# Reconsidering Traducianism



## RamistThomist (Jan 28, 2018)

I embraced traducianism a few years ago when I read WGT Shedd. And it does have some explanatory power, but I've come across several difficulties (some of which were pointed out by Oliver Crisp).

1. Traducianism demands that the soul be "fissile." Here's the problem. The soul by definition is a metaphysically simple entity. It cannot be cut apart, yet traducianism seems to say that "part" of my soul came from one (or both) of my parents.

2. If traducianism is true, and if it is applied to Christ's human nature, then the following must obtain:
2.1. Christ has a fallen human nature, since it came from a previous lump, which was itself "fallen."
2.1.1. This can be solved by saying the human nature of Christ was immediately sanctified by the Holy Spirit upon conception.
2.1.2. Thus, we have the action of Christ's saving work being applied to Christ before the atonement!
2.2. One could opt for some form of immaculate conception of Mary, but this obviously won't work for Protestants (and in any case it punts the problem).

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## OPC'n (Jan 28, 2018)

I've never heard of this before. I've never even thought about where souls come from. Just off the top of my head I would think that my soul was formed by the same process that my emotions were formed. Neither have DNA so my emotions are my own. My parents did not give them to me. I might have inherited the same chemical makeup of my parents that makes me a super happy person or a super despondent person, but my emotions are not passed down to me from my parents. Same with my soul. Christ was not formed in iniquity like the rest of us. His soul was formed from the Holy Spirit and was his own. Just my own quick thoughts about this.


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jan 28, 2018)

Turretin, endorsing creationism (1) from the law of creation; (2) from the testimony of Scripture; (3) from reasons:

http://www.apuritansmind.com/puritan-favorites/francis-turretin/creationism-or-traducianism/


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jan 29, 2018)

*Creationism*:
John Calvin
Francis Turretin
Charles Hodge
A.A. Hodge
Louis Berkhof

Augustine (according to Berkhof hesitated to choose)

*Traducianism*:
Tertullian
Martin Luther
Jonathan Edwards
Ezekiel Hopkins
W.G.T. Shedd
Augustus Strong
Gordon H. Clark
Robert Reymond (drawn to the view)
Robert Duncan Culver

I have to wonder how traducianists get around immediate imputation as the mode of transmission of sin. If Adam's guilt occurs by a natural process of descent from a distribution of substance to his posterity, this seems to me to infer that in some way we actually participate in the substance of Christ in our redemption from guilt, contrary to Romans 5.

Some pros and cons, Berkhof:


Spoiler



*a. Arguments in favor of Traducianism. *
Several arguments are adduced in favor of this theory:

(1) It is said to be favored by the Scriptural representation

(a) that God but once breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and then left it to man to propagate the species, Gen. 1:28; 2:7;
(b) that the creation of Eve's soul was included in that of Adam, since she is said to be "of the man" (I Cor. 11:8), and nothing is said about the creation of her soul, Gen. 2:23;
(c) that God ceased from the work of creation after He had made man, Gen. 2:2; and
(d) that descendants are said to be in the loins of their fathers, Gen. 46:26; Heb. 7:9,10. Cf. also such passages as John 3:6; 1:13; Rom. 1:3; Acts 17:26.

(2) It is supported by the analogy of vegetable and animal life, in which the increase in numbers is secured, not by a continually increasing number of immediate creations, but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. But cf. Ps. 104:30.

(3) It also seeks support in the inheritance of mental peculiarities and family traits, which are so often just as noticeable as physical resemblances, and which cannot be accounted for by education or example, since they are in evidence even when parents do not live to bring up their children.

(4) Finally, it seems to offer the best basis for the explanation of the inheritance of moral and spiritual depravity, which is a matter of the soul rather than of the body. It is quite common to combine with Traducianism the realistic theory to account for original sin.

*b. Objections to Traducianism. Several objections may be urged against this theory: *

(1) It is contrary to the philosophical doctrine of the simplicity of the soul. The soul is a pure spiritual substance that does not admit of division. The propagation of the soul would seem to imply that the soul of the child separates itself in some way from the soul of the parents. Moreover, the difficult question arises, whether it originates from the soul of the father or from that of the mother. Or does it come from both; and if so, is it not a compositum?

(2) In order to avoid the difficulty just mentioned, it must resort to one of three theories: (a) that the soul of the child had a previous existence, a sort of pre-existence; (b) that the soul is potentially present in the seed of man or woman or both, which is materialism; or (c) that the soul is brought forth, that is, created in some way, by the parents, thus making them in a sense creators.

(3) It proceeds on the assumption that, after the original creation, God works only mediately. After the six days of creation His creative work ceased. The continued creation of souls, says Delitzsch, is inconsistent with God's relation to the world. But the question may be raised, What, then, becomes of the doctrine of regeneration, which is not effected by second causes?

(4) It is generally wedded to the theory of realism, since this is the only way in which it can account for original guilt. By doing this it affirms the numerical unity of the substance of all human souls, an untenable position; and also fails to give a satisfactory answer to the question, why men are held responsible only for the first sin of Adam, and not for his later sins, nor for the sins of the rest of their forebears.

(5) Finally, in the form just indicated it leads to insuperable difficulties in Christology. If in Adam human nature as a whole sinned, and that sin was therefore the actual sin of every part of that human nature, then the conclusion cannot be escaped that the human nature of Christ was also sinful and guilty because it had actually sinned in Adam.


*a. Arguments in favor of Creationism. *

The following are the more important considerations in favor of this theory:

(1) It is more consistent with the prevailing representations of Scripture than Traducianism. The original account of creation points to a marked distinction between the creation of the body and that of the soul. The one is taken from the earth, while the other comes directly from God. This distinction is kept up throughout the Bible, where body and soul are not only represented as different substances, but also as having different origins, Eccl. 12:7; Isa 42:5; Zech. 12:1; Heb. 12:9. Cf. Num. 16:22. Of the passage in Hebrews even Delitzsch, though a Traducianist, says, "There can hardly be a more classical proof text for creationism."

(2) It is clearly far more consistent with the nature of the human soul than Traducianism. The immaterial and spiritual, and therefore indivisible nature of the soul of man, generally admitted by all Christians, is clearly recognized by Creationism. The traducian theory on the other hand, posits a derivation of essence, which, as is generally admitted, necessarily implies separation or division of essence.

(3) It avoids the pitfalls of Traducianism in Christology and does greater justice to the Scriptural representation of the person of Christ. He was very man, possessing a true human nature, a real body and a rational soul, was born of a woman, was made in all points like as we are, and yet, without sin. He did not, like all other men, share in the guilt and pollution of Adam's transgression. This was possible, because he did not share the same numerical essence which sinned in Adam.

*b. Objections to Creationism.*

Creationism is open to the following objections:

(1) The most serious objection is stated by Strong in the following words: "This theory, if it allows that the soul is originally possessed of depraved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil; if it holds the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of moral evil, by teaching that He put this pure soul into a body which will inevitably corrupt it." This is undoubtedly a serious difficulty, and is generally regarded as the decisive argument against Creationism. Augustine already called attention to the fact that the Creationist should seek to avoid this pitfall. But it should be borne in mind that the Creationist does not, like the Traducianist, regard original sin entirely as a matter of inheritance. The descendants of Adam are sinners, not as a result of their being brought into contact with a sinful body, but in virtue of the fact that God imputes to them the original disobedience of Adam. And it is for that reason that God withholds from them original righteousness, and the pollution of sin naturally follows.

(2) It regards the earthly father as begetting only the body of his child, certainly not the most important part of the child, and therefore does not account for the re-appearance of the mental and moral traits of the parents in the children. Moreover, by taking this position it ascribes to the beast nobler powers of propagation than to man, for the beast multiplies itself after its kind. The last consideration is one of no great importance. And as far as mental and moral similarities of parents and children are concerned, it need not necessarily be assumed that these can be accounted for only on the basis of heredity. Our knowledge of the soul is still too deficient to speak with absolute assurance on this point. But this similarity may find its explanation partly in the example of the parents, partly in the influence of the body on the soul, and partly in the fact that God does not create all souls alike, but creates in each particular case a soul adapted to the body with which it will be united and the complex relationship into which it will be introduced.

(3) It is not in harmony with God's present relationship to the world and His manner of working in it, since it teaches a direct creative activity of God, and thus ignores the fact that God now works through secondary causes and ceased from His creative work. This is not a very serious objection for those who do not have a deistic conception of the world. It is a gratuitous assumption that God has ceased from all creative activity in the world.

*Berkhof's conclusion:*

*b. Some form of Creationism deserves preference. *

It seems to us that Creationism deserves the preference, because
(1) it does not encounter the insuperable philosophical difficulty with which Traducianism is burdened;
(2) it avoids the Christological errors which Traducianism involves; and
(3) it is most in harmony with our covenant idea.

At the same time we are convinced that the creative activity of God in originating human souls must be conceived as being most closely connected with the natural process in the generation of new individuals. Creationism does not claim to be able to clear up all difficulties, but at the same time it serves as a warning against the following errors:

(1) that the soul is divisible;
(2) that all men are numerically of the same substance; and
(3) that Christ assumed the same numerical nature which fell in Adam.



Hodge:


Spoiler



Hodge on creationism the dominant Reformed view:

*§ 2. Traducianism.*

What is meant by the term traduction is in general sufficiently clear from the signification of the word. Traducianists on the one hand deny that the soul is created; and on the other hand, they affirm that it is produced by the law of generation, being as truly derived from the parents as the body. The whole man, soul and body, is begotten. The whole man is derived from the substance of his progenitors. Some go further than others in their assertions on this subject.

Some alarm that the soul is susceptible of ”abscission and division,” so that a portion of the soul of the parents is communicated to the child. Others shrink from such expressions, and yet maintain that there is a true derivation of the one from the other. Both classes, however, insist on the numerical identity of essence in Adam and all his posterity both as to soul and as to body. The more enlightened and candid advocates of traducianism admit that the Scriptures are silent on the subject.

Augustine had said the same thing a thousand years ago. “De re obscurissima disputatur, non adjuvantibus divinarum scripturarum certis clarisque documentis.” The passages cited in support of the doctrine teach nothing decisive on the subject. That Adam begat a son in his own likeness, and after his own image, and called his name Seth, only asserts that Seth was like his father. It sheds no light on the mysterious process of generation, and does not teach how the likeness of the child to the parent is secured by physical causes. When Job asks, “Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?” and when our Lord says, “That which is born of the flesh is flesh,” the fact is asserted that like begets like; that a corrupt nature is transmitted from parent to child. But that this can be done only by the transmission of numerically the same substance is a gratuitous assumption. More stress is laid on certain facts of Scripture which are assumed to favour this theory. That in the creation of the woman no mention is made of God’s having breathed into her the breath of life, is said to imply that her soul as well as her body was derived from Adam. Silence, however, proves nothing.

In Gen. i. 27, it is simply said, “God created man in his own image,” just as it is said that He created “every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.” Nothing is there said of his breathing into man the breath of life, i. e., a principle of rational life. Yet we know that it was done. Its not being expressly mentioned in the case of Eve, therefore, is no proof that it did not occur. Again, it is said, that God’s resting on the Sabbath, implies that his creating energy was not afterwards exerted. This is understood to draw the line between the immediate creation and the production of effects in nature by second causes under the providential control of God.

The doctrine of creationism, on the other hand, assumes that God constantly, now as well as at the beginning, exercises his immediate agency in producing something out of nothing. But, in the first place, we do not know how the agency of God is connected with the operation of second causes, how far that agency is mediate, and how far it is immediate; and in the second place, we do know that God has not bound himself to mere providential direction; that his omnipresent power is ever operating through means and without means in the whole sphere of history and of nature.

Of all arguments in favor of traducianism the most effective is that derived from the transmission of a sinful nature from Adam to his posterity. It is insisted that this can neither be explained nor justified unless we assume that Adam’s sin was our sin and our guilt, and that the identical active, intelligent, voluntary substance which transgressed in him, has been transmitted to us. This is an argument which can be fully considered only when we come to treat of original sin. For the present it is enough to repeat the remark just made, that the fact is one thing and the explanation of the fact is another thing. The fact is admitted that the sin of Adam in a true and important sense is our sin,—and that we derive from him a corrupt nature; but that this necessitates the adoption of the ex traduce doctrine as to the origin of the soul, is not so clear. It has been denied by the vast majority of the most strenuous defenders of the doctrine of original sin, in all ages of the Church.

To call creationism a Pelagian principle is only an evidence of ignorance. Again, it is urged that the doctrine of the incarnation necessarily involves the truth of the ex traduce theory. Christ was born of a woman. He was the seed of the woman. Unless both as to soul and body derived from his human mother, it is said, He cannot truly be of the same race with us. The Lutheran theologians, therefore, say:”Si Christus non assumpsisset animam ab anima Maria, animam humanam non redemisset.” This, however, is a simple non sequitur. All that is necessary is that Christ should be a man, a son of David, in the same sense as any other of the posterity of David, save only his miraculous conception. He was formed ex subatantia matris sure in the same sense in which every child born of a woman is born of her substance, but what that sense is, his birth does not determine.

The most plausible argument in favour of traducianism is the undeniable fact of the transmission of the ethnical, national, family, and even parental, peculiarities of mind and temper. This seems to evince that there is a derivation not only of the body but also of the soul in which these peculiarities inhere. But even this argument is not conclusive, because it is impossible for us to determine to what proximate cause these peculiarities are due. They may all be referred, for what we know, to something peculiar in the physical constitution. That the mind is greatly influenced by the body cannot be denied. And a body having the physical peculiarities belonging to any race, nation, or family, may determine within certain limits the character of the soul.

*§ 3. Creationism.*

The common doctrine of the Church, and especially of the Reformed theologians, has ever been that the soul of the child is not generated or derived from the parents, but that it is created by the immediate agency of God. The arguments generally urged in favour of this view are,

*1. That it is more consistent with the prevailing representations of the Scriptures.*

In the original account of the creation there is a marked distinction made between the body and the soul. The one is from the earth, the other from God. This distinction is kept up throughout the Bible. The body and soul are not only represented as different substances, but also as having different origins. The body shall return to dust, says the wise man, and the spirit to God who gave it. Here the origin of the soul is represented as different from and higher than that of the body. The former is from God in a sense in which the latter is not. In like manner God is said to form “the spirit of man within him” (Zech. xii. 1); to give “breath unto the people upon” the earth, “and spirit to them that walk therein.” (Is. xlii. 5.) This language nearly agrees with the account of the original creation, in which God is said to have breathed into man the breath of life, to indicate that the soul is not earthy or material, but had its origin immediately from God. Hence He is called “God of the spirits of all flesh.” (Num. xvi. 22.) It could not well be said that He is God of the bodies of all men.

The relation in which the soul stands to God as its God and creator is very different from that in which the body stands to Him. And hence in Heb. xii. 9, it is said, “We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?” The obvious antithesis here presented is between those who are the fathers of our bodies and Him who is the Father of our spirits. Our bodies are derived from our earthly parents, our souls are derived from God. This is in accordance with the familiar use of the word flesh, where it is contrasted, either expressly or by implication, with the soul. Paul speaks of those who had not “seen his face in the flesh,” of “the life he now lived in the flesh.” He tells the Philippians that it was needful for them that he should remain “in the flesh;” he speaks of his “mortal flesh.” The Psalmist says of the Messiah, “my flesh shall rest in hope,” which the Apostle explains to mean that his flesh should not see corruption. In all these, and in a multitude of similar passages, flesh means the body, and “fathers of our flesh” means fathers of our bodies. So far, therefore, as the Scriptures reveal anything on the subject, their authority is against traducianism and in favour of creationisrn.

*Argument from the Nature of the Soul.*

*2. The latter doctrine, also, is clearly most consistent with the nature of the soul.*

The soul is admitted, among Christians, to be immaterial and spiritual. It is indivisible. The traducian doctrine denies this universally acknowledged truth. It asserts that the soul admits of “separation or division of essence.”1 On the same ground that the Church universally rejected the Gnostic doctrine of emanation as inconsistent with the nature of God as a spirit, it has, with nearly the same unanimity, rejected the doctrine that the soul admits of division of substance. This is so serious a difficulty that some of the advocates of the ex traduce doctrine endeavour to avoid it by denying that their theory assumes any such separation or division of the substance of the soul. But this denial avails little. They maintain that the same numerical essence which constituted the soul of Adam constitutes our souls. If this be so, then either humanity is a general essence of which individual men are the modes of existence, or what was wholly in Adam is distributively, partitively, and by separation, in the multitude of his descendants. Derivation of essence, therefore, does imply, and is generally admitted to imply, separation or division of essence. And this must be so if numerical identity of essence in all mankind is assumed to be secured by generation or propagation.

*3. A third argument in favour of creationism and against traducianism is derived from the Scriptural doctrine as to the person of Christ.*

He was very man; He had a true human nature; a true body and a rational soul. He was born of a woman. He was, as to his flesh, the son of David. He was descended from the fathers. He was in all points made like as we are, yet without sin. This is admitted on both sides. But, as before remarked in reference to realism, this, on the theory of traducianism, necessitates the conclusion that Christ’s human nature was guilty and sinful We are partakers of Adam’s sin both as to guilt and pollution, because the same numerical essence which sinned in him is communicated to us. Sin, it is said, is an accident, and supposes a substance in which it inheres, or to which it pertains. Community in sin supposes, therefore, community of essence.

If we were not in Adam as to essence we did not sin in him, and do not derive a corrupt nature from him. But, if we were in him as to essence then his sin was our sin both as to guilt and pollution. This is the argument of traducianists repeated in every form. But they insist that Christ was in Adam as to the substance of his human nature as truly as we were. They say that if his body and soul were not derived from the body and soul of his virgin mother he was no true man, and cannot be the redeemer of men. What is true of other men must, consequently, be true of Him. He must, therefore, be as much involved in the guilt and corruption of the apostasy as other men. It will not do to affirm and deny the same thing. It is a contradiction to say that we are guilty of Adam’s sin because we are partakers of his essence, and that Christ is not guilty of his sin nor involved in its pollution, although He is a partaker of his essence. If participation of essence involve community of guilt and depravity in the one case, it must also in the other. As this seems a legitimate conclusion from the traducian doctrine, and as this conclusion is anti-Christian, and false, the doctrine itself cannot be true.

*§ 4. Concluding Remarks.*

Such are the leading arguments on both sides of this question In reference to this discussion it may be remarked,

*1. That while it is incumbent on us strenuously to resist any doctrine which assumes the divisibility, and consequent materiality, of the human soul, or which leads to the conclusion that the human nature of our blessed Lord was contaminated with sin, yet it does not become us to be wise above that which is written.*

We may confess that generation, the production of a new individual of the human race, is an inscrutable mystery. But this must be said of the transmission of life in all its forms. If theologians and philosophers would content themselves with simply denying the creation of the soul ex nihilo, without insisting on the division of the substance of the soul or the identity of essence in all human beings, the evil would not be so great. Some do attempt to be thus moderate, and say, with Frohschammer,1 “Generare is nicht ein traducere, sondern ein secundares, ein creatürliches creare.“They avail themselves of the analogy often referred to, “cum flamma accendit flammam, neque tota flarmma accendens transit in accensam neque pars ejus in eam descendit: ita anima parentum generat aniniam filii, ei nihil decedat.” It must be confessed, however, that in this view the theory loses all its value as a means of explaining the propagation of sin.

*2. It is obviously most unreasonable and presumptuous, as well as dangerous, to make a theory as to the origin of the soul the ground of a doctrine so fundamental to the Christian system as that of original sin.*

Yet we see theologians, ancient and modern, boldly asserting that if their doctrine of derivation, and the consequent numerical sameness of substance in all men, be not admitted, then original sin is impossible. That is, that nothing can be true, no matter how plainly taught in the word of God, which they cannot explain. This is done even by those who protest against introducing philosophy into theology, utterly unconscious, as it would seem, that they themselves occupy, quoad hoc, the same ground with the rationalists. They will not believe in hereditary depravity unless they can explain the mode of its transmission. There can be no such thing, they say, as hereditary depravity unless the soul of the child is the same numerical substance as the soul of the parent. That is, the plain assertions of the Scriptures cannot be true unless the most obscure, unintelligible, and self-contradictory, and the least generally received philosophical theory as to the constitution of man and the propagation of the race be adopted. No man has a right to hang the millstone of his philosophy around the neck of the truth of God.

*3. There is a third cautionary remark which must not be omitted. The whole theory of traducianism is founded on the assumption that God, since the original creation, operates only through means.*

Since the “sixth day the Creator has, in this world, exerted no strictly creative energy. He rested from the work of creation upon the seventh day, and still rests.” The continued creation of souls is declared by Delitzsch to be inconsistent with God’s relation to the world. He now produces only mediately, i. e., through the operation of second causes. This is a near approach to the mechanical theory of the universe, which supposes that God, having created the world and endowed his creatures with certain faculties and properties, leaves it to the operation of these second causes. A continued superintendence of Providence may be admitted, but the direct exercise of the divine efficiency is denied. What, then, becomes of the doctrine of regeneration’?

The new birth is not the effect of second causes. It is not a natural effect produced by the influence of the truth or the energy of the human will. It is due to the immediate exercise of the almighty power of God. God’s relation to the world is not that of a mechanist to a machine, nor such as limits Him to operating only through second causes. He is immanent in the world. He sustains and guides all causes. He works constantly through them, with them, and without them. As in the operations of writing or speaking there is with us the union and combined action of mechanical, chemical, and vital forces, controlled by the presiding power of mind; and as the mind, while thus guiding the operations of the body, constantly exercises its creative energy of thought, so God, as immanent in the world, constantly guides all the operations of second causes, and at the same time exercises uninterruptedly his creative energy. Life is not the product of physical causes. We know not that its origin is in any case due to any cause other than the immediate power of God. If life be the peculiar attribute of immaterial substance, it may be produced agreeably to a fixed plan by the creative energy of God whenever the conditions are present under which He has purposed it should begin to be.

The organization of a seed, or of the embryo of an animal, so far as it consists of matter, may be due to the operation of material causes guided by the providential agency of God, while the vital principle itself is due to his creative power. There is nothing in this derogatory to the divine character. There is nothing in it contrary to the Scriptures. There is nothing in it out of analogy with the works and working of God. It is far preferable to the theory which either entirely banishes God from the world, or restricts his operations to a concursus with second causes. The objection to creationism that it does away with the doctrine of miracles, or that it supposes God to sanction every act with which his creative power is connected, does not seem to have even plausibility. A miracle is not simply an event due to the immediate agency of God, for then every act of conversion would be a miracle. But it is an event, occurring in the external world, which involves the suspension or counteracting of some natural law, and which can be referred to nothing but the immediate power of God. The origination of life, therefore, is neither in nature nor design a miracle, in the proper sense of the word. This exercise of God’s creative energy, in connection with the agency of second causes, no more implies approbation than the fact that He gives and sustains the energy of the murderer proves that He sanctions murder.

*4. Finally this doctrine of traducianism is held by those who contend for the old realistic doctrine that humanity is a generic substance or life.* The two theories, however, do not seem to harmonize, and their combination produces great confusion and obscurity. According to the one theory the soul of the child is derived from the soul of its parents; according to the other theory there is no derivation. One magnet is not, or need not be derived from another; one Leyden jar is not derived from another; nor one galvanic battery from another. There is no derivation in the case. The general forces of magnetism, electricity and galvanism, are manifested in connection with given material combinations. And if a man be the manifestation of the general principle of humanity in connection with a given human body, his human nature is not derived from his immediate progenitors.

The object of this discussion is not to arrive at certainty as to what is not clearly revealed in Scripture, nor to explain what is, on all sides, admitted to be inscrutable, but to guard against the adoption of principles which are in opposition to plain and important doctrines of the word of God.

If traducianism teaches that the soul admits of abscission or division; or that the human race are constituted of numerically the same substance; or that the Son of God assumed into personal union with himself the same numerical substance which sinned and fell in Adam; then it is to be rejected as both false and dangerous.

But if, without pretending to explain everything, it simply asserts that the human race is propagated in accordance with the general law which secures that like begets like; that the child derives its nature from its parents through the operation of physical laws, attended and controlled by the agency of God, whether directive or creative, as in all other cases of the propagation of living creatures, it may be regarded as an open question, or matter of indifference.

Creationism does not necessarily suppose that there is any other exercise of the immediate power of God in the production of the human soul, than such as takes place in the production of life in other cases. It only denies that the soul is capable of division, that all mankind are composed of numerically the same essence and that Christ assumed numerically the same essence that sinned in Adam.

Src: Hodge, C. (1997). Vol. 2: _Systematic Theology_ (68–76).

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## TylerRay (Jan 29, 2018)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> I have to wonder how traducianists get around immediate imputation as the mode of transmission of sin. If Adam's guilt occurs by a natural process of descent from a distribution of substance to his posterity, this seems to me to infer that in some way we actually participate in the substance of Christ in our redemption from guilt, contrary to Romans 5.


I don't think that, for a Protestant, traducianism need imply that Adam's guilt is passed on via natural generation. There's no problem affirming that the soul traduces from the soul of parents, while the guilt of Adam's first transgression is imputed due to being _in Adam_, federally.



BayouHuguenot said:


> 2. If traducianism is true, and if it is applied to Christ's human nature, then the following must obtain:
> 2.1. Christ has a fallen human nature, since it came from a previous lump, which was itself "fallen."
> 2.1.1. This can be solved by saying the human nature of Christ was immediately sanctified by the Holy Spirit upon conception.
> 2.1.2. Thus, we have the action of Christ's saving work being applied to Christ before the atonement!
> 2.2. One could opt for some form of immaculate conception of Mary, but this obviously won't work for Protestants (and in any case it punts the problem).



Could it not be that God did a special work in making the soul of Christ from Mary's soul, which had a corrupt nature, an incorrupt soul, just as he did a special work in Christ being conceived without a man?

To be clear, I am not a convinced traducianist. This is a matter that I've suspended judgment on until I've studied it out more thoroughly. I lean in the direction of traducianism, though.

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## RamistThomist (Jan 29, 2018)

TylerRay said:


> Could it not be that God did a special work in making from Mary's soul, which had a corrupt nature, an incorrupt soul, just as he did a special work in Christ being conceived without a man?



Yes, but that goes against the very point traducianism is trying to make.


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## Dachaser (Jan 29, 2018)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> *Creationism*:
> John Calvin
> Francis Turretin
> Charles Hodge
> ...





Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Turretin, endorsing creationism (1) from the law of creation; (2) from the testimony of Scripture; (3) from reasons:
> 
> http://www.apuritansmind.com/puritan-favorites/francis-turretin/creationism-or-traducianism/


Would God be create every time a life is conceived a "breath of God" unto/into that new person, which would be pure, but than become warped and made sinful due to all of us being included and judged by God to be in the Fall of Adam now?
And the Immaculate Conception is how God bypassed the Original Sin all of us received from fall of Adam?
If not having God create the soul directly, how would Jesus have avoided sin from His parents than?


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## TylerRay (Jan 29, 2018)

BayouHuguenot said:


> Yes, but that goes against the very point traducianism is trying to make.


Not necessarily. The reason I am attracted to traducianism is because of the paradigm of WSC 8, 9, and 11, regarding God's execution of his decrees. His work of creation is his "making all things of nothing, by the word of his power, in the space of six days, and all very good," and the rest of his works are categorized as "works of providence." Creationism doesn't fit very neatly into this paradigm--the creation of souls would be a glaring exception.

It seems terribly awkward to say, "God does not create anything from nothing anymore, except for human souls."

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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jan 29, 2018)

TylerRay said:


> Not necessarily. The reason I am attracted to traducianism is because of the paradigm of WSC 8, 9, and 11, regarding God's execution of his decrees. His work of creation is his "making all things of nothing, by the word of his power, in the space of six days, and all very good," and the rest of his works are categorized as "works of providence." Creationism doesn't fit very neatly into this paradigm--the creation of souls would be a glaring exception.
> 
> It seems terribly awkward to say, "God does not create anything from nothing anymore, except for human souls."


Are you reading the Confession to the effect that a person is conceived with corruption and death inhering in the soul that the person receives from their parents and the Lord imputes guilt to that soul independently of death and corruption?


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## TylerRay (Jan 29, 2018)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> Are you reading the Confession to the effect that a person is conceived with corruption and death inhering in the soul that the person receives from their parents and the Lord imputes guilt to that soul independently of death and corruption?


Again, I haven't studied the issue out thoroughly. My only point is that the Standards explicitly teach that creation is finished after day six. If someone wants to make an allowance for the creation of human souls after day six, that's fine, but it doesn't fit neatly into the paradigm.


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jan 29, 2018)

Dachaser said:


> Would God be create every time a life is conceived a "breath of God" unto/into that new person, which would be pure, but than become warped and made sinful due to all of us being included and judged by God to be in the Fall of Adam now?
> And the Immaculate Conception is how God bypassed the Original Sin all of us received from fall of Adam?
> If not having God create the soul directly, how would Jesus have avoided sin from His parents than?


David,

Please unpack these statements with some careful explanations and proper grammar. I cannot respond effectively if I have to assume what you are actually trying to say. This means you can feel free to post more that short snippets, taking the time to lay out what you are trying to say. PB is a long-form discussion site, so posts that are more than a couple of sentences, are very welcome when the topic warrants the same.


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## RamistThomist (Jan 29, 2018)

TylerRay said:


> Not necessarily. The reason I am attracted to traducianism is because of the paradigm of WSC 8, 9, and 11, regarding God's execution of his decrees. His work of creation is his "making all things of nothing, by the word of his power, in the space of six days, and all very good," and the rest of his works are categorized as "works of providence." Creationism doesn't fit very neatly into this paradigm--the creation of souls would be a glaring exception.
> 
> It seems terribly awkward to say, "God does not create anything from nothing anymore, except for human souls."



Except for 'the special work in Mary's soul,' which is explicitly an act of creationism.


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## TylerRay (Jan 29, 2018)

BayouHuguenot said:


> Except for 'the special work in Mary's soul,' which is explicitly an act of creationism.


Not necessarily--God could work by an extraordinary providence to bring a sinless Christ from the substance of Mary's sinful soul.


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## Dachaser (Jan 29, 2018)

Ask Mr. Religion said:


> David,
> 
> Please unpack these statements with some careful explanations and proper grammar. I cannot respond effectively if I have to assume what you are actually trying to say. This means you can feel free to post more that short snippets, taking the time to lay out what you are trying to say. PB is a long-form discussion site, so posts that are more than a couple of sentences, are very
> 
> ...


The Holy Spirit Conceived Him by miraculous means though, in order to allow Jesus to avoid being tainted and corrupted by Original Sin.


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## RamistThomist (Jan 29, 2018)

TylerRay said:


> Not necessarily--God could work by an extraordinary providence to bring a sinless Christ from the substance of Mary's sinful soul.



Did Christ receive his human soul from Mary's soul?


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## TylerRay (Jan 29, 2018)

BayouHuguenot said:


> Did Christ receive his human soul from Mary's soul?


It's a viable option for a traducianist, no?


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## RamistThomist (Jan 29, 2018)

TylerRay said:


> It's a viable option for a traducianist, no?



That is the traducianist conclusion. All Christians must confess that Christ received his human flesh from Mary's flesh--but did he receive his human soul from Mary's soul?


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## RBachman (Jan 29, 2018)

I confess at first this post and the comments made me smile as it was evidence of a 'slow news day' on the forum. But I remembered some articles on Drudge that discussed cloning of humans and chimps. I find this kind of 'scientific research' damnable and open to God's judgment. However, if human cloning does take place at some point (which seems inevitable), then this topic of the source of the soul may take on new importance for believers. I have not considered it enough to comment or have a view. But I would suggest that those of you considering the matter may be taking on a very important and relevant topic for our day. I will continue reading your contributions with interest.

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## Ask Mr. Religion (Jan 29, 2018)

_Pulling traducianism out of the Shedd_ - Oliver Crisp (2006)

A response to Crisp in the form of a paper by a student at CTS, Lawrence R. O'Donnell III, a relatively known scholar and critic of Van Til:
_Shedding traducianism: Oliver Crisp’s analysis of William Shedd’s traducianism in light of Herman Bavinck’s creationism _(2011)

Both are attached and worth a read.

O'Donnell's Th.M. thesis linked above is also a good read, but that is for a separate topic.

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