Westminster Session 520-524: Christ Died for All

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Andrew P.C.

Puritan Board Junior
Reading through the Westminster Assembly minutes (archive.org), I came across the session meetings of 520-524 where they are going over a "debate about permission of man's fall about 'the same decree.'" In there, Mr. Calamy (Edmund?) argues a following point (that is confusing):

"I hold...the sense of our divines in the Synod of Dort, that Christ did pay a price for all, -- absolute intention for the elect, conditional intention for the reprobate in case they do believe,-- that all men should be salvabiles, non obstante lapsu Adami... that Jesus Christ did not only die sufficiently for all, but God did intend, in giving of Christ, and Christ in giving Himself, did intend to put all men in a state of salvation in case they do believe." (Session 522, Oct. 22 1645 Wednesday Morning)

Can someone help me out here? It seems Calamy is making a distinction from the Arminians as Mr. Palmer says in the minutes. Mr. Reynolds states "This opinion cannot be asserted by any that can say he is not of the Remonstrants' opinion... Upon a condition that they cannot perform, and God never intends to give." Gillespie and Rutherford also argue against this opinion.

It seems that Calamy is saying all men are "savable", due to the death of Christ. That what Christ has done, has now made all men savable. At least this is what it seems.

Thoughts?
 
As Chris noted, this is one of the tenets of "hypothetical universalism" which was floating around the English church at the time and came in different shades and colours.

Some argue that Calamy's view entailed an accommodation in the Confession for hypothetical universalism. There is no evidence for this. There are numerous cases where the opinions of individual divines were left unaccommodated by the wording of the Westminster documents; and there are particularist expressions in the Confession and Catechisms which work against the hypothetical view. As Warfield noted, "there was denied, to be sure, the right to modify the statement of the ordo decretorum so as to make room for their 'hypothetical universalism' in the saving work of Christ (cf. the Confession, iii. 6, viii. 5, 8)."
 
Thank you gentlemen. That helped tremendously. I am curious if there are any other sources available on this subject?
 
I would imagine there is. There is the below chapter in Drawn into controversie : Reformed theological diversity and debates within seventeenth-century British Puritanism ed. Haykin and Jones.
The extent of the atonement: English hypothetical universalism versus particular redemption / Jonathan D. Moore --
 
I would imagine there is. There is the below chapter in Drawn into controversie : Reformed theological diversity and debates within seventeenth-century British Puritanism ed. Haykin and Jones.
The extent of the atonement: English hypothetical universalism versus particular redemption / Jonathan D. Moore --

A response which echoes the judgment of Warfield may be found here:

http://booksandjournals.brillonline...FTTab=true&isFastTrackArticle=#introduction-1

The treatment in Fesko's book is all over the place from an historical point of view. He helpfully incorporates recent studies which distinguish different forms of hypothetical universalism, but his taxonomy is amiss and his use of divines' writings is decontextualised, especially William Twisse.
 
Tim, I would really appreciate that!

Here it is:

The Extent of Christ’s Satisfaction



The Confession bases the mediatorial work of Christ upon both natures, and in his earthly ministry Christ “fully satisfied the Justice of his Father; and purchased, not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the Kingdom of Heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him”(8.5). In his priestly work Christ made both satisfaction and intercession on behalf of the elect. He made satisfaction through his suffering throughout his life, though the pinnacle came in the garden of Gethsemane and the crucifixion. In his satisfaction he suffered for the sins of the elect. But as Leigh maintains, Christ not only suffered for the sins of the elect but also performed perfect righteousness, and the combination of both suffering for sin and perfect obedience to the law secured eternal life for the elect. 65 In this respect, “the Covenant of Grace is laid upon the satisfaction of Christ.”66



The Standards invoke the term satisfaction, but this does not imply the Anselmian satisfaction theory of the atonement. Anselm (1033–1109) advanced the dilemma of aut satisfactio aut poena. God would accept either satisfaction or punishment as an answer to humanity’s fallen condition: “Either the honor which has been taken away should be repaid, or punishment should follow. Otherwise, either God will not be just to himself, or he will be without the power to enforce either of the two options.”67 By choosing satisfaction over punishment, Anselm eliminated the idea of substitutionary punishment. He therefore located Christ’s satisfaction outside the context of punishment and placed it exclusively under the rubric of merit. By his merit Christ repays the debt of honor that the sinner owes, both in terms of what he owes God and as recompense for the failure to give him honor. Christ restores man through his satisfaction and merit. 68



By way of contrast, an early modern Reformed understanding of satisfaction differs from the Anselmian version because it offers satisfactio poenalis, or satisfaction through punishment. It eliminates the false dichotomy of satisfaction or punishment and posits a both–and—satisfaction and punishment. 69 Few Reformed theologians in the early modern period would dissent from these conclusions, but there are a number of variant views that pertain to the extent of Christ’s satisfaction. For whom, and in what sense, did Christ die? Christ most certainly died for the elect—this is undisputed among a host of Reformed and non-Reformed theologians. But in what sense, if any, did Christ die for all? 70



Presently this question is typically filtered through the grid of “five-point Calvinism”and the famous TULIP acronym: Total depravity, Unconditional election, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the saints. According to this modern acronym, Christ died only for the elect, and all other positions fall under the category of “four-point Calvinism.”As pedagogically useful as the acronym might be, it is historically problematic for at least three reasons. First, no early modern Reformed theologian ever uses the acronym, for it originated well after the seventeenth century. Second, no early modern Reformed theologian uses the term limited atonement. One factor contributing to the absence of the term in early modern Reformed theology is that atonement is an English word, and the lion’s share of theology was written in Latin. The common term of the period was satisfactio, hence the English term satisfaction. This is why the term atonement does not appear in the Standards, but satisfaction appears nine times. 71



Third, few early modern Reformed theologians saw themselves as the disciples of Calvin or as Calvinists. The term Calvinist was originally created as a term of derision in an effort by the opponents of the Reformed churches to isolate and brand them as sectarian. 72 Hence, if read through the alien grid of the TULIP, early modern views are distorted, and fine nuances that were once carefully argued are lost with the ham-fisted separation between five-point and four-point Calvinism, as if Calvin were the standard and taught a strict doctrine of limited atonement, and all other views fall under the category of universal atonement. Consequently, it is necessary, first, to briefly set out the various views on the extent of the satisfaction of Christ and then, second, to determine to what extent the Standards accommodate these views, if at all.



From within the early modern period authors identify several major positions on the extent of Christ’s satisfaction. John Ball (1585–1640) acknowledges only two chief positions, covering Remonstrant and Reformed views; the Remonstrants hold that Christ “died for all and every man with a purpose to save,”and the latter “distinguish the sufficiency and efficiency of Christs death.”73 Francis Turretin first acknowledges, “Though all agree that Christ died for each and every one, still they do not explain their meaning in the same way.”74 He then delineates three different major classes, those who argue that Christ conditionally died for all and absolutely died only for the elect, those who claim that Christ died absolutely for all, and the “common opinion of the Reformed”that Christ died only for the elect. 75 In this threefold classification Turretin has in mind the views of John Cameron (ca. 1579–1625) and Moïse Amyraut (1596–1664) for the first view, the Remonstrants for the second, and the Reformed for the third. John Davenant (1572–1641), in his treatise on the death of Christ, notes that the church fathers and theologians of the Middle Ages contended that Christ died sufficiently for all, but efficiently, or effectually, for only the elect. Davenant points out that the doctors of the Reformed church from the beginning of the Reformation embraced this common sufficient-efficient theological distinction. 76



Davenant points to several Reformed theologians to illustrate this claim, including Bullinger, Aretius, Musculus, and Zanchi. Heinrich Bullinger states quite simply: “The Lord died for all: but all are not partakers of this redemption, through their own fault. Otherwise the Lord excludes no one but him who excludes himself by his own unbelief and faithlessness.”77 Benedict Aretius (1505–1574) says, “Christ died for all, yet notwithstanding all do not embrace the benefit of his death, because by their own wickedness, and the corruption of their nature, they despise the offered grace.”78 Wolfgang Musculus (1497–1563) likewise offers, “We know that all be not partakers of this redemption, but yet the losse of them which be not saved, doth hinder nothing at all, why it shoulde not be called an universal redemption, whiche is appointed not for one nation, but for all the whole world.”79 And Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590) also holds to the universality of the satisfaction of Christ: “That it is not false that Christ died for all men as it regards his conditional will, that is, if they are willing to become partakers of his death through faith. For the death of Christ is set before all in the Gospel, and no one is excluded from it, but he who excludes himself.”80 All of these Reformed theologians argue that in some sense Christ died for all. So the question arises, how do Reformed theologians relate the satisfaction of Christ to the redemption of the elect?



The answer to this question is somewhat complex, as the variety of views defies a neat and tidy taxonomy. Nevertheless, Voetius offers a basic taxonomy of four chief views:


1. Universal satisfaction for every person, believer and unbeliever alike (the Remonstrants)


2. Those who affirm the universal sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction and argue that it is applied in some sense to all but only effectively for the elect


3. Those who admit the universal sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction but deny its application to all (the scholastics, e.g., Lombard, Aquinas, as well as Calvin, and others)


4. Those who hold that Christ died solely for the elect (William Ames, 1560–1609, and Franciscus Gomarus, 1563–1641) 81



These four positions may be classified as universalism, hypothetical universalism, the classical sufficient-efficient position, and strict particularism. Among the latter two views, a number of Reformed theologians employ the sufficient-efficient distinction, including Calvin, Turretin, Zanchi, Ursinus, and Herman Witsius (1636–1708). 82 The strict particularists—those who reject the sufficiency-efficiency distinction and argue that Christ died strictly and exclusively for the elect—include Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644) and Wilhelmus à Brakel (1635–1711). 83 At first appearance, this taxonomy of views appears simple enough, but matters are complicated when the extent of Christ’s satisfaction is coordinated with the lapsarian question. Modern assumptions connect supralapsarianism with strict particular satisfaction. 84 However, as we will see below, some supralapsarians advocate hypothetical universalism, and three of the four views were represented at the assembly (e.g., hypothetical universalism, sufficient-efficient, and strict particularism).



The minutes of the assembly contain some information about the debates over the extent of the satisfaction of Christ, though the record is at times spotty since the minutes fail to record entire speeches. Readers are left wondering what more was said. Nevertheless, on the morning of October 22, 1645, the assembly began to debate the subject of the “redemption of the elect only, by Christ.”85 Edmund Calamy was then recorded as stating:


“I am farre from universall Redemption in the Arminian sence, but that that [sic] I hould is in the sence of our devines in the sinod of Dort; that Christ did pay a price for all, absolute intention for the elect, conditional intention for the reprobate, in case they doe believe; that all men should be salvibles, non obstante lapsu Adami [saveable, in spite of the fall of Adam]; that Jesus Christ did not only dy sufficiently for all, but God did intend in giving of Christ & Christ in giving himselfe did intend to put all men in a state of salvation in case they doe believe.” 86


Calamy’s statement is important because it fits within Voetius’s taxonomy noted above, though important qualifications should be made.



First, Calamy rejects the “Arminian”position, which argues that Christ died sufficiently for all without exception. The Remonstrance, or Arminian Articles (1610), for example, states, “Christ, the Savior of the world, died for all and for every individual, so that he has obtained for all, by his death on the cross, reconciliation and remission of sins.”Second, Calamy connects his own position with “our devines in the sinod of Dort,”which is a reference to the British delegation to the Synod of Dort (1618–1619). This is a crucial identification because Calamy specifically aligns his own form of hypothetical universalism with the British delegation at Dort, not with the later views of Cameron and Amyraut. This admission reveals that there were at least two different types of hypothetical universalist positions, which for the sake of simplicity I call hypothetical universalism (generally) and the particular form Amyraldianism.



In the assembly’s debates Calamy defends a number of points that place his views within the hypothetical universalism advocated by the British delegation at Dort. The British delegation argued that the satisfaction of Christ was extended to “all adults,”rendered human nature as potentially being redeemed, but in the end was only applied to the elect. 87 The Synod of Dort is infamously known for its codification of the dreaded “limited atonement,”but such characterizations fail to acknowledge that the synod embraced a classical formula that Christ died sufficiently for all and efficiently only for the elect, a formula that goes back to the Middle Ages and Peter Lombard and even earlier to the Patristic period. Ursinus, for example, cites Ambrose (339–397), Augustine (354–430), Cyril of Alexandria (ca. 376–444), and Prosper of Aquitaine (ca. 390–ca. 455) as examples of those who employ the sufficient-efficient distinction. 88



Caricatures of Dort also fail to mention that the British delegation included hypothetical universalists. The official position of the British delegates offers the following on the extent of Christ’s satisfaction:


“In as much as that price was paid for all, and will certainly promote all beleevers unto eternall life, yet is not beneficial unto all; because all have not the gift of fulfilling this condition of the gracious covenant. Christ therefore so dyed for all, that all and every one by the means of faith might obtaine remission of sins, and eternal life by vertue of that ransome paide once for all mankinde. But Christ so dyed for the elect, that by the merit of his death in special manner destinated unto them according to the eternal good pleasure of God, they might infallibly obtaine both faith and eternal life.” 89


Calamy’s view, that “Christ did pay a price for all …conditionall intention for the reprobate,”echoes what the British delegation states here, namely, that a “price was paid for all …that all and every one by the means of faith might obtaine remission of sins.”In other words, Christ has died for all upon the condition that they believe.



Davenant, one of the British delegates to Dort, gives a fuller explanation of this position:


“For in this ordination of God, according to which the death of Christ is appointed and proposed as a cause of salvation to every living person, applicable by faith, there is contained less than in the real application, but there is contained something more than in the mere and bare sufficiency of the thing considered in itself, this conditional ordination being excluded, which regards every partaker of human nature.” 90


Here Davenant specifies that Christ’s death is ordained to be sufficient for all, and that it extends to anyone and everyone who shares in human nature, a point that Calamy raised in the assembly’s debates. Davenant also contrasts his own view of ordained sufficiency with what he calls “bare sufficiency.”In other words, it is one thing to say that Christ’s death is inherently sufficient to bring satisfaction for the sins of all and entirely another to say that God specifically ordained it as such.



A key element to Davenant’s position, and presumably Calamy’s as well, is the distinction between ordaining the death of Christ to be an applicable remedy for salvation to all people upon the condition of faith and the absolute decree to appoint and effectually produce faith and salvation in specific individuals. As Davenant explains:


“For as if God should create any herb endued with such a virtue that it might heal any one who labors under any disease whatever, and moreover should promise, that any one who should use it should undoubtedly recover his former health, any one would rightly conclude from thence, that this herb was a remedy for any disease, applicable, by the ordination of God, to all sick persons individually; but would not rightly infer that every individual would be infallibly cured by means of this remedy, because it would not be given to some that they should find this remedy, and others perhaps would not be willing to make use of it when it was found.” 91

Calamy and the British delegation at Dort, then, affirmed a non-Amyraldian hypothetical universalism. But Calamy was not alone in the assembly; other divines also held this view.



While there is some question about the exact nature of his influence, most signs point to James Ussher as the origin of this form of hypothetical universalism. 92 Ussher was intent on cutting a middle path between the Remonstrants and strict particularists. 93 Like Calamy and Davenant, Ussher considers Christ’s satisfaction absolutely and relatively, that is, in and of itself and in its application. For Ussher, Christ’s satisfaction renders the sins of humanity fit for pardon, and God is made “placable unto our nature”; this is the language Calamy employed in the debate. 94 Elsewhere Ussher writes that Christ gave sufficient satisfaction to make humanity’s nature “a fit subject for mercy, and to prepare a medicine for the sinnes of the whole world.”95



Ussher’s view was influential among a number of theologians of the period, including William Twisse (ca. 1577–1646), a supralapsarian, the first moderator of the assembly. 96 Twisse, like Calamy, argued for hypothetical universalism but also maintained that faith was necessary to enjoy the benefits of Christ’s satisfaction. Twisse based his views upon a number of passages of Scripture, such as Romans 5: 18, which speaks of Christ dying for all as well as the elect:


“We say that pardon of sinne and salvation of soules are benefites purchased by the deathe of Christ, to be enjoyed by men, but how? Not absolutely, but conditionally, to witt, in case they believe, and only in case they believe…. So that we willingly professe, that Christ had both a full intention of his owne, and commandment of his Father to make a propitiation for the sinnes of the whole world, so farre as thereby to procure both pardon of sinne and salvation of soule to all that doe believe…. Now as touching these benefites, we willingly professe, that Christ dyed not for all, that is, he dyed not to obtaine the grace of faith and repentance for all, but only for God’s elect; In as much as these graces are bestowed by God, not conditionally, least so grace should be given according to mens workes, but absolutely, And if Christ dyed to obtyene these for all absolutely, it would follow here hence that all should believe & repent and consequently all shoulde be saved.” 97


Twisse intertwined his hypothetical universalism with his understanding of the decree, in that God ordained some things necessarily, others contingently, and others freely. 98 This is language that appears in the Confession: God ordains whatsoever comes to pass, yet in such a way that no violence is offered to the will of creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away (3.1).



Twisse and Calamy believed that God ordained the universal sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction but that its application is predicated upon the condition of faith. Both Twisse and Calamy, as well as the British delegation to Dort, believed these formulations were in harmony with the Canons of Dort. Indeed, the British delegation’s presence, participation, and submission of their views to the Synod in the composition of the Canons prove they were acceptable and within the bounds of orthodoxy. Other divines at the assembly, including John Arrowsmith (1602–1659), Jeremiah Burroughs (1599–1646), Thomas Gataker (1574–1657), Richard Vines (1599–1656), and Lazarus Seaman (d. 1675), held similar views. 99
 
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The view was likely prevalent not only because of the influence of Ussher, Davenant, and others, such as John Preston (1587–1628), but also because of the Thirty-Nine Articles, which state that Christ “truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a sacrifice, not only for original guilt, but also for all actual sins of men”(§ 2). In fact, Davenant appeals to this very portion of the Thirty-Nine Articles to affirm the universal extent of Christ’s satisfaction. 100 Hence, a qualified universalism, that is, that Christ’s satisfaction in some sense extended to all, was part of the confessional air that the Westminster divines breathed, found both in the Thirty-Nine Articles and in the Canons of Dort with its use of the sufficient-efficient distinction.



The presence of hypothetical universalists at the assembly, however, does not automatically mean that the view was immediately accepted or sanctioned. As one can imagine, considerable debate ensued after Calamy made his initial remarks in favor of hypothetical universalism. Some accused him of holding to the Remonstrant view of universal satisfaction, but he parried the charge and further explained his views. Two of the Scottish divines, George Gillespie (1613–1648) and Samuel Rutherford (1600–1661), along with Thomas Goodwin, engaged Calamy’s arguments. 101 In what appears to be a debate tactic, Gillespie tried to associate Calamy’s views with those of Amyraut and Cameron. 102 In truth, Amyraut’s views were somewhat different than those of Ussher, Davenant, or Calamy. Richard Baxter (1615–1691) notes that Richard Vines, one of the divines mentioned above, “openly owned Davenant’s way of Universal Redemption,”not Amyraut’s. 103 But the divines were not unfamiliar with Amyraut’s views; Robert Baillie (1602–1662), one of the Scottish divines, commented that Amyraut’s work, perhaps his Brief Treatise on Predestination (1634), went around the assembly from “hand to hand.”104



Amyraut, unlike Ussher, Davenant, and Calamy, defended a hypothetical decree of predestination, which is different from a hypothetical extent of Christ’s satisfaction. Amyraut distinguishes between predestination to salvation and predestination to faith. The former is conditional, and the latter is absolute and the means by which the former is attained. 105 According to Amyraut, God decrees to predestine the whole human race equally but conditionally upon faith. But because the whole human race is incapable of fulfilling the required condition, owing to no defect in the decree but the hardness of heart and stubbornness of the human condition, God makes a second decree that is absolute—a decree to predestine the elect to faith. 106 This distinction among the decrees, predestination to salvation versus predestination to faith, allowed Amyraut to explain how Christ’s satisfaction was universal in its extent but particular in its application.



This particular construction, namely, conditional predestination, drew significant criticism from within the early modern Reformed world. However, at no time was it ever deemed as heresy, as one scholar has incorrectly labeled it. 107 In fact, Amyraut was exonerated on three different occasions by three separate national French synods: Alençon (1637), Charenton (1644–1645), and Loudun (1659). Throughout the process Amyraut repeatedly swore his allegiance to the decisions of Dort and offered his defense within the sufficiency-efficiency framework, though the Synod of Alençon instructed Amyraut not to speak of a “conditional, frustratory, or revocable Decree.”108 Nevertheless, Baxter noted that half of the divines of England were Amyraldians. 109 In summary, Amyraldianism is somewhat different from the hypothetical universalism of Ussher, Davenant, Calamy, and Twisse. All Amyraldians were hypothetical universalists, but not all hypothetical universalists were Amyraldians.



What were the exegetical reasons behind the advocacy of hypothetical universalism? While the assembly debated a number of texts, John 3: 16 provides a window into the issues at stake. Calamy believed that John 3: 16 was the exegetical ground for God’s intention to give Christ to the world and offer it love and philanthropy; additionally, he argued that the universal promulgation of the gospel to all of the nations was founded upon universal redemption, and God’s offering of the gospel to all had to be “serious & true.”110 Other divines, such as Rutherford, objected to the satisfaction-gospel connection, though Gillespie noted that Calamy’s appeal to the term world in John 3: 16, “For God so loved the world,”rested on a highly controverted text even among the Reformed. Gillespie denied that the term world denoted a general philanthropy to all indiscriminately. He believed that Calamy’s error rested in his failure to distinguish between the decreed and revealed will of God: that God reveals that anyone who believes shall be saved, but God’s revealed will does not govern his decreed, or secret, will. 111



Calamy countered that he understood that the term world was taken in different senses: sometimes for the elect, sometimes for the whole world. But he qualified his remarks by adding that there was a twofold love of God: his general love for the reprobate, which included the general offer and general grace to all, and his special love for the elect. 112 John Lightfoot (1602–1675) entered the fray by arguing that he understood world in a different sense, to indicate the Gentiles in contrast to the Jews. 113 Hypothetical universalist Richard Vines stated his belief that world refers not to the Gentiles, but to a group more extensive than the elect. It denotes God’s intention in the gift of Christ and the extent of God’s love for all, though it is a general love of mankind. 114



In one of the last recorded comments on the debate, Rutherford offered several reasons why John 3: 16 does not refer to the general love of God for all. Rutherford identified three elements of the arguments offered by Calamy and others: (1) the word loved refers to a general love to the elect and reprobate alike; (2) the word world should be understood generally and distributively of the aforementioned love; and (3) this universal distribution of God’s general love is grounded upon God’s intention but conditioned upon the necessity of faith. Rutherford first argued that Christ’s love in the Gospel of John is directed exclusively at the elect, which is paralleled in other passages, such as John 15: 13, on Christ laying down his life for his friends. If the other parallels indicate anything, it is that God’s love is commensurate with election, and there is “not one scripture in all the New Testament wher it can be expounded for the generall”love of God. Second, Rutherford argued that the love mentioned in John 3: 16 is restricted to the church; he cited Romans 5: 8 ; Galatians 2: 20; and Ephesians 5: 21. And third, John 3: 16 is an actual saving love, and therefore not a general love for all. 115 The question now presses in, what room, if any, do the Standards have for hypothetical universalism?



A number of commentators, including B. B. Warfield (1851–1921), A. A. Hodge (1823–1886), and John Murray, have maintained that the Standards leave no room for Amyraldianism. 116 However, Warfield, Hodge, and Murray share in the idea that all hypothetical universalists were Amyraldians, rather than devotees of the earlier and different strand of universalism found in Ussher, Davenant, and the British delegation to Dort. On the one hand, it does seem difficult to square Amyraut’s order of the decrees (first the decree of salvation for all dependent upon the condition of faith, followed by a second decree of predestination to faith) with what the Confession states about God’s decrees: “In his sight all things are open and manifest; his knowledge is infinite, infallible, independent upon the creature, so as nothing is to him contingent, or uncertain”(2.2). 117 So Amyraldianism does seem to be precluded by the language of the Standards. Gillespie specifically raised this issue in the debates: “Ther is a concatenation of the death of Christ with the decrees, therefore we must see what they hould concerning that which in order goes before & what in order followes after.”118 In the context of this statement Gillespie specifically names Cameron and Amyraut. What about the other form of hypothetical universalism?



A number of points in the Confession seemingly present challenges for anyone who would assert the universality of Christ’s satisfaction. The initial idea under discussion when this debate surfaced in the assembly was the following: “Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified and saved; but the Elect only”(3.6). This does not present a challenge to the hypothetical universalists, however, because the Confession states that only the elect are “redeemed by Christ,”which is a point they would affirm, given that they typically distinguish between making satisfaction and applying it in redemption. 119 Ussher, for example, writes:


“We must, in the matter of our redemption, carefully put a distinction betwixt the satisfaction of Christ absolutely considered, and the application thereof to every one in particular: the former was once done for all, the other is still in doing: the former brings with it sufficiency, abundant to discharge the whole debt; the other adds to its efficacy.” 120


Hence, a hypothetical universalist could agree with Confession 3.6, given the distinction between satisfaction made and its application.



The issue of Christ’s satisfaction arises again in the Confession and Larger Catechism: “The Lord Jesus …fully satisfied the Justice of his Father; and purchased, not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the Kingdom of Heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him”(8.5). The Larger Catechism similarly states, “Redemption is certainly applied, and effectually communicated to all those for whom Christ hath purchased it, who are in time by the Holy Ghost inabled to believe in Christ according to the Gospel”(q. 59). Given these statements, Murray and others have argued that the acquisition of Christ’s satisfaction is coextensive with its application. 121



However, as recent analysis has demonstrated, theologians employed a distinction between impetration (or redemption accomplished) and intercession that the Confession does not directly address. 122 Ussher explains that he connects Christ’s impetration not to his satisfaction but to his intercession. In other words, for Ussher, Christ’s completed work is part of his intercessory work as High Priest but not his satisfaction. Ussher appeals, for example, to John 17: 9, “I pray not for the [reprobate] World,”and argues:


“I must needs esteem it a great folly to imagine that he hath impetrated Reconciliation and Remission of sinnes for that world. I agree therefore thus farre with Mr. Aimes in his Dispute against Grevinchovius, That application and impetration, in this latter we have in hand, are of equal extent; and, That forgivenesse of sinnes is not by our Savior impetrated for any unto whom the merit of his death is not applied in particular.” 123


Hence, a hypothetical universalist like Ussher had no problem arguing that Christ’s impetration and intercession were coextensive. Ussher bracketed out Christ’s satisfaction, which was universal.



These points in the Confession do not specifically advocate hypothetical universalism. In fact, the Standards lean in the direction of strict particularism, given the absence of the sufficiency-efficiency distinction. 124 But neither are they written in such a manner as to preclude or proscribe hypothetical universalism. 125 Again, Baxter claims, “I have spoken with an eminent Divine, yet living, that was of the Assembly, who assured mee that they purposely avoided determining that Controversie, and some of them protest themselves for the middle way of Universal Redemption.”126 In other words, as a historical observation (if Baxter’s report is credible), the Westminster Standards appear to be only somewhat more tightly drawn than the Canons of Dort regarding the extent of Christ’s satisfaction. 127 This is to say nothing about the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of hypothetical universalism. Given the debate surrounding the extent of Christ’s satisfaction, especially Amyraut’s examination at the Synod of Charenton in 1644–1645, which was around the same time as the debates over these same matters in the assembly, it is likely that the divines completely avoided the sufficiency-efficiency language to mitigate debates over the subject. 128




Confirmation that the Standards leave hypothetical universalism as an option appears when we compare the Confession with Turretin’s Formula Consensus (1675), which was written specifically to refute Amyraut, though not necessarily the view of Davenant, Ussher, or Twisse. Turretin likely considered those three within the pale of orthodoxy, since Davenant and other hypothetical universalists were signatories to Dort, whereas Amyraut’s views arose some fifteen years later. The Formula Consensus states:


“We can not approve the contrary doctrine of those who affirm that of His own intention, by His own counsel and that of the Father who sent Him, Christ died for all and each upon the impossible condition, provided they believe; that He obtained for all a salvation, which, nevertheless, is not applied to all, and by His death merited salvation and faith for no one individually and certainly (proprie et actu), but only removed the obstacle of Divine justice, and acquired for the Father the liberty of entering into a new covenant of grace with all men.” (§ 16) 129

Nothing of this nature appears in the Westminster Standards. And even the Formula characterizes Amyraut’s view as “contrary to the plain Scriptures and the glory of Christ”(§ 16), but not as heresy.


Conclusion


The doctrine of Christ according to the Standards rests squarely upon the Scriptures but also extends its hands across the centuries to express its fellowship and agreement with the teachings of the ancient church in the ecumenical councils. Along with the Reformers, the divines wanted the world to know its agreement with the ancient church and the belief in the full deity and humanity of Christ, as well as other key teachings that fended off ancient and contemporary heresies such as Arianism, Eutychianism, Nestorianism, and Socinianism. The divines also seated Christ’s work within the context of the dual covenants, works and grace. As covenant surety, Christ offered satisfaction and his obedience on behalf of the elect to save them, and them alone. This is a point that set apart Reformed theology from the Remonstrants, as well as others who advocated universal satisfaction. However, the debates surrounding the Standards’composition, works from the period, and the Standards themselves exhibit a certain sophistication that should be taken into consideration.



In a day when scholastic distinctions are scarcely employed, readers should take note of the careful arguments offered by the various members of the assembly, such as Edmund Calamy. One need not approve of or agree with them but should acknowledge that what may be clear-cut in our own day may not have been so easily decided in the past. Our own present theological sophistication has not exceeded the abilities of our forefathers, but Reformed churches have largely lost the theological ability to debate issues exegetically, theologically, and precisely, or scholastically. Reformed theology these days seems to be dominated more by bumper-sticker statements and slogans than by carefully reasoned argumentation. Moreover, present-day Reformed churches are largely unfamiliar with the very documents they purport to profess, such as the Canons of Dort. Few people are likely aware of the doctrinal diversity that marks the so-called doctrine of “limited atonement.”



My hope is that this chapter has shed a little light on this subject to show that the divines, along with the broader early modern Reformed tradition, exercised a principled diversity on a number of subjects, such as the extent of Christ’s satisfaction, while at the same time rejecting Remonstrant views. Such an ethos characterizes the question of the extent of Christ’s satisfaction but does not mark issues to be treated in the next chapter on the doctrine of justification. The divines were insistent upon a number of key points regarding the doctrine upon which the church stands or falls.
 
The issue of Christ’s satisfaction arises again in the Confession and Larger Catechism: “The Lord Jesus …fully satisfied the Justice of his Father; and purchased, not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the Kingdom of Heaven, for all those whom the Father hath given unto him”(8.5). The Larger Catechism similarly states, “Redemption is certainly applied, and effectually communicated to all those for whom Christ hath purchased it, who are in time by the Holy Ghost inabled to believe in Christ according to the Gospel”(q. 59). Given these statements, Murray and others have argued that the acquisition of Christ’s satisfaction is coextensive with its application.

However, as recent analysis has demonstrated, theologians employed a distinction between impetration (or redemption accomplished) and intercession that the Confession does not directly address.

Murray et al argued from the actual words of the Westminster Standards. Fesko seeks to bring in diversity by appealing to the individual views of theologians. At the end of the day the Westminster Standards are the subordinate standard, not the individual views of different theologians. The Standards should be permitted to speak for themselves without having variant views thrust upon them from the time in which it was written.
 
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