# Imperative vs. indicative moods as conveyed in scripture?



## earl40 (May 15, 2011)

I am trying to explain to someone who is not reformed the following Martin Luther said in The Bondage of the Will "And even common grammarians and every little school-boy in the street knows, that by verbs of the imperative mood, nothing else is signified than that which ought to be done, and that, what is done or can be done, is expressed by verbs of the indicative mood."

The revealed or prescriptive will is what should happen (imperative mood) as are the many commands God gives to all people. The decretive will is what has happened, is happening, or will happen thus the indicative mood is used. One SHOULD only ascribe volition to God to His decretive will which is the proper way to think of God in that His will is always done. So when we say that people do not do "God's will" we in no way are saying that God did not desire for the event to fall out any other way. For everything that comes to pass is God's will and even the evil people do will bring Him Glory.

Is the above OK?


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## Contra_Mundum (May 15, 2011)

Earl,
Your comments are accurate, but they seem to be addressing various points, rather than one; and they don't flow directly from Luther's comment, although I see their relation. The question of the difference between "ought" and "can" (with regard to man) is important to the discussion, as is the matter of relating the will of God to the manner of its expression. The element of the *readers* responsibility ("SHOULD"--emphasis yours) adds confusion to what I think you're trying to say, when you just before wrote of the prescriptive will of God as what "should happen."

Continuing, there is no "ought to" with regard to God's behavior; whatever he wills for himself is right ethically, and comports with his being and knowledge. Anything that comes to pass can only happen as a result of God's will, so description of facts of revelation (past/present/future) expresses that decretive will of God. If some evil is permitted to be done by some creature, the believing response is to view it as allowed for the greater purpose of its ultimate frustration and destruction. "You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good."

The prescriptive will of God does define that which is the morally proper thing to do, because the creature is naturally subject to his Creator. Some explanation is sought to account for the fact of human rebellion, man's defiance of the "expressed will" of God. The one explanation that comports with the Bible's description of meticulous divine providence, or even a simple or simplistic view of exhaustive divine precognition, is that God's imperatives do not consistently line up with God's indicatives prior to the final moment of history, when they line up perfectly.

The basic or descriptive mood of speech is the indicative. It the the sort of speech one regularly encounters in narrative, whether in past, present--excluding the content of dialog. The future tense can also be in the indicative mood, where description is the purpose. Thus, the statement:"Jesus will be coming again," is indicative.

The statement: "Even so, Come! Lord Jesus," is in the imperative mood. Note the rather obvious contextual limits on this being a "command" believers issue to Christ. In Luther's words, "Nothing else is signified that that which OUGHT to be done."

Luther's full statement sounds like it comes in the context of dealing with the argument that whatever Scripture commands (imperative mood) assumes the possibility of fulfillment. In other words, "Ought implies can" (by logical or moral necessity). It assumes that God--either because of his knowledge or his moral character (fairness)--never demands of anyone that which lies beyond their ability to perform. It reads this belief _into_ the imperatives of Scripture.

But that's not a logical implication of the imperative mood at all. And there is no "moral necessity" for God to limit his commands to that which men can naturally perform. The possibility that a creature might *resent* him for such a command is irrelevant; and resentment would only occur to the *sinful* creature anyway, while a good creature would only be too-willing to die in the attempt. "Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?"

The idea that such a command as "Look unto me, all you ends of the earth, and be saved," means that dead men can look to God _apart from_ his making them alive, takes the theologically descriptive indicative (bound/captive/enslaved will) and subordinates it to the philosophical presuppositions that 1) men possess the power of contrary choice, and 2) God deals with men "fairly" (that is, he lowers the bar for men in their fallen condition, and doesn't ask so much from them as he asked of the two perfect men, Adam then Christ). Again, none of the humanistic assumptions are tethered to the imperative mood.

What Scripture commands (imperative) indeed is what OUGHT to be done. "He did/didn't," "he does/doesn't," "he will/won't," are all indicative expressions of the moving relation from "ought" to "is." (btw, the inverse movement--from "is" to "ought"--is fallacious).


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## earl40 (May 16, 2011)

I am a tad confused that Luther may have implied "that whatever Scripture commands (imperative mood) assumes the possibility of fulfillment." For we know that it is impossible to do the imperative commands unless one is born again. 

I like the comment that there is no "ought to" with respect to God. 

Thank you Rev. Bruce


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## Contra_Mundum (May 16, 2011)

Earl,
It's NOT Luther's position; its the position he's refuting in the BotW. Erasmus' argument is that "ought" implies "can" (because God is "reasonable" or "fair").

Blessings,


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## earl40 (May 16, 2011)

Contra_Mundum said:


> Earl,
> It's NOT Luther's position; its the position he's refuting in the BotW. Erasmus' argument is that "ought" implies "can" (because God is "reasonable" or "fair").
> 
> Blessings,




Thank you very very much.


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