity among its partisans--what's the alternative for them? No, I think some form of naturalism or scientism, even without philosophical respectability (have you not noticed that they freely disdain philosophy and philosophers?), will be around for some time.

Peace,
Alan


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## Peairtach

*Alan*


> (have you not noticed that they freely disdain philosophy and philosophers?)



Hawking famously said, a year or two ago, "Philosophy is dead"


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## Alan D. Strange

Exactly, Richard. Hawking's sentiment in _Grand Design_, that you here cited, is legion among scientists and leading ones at that. That philosphers scoff at that (and I join them as a theologian and historian) does not mean that this is not a popular sentiment among scientists. Hawking and Dawkins sell a lot more books than philosophers like Plantinga. Their naturalism is absurd but this does not mean that it is not influential. Rumors of the death of modernism/scientism/naturalism are, I fear, like Twain once said of his own, greatly exaggerated.

Peace,
Alan


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## Philip

Alan D. Strange said:


> No, I think some form of naturalism or scientism, even without philosophical respectability (have you not noticed that they freely disdain philosophy and philosophers?), will be around for some time.



In the "hard" sciences, yes. The problem is that the rest of the academy has seen through the charade. I guess when I talk about scientism, I'm thinking the philosophy where science dominated the academy and was seen as the paradigm for all other disciplines: logical positivism was an extreme form of this. Yes, scientists still wish that they had this position, but it's no longer a given.



Alan D. Strange said:


> And he, in a number of places, willingly puts his theology in the service of his philosophy. That is quite backwards. As you acknowledged, our philosophy should be in the service of our theology. The category we are in here, after all, is not philosophy as such but apologetical methods.



True. However, I would argue that apologetics is the philosophical defence of theology. When we are debating method, the categories we use are philosophical. Plantinga is guilty of this in some places, but (for example) in _Warranted Christian Belief_, all he is really doing is presenting a Christian model of belief that is unashamedly theological.


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## Alan D. Strange

Philip:

Here's where we differ: I do not believe that apologetics is the philosophical defence of theology. I believe that apologetics is the biblical defense of the faith. It's of a piece with evangelism. We preach the gospel. We call for faith and repentance. If objections are raised, we engage in apologetics, a biblical defense of the faith involving a two-fold approach: the internal critique of unbelief and the contextualizing and answering of the objections with the Christian worldview. Yes, in that task we may use philosophy, particularly in the internal critique and as we engage unbelief. Indeed, we delight to put philosophy in the service of theology. But our task is biblical and theological chiefly.

Apologetics is part of the prolegomena to our theology, but it is no more, properly speaking, philosophy, than is our doctrine of revelation, which is also part of our prolegomena. It may appear to be "philosophy" more than anything in any other part of our theology but this is simply because of the nature of the objections that come our way and the unbelief that we are called upon to answer. Apologetics is part of the theological enterprise and, properly and consistently done, does not depart from the Bible as its true source any more than the doctrine of the Word or the doctrine of Christ does. All of these loci dragoon philosophy into their service as you know but are part of the theological enterprise, properly speaking, and not part of the philosophical enterprise (as that is a part of the arts and humanities, which together with the sciences, comprise our liberal arts curriculum).

Peace,
Alan


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## Philip

Alan D. Strange said:


> Apologetics is part of the prolegomena to our theology, but it is no more, properly speaking, philosophy, than is our doctrine of revelation, which is also part of our prolegomena.



I would say that the doctrine of the Trinity has priority over our doctrine of revelation.

I wouldn't say that apologetics is the prolegomena to theology: it is the place where philosophy and theology meet. Certain objections to the faith are philosophical in nature and thus the philosophical defence of the faith is called for. On the other hand, other objections are existential and pastoral, which is where theological and pastoral answers to objections may be called for. But arguments are not a presentation of the Gospel, nor are they necessary for theology. In my current work in philosophy, I'm providing a framework for theories of doctrine, but I don't pretend that it is necessary to have a theory of doctrine in order to do theology.


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## Alan D. Strange

Philip:

I realize that you have not studied in a theological seminary. It is simply the case that the theological curriculum is laid out in this fashion: prolegomena, theology, anthropology, Christology, Pneumatology (or soteriology), ecclesiology, and eschatology. This is the order in which the loci are treated in the theological encyclopedia. Prolegomena, or theological foundation, includes apologetics and doctrine of the Word (or revelation). This is not exceptionable or even debatable. It's the order of treatment of the encyclopedia within institutions that teach classical Reformed theology. This, by the way, is only the order for the theological, or doctrinal, division, classically considered the third division in the overall seminary curriculum, following the biblical and ecclesiastical divisions, and preceding the ministerial division. 

This is what I mean in the first instance when noting that apologetics is prolegomena. The doctrine of the Trinity is a part of theology, or as it is often called, theology proper, doctrine of God. I am not sure what you mean by "the doctrine of the Trinity has priority over our doctrine of revelation" but what I meant by revelation as prolegomena is that the doctrine of the Word precedes in order of treatment the doctrine of God. Very simple. I am not talking about some sort of theological privileging only the basic order in which the theological encyclopedia receives its treatment. This is true of the standard theologies (look at Hodge's--appealing to a CSRer!) and of the theological curriculum.

Peace,
Alan


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## Alan D. Strange

P. F. Pugh said:


> I wouldn't say that apologetics is the prolegomena to theology: it is the place where philosophy and theology meet. Certain objections to the faith are philosophical in nature and thus the philosophical defence of the faith is called for. On the other hand, other objections are existential and pastoral, which is where theological and pastoral answers to objections may be called for. But arguments are not a presentation of the Gospel, nor are they necessary for theology. In my current work in philosophy, I'm providing a framework for theories of doctrine, but I don't pretend that it is necessary to have a theory of doctrine in order to do theology.



As I've said, Philip, I agree that philosophy may have as much play in apologetics as anywhere in the theological encyclopedia. Two things to observe here: that does not mean, however, that apologetics does not remain, as do all the theological loci, rooted and grounded in the Word; it also does not mean that philosophy does not have play throughout the other theological loci. Though philosophical theology is not easy to define, certainly it is in play in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, in defining the hypostatic union, and so forth. It is in play, as we've agreed, as the handmaiden of theology. Other disciplines are in play in the development of the loci as well, but, again, the root and ground iof it all is God's Word. 

It is simply not the case that when we do Christology, for example, we are being purely biblical, but when we are doing apologetics we are being mostly, if not entirely, philosophical. I am not saying that there is no place for philosophy in the theological disciplines. Not at all. I am only saying that all is subordinated to, and dependent on, the Holy Scripture. And we don't stop that dependence when we come to apologetics.

I agree, in fact, with the rest of the quoted paragraph after the first sentence. There are different sorts of objections to the faith and they are dealt with accordingly, some more philosophically, some more pastorally, all from God's Word. In fact, every department of the theological curriculum is to have and do its own apologetic. In biblical studies, for example, refutation of higher critical approaches occurs; in church history (as part of ecclesiastical studies), we refute a cyclical, say, or a Marxist view of history; in ministerial studies, we engage varieties of contextualization. These are a few illustrations. Apologetics, in other words, is both a distinct discipline, serving together with doctrine of the Word (or revelation) as part of theological foundation(s), prolegomena to the rest of the theological loci, and also as a defensive stance taken in every other department of theological study (the biblical, ecclesiastical, and ministerial). Philosophy (and the other liberal arts as appropriate) are employed all along the way, subordinated to the Word of God.

But no part of the theological loci, including apologetics, is something other than fundamentally theological.

Peace,
Alan


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## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Here's my concern: in theory, I see how a transcendental argument could work. However, the claim it makes will always come across as arrogance for this reason: the claim made is such that the burden of proof required to establish it would take several lifetimes. The impossibility of the contrary may be established either by a direct argument from logical necessity, or an indirect argument from a) logical coherence (and consistency with reality), which always ends up being an argument from lack of unanswerable objections b) deconstruction of all other possible worldviews.



What if the burden of proof is more this. Western philosophy has been plagued by certian fundamental problems. They can be predictably present in all attempts thus far to solve the logical questions of Philosophy. I have not always stressed this historical element as well as I should have in our previous discussions, so my bad for any uneccessary misunderstanding. Like any good disease (unbeleiving philosophy) this one has syptoms (the various schools of philosophy) that are all part the reason why unbeleiver's cannot solve in a complete or ultimate sense the fundamental problems of Philosophy (with a capital "P"). 

Van Til and people like Dooyeweerd have pointed out that the ultimate reason why they cannot acomplish what they wish to acomplish is because they are resting their attempts on ungodly presuppositions. If that is in fact their root problem than the TA works because it rests its presuppositions on biblical presuppositions. Therefore it cannot be guilty of the same destructive errors of unbeleiving thought. Of course this discription of the two opposing wordlviews, beleiving and unbeleiving, is in an ideal sense. Both worldviews will be a mixture of truth and error in the actual individuals espousing them but in their presuppositions they are different. 

By way of an analogy it is like mankind is on one side of a lake that they know they must get across. But there are no bridges or anything. So unbeleiver's try to drive over in cars. They insist, and this is a very crude analogy so bear with me, that there must be some car that will do and they with unaided reason will discover it. So on through the years they try many different makes and models only to end in futility. They then conclude that no one can ever get over there. This is where Van Til says "why don't we just get into the boat that the harbor master sent over to pick us up" (that would be divine revelation). 




P. F. Pugh said:


> In theory, the contrary is impossible, but one is forced, as a creature with limits on time, energy, and reasoning abilities, to find arguments that are less cumbersome. If you can prove that Christianity is, indeed, the only possible academically-respectable view, then do so. But if you're going to make this claim in the academy, then a demonstration is necessary.



I agree to a degree here. That is why I would employ the previous mentioned critical-historical interpratation of western thought. This same critique was leveled by postmodernism only to conclude in irrationality. Van Til says that they are just two sides of the same coin. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> My problem with it is that it's a burden of proof that is impossible to actually fulfill. It's a claim so strong as to be not demonstrable.



If you can point out the fundamental flaws of all western thought and than demonstrated that christian theism does not posses these flaws wouldn't that be demonstration?




P. F. Pugh said:


> The other problem, of course, is that this isn't how anyone comes to faith. People come to faith because the Holy Spirit illumines their hearts, reveals Christ, and regenerates them---that's the epistemic basis for our knowledge of God. A transcendental argument wouldn't convince me out of any position, only to nuance it---and that would only be if I admitted that such an argument was both interesting (difficult) and necessary (more difficult).



Isn't this a problem with all schools of thought?


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Like any good disease (unbeleiving philosophy) this one has syptoms (the various schools of philosophy) that are all part the reason why unbeleiver's cannot solve in a complete or ultimate sense the fundamental problems of Philosophy (with a capital "P").



Oh dear. If differing philosophical schools are a symptom of unbelieving philosophy, then clearly most philosophers who claim the name of Jesus are only faking Christian thinking really. I don't think we should attribute this merely to unbelief: many philosophers who are true (and non-autonomous) believers end up with conclusions that I disagree with. I will never agree with Edwards and Berkeley on the existential state of matter; I'm not sure that I agree with Johannes Duns Scotus on universals; I certainly don't agree with Augustine's epistemology of Divine occasionalism.



jwright82 said:


> If that is in fact their root problem than the TA works because it rests its presuppositions on biblical presuppositions. Therefore it cannot be guilty of the same destructive errors of unbeleiving thought.



No, just different errors.



jwright82 said:


> If you can point out the fundamental flaws of all western thought and than demonstrated that christian theism does not posses these flaws wouldn't that be demonstration?



Even if you could (and the logical category of "all" is a tall order), you'd still have eastern thought, pantheism, Islam, etc. And even then, there would be the possibility of constructing something completely new. No, it wouldn't be a demonstration.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Oh dear. If differing philosophical schools are a symptom of unbelieving philosophy, then clearly most philosophers who claim the name of Jesus are only faking Christian thinking really. I don't think we should attribute this merely to unbelief: many philosophers who are true (and non-autonomous) believers end up with conclusions that I disagree with. I will never agree with Edwards and Berkeley on the existential state of matter; I'm not sure that I agree with Johannes Duns Scotus on universals; I certainly don't agree with Augustine's epistemology of Divine occasionalism.



And this is for Van Til when christians adopt autonomous philosophies, they accommodate to unbeleiving philosophies. Note that I think that Frame is on to something here when he says that perhaps Van Til is not at his strongest here. I mean how much adoption of philosophy is too much? Who can say? We can say it after the fact though, so that is In my humble opinion where he is stronger. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> No, just different errors.



Or just different examples of one underlying error. Remember two things that anyone who reads Van Til must keep in mind:

1. He made a dinstinction between ideal considerations of worldviews. In an ideal sense the beleiver and unbeleiver are diametrically opposed to one another. In actual everyday experience we are an "awkward mixture" of true and false beleifs, but our underlying presuppositions are either beleif or unbeleif. Either we are in Adam or in Christ. I also think that you are on to something when you describe presuppositions as "tacit knowledge". You are right to emphasize the "noncognative" aspect of a presupposition. Of course we would both agree that there is a cognative aspect to them that can be expressed in language. But they are more than that. 

2. He was in many ways "continental" in his thinking. His greatest theological influence was the continental thinker Bavink, well worth the study by the way (I only have that book _Our Reasonable Faith_ by him, it is a compilation edited by someone who I can't remember the name of). But he viewed history in the staple continental way since Hegel. Derrida and the rest of them all took the same method of analyzing the history of thought the same way without excepting Hegel's dinstinctive ideas. So he viewed movements in an organic way. So although unbeleiving thought has many "bumps" (or philosophers) along the way it is still one road that can be analyzed as a whole. This is, I'll admit, "strange" to analytical philosophy but perhaps it is time the two different "streams" to cross. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> Even if you could (and the logical category of "all" is a tall order), you'd still have eastern thought, pantheism, Islam, etc. And even then, there would be the possibility of constructing something completely new. No, it wouldn't be a demonstration.



Well two things here:

1. CA has not faired well in this department either. Someone states a version of the traditional arguments and then someone comes along and criticizes it and someone has to reformulate it and on and on and on

2. We are finite, we cannot have a totality of knowledge. That being true we will always have "new" challanges to the faith. You are right to bring up eastern thought but as I've read Van Til's insights work there as well


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> And this is for Van Til when christians adopt autonomous philosophies, they accommodate to unbeleiving philosophies.



But that's the trouble: Edwards and Berkeley, for instance, are specifically addressing unbelieving philosophy when they envision their metaphysic of anti-materialism.



jwright82 said:


> This is, I'll admit, "strange" to analytical philosophy but perhaps it is time the two different "streams" to cross.



It's less my analytical nature than the fact that reading C.S. Lewis on historicism has made me suspicious of attempts to try and get above history and see the patterns apart from what God has revealed specifically in Scripture. If God says that these are the fundamental errors in all of western philosophy, that's one thing. If Van Til says it, I'm going to be very suspicious. There's always a multiplicity of factors and the mistakes aren't always the same.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> But that's the trouble: Edwards and Berkeley, for instance, are specifically addressing unbelieving philosophy when they envision their metaphysic of anti-materialism.



But for them philosophy dictated their faith. Don't mistake their error for an error in Van Til's method. Just because a christian does philosophy doesn't guarentee that they are right. Allowing philosophy to tell us what we should believe about the bible is backwards.




P. F. Pugh said:


> It's less my analytical nature than the fact that reading C.S. Lewis on historicism has made me suspicious of attempts to try and get above history and see the patterns apart from what God has revealed specifically in Scripture. If God says that these are the fundamental errors in all of western philosophy, that's one thing. If Van Til says it, I'm going to be very suspicious. There's always a multiplicity of factors and the mistakes aren't always the same.



Thats fine. If you feel that there is a philosophy out there that does not fall under this scheme than name it. If you want me to provide examples I will. I still don't understand how we can say that a being made in the image of God can interpret creation in a way that is consistantly atheistic for instance.


----------



## Loopie

jwright82 said:


> I still don't understand how we can say that a being made in the image of God can interpret creation in a way that is consistantly atheistic for instance.



You bring up an excellent point. I mean, wouldn't it be awkward to suggest that a person can be theoretically perfectly consistent and theoretically have true knowledge of all of creation without making any reference to God? If God is indeed a necessary being (for the existence of creation), then wouldn't he be a necessary being for the knowledge of that creation? That is, wouldn't we have to know him in order to have a theoretically perfectly consistent worldview and a theoretically true knowledge of all of creation?


----------



## jwright82

Loopie said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> I still don't understand how we can say that a being made in the image of God can interpret creation in a way that is consistantly atheistic for instance.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You bring up an excellent point. I mean, wouldn't it be awkward to suggest that a person can be theoretically perfectly consistent and theoretically have true knowledge of all of creation without making any reference to God? If God is indeed a necessary being (for the existence of creation), then wouldn't he be a necessary being for the knowledge of that creation? That is, wouldn't we have to know him in order to have a theoretically perfectly consistent worldview and a theoretically true knowledge of all of creation?
Click to expand...


Yeah how can creation be interpreted correctly as anything other than creation. You raise a good point.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But for them philosophy dictated their faith.



Actually, it was the other way around. They argued against a material world outside the mind of God because they saw that as a Biblical alternative to empiricism.



jwright82 said:


> I still don't understand how we can say that a being made in the image of God can interpret creation in a way that is consistantly atheistic for instance.



Because he's fallen and suppressing the truth, perhaps? Coherence doesn't equal truth.



Loopie said:


> If God is indeed a necessary being (for the existence of creation), then wouldn't he be a necessary being for the knowledge of that creation?



Yes---ontologically. However, the unbeliever won't admit this and will find ways around it. His cognitive faculties are ontologically derived from his being created, but he doesn't see that and refuses to see it.



Loopie said:


> That is, wouldn't we have to know him in order to have a theoretically perfectly consistent worldview and a theoretically true knowledge of all of creation?



No. Knowledge of the world does not automatically equal knowledge of God. What you've done here is conflated belief-forming processes with personal knowledge with ontology. Unbelievers know stuff even though they don't know God---not in the way that believers do.

As for consistency, that's just a matter of logical analysis.



jwright82 said:


> Yeah how can creation be interpreted correctly as anything other than creation.



You're conflating things again: we are talking warranted true beliefs about particular things, not a grand schema. As I said, I'm not terribly interested in creating them.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Actually, it was the other way around. They argued against a material world outside the mind of God because they saw that as a Biblical alternative to empiricism.



I still would say that despite their intentions they are wrong, I have read Edwards' early philosophical writings. He got into hot water with reformed folk not because of his theology so much as his philosophical theology.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Because he's fallen and suppressing the truth, perhaps? Coherence doesn't equal truth.



But corespondence to creation is always corespondence to creation.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Yes---ontologically. However, the unbeliever won't admit this and will find ways around it. His cognitive faculties are ontologically derived from his being created, but he doesn't see that and refuses to see it.



I mean the point is can any comprehensize theory of reality better make sense of things than the christian narrative?




P. F. Pugh said:


> No. Knowledge of the world does not automatically equal knowledge of God. What you've done here is conflated belief-forming processes with personal knowledge with ontology. Unbelievers know stuff even though they don't know God---not in the way that believers do.
> 
> As for consistency, that's just a matter of logical analysis.



Well you are assuming a creation that is other than creation. The existance of God is irellevant to creation, the almighty is of no consequence logically speaking. I know that you fully believe that creation is creation so please don't misunderstand me. I think that you are moving this way despite your intentions. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> You're conflating things again: we are talking warranted true beliefs about particular things, not a grand schema. As I said, I'm not terribly interested in creating them.



Yes but considering the manifold problems in common realism why can't a "grand schema" be appropriate?


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Yes but considering the manifold problems in common realism why can't a "grand schema" be appropriate?



What problems did you have in mind?



jwright82 said:


> I still would say that despite their intentions they are wrong, I have read Edwards' early philosophical writings. He got into hot water with reformed folk not because of his theology so much as his philosophical theology.



Fair enough. My point though is that just because you are reasoning in subjection to Scripture (as Edwards was) doesn't mean you're right.



jwright82 said:


> But corespondence to creation is always corespondence to creation.



Well I'm not sure I can dispute this one.



jwright82 said:


> I mean the point is can any comprehensize theory of reality better make sense of things than the christian narrative?



Depends on who is defining "better."



jwright82 said:


> Well you are assuming a creation that is other than creation. The existance of God is irellevant to creation, the almighty is of no consequence logically speaking. I know that you fully believe that creation is creation so please don't misunderstand me. I think that you are moving this way despite your intentions.



How, exactly? All that I am claiming is this: if an unbeliever arrives at true conclusion X by means of his God-given faculties, then despite the fact that he is denying the creation is creation, he is still correct about X, is still warranted in his belief that X, and still knows X. If autonomy is defined as you seem to be defining it, then it impossible and thus it makes no sense to accuse anyone of it. If, on the other hand, it is an attitude of rebellion and resistance toward God, then one may be autonomous and still be correct about some things.

The unbeliever refuses to see the forest for the trees, but that doesn't mean that he is ignorant of trees.


----------



## MW

Matthew 16:3, "O ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky; but can ye not discern the signs of the times?" Unbelievers clearly know the truth about things that are created. They function as rationally responsible and accountable beings. It is their ability to act rationally in relation to the things of this world which makes them all the more culpable when they refuse to act rationally in relation to the Creator of the world. Does an unbeliever have ultimate epistemic justification for what he relies upon as a truth claim? No; but that does not negate the fact that he makes valid truth claims. It is his very claim to truth which makes his unrighteousness inexcusable. Romans 1:18.


----------



## Loopie

But we would agree that sin has corrupted even the rational mind of man. Rationality and reason are not untouched by sin. And Philip, even if the unbeliever concluded X correctly, he still 'knew' God (and suppressed this knowledge) before he even perceived X. 

Romans 1:19 (NASB) 
19 because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them. 

Romans 1:21 (NASB) 
21 For even though they knew God, they did not honor Him as God or give thanks, but they became futile in their speculations, and their foolish heart was darkened. 

It would seem that the natural man, from the moment he was made had a knowledge of his creator within him. I would argue that the very first thing any person 'knows' is that God exists (but they suppress this knowledge). That is why an innate knowledge of God is prior to any knowledge of the universe around us. Whether or not the unbeliever has TRUE knowledge of the universe is certainly a different discussion, but I do not think an argument can be made that there is no knowledge of God innate to all people.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> But we would agree that sin has corrupted even the rational mind of man. Rationality and reason are not untouched by sin. And Philip, even if the unbeliever concluded X correctly, he still 'knew' God (and suppressed this knowledge) before he even perceived X.



But whatever does this have to do with whether or not the unbeliever knows X? See my comments on the other thread.


----------



## MW

Loopie said:


> That is why an innate knowledge of God is prior to any knowledge of the universe around us.



This is moving towards a form of hyper-rationalism and idealism which reformed theology has traditionally rejected. I don't mean to say you are there but it is something I would be wary of. In Romans 1, Calvin's Institutes, and the Westminster documents there is a strong connection between what is innate (the microcosm, man) and what is perceived in the world of creation and providence (the macrocosm). Natural knowledge is never regarded as a product of what is innate. The implanted knowledge of God is the mere seed of religion; it is not religion itself. In order to "know God" reformed theologians emphasise the importance of the external works of God and the process of discursive thought. This is a part of being a creature.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> but I do not think an argument can be made that there is no knowledge of God innate to all people.



Naturally---otherwise arguments from creation wouldn't be possible.


----------



## Loopie

armourbearer said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> That is why an innate knowledge of God is prior to any knowledge of the universe around us.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is moving towards a form of hyper-rationalism and idealism which reformed theology has traditionally rejected. I don't mean to say you are there but it is something I would be wary of. In Romans 1, Calvin's Institutes, and the Westminster documents there is a strong connection between what is innate (the microcosm, man) and what is perceived in the world of creation and providence (the macrocosm). Natural knowledge is never regarded as a product of what is innate. The implanted knowledge of God is the mere seed of religion; it is not religion itself. In order to "know God" reformed theologians emphasise the importance of the external works of God and the process of discursive thought. This is a part of being a creature.
Click to expand...


Rev Winzer,

I certainly would not claim that the innate knowledge of God that I spoke about was a mental knowledge, or a rational/conscious knowledge. I agree completely with what you said. I use the term know and knowledge because that is what I see in Romans 1. They KNEW God, and the KNOWLEDGE of God was evident within them. I would not call this 'head knowledge' or anything like that. It is spiritual in nature, but it is still knowledge in some way (just suppressed). So doesn't this innate seed of religion exist prior to any other forms or types of knowledge in man?


----------



## MW

Loopie said:


> So doesn't this innate seed of religion exist prior to any other forms or types of knowledge in man?



Certainly ability to reason exists before reason itself. And the ability to reason is a certain form of knowledge, which is what is usually designated "innate." But, as you qualified (which I take to be the only safe qualification to make in this context), it is not knowledge in the rational sense. While it is confined to being pre-rational it cannot become hyper-rational. But however it is described, (1) it only functions in accord with the cognitive and perceptive processes, and (2) is only discerned by those processes. If we stick with the "seed" terminology we are safe. A seed is not a plant; it is the potential of a plant; other factors are necessary to produce the plant out of it.


----------



## Loopie

I completely agree with you, but it would still be accurate to use the term 'know' or 'knowledge' as Romans 1 uses it, right? I only meant to show that a type of knowledge of God, a seed of religion, existed from the beginning which the man suppresses. I mean, this is how one would be sinful even in the womb right? He is in rebellion against a God that he 'knows' in some sense of the word from the moment the man is created, right? I hope I am clarifying my position a bit better.


----------



## MW

Loopie said:


> He is in rebellion against a God that he 'knows' in some sense of the word from the moment the man is created, right? I hope I am clarifying my position a bit better.



Yes, good point; but it only applies to ultimate epistemic justification; once you qualify that it is pre-rational this "innate knowledge" has no capacity to nullify the rational process but is simply the pre-condition of it. So for actual facts, what is reasoned may be justified even if there is no ultimate justification.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> What problems did you have in mind?



Basically that common notions equals majority rules. If the majority of people in a society feel that people of a certian race should not be allowed to eat at the same table as another race doesn't make it right just because everyone agrees on it. Read Locke's first section on his (and I may confuse his title for Hume's, for some reason I always do that) _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_ on innate ideas. His criticisms work well here.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Fair enough. My point though is that just because you are reasoning in subjection to Scripture (as Edwards was) doesn't mean you're right.



Your right that we as beleivers can and do make mistakes. It is not full proof in practice.




P. F. Pugh said:


> Depends on who is defining "better."



I would say that means not only do we consistantly interpret reality but we have a liveable worldview that gives us meaning and hope. 




P. F. Pugh said:


> How, exactly? All that I am claiming is this: if an unbeliever arrives at true conclusion X by means of his God-given faculties, then despite the fact that he is denying the creation is creation, he is still correct about X, is still warranted in his belief that X, and still knows X.



Yes and Van Til would say that he came to that conclusion in spite of his denial.




P. F. Pugh said:


> If autonomy is defined as you seem to be defining it, then it impossible and thus it makes no sense to accuse anyone of it. If, on the other hand, it is an attitude of rebellion and resistance toward God, then one may be autonomous and still be correct about some things.



Correct. The antithesis is not absolute in practice due to God's restraining common grace.




P. F. Pugh said:


> The unbeliever refuses to see the forest for the trees, but that doesn't mean that he is ignorant of trees.



I agree.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> Read Locke's first section on his (and I may confuse his title for Hume's, for some reason I always do that) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding on innate ideas. His criticisms work well here.



Sorry, Locke is just confused. He never gives a definition of "idea" and operates under the assumption that the mind is a _tabula rasa_---an assumption that is completely unwarranted and rather discredited. This is one of the main points that Reid makes against empiricism: the idea that people are born without predispositions and that certain cognitive faculties have privilege to judge the others.



jwright82 said:


> Basically that common notions equals majority rules. If the majority of people in a society feel that people of a certian race should not be allowed to eat at the same table as another race doesn't make it right just because everyone agrees on it.



No---but reason is certainly capable to point this out. However, if you come to certain conclusions by "reason" (say, that inductive reasoning can't be trusted at all) then you have to start wondering where you went wrong in your reasoning, because you know that induction is necessary for life.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> Sorry, Locke is just confused. He never gives a definition of "idea" and operates under the assumption that the mind is a tabula rasa---an assumption that is completely unwarranted and rather discredited. This is one of the main points that Reid makes against empiricism: the idea that people are born without predispositions and that certain cognitive faculties have privilege to judge the others.



But his criticisms are not based on his empiricism, it is actually a very independent section of the work.




P. F. Pugh said:


> No---but reason is certainly capable to point this out. However, if you come to certain conclusions by "reason" (say, that inductive reasoning can't be trusted at all) then you have to start wondering where you went wrong in your reasoning, because you know that induction is necessary for life.



But all that means is that you need a TA to show why we can trust inductive reasoning despite its limitations. Appealing to majority rules never solves the problems but a TA can in theory.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> But all that means is that you need a TA to show why we can trust inductive reasoning despite its limitations.



No it doesn't. Induction is warranted practically. Again, this is like saying I need to do theoretical physics in order to turn on the lights.


----------



## Loopie

I think the point that James is trying to make is that the atheist MUST trust inductive reasoning based on an assumption. As Hume suggested, there is an assumption that there is a uniformity of nature, where similar causes produce similar effects. One example he used is putting your hand in the fire. You assume based on past experience (usually just one event) that when you put your hand in the fire you will be burned. It is simply an argument from induction (one that we would call 'common sense'). Yet the fact is that the atheist ASSUMES that the laws of nature will not change tomorrow, and that similar causes will produce similar effects. He MUST assume this in order to live life practically and not pull his hair out. It is practical to assume that the laws of nature do not change, but he cannot say why. Ultimately, all the atheist can do is declare that laws of nature do not change, and that there is no reason why this is the case. 

Hume also has shown that deductive reasoning depends upon (and is founded upon) inductive reasoning. The problem of induction exists whether the atheist recognizes it or not. Of course an atheist is not going to think that his worldview is wrong, because his will is depraved, and he does not recognize God as the final authority on these matters. 

In the end Philip, you obviously do not need to do theoretical physics to turn on the lights. But then again, atheists don't have to be Christians in order to be nice to other people, or help out their neighbor. Yet when you go to the heart of the matter, and you try to figure out what the foundation is for an atheist's system of morality, he is simply inconsistent. He must either borrow from a theistic worldview, or he must use ambiguous terms in order to avoid difficulties. So even though I believe that atheists can be 'good' people (in a relative sense), they have no consistent reason for doing so. If they do not borrow from a Christian worldview, they end up falling into irrationality, chaos, and relativism. Without presupposing the Triune God of scripture, one cannot come up with any system of objective morality that is consistent with itself and the universe around us.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> jwright82 said:
> 
> 
> 
> But all that means is that you need a TA to show why we can trust inductive reasoning despite its limitations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No it doesn't. Induction is warranted practically. Again, this is like saying I need to do theoretical physics in order to turn on the lights.
Click to expand...


Loopie is correct. But your choices are fourfold as I see it.
1. Use inductive or deductive reasoning to establish a firm foundation for induction, which Hume proved is impossible
2. Establish a common sense basis which again is impossible because we have no idea if the laws of physiscs will change in an instance and majority rule has no bearing on the actual state of affairs
3. prove that the question is a psuedo question and needs no answer, I do not think that can be done since the problem of why there is a uniformity of nature is hardly an extreme skeptical position
4. Provide a TA for the assumption we all have

You don't need theoretical physics to turn on the lights but theoretical physics must be what it is in order for the lights to work at all. Whether I am aware of it or not physics must be physics for the light to work.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> Ultimately, all the atheist can do is declare that laws of nature do not change, and that there is no reason why this is the case.



Or he could claim that he doesn't yet know the reason.



Loopie said:


> So even though I believe that atheists can be 'good' people (in a relative sense), they have no consistent reason for doing so.



Yes they do---you just said it yourself: practicality. It makes sense to be a 'good' person. There are good practical reasons for having standards of morality. The meta-ethical questions that you are proposing are secondary reasons for most.


----------



## Loopie

Philip,

The atheist would be unable to find a reason, because any 'scientific study' is simply another argument from induction. He cannot find a reason because he must ALWAYS have an assumption about the universe when he seeks to find 'a reason for the reason'. Remember, he believes that the fire will still burn him, and he concludes that the reason for this is that fire always burns. When he tries to figure out why fire always burns, he realizes the only explanation is a uniformity of nature. When he asks himself why nature is uniform, whatever answer he discovers will be based on inductive reasoning from some science experiment. The TRUE and CORRECT answer is that God is the creator of all things, the law-giver, and has decreed the universe to work the way it does.

As for people having a consistent reason for doing good, they might THINK that they have a consistent reason, but when we look at it, they don't. What are the good practical reasons for having standards of morality? In fact, how do you come up with those standards? Consider the following philosophers:

Aristotle: Argued that Happiness is the final good. Of course, happiness is defined differently by different people, and so the sadist and masochist will have different opinions on what is 'good'.

Hume: Argued that morality is based on what is useful. Of course, usefulness is a relative term, because some people (like the Nazis) will consider other people to be useless.

John Stuart Mill: Argued that what is good is what provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Again, happiness being a relative term, who decides what is 'happiness'?

Ultimately these philosophers (and others) made either one of two fallacies. One is the Is-Ought fallacy. Simply because something IS a certain way does not mean that it OUGHT to be a certain way. The other is the Ad-Populum fallacy where they declare that society, or the majority vote, determines what is moral.

There is no way that an atheist can escape making one of these two fallacies other than borrowing from the Christian worldview (at which point the atheist reveals himself as inconsistent). 

As for there being practical reasons for 'doing good', I would argue that when the atheist makes this claim, he is being inconsistent with his own worldview. I mean, if you TRULY believe that there is no life after death, no judgment after death, then WHY are you doing ANYTHING other than that which benefits you? I mean, if Hitler and Mother Theresa go to the same place when they die, there is no real reason to refrain from doing something unless it limits your pleasure in some way.

I mean, if I was an atheist I could expect only to live to about 80-85 years old. But perhaps some of those last years will be spent in a hospital, so I really don't have that much time to enjoy myself. And in fact, if ALL we have is this life, then I would argue that the goal logically should be to live as long as possible while enjoying one's self as much as possible.

The only limits to my search for pleasure are placed upon me by society and my own physical body. I would avoid eating too unhealthily because I don't want to end my life prematurely. I would avoid excessive use of drugs because even though they bring me pleasure, they can cause me to die earlier. When it comes to my behavior towards other human beings, I only should do something to help them if there was some ultimate benefit for me. It would be silly to waste precious time in my life making others happy if it is not going to bring pleasure to myself. And even if I find pleasure in the happiness of others, I am still not acting altruistically, since my ultimate goal is still self-pleasure, in whatever form it appears.

So you see, this is the mentality that atheism as a system logically leads to. Life is short, there is no difference between the wicked and the righteous, so one should seek as much pleasure for one's self (the only limits being imposed by human society). 

Obviously most atheists don't think this way, BECAUSE THEY ARE BEING INCONSISTENT. They are borrowing from a Christian worldview concerning morality while at the same time holding to a worldview whose presuppositions lead only to moral relativism. It is either determined by society, which is a logical fallacy, or it is an argument from nature, another fallacy. If the atheist claims that he believes in objective morality, it is not an objective morality that is logically derived from his atheistic presupposition. He must have borrowed this objective morality from some other system/worldview.

In the end, I would love for you to explain to me how any atheist can have an objective system of morality that is consistent with itself and with the universe around us.


----------



## Philip

jwright82 said:


> You don't need theoretical physics to turn on the lights but theoretical physics must be what it is in order for the lights to work at all. Whether I am aware of it or not physics must be physics for the light to work.



But it's a second-order question and is only answerable under the assumptions that if one flips the switch, the lights come on. One would still be warranted in flipping on the lights if one believed in Aristotelian physics.



Loopie said:


> When he asks himself why nature is uniform, whatever answer he discovers will be based on inductive reasoning from some science experiment.



Ok---where's the problem? Why is this assumption unwarranted? Why should it be brought into question?



Loopie said:


> I mean, if you TRULY believe that there is no life after death, no judgment after death, then WHY are you doing ANYTHING other than that which benefits you?



Empathy? Altruism? People have all sorts of interesting motivations for doing good.



Loopie said:


> In the end, I would love for you to explain to me how any atheist can have an objective system of morality that is consistent with itself and with the universe around us.



Fine. Our theoretical atheist starts with premises a) human beings should be moral b) this morality cannot be grounded in God, given that God does not exist. When questioned on it, he asks you to show how these two premises are inconsistent with one another---how do they directly contradict one another?

Myself, I'd go with Lewis's moral argument, but that's me.


----------



## Loopie

Philip,

The reason why there is a problem is that he is unable to rationally find a reason why he should hold the assumptions that he does. Any attempt to 'prove' things through induction will lead to the problem of induction. Simply because he doesn't view it as a problem doesn't mean it does not exist. I mean, there are plenty of people who think that their worldview is perfectly consistent, but would not be true. It would be much like the alcoholic who is constantly told that he has a problem, but refuses to acknowledge it (it is not a problem to him). That is the nature of sin, and it permeates everything (including one's conclusions on epistemology).

I would argue that under the atheistic system altruism does not exist. I mean, by the very nature of being a sinner, the atheist is focused on self-glorification and self-service (I hope you would agree with me that this is the nature of sin). Even if no other humans existed other than yourself, you would still naturally be a sinner and would have your universe revolve around yourself. 

For this reason altruism is a facade. If an unbeliever were to act in a way that helps others, it is only because such an act pleases themselves. Their motivation for doing anything is self-seeking, and is not done out of service to God. 

By the way, regardless of a person's motivation for doing 'good', can we really call it that? I mean, something is only truly good if it is done for the purpose of glorifying God. God must be the ultimate end of an action for it to be good. He IS good, and anything that does not come from faith is sin. So IN THIS SENSE of the word 'good', unbelievers never do good.

Relative good simply refers to the fact that as creatures made in the image of God, men do not act as wickedly as they could. God certainly does restrain the evil of men as part of his common grace. So yes, atheists do 'relatively good' things to other people, but their motivations are never to glorify God, but to glorify themselves. Some people seek pleasure through more direct means (they rape, murder, and steal). Other people seek pleasure through more in-direct means. But either way, the ultimate goal (or end) of the unbeliever is self-glorification.

In the case of your hypothetical atheist, I would challenge premise A. Why should human beings be moral? In fact, how would we define moral? We would need to know what moral was before we even could say whether human beings should be that way or not.

I have already shown you how they are inconsistent. If he claims that there is an objective morality (without reference to God), I would like to know how to determine what this morality is. Who is the final authority on right and wrong if it is not God? Mankind? Ok, is it a majority vote, or is it one specific society? The majority vote is a fallacy because we would all agree that simply because the majority believe something is morally right does not make it so (sometimes the majority is wrong). 

Furthermore, if the majority IS right, then it is wrong for any person to challenge the majority. This means that any person who was not in the majority concerning their opinions on morality was wrong, because ONLY the majority can determine what is right.

The other option for the atheist is to say that since we are all humans, we ought to be treated as humans. Of course, this begs the question: "What does it mean to be treated as a human?" The atheist COULD say that since a person IS alive they OUGHT to stay alive. Well if this is the case, then I suppose no one should ever be put to death for any crime they commit. Besides, there is no inherent reason why humans are unique in this area. We could just as easily make the claim that since cows ARE alive they OUGHT to stay alive. In fact, any living organism could be put into this Is-Ought argument. 

So in the end, the hypothetical atheist is using the term 'moral' in both of his premises. Well, he first needs to explain what he means by moral, because as an external observer I have no clue what he is talking about. The Nazis would consider morality to be VERY different than modern America. Remember, the ancient Greeks considered pederasty to be moral; the Japanese believed in honor-suicide; the Aztecs believed in human sacrifice and cannibalism; the Spartans believed in primitive eugenics; and the Nazis believed in genocide/social darwinism. Which society is right? If a society was wrong, how would you show this?


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> The reason why there is a problem is that he is unable to rationally find a reason why he should hold the assumptions that he does.



Hence why they are assumptions.



Loopie said:


> I would argue that under the atheistic system altruism does not exist.



I'd dispute this, actually. There are idols outside the self---Kantianism is all about altruism and self-denial.

By the way, I don't think Christian ethics is altruistic either. We are in it to enjoy God, remember? Why did Jesus endure the cross, according to Hebrews? For the joy that was set before Him.



Loopie said:


> Why should human beings be moral?



Why not? It's pretty blasted obvious that they should.



Loopie said:


> So in the end, the hypothetical atheist is using the term 'moral' in both of his premises. Well, he first needs to explain what he means by moral



But Eric, not having a convincing answer is very different from being inconsistent or self-contradictory. Our hypothetical atheist is challenging you to find a contradiction, not an unanswerable question.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I would argue that under the atheistic system altruism does not exist.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'd dispute this, actually. There are idols outside the self---Kantianism is all about altruism and self-denial.
Click to expand...


Really? So you think that a person, particularly an unbelieving person, can TRULY do something without ANY self-seeking involved whatsoever? Yes, Kant argued that in order to truly do something altruistically a person would have to find absolutely no pleasure in it. In fact, they would essentially have to grudgingly force themselves to act for the benefit of others in order for their action to have moral worth. 

By the way, if you believe that man is totally depraved, and enslaved to sin, then what WOULD man's ultimate end of his actions be? They would always be self-seeking, whether directly or in-directly. All man's actions are a means to an end, and the end (for the sinful man) is himself (for he has rebelled against God and attempted to usurp his authority).



P. F. Pugh said:


> By the way, I don't think Christian ethics is altruistic either. We are in it to enjoy God, remember? Why did Jesus endure the cross, according to Hebrews? For the joy that was set before Him.



So are you saying that we ONLY love God because we get something out of it? Loving God and finding satisfaction in that relationship with God is VERY different then loving God IN ORDER TO find satisfaction. Consider what the Apostle John says:

1 John 4:15-19 (NASB) 
15 Whoever confesses that Jesus is the Son of God, God abides in him, and he in God. 
16 We have come to know and have believed the love which God has for us. God is love, and the one who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him. 
17 By this, love is perfected with us, so that we may have confidence in the day of judgment; because as He is, so also are we in this world. 
18 There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear involves punishment, and the one who fears is not perfected in love. 
19 We love, because He first loved us. 

I would honestly say that based on this, Christians are indeed altruistic. The ultimate goal of our actions is the glorification of God, not of ourselves. We do not glorfiy God IN ORDER to please ourselves, but we do indeed find pleasure in glorifying God. It is a question of causality. We do not love God in order for him to love us (this statement would be made by someone who is self-seeking). Instead, we love God BECAUSE he loved us first. We do indeed find pleasure in loving God, but that is not WHY we love him. For this reason Christians, in their glorification of God, are NOT self-seeking.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Why should human beings be moral?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why not? It's pretty blasted obvious that they should.
Click to expand...


Obvious to who? It's only obvious because you believe in God. I am fairly certain that the Nazis would laugh at your statement that it is obvious that humans should be moral (unless of course you were to define morality in a way that they agreed with).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> So in the end, the hypothetical atheist is using the term 'moral' in both of his premises. Well, he first needs to explain what he means by moral
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But Eric, not having a convincing answer is very different from being inconsistent or self-contradictory. Our hypothetical atheist is challenging you to find a contradiction, not an unanswerable question.
Click to expand...


I never mentioned having a convincing answer, and I don't think it matters just how 'convinced' the atheist is (no matter how convinced he is that he is right, he is still wrong). I said that ANY attempt on his part to come up with an objective moral system will be fallacious. It will be illogical and be reduced to absurdity. In fact, it would be IMPOSSIBLE for him to come up with an objective morality. If he tries to appeal to the majority, he needs to pick a society as his final authority. But societies change over time. Furthermore, he has deal with the issue that the majority is not always right. If he wishes to appeal to nature, he has to bridge the gap between IS and OUGHT. Ultimately his system will lead to moral relativism, and he will have to conclude that there is no such thing as morality (it is just an arbitrary human construct that changes between time, culture, and location).

Generally, atheists AVOID having to conclude in moral relativism by doing a number of things:

1) They exchange one relative/ambiguous term for another (happiness, hurt, harm, bad, good, usefulness, practical, common sense)
2) They divert the argument, change direction in order to avoid the path that their worldview leads them down 
3) They borrow from a worldview that does not lead to moral relativism (Christianity)

But the one thing they cannot do is remain consistent with their atheistic worldview and end up with a system of objective morality. If they did do this, it would prove that God is unnecessary for there to be morality (because obviously they found an objective system of morality without any reference to God).


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> So you think that a person, particularly an unbelieving person, can TRULY do something without ANY self-seeking involved whatsoever?



Absolutely. It's a sad way to go about things, in my estimation.



Loopie said:


> By the way, if you believe that man is totally depraved, and enslaved to sin, then what WOULD man's ultimate end of his actions be?



Either himself or something else---anything other than God.



Loopie said:


> Instead, we love God BECAUSE he loved us first. We do indeed find pleasure in loving God, but that is not WHY we love him.



We find pleasure in loving God because He loves us.



Loopie said:


> Obvious to who?



The atheist.



Loopie said:


> I am fairly certain that the Nazis would laugh at your statement that it is obvious that humans should be moral



Godwin's Law. Time out.



Loopie said:


> I said that ANY attempt on his part to come up with an objective moral system will be fallacious.



What if he doesn't find the meta-ethical question interesting?



Loopie said:


> If they did do this, it would prove that God is unnecessary for there to be morality



No it wouldn't. You're talking like an evidentialist here. Coherent metaphysical systems are not necessarily true. Again, Leibniz: absolutely consistent and absolutely laughably absurd. 

I don't see why coming up with a consistent moral atheism would prove that God is unnecessary---it would most likely involve absurd conclusions, as in Kantianism. It would prove logically consistent but practically unsatisfying. There is a difference.


----------



## MW

If one could do something without seeking the good of self there would be no "motive" for what a person does. Further, the concept of reward and punishment would have no basis in human experience if this were possible.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> So you think that a person, particularly an unbelieving person, can TRULY do something without ANY self-seeking involved whatsoever?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Absolutely. It's a sad way to go about things, in my estimation.
Click to expand...


How would you go about showing that a person can indeed act for the ultimate end of something other than themselves? Consider that when children are raised they have to be taught to be not-selfish. Left to their own devices, without any parenting or teaching whatsoever, they will end up being a VERY self-centered adult. Again, if we believe that man is sinful in the womb, such a sinfulness would be self-centered, not centered on anything else. I honestly believe that this is the nature of sin (man attempts to take upon himself what is rightfully God's).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> By the way, if you believe that man is totally depraved, and enslaved to sin, then what WOULD man's ultimate end of his actions be?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Either himself or something else---anything other than God.
Click to expand...


Well, if we consider that sin and depravity affects man from the moment he is created, then it would obviously be himself if it was not God. Again, there is no evidence to suggest that a person actually does anything without having self-interest.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Instead, we love God BECAUSE he loved us first. We do indeed find pleasure in loving God, but that is not WHY we love him.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We find pleasure in loving God because He loves us.
Click to expand...


Exactly, so you see that the ultimate end is God's glorification. If anyone asks you WHY you love God, it is because he loved you first. Self-pleasure is not the reason why you love God. Yet when an unbeliever appears to be purely altruistic (taking out the next door neighbor's garbage or something like that), there is still a reason behind why the person does so. They do it because they think it is 'right' to do so. And they do what is 'right' because it is pleasing for them to do so. I know of a number of people who love to boast in their 'good works', and are very satisfied with how good of a person they are (they honestly think that is why God will welcome them into heaven). They are great philanthropists, and they do many good works, but it is never truly done without self-interest. They always do the 'right' thing because it pleases them to do so. Again, this is not to be confused with finding pleasure in serving God as a believer. A Christian can find pleasure in loving the Lord but the pleasure itself is not the reason why he loves the Lord.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Obvious to who?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The atheist.
Click to expand...


And it is obvious to the alcoholic that he doesn't have a problem. He is still wrong.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I am fairly certain that the Nazis would laugh at your statement that it is obvious that humans should be moral
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Godwin's Law. Time out.
Click to expand...


LOL. Good point. That's fine, insert any group of people (or just one person) who are viewed as extremely immoral. Again, there are plenty of moral relativists out there who would disagree that it is obvious that man should be moral. If anything, some would argue that anarchy would be a better system (survival of the fittest). Why are they wrong?



P. F. Pugh said:


> [
> 
> 
> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I said that ANY attempt on his part to come up with an objective moral system will be fallacious.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> What if he doesn't find the meta-ethical question interesting?
Click to expand...


It doesn't matter what he finds interesting. The alcoholic doesn't always find AA meetings interesting, but he still has a problem, and he is still wrong.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> If they did do this, it would prove that God is unnecessary for there to be morality
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No it wouldn't. You're talking like an evidentialist here. Coherent metaphysical systems are not necessarily true. Again, Leibniz: absolutely consistent and absolutely laughably absurd.
Click to expand...


Well, I haven't read Leibniz, and know very little about him. I am sure that one could figure out where he is inconsistent. By the way, I have mentioned several times that a system needs to be consistent with itself AND with the universe around us. As we have discussed before, creation testifies to the glory of God. You may indeed find a system that is consistent with itself, but that is no guarantee that it is consistent with what we see from God's creation.



P. F. Pugh said:


> I don't see why coming up with a consistent moral atheism would prove that God is unnecessary---it would most likely involve absurd conclusions, as in Kantianism. It would prove logically consistent but practically unsatisfying. There is a difference.



Well, I think you would agree that God is necessary for creation to exist. I am simply saying that God is necessary for objective morality to exist. You have still not at all dealt with my arguments concerning logical fallacies for the atheist, and how his worldview, followed to its logical conclusion, leads to moral relativism. I mean, can you even show me how an atheist would come up with an objective system of morality without referencing God as the giver of moral law? 

By the way, I said that if the atheist came up with an OBJECTIVE AND CONSISTENT moral system, that it would make God unnecessary for morality to exist. Certainly an atheist could come up with some arbitrary system that was consistent with itself (such as something similar to social darwinism/survival of the fittest), but it would still not be objective, because there is no way for him to show that HIS system is correct and his neighbor's system is incorrect. In the end it would simply be 'might makes right' (the classic Ad Baculum fallacy, or appeal to force).


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> How would you go about showing that a person can indeed act for the ultimate end of something other than themselves?



You show them that seeking the good of others brings greater joy and that giving is more blessed than receiving.



Loopie said:


> Well, I haven't read Leibniz, and know very little about him. I am sure that one could figure out where he is inconsistent. By the way, I have mentioned several times that a system needs to be consistent with itself AND with the universe around us. As we have discussed before, creation testifies to the glory of God. You may indeed find a system that is consistent with itself, but that is no guarantee that it is consistent with what we see from God's creation.



Leibniz' monadology is absolutely consistent and can account for every phenomenon that we see. It's even theological (best of all possible worlds). It's also rather silly and there's no reason to think it true.



Loopie said:


> In the end it would simply be 'might makes right' (the classic Ad Baculum fallacy, or appeal to force).



So how's this different from reason? Reason works on the head, not the heart. We may touch a man's heart, but we can only hit him on the head (apologies to G.K. Chesterton for the analogy). Reason is simply a different kind of force as the hope is to "force" someone to see things our way.



Loopie said:


> Certainly an atheist could come up with some arbitrary system that was consistent with itself (such as something similar to social darwinism/survival of the fittest), but it would still not be objective, because there is no way for him to show that HIS system is correct and his neighbor's system is incorrect.



No, but neither can his neighbour. Objectivity is a myth, anyway, since the unbeliever and his neighbour are both subjects. I don't believe in objective truth, I believe in transcendent truth.


----------



## jwright82

P. F. Pugh said:


> But it's a second-order question and is only answerable under the assumptions that if one flips the switch, the lights come on. One would still be warranted in flipping on the lights if one believed in Aristotelian physics.



Oh the warrant is non-debatable, you are right about that. But that is how a TA works.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> How would you go about showing that a person can indeed act for the ultimate end of something other than themselves?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You show them that seeking the good of others brings greater joy and that giving is more blessed than receiving.
Click to expand...


I did not ask how you would show THEM how to not act selfishly. I asked if you could show ME how a naturally sinful person does indeed act for an ultimate end other than themselves. By the way, when you do tell someone that seeking the good of others brings greater joy you are appealing to a selfishness in the person. If you do X for someone else, you will receive Y, so therefore, do X. I would say to you that this is true for non-believers (they are molded by positive and negative reinforcement). But for believers, the reason why we believe in the Lord is because HE called us to faith and repentance. Whereas an unbeliever does 'good' things for ultimately selfish reasons, the believer loves God NOT in order to gain pleasure, but because God called them to love him. There is no doubt that I find pleasure in serving the Lord, but when someone asks me WHY I serve God, I don't say it is because I find pleasure in it, but that it is because God called me to faith and repentance (pleasure and joy are simply results of one's relationship with the Lord, not the cause of, or motive behind, one's relationship with the Lord).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Well, I haven't read Leibniz, and know very little about him. I am sure that one could figure out where he is inconsistent. By the way, I have mentioned several times that a system needs to be consistent with itself AND with the universe around us. As we have discussed before, creation testifies to the glory of God. You may indeed find a system that is consistent with itself, but that is no guarantee that it is consistent with what we see from God's creation.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Leibniz' monadology is absolutely consistent and can account for every phenomenon that we see. It's even theological (best of all possible worlds). It's also rather silly and there's no reason to think it true.
Click to expand...


Well, I honestly think the 'best possible worlds' concept is unbiblical. It essentially is molinism (a concept defended by William Lane Craig). So again, Leibniz would not be consistent with the world that we see, because he would have show HOW this is the best possible world (with 'best' being a very ambiguous and relative term).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> In the end it would simply be 'might makes right' (the classic Ad Baculum fallacy, or appeal to force).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So how's this different from reason? Reason works on the head, not the heart. We may touch a man's heart, but we can only hit him on the head (apologies to G.K. Chesterton for the analogy). Reason is simply a different kind of force as the hope is to "force" someone to see things our way.
Click to expand...


Well, your apologetic method can be an appeal to either the head, or the heart, or both. If I was talking to someone who just recently lost a loved one, I would approach more from the heart than the head. But either way, it is God who saves, and no amount of words (or appeals) can bring a person to salvation unless God regenerate them. By the way, when I am using an apologetic argument that focuses on reason, I am not attempting to 'force' my opponent to see things my way. I am giving an account for the hope that I have, and for the faith that I have. I not only present the Christian worldview, but I show him that his position is inconsistent with itself and the world around us. Obviously I know that I can never 'force' a person to believe. That is not my place. Whether he believes or not is dependent upon God's saving grace. This is true REGARDLESS of the type of apologetic method you are using, whether you are appealing to the heart or the head. 

By the way, the difference between 'reason' and force is that when you appeal to force 'physically' you are appealing to YOUR standard and YOUR belief above all others (you are threating to hurt or kill the person if they do not submit to you). It certainly is not objective. Yet logical fallacies and consistent reasoning are not principles that are based on one man's opinion, they are principles that can be universally applied to all men (and there is no threat of injury or death). This is because God is a logical God, the source of all logic, truth, and reason (as well as morality). So the analogy that you made is not quite accurate.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Certainly an atheist could come up with some arbitrary system that was consistent with itself (such as something similar to social darwinism/survival of the fittest), but it would still not be objective, because there is no way for him to show that HIS system is correct and his neighbor's system is incorrect.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No, but neither can his neighbour. Objectivity is a myth, anyway, since the unbeliever and his neighbour are both subjects. I don't believe in objective truth, I believe in transcendent truth.
Click to expand...


When I say 'objective morality' I would consider it to be referring to a belief that something is good and always good (such as God). An objective morality is in truth a transcendental morality, as God is the source of morality. I consider objective truth the same way. Objective truth would refer to the belief that there IS absolute truth, and that truth is not relative. Of course, this truth is founded upon God and only God, and is certainly transcendental in nature. So we are talking about the same things. If you don't want to use the term 'objective' that is fine, but remember that most common conversations with people will involve that term, rather than 'transcendental truth'. Even then, transcendental truth is very much a part of the transcendental argument. Without God, there would be no absolute truth or absolute morality. Everything would be relative.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> I asked if you could show ME how a naturally sinful person does indeed act for an ultimate end other than themselves.



Let's take the example of a radical Marxist. He has read the works of Marx and believes in the philosophy of Marxism and believes that it will help his fellow man, so he joins a socialist party to help create a society. Let's even suppose that our Marxist comes from a wealthy family, so he knows that he will lose a lot from the socialist revolution. I don't see a good reason to question the sincerity of his desires. He is sincerely wrong and following a false god, but it is a cause outside himself nonetheless.



Loopie said:


> Well, I honestly think the 'best possible worlds' concept is unbiblical.



Is it? So you are saying that God's creation (time and space) is not the best that He could possibly create? I realize what your objection is, but in a certain sense, Leibniz is right and coherent with Scripture.



Loopie said:


> but remember that most common conversations with people will involve that term, rather than 'transcendental truth'.



I said "transcendent" not "transcendental." Actually, I've found that the term "objective" will often become a barrier because it is thought of in a scientific sense.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I asked if you could show ME how a naturally sinful person does indeed act for an ultimate end other than themselves.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Let's take the example of a radical Marxist. He has read the works of Marx and believes in the philosophy of Marxism and believes that it will help his fellow man, so he joins a socialist party to help create a society. Let's even suppose that our Marxist comes from a wealthy family, so he knows that he will lose a lot from the socialist revolution. I don't see a good reason to question the sincerity of his desires. He is sincerely wrong and following a false god, but it is a cause outside himself nonetheless.
Click to expand...


Yes but you see Philip that the Marxist is joining the socialist party because he believes it is the 'right' thing to do. The reason WHY he does what he views to be 'the right thing' is because he enjoys it and finds pleasure in it. In his own mind he feels good to be part of something he believes in, however selfless it might seem. It is just like we talked about earlier regarding secondary causes; there are secondary motives as well for a person's actions. Consider two different men. Both men are hungry. One man steals food from a convenience store to satisfy his hunger. Another man gets a job, makes some money, and pays for his food from a convenience store to satisfy his hunger. Both men acted out of self-interest (ultimately), but the first man DIRECTLY served his self-interest while the other man INDIRECTLY served his self-interest.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Well, I honestly think the 'best possible worlds' concept is unbiblical.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Is it? So you are saying that God's creation (time and space) is not the best that He could possibly create? I realize what your objection is, but in a certain sense, Leibniz is right and coherent with Scripture.
Click to expand...


Would you agree with William Lane Craig when he says that God 'has to play with the hand he has been dealt'? Molinism (which is what leads to the 'best possible worlds' scenario) essentially makes God out to be the cosmic calculator that runs all the numbers before making a decision. Is that the type of God that you believe exists? Is that how scripture portrays God (as looking down the tunnel of time and then choosing to create). Or would you agree with me that God's knowledge of future events is based upon his eternal decree to create?

As for God's creation being the 'best' that he could possibly create, it really depends on how you define 'best'. If you say that 'best' means that God perfectly glorifies himself by demonstrating his divine attributes, including his justice and mercy, then I would absolutely agree that this is the 'best' possible world. But then again, the phrase 'best possible world' is very loaded. It seems to suggest that other worlds were a possibility (as if God is somehow subject to chance, possibility, and probability). This universe is exactly how God decreed it to be, and in fact I would say that there was no possible way that it would have been created differently (because God is not subject to chance, which is what the term 'possiblity' implies). There was a never a time when God was not sure what he would create, since his decree to create was eternal.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> but remember that most common conversations with people will involve that term, rather than 'transcendental truth'.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I said "transcendent" not "transcendental." Actually, I've found that the term "objective" will often become a barrier because it is thought of in a scientific sense.
Click to expand...


Well, when most people talk about morality, they usually refer to either moral objectivity or moral subjectivity (relativism). I have never heard the term transcendent truth used before in common conversation. I understand your concern for clarity, but most people I have had discussions with would consider objective morality to refer to a morality where something is good and always good, and not subject to change based on time, culture, location, etc.

By the way, a transcendent truth (if I am not mistaken) is simply a truth that defines reality but is not affected by time or space (is unchanging). Well, those truths can only exist if God exists (if God did not exist, they would not exist), so those truths are indeed part of the transcendental argument. The transcendental argument declares that God is a pre-condition necessary for knowledge, existence, and morality. The transcendent truths are also truth claims that are a pre-condition required for us to make sense of the reality that we see. They are truths that are dependant upon God existing. In that sense they are very much transcendental.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> Yes but you see Philip that the Marxist is joining the socialist party because he believes it is the 'right' thing to do. The reason WHY he does what he views to be 'the right thing' is because he enjoys it and finds pleasure in it.



Eric, exactly how do you know this? And even so, if this is self-centredness, may God make me more so! May God help me to enjoy glorifying Him more!

Am I seriously hearing you advocate Kantianism here? As if a life of pleasureless altruism is somehow morally better than a life where one enjoys helping others?



Loopie said:


> Would you agree with William Lane Craig when he says that God 'has to play with the hand he has been dealt'?



Absolutely not. God could have created the world however He wanted to. However, given that God had infinite options and chose to create the world as it is, this is the best of all possible worlds.



Loopie said:


> But then again, the phrase 'best possible world' is very loaded. It seems to suggest that other worlds were a possibility



Possibility refers to the fact that it is the case that God could have created the world otherwise. When we talk about possible world theory, we are asking the question, "could God have created the world such that X was true?"

You're confusing logical possibility with physical possibility.



Loopie said:


> I understand your concern for clarity, but most people I have had discussions with would consider objective morality to refer to a morality where something is good and always good, and not subject to change based on time, culture, location, etc.



Generally, the people I have spoken with think of objectivity is scientific terms---coming to the discussion with no presuppositions and no biases. 



Loopie said:


> They are truths that are dependant upon God existing. In that sense they are very much transcendental.



I'm not sure how much sense it makes to talk about a transcendental truth given that transcendental refers to an argument that relies on transcending something. When I talk about a transcendent truth, I simply mean a truth that transcends opinions and is true for all. You're conflating your terms.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Yes but you see Philip that the Marxist is joining the socialist party because he believes it is the 'right' thing to do. The reason WHY he does what he views to be 'the right thing' is because he enjoys it and finds pleasure in it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Eric, exactly how do you know this? And even so, if this is self-centredness, may God make me more so! May God help me to enjoy glorifying Him more!
> 
> Am I seriously hearing you advocate Kantianism here? As if a life of pleasureless altruism is somehow morally better than a life where one enjoys helping others?
Click to expand...


Philip, I think you are completely missing the point that I am making. What I am simply showing you is that WITHOUT being saved by the grace of God, man is naturally selfish and self-centered. This is not morally 'good' or 'righteous behavior'. Yet when we become saved, regenerate, we ARE ABLE to TRULY do 'good' works, because they are done for the glorification of God out of faith. THAT is true altruism. I NEVER ONCE held to Kantianism, and in fact in an early post clearly rejected it as silly. What I believe is true is that NO ONE does good unless they act out of faith in God. While all other actions that a sinful man commits are for self-glorification, the righteous man seeks to glorify God.

So in the end, I am not sure why you would want God to make you more self-centered. Clearly that would be asking God to make you more sinful. Acting in a way that glorifies self is NOT how one glorifies God. All I ask is that you carefully read what I say before jumping to a conclusion that somehow I advocated Kantianism, or that I believe self-centeredness glorifies God. I have never said anything to advocate these positions.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Would you agree with William Lane Craig when he says that God 'has to play with the hand he has been dealt'?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Absolutely not. God could have created the world however He wanted to. However, given that God had infinite options and chose to create the world as it is, this is the best of all possible worlds.
Click to expand...


But no other worlds were possible. God's 'choice' to create the world as it is was an eternally made choice. I honestly do not believe that there was a time where God had still not decided on what kind of world to create. There was only ever one world that would have been created, the world that God had decreed in eternity past to create.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> But then again, the phrase 'best possible world' is very loaded. It seems to suggest that other worlds were a possibility
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Possibility refers to the fact that it is the case that God could have created the world otherwise. When we talk about possible world theory, we are asking the question, "could God have created the world such that X was true?"
> 
> You're confusing logical possibility with physical possibility.
Click to expand...


This just leads into one of those so-called 'conundrums' where we ask ourselves: "Could God have created a square circle?" or "Could God have created a world without evil?" Yet we must remember that God's omnipotence means that he is always able to accomplish his will. Whatever God wills WILL come to pass (but he doesn't WILL all possible things to occur). So to address your statement that God COULD have created a world where X was true, that is only true if that was God's will. If God had an eternal will, an eternal decree to create the world as it is, then there was no possibility that another world could have been created. Again, when you use the term 'possible' you are implying a sense of uncertainty, which I do not think can be implied in the case of God's eternal decree. Something might be 'uncertain' or 'possible' from our limited human perspective, but we have to try to break away from that perspective when considering God's divine attributes (particularly with regard to his eternal nature).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I understand your concern for clarity, but most people I have had discussions with would consider objective morality to refer to a morality where something is good and always good, and not subject to change based on time, culture, location, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Generally, the people I have spoken with think of objectivity is scientific terms---coming to the discussion with no presuppositions and no biases.
Click to expand...


Well, I suppose it depends on what different types of people we talk to. Obviously there is no one who is truly unbiased and without presuppositions. Everyone has them. The question is, whose presuppositions can most consistently account for the reality that we see while being consistent with itself? None but the Christian worldview.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> They are truths that are dependant upon God existing. In that sense they are very much transcendental.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'm not sure how much sense it makes to talk about a transcendental truth given that transcendental refers to an argument that relies on transcending something. When I talk about a transcendent truth, I simply mean a truth that transcends opinions and is true for all. You're conflating your terms.
Click to expand...


Ok, so when you mean 'a truth that transcends opinions and is true for all' you are obviously talking about absolute truth. Well, such truths would not exist without God, and so it all points back to the transcendental argument. Without God, your transcendent truths do not exist, and all is relative.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> What I am simply showing you is that WITHOUT being saved by the grace of God, man is naturally selfish and self-centered. This is not morally 'good' or 'righteous behavior'.



And here's what I'm saying, Eric: genuine altruism can also be idolatrous and sinful. One may have the best of intentions and not in a self-serving manner, and still go to hell.



Loopie said:


> There was only ever one world that would have been created, the world that God had decreed in eternity past to create.



Eric, you're making a claim here about the secret will of God. Don't presume to know what God did or didn't decree apart from what is revealed and especially do not limit the freedom of God in creation. God was free to create whatever kind of world He chose.



Loopie said:


> This just leads into one of those so-called 'conundrums' where we ask ourselves: "Could God have created a square circle?" or "Could God have created a world without evil?"



God cannot create a square circle. Neither can God create a rock too big for Him to lift. God cannot create that which is self-contradictory. Both of these concepts are self-referentially incoherent.

Yes, God could have created a world without evil---but clearly it glorified Him more to create a world where good came of evil and God became man.



Loopie said:


> Again, when you use the term 'possible' you are implying a sense of uncertainty, which I do not think can be implied in the case of God's eternal decree.



Eric, you're conflating things. Metaphysical possibility is a mere function of logic. God is free to create the world howsoever He wills.



Loopie said:


> Well, such truths would not exist without God, and so it all points back to the transcendental argument.



Don't put the weight here on the argument. Make the argument and show how it is logically impossible that transcendent truth cannot exist without the transcendent God of Scripture. But don't make the claim that this form of argument (transcendental) is what accounts for things: God is what makes things possible, not the argument.

Here's my point: God is still God even if there is no smackdown conclusive argument. My faith does not stand or fall on such arguments and neither should yours. Arguments are always a tool and they always are the product of faith seeking understanding.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> What I am simply showing you is that WITHOUT being saved by the grace of God, man is naturally selfish and self-centered. This is not morally 'good' or 'righteous behavior'.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And here's what I'm saying, Eric: genuine altruism can also be idolatrous and sinful. One may have the best of intentions and not in a self-serving manner, and still go to hell.
Click to expand...


But due to the nature of sin and its affect on man, we know that altruism does not really exist apart from those who are Christ's sheep. The sinner's ultimate goal is self-glorification, which is the creature rebelling against the creator. I think that this is fairly clear from what scripture teaches. For this reason a non-regenerate person ALWAYS has a motive for doing something that is self-seeking.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> There was only ever one world that would have been created, the world that God had decreed in eternity past to create.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Eric, you're making a claim here about the secret will of God. Don't presume to know what God did or didn't decree apart from what is revealed and especially do not limit the freedom of God in creation. God was free to create whatever kind of world He chose.
Click to expand...


I absolutely agree that God is free. The problem is that the phrase 'best possible worlds' leads one to imagine an amount of uncertainty on the part of God. You are absolutely right that I, and no one else should claim to know the secret will of God, but I think we would go too far if we were to embrace molinism.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> This just leads into one of those so-called 'conundrums' where we ask ourselves: "Could God have created a square circle?" or "Could God have created a world without evil?"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> God cannot create a square circle. Neither can God create a rock too big for Him to lift. God cannot create that which is self-contradictory. Both of these concepts are self-referentially incoherent.
> 
> Yes, God could have created a world without evil---but clearly it glorified Him more to create a world where good came of evil and God became man.
Click to expand...


I absolutely agree. It was part of God's plan for demonstrating his divine attributes and bringing glory to himself that the world exist as it does today. I was simply highlighting the relationship between God's ability to do something and his WILL to do something. The two should be viewed in relation to one another.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Again, when you use the term 'possible' you are implying a sense of uncertainty, which I do not think can be implied in the case of God's eternal decree.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Eric, you're conflating things. Metaphysical possibility is a mere function of logic. God is free to create the world howsoever He wills.
Click to expand...


Absolutely, God is the only truly free being. I am merely pointing out the weaknesses of the phrase 'best possible worlds'. You generally never hear that phrase used from Christians unless there is a reference to molinism and 'middle knowledge'. I have never heard of a Reformed Theologian using that phrase (I very well could be mistaken).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Well, such truths would not exist without God, and so it all points back to the transcendental argument.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Don't put the weight here on the argument. Make the argument and show how it is logically impossible that transcendent truth cannot exist without the transcendent God of Scripture. But don't make the claim that this form of argument (transcendental) is what accounts for things: God is what makes things possible, not the argument.
> 
> Here's my point: God is still God even if there is no smackdown conclusive argument. My faith does not stand or fall on such arguments and neither should yours. Arguments are always a tool and they always are the product of faith seeking understanding.
Click to expand...


Philip, I think you assume a bit too much concerning the motives behind those who use the transcendental argument. Never once have I said that the transcendental argument itself is what accounts for things (or makes them possible). The transcendental argument, as I have come to understand it, makes the case that unless we presuppose the Tri-une God of scripture, we cannot account for anything. The argument itself does not account for things, but it is God. This has been Van Til's argument, and I am not sure why you would think that we believe the argument itself accounts for anything. Clearly it is ALL of God. 

Throughout this entire conversation I have been trying to show the merit of the transcendental argument, and how we MUST have God in order to account for anything. I apologize if I have not been as clear as I could be, but I think that perhaps you have misunderstood the position of those who use the transcendental argument. As you said, it is simply a tool. My faith does not come from reason, or from emotion, but from the grace of God. It is God who saves. And just like I have mentioned several times, no amount of appeals to the heart or the mind will lead an unbeliever to Christ. Only by God's grace will they be made regenerate. The usefulness of the transcendental argument is that it is a tool that allows us to see just how much everything depends upon God. History, science, creation, knowledge, morality, etc. ALL point back to the creator. In fact, these things (and reality in general) cannot make sense without God. When the unbeliever attempts to remove God from the picture, he ends up wallowing in darkness and absurdity. My use of the transcendental argument is simply to call unbelievers to repentance, so that they might realize their sinful state and their utter dependance upon God's mercy. I use it to point them to scripture, and to show them that the only way that man can truly live is to live by the word of God. Without God, and without his word, nothing makes sense. Glory be to God.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> I have never heard of a Reformed Theologian using that phrase (I very well could be mistaken).



This is because it's a philosophical term and has fallen out of favour since Voltaire's _Candide_, which mocked the concept. Again, possibility here has nothing to do with uncertainty---it has to do with ability.



Loopie said:


> Throughout this entire conversation I have been trying to show the merit of the transcendental argument, and how we MUST have God in order to account for anything.



Part of the trouble here, though, is that you're preaching to the choir. In an actual apologetic context, you would need to be able to demonstrate this conclusively---which I don't think is possible. The problem with the argument is not simply that it's Christianity vs. atheism or whatever other view the particular person you are engaging with has, but that it sets up Christianity against all other views such that in order to demonstrate that Christianity is the truth, one has to not only prove that Christianity is coherent (it's impossible, by the way, to conclusively establish coherence) but one has to deconstruct all other _possible_ views. Otherwise it's an inconclusive argument.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I have never heard of a Reformed Theologian using that phrase (I very well could be mistaken).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is because it's a philosophical term and has fallen out of favour since Voltaire's _Candide_, which mocked the concept. Again, possibility here has nothing to do with uncertainty---it has to do with ability.
Click to expand...


But the problem is that when the phrase 'best possible worlds' is used, it can only lead down the road to molinism. I mean, consider for a moment that when you say 'possible worlds', it implies that there were other worlds that were 'possible'. In fact, it would imply that there was a point in time when God looked at all the different possible worlds that he could create, calculated which one would be 'best', and then made his decision based on this knowledge. It implies that God passively takes in knowledge (when he looks down the tunnel of time), and that this knowledge was not based on his eternal decree. That is why Reformed Theologians shy away from the phrase 'best possible worlds', because it leads to confusion and misunderstanding.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Throughout this entire conversation I have been trying to show the merit of the transcendental argument, and how we MUST have God in order to account for anything.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Part of the trouble here, though, is that you're preaching to the choir. In an actual apologetic context, you would need to be able to demonstrate this conclusively---which I don't think is possible. The problem with the argument is not simply that it's Christianity vs. atheism or whatever other view the particular person you are engaging with has, but that it sets up Christianity against all other views such that in order to demonstrate that Christianity is the truth, one has to not only prove that Christianity is coherent (it's impossible, by the way, to conclusively establish coherence) but one has to deconstruct all other _possible_ views. Otherwise it's an inconclusive argument.
Click to expand...


It certainly did not seem like I was preaching to the choir, since your opposition to the transcendental argument was very intense (from my point of view). When you say the phrase 'demonstrate conclusively' I assume that you mean that we must demonstrate this conclusively to the unbeliever. I mentioned in previous posts how no amount of appeals or arguments by themselves will convince an unbeliever to repent and believe. As a sinner, the unbeliever is UNWILLING to acknowledge his position as untenable (regardless of the evidence). Keep in mind that this is true REGARDLESS of the argument or appeal that you make. No amount of evidence by itself will demonstrate conclusively to the unbeliever that the bible is the word of God and that Jesus rose from the dead. 

So in the end, if you say that the transcendental argument cannot demonstrate the truth of God conclusively to the unbeliever, I would agree with you (because NO argument can do that). Only God, by his grace, can convince the unbeliever that the position of unbelief is an untenable one. Of course, this does not in any way reduce the usefulness and merit of the transcendental argument. The transcendental argument is in fact a argument for the truth, because the truth is that God is a necessary being for creation, logic, morality, etc. Just because an unbeliever is unwilling (and unable) to acknowledge that, does not mean that the argument is useless (the unbeliever will refuse ANY argument that you make). The argument (like other arguments) is simply a tool used for apologetics. But I do think that it is the best tool. An arminian can make arguments in defense of the faith, and God might use that apologetic method in that moment as a means to bestow saving Grace upon the unbeliever. Does this mean that we SHOULD use arminian arguments? Not at all. God can certainly draw a straight line with a crooked stick, but we should not be in the habit of making crooked sticks. For this reason we must use an apologetic that is as biblical as possible, and I believe that the transcendental argument is exactly that (the best tool in the shed).


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> But the problem is that when the phrase 'best possible worlds' is used, it can only lead down the road to molinism.



No it doesn't. Molinism depends on a certain view of human freedom and involves a certain view of indeterminacy. Leibniz' "best of all possible worlds" theodicy does not hold this view.



Loopie said:


> I mean, consider for a moment that when you say 'possible worlds', it implies that there were other worlds that were 'possible'. In fact, it would imply that there was a point in time when God looked at all the different possible worlds that he could create, calculated which one would be 'best', and then made his decision based on this knowledge. It implies that God passively takes in knowledge (when he looks down the tunnel of time), and that this knowledge was not based on his eternal decree.



No it doesn't. It could also imply that God decreed from before time began the world that would be best out of all the ones that He could have created. Do not presume to say that God was somehow bound to create this world or that God was bound to elect any particular person. You are suggesting that there is necessity in God apart from His nature.

No, reformed theologians don't talk this way because this isn't a theological category. It's a philosophical one. Possible worlds are a thought-experiment.



Loopie said:


> When you say the phrase 'demonstrate conclusively' I assume that you mean that we must demonstrate this conclusively to the unbeliever.



No. I mean in general. The burden of proof you have set here is such that you must prove that God is the only _logically_ possible explanation for the various phenomena that you have suggested. It's not enough to posit God as a nice explanation---you must conclusively demonstrate that He is the only possible explanation. The method you've chosen, by the way, is possibly the hardest, since you're trying to prove that there is no gold in China.

As long as you fail to provide this, the argument is inconclusive from a logical standpoint. As long as there is a single possible view that you have not addressed, the argument is incomplete.



Loopie said:


> I believe that the transcendental argument is exactly that (the best tool in the shed).



I'd say it's the clumsiest and most cumbersome. Rhetorically, it ends up being mostly composed of assertions. The only reason why the Bahnsen/Stein debate went the way it did was because Stein didn't understand the kind of argument that Bahnsen was giving or that all he really had to do was challenge Bahnsen's assertions.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> But the problem is that when the phrase 'best possible worlds' is used, it can only lead down the road to molinism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No it doesn't. Molinism depends on a certain view of human freedom and involves a certain view of indeterminacy. Leibniz' "best of all possible worlds" theodicy does not hold this view.
Click to expand...


But Leibniz did not use the term 'best' to refer to God's glorification of himself. It seems that his focus was more on good and evil rather than God glorifying himself or not. If we view 'best possible worlds' as referring to the actual world itself, and whether it is as 'good' as it could be, I would say that would be incorrect. If we view 'best possible world' as referring to God's decision to 'best' glorify himself, then I would say that is correct. The question is: In which sense did Leibniz use the phrase?



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I mean, consider for a moment that when you say 'possible worlds', it implies that there were other worlds that were 'possible'. In fact, it would imply that there was a point in time when God looked at all the different possible worlds that he could create, calculated which one would be 'best', and then made his decision based on this knowledge. It implies that God passively takes in knowledge (when he looks down the tunnel of time), and that this knowledge was not based on his eternal decree.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No it doesn't. It could also imply that God decreed from before time began the world that would be best out of all the ones that He could have created. Do not presume to say that God was somehow bound to create this world or that God was bound to elect any particular person. You are suggesting that there is necessity in God apart from His nature.
> 
> No, reformed theologians don't talk this way because this isn't a theological category. It's a philosophical one. Possible worlds are a thought-experiment.
Click to expand...


Of course I would not say that God was 'bound' or 'forced' to do anything. God is absolutely free in that he is never influenced, forced, or pressured into doing anything. By the way, since when did the concept of Election come into this conversation? I think you are jumping to a conclusion that was not even part of this discussion (I know I never brought it up). God is a necessary being, but he himself is free. The reason I think Leibniz would be incorrect about his theodicy is because he does not seem to be referring to God glorifying himself (which is what makes this world 'best'). He is talking about the world itself, and whether it is 'good' or 'bad'. For this reason he would be wrong (even Plantinga criticized his theodicy).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> When you say the phrase 'demonstrate conclusively' I assume that you mean that we must demonstrate this conclusively to the unbeliever.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No. I mean in general. The burden of proof you have set here is such that you must prove that God is the only _logically_ possible explanation for the various phenomena that you have suggested. It's not enough to posit God as a nice explanation---you must conclusively demonstrate that He is the only possible explanation. The method you've chosen, by the way, is possibly the hardest, since you're trying to prove that there is no gold in China.
> 
> As long as you fail to provide this, the argument is inconclusive from a logical standpoint. As long as there is a single possible view that you have not addressed, the argument is incomplete.
Click to expand...


What do you mean in general? When you are attempting to demonstrate something conclusively, you are demonstrating it TO SOMEONE. So either you are demonstrating it to God (which would be unnecessary and silly), yourself (which is also silly, because you already believe it), or to someone else (which makes sense if they don't believe it). For this reason it seems that when you say 'demonstrate conclusively' you are saying that we are demonstrating it to someone else. You cannot demonstrate something without reference to someone (the term 'demonstrate' implies this). 

The difficulty with demonstrating that God is the only possible explanation does not lie in the method itself, it lies in the fact that you are trying to demonstrate this to a person enslaved to sin, who is UNWILLING to believe what you say. That is the difficulty (and it is true for any apologetic method). You yourself obviously believe that God is the only explanation for the world that we see. You believe this because you believe that scripture is the word of God when God called you to repentance and faith. Now that you are no longer a slave to sin, no longer living in darkness, you see the truth of reality (that it does not make sense without God). 

So I do not see how my method is the hardest. It is simply a statement of the truth. God is necessary. Period, end of story. The usefulness of the method is that from ANY discussion you can point the unbeliever back to God and scripture. Are you talking about history? Well, you can show how history was ordained and controlled by God, and that nothing makes sense apart from his divine plan. Are you talking about existence? Well, you can show that life/creation would not be possible without God, and that scripture declares him to be the creator of all things. Are you talking about knowledge? Well, you can show that truth/knowledge is meaningless and relative without God. As scripture declares, God is the God of truth. Are you talking about morality? Well, you can show that without God there is no such thing as absolute morality. All morality is relative without a law-giver. Yet God IS that law-giver, and scripture declares his law.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I believe that the transcendental argument is exactly that (the best tool in the shed).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I'd say it's the clumsiest and most cumbersome. Rhetorically, it ends up being mostly composed of assertions. The only reason why the Bahnsen/Stein debate went the way it did was because Stein didn't understand the kind of argument that Bahnsen was giving or that all he really had to do was challenge Bahnsen's assertions.
Click to expand...


How is it clumsy and cumbersome? Assertions? Well of course we assert that the Triune God of scripture is necessary for the world to make sense. Just because the unbeliever can't grasp it is not the fault of the assertion, but is a result of the enslaved will of the unbeliever. As for the Bahnsen/Stein debate, I was not even thinking about this, and am not sure why you brought it up (I know that it was discussed a while ago, but I thought it was no longer part of the discussion). 

I think ultimately you seem to have an opposition to the transcendental argument perhaps because you have seen people misuse or abuse it. Perhaps they (or yourself) have not fully understood it, but it was my hope to provide an explanation of its purpose and usefulness. It is simply a method by which we bring everything back to God and the Bible. Shouldn't that be how apologetics works?


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> But Leibniz did not use the term 'best' to refer to God's glorification of himself. It seems that his focus was more on good and evil rather than God glorifying himself or not. If we view 'best possible worlds' as referring to the actual world itself, and whether it is as 'good' as it could be, I would say that would be incorrect. If we view 'best possible world' as referring to God's decision to 'best' glorify himself, then I would say that is correct. The question is: In which sense did Leibniz use the phrase?



Sorry, but I'm not sure how the two are in conflict? I don't agree with the theodicy, by the way, but it's for an entirely different reason. I'm just arguing that the best of all possible worlds theodicy is a live option.



Loopie said:


> So either you are demonstrating it to God (which would be unnecessary and silly), yourself (which is also silly, because you already believe it)



Hold on, here. Just because you already believe something doesn't make coming up with an argument for it for yourself silly at all. Where did you get that notion?



Loopie said:


> The difficulty with demonstrating that God is the only possible explanation does not lie in the method itself



Eric, this is my point: any atheist with any training in philosophy at all will understand that the burden of proof on you is absurdly high with a TA. Simply as an argument it has this problem.

You're missing my point entirely: a TA doesn't work _as an argument_. Unless you are using the ontological argument, there is no way of conclusively showing that God is logically necessary without deconstructing all other possible views of the matter (impossible).

I'm talking about proofs that are actually absolutely conclusive.



Loopie said:


> How is it clumsy and cumbersome?



Because it tries to prove that there is no gold in China. The only way to conclusively prove that there is no gold in China is to go over every square inch of China making sure that there isn't an atom of gold.



Loopie said:


> Assertions? Well of course we assert that the Triune God of scripture is necessary for the world to make sense.



Simply asserting it isn't a proof. You've given no reason for the unbeliever to accept it. An assertion isn't an argument.



Loopie said:


> I think ultimately you seem to have an opposition to the transcendental argument perhaps because you have seen people misuse or abuse it.



No, I don't like it because it promises everything and delivers nothing unless you already accept the premise that God exists. In a logical sense, all it proves is that you have a nice theory. The only thing that an unbeliever will respond with is "well that's interesting."


----------



## Afterthought

Loopie said:


> The difficulty with demonstrating that God is the only possible explanation does not lie in the method itself, it lies in the fact that you are trying to demonstrate this to a person enslaved to sin, who is UNWILLING to believe what you say.


I don't think that's what Philip is getting at. He's speaking about the transcendental argument as a logical argument. From logic, we learn there are certain rules that must be satisfied in order for an argument to be successful or complete. In order for the transcendental argument to be successful, complete according to logical rules, one must deconstruct every single possible other worldview and establish the coherency of the Christian worldview. Why? The transcendental argument claims that Christianity is the only possible explanation. Since one is proving this indirectly, one must show no other worldview can do this before one is left with _only_ Christianity, and even then one would need to demonstrate that Christianity provides that explanation. Because Christianity makes exclusive truth claims, it indeed would be quicker to prove the truth of Christianity than the falsity of everything else.

Nevertheless, as a _method of arguing_ rather than an argument itself, obliterating an opponent's worldviews and showing how Christianity does account for something can work. While an unbeliever may jump from worldview to worldview, the unbeliever is as finite as the one arguing and has his or her own biases and prejudices, and so psychologically speaking (perhaps there's a better word I could use here), that unbeliever could only jump around so much (or perhaps, because of the unbeliever's hostility to Christianity, will move a little and then stick with some other worldview); the unbeliever could only have so many "live" options, to borrow terminology from William James. That is how I understood Van Til anyway (with respect to this issue; I'm aware of the method of showing an unbeliever that what they claim presupposes a belief in God and so that they borrow from a Christian worldview): he was providing a method of arguing rather than an argument itself, the method being based on the fact that the argument itself is true from a Christian perspective (supporters of Van Til, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong), though one would have to accept Christianity in order to see the argument as true.



Think of it like this. Say you had a cupcake on a table and left it for a while. You came back and found it was gone. You have a possible theory for why it has disappeared, but you wish to prove it is the correct theory by showing it is the only possible theory (which means, of course, your "possible theory" must actually explain the facts and you'll need to show this). In order to show it is the only possible theory, you decide to eliminate all the other options (e.g., aliens took it). There are so many possible options that it is impossible to show your one theory is correct--logically speaking--by being the one remaining possibility. Nevertheless, psychologically, you are finite and only have a finite number of "live" options, so it is possible _psychologically_ (again, I'm not sure this is the right word to use) to convince yourself that your theory is correct by eliminating the other "live" possibilities (of course, in this example, I am assuming your original theory is correct).


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> But Leibniz did not use the term 'best' to refer to God's glorification of himself. It seems that his focus was more on good and evil rather than God glorifying himself or not. If we view 'best possible worlds' as referring to the actual world itself, and whether it is as 'good' as it could be, I would say that would be incorrect. If we view 'best possible world' as referring to God's decision to 'best' glorify himself, then I would say that is correct. The question is: In which sense did Leibniz use the phrase?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sorry, but I'm not sure how the two are in conflict? I don't agree with the theodicy, by the way, but it's for an entirely different reason. I'm just arguing that the best of all possible worlds theodicy is a live option.
Click to expand...


Well, Plantinga argued the Leibniz' concept was wrong because a person could always conceive of a world with one more moral person. Again, it does not seem that Leibniz considered 'best' to refer to that world which best glorifies God. He was referring to 'best' as in the state of the world as it is. Those who believe that there will be a New Heavens and a New Earth understand that what we have right now is not the best possible world (in the sense that Leibniz understood it to be).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> So either you are demonstrating it to God (which would be unnecessary and silly), yourself (which is also silly, because you already believe it)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hold on, here. Just because you already believe something doesn't make coming up with an argument for it for yourself silly at all. Where did you get that notion?
Click to expand...


Well you can certainly grow in faith and assurance. I mean as I learn more about the world I continuously see God's glory, and come to better appreciate the grace that he has bestowed upon me. Yet I do not go out there with the intention that I need to demonstrate to myself conclusively something that I already believe. Reinforcing one's believe is very different than demonstrating conclusively in the sense that you presented the term. It still is quite clear though that we don't really demonstrate things in general without reference to a person.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> The difficulty with demonstrating that God is the only possible explanation does not lie in the method itself
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Eric, this is my point: any atheist with any training in philosophy at all will understand that the burden of proof on you is absurdly high with a TA. Simply as an argument it has this problem.
> 
> You're missing my point entirely: a TA doesn't work _as an argument_. Unless you are using the ontological argument, there is no way of conclusively showing that God is logically necessary without deconstructing all other possible views of the matter (impossible).
> 
> I'm talking about proofs that are actually absolutely conclusive.
Click to expand...


Any atheist with any training in philosophy will more than likely be a skeptic, and will not be able to account for existence, knowledge, and morality. He cannot show why humans should behave a certain way without reference to a law-giver. Plain and simple. The ontological argument itself depends on the assumption that God exists (it also will never lead one necessarily to conclude that it is the Christian God, or that scripture is God's word, it just leads to some general 'God'). It is reasoning from the creature back to God, while not addressing the underlying presuppositions.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> How is it clumsy and cumbersome?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Because it tries to prove that there is no gold in China. The only way to conclusively prove that there is no gold in China is to go over every square inch of China making sure that there isn't an atom of gold.
Click to expand...


Actually the burden of proof is on the atheist. The atheist must find a system that is both consistent with itself and with the world around us. Yet despite his best efforts, he will never be able to make full and complete sense out of reality without God. He is searching in the dark for an answer that is anything but God (because he is in rebellion against God). The Christian who uses the transcendental argument simply points this out. It would seem that the 'no gold in China' analogy does not fit very well. If we were to try to make it analogous to the TA, we would have to make a few adjustments. For instance, let us say that the unbeliever asserts that there is no gold in China (he is the one making the negative assertion that 'there is no God'). The believer argues that there is gold in China (God exists). The unbeliever says there is no proof that gold exists, but the believer argues that the unbeliever cannot make sense of reality without gold existing (there is evidence everywhere, but the unbeliever refuses to acknowledge it). In the analogy, the unbeliever can only make sense of the world that he sees if gold exists in China. No matter how hard the unbeliever tries, he cannot find a way to consistently explain reality apart from gold existing in China. He searches for a way to escape the reality that there is gold in China, but he cannot do so and remain consistent. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Assertions? Well of course we assert that the Triune God of scripture is necessary for the world to make sense.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Simply asserting it isn't a proof. You've given no reason for the unbeliever to accept it. An assertion isn't an argument.
Click to expand...


But the unbeliever does not accept God based on reasoning of the mind. He will only accept God when God spiritually removes the heart of stone and replaces it with the heart of flesh. There is no argument in the world that will cause the unbeliever to accept God (apart from God's saving grace). I agree that an assertion isn't an argument, but all arguments are based upon assertions/presuppositions. No matter how many words you speak to the unbeliever, in his mind he will conclude that he has no good reason to accept God. It is simply willful rebellion.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I think ultimately you seem to have an opposition to the transcendental argument perhaps because you have seen people misuse or abuse it.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No, I don't like it because it promises everything and delivers nothing unless you already accept the premise that God exists. In a logical sense, all it proves is that you have a nice theory. The only thing that an unbeliever will respond with is "well that's interesting."
Click to expand...


I don't see how it promises everything and delivers nothing. It is an argument, not a promise. It is God who promises and delivers, but the unbeliever will not accept that. In fact, what the transcendental argument points out is that the unbeliever continuously tries to find something else (other than God) to deliver promises. Yet everything that the unbeliever puts his hope in delivers nothing, for only God can deliver the truth.

---------- Post added at 12:58 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:45 PM ----------

Philip,

I think that we are at an impasse regarding our discussion on the topic. To use an air force term I think it is best to call 'terminate' due to the fact that we do not seem to be progressing in our discussion (no more learning is being accomplished). I think perhaps we should call it a day and perhaps discuss the issue privately or in a future discussion board. I really do appreciate your zeal, and I have enjoyed our discussion immensely. Anyways, please PM me if you wish to discuss anything further, but for now let us agree to disagree.

---------- Post added at 01:15 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:58 PM ----------




Afterthought said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> The difficulty with demonstrating that God is the only possible explanation does not lie in the method itself, it lies in the fact that you are trying to demonstrate this to a person enslaved to sin, who is UNWILLING to believe what you say.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't think that's what Philip is getting at. He's speaking about the transcendental argument as a logical argument. From logic, we learn there are certain rules that must be satisfied in order for an argument to be successful or complete. In order for the transcendental argument to be successful, complete according to logical rules, one must deconstruct every single possible other worldview and establish the coherency of the Christian worldview. Why? The transcendental argument claims that Christianity is the only possible explanation. Since one is proving this indirectly, one must show no other worldview can do this before one is left with _only_ Christianity, and even then one would need to demonstrate that Christianity provides that explanation. Because Christianity makes exclusive truth claims, it indeed would be quicker to prove the truth of Christianity than the falsity of everything else.
Click to expand...


Raymond,

Yes but Christianity's truth claims are based upon God and his revelation. There is no way to prove the truth of Christianity to an unbeliever 'quickly' because both the unbeliever and the Christian begin from very different points. Their worldviews are based upon different presuppositions. The unbeliever makes man the final authority on matters of truth and morality, while the believer rightly acknowledges God as the final authority. The unbeliever has to show how he can make sense of reality consistently. All you have to do is simply show him that every time he thinks he has made sense of the world, that he really hasn't. It is because he searches in darkness for something that is not there.



Afterthought said:


> Nevertheless, as a _method of arguing_ rather than an argument itself, obliterating an opponent's worldviews and showing how Christianity does account for something can work. While an unbeliever may jump from worldview to worldview, the unbeliever is as finite as the one arguing and has his or her own biases and prejudices, and so psychologically speaking (perhaps there's a better word I could use here), that unbeliever could only jump around so much (or perhaps, because of the unbeliever's hostility to Christianity, will move a little and then stick with some other worldview); the unbeliever could only have so many "live" options, to borrow terminology from William James. That is how I understood Van Til anyway (with respect to this issue; I'm aware of the method of showing an unbeliever that what they claim presupposes a belief in God and so that they borrow from a Christian worldview): he was providing a method of arguing rather than an argument itself, the method being based on the fact that the argument itself is true from a Christian perspective (supporters of Van Til, feel free to correct me if I'm wrong), though one would have to accept Christianity in order to see the argument as true.



If an unbeliever jumps from worldview to worldview he has just shown himself to be inconsistent. He is simply highlighting his rebellious nature and that he is attempting to escape God. It doesn't matter to me how many times the unbeliever jumps around. If he continues to reject God he only ends up demonstrating his fallen nature and that the wrath of God is upon him. If he accepts God it is because God chose to bestow saving grace upon him. Again, no one argument will win over an unbeliever. The classical arguments for the existence of God will never logically lead an unbeliever to conclude that it must be the Christian God, and that the Bible must be His word (these two things must be presupposed).



Afterthought said:


> Think of it like this. Say you had a cupcake on a table and left it for a while. You came back and found it was gone. You have a possible theory for why it has disappeared, but you wish to prove it is the correct theory by showing it is the only possible theory (which means, of course, your "possible theory" must actually explain the facts and you'll need to show this). In order to show it is the only possible theory, you decide to eliminate all the other options (e.g., aliens took it). There are so many possible options that it is impossible to show your one theory is correct--logically speaking--by being the one remaining possibility. Nevertheless, psychologically, you are finite and only have a finite number of "live" options, so it is possible _psychologically_ (again, I'm not sure this is the right word to use) to convince yourself that your theory is correct by eliminating the other "live" possibilities (of course, in this example, I am assuming your original theory is correct).



Yes but the person you are trying to prove something to is not unbiased, but is in complete rebellion against God. If you were both on the same playing field (neutrality) then you certainly could simply prove the truthful position. But since you both play by two different sets of rules (presuppositions), you must show that his rules are inconsistent. Remember, I didn't become a Christian by convincing myself that God was a necessary being. I became a Christian by the grace of God, and now that I see the truth of reality I have come to realize just how necessary God is. Of course the unbeliever will not believe you, but then again, no matter how much 'positive' evidence you present to him, he will not be convinced (because he holds entirely different presuppositions). In the case of the cupcake, ALL evidence points to the very theory that you are trying to defend. Your friend believes that you have ZERO evidence to defend your theory. Your next step is to show him that his presuppositions (and his sinful nature) prevent him from seeing things clearly. You ask him to try and explain reality consistently, and every time he tries to explain it you show him how he fails. Whether he comes to realize his enslaved state or not is up to God.


----------



## Afterthought

Well, considering that the only reason I posted was in order to hopefully clarify what was going on so that the discussion could continue, I guess I'm done now too! I will only note that each example you have given in response to me is again a _method of arguing_ not an _argument_. It is the latter that I was speaking about and only _with respect to the transcendental argument_ anyway. It is also important to distinguish between _the reason for using_ an argument or method of arguing and the argument or method of arguing. For example, you state

"All you have to do is simply show him that every time he thinks he has made sense of the world, that he really hasn't."

"But since you both play by two different sets of rules (presuppositions), you must show that his rules are inconsistent."

"Your next step is to show him that his presuppositions (and his sinful nature) prevent him from seeing things clearly. You ask him to try and explain reality consistently, and every time he tries to explain it you show him how he fails. Whether he comes to realize his enslaved state or not is up to God."

All of these are merely methods of arguing. They include arguments, yes, but they do not include a transcendental argument that was argued for indirectly. To prove a transcendental argument indirectly (or perhaps more accurately, proving Christianity as a worldview indirectly) requires the things mentioned earlier in the thread. To use a method in which one shows that the unbeliever requires God with respect to some worldviews--in the manner you have stated--does not prove a transcendental argument, which again, requires certain rules in order to be proved. Instead it provides evidence for the transcendental argument's truth. I explained in my post a possible reason why this method of arguing may work in practice, and indeed, I don't have a problem with this method of arguing.



"There is no way to prove the truth of Christianity to an unbeliever 'quickly' because both the unbeliever and the Christian begin from very different points. Their worldviews are based upon different presuppositions. The unbeliever makes man the final authority on matters of truth and morality, while the believer rightly acknowledges God as the final authority."

"[The unbeliever] is simply highlighting his rebellious nature and that he is attempting to escape God. It doesn't matter to me how many times the unbeliever jumps around. If he continues to reject God he only ends up demonstrating his fallen nature and that the wrath of God is upon him."

"The classical arguments for the existence of God will never logically lead an unbeliever to conclude that it must be the Christian God, and that the Bible must be His word (these two things must be presupposed)."

"Yes but the person you are trying to prove something to is not unbiased, but is in complete rebellion against God. If you were both on the same playing field (neutrality) then you certainly could simply prove the truthful position. But since you both play by two different sets of rules (presuppositions), you must show that his rules are inconsistent."

"Of course the unbeliever will not believe you, but then again, no matter how much 'positive' evidence you present to him, he will not be convinced (because he holds entirely different presuppositions)."

These are the _reasons for your method of arguing_ (the method being: deconstructing their view with respect to something and showing that Christianity explains that something). They are not an argument for Christianity but rather an argument for using the method of arguing that you are using. Indeed, they go a little further in that they also give the attitude with which you argue with an unbeliever (lets not forget that we're not just talking about atheists; the transcendental argument for _Christianity_ is about the Christian God). But none of these are _arguments for Christianity._


Such was what I was trying to get across in my earlier post.


----------



## Philip

Loopie said:


> Those who believe that there will be a New Heavens and a New Earth understand that what we have right now is not the best possible world (in the sense that Leibniz understood it to be).



"World" here includes both time and space. This argument misunderstands the proposition.



Loopie said:


> It still is quite clear though that we don't really demonstrate things in general without reference to a person.



Not necessarily. Many people (Blaise Pascal) have done logical and philosophical proofs for personal edification.



Loopie said:


> Any atheist with any training in philosophy will more than likely be a skeptic, and will not be able to account for existence, knowledge, and morality.



No, but he's questioning whether he needs to.



Loopie said:


> The ontological argument itself depends on the assumption that God exists (it also will never lead one necessarily to conclude that it is the Christian God, or that scripture is God's word, it just leads to some general 'God'). It is reasoning from the creature back to God, while not addressing the underlying presuppositions.



Actually, no. Greatness is defined in terms of worship-worthiness and therefore the only worldview which this being could possibly be is the God of Scripture. Reasoning from creation to creator is what all theistic argumentation does---even a TA. Further, the OA is just a TA in reverse.



Loopie said:


> Actually the burden of proof is on the atheist. The atheist must find a system that is both consistent with itself and with the world around us.



Why? What compelling reason does he have?

You misunderstood what I was saying with the "Gold in China" analogy. The form of the TA shifts the burden of proof onto you because it's a claim not simply that God exists, but that God is a necessary being. In order to demonstrate this, you either have to prove it directly (an ontological argument) or indirectly (transcendental). The indirect argument means that you must examine _every single possible alternative_ system in order for it to be logically valid. "China" in this analogy would be "unbelief" and "gold" would be "grounding for phenomenon X."



Loopie said:


> I don't see how it promises everything and delivers nothing. It is an argument, not a promise.



Eric, you missed my point. You claim that the argument proves that God is necessary---it doesn't, or rather it only does so in theory. Because you are finite, it cannot do so in practice. 

My objection to the transcendental argument is that it has no audience. Here is what I mean by this: in practice it boils down to a lot of bare assertions and unstated presuppositions without the logical force to back them up. In theory it is valid, but in practice it is not capable of validity given the finitude of the presenter. Further, the subtlety of the argument is lost on many. Thus, most will not understand it and rather than being enlightened will simply be confused by it. Those who actually understand it, on the other hand, will be able to see through the fact that you can't actually present a valid form of the argument given what this would involve.

Further, if the argument is valid in theory (which I will grant that it is), then all of the classical arguments are, in fact, just transcendental arguments in reverse. Thus it would make much more sense to continue fine-tuning these arguments rather than attempting the Sysyphian task of actually trying to present a TA.

If Christianity is the only possible way of accounting for reality, then a conclusive argument for Christianity would by default accomplish all that a TA attempts to accomplish. A transcendental view of Christianity entails that a transcendental argument is itself the most cumbersome and least efficient possible way of presenting the Gospel.


----------



## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> It still is quite clear though that we don't really demonstrate things in general without reference to a person.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Not necessarily. Many people (Blaise Pascal) have done logical and philosophical proofs for personal edification.
Click to expand...


And he is a person, right? So he is demonstrating things to a person, not just 'in general'.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Any atheist with any training in philosophy will more than likely be a skeptic, and will not be able to account for existence, knowledge, and morality.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> No, but he's questioning whether he needs to.
Click to expand...


Obviously he doesn't think he needs to, but he would still be wrong. Again, the alcoholic doesn't think he needs help, but he still does.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> The ontological argument itself depends on the assumption that God exists (it also will never lead one necessarily to conclude that it is the Christian God, or that scripture is God's word, it just leads to some general 'God'). It is reasoning from the creature back to God, while not addressing the underlying presuppositions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Actually, no. Greatness is defined in terms of worship-worthiness and therefore the only worldview which this being could possibly be is the God of Scripture. Reasoning from creation to creator is what all theistic argumentation does---even a TA. Further, the OA is just a TA in reverse.
Click to expand...


Who defined 'greatness', you? Obviously I believe that the God of scripture is the only God who is worship worthy, but this presupposes that scripture tells the truth concerning God. Again, it all goes back to the presuppositions. The OA and the TA reason from creation to creature in different ways. The TA presupposes God and the Bible because that is the only way to make sense of reality. The OA looks at reality and tries to figure out what God is like. The problem is that the OA will never bring you to the God of scripture (it will never lead you to conclude that scripture is the infallible world of God). This must be presupposed.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> Actually the burden of proof is on the atheist. The atheist must find a system that is both consistent with itself and with the world around us.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why? What compelling reason does he have?
Click to expand...


Well, in general he is trying to show that God is not necessary (because he hates God). That is the compelling reason, because he is a slave to sin and a rebel against God. Rebels don't want to just be left alone, they want to overthrow the king. And we wonder why atheists are so aggressive in their attack on God. It is not enough that they are allowed to believe or disbelieve if they want, but they cannot stand the fact that others believe.



P. F. Pugh said:


> You misunderstood what I was saying with the "Gold in China" analogy. The form of the TA shifts the burden of proof onto you because it's a claim not simply that God exists, but that God is a necessary being. In order to demonstrate this, you either have to prove it directly (an ontological argument) or indirectly (transcendental). The indirect argument means that you must examine _every single possible alternative_ system in order for it to be logically valid. "China" in this analogy would be "unbelief" and "gold" would be "grounding for phenomenon X."



The TA claims that God exists. God by definition is a necessary being. It is making a positive statement. The atheist is making a negative statement, either God does not exist or he is not necessary. So the burden of proof is indeed on the atheist who is trying to argue that there is no gold in China (another negative statement). The ontological argument will never prove the God of scripture, because you must presuppose that scripture actually depicts God accurately. Your definitions of the analogy simply do not make any sense. The analogy clearly showed that one person is arguing that there is gold in china (positive statement that represents a belief in God), while the other person is arguing that there is no gold in china (a negative statement that represents unbelief). I know that you are trying to redefine the terms in order to force the analogy to fit, but it simply does not work.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Loopie said:
> 
> 
> 
> I don't see how it promises everything and delivers nothing. It is an argument, not a promise.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Eric, you missed my point. You claim that the argument proves that God is necessary---it doesn't, or rather it only does so in theory. Because you are finite, it cannot do so in practice.
Click to expand...


What does it have to do with me being 'finite'? Either I am wrong when I say God is necessary, or I am right. No matter how much I try to 'prove' it, the unbeliever will never accept the 'proof' because he is a rebel. This is true for all arguments, not just the TA. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> My objection to the transcendental argument is that it has no audience. Here is what I mean by this: in practice it boils down to a lot of bare assertions and unstated presuppositions without the logical force to back them up. In theory it is valid, but in practice it is not capable of validity given the finitude of the presenter. Further, the subtlety of the argument is lost on many. Thus, most will not understand it and rather than being enlightened will simply be confused by it. Those who actually understand it, on the other hand, will be able to see through the fact that you can't actually present a valid form of the argument given what this would involve.



What do you mean unstated presuppositions? The TA states the ones it holds to (such that the Triune God of scripture exists). How does it not have 'logical force'? Who determines what is 'enough' logical force? You can't logically force an unbeliever to believe you. In fact, the TA is not just valid in theory, it is valid in reality as well. When you say that the 'subtlety of the argument is lost on many', now you are making a bare assertion about how others will perceive it. Just because you do not understand it does not mean that others will not either. By the way, unbelievers are not going to accept it just like they won't accept any argument in defense of the Christian faith (because their reasoning is clouded by sin). The validity of an argument is not dependent upon how it is received by others. In fact, nothing is valid anyways without God, who is the source of truth and logic.



P. F. Pugh said:


> Further, if the argument is valid in theory (which I will grant that it is), then all of the classical arguments are, in fact, just transcendental arguments in reverse. Thus it would make much more sense to continue fine-tuning these arguments rather than attempting the Sysyphian task of actually trying to present a TA.



No, because those arguments BEGIN with certain presuppositions and they expect the unbeliever to begin there as well. The TA recognizes the presuppositions of both sides and seeks to address it. Allow me to show you how those arguments fail to bring us to the God of the Bible:

Cosmological Argument: God is the uncaused first cause, but this says nothing about whether he is the God of Christianity or not. Scripture is clearly not proven to be infallible. All you get is a generic deity that would look more like what Plato argued for than what scripture reveals.

Moral Argument: God exists because objective moral values and duties exist. Of course, these objective moral values are undefined without scripture being the word of God. All you get is a generic deity who is the source of morality, but you have no idea what that morality is (could be Islam, Christianity, etc.)

Teleological Argument: God exists because there is fine-tuning in the universe that must be from design. The only way we can know who this God is though is to go to the word of God. Without presupposing scripture as the word of God you simply get a deity who designed everything, but you have no idea for what purpose (unless you appeal to scripture).

Ontological Argument: God exists because there must be a 'maximally great being', based on such a being existing in some possible world. Of course this will never get you to the God of scripture. Again, it simply brings you to a deity that is 'maximally great', but we have no idea what this maximally great being would look like without presupposing scripture as correctly describing God.

These four arguments for God's existence were drawn from one of William Lane Craig's writings. As you can see they do not (and never will) lead us to the God of the Bible, unless the Triune God of scripture be presupposed. That is why the TA is the strongest argument.



P. F. Pugh said:


> If Christianity is the only possible way of accounting for reality, then a conclusive argument for Christianity would by default accomplish all that a TA attempts to accomplish. A transcendental view of Christianity entails that a transcendental argument is itself the most cumbersome and least efficient possible way of presenting the Gospel.



But you will never find a conclusive argument for Christianity without using presuppositions that the unbeliever does not hold. The transcendental argument/method is the best way of presenting the gospel because it immediately seeks to bring the matter back to God and the Bible by quickly addressing the presuppositions that both sides hold. 

In the end Philip I think we can see that this is going nowhere. Will you agree with me that perhaps we should call it a day and move this to a PM or a later thread? I myself will refrain from future posts in this thread, since I honestly cannot make my statements any more clear.

---------- Post added at 03:09 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:43 PM ----------



By the way, for anyone who is interested in a quick summary of the TAG, I recommend the following article by Steve Scrivener: http://www.vantil.info/articles/Van...t Form and Theological and Biblical Basis.pdf. There is alot of good information in there concerning Van Til's apologetic (without requiring you to buy a book).


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## Unoriginalname

Loopie said:


> Cosmological Argument: God is the uncaused first cause, but this says nothing about whether he is the God of Christianity or not. Scripture is clearly not proven to be infallible. All you get is a generic deity that would look more like what Plato argued for than what scripture reveals.
> 
> Moral Argument: God exists because objective moral values and duties exist. Of course, these objective moral values are undefined without scripture being the word of God. All you get is a generic deity who is the source of morality, but you have no idea what that morality is (could be Islam, Christianity, etc.)
> 
> Teleological Argument: God exists because there is fine-tuning in the universe that must be from design. The only way we can know who this God is though is to go to the word of God. Without presupposing scripture as the word of God you simply get a deity who designed everything, but you have no idea for what purpose (unless you appeal to scripture).
> 
> Ontological Argument: God exists because there must be a 'maximally great being', based on such a being existing in some possible world. Of course this will never get you to the God of scripture. Again, it simply brings you to a deity that is 'maximally great', but we have no idea what this maximally great being would look like without presupposing scripture as correctly describing God.


The TA still fails because it never gets to the end of it self. The assertion of the TA is that it can prove every possible theory wrong. Until you have done this with every single theory in existence and everyone to every be formed I have no reason to believe that it is valid. I understand that unbelievers have a moral obligation to believe so I do not need that point to be rehashed. Earlier you mentioned that your atheistic associates kept demanding that you read their books before debating them. Well they have every right to because your initial claim is that you have an answer to their objections or theories- whatever they could ever possibly be. This leaves the TA as an open ended challenge that can never be fully completed. That is why it is cumbersome. It may work as Raymond said earlier to psychologically dishearten an opponent if they are caught off guard, but if someone knows what you are doing, they know that the ball is in your court because of your initial claim to be able to deconstruct anything to have to deconstruct everything before the argument is complete.


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> The OA looks at reality and tries to figure out what God is like.



Read the _Proslogion_ and get back to me on this. You may be surprised.



Loopie said:


> Well, in general he is trying to show that God is not necessary



Eric, he assumes that God is not necessary. He's not trying to show this at all.



Loopie said:


> God by definition is a necessary being.



Ah, so you're using an ontological argument (this is exactly what the OA concludes)?



Loopie said:


> What does it have to do with me being 'finite'? Either I am wrong when I say God is necessary, or I am right. No matter how much I try to 'prove' it, the unbeliever will never accept the 'proof' because he is a rebel. Well this is true for all arguments, not just the TA.



I'm not talking about rhetorical force: I'm talking about logical validity of form. The form of a TA is "there is no ground for truth in unbelief therefore Christianity is true."

I am merely talking here about the burdens of proof that the TA sets _for itself_. I am not talking about who ought to have ultimate burden of proof, but what the form of the TA entails in terms of its own burden of proof. You are missing my point entirely.



Loopie said:


> What do you mean unstated presuppositions? It states them all (such that the Triune God of scripture exists).



In which case it's a circular argument and therefore, though not invalid, proves nothing whatsoever.



Loopie said:


> In fact, the TA is not just valid in theory



All right, then: please lay out for me a _complete_ transcendental argument for the existence of God that is logically conclusive. If it's valid in practice, then this can be done. I'll even offer to translate it into formal logical terms and go over it to see if the premises yield the conclusion.



Loopie said:


> These five arguments for God's existence were drawn from one of William Lane Craig's writings. As you can see they do not (and never will) lead us to the God of the Bible, unless the Triune God of scripture be presupposed. That is why the TA is the strongest argument.



You've oversimplified and misunderstood all of them. Further, all of them are forms of transcendental argumentation, if a transcendental argument is correct.

I'm not convinced right now that you understand my critique: my critique is that it is impossible for you to present a transcendental argument. You can present the Christian system, but a transcendental argument depends for its logical validity on a deconstruction of all possible alternative systems, a burden of proof that is unfulfillable by any but God Himself.

The clash of worldviews is never merely between Christianity and a particular form of atheism or Christianity vs another religion: it is always Christianity versus every other possible view. In apologetics, you are defending and presenting arguments for Christianity from general revelation and such arguments must be presentable. In order to actually present a logically-valid TA, one would have to examine the presuppositions of _every possible_ alternative system. As long as you fail to do this, your TA is logically invalid and logically inconclusive because of the way the methodology proceeds.

Again, there are two ways to logically demonstrate necessity and a TA is a "no-gold-in-China" approach because it proceeds by a process of elimination. Again, I'm not talking about who properly has the burden of proof but about what the logical form of a TA demands in terms of a burden of proof.

I do not, by the way, think that most of the other classical arguments are conclusive either (other than the OA---which can be made from Biblical presuppositions without being controversial), but then again, they aren't trying to be. The point of a classical argument is to point out that even from things that the unbeliever must admit, there is good reason for believing in God. A transcendental argument presented by a human cannot show what it claims to show because only God can ultimately provide one. You say that a transcendental argument "quickly" addresses presuppositions, whereas I maintain that it cannot. Instead you will inevitably end up bogged down in a discussion in which both you and the unbeliever will end up talking past one another. In practice, a transcendental argument will boil down to a shouting match.

I am, by the way, concluding here. My point is this: the transcendental arguments claims to conclusively establish that only Christianity is left standing, but cannot because each step (each alternative to be deconstructed) takes (really) a book-length discussion to even establish. It is also the case that simpler direct arguments can be valid (again, I would suggest reading Anselm, who is essentially presuppositional, by the way, and Van Til would probably admit it) and have more by way of logical and rhetorical merit as well as being actually presentable in full.

The TA is wonderful in theory and a theory of transcendental argumentation can even be of benefit to one presenting arguments, but the argument itself is comparable to a certain cannon called the "Basilica" used at the siege of Constantinople. It was large and impressive, designed to batter the walls of the city to a pulp. However, when it was actually fired, it ended up blowing up because the technology of the time was unable to actually create a gun of those proportions. That's what ends up happening with such an argument: it's not the theory that's the trouble---in theory, I think that the TA should work. However, we're finite and the list of false systems is much longer than we can overcome one by one. However, if the TA is right, then it should be possible to have a _direct_ proof that God is a logically necessary being. It should be possible to do a TA in reverse.


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## jwright82

Unoriginalname said:


> The TA still fails because it never gets to the end of it self. The assertion of the TA is that it can prove every possible theory wrong. Until you have done this with every single theory in existence and everyone to every be formed I have no reason to believe that it is valid. I understand that unbelievers have a moral obligation to believe so I do not need that point to be rehashed. Earlier you mentioned that your atheistic associates kept demanding that you read their books before debating them. Well they have every right to because your initial claim is that you have an answer to their objections or theories- whatever they could ever possibly be. This leaves the TA as an open ended challenge that can never be fully completed. That is why it is cumbersome. It may work as Raymond said earlier to psychologically dishearten an opponent if they are caught off guard, but if someone knows what you are doing, they know that the ball is in your court because of your initial claim to be able to deconstruct anything to have to deconstruct everything before the argument is complete.



If I establish a TA for this conversation I don't have disoprove any and all other possibilities. I only have to give the preconditions for the conversation to be what it is.


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## Afterthought

Loopie said:


> By the way, for anyone who is interested in a quick summary of the TAG, I recommend the following article by Steve Scrivener


Thank you.



Unoriginalname said:


> It may work as Raymond said earlier to psychologically dishearten an opponent if they are caught off guard, but if someone knows what you are doing, they know that the ball is in your court because of your initial claim to be able to deconstruct anything to have to deconstruct everything before the argument is complete.


Well, you seem to have got the gist of my post, though I don't know if I exactly meant "psychologically dishearten;" but of course, I'm not sure the word "psycholgoically" that I used is the proper word. To clarify for the future, though I'm sure you knew what I meant anyway, I meant that as finite human beings, there are only a finite number of worldviews a particular human being will have considered or can consider. Further, there are only a few worldviews that a particular human being will take seriously, e.g., not everyone will invent a pseudo-Christian system to explain reality because they know they invented their system; indeed, a particular human being may have already begun the work of the Christian apologist ahead of time by dismissing other sorts of worldviews for that particular human being's current worldview.

When a Christian then attempts arguing with a "transcendental method," there are only a finite number of views the Christian will need to take down because there are only a finite number of views the particular human being will take seriously. During the course of the argument or after the argument, it is possible the particular human being will suddenly take other worldviews more seriously, and so the Christian will have more to take down, but I do think it is possible that a particular human being could be persuaded by this method (well, provided the Holy Spirit acts to remove their hostility to God) because that particular human being will only be tempted by so many worldviews, though perhaps refusing to move out of one eventually. I guess it depends on the person one is arguing with. And of course, because the actual transcendental argument is true according to Christianity, this is not a dishonest method but instead is akin to "knocking the roof" off their actual or potential worldviews and presenting an alternative.



jwright82 said:


> If I establish a TA for this conversation I don't have disoprove any and all other possibilities. I only have to give the preconditions for the conversation to be what it is.


But if you're trying to show your TA is correct, don't you also have to critique "any and all other possibilities" in order to show your TA withstands the critique of all other possible explanations? And don't you also have to show your TA actually explains the problems, which is still a hefty thing to do in itself because of all the various problems that are out there? I remember once you explained the TA to me as, (1) You set up your explanation. (2) Show that your explanation satisfies the conditions. That is your TA. Then if someone disagrees, they must first critique your TA. It would seem that if your TA is really correct, it would need to withstand all possible critiques of your TA, which means you would end up proving your TA indirectly by showing all other TAs (ways of explaining that something) do not work. If not, then it seems the TA is more of a method of arguing again rather than an argument itself (which the link from the vantilinfo website seems to confirm).


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## jwright82

Afterthought said:


> But if you're trying to show your TA is correct, don't you also have to critique "any and all other possibilities" in order to show your TA withstands the critique of all other possible explanations? And don't you also have to show your TA actually explains the problems, which is still a hefty thing to do in itself because of all the various problems that are out there? I remember once you explained the TA to me as, (1) You set up your explanation. (2) Show that your explanation satisfies the conditions. That is your TA. Then if someone disagrees, they must first critique your TA. It would seem that if your TA is really correct, it would need to withstand all possible critiques of your TA, which means you would end up proving your TA indirectly by showing all other TAs (ways of explaining that something) do not work. If not, then it seems the TA is more of a method of arguing again rather than an argument itself (which the link from the vantilinfo website seems to confirm).



Yeah you will in theory have to "disprove all other possibilities" eventually because they will challange your argument and you will TC them and on and on and on. So yeah you are right. It is more of a method yes. I may not have stressed that in our conversation but I think with Van Til's obsession with method justifies this. The TA is technically a form of an argument but it is also a method that we use to argue for the truth. I think that it should be contrasted with other more static methods, one size fits all I call them.

You know them like 10 arguments for the existance of God and here you go good luck but how does that method allow you to deal with the cultural challanges facing us with the various worldviews out there? We must be able to take the presuppositions of these philosophies and show how they cannot explain why things are the way that they are. It is always very intellectual but it touchs the heart as well. Because it is transcendental it goes to the core of the person and we need a method that is that adaptable.


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## Afterthought

jwright82 said:


> Yeah you will in theory have to "disprove all other possibilities" eventually because they will challange your argument and you will TC them and on and on and on. So yeah you are right. It is more of a method yes. I may not have stressed that in our conversation but I think with Van Til's obsession with method justifies this. The TA is technically a form of an argument but it is also a method that we use to argue for the truth. I think that it should be contrasted with other more static methods, one size fits all I call them.
> 
> You know them like 10 arguments for the existance of God and here you go good luck but how does that method allow you to deal with the cultural challanges facing us with the various worldviews out there? We must be able to take the presuppositions of these philosophies and show how they cannot explain why things are the way that they are. It is always very intellectual but it touchs the heart as well. Because it is transcendental it goes to the core of the person and we need a method that is that adaptable.


That makes sense, thanks!


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## MW

Loopie said:


> Allow me to show you how those arguments fail to bring us to the God of the Bible



All arguments fail to bring us to the God of the Bible, even the transcendental argument. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God." The reason why the traditional arguments all fail is due to the fact that they all depend on a natural reasoning which by its very nature cannot account for the supernatural act of creation. Every one of them leaps at some point from the natural to the supernatural, whether in a way of cause and effect, design, morality, and so forth. And the transcendental argument is no different in this respect. It simply makes the leap in the area of verifiability. When we speak of the preconditions of truth we simply mean that truth has certain qualities that demand a greater intelligence than man himself is able to give to the truth. But greater intelligence does not prove the God of the Bible. There are other arguments that are needed to supplement the transcendental argument. It is at this point that the traditional arguments show themselves to be very useful. But after all has been said, and the best cumulative argument has been made for the existence of God, those arguments do not prove the God of the Bible. They certainly give the greatest credibility to the rationality of believing in God. When all philosophical systems are taken into account the God of the Bible can be shown to meet all the "characteristics" that are demanded by those arguments, and even to do so in a way that no other can. But without faith the best cumulative argument proves nothing. Faith is needed to believe that God is and that He is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. And that faith is the gift and work of God.


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## Loopie

Rev. Winzer,

Well I would say that the transcendental argument would indeed bring us to the God of the Bible IF we were to start from a 'non-rebel perspective'. I completely agree that NO argument itself can BRING someone to Christ, because that is only in the hands of God. But IF the person hearing the message were not under the influence of sin, they would conclude that God exists by the transcendental argument. If logic and truth only exist if God exists, then there SHOULD be a way that God can be "proven". The reason why there is no argument that itself can "prove" God is because the mind of the sinner (the one hearing the argument) is twisted. It isn't working properly. His mind (and emotions) only function properly in relationship with God. If his mind WERE functioning properly, the transcendental argument would indeed "prove" God. I mean, isn't it silly to suggest that God, even though he exists, is unprovable? But I would say he would be provable to a mind that was not already in open rebellion against him.

By the way, I would slightly disagree that it leaps in the verifiable area. I know that many have argued that the TAG has to deal with an infinite number of worldviews. Yet this article by Michael Butler presents a strong rebuttal to that critique: The Transcendental Argument for God's Existence

Allow me to simply post an excerpt from that article that addresses the question of 'infinite worldviews':

"Recall that objection (2) against TAG maintains that it is impossible to provide a uniqueness proof for the conclusion that the Christian worldview is the necessary precondition for experience. This is due to the fact that there is no way of refuting all possible competing worldviews. Thus, even if all actual worldviews in competition with Christianity (naturalism, Islam, etc.) are shown to be false and Christianity is shown to be a sufficient precondition for experience, it does not follow that Christianity is the necessary precondition for experience.

But as Förster has pointed out, TAs, and, by implication, TAG, do not set out to provide a uniqueness proof by refuting an indefinite or infinite number of worldviews. Rather the proof is provided by refuting the negation of the conceptual scheme or worldview that one is attempting to establish. It subjects the non-Christian worldview to an internal critique and shows that, on its own terms, it is contradictory, arbitrary and cannot provide sufficient preconditions of experience. 

What, then, is the nature of the non-Christian worldview? Simply put, all non-Christian systems presuppose that experience can be accounted for on autonomous lines. The non-Christian worldviews share the common feature that experience can be made sense of independently of God and his revelatory word. Thus all non-Christian worldviews deny the Creator-creature distinction, the doctrine of the Trinity and the biblical doctrine of man as being created as God's image. They deny the fall and the noetic effects of sin. They deny the necessity of Christ's redeeming work for not only personal salvation, but the salvation of the human intellect. They also deny the necessity of divine revelation, the foundation of all of these doctrines.

From this we can see that Van Til is correct, "We have constantly sought to bring out that all forms of antitheistic thinking can be reduced to one."[87] Bahnsen elaborates on this important insight:

Despite "family squabbles" and secondary deviations among unregenerate men in their thinking, they are united at the basic level in setting aside the Christian conception of God. The indirect manner of proving the Christian position is thus to exhibit the intelligibility of reasoning, science, morality, etc., within the context of biblical presuppositions...and then to make an internal criticism of the presuppositions of autonomous thought (in whatever form it is presently being discussed) in order to show that it destroys the possibility of proving, understanding, or communicating anything.[88]

Thus the Christian apologist may boldly assert that without an absolute personal being as the foundation of all things, there is no possibility of ethics. Without the ontological Trinity as the fount of all being, there is no possibility of unifying the particulars of human experience. Without the combined doctrines of the Trinity and man being God's image bearer there is no possibility of predication and thus language. Without the doctrine of God's sovereignty and providence there is not ground for inductive logic and science. Without a good and all-powerful God that creates both man and the natural realm there is not reason to believe that our senses are reliable. From these considerations it is clear why TAG is often described as an argument that proves the impossibility of the contrary.[89] There is, at bottom, one non-Christian worldview and this worldview is easily reduced to absurdity. FØrster's insight is relevant at this point. When one version of the non-Christian worldview is refuted, the general non-Christian worldview is refuted for all of them since they are variations on a common theme."

But if the gist of your post was to show that no argument by itself can bring anyone to Christ, that I wholeheartedly agree with. Only God can do that. At the same time though when we do present any arguments for God's existence, we want to do so correctly. Certainly God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick, but that doesn't mean we should make it a goal to always make crooked sticks. A person can come to faith in the Roman Catholic Church, but we aren't in the habit of adopting Rome's doctrines. In this same way there are many different arguments that have been means by which God brought someone to faith, but that does not mean those arguments were necessarily well-made.


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## MW

Loopie said:


> Well I would say that the transcendental argument would indeed bring us to the God of the Bible IF we were to start from a 'non-rebel perspective'. I completely agree that NO argument itself can BRING someone to Christ, because that is only in the hands of God. But IF the person hearing the message were not under the influence of sin, they would conclude that God exists by the transcendental argument.



Man was created in the image of God with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. This means man naturally believes in God. If the person hearing the message were not under the influence of sin he would conclude that God exists without ANY argument.


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## Loopie

That is an awesome point, and I concede that. I suppose the better way to word my statement would be to say this: the transcendental argument attempts to point out man's deadness in sin. By pointing out that man's intellect (and emotions) are twisted and enslaved to sin, the TAG attempts to show that the man is not really neutral in this world, he is rather a rebel against God. We all agree that scripture teaches this, but obviously the unbeliever does not believe that he is a slave to sin (he thinks that he really can be neutral and unbiased). I am not saying that the TAG causes him to change his mind (only God can do that). What the TAG does is point out that any worldview that is enslaved by sin is a worldview that cannot consistently and fully interpret the world. Certainly the unbeliever will try with all of his might to avoid this conclusion (and in doing so will show himself as inconsistent). In the end, he either continues in his open rebellion, meriting wrath from God, or God regenerates him and opens his eyes. Other arguments, while presenting the Christian worldview, do not necessarily deconstruct the worldview of the unbeliever, and so in this sense would I say that they are 'weaker'.


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## MW

Loopie said:


> That is an awesome point, and I concede that. I suppose the better way to word my statement would be to say this: the transcendental argument attempts to point out man's deadness in sin. By pointing out that man's intellect (and emotions) are twisted and enslaved to sin, the TAG attempts to show that the man is not really neutral in this world, he is rather a rebel against God. We all agree that scripture teaches this, but obviously the unbeliever does not believe that he is a slave to sin (he thinks that he really can be neutral and unbiased). I am not saying that the TAG causes him to change his mind (only God can do that). What the TAG does is point out that any worldview that is enslaved by sin is a worldview that cannot consistently and fully interpret the world. Certainly the unbeliever will try with all of his might to avoid this conclusion (and in doing so will show himself as inconsistent). In the end, he either continues in his open rebellion, meriting wrath from God, or God regenerates him and opens his eyes. Other arguments, while presenting the Christian worldview, do not necessarily deconstruct the worldview of the unbeliever, and so in this sense would I say that they are 'weaker'.



Any "fact of revelation" is going to bring out this inexcusability. An argument merely presents the facts of revelation in a form that others will be open to hear. That is all. Verifiability is a fact of revelation, hence the usefulness of the transcendental argument. Cosmology, morality, teleology, ontology, etc., are also facts of revelation. Hence the usefulness of the traditional arguments. They all point to different things in different ways. I don't see any benefit in presenting the transcendental argument in an evidential way. This just makes it vulnerable to the same criticisms as the traditional proofs. I am sure Van Til would be in full agreement.


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## Loopie

But the other arguments, such as the cosmological argument, do not traditionally begin by addressing the presuppositions (and underlying rebellious disposition) of the unbeliever. Without presupposing the God of the Bible, the cosmological argument will only get you to a generic deity (the uncaused first cause). At some point you will likely attempt to deconstruct the unbeliever's worldview while presenting your own presuppositions (in order to show that you are speaking about the God of scripture), which is what TAG focuses on doing immediately. The traditional arguments are fine tools to use within the context of the larget transcendental method/argument.

Here are some quotes from Van Til that might clarify my position:

“Accordingly I do not reject “the theistic proofs” but merely insist on formulating them in such a way as not to compromise the doctrines of Scripture” (DOF 256).

“That is to say, if the theistic proof is constructed as it ought to be constructed, it is objectively valid, whatever the attitude of those to whom it comes may be” (CTK 292).

“In not challenging this basic presupposition with respect to himself as the final reference point in predication the natural man may accept the “theistic proofs” as fully valid. He may construct such proofs. He has constructed such proofs. But the god whose existence he proves to himself in this way is always a god who is something other than the self-contained ontological trinity of Scripture” (DOF 94).

“This is, in the last analysis, the question as to what are one’s ultimate presuppositions. When man became a sinner he made of himself instead of God the ultimate or final reference point. And it is precisely this presupposition, as it controls without exception all forms of non-Christian philosophy, that must be brought into question. If this presupposition is left unquestioned in any field all the facts and arguments presented to the unbeliever will be made over by him according to his pattern. The sinner has cemented colored glasses to his eyes which he cannot remove” (DOF 94).

“Hence Warfield was quite right in maintaining that Christianity is objectively defensible. And the natural man has the ability to understand intellectually, though not spiritually, the challenge presented to him. And no challenge is presented to him unless it is shown him that on his principle he would destroy all truth and meaning. Then, if the Holy Spirit enlightens him spiritually, he will be born again “unto knowledge” and adopt with love the principle he was previously anxious to destroy” (DOF 364).


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## MW

Loopie said:


> But the other arguments, such as the cosmological argument, do not traditionally begin by addressing the presuppositions (and underlying rebellious disposition) of the unbeliever. Without presupposing the God of the Bible, the cosmological argument will only get you to a generic deity (the uncaused first cause). At some point you will likely attempt to deconstruct the unbeliever's worldview while presenting your own presuppositions (in order to show that you are speaking about the God of scripture), which is what TAG focuses on doing immediately. The traditional arguments are fine tools to use within the context of the larget transcendental method/argument.



You seem to be saying that this "argument" is in essence something that the other "arguments" are not. How can that be? If one follows Van Til's method then every fact is revelational and every valid argument is objective proof of the reality that the unbeliever suppresses. The idea that this argument can assume a place of superiority over the traditional proofs is not in keeping with a presuppositional approach.


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## Loopie

I would say that the argument's goal is to address something that the other arguments do not necessarily address as their goal. Every fact is revelational and every valid argument is proof of the reality that the unbeliever presupposes. Yet the traditional arguments do not seek to highlight or address the unbeliever's presuppositions. They can be worded in a way that they do, but traditionally do not (Plato and Aristotle's version of the cosmological argument leads to a generic deity based on their presuppositions, not to the God of the Bible). The argument is an objective proof if it begins with the correct presuppositions. If it adopts the presuppositions of the unbeliever, it will simply lead to the deity of Plato or Aristotle. For this reason I would say that the only way one could view the presuppositional approach as superior is that it directly addresses the issue of presuppositions. Traditional arguments can eventually lead to this, but it is not what they generally do from the start.

Here are three quotes from Van Til's writings as to why he disagreed with the traditional method of apologetics:

"I had for many years rejected the Thomistic-Butler type of approach to apologetics. I had done so because of
the unbiblical view of man and the cosmos which underlay this apologetic. I had over and over pointed out that
non-Christian schemes of thought, whether ancient or modern, presupposed a view of man as autonomous, of human
thought or logic as legislative of what can or cannot exist in reality, and of pure contingency as correlative to such
legislative thought. I had for years pointed out that for a Christian to adopt these non-Christian presuppositions about
man, together with the dialectical interdependence of legislative logic and brute contingency, and then to join the natural
man [1 Cor 2:14] in asking whether God exists and whether Christianity is true would be fatal for his enterprise. If we
allow that one intelligent word can be spoken about being or knowing or acting as such, without first introducing the
Creator-creature distinction, we are sunk. As Christians we must not allow that even such a thing as enumeration or
counting can be accounted for except upon the presupposition of the truth of what we are told in Scripture about the
triune God as the Creator and Redeemer of the world. As a Christian believer I must therefore place myself, for the sake
of the argument, upon the position of the non-Christian and show him that on his view of man and the cosmos he and
the whole culture is based upon, and will sink into, quicksand. If the unbeliever then points to the fact that non-Christian
scientists and philosophers have discovered many actual “states of affairs,” I heartily agree with this but I must tell him
that they have done so with borrowed capital. They have done so adventitiously. The actual state of affairs about the
entire cosmos is what the Bible says it is." JA 90-1

"It has become plain to us that the traditional Butler-type of apologetics does not present Christianity as a
challenge to modern relativist thought. Modern man must be challenged to forsake his sinful and therefore futile effort
to find meaning in life in terms of himself as a law unto himself. …
So far as modern thought is not based upon the presupposition of the truth of Christianity it is lost in utter darkness.
Christianity is the only alternative to chaos. The traditional method of apologetics fails to bring out this fact. It is the
business of a Reformed and therefore truly biblical apologetics to do what Romanist-Arminian apologetics has not done
and cannot do." CTK 310

"The general conclusion then is that on the traditional method it is impossible to set one position clearly over
against the other so that the two may be compared for what they are. Certainly there can be no confrontation of two
opposing positions if it cannot be pointed out on what they oppose each other. On the traditional basis of reasoning the
unbeliever is not so much as given an opportunity of seeing with any adequacy how the position he is asked to accept
differs from his own." DF 3 207


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## MW

"It has become plain to us that the traditional Butler-type of apologetics does not present Christianity as a challenge to modern relativist thought. Modern man must be challenged to forsake his sinful and therefore futile effort to find meaning in life in terms of himself as a law unto himself." I fully agree with Van Til's arguments against the traditional "type." This leads me to reject the idea that the transcendental "argument" can be picked up and used in the place of the traditional "arguments" as if it were somehow more effective. If you present the transcendental argument to an unbeliever he must still be challenged to forsake his sinful and futile autonomy.


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> I would say that the argument's goal is to address something that the other arguments do not necessarily address as their goal. Every fact is revelational and every valid argument is proof of the reality that the unbeliever presupposes. Yet the traditional arguments do not seek to highlight or address the unbeliever's presuppositions.



Actually, if the TAG is correct, they do so implicitly, indicating that the unbeliever has preconceived notions that prevented him from seeing this fact before.



Loopie said:


> For this reason I would say that the only way one could view the presuppositional approach as superior is that it directly addresses the issue of presuppositions.



Why is directly addressing presuppositions from the outset necessarily superior? If I state from the outset that God exists because the contrary is impossible, I will immediately (and rightfully) be met with the charge of making bare unsupported assertions until I actually demonstrate that this is a logically necessary conclusion (ie, that the statement "There is no God" is, by itself, self-referentially incoherent). I have stated that there is, indeed, a classical method of proving this directly, by the way.


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## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Actually, if the TAG is correct, they do so implicitly, indicating that the unbeliever has preconceived notions that prevented him from seeing this fact before.



Reference the cosmological argument. No way to get to the God of the Bible unless you presuppose him. The unbeliever definitely has preconceived notions from seeing the facts of traditional arguments as he ought to see it. They are false presuppositions that need to be brought out into the light (so that your traditional argument is more effective and that the God you are trying to prove exists cannot be manipulated by the unbeliever into Plato's deity).



P. F. Pugh said:


> Why is directly addressing presuppositions from the outset necessarily superior? If I state from the outset that God exists because the contrary is impossible, I will immediately (and rightfully) be met with the charge of making bare unsupported assertions until I actually demonstrate that this is a logically necessary conclusion (ie, that the statement "There is no God" is, by itself, self-referentially incoherent). I have stated that there is, indeed, a classical method of proving this directly, by the way.



Because if you do not address the presuppositions that your opponent has, you will end up beating the air. Certainly if you state that God exists because the contrary is impossible, you will be charged with making assertions. That is because the argument needs to be elaborated a bit more than that. The same would be true if I said God exists because everything has a cause. That too would be ridiculed as making an assertion until I better explain the argument. By the way, by addressing presuppositions you can show that the statement 'There is no God' is incoherent without God being the creator of the universe. Your classical method of proving anything demands that you presuppose the God of the Bible. Your opponent can use the cosmological argument and get to the deity of Plato. How are you going to show him that he is wrong without addressing his presuppositions?

Allow me to finish with an illustration that Van Til used (the bottomless pit scenario):

"Let us watch [the self-frustration of the traditional apologist] for a moment. Think of him first as an inductivist.
As such he will engage in “historical apologetics” and in the study of archaeology. In general he will deal with the
“facts” of the universe in order to prove the existence of God. He cannot on his position challenge the assumption of the
man he is trying to win. That man is ready for him. Think of the traditional apologist as throwing facts to his
non-Christian friend as he might throw a ball. His friend receives each fact as he might a ball and throws it behind him
in a bottomless pit. The apologist is exceedingly industrious. He shows the unbelieving friend all the evidence for
theism. He shows all the evidence for Christianity, for instance, for the virgin birth and the resurrection of Christ. Let
us think of his friend as absolutely tireless and increasingly polite. He will then receive all these facts and toss them
behind him in the bottomless pit of pure possibility. ‘Is it not wonderful,’ he will say, ‘what strange things do happen in
Reality. You seem to be a collector of oddities. As for myself I am more interested in the things that happen regularly.
But I shall certainly try hard to explain the facts you mention in accord with the laws that I have found working so far.
Perhaps we should say that laws are merely statistical averages and that nothing can therefore be said about any
particular event ahead of its appearance. Perhaps there are very unusual things in reality. But what does this prove for
the truth of your view?’ 

You see that the unbeliever who does not work on the presupposition of creation and providence is perfectly
consistent with himself when he sees nothing to challenge his unbelief even in the fact of the resurrection of Christ. He
may be surprised for a moment as a child that grows up is surprised at the strange things of life but then when he has
grown up he realizes that “such is life.” Sad to say the traditional Christian apologist has not even asked his unbelieving
friend to see the facts for what they really are. He has not presented the facts at all. That is he has not presented the facts
as they are according to the Christian way of looking at them and the Christian way of looking at them is the true way
of looking at them. Every fact in the universe is what it is by virtue of the place that it has in the plan of God. Man cannot
comprehensively know that plan. But he does know that there is such a plan. He must therefore present the facts of
theism and of Christianity, of Christian theism, as proving Christian theism because they are intelligible as facts in terms
of it and in terms of it alone.

But this is also in effect to say that the Christian apologist should never seek to be an inductivist only. He should
present his philosophy of fact with his facts. He does not need to handle less facts in doing so. He will handle the same
facts but he will handle them as they ought to be handled."
DF3 203-4


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> How are you going to show him that he is wrong without addressing his presuppositions?



Proving that he is wrong is not the primary objective. I am interested in showing that God is there. It just so happens that a side conclusion to this is that the unbeliever is wrong.



Loopie said:


> Allow me to finish with an illustration that Van Til used (the bottomless pit scenario):



All right: what makes the TA different? The unbeliever will simply chuck it into the pit along with the others. From his perspective it's no different---in fact, since Christian theism operates only on the assumption of Christian theism, it's an even worse argument from the perspective of the unbeliever because you've just called him to take a leap of faith (in the straw-man Kierkegaardian sense).


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## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Proving that he is wrong is not the primary objective. I am interested in showing that God is there. It just so happens that a side conclusion to this is that the unbeliever is wrong.



A side conclusion? That is the whole point of witnessing to the unbeliever, to call him to abandon his rebellion and bend the knee to Christ. How can you show that God 'is there' without addressing the presuppositions? Let's say you use the cosmological argument, and say that 'God is there as the uncaused first cause'. The unbeliever could rightly ask you: "What God?: the Muslim's? the Deists? Plato's? Aristotle's?" 



P. F. Pugh said:


> All right: what makes the TA different? The unbeliever will simply chuck it into the pit along with the others. From his perspective it's no different---in fact, since Christian theism operates only on the assumption of Christian theism, it's an even worse argument from the perspective of the unbeliever because you've just called him to take a leap of faith (in the straw-man Kierkegaardian sense).



Not at all, the TA deconstructs his worldview and shows that his position is rationally and logically inconsistent and untenable. His worldview is built on sand. It is on sand because he is a rebel against God. I don't call him to take a leap of faith. I call him to repent and bend the knee to Christ. 

In fact, it isn't just Christian theism that operates on the assumption of Christian theism (you are misunderstanding the TA). ALL of reality operates on the presupposition of Christian Theism. The unbeliever can't throw the 'facts' into the pit because we don't toss them to him for him to play with at his leisure. We first address how it is that he can even catch a ball, or make sense out of what is being tossed to him. We obliterate his pit because that is the first thing we address (a pre-emptive strike of sorts).


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## kappazei

---------- Post added at 07:47 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:33 PM ----------

[/COLOR]


jwright82 said:


> if you look at common evangelical apologetics you will see them hitching our cart to the enlightment



Would you give me an example of this?

Thanks

Bob


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## Philip

Loopie said:


> Let's say you use the cosmological argument, and say that 'God is there as the uncaused first cause'. The unbeliever could rightly ask you: "What God?: the Muslim's? the Deists? Plato's? Aristotle's?"



Is there any other God who satisfies the criteria set forth in the CA and provides adequate ground for being by being necessarily existent? Or, to put it another way, knowledge of a creator entails that He has revealed Himself, and revealing implies revelation, and revelation of a being such as a creator would not be possible without incarnation.



Loopie said:


> Not at all, the TA deconstructs his worldview and shows that his position is rationally and logically inconsistent and untenable. His worldview is built on sand. It is on sand because he is a rebel against God. I don't call him to take a leap of faith. I call him to repent and bend the knee to Christ.



Which from his perspective is a leap of faith.



Loopie said:


> The unbeliever can't throw the 'facts' into the pit because we don't toss them to him for him to play with at his leisure. We first address how it is that he can even catch a ball, or make sense out of what is being tossed to him. We obliterate his pit because that is the first thing we address (a pre-emptive strike of sorts).



Or you would if he'd let you.


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## Loopie

P. F. Pugh said:


> Is there any other God who satisfies the criteria set forth in the CA and provides adequate ground for being by being necessarily existent? Or, to put it another way, knowledge of a creator entails that He has revealed Himself, and revealing implies revelation, and revelation of a being such as a creator would not be possible without incarnation.



That's not what Plato or Aristotle concluded. Just saying. Unless of course they had incorrect presuppositions...



P. F. Pugh said:


> Which from his perspective is a leap of faith.



Well, the sick patient thinks that the massive surgery he needs to cure his condition (only God is the great physician) is a leap of faith. He still is sick, and still needs surgery. Obviously he is not going to listen to the nurse telling him that he has symptoms that are the direct result of his sinful condition, and that he needs a doctor. But just because HE thinks it is a leap of faith doesn't mean that IT IS a leap of faith. 



P. F. Pugh said:


> Or you would if he'd let you.



Well, we don't toss him the balls in the first place until we talk about his presuppositions. Again, you are positing a 'problem' that is the problem for all Christians who try to witness to unbelievers. The unbelievers are UNWILLING to be convinced until God regenerate them. Presuppositional apologetics does not claim to save the unbeliever by reason. If you can understand that, then we can proceed.


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