Turretin's Method of Theology (or how not to be a Campbellite)

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I'd like to think it's possible. I'm frustrated because I have friends on both sides. I do think there is a neo-Socinian spirit in many of those who call themselves Reformed where they imagine a very shallow appeal to prooftexts and what they deem as exegesis allows them freedom to redefine classic theological tenets. Frame is an example, not so much of someone who is a thin Biblicist but someone who forges out in new metaphysical directions and often feels no compunction to stick with Catholicity.

I think the EFS and ERAS debates were a necessary wake-up call to get people to think about small-c catholic Christian ideas that many in the 20th century felt were OK to depart from as long as they were good on salvation proper. The problem, as I see it, is that it's starting to become more of a "club" to be a "classic theist" and isn't being worked out in a mature, Ecclesiastical way. It's not enough to show very broad strokes but to get to specifics of dangers. It's OK as well to acknowledge that a person is in danger of a particular trajectory without labelling them as being in a certain camp. For instance, the Socinian or anabaptist way of thinking may bear similarities to a sort of "I'll study history and arrive at my own conclusions as I read the Scripture" but since they don't always quite "fit" it's not possible to fully label someone. It seems like all conversation is stopping at this point and people are just taking sides.
How would the Reformed Baptist divide over this issue be resolved in an ecclesiastical way? Not asking you for an answer but just an observation. It could be resolved through journals but I don’t think the non classical theists have such an avenue
 
I'd like to think it's possible. I'm frustrated because I have friends on both sides. I do think there is a neo-Socinian spirit in many of those who call themselves Reformed where they imagine a very shallow appeal to prooftexts and what they deem as exegesis allows them freedom to redefine classic theological tenets. Frame is an example, not so much of someone who is a thin Biblicist but someone who forges out in new metaphysical directions and often feels no compunction to stick with Catholicity.

I think the EFS and ERAS debates were a necessary wake-up call to get people to think about small-c catholic Christian ideas that many in the 20th century felt were OK to depart from as long as they were good on salvation proper. The problem, as I see it, is that it's starting to become more of a "club" to be a "classic theist" and isn't being worked out in a mature, Ecclesiastical way. It's not enough to show very broad strokes but to get to specifics of dangers. It's OK as well to acknowledge that a person is in danger of a particular trajectory without labelling them as being in a certain camp. For instance, the Socinian or anabaptist way of thinking may bear similarities to a sort of "I'll study history and arrive at my own conclusions as I read the Scripture" but since they don't always quite "fit" it's not possible to fully label someone. It seems like all conversation is stopping at this point and people are just taking sides.

That is probably right. My own opinion is that "Conference Calvinism" was always more interested in "Yet Another Conference or Book on the Five Points" or having conferences about "Passion!" or something like that. More mature teachers avoided that, but few then actually discussed metaphysical issues like divine simplicity.

Then when Conference Calvinism turned to the doctrine of God, it was seen as a means to an end, as a way to keep women in the kitchen.
 
I sort of know why Van Tillians say this [Logic requires that the Ultimate be either three Persons or one God], but I think it is a very bad way of speaking about God.
Yes, this is "a very bad way of speaking about God," because His nature cannot be comprehensively analyzed by logic. Recognizing that the nature of the Trinity is supralogical is an application of the Second Commandment.
 
Yes, this is "a very bad way of speaking about God," because His nature cannot be comprehensively analyzed by logic. Recognizing that the nature of the Trinity is supralogical is an application of the Second Commandment.
Right, but that does not mean that saying the "Three persons and the One nature" are equally ultimate is a good way of speaking of the Trinity.
 
Moreover, we believe God cannot lie, but no one who says that thinks God subordinated himself to Ethics.

Of course not. God defines truth by his nature - his self-expression makes up the essence of Truth. Does that not constitute a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of him? - i.e. an attribute?

The same for logic itself, no? You hesitate to say logic is an attribute of God and you (rightly) do not quickly embrace the idea that God created the laws of logic. But what else is there? This is not a rhetorical question as if "ha! I got you on this!" I am genuinely asking.
 
One question though, don't baptists reject good and necessary consequences? (This is not meant to pick a fight, it is just something I have heard some baptists say)

In 1689, the Baptists changed the language of WCF 1.6 from: "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added ..."

to:

"The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down or necessarily contained in the Holy Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added,..."

They did not reject necessary consequences and agreed that these are binding from Scripture but that so-called "good" consequences lack the power to bind.

"The distinction has reference to the use of logic in interpretation. The question in one sense is this: 'Is the use of reason appropriate in understanding the Scripture and is the result of the use of logic binding for the result of interpretation?' The simple answer to this question among the Particular Baptists is yes. Nehemiah Coxe (co-editor of 1689 2LBCF) and the six London elders who endorsed his work stand as examples of this." - Jim Renihan's exposition of 1689 To the Judicious and Impartial Reader p. 55

Coxe and the London elders' work he was referring to was addressing an evangelist out in the west country of London named Thomas Collier. Collier was preaching that:

"That which the Scripture no where affirms, is unsound and unsafe for any man to affirm."

Coxe investigated his teachings and found him to have heresy and gross error. In his Vindiciae Veritatis, or a Confutation of the Heresies and Gross Errors asserted by Thomas Collier, he acknowledges the "propriety of deduction by just consequence" and states: "It is a sure maxim ... The just and necessary consequence of a true notion, is truth, and nothing else." (Coxe 134)

Not all Baptists are aware of this. Some misuse the perceived softer language and go the way of Collier and other biblicist-ish positions.

It is complex. Renihan goes on to tell of how Benjamin Keach preached that "good and necessary consequences" forms one of the stones in the base of the error of paedobaptists because - on the distinction of moral law vs. positive commands - circumcision and baptism were not moral laws (defined as naturally written on men's hearts and codified in the Decalogue) but these are positive commands (defined as unknowable apart from special revelation and carrying specific obligations for specific people). In the cases of circumcision and baptism, these would be covenantal requirements.

"Doctrine may be established on the basis of a consequence, but not covenantal practices." (Renihan 57, paraphrasing in summation the position of Keach re: consequences contained in Scripture).

I hope this helps.

God bless you and everyone here.
 
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The same for logic itself, no? You hesitate to say logic is an attribute of God and you (rightly) do not quickly embrace the idea that God created the laws of logic. But what else is there? This is not a rhetorical question as if "ha! I got you on this!" I am genuinely asking.

I understand what people mean when they say logic is an attribute. My only hesitation is that none of the guys who did the hard work on the attributes of God said that.
 
How would the Reformed Baptist divide over this issue be resolved in an ecclesiastical way? Not asking you for an answer but just an observation. It could be resolved through journals but I don’t think the non classical theists have such an avenue
That's a good question that I find myself asking. As the LBCF removed the GNC clause about theology, I find it a curious thing when RB's are holding other RB's to Thomistic ideas. It's also one of the reasons the charges and counter-charges are so easily ramped up because, in the PCA, formal charges could be pressed for some of the rhetoric that's flying.
 
That's a good question that I find myself asking. As the LBCF removed the GNC clause about theology, I find it a curious thing when RB's are holding other RB's to Thomistic ideas. It's also one of the reasons the charges and counter-charges are so easily ramped up because, in the PCA, formal charges could be pressed for some of the rhetoric that's flying.
Which is why the social media quarrels are at seminary level, if I had to choose an avenue. The tribalism is under those headings. Not even in academic journals but in social media. There are no other avenues.
 
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That is not what the law of noncontradiction says. It says A cannot be ~A at the same time and in the same relationship.
God as Divinity and God as Persons are two aspects of the same unitary Being, but within the Being itself, these two aspects are indissolubly intertwined, i.e., not logically separable. I suggest that this is a prime example of why the law of noncontradiction is unhelpful in establishing fundamental metaphysical principles.
 
I understand what people mean when they say logic is an attribute. My only hesitation is that none of the guys who did the hard work on the attributes of God said that.

I understand, but when I read Charnock, I imagine that I see the underlying necessary consequences of logic as an attribute contained in large portions of Discourse 1 (existence of God), 2 (practical atheism), 8 (on God's knowledge), 9 (on the wisdom of God), and 13 (on God's dominion). Am I reading too much into it? Is that because I read Poythress before I read Charnock?

Very possibly; I am highly prone to error when reading on my own.

I am grateful to your conservativism here, and I want you to know (and any others following our back-and-forth) that my initial comment was a paraphrase of Poythress from my memory.

I have not pulled out my copy of Logic: A God-centered Approach yet to confirm this but now, I am curious as to how the laws of logic should be categorized as to Scriptural adherence to the nature of God himself. There must be a necessary component to logic in such a way that does not make God a servant to logic but logic as a necessary consequence to the Being of God.
 
I understand, but when I read Charnock, I imagine that I see the underlying necessary consequences of logic as an attribute contained in large portions of Discourse 1 (existence of God), 2 (practical atheism), 8 (on God's knowledge), 9 (on the wisdom of God), and 13 (on God's dominion). Am I reading too much into it? Is that because I read Poythress before I read Charnock?

Very possibly; I am highly prone to error when reading on my own.

I am grateful to your conservativism here, and I want you to know (and any others following our back-and-forth) that my initial comment was a paraphrase of Poythress from my memory.

I have not pulled out my copy of Logic: A God-centered Approach yet to confirm this but now, I am curious as to how the laws of logic should be categorized as to Scriptural adherence to the nature of God himself. There must be a necessary component to logic in such a way that does not make God a servant to logic but logic as a necessary consequence to the Being of God.
I might go reread what Poythress says, too. I suppose it could work. If logic is an attribute, then we have to think of communicable vs. incommunicable attributes.
 
That's a good question that I find myself asking. As the LBCF removed the GNC clause about theology, I find it a curious thing when RB's are holding other RB's to Thomistic ideas. It's also one of the reasons the charges and counter-charges are so easily ramped up because, in the PCA, formal charges could be pressed for some of the rhetoric that's flying.
This is one of the reason's why I think White is actually being consistent with his confession (whether he is right or wrong). I think the issue is though that the Thomistic baptists are not confessional. So, that may be causing some of these issues. White is committed to the 1689 which does not have the GNC clause. Barrett and some of these other baptists are SBC I believe, and they do not hold to a confession really (not sure I consider the Baptist Faith and Message 2000 a proper confession), so they would not be bound to that exclusion.
 
This is one of the reason's why I think White is actually being consistent with his confession (whether he is right or wrong). I think the issue is though that the Thomistic baptists are not confessional. So, that may be causing some of these issues. White is committed to the 1689 which does not have the GNC clause. Barrett and some of these other baptists are SBC I believe, and they do not hold to a confession really (not sure I consider the Baptist Faith and Message 2000 a proper confession), so they would not be bound to that exclusion.

If the 1689 teaches the historic doctrine of simplicity, then White might have a problem. He says he affirms simplicity in the biblical sense. The particular baptists did as well, yet they understood it differently than he does.
 
I might go reread what Poythress says, too. I suppose it could work. If logic is an attribute, then we have to think of communicable vs. incommunicable attributes.

I remembered I had an epub version in my Crossway account and pulled it at work on break.

Chapter 7 is the critical point: "Logic Revealing God"

Allow me to quote around the edges of the chapter for learned consideration by yourself and any of our other esteemed colleagues here.

KEY QUOTES:

"If all human beings were to die, and Felix the cat were to survive, it would still be the case that Felix is a carnivore. The logic leading to this conclusion would still be valid. An angel examining the argument could still acknowledge its validity. This hypothetical situation shows that logic is independent of humanity. But, if God exists, God is still there. So it does not necessarily follow that logic is independent of God. What is the relation of God to logic?" (Poythress 62)

"If God is righteous, then he must not be unrighteous. More precisely, it is impossible for him to be righteous and not to be righteous at the same time and in the same way. According to this view, God is then subject to the law of noncontradiction. This view has the effect of making logic an absolute above God, to which God himself is subjected. This view in fact is radically antagonistic to the biblical idea that God is absolute and that everything else is radically subject to him: “The Lord has established his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom rules over all” (Ps. 103:19). A Bible reader may try to escape the implications of this verse by interpreting the word all in a limited sense. He might say that God rules over all things that have been created. But logic is not created. Philosophers have maintained that it just “is.” But if logic is not created, and it just “is,” we have to return to the question of whether God is subject to the laws of logic. If he is, he is not truly absolute. Logic rules over him. Logic appears to be a kind of ruling “god” above God, making us question who or what is the final controller." (Poythress 63)

"If an argument is indeed valid, its validity holds for all times and all places. That is, its validity is omnipresent (in all places) and eternal (for all times). Logical validity has these two attributes that are classically attributed to God. Technically, God’s eternity is usually conceived of as being “above” or “beyond” time. But words like “above” and “beyond” are metaphorical and point to mysteries. There is, in fact, an analogous mystery with respect to laws of logic." (Poythress 65)

"We are rather focusing on logical laws themselves. Are there norms for good reasoning? If a syllogism really does display valid reasoning, does it continue to be valid over time? The law—the law governing reasoning—does not change with time. It is immutable. Validity is unchangeable. Immutability is an attribute of God. Next, logic is at bottom ideational in character. We do not literally see logic, but only the effects of logic on particular cases of reasoning in language. Logic is essentially immaterial and invisible but is known through its effects. Likewise, God is essentially immaterial and invisible but he is known through his acts in the world. If we are talking about the real laws, rather than possibly flawed human formulations, the laws of logic are also absolutely, infallibly true. Truthfulness is also an attribute of God." (Poythress 66)

"Standards for validity must exist even before the logician formulates a description. A law of logic must hold for a whole series of cases. A student of logic cannot force the issue by inventing a law and then forcing reasoning to conform to the law. Reasoning rather conforms to laws already there, laws that are discovered rather than invented.The laws must already be there. They must actually hold. They must “have teeth.” If they are truly universal, they are not violated. Human beings may of course engage in fallacious reasoning, but even their failure is measured by reference to standards for validity that always hold. No reasoning escapes the “hold” or dominion of these logical principles. The power of these real laws is absolute, in fact, infinite. In classical language, the law is omnipotent (“all powerful”)" (Poythress 66)

"Logic is both transcendent and immanent. It transcends the creatures of the world by exercising power over them, conforming them to its dictates. It is immanent in that it touches and holds in its dominion even the smallest bits of this world. (5) Logic transcends the galactic clusters and is immanently present in the way in which it governs the truths about a single proton. Transcendence and immanence are characteristics of God" (Poythress 67)

[Footnote 5 refers to Frame: "On the biblical view of transcendence and immanence, see John M. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1987), especially pp. 13–15; and Doctrine of God, especially pp. 107–115"]
 
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This is one of the reason's why I think White is actually being consistent with his confession (whether he is right or wrong). I think the issue is though that the Thomistic baptists are not confessional. So, that may be causing some of these issues. White is committed to the 1689 which does not have the GNC clause. Barrett and some of these other baptists are SBC I believe, and they do not hold to a confession really (not sure I consider the Baptist Faith and Message 2000 a proper confession), so they would not be bound to that exclusion.

I think it is my turn to ask you a question. How are "Thomistic baptists" not confessional? Granting that "Thomistic" here refers to doctrine of divine simplicity, how do you interpret 1689 as disallowing the view? Or am I misinterpreting you?
 
I think it is my turn to ask you a question. How are "Thomistic baptists" not confessional? Granting that "Thomistic" here refers to doctrine of divine simplicity, how do you interpret 1689 as disallowing the view? Or am I misinterpreting you?
I don't think any of the men calling themselves Thomistic baptists are confessional, meaning they don't subscribe to a reformed confession. That was my point. I am not saying that the 1689 would disallow that view, but they don't hold to the 1689 confession.
 
The 1689 view of simplicity is the same one that Reformed Thomists embrace. It is the same as what Owen and Turretin, whom White critiques, embraced.
 
The 1689 view of simplicity is the same one that Reformed Thomists embrace. It is the same as what Owen and Turretin, whom White critiques, embraced.
It could very well be. The reason I made the comment was to try and give an explanation of why perhaps the groups are talking past each other. They are not arguing on even confessional ground. For me personally, I agree we ought to think twice before questioning something that many good men in the past have affirmed. I may not have much admiration for Aquinas and his exegesis ability, but that is NOT TRUE for Owen and Turretin. I have gained much from both men (especially Turretin) and trust their judgment. More importantly, both men are also very good at anchoring their teaching to the Bible.
 
It could very well be. The reason I made the comment was to try and give an explanation of why perhaps the groups are talking past each other. They are not arguing on even confessional ground. For me personally, I agree we ought to think twice before questioning something that many good men in the past have affirmed. I may not have much admiration for Aquinas and his exegesis ability, but that is NOT TRUE for Owen and Turretin. I have gained much from both men (especially Turretin) and trust their judgment. More importantly, both men are also very good at anchoring their teaching to the Bible.

That is probably right. I think White overreacted to doctrines like simplicity and ISO, maybe because Thomists believed them, and then the other particular Baptists saw White rejecting those doctrines, so they doubled down on Thomas. There was probably a better way.
 
That is probably right. I think White overreacted to doctrines like simplicity and ISO, maybe because Thomists believed them, and then the other particular Baptists saw White rejecting those doctrines, so they doubled down on Thomas. There was probably a better way.
Agreed
 
He might want to affirm that doctrine, but his criticism of Turretin does not encourage us.
I think it's consistent with White's overall approach for years where he won't accept (in many cases for good reasons) an appeal to a formulation without taking into consideration other factors. Some, for instance, appeal to Turretin for what he says about the documents available for translation as a way to argue that the "Confessional" view on manuscripts is the TR. I'm not saying James is right on this argument but I haven't really seen him substantively depart from anything as much as challenge others to do more than appeal to authorities.

On Divine Simplicity, the closest I've seen him get on this is doubting that it is really Biblical to conceive of Simplicity in such a way that, ultimately, we can cannot differentiate the acts of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Now, he also reacts to some foolish statements by some self-described Thomists, but he also doubts that it is really exegetically sustainable to argue that the Father and the Son and the Spirit cannot be distinguished.

Having not studied this closely, I think that some of this has to do with archetypal and ectypal distinctions in some of these arguments. From the standpoint of revealed theology, we have a thin apprehension of the hypostases and their relationship to the essence. We can cautiously approach the subject, but we are not really comprehending the reality.

This is where the GNC thing comes in, because you can argue that the 1689 folks borrowed their theology on certain things and assumed certain metaphysical ideas, but they also denied the form of theology (GNC) that would give them traction to force the issue that it is confessional to go beyond clear exegetical ideas. I think some of these ideas on inseparable operations are GNC but are very hard to argue for with respect to grounding everything in exegetical conclusions.

Not taking sides here, but merely pointing out that it seems like it's more like accusations flying rather than any substantive discussion where the concerns of the sides are taken into account (as well as the limitations of an approach that rejects GNC).
 
much as challenge others to do more than appeal to authorities.

I get that. From 2016 to 2019 I was quite hostile to the Reformed Thomists. I offered the same criticisms of simplicity (ala WL Craig) that White does. However, once I worked through the implications in Dolezal, I realized that it was correct and I had to apologize to a number of Thomists.
On Divine Simplicity, the closest I've seen him get on this is doubting that it is really Biblical to conceive of Simplicity in such a way that, ultimately, we can cannot differentiate the acts of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.

Richard Muller has clearly explained the distinctions from God's perspective (archetypal) and ours (ectypal). A realiter distinction is a distinction between two things. Being, though, is not a thing and so is not reduced to realiter distinctions. However, we can make notional distinctions.
 
I never seen a Reformed Thomist journal article that has interacted with White directly. Even GBTS’ journal has not yet entered the circle of academic discussion.

This issue won’t stop anytime soon because there isn’t even a back and forth other than tweets. The Credo guys don’t even enter into the social media debates which is where the non Thomists are talking.
 
This is ought what to be done. Some clarity. I really don't see this in the current debate—I may be ignorant though.
 
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