RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Divine eternity: God exists without beginning or end. But is God temporal or timeless? We will come back to this question, as Craig himself revisits it at the very end of the book. We see much about time and eternity, and the numerous tortured arguments from all sides, but little on (T/E’s) relation to God, per the book’s subtitle. That shouldn’t detract from the fine scholarship, though.
Much of the book is a sustained analysis of Einstein and the various debates concerning relativity. I’m going to skip those. The heart of Craig’s argument is setting forth two views of time:
Tensed time (A). This is the common-sense view of time (and the one Craig upholds). We can speak of past, present, and future. However, if God is timeless, as he must be if we deny that time is eternal, then it’s hard to see how he can relate to time.
Tenseless time (B). Time is an illusion, or at least speech of a past and a future is meaningless. This fits well with some models of relativity. If time is actually space-time, and space is a 3-D coordinate, and if space isn’t tensed (and it isn’t), then time is tenseless. While this is quite bizarre, and Craig offers a number of rebuttals, but its strength lies in its ability to comport with God’s eternity.
In conclusion, Craig argues that God is eternal before Creation but has a temporal dimension with respect to creation. And that’s my problem with his conclusion. I think there is something to it, but he does very little to develop it (Craig, 217-235, and much of that discussion is a summary of his Kalam argument). He adds a fine discussion on God’s foreknowledge as an appendix.
Much of the book is a sustained analysis of Einstein and the various debates concerning relativity. I’m going to skip those. The heart of Craig’s argument is setting forth two views of time:
Tensed time (A). This is the common-sense view of time (and the one Craig upholds). We can speak of past, present, and future. However, if God is timeless, as he must be if we deny that time is eternal, then it’s hard to see how he can relate to time.
Tenseless time (B). Time is an illusion, or at least speech of a past and a future is meaningless. This fits well with some models of relativity. If time is actually space-time, and space is a 3-D coordinate, and if space isn’t tensed (and it isn’t), then time is tenseless. While this is quite bizarre, and Craig offers a number of rebuttals, but its strength lies in its ability to comport with God’s eternity.
In conclusion, Craig argues that God is eternal before Creation but has a temporal dimension with respect to creation. And that’s my problem with his conclusion. I think there is something to it, but he does very little to develop it (Craig, 217-235, and much of that discussion is a summary of his Kalam argument). He adds a fine discussion on God’s foreknowledge as an appendix.