RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Blond, Phillip. Red Tory: How Left and Right Have Broken Britain and how we can Fix it. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 2010.
Although critiquing Left and Right programs, a Red Tory, so argues Phillip Blond, is not a centrist. A centrist tries to take both Left and Right without really understanding either. Blond’s program seeks for the common good of society and how the government may best promote it. This involves the government putting restraints on markets in one area while freeing up capital in others. Much of this book is an analysis of how the British government, namely the Labour Party of Blair, mishandled issues leading to the housing collapse. I do not know enough of British economics to really evaluate his claims on that point. His larger thesis concerning the common good, however, does warrant discussion.
After numerous insightful analyses of modern economic culture, Blond gives us many, many suggestions on how to fix it. I’m a stranger to British life so I cannot evaluate whether he is on to something. It does feel, however, that he is firing suggestions at the reader.
If the Left sees the State as the savior and the Right the market, a Red Tory sees in civil society as a counter to the extremes of State and Market. What is this counter? Blond begins this discussion, not surprisingly, with a genealogical critique of philosophical liberalism. Summing up liberalism, he writes: “if we cannot agree upon the good, then we must found society not upon the good but upon the idea of rights–upon people’s permission to think and act as they like,” provided this does not interfere with the negative freedom of others (142).
He has not yet defined the idea of common good, or even “The Good” itself. Indeed, one fears his critique of liberalism sounds rather liberal: rather than a positive definition, he gives a negative critique. A good critique, one that is in fact true, but still a negative critique.
There is perhaps more going on. Before addressing the idea of a common good, he notes that society must have a shared sense of virtue. In a very nice turn of phrase, Blond notes that a virtue society “constantly seeks to discern a just order of priorities between differential claims and between various associative groups” (150). He does not say it this way, but a society based on “the Good” must at the same time differentiate and distinguish between gradations of good; it must have a clear conception of how those goods are ordered. Therefore, the common good is an associative expression of shared moral and social belief. In other words, Blond has adopted St. Augustine’s discussion of civil society found in Book 19 of City of God.
To borrow a phrase from Francis Schaeffer, in light of this, how shall we then live? We begin by pursuing virtue, and virtue is understood as “the means by which people fulfill socially recognized goals” (160). As it stands, this definition is somewhat anemic. It describes the process of pursuing virtue rather than virtue itself. It is a good definition of the process, though.
Perceptive observations:
On Welfare: the state has been able to prevent a fall into abject poverty, but it has not been able to raise people out of relative poverty (77).
On New Labour: “not a third way between the two opposites of individualism and collectivism, but a union of the two, which excludes any sort of civil society” (131).
On the individual liberal: “the state has become the ultimate expression of the individual and the exercise of freedom has curiously fused with the will of the state” (152).
Contra Rawls: “Equal distribution of goods requires an agreement as to a hierarchy of true goods” (170).
Conclusion
Blond tries to do too much in too little space. I think “Red Tory” is a fascinating concept. I am very interested in how such a view would flourish in the United States. As it stands, one fears that any viable “Red Tory” option in America would either get co opted by the Republican Party or fade into irrelevance in the Solidarity Party or the Constitution Party.
Although critiquing Left and Right programs, a Red Tory, so argues Phillip Blond, is not a centrist. A centrist tries to take both Left and Right without really understanding either. Blond’s program seeks for the common good of society and how the government may best promote it. This involves the government putting restraints on markets in one area while freeing up capital in others. Much of this book is an analysis of how the British government, namely the Labour Party of Blair, mishandled issues leading to the housing collapse. I do not know enough of British economics to really evaluate his claims on that point. His larger thesis concerning the common good, however, does warrant discussion.
After numerous insightful analyses of modern economic culture, Blond gives us many, many suggestions on how to fix it. I’m a stranger to British life so I cannot evaluate whether he is on to something. It does feel, however, that he is firing suggestions at the reader.
If the Left sees the State as the savior and the Right the market, a Red Tory sees in civil society as a counter to the extremes of State and Market. What is this counter? Blond begins this discussion, not surprisingly, with a genealogical critique of philosophical liberalism. Summing up liberalism, he writes: “if we cannot agree upon the good, then we must found society not upon the good but upon the idea of rights–upon people’s permission to think and act as they like,” provided this does not interfere with the negative freedom of others (142).
He has not yet defined the idea of common good, or even “The Good” itself. Indeed, one fears his critique of liberalism sounds rather liberal: rather than a positive definition, he gives a negative critique. A good critique, one that is in fact true, but still a negative critique.
There is perhaps more going on. Before addressing the idea of a common good, he notes that society must have a shared sense of virtue. In a very nice turn of phrase, Blond notes that a virtue society “constantly seeks to discern a just order of priorities between differential claims and between various associative groups” (150). He does not say it this way, but a society based on “the Good” must at the same time differentiate and distinguish between gradations of good; it must have a clear conception of how those goods are ordered. Therefore, the common good is an associative expression of shared moral and social belief. In other words, Blond has adopted St. Augustine’s discussion of civil society found in Book 19 of City of God.
To borrow a phrase from Francis Schaeffer, in light of this, how shall we then live? We begin by pursuing virtue, and virtue is understood as “the means by which people fulfill socially recognized goals” (160). As it stands, this definition is somewhat anemic. It describes the process of pursuing virtue rather than virtue itself. It is a good definition of the process, though.
Perceptive observations:
On Welfare: the state has been able to prevent a fall into abject poverty, but it has not been able to raise people out of relative poverty (77).
On New Labour: “not a third way between the two opposites of individualism and collectivism, but a union of the two, which excludes any sort of civil society” (131).
On the individual liberal: “the state has become the ultimate expression of the individual and the exercise of freedom has curiously fused with the will of the state” (152).
Contra Rawls: “Equal distribution of goods requires an agreement as to a hierarchy of true goods” (170).
Conclusion
Blond tries to do too much in too little space. I think “Red Tory” is a fascinating concept. I am very interested in how such a view would flourish in the United States. As it stands, one fears that any viable “Red Tory” option in America would either get co opted by the Republican Party or fade into irrelevance in the Solidarity Party or the Constitution Party.
