Can someone affirm Reformed Orthodoxy and not classical apologetics?

[jwright82]

Can someone be an orthodox, consistent reformed scholastic loving individual and be a different school of apologetics, presuppositionalist I suppose? Or must we all be classical apologetics loving individuals to be reformed orthodox? Can we separate apologetics from theology?

 

[Taylor]

Can we separate apologetics from theology?

No. This was one of Van Til's most repeated emphases.

 

[Polanus1561]

Can we separate apologetics from theology?

Wait, I am missing the link from this to the rest of your words

 

[RamistThomist]

Here is where it gets interesting. The Reformed Orthodox all held to classical categories. While they weren't unanimous on what they meant by "being" and "causation," it isn't hard to see from where they got it. If you read through Richard Muller, you can start to connect the dots.

Does that mean that someone who holds to presuppositional apologetics cannot hold to classical theology? Not necessarily. I do think it is a somewhat uneasy marriage, though. I can't see a formal contradiction, but those who read Muller generally leave presuppositionalism.

 

[MyCrows]

 

[jwright82]

Here is where it gets interesting. The Reformed Orthodox all held to classical categories. While they weren't unanimous on what they meant by "being" and "causation," it isn't hard to see from where they got it. If you read through Richard Muller, you can start to connect the dots.

Does that mean that someone who holds to presuppositional apologetics cannot hold to classical theology? Not necessarily. I do think it is a somewhat uneasy marriage, though. I can't see a formal contradiction, but those who read Muller generally leave presuppositionalism.

And what if Van Til's right and there's significant problems with the traditional method? Do we have to accept it anyway or can Orthodoxy adapt to change?

 

[jwright82]

No. This was one of Van Til's most repeated emphases.

I agree that it is our theology we are defending which is biblical theology.

 

[jwright82]

Here is where it gets interesting. The Reformed Orthodox all held to classical categories. While they weren't unanimous on what they meant by "being" and "causation," it isn't hard to see from where they got it. If you read through Richard Muller, you can start to connect the dots.

Does that mean that someone who holds to presuppositional apologetics cannot hold to classical theology? Not necessarily. I do think it is a somewhat uneasy marriage, though. I can't see a formal contradiction, but those who read Muller generally leave presuppositionalism.

"People generally leave presuppositionalism " where did you get that figure from? In all honesty. The statement sounds confusing thats all, and impossible to prove.

 

[Ulster Fry]

And what if Van Til's right and there's significant problems with the traditional method? Do we have to accept it anyway or can Orthodoxy adapt to change?

Well, given that Reformed Orthodoxy refers to an historical period (roughly mid-late sixteenth to mid eighteenth century I believe) then no, it can't be changed. Unless you want to rewrite the history.

This is an important point, though. As you suggest, if one agrees with Van Til's critique, then he will have to accept that everyone before Van Til got it wrong, and the true Reformed apologetic begins with Van Til. That's fine, I guess, but what isn't acceptable (this is a real bug bear of mine in any discussion) is when people try to reinterpret the history to suit their position. Better to just embrace the novelty and run with it.

More directly to your original question, you have to understand that the Reformed Orthodox have an entirely different philosophical methodology from the post-Kantianism of Van Til and modern philosophy in general. In fact, given that we are all post-Kantian as a matter of history, we can't just take Reformed Orthodoxy wholesale and apply it directly to our own time. Much of classical philosophy and theology has to be revised and adapted to contemporary theological and philosophical controversies. The best theologians are those who can do this effectively (look at Bavinck in his context).

 

[RamistThomist]

And what if Van Til's right and there's significant problems with the traditional method? Do we have to accept it anyway or can Orthodoxy adapt to change?

We aren't talking about whether Van Til is right. Your question is whether one can hold to traditional Reformed scholastic orthodoxy and still be a presup.

 

[RamistThomist]

"People generally leave presuppositionalism " where did you get that figure from? In all honesty. The statement sounds confusing thats all, and impossible to prove.

Admittedly, it's anecdotal. I'm not saying that people who are presups leave presuppositionalism. I am saying that those who read a lot of Muller and then start reading his sources, generally don't stay presuppositionalism (since Van Til said that much of that Reformed Orthodox methodology was wrong).

 

[jwright82]

We aren't talking about whether Van Til is right. Your question is whether one can hold to traditional Reformed scholastic orthodoxy and still be a presup.

Fair enough your right. But my second question was if Van Til's critique is correct than that would good reason to abandon it. And if one did as a development on Reformed Orthodoxy than would they cease to be Reformed Orthodox? I say no, Reformed and always reforming right? That's all.

 

[jwright82]

Admittedly, it's anecdotal. I'm not saying that people who are presups leave presuppositionalism. I am saying that those who read a lot of Muller and then start reading his sources, generally don't stay presuppositionalism (since Van Til said that much of that Reformed Orthodox methodology was wrong).

Unfortunately he did but that's an area of study underdeveloped. I've read essays that argue the opposite, see "Reason and Revelation: New Essays In Reformed Apologetics". They argue that despite what he said he was still drawing from that well. I mean his main theological influences were Bavink, Warfield, Kuyper, and Vos who could hardly be said to be outside the fold. So despite his best efforts he was within the fold.

 

[RamistThomist]

Fair enough your right. But my second question was if Van Til's critique is correct than that would good reason to abandon it. And if one did as a development on Reformed Orthodoxy than would they cease to be Reformed Orthodox? I say no, Reformed and always reforming right? That's all.

Sure, if Van Til is correct, then we should follow Van Til.

Part of this might be my fault on Reformed Orthodoxy. In terms of fact, it meant the time from Beza to around 1720. I guess when we use the term for today, we mean those who follow their contributions. To be sure, we all can't be pure Aristotelians and Ramists today. I've read too much of Polanyi and Torrance on that point. The goal, rather, is someone like Bavinck. All of that can be done without conceding that Van Til was correct. I think he was quite wrong on this point.

 

[RamistThomist]

Unfortunately he did but that's an area of study underdeveloped. I've read essays that argue the opposite, see "Reason and Revelation: New Essays In Reformed Apologetics". They argue that despite what he said he was still drawing from that well. I mean his main theological influences were Bavink, Warfield, Kuyper, and Vos who could hardly be said to be outside the fold. So despite his best efforts he was within the fold.

Vos used Classical Argumentation and Van Til said Bavinck was still too much of a scholastic. Van Til critiqued Warfield on evidences, but agreed with Warfield, pace Kuyper, that apologetics was an objective enterprise. As to whether he was still in the fold, read all of Reformed systematics before the 20th century on the arguments for existence of God, then read van Til on them.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I say no, Reformed and always reforming right? That's all.

I've grown extremely suspicious of this phrase over the past few years.

 

[Polanus1561]

Is WSCAL more classical or VT?

 

[RamistThomist]

Is WSCAL more classical or VT?

They are rigorously classical on the doctrine of God and Reformed Orthodoxy. Formally, though, they are Van Tillian.

 

[Polanus1561]

They are rigorously classical on the doctrine of God and Reformed Orthodoxy. Formally, though, they are Van Tillian.

Is that not pertinent to the discussion (which I admit I am still not clear on)?

 

[RamistThomist]

Is that not pertinent to the discussion (which I admit I am still not clear on)?

It's a good question. I think they will say that Van Til was wrong on his historiography. That can't be denied. They think, though, that the two are compatible.

 

[RamistThomist]

Despite himself, Van Til did say some classical-ish things. See his remarks on subordination. He mightily rebuts the heresy of ESS. Try to find the actual quote. I couldn't say it better myself. Once you remove his claim that the Trinity One Person and Three Persons, he's pretty good on the doctrine of God. Good luck figuring out what concrete universal means, though.

 

[Matt LaMaster]

Can someone be an orthodox, consistent reformed scholastic loving individual and be a different school of apologetics, presuppositionalist I suppose? Or must we all be classical apologetics loving individuals to be reformed orthodox? Can we separate apologetics from theology?

Part of the problem comes when considering apologetics as a separate discipline. This is actually a relatively new phenomenon. Most of the Orthodox, Reformed Scholastics weren't operating with a view that saw apologetics as a separate discipline than the rest of the Theological enterprise. Their writings were typically informed by philosophical categories, true, but they weren't typically articulating their views with a goal of winning over unbelievers. They were integrating the philosophical advances of earlier ages, but their interlocutors (typically R. Catholics and Lutherans) were all operating with a similar mindset. It is difficult to say, and historically anachronistic, which apologetic "school" the Reformed Scholastics held to since those schools weren't clearly delineated because the whole field was as of yet nascent and not yet distinct from regular theological methodology.

That being said, it's hard for me to read Calvin himself and to end up as anything other than a presuppositionalist.

 

[Charles Johnson]

I don't see how one could have broad agreement with the reformed Orthodox and think presuppositionalism or transcendental arguments are the only valid apologetic, as Van Til did. I can see how one would continue to use them, but the exclusivity has to go.
On the other hand, today's classical apologists, in comparison to those of the 16th and 17th centuries, tend to exaggerate the importance of Aquinas. Those of the 17th century were using a lot of arguments, some directly derived from scripture and some not, of which Thomas's prime mover argument was a small piece, and Anselm's ontological argument was also a small piece. And, of course, their willingness to accept Anselm's argument as valid represents a major departure from Thomas. These are the arguments Polanus uses for example:
"1. The consideration of the world, the mass, the skillful production, the form, the continuous sustaining, the very wise governance, the innumerable variety, the order of bodies, the diverse movement, and the admirable virtues of which teach that there is some intelligent nature from which all of these things come. Ps. 8, 19, Rom. 1:19-20. “Seeing as τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, that which can be known of God, is manifest in them, for God has shown it to them. For the invisible things of him are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse.” Act. 14:17, “Nevertheless, he did not leave himself without witness, in that he did good and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.” From here, that axiom repeated by the gentile philosophers: “nothing is the cause of itself,” unless the prior and the consequent are the same as it. It would be no less foolish than false to affirm that the same thing is in the same sense simultaneously in potency and act. At any rate, a cause was needed which would produce the world and all its parts. Diagoras openly and explicitly denied that God exists, and not having wood to cook his turnips with, he cut up a statue of Hercules, as Athenagoras relates in Legatio pro Christianis. And in the same place, he recalls that an infamous rumor of three scandalous acts was spread concerning Christians: impiety, that they did away with Gods, cannibalistic feasts, and incestuous copulation. But Athenagoras proves that these scandalous deeds were slanderously attributed to Christians. Justin Martyr testifies that Christians were called atheists, Apologia II. ad Antoninum Pium Imperatorem. But Christians by no means deny that God exists. It is a delusion of the heathens; and therefore, we take up nature arguments to prove that God exists. Hermes Trismegistus said in Poemandres, “Indeed, God cannot be penetrated by human reason, but he can be touched by hands.”
2. The principles innate in us, which are the starting points of doctrines, which it is necessary to have been engraved in the minds of man by an intelligent nature. Rom. 1:19.
3. The special knowledge naturally inherent in us that God exists.
4. The proper testimony of our conscience, upon thunder and other unusual storms, earthquakes, which is frightened, and fears God the judge on account of wicked deeds, and thus, shudders with some trepidation, as may be seen in Caesar Caligula, as Suetonius testifies on Caligula, ch. 51.
5. Punishments for evil deeds, inflicted upon the wicked even in this life, concerning which Thucydides says, μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι τιμωρίαι εἰσὶ παρὰ Θεοῦ. “To great evil deeds belong great acts of vengeance from God.”
6. The establishing and conserving of political order.
7. Particular virtues and motions in heroic persons. Hence, by Homer, heroes are called “god-like.”
8. Indications of future things. Cicero said concerning divination, “If there is divination, there are gods.”
9. The end of all natural things. For, since it is most certain in all things, and so very few things, rather, have a view to or perceive that end to which they constantly are inclined and continue, it is wholly necessary for there to be some mind that understands all things, and governs particular things and directs them to their ends.
10. The series of causes that does not progress into infinity, leading by hand, as it were, to some first mover, upon whom all motions, actions, and effects depend.
11. Worship itself, whether religious or superstitious, introduced by fear of the deity.
12. The common confession and consent of all peoples, even the most savage. “For no people is so barbaric that it does not judge that there is some god, indeed, so that men prefer to have a false god to none at all: certainly, a sense of the divinity sits so highly in our hearts.” Cicero, Tusc. Sen. 1.21. ep. 118. Divinus ille Jamblichus, de mysteriis. ch. 1.
13. A sense of the goodness of God; that is, of the immense spiritual and corporal benefits of God. For that we live, that we move, and that we exist is a benefit of his. Act. 14:15. And so many benefits of his surround us that he is nearly felt by us, Act. 17:27. Seneca, de benefic. 4.4.
14. The excellence of our mind. For, that we reason, that we dispute in our mind, and that we think up various arts and exercise them, is done by the benefit of God. The soul, in itself, is immobile, and at the same time, by its will it governs all the motions of the body, it reveals itself by admirable effects, and yet, it is not discerned with the eyes, nor can it be comprehended with sharpness of mind. This compels us to think that there is some mind that goes, moves, and guides all these things: that there is a Spirit in whom we live, move, and have our being. Man even sees and feels in himself that there is a God, whether he beholds the body or considers the soul.
15. The immortality of our soul. For the soul goes forth to God, when it departs this body, and flies away as from a prison: and the gentiles said that the soul is our little part of the divine breath.
16. Admirable, remarkable, and unexpected events that could not be done except by a most powerful nature, with which the theater of human life is full.
From these very many arguments, it can be clear to any, even one ignorant of the Holy Scriptures, that God exists. And thus, absolutely all men know that God exists from the touch of divinity, before all use of reason. And thus, Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics deny in vain that God is known in himself."

 

[jwright82]

Vos used Classical Argumentation and Van Til said Bavinck was still too much of a scholastic. Van Til critiqued Warfield on evidences, but agreed with Warfield, pace Kuyper, that apologetics was an objective enterprise. As to whether he was still in the fold, read all of Reformed systematics before the 20th century on the arguments for existence of God, then read van Til on them.

Yes but can you prove, rather than imply by empty suggestions, that he was against their theology? It goes back to my OP, does being reformed Wed one to a particular method rather a method simply?
If he was critical at points, rather than totality, of their theology but basically agreed with them and they agreed with reformed Orthodoxy doesn't that either make him within the fold or their wrong? Your generalized and sweeping statements prove nothing.

 

[RamistThomist]

es but can you prove, rather than imply by empty suggestions, that he was against their theology?

I specifically said I was not making that argument.

It goes back to my OP, does being reformed Wed one to a particular method rather a method simply?

As I said in my earlier remarks, I'm not 100% sure.

If he was critical at points, rather than totality, of their theology but basically agreed with them and they agreed with reformed Orthodoxy doesn't that either make him within the fold or their wrong?

He attacked their prolegemona. That's not up for debate. Read Van Til's statements on the traditional method, and then read any Reformed prolegomena from Beza to Bavinck. Again, I am not saying Van Til is against their theology. I'm just pointing out a tension.

Your generalized and sweeping statements prove nothing

My statements weren't generalized. In any case, what do you think I was actually trying to prove?

 

[83r17h]

does being reformed Wed one to a particular method

I would think that Reformed theology specifically militates against treating a singular method as the ultimate method. WLC 2 and WLC 4 both affirm a diversity of "methods" in epistemological warrant for belief either in God or in Scripture. But both also affirm that belief is not grounded in epistemological warrant, but rather in a work of the Spirit. And the Spirit is not to be reduced to any one method (or to method in the abstract) because "the wind blows where it wishes, and you hear the sound of it, but cannot tell where it comes from and where it goes. So is everyone who is born of the Spirit." (John 3:8).

The legitimacy of various arguments only goes hand in hand with the futility of all arguments (and method) in themselves. Also, I'm fairly certain that Van Til was strictly against treating apologetics as prolegomena, because that is the error that he charged others with. If theology rules apologetics, then it seems a bit strange to say that theology must change because of one's apologetic. I think a distinction between apologetics and prolegomena could be helpful here. It would also be helpful to treat prolegomena as tools, not as the deductive basis of theology (if prolegomena was the deductive basis of theology, Scripture is unnecessary).

 

[Joshua]

Can they? Prolly. May they? I dunno. Should they? I dunno. This stuff's over my hillbilly head.

 

[RamistThomist]

I'm willing to criticize today's "Great Tradition Thomists." They've generally done a terrible job understanding what analytic theology is trying to do.

 

[RamistThomist]

I'm willing to criticize today's "Great Tradition Thomists." They've generally done a terrible job understanding what analytic theology is trying to do.

It actually points to a deeper problem on both sides. Of course, I have the otherwise well-read layman in mind, and not professional philosophers like Ed Feser or James Anderson. It's not simply that "philosophy has changed since Kant" (I never found Kant all that impressive), but philosophy has changed even since Frege. A good source on this is Roger Scruton's A Short History of Modern Philosophy. You should read it, anyway, as it is written with grace and elegance.

 

[AT]

I'm willing to criticize today's "Great Tradition Thomists." They've generally done a terrible job understanding what analytic theology is trying to do.

I get a lot of "reject modernity, return" vibe from them. A sort of utopian traditionalism. Just an observation.

It actually points to a deeper problem on both sides. Of course, I have the otherwise well-read layman in mind, and not professional philosophers like Ed Feser or James Anderson. It's not simply that "philosophy has changed since Kant" (I never found Kant all that impressive), but philosophy has changed even since Frege. A good source on this is Roger Scruton's A Short History of Modern Philosophy. You should read it, anyway, as it is written with grace and elegance.

Yes, Scruton, maybe a bit too much of a traditionalist for me, is a fine example of utilising modern philosophy without buying into modernity itself. His Short History is still on the to-read pile though.