# Defining Free Will



## Philip (Oct 9, 2009)

In philosophy class this morning, there was a debate over free will and part of the issue came down to two different senses:

Pre-enlightenment: Freedom is the ability to do what is good in the sight of God.

Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.

Can Calvinists agree that depraved man has free will in the second sense? I suggest yes.


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## PresbyDane (Oct 9, 2009)

I would also say yes, but next question Will then be is the Will really free when it only has a limited desire to choose from that being the one bound to sin. Something bound is not free!


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## Tripel (Oct 9, 2009)

I think any definition of free will needs to include mention of ability. In other words, our will is free, but we are only going to will to do that which is within our depraved ability.


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## Christusregnat (Oct 9, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.
> 
> Can Calvinists agree that depraved man has free will in the second sense? I suggest yes.



The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.

Cheers,


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## Skyler (Oct 9, 2009)

I think the differentiation between moral and constitutional ability would also come into play here--the limits of one's moral nature vs. one's physical nature. Physically, one can do good things; morally, one cannot(assuming said person is unregenerate).


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## Philip (Oct 9, 2009)

> The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.



The second definition leaves what one wants out of the question. The question is whether one could, if so disposed, do good. The second definition was not a concept that anyone before 1700 would have been familiar with. If we define free will as the ability to do what one is disposed to do, I think that we can say yes, this idea is compatible with reformed theology. What is incompatible is libertarianism which says that the will is unconditioned.



> I would also say yes, but next question Will then be is the Will really free when it only has a limited desire to choose from that being the one bound to sin. Something bound is not free!



Will we have free will in the New Heavens/New Earth?


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## Iakobos_1071 (Oct 9, 2009)

I believe the Bible teaches the absolute Sovereignty of God. (In control of everything) To me this means our will (the elect) and the will of the reprobate as well.. It was not Pharaoh's free will falling on his total depravity that let him to the choice to not let the slaves go, it was the authority of the living God hardening his heart and making him choose not to let His people go that his wrath might be shown. This is in the bible in many other examples.. God is never caught off guard.


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## Christusregnat (Oct 9, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> > The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.
> 
> 
> 
> The second definition leaves what one wants out of the question. The question is whether one could, if so disposed, do good. The second definition was not a concept that anyone before 1700 would have been familiar with.



That's funny, I think Martin Luther lived before 1700, and he refuted the second view in Bondage of the Will. It's good your in college, so that you can help me get my time line straight. 

Cheers,


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

The Arminian, and common, definition of free will must involve the power of contrary choice, i.e. that an action is free iff one has the ability to do otherwise, all other things being equal. Although, I was discussing this with a friend yesterday, and I realized that the libertarian definition must be a little more than this; it must also include the possibility of performing anything which is within one's natural ability.

For instance, operating on the former definition of libertarian free will, one could say that I have three options in front of me (for the sake of argument): I could type an "a," "b," or "c" on the computer screen. If it is within my natural ability to type in a "c," yet my only conceivable options are "a" and "b," then clearly I don't have libertarian free will with respect to typing "c"; some external force must be restraining me. Therefore the ability to do otherwise, strictly speaking, is not a sufficient definition of free will. It must be the ability to do whatever is within one's natural ability at any given moment.

The Reformed and Biblical viewpoint, on the other hand, is basically the second definition you have above, although saying this convinces me to make a qualifier. I don't think either of the definitions in the OP are false definitions of freedom, but I believe they are true with respect to different aspects of freedom. The second definition properly defines freedom in the sense of possessing moral responsibility, while the first properly defines freedom in the sense of appropriately utilizing our faculties associated with moral responsibility. Just as the _imago Dei_ can be spoken of in two senses, having a rational-moral nature, and properly using that nature, so also freedom can be spoken of in two senses.

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 06:05:57 EST-----



Christusregnat said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> > > The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.
> ...



Adam,

The second view in the OP is the Biblical view. Arminians appeal to the power of contrary choice (in good Romans 9:19 fashion) as essential to freedom, while Reformed Christians stress that freedom is the ability to act in accord with one's inclinations/"heart."

And, as I said above, freedom with respect to _properly utilizing our faculties_ is correctly defined in the first definition. But this does not imply that freedom with respect to the sheer possession of moral responsibility for actions is incorrectly defined in the second definition.

Ben


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## Philip (Oct 9, 2009)

Christusregnat said:


> P. F. Pugh said:
> 
> 
> > > The second definition is the Arminian view. Man's fallen nature has no ability to choose what is good, but is wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually. If you're considering man as originally created, then, yes, the second definition is true.
> ...



No, that wasn't it at all. What he was refuting is the idea that man, in his natural state, can do good in the sense that he is willing. That is, though man has the natural ability to do good, he does not have the actual or volitional ability to do good.

Free will is the ability to choose the contrary, if one were so disposed. I chose to eat pizza rather than wings tonight because I felt like pizza. Could I have chosen have chosen wings? Yes, if I was so disposed--but I wasn't, so the choice of pizza was inevitable.


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## Christusregnat (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Adam,
> 
> The second view in the OP is the Biblical view. Arminians appeal to the power of contrary choice (in good Romans 9:19 fashion) as essential to freedom, while Reformed Christians stress that freedom is the ability to act in accord with one's inclinations/"heart."



The second view states that man has the natural ability to choose good or evil. That may be your view, but it is not the Scripture's, nor the confessional view.



> Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.



Man does not have the natural ability to choose anything but evil.



> I. God has endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined good, or evil.[1]
> 
> II. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom, and power to will and to do that which was good and well pleasing to God;[2] but yet, mutably, so that he might fall from it.[3]
> 
> ...



Human nature, as fallen, cannot choose anything spiritually good.

Cheers,


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

Christusregnat said:


> The second view states that man has the natural ability to choose good or evil. That may be your view, but it is not the Scripture's, nor the confessional view.



No, it states that _if man pleases_, he may choose good or evil. TD men may not please to do good; therefore they choose only evil.



Adam said:


> Philip said:
> 
> 
> > Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil.
> ...



I should have defined this term from the outset. Natural ability by definition refers to one's capability to perform an action _if he desires to do that action_. To get this across with an extreme example, God has the natural ability to sin, but He does not have the moral ability to sin. He is not too _weak_ to sin, but too _good_ to sin. He would never desire to sin, but if He did (God forbid), then He would be powerful enough to carry it out.



Adam said:


> Human nature, as fallen, cannot choose anything spiritually good.



Agreed. But this is a moral inability, not a natural inability. The distinction has to be made, for there are clearly things we are unable to carry out for which we have moral responsibility (e.g. repentance and faith), and there are clearly things we are unable to carry out for which we don't (e.g. flying without technological assistance).


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## steven-nemes (Oct 9, 2009)

Free will is the power or ability to do otherwise than we do in some circumstances. Peter van Inwagen defines it as such in his essay _How to Think about the Problem of Free Will._

Compatibilism is the view that this ability is compatible with determinism being true; incompatibilism is the view that this ability is not compatible with determinism being true.

Hard determinists are incompatibilists who believe in determinism. Libertarians are incompatibilists who believe we do have free will and determinism is false. Pessimism about free will is the view that whether or not determinism is true, free will is not possible.

Some people interpret "ability or power to do otherwise than we do" in a counter-factual sense: _S could have done otherwise if the conditions prior to his committing that act had been different_, for instance. A compatibilist might hold to that kind of power of contrary choice. 

Others interpret "ability or power to do otherwise than we do" in a stronger sense: _S could have done otherwise than he did, all prior conditions being the same._ A libertarian might hold to that kind of power of contrary choice.

I lean towards hard determinism or pessimism about free will.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

steven-nemes said:


> I lean towards hard determinism or pessimism about free will.





Doesn't hard determinism _ipso facto_ preclude moral responsibility?


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## steven-nemes (Oct 9, 2009)

Only if you assume free will is necessary for moral responsibility.

Which I don't.

Remember, I was speaking of _free will_, which is a separate issue from moral responsibility, though the two are closely related.

Really, I could've added the _semi-compatibilist_ position to the list, which is the view that whether or not free will is compatible with determinism, moral responsibility is.

I could be a pessimist about free will and still believe in moral responsibility, though this view is probably very rare.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

I thought compatibilism referred to the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, not of LFW and determinism -- for the latter two are excluded by definition.


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## Christusregnat (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Agreed. But this is a moral inability, not a natural inability.



I think you are equivocating with the word natural. Please tell me what do you mean by _natural_, and then perhaps we can discuss this. God does not have a natural ability to sin, nor a moral ability to sin; He is impeccable.

When we talk about man's nature, we have to talk about it under the fourfold state. Which one do you want to talk about? To blur the four states is to create confusion.

Cheers,


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## CharlieJ (Oct 9, 2009)

*Neither?*



Confessor said:


> I thought compatibilism referred to the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, not of LFW and determinism -- for the latter two are excluded by definition.



You are surely correct in your second assertion - LFW and determinism are mutually exclusive concepts. However, I'm not sure you're correct in your first assertion, that compatibilism refers to moral responsibility and determinism. I believe that compatibilism refers to the belief that determinism is compatible with a reasonable definition of free will (although not LFW). Most Reformed, for example, would argue both for determinism and for a concept of free will focusing on freedom from external compulsion. 

As you can tell from Steven's post, the discussion has advanced along a number of different lines, not all of which can be placed on a two-dimensional spectrum.


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## steven-nemes (Oct 9, 2009)

Free will is what I defined it to be at the top of my post. That's the definition van Inwagen gives.

Compatibilism is the view that _that_ is compatible with determinism. Semi-compatibilism is the view that whether or not _that_ is compatible with determinism, moral responsibility nonetheless is.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

Christusregnat said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> > Agreed. But this is a moral inability, not a natural inability.
> ...



If one has the capability of performing an action _when he wants_, then he has a natural ability to carry out that action. That God cannot sin is not a want of power, but a want of evil in Him. If He desired, He could sin, but since He is perfect He will never desire to sin -- thus He has a moral inability to sin.

I am not talking about any particular one of the four states, but if I were to categorize them, I would say that in all four states man has the natural ability to sin: in the first he has the moral ability to sin and not to sin (at various points in time); in the second he has the moral ability to sin, but not to do good; in the third he has the moral ability to sin and not to sin (again, at various points); and in the fourth he has the moral ability to do good, but not to sin.

And, again, among various actions that humans are incapable of performing, there are some for which our inability is punishable, and some for which it is not. Therefore there _must_ be some non-arbitrary distinction between the two. Hence, natural ability and moral ability.

I'm basically just rehashing Jonathan Edwards here, by the way.


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## Skyler (Oct 9, 2009)

Joshua said:


> I'm pretty sure the definition I gave was the simplest, most succinct, and best answer. I would know, I have a Bachelor's Degree.


You're absolutely right, Joshua. What _was_ I thinking to doubt you?


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## Marrow Man (Oct 9, 2009)

Alister McGrath writes the following paragraph in his book Studies in Doctrine concerning the historical meaning of the term (see my blog post here):



> The term “free will” (which is a translation of the Latin _liberum arbitrium_) is not a biblical term but derives from Stoicism. It was introduced into Western Christianity by the second-century theologian Tertullian, who borrowed this Latin term to translate the Greek word _autexousia_, which meant something rather different: “responsibility for one’s own actions” is probably the most helpful translation. What Augustine had to do, therefore, was to keep the term “free will” (which during the two centuries since Tertullian had become so well established that its elimination was impossible) but to try and bring its meaning back into line with the teaching of the New Testament, especially that of Paul.


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## Philip (Oct 9, 2009)

I should have mentioned that Edwards makes the distinction I just made.

Natural here is not the theological natural. It means--within one's power. I have a natural ability to walk around my room even if I don't want to do so. I do not have a natural ability to fly around the room even if I want to do so.


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## MW (Oct 9, 2009)

There are some odd statements flying around this thread.

First, God cannot sin. He cannot even be tempted to sin, naturally, morally, or otherwise. He hates sin and is of purer eyes than to behold evil. Perish the thought, whoever suggested the contrary.

Secondly, the discussion is woefully confused between action and the morality of an action. Of course an unregernerate person can choose to do good and abstain from evil so far as actions commanded or forbidden are concerned. Read Paul's account in Philippians 3. But those actions can never be pleasing to God because they are not done for the glory of God or by faith in the righteousness of Jesus Christ.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> First, God cannot sin. He cannot even be tempted to sin, naturally, morally, or otherwise. He hates sin and is of purer eyes than to behold evil. Perish the thought, whoever suggested the contrary.



Would you say that this proposition is true? _If God desired to sin, He would be powerful enough to carry it out._

I am not advocating for the truthfulness of the antecedent, or even the remote possibility of its truthfulness.


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## MW (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Would you say that this proposition is true? _If God desired to sin, He would be powerful enough to carry it out._



No; it falls into the same category as the "rock too heavy to lift." It is an absurdity. Sin is weakness, not strength.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> No; it falls into the same category as the "rock too heavy to lift." It is an absurdity. Sin is weakness, not strength.



Right, but a morally perfect being's capability of sinning is an objective impossibility only because of its _moral_ aspect. Sin is moral weakness, not natural weakness.


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> armourbearer said:
> 
> 
> > First, God cannot sin. He cannot even be tempted to sin, naturally, morally, or otherwise. He hates sin and is of purer eyes than to behold evil. Perish the thought, whoever suggested the contrary.
> ...



What moral law could God be bound to so as to desire Himself to break it? It seems like the proposition is meaningless because the terms are self-contradictory.


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## MW (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Right, but a morally perfect being's capability of sinning is an objective impossibility only because of its _moral_ aspect. Sin is moral weakness, not natural weakness.



No; it is natural weakness, if by natural you mean what is ordinarily conveyed by the moral-natural distinction. Just look at the political spectrum. Sin is the easy choice; there is a temporary pleasure in it, even if it is but for a season.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

JTB said:


> What moral law could God be bound to so as to desire Himself to break it? It seems like the proposition is meaningless because the terms are self-contradictory.



Are you saying that since God is the standard for moral goodness, it would be meaningless to speak of the possibility of His acting apart from that standard?

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 07:59:13 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> Confessor said:
> 
> 
> > Right, but a morally perfect being's capability of sinning is an objective impossibility only because of its _moral_ aspect. Sin is moral weakness, not natural weakness.
> ...



Well, some sins can be physically grueling to carry out, e.g. a mass murder. It would be physically easier, at least in one case, not to carry that out.

But at any rate, by "natural ability" I mean this: one has the natural ability to carry out an action if he can carry it out when he so desires. Moral ability refers to the actual possession of that desire. (God can never possess a desire to sin; therefore He is morally unable to sin.)


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> JTB said:
> 
> 
> > What moral law could God be bound to so as to desire Himself to break it? It seems like the proposition is meaningless because the terms are self-contradictory.
> ...



I'm saying that, as the Sovereign determiner of law, He cannot be bound to anything other than His own desire. But sin is any want of conformity or transgression of the law. It would require God to want other than He wants to be both lawgiver and lawbreaker. No amount of power can set aside the nature of thinking (laws of logic) itself.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

JTB said:


> I'm saying that, as the Sovereign determiner of law, He cannot be bound to anything other than His own desire. But sin is any want of conformity or transgression of the law. It would require God to want other than He wants to be both lawgiver and lawbreaker. No amount of power can set aside the nature of thinking (laws of logic) itself.



The tension you're describing is one of desires, and how it is impossible for God to desire sin. By definition, that would be referring to His moral inability to sin (with which I'd agree), not a natural inability.

I'm not saying He's powerful enough to change His desires in order to make them sinful, by the way. That would imply LFW, as it would entail the precedence of volition to inclinations.


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## MW (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> Well, some sins can be physically grueling to carry out, e.g. a mass murder. It would be physically easier, at least in one case, not to carry that out.
> 
> But at any rate, by "natural ability" I mean this: one has the natural ability to carry out an action if he can carry it out when he so desires. Moral ability refers to the actual possession of that desire. (God can never possess a desire to sin; therefore He is morally unable to sin.)



Your first paragraph conflates physical with natural.

Your second paragraph is closer to the distinction between moral and natural because it looks at the natural as a constitutive ability. However, it is confused because it sees "natural" as referring to ability to carry out an action rather than an ability to choose. The discussion is freedom of the "will," which is solely concerned with the power to choose. "Natural" refers to the ability to make choices as a free agent. "Moral" refers to the quality of those choices as judged by God according to the standard of His law. Again, I would say that God has no such ability to choose sin either naturally or morally.


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## Ron (Oct 9, 2009)

We must define the will and then freedom. The will is the simply the faculty of choice, or that by which the mind chooses. One can have a will yet not be able to do what he is disposed to do for many reasons. For instance, one with a will might wish to take a walk in the park but not be able to do so due to physical imprisonment or physical disability. In a word, man has a will but I find nothing free about it since in a philosophical sense, there is no such thing as free will for such freedom implies the power of contrary choice. Liberty is another matter altogether. I discuss liberty below. 

From my blog:

The question that always lurks behind the objection to the Edwardsian view of God’s determination of the human will is how can man be morally accountable for choices that are necessary and not free? In other words, if it is true that God knows the future choices of men because he has determined them and that free will is a philosophical surd, then how can man be held responsible for any choices whatsoever? The solution lies in the distinction between ability and liberty.

There are four states of man. (1) Man in the garden prior to the fall; (2) man after the fall yet prior to conversion; (3) converted man; and (4) glorified man. In all four states man does not have free will; for man cannot choose contrary to his is strongest inclination at the moment of choice; nor can man choose contrary to the truth of how he will choose. It is not as if prior to the fall Adam had free will and then lost it with sin, regaining it upon conversion, etc. Neither man nor God ever has free will.The seat of moral accountability is (a) liberty (the ability to choose what one wants), AND (b) the want of being able to choose contrary to how one will. With respect to liberty, man is morally accountable when he has the ability to choose as he wants; which is to say, man is morally accountable when he has liberty to act, which presupposes no prohibitors, whether they be economic, intellectual, physical, etc. Given liberty, it is necessary that man always choose according to his intentions and never contrary to them; for to act contrary to an intention is not to choose but to act irrationally, without intention. Accordingly, man is morally accountable when he has liberty yet no free will.

A man crippled in his legs from birth cannot be held responsible for not running around the back yard with his children. The reason being, he could not do so if he wanted. He has no liberty in other words, which is again the ability to choose as one wants. With respect to coming to Christ, God’s election of reprobates unto damnation does not prohibit them from acting according their desires and intentions. A reprobate does not lack liberty, the ability to act according to his desire or want of desire for Christ. Consequently, the reprobate is not at all like the crippled man who is prevented from running even given a desire to do so; for the crippled man cannot act according to a desire to run, whereas the reprobate can and does act according his intention toward Christ. A reprobate chooses to reject God, yet could embrace God if he so desired; whereas a crippled man cannot run with his children given a desire to do so. The difference is obvious. The reprobate has liberty, whereas the crippled man has none.

I’ve addressed the matter of the reprobate coming to Christ only because it is the most important choice one makes in his life. However, one should not become confused and think that some real choices are not determined and not according to one’s intentions and, therefore, "free." Some Calvinists wrongly think that reprobates are "free" except with respect to coming to Christ. That is false. No person is free to choose contrary to how he will, whether in the area of the gospel or in common life.

Ron


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## JTB (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> JTB said:
> 
> 
> > I'm saying that, as the Sovereign determiner of law, He cannot be bound to anything other than His own desire. But sin is any want of conformity or transgression of the law. It would require God to want other than He wants to be both lawgiver and lawbreaker. No amount of power can set aside the nature of thinking (laws of logic) itself.
> ...



The definition of sin contains an aspect that would make it impossible for God to desire it as a metaphysical consideration. Sin is the transgression of what God has Himself established as the standard of conduct. Therefore, for God to desire Himself to sin, would be to desire against His desire to craft a standard for Himself. It basically asserts a contradictory willing in God's nature, which is not respecting of moral character, but of metaphysical or epistemological possibility.


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## Confessor (Oct 9, 2009)

armourbearer said:


> Your first paragraph conflates physical with natural.



You said that sin is an easier choice because it has temporary pleasure, and thereby sin denotes a natural weakness. But is not a temporary pleasure a physical thing?



Matthew said:


> "Natural" refers to the ability to make choices as a free agent. "Moral" refers to the quality of those choices as judged by God according to the standard of His law. Again, I would say that God has no such ability to choose sin either naturally or morally.



Defined as that, I have no problem with saying God is naturally unable to sin, but I'm not sure how, given that definition of "moral," it is intelligible to speak of moral ability. If we use the word "moral" as it is used in another context, i.e. the judgment of choices, then it doesn't make sense to apply it to an _ability_. In other words, if the category of natural ability encompasses one's ability to make righteous choices or sinful choices, then there is nothing left to relegate to the purview of moral ability.

And, as I said above, among the actions of which we are incapable, there are some punishable, and some not. What is the distinction that makes sense of this? I contend that natural and moral ability, as I defined above, do this perfectly.


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## MW (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor said:


> You said that sin is an easier choice because it has temporary pleasure, and thereby sin denotes a natural weakness. But is not a temporary pleasure a physical thing?



No, it is a state of the mind.



Confessor said:


> Defined as that, I have no problem with saying God is naturally unable to sin, but I'm not sure how, given that definition of "moral," it is intelligible to speak of moral ability. If we use the word "moral" as it is used in another context, i.e. the judgment of choices, then it doesn't make sense to apply it to an _ability_. In other words, if the category of natural ability encompasses one's ability to make righteous choices or sinful choices, then there is nothing left to relegate to the purview of moral ability.



This still doesn't grasp what is meant by the distinction. "Natural ability" is an ability to make choices. "Moral ability" is an ability to "choose good," i.e., choices which God judges as good, spiritually and absolutely.



Confessor said:


> And, as I said above, among the actions of which we are incapable, there are some punishable, and some not. What is the distinction that makes sense of this? I contend that natural and moral ability, as I defined above, do this perfectly.



Well, if you want to make up your own definitions, that is your prerogative, but don't be surprised if no one can follow you.


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## cih1355 (Oct 9, 2009)

Free will can mean, "to act according to one's desires." One can be a Calvinist and believe that we have free will in the sense of acting according to one's desires. 

Anselm defined free will as "the power of preserving rectitude of will for its own sake." What did he mean by this?


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## OPC'n (Oct 9, 2009)

Everyone's free will plays in a playpen.


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## Ron (Oct 9, 2009)

Confessor, 

I think you might be getting a bit ahead of yourself. 

"_If one has the capability of performing an action *when he wants*, then he has a natural ability to carry out that action._" (I placed your entire quote in italics so I decided to place what you had in italics in bold print.)

Although the capability of performing an action when one wants is a sufficient condition for natural ability, it is not the only the sufficient condition; in fact, it might be misleading to say what you said given where you put the accent. One’s liberty can be restricted due to external physical constraints (such as imprisonment) yet such constraints would not eliminate natural ability, yet your statement above seems to place the accent upon the ability to act upon one's intentions, as if the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability. I find the accent a bit misleading, that's all. “When one wants” does not speak to natural ability but to liberty. The man in jail, for instance, has the innate capability of walking in the park, which is to say he has the natural ability to carry out the action. However, his being lock-up precludes such action, but does not take away his natural ability; so it is false that being capable of acting _when one wants _is the only sufficient condition for natural ability. "When one wants" either muddies the water or implies something false. 

"_Would you say that this proposition is true? If God desired to sin, [then] He would be powerful enough to carry it out._"

If God desired to sin, then he would have sinned already. He would have sinned prior to acting upon the intention, whether he was or wasn’t “powerful enough to carry it out.” Accordingly, the power to carry out the sin is not necessary for sin to occur. It only clouds the issue. 

Moreover, the If-then proposition proceeds upon a false premise, that being God having a desire to sin, which is what I believe Joshua and Matthew are driving at. It’s like saying “if a square was round, then the square x”. The antecedent that contemplates God desiring sin, or a square being round, are logically impossible since for God to desire sin would equate to God not being God, which is indeed a contradiction since by definition God cannot become not God - just like a square cannot be round. 

Consider the argument:

If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God
It is false that God could stop being God
Therefore, it is false that God could desire sin

Doesn't that give us pause to argue under the premise of "If God desired to sin", then...?

Yours,

Ron


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## Iconoclast (Oct 9, 2009)

Matthew and Ron are correct in their posts. Take the time to re-read them.
Free-will does not exist, but is a false philosophical idea,as if man is somehow neutral and outside of the creation of God.
All facts are created facts.God gives meaning to all things. The under-pinning of this supposed ability in fallen mankind is unbelief and a denial of the biblical revelation as set forth in scripture.
We do not have to give in to the false philosphers of the age try and re-define the world. Read carefully 1Cor 1,and 2.


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## Confessor (Oct 10, 2009)

JTB said:


> The definition of sin contains an aspect that would make it impossible for God to desire it as a metaphysical consideration. Sin is the transgression of what God has Himself established as the standard of conduct. Therefore, for God to desire Himself to sin, would be to desire against His desire to craft a standard for Himself. It basically asserts a contradictory willing in God's nature, which is not respecting of moral character, but of metaphysical or epistemological possibility.



I would agree that it is a metaphysical impossibility, for it is not possible, given God's nature, for Him to possess any inclinations to sin. The outworking of God's will, including all His choices from His inclinations, is metaphysical. This is simply to say that the antecedent of the proposition, "If God could desire sin, then He would be powerful enough to carry it out," is impossible, not necessarily that it is unintelligible.

But this raises the question of whether a proposition which is objectively impossible can be intelligible. If we take a proposition the entirety of which is nonsensical, e.g. "Pyrques kib gyjurles," and if we take a proposition with two unresolvable aspects, e.g. "A square circle exists," then we can see a key difference between the two. In the former, not a single thing makes sense; in the latter, the individual concepts make sense, and because they make sense, we can realize that the whole proposition is unintelligible. It would be foolish to say "If a square circle exists, then X," as the entire proposition would be unintelligible due to the antecedent's unintelligibility. Therefore, if the proposition contains two absolutely unresolvable aspects (e.g., a morally perfect Being who can sin), then such a proposition cannot be the antecedent of an intelligible conditional proposition.

So, Joshua, you are absolutely correct that it is simply meaningless to talk about God's desiring to sin -- and if it's meaningless to posit it as an antecedent, then it's meaningless to attempt to deduce things from it, which I was attempting.

This shows that I should have used a glorified saint to make my point. I will presently change the aforesaid question to, "If a glorified saint could sin, then would he be powerful enough to carry it out?" If so, then he has the natural ability to sin; if not, then he does not. (Certainly it is not unintelligible to speak of someone glorified to have the desire to sin, as it is not inconceivable that God could decree such a thing for His glory. Satan fell from heaven.)

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 11:44:58 EST-----



armourbearer said:


> This still doesn't grasp what is meant by the distinction. "Natural ability" is an ability to make choices. "Moral ability" is an ability to "choose good," i.e., choices which God judges as good, spiritually and absolutely.



So moral ability refers to a proper use of one's natural ability?


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## Philip (Oct 10, 2009)

Intelligibility is simply the ability to be understood. Only intelligible things can be possible or impossible. I can't say whether a slithey tove is possible because I don't understand the term and it is therefore unintelligible to me. I can tell you whether a spherical cube exists because I understand what that entails--it's intelligible and I therefore can understand it to be impossible.

Given a malicious omnipotent being, yes he could sin. God is not malicious and therefore cannot sin.


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## Confessor (Oct 10, 2009)

Ron said:


> Although the capability of performing an action when one wants is a sufficient condition for natural ability, it is not the only the sufficient condition; in fact, it might be misleading to say what you said given where you put the accent. One’s liberty can be restricted due to external physical constraints (such as imprisonment) yet such constraints would not eliminate natural ability, yet your statement above seems to place the accent upon the ability to act upon one's intentions, as if the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability.



I would say the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability. If I intend to arise from my bed in the morning, but I am actually chained down, then I don't have the natural ability to arise; I am constrained from without.



Ron said:


> I find the accent a bit misleading, that's all. “When one wants” does not speak to natural ability but to liberty. The man in jail, for instance, has the innate capability of walking in the park, which is to say he has the natural ability to carry out the action. However, his being lock-up precludes such action, but does not take away his natural ability; so it is false that being capable of acting _when one wants _is the only sufficient condition for natural ability. "When one wants" either muddies the water or implies something false.



How does a man in jail have the natural ability of walking in the park? Does that mean that, if he were in the park and desired to walk, he could? If so, what if I said that a man with no legs had the natural ability to walk in the park, provided he had legs and desired to walk? It seems the only distinction between the two is that one of them is belonging directly to the man's body while one isn't, but that seems an arbitrary divide. And if the divide is arbitrary, then your definition of natural ability as so distinct from liberty is, in my estimation, nonsense, for it would basically say that just about anything has the natural ability to do just about anything, e.g. "My dog has the natural ability to fly, because if she had hollow bones and wings (etc.), and if she wanted, then she could fly."

I would contend that natural ability and liberty are not so different. They are pieces of the same puzzle. If one is capable of doing X when one desires to do X, then one has the natural ability to do X. And if one is performing X when he desires to perform X, then he is performing X with liberty. Therefore, to have natural ability to perform an action is requisite to perform an action; and to perform an action when desiring to perform the action is liberty.



Ron said:


> If God desired to sin, then he would have sinned already.



I actually would dispute this. Seeing as this is a separate topic, I'll keep it brief. First, keep in mind that there is a distinction between internal sins (lust, covetousness, etc.) and desires to sin; one can desire to do a sin, internal or external, without effecting that desire. Second, and more importantly, desires to sin are necessary in order to undergo temptation; Jesus underwent temptation; ergo etc.



Ron said:


> Moreover, the If-then proposition proceeds upon a false premise, that being God having a desire to sin, which is what I believe Joshua and Matthew are driving at. It’s like saying “if a square was round, then the square x”. The antecedent that contemplates God desiring sin, or a square being round, are logically impossible since for God to desire sin would equate to God not being God, which is indeed a contradiction since by definition God cannot become not God - just like a square cannot be round.
> 
> Consider the argument:
> 
> ...



Well, the mere fact that the antecedent is false does not imply that the antecedent cannot be used to convey intelligible (and therefore, possibly truthful) propositions -- as your syllogism itself proves. For how could you show such a syllogism if the first premise were wholly unintelligible? I conceded to Joshua above that it would be foolish to proceed from such an unintelligible antecedent, but, even after writing my reply to Joshua so soon, I am questioning this. If the antecedent, "If God could desire sin," is unintelligible, then why is the proposition, "If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God" intelligible? If that proposition, containing the supposedly unintelligible antecedent, is true, then why cannot other propositions containing the same antecedent be true?

I would say this goes back to the two propositions I mentioned earlier, "Pyrques kib gyjurles," and, "A square circle exists." Squares and circles are intelligible concepts, yet they are contradictory; therefore attempting to merge them leads to unintelligibility. For now, I realize that it has something to do with the fact that _parts_ of the proposition are intelligible, and these parts have to be distributed in the syllogism in such a way in order to retain the intelligibility of the propositions as whole, but at the moment I have worked my brain in grinding out all the details of this thread, so I'm gonna take a pass right now.

-----Added 10/10/2009 at 12:10:06 EST-----



P. F. Pugh said:


> Intelligibility is simply the ability to be understood. Only intelligible things can be possible or impossible.



These short sentences are immensely helpful.


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## Ask Mr. Religion (Oct 10, 2009)

While responsibility presupposes accountability, accountability does not presuppose ability or freedom. Indeed, free will has absolutely nothing to do with responsibility. Instead, accountability simply presupposes one who is in a position to demand accountability, ergo the One who is not responsible to anyone, God.

AMR


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## Ron (Oct 10, 2009)

Confessor,

I'm going to pass on trying to work through all that you wrote. I find it somewhat confused.

Cheers,

Ron


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## CharlieJ (Oct 10, 2009)

*Back on track*

OK, at least before all the arguments about God and such, Ben was simply stating the view of mainstream Reformed philosophy (of which I'm aware) since Edwards. The natural vs. moral distinction is useful in distinguishing between the Reformed concept of free will vs. libertarian free will. (It can be confusing because the unregenerate's sinful "nature" does not at all pertain to "natural ability" but rather to "moral ability.")

For anyone interested, the seeds of this idea (though not the clear technical language) are visible in Calvin, and perhaps in a few before him. I recommend reading "Free Will" in Paul Helm's _John Calvin's Ideas_. He is very good at addressing Calvin in his own context, yet also assessing Calvin's ideas from the categories of modern analytic philosophy.


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## Dao (Oct 10, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> . . . Pre-enlightenment: Freedom is the ability to do what is good in the sight of God.
> 
> Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil. . . .



Enlightenment is a funny word. Being an instructor of a Chinese alternative medicines, their philosophies had taken me to many la la lands until I sensed the animated force that keeps man alive and living . One of my schools are called the "School of Sudden Enlightenment" and was trained by well known so-called-masters in China. Man has this animated energy that makes them a living being or alive as compared to dead things. One school teaches a sort of "surrender" to the natural forces barely known to man. A type of free will plays a lot into this. Many claims it's cultic and from the demons but I rather explore all explanation of human slaved free will as much as possible. So far, I've learned that God is in control of all things including every will of men. I, also, learned that God doesn't control of all things including every will of men. As some state here on this site, "it's a mystery!, we may never learn why both "God controls and God doesn't control" until we become enlightened or go "Ah ha! I see now"
As the cult-like Taoist said," We can't talk about the Tao (an impersonal god) cause we don't have the language to understand it. They say if you describe the Tao, you don't understand what it is.
There is a form, (movements) that I teach, that allows man to surrender to the forces or an invisible natural magnetic fields of earth and I believe God uses our environments to cause us to do things according to His Own Will. This surrender allows us to observe the forces that controls us. In other Words, free will is a man-made philosophy that doesn't really exist.
What I wrote here may sound from la la land but it's from my deep search to explain the works of Charismatic Pentecostal movements and many other healing arts. Theres a lot of historical explanations of "freewill" in many countries that are unfamiliar to us. As many Christians calls a Taoist, demonic, one Taoist said this:

" The perfect Tao is without difficulty, save that it avoids picking and choosing. Only when you stop liking and disliking will all be clearly understood. A split hair's difference, and heaven and earth are set apart! If you want to get the plain truth, be not concerned with right and wrong. The conflict between right and wrong is the sickness of the mind."

Perhaps we might want to stop liking or disliking whether we have free will or not and allow God to say, "I'm in control"


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## Philip (Oct 10, 2009)

Charlie, the libertarian incompatibilist definition says that free will is not choosing in accordance with desires, but choosing in a wholly unconditioned manner--which is absurd (I think the concept of Burridan's Ass is a good reality check).

Edwards is distinguishing between the philosophical concept of freedom, apart from moral categories, and the theological concept, which is all about the moral distinctions. One is a philosophy of mind that actually helps to clarify God can foreordain and humans still be held morally responsible.

Enlightenment refers to the philosophical movement of the 18th century that I have been known to term "Endarkenment."


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## CharlieJ (Oct 10, 2009)

P. F. Pugh said:


> Charlie, the libertarian incompatibilist definition says that free will is not choosing in accordance with desires, but choosing in a wholly unconditioned manner--which is absurd (I think the concept of Burridan's Ass is a good reality check).
> 
> Edwards is distinguishing between the philosophical concept of freedom, apart from moral categories, and the theological concept, which is all about the moral distinctions. One is a philosophy of mind that actually helps to clarify God can foreordain and humans still be held morally responsible.
> 
> Enlightenment refers to the philosophical movement of the 18th century that I have been known to term "Endarkenment."



Yes, I agree with all you wrote. Did I say something wrong?


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## Philip (Oct 10, 2009)

I thought you said that the second definition is libertarian, but now that I reread, I see I was mistaken. As it is, I think we've just clarified each other.


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## jandrusk (Oct 16, 2009)

I think that Paul makes it very clear that all are either in bondage to sin or to righteousness and therefore the will is not free for either one outside these two contexts. I guess you have to define what you mean by "free"? I kind of liken this to a computer being able to generate a random number; a computer can never truly generate a random number without providing a seed to make even more random. So I think with the natural depraved man his enslavement to sin will never let him choose otherwise unless God intervenes.


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