Turretin's Method of Theology (or how not to be a Campbellite)

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This is where the GNC thing comes in, because you can argue that the 1689 folks borrowed their theology on certain things and assumed certain metaphysical ideas, but they also denied the form of theology (GNC) that would give them traction to force the issue that it is confessional to go beyond clear exegetical ideas. I think some of these ideas on inseparable operations are GNC but are very hard to argue for with respect to grounding everything in exegetical conclusions.

I do not think your assertion follows. 1689 does not deny GNC rather modifies it to only include necessary as separated from "good".

Obviously, the covenantal differences plays the majority part in separating these things, yet it does not follow that they lack the "traction to force issues beyond clear exegetical ideas".

For example, I was discussing with a NCT re: the existence of moral law (which they - being non-confessional and partially dispensationalist - outright deny), the conversation switched to "what Scripture says" and he even denied theology is allowed to make logical deductions!

I pointed out to him that he is - in point of fact - unintentionally denying many doctrinal truths regarding the Trinity.

as in:

1) "All words that the Son says are words that the Father says" (John 17:7-8)
2) "All words that the Spirit says are words that the Son says" (John 16:13-14)
Therefore, all words that the Spirit says are words that the Father says.

The conclusion has no direct chapter and verse. It flows and follows logically from the "Barbra" syllogism of the two preceding verses. (This was again pulled from Poythress on logic).

If you say some of these ideas on inseparable operations are GNC but hard to argue for with respect to grounding everything in exegetical conclusions, do you mean it is hard to construct exegetically based syllogisms? I am unfamiliar with ISO so I am genuinely asking while at the same time defending the honor of my confession a little bit.

God bless you
 
I get that. From 2016 to 2019 I was quite hostile to the Reformed Thomists. I offered the same criticisms of simplicity (ala WL Craig) that White does. However, once I worked through the implications in Dolezal, I realized that it was correct and I had to apologize to a number of Thomists.


Richard Muller has clearly explained the distinctions from God's perspective (archetypal) and ours (ectypal). A realiter distinction is a distinction between two things. Being, though, is not a thing and so is not reduced to realiter distinctions. However, we can make notional distinctions.
I'm not defending him as much as describing the issue. I rather see the issue as needlessly divisive. White isn't promoting some form of systematic theology or writing books as much as reacting to people whom he sees are suddenly drawing sharp lines of division where none existed just a few years ago. I've been following him for 20 years and, for better or worse, he is who he is. During the EFS debates he articulated his disagreement with the movement. He may not be the scholastic theologian that others may prefer drawing very fine lines and trying to define the boundaries of dogmatics, but more of a jack of all trades who is really useful for some things while there are other things that I just wish he would leave alone (he tends to be a bit alarmist on certain areas). I don't like that he's cozy with Wilson but White's not a Presbyterian so I take his ideas about how Wilson departs from things with the theological blindspots that I recognize.

I guess what I'm saying is that White isn't a dogmatician and I've always considered men like Frame to be more dangerous to the Church because he does work to establish a theological trajectory that offers a metaphysical and theological alternative to Reformed orthodoxy on a number of subjects.

This won't make Baptists happy but I also find some of the historical debates about what makes a true Particular Baptist to be hanging in mid-air. I suppose it has to do with the independent nature of the theological tradition. It becomes a debate (to me) among people who ultimately have no Ecclesiastical levers to do anything about a departure from what they see as the "purity" of the 1689 LBCF. There are no courts to arbitrate the disputes. The WCF has had to be "lived out" over centuries with court cases and historical movements that tested and tried the ideas.

I guess it's a backhanded way of writing that I consider the limitations of the 1689 or the Baptist movement to settle these things even while I have always been accustomed to dealing with what I see as the blindspots of Baptists in general. It's not that I look down on Baptists or am trying to be patronizing, but I know who they are and it's really odd for me to think about one Baptist using Thomas Aquinas as a lever to cast another outside the club. Where, after all, is the fulcrum?
 
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I do not think your assertion follows. 1689 does not deny GNC rather modifies it to only include necessary as separated from "good".

Obviously, the covenantal differences plays the majority part in separating these things, yet it does not follow that they lack the "traction to force issues beyond clear exegetical ideas".

For example, I was discussing with a NCT re: the existence of moral law (which they - being non-confessional and partially dispensationalist - outright deny), the conversation switched to "what Scripture says" and he even denied theology is allowed to make logical deductions!

I pointed out to him that he is - in point of fact - unintentionally denying many doctrinal truths regarding the Trinity.

as in:

1) "All words that the Son says are words that the Father says" (John 17:7-8)
2) "All words that the Spirit says are words that the Son says" (John 16:13-14)
Therefore, all words that the Spirit says are words that the Father says.

The conclusion has no direct chapter and verse. It flows and follows logically from the "Barbra" syllogism of the two preceding verses. (This was again pulled from Poythress on logic).

If you say some of these ideas on inseparable operations are GNC but hard to argue for with respect to grounding everything in exegetical conclusions, do you mean it is hard to construct exegetically based syllogisms? I am unfamiliar with ISO so I am genuinely asking while at the same time defending the honor of my confession a little bit.

God bless you
The term "consequence" is absent from the LBCF. Where the WCF speaks of good and necessary consequence, the LBCF confesses: "...the whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down or necessarily contained in the Holy Scripture:.."
 
I'm not defending him as much as describing the issue. I rather see the issue as needlessly divisive. White isn't promoting some form of systematic theology or writing books as much as reacting to people whom he sees are suddenly drawing sharp lines of division where none existed just a few years ago. I've been following him for 20 years and, for better or worse, he is who he is. During the EFS debates he articulated his disagreement with the movement. He may not be the scholastic theologian that others may prefer drawing very fine lines and trying to define the boundaries of dogmatics, but more of a jack of all trades who is really useful for some things while there are other things that I just wish he would leave alone (he tends to be a bit alarmist on certain areas). I don't like that he's cozy with Wilson but White's not a Presbyterian so I take his ideas about how Wilson departs from things with the theological blindspots that I recognize.

I guess what I'm saying is that White isn't a dogmatician and I've always considered men like Frame to be more dangerous to the Church because he does work to establish a theological trajectory that offers a metaphysical and theological alternative to Reformed orthodoxy on a number of subjects.

This won't make Baptists happy but I also find some of the historical debates about what makes a true Particular Baptist to be hanging in mid-air. I suppose it has to do with the independent nature of the theological tradition. It becomes a debate (to me) among people who ultimately have no Ecclesiastical levers to do anything about a departure from what they see as the "purity" of the 1689 LBCF. There are no courts to arbitrate the disputes. The WCF has had to be "lived out" over centuries with court cases and historical movements that tested and tried the ideas.

I guess it's a backhanded way that I consider the limitations of the 1689 or the Baptist movement to settle these things even while I have always been accustomed to dealing with what I see as the blindspots of Baptists in general. It's not that I look down on Baptists or am trying to be patronizing, but I know who they are and it's really odd for me to think about one Baptist using Thomas Aquinas as a level to cast another outside the club. Where, after all, is the fulcrum?
Well said
 
, but I know who they are and it's really odd for me to think about one Baptist using Thomas Aquinas as a level to cast another outside the club. Where, after all, is the fulcrum?
Who do you speak of? I think the Credo people are aiming the retrieval at a broad audience. Matthew Barrett isn’t even 1689
 
Who do you speak of? I think the Credo people are aiming the retrieval at a broad audience. Matthew Barrett isn’t even 1689
I referred to all kinds of Baptists, not just the various camps in the 1689 camp. The idea of any Baptist referring to "great Tradition exegesis" is odd to me. It seems impossible to me that the idiosyncratic variants of each Baptist condemning another as lacking any kind of coherent Baptist "center" for disputes that are theologically abstruse. Again, I know it is very important to some, but this dispute didn't begin with a denial of simplicity as a concept but whether very technical ideas of inseparable operations as a total package are necessary and, if any disputes exist, then the critic is said to have departed from the Baptist faith itself as it has presumably departed from the great Tradition where Aquinas is seen as its mature fulfillment.
 
The term "consequence" is absent from the LBCF. Where the WCF speaks of good and necessary consequence, the LBCF confesses: "...the whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down or necessarily contained in the Holy Scripture:.."

I know this already. I agree with 1689 in that NC (necessarily contained) is more precise than GNC without losing necessary theological deductions.

Where I am confused is in how you go from your statement here to claiming:

"they (Baptists) also denied the form of theology (GNC) that would give them traction to force the issue that it is confessional to go beyond clear exegetical ideas."

What do you mean by "clear exegesis"?

There is no direct exegesis to say that "all the words the Spirit says are words that the Father says." That is indirect. Yet if Collier (or my NCT friend) claims that "That which the Scripture no where affirms, is unsound and unsafe for any man to affirm" then Coxe and myself would say that while it is not directly (or clearly) contained, it is logically and necessarily contained.

Again as I posted before quoting Keach, "consequence" itself is interpreted by many of the authors of 1689 as part of what is necessarily contained if the premises are exegetically derived for the pursuit of doctrine.

Bottom line: I feel as if 1689 1.6 is being attacked for unwitting biblicism - or at least incidental semi-biblicism. But it is possible I am reading you incorrectly. It is perhaps simply a result of no specific examples given for why GNC is inherently superior to NC?

Or at least why if 1689 had the GNC clause then White and other RB's (or non-RB's) would not be disputing each other here?
 
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This [CovenantWord's claim: "Logic requires that a being be either divine or human, Creator or created, not both at the same time"] is a confusion of the categories of Person and Nature.
No, the Incarnation is not confusion, it is paradox. Paradox is a literary device that juxtaposes two seemingly contradictory ideas, inducing the mind to delve deeper, seeking reconciliation. A theme paradox of Scripture is whether one is inducted into God's favor by faith or by works. As you are well aware, of course, the deeper reconciliation is that good works are a thankful response to, and natural outgrowth of, the radical spiritual transformation wrought through faith. The Bible is unique in literature in that it alone originates paradoxes that not only accurately reflect reality, but also cannot be reconciled within the strictures of human comprehension. This would be one of the proofs of the divine authorship of the Scriptures. By definition, the first kind of paradox is subject to logical analysis, and the second is not.

“For My thoughts are not your thoughts,
Nor are your ways My ways,” says the LORD.
“For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
So are My ways higher than your ways,
And My thoughts than your thoughts." (Isaiah 55:8-9 NKJ)
 
No, the Incarnation is not confusion, it is paradox. Paradox is a literary device that juxtaposes two seemingly contradictory ideas, inducing the mind to delve deeper, seeking reconciliation. A theme paradox of Scripture is whether one is inducted into God's favor by faith or by works. As you are well aware, of course, the deeper reconciliation is that good works are a thankful response to, and natural outgrowth of, the radical spiritual transformation wrought through faith. The Bible is unique in literature in that it alone originates paradoxes that not only accurately reflect reality, but also cannot be reconciled within the strictures of human comprehension. This would be one of the proofs of the divine authorship of the Scriptures. By definition, the first kind of paradox is subject to logical analysis, and the second is not.

“For My thoughts are not your thoughts,
Nor are your ways My ways,” says the LORD.
“For as the heavens are higher than the earth,
So are My ways higher than your ways,
And My thoughts than your thoughts." (Isaiah 55:8-9 NKJ)

I do not see the Incarnation as paradox, nor do I see divinity and humanity as apparently contradictory. Ironically, that is a very Hellenistic idea, things being defined by their negation or contradiction. There is no apparently contradictory reason why a divine person cannot assume a human nature in conjunction to his divine nature.

Nor does Isaiah 55 support your claim. God's thoughts are higher than mine, but not necessarily apparently contradictory to mine.
 
What does this mean? It looks like you introduced a third term besides nature and person. Is "unitary being" a person or a nature?
Thank you for pointing out that I expressed myself clumsily. Let me try again:
Is the Godhead ultimate? Yes, He is.
Are the three Persons ultimate? Yes, they are.
Can man explain this paradox? No, he cannot, for it is not subject to the strictures of logic.
"There is but one only, living, and true God: who is infinite in being and perfection" (WCF 2.1) "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity" (WCF 2.3).
 
Thank you for pointing out that I expressed myself clumsily. Let me try again:
Is the Godhead ultimate? Yes, He is.
Are the three Persons ultimate? Yes, they are.
Can man explain this paradox? No, he cannot, for it is not subject to the strictures of logic.
"There is but one only, living, and true God: who is infinite in being and perfection" (WCF 2.1) "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity" (WCF 2.3).

"Not subject to the strictures of logic"?

I am unsure what you mean by this.

From my understanding of philosophical definitions, the Trinity is not a paradox.

A paradox is an apparent contradiction that upon closer scrutiny, yields resolution. Rather, it is a mystery in that it holds no apparent contradiction yet cannot be fully understood until more information is forthcoming in glory.

This means that the Godhead is indeed able to be analyzed by logic to reveal there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction in order to strengthen faith for the future further revelations to come.
 
Thank you for pointing out that I expressed myself clumsily. Let me try again:
Is the Godhead ultimate? Yes, He is.
Are the three Persons ultimate? Yes, they are.
Can man explain this paradox? No, he cannot, for it is not subject to the strictures of logic.
"There is but one only, living, and true God: who is infinite in being and perfection" (WCF 2.1) "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity" (WCF 2.3).

I sort of get that, but it is telling that no one in the history of the church until recently used the language of equal ultimacy to construct a paradox of the Trinity. I do not even know what "equal ultimacy" practically means. A person of the Trinity is a rational subsistence of the divine nature, a mode of the nature with unique properties. Whether it is "equally ultimate" or not, that is not the point of a person.
 
I sort of get that, but it is telling that no one in the history of the church until recently used the language of equal ultimacy to construct a paradox of the Trinity. I do not even know what "equal ultimacy" practically means. A person of the Trinity is a rational subsistence of the divine nature, a mode of the nature with unique properties. Whether it is "equally ultimate" or not, that is not the point of a person.
Didn't you review Lane Tipton’s book? I'm sure "equal ultimacy" was in there
 
"If all human beings were to die, and Felix the cat were to survive, it would still be the case that Felix is a carnivore. The logic leading to this conclusion would still be valid. An angel examining the argument could still acknowledge its validity. This hypothetical situation shows that logic is independent of humanity." ("Logic Revealing God, Poythress 62)
I recognize that I am to respect my betters, so I write with some hesitancy, but I am concerned that the quotations in this post manifest a misunderstanding of the nature of logic. As logic is at the heart of the subject I teach professionally (high school math), I hope that my comments will edify, or at least stimulate thought. Perhaps a definition at this point will help: Logic is the abstract system of reasoning that develops the results of analysis into conclusions defensible according to certain preset principles, primarily deduction. Logic is possible because, and only because, God created the world orderly, that is to say, characterized at the human level by recognizable patterns permanent enough to be reasonably predictable in the absence of significant changes in circumstances. Thus, logic is a powerful tool developed by the ordained steward to care for the garden of creation. Logic is no more independent of man than is a hammer.

The weakness of the quoted reasoning is manifest in the proposed thought experiment. The preferred menu of a given species of animal is not determined by logic, but by Providence, Who has the power to alter earthly circumstances at will, as is frequently attested in Scripture. That domesticated felines are obligate carnivores is a statement of biological observation, not of deductive reasoning.
 
Logic is possible because, and only because, God created the world orderly

I have no problem with this statement. It flows from the character of God and humans - as created beings of His created world - were gifted with the possibility for the ability to recognize logic and apply it. At this point, you are in agreement.
Thus, logic is a powerful tool developed by the ordained steward to care for the garden of creation.

Whoa. logic is a tool developed by the steward of the garden? Did Newton and Leibniz invent the tool of calculus? Or discover calculus and its inherent usefulness as a tool?
Logic is no more independent of man than is a hammer.

No. You have overstated here and have not shown this to be true.

A hammer is a tool but it is not a tool of the same kind of tool as logic. That logic can be used as a tool is granted, but that logic is only a tool of man's development is a secular leap I am unconvinced of.

You have only asserted this but not shown how the laws of logic are dependent on mankind.

You would need to show that "A = A" if and only if it is Day 6 of creation onward - and not before. If two fish swim in a cove on Day 5, and there is no human to count them, have they lost the property of "1+1=2"? Or does God ordain the laws of logic and mathematics to be true independent of humans?

Poythress says that not only does God ordain the laws of logic but that God is a God of order so logic is necessarily part of His nature. Even if you stop short of an attribute per se, you must see that all knowledge and wisdom belongs to Him (Job 12:13) and depends on Him, not man.

The preferred menu of a given species of animal is not determined by logic, but by Providence

This is true but nonsequiter. Poythress did not claim logic determines whether cats are carnivores.

He said (earlier than my quote here) that if Premise 1: "All cats are carnivores" and Premise 2: "Felix is a cat" then unavoidably it follows: "Felix is a carnivore". This logical validity and logical consistency is true for cats - even if no human were to observe and work out this syllogism deductively. And he is correct on this point.
That domesticated felines are obligate carnivores is a statement of biological observation, not of deductive reasoning.

And lastly, while this statement is true enough (yet missing the point), the fact that felines - domestic or not - are obligate carnivores can be observed by humans (of any profession) does not prove that human observers are required for felines - domestic or not - to (in fact) be obligate carnivores.

Thank you for the stimulating discussion. God bless you
 
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"If an argument is indeed valid, its validity holds for all times and all places." (Poythress 65)
I suggest the following objections to this claim: 1) Logic exists only within the mind of man. 2) Validity is independent of truthfulness, that is, a false premise will result in a false conclusion, even when the argument is valid. Logic is an amoral tool, whose conclusions can be helpful, useless, or harmful. 3) The truthfulness of the conclusion is entirely dependent on the truthfulness of the premises, which in itself is dependent upon context. 4) The laws of logic simply cannot establish the fundamental truths of Christianity, e.g.:

Justice requires condign punishment.
The Father punished the Son for sins He did not commit.
Therefore, the Father is unjust.

Note: This syllogism is valid, both premises are universally true, but the conclusion is false.
 
I suggest the following objections to this claim: 1) Logic exists only within the mind of man.

Only? Within man? Outright rejected by Scripture. God is the source of all truth, knowledge and wisdom.
4) The laws of logic simply cannot establish the fundamental truths of Christianity, e.g.:

Nonsequiter. No one claims the laws of logic establish fundamental truths of Christianity. Not in Poythress' book nor anyone else here.

We are all Reformed confessional and adhere to sola Scriptura.

Logic can - and does - support and confirm the truth of Scripture but logic will never contradict Scripture.

Rom. 1:20 says "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse" granting the laws of logic status among the category of general revelation gifted by common grace from the Creator to all human beings. The only way to faith in Christ is by the Word - faithfully preached in which the Spirit of truth will guide them into all truth (John 16:13)

Justice requires condign punishment.
The Father punished the Son for sins He did not commit.
Therefore, the Father is unjust.

Note: This syllogism is valid, both premises are universally true, but the conclusion is false.
Yikes. When constructing syllogisms regarding theology, one needs to be really careful.

This syllogism is indeed valid. The premises are not quite true.

P1: Justice for sins requires condign punishment from the sinner directly or from one qualified as a plenary sinless substitute.

[DEF: "sin" - any action, thought, behavior, state of mind, state of being that rejects the least of God's commandments, deserving just wrath, negating any possibility of repentance, separated from God - physically and spiritually with no possibility for reunion with the Father on our own merit"

P2: Ceremonial sacrifices for sins may grant absolution if according to God's law with spotless lambs, bulls, goats, etc - but will never grant union with God unless the plenary sinless substitute be of the same kind as the sinner himself.
P3: God the Father desires sinlessness and also union with His creatures as it was before the Fall with Adam.
P4: God the Father reserves just wrath for sinners and plenary substitutes for sinners.
P5: God The Son became human, born sinless, and became the plenary substitution. This introduces:

5a) God the Son's sacrifice fulfills atonement for sins of those who are born again by His Spirit,
5b) God the Son's sacrifice obtains for the newly regenerated mercy from God, and
5c) God the Son's sacrifice obtains also union with God - a new Adam for all who covenant in His family by His Spirit.

[DEF: "elect" - a human member full of sin benefitting from God's sovereign decree to be saved from wrath, granted the capacity to repent, united into Christ and adopted into His kingdom as heirs (Rom. 8:17) entirely by His own merit"

C1: God the Son's sacrifice obtains wrath from God the Father as a plenary substitute for the elect
C2: God the Son's sacrifice obtains mercy from God for the elect and union with God for the elect through gradual progressive sanctification.

P6: Those who are not elect fall back under P1 (justice for sin requires condign punishment towards the sinner directly or from one qualified as a plenary sinless substitute.)
P7: There is no other qualified plenary sinless substitute besides Christ whom they will not be born again into.

-- Combining P1, P4, P6 and P7, with no contradiction from any other premises, we conclude:

C3: God the Father's wrath obtains justice from all those who are not elect.

(Now even to this detail, there has to be about a thousand different points that can be raised. Maybe an error or two - unintentionally I swear - but I would not feel confident turning this into Professor Sproul if he were alive and I were his pupil.)

I am not at all confident that many other renowned scholars here on this board will not pick at this - and likely with good scholarship.

My point is not to "spinoza" the Gospel as some kind of grand achievement on my part. Rather to show how difficult and detailed such a task would be.

Your quick little syllogism is fraught with partially true statements - and with their bare bones - could lead to any number of possible heresies.

That God is unjust for example (which I see you deny)

But also a potential error seems overall implied and that is that God is irrational somehow.

I know many fundies who love to shout how reckless and irrational God's love is as they emotionally exclaim with raised hands, and the more irrational it feels subjectively to them, the louder their praise gets. This deep concern I have for family in these churches is why I have written so much here in response.

God bless you
 
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Whoa. logic is a tool developed by the steward of the garden? Did Newton and Leibniz invent the tool of calculus? Or discover calculus and its inherent usefulness as a tool?
Both discovery and invention are involved in the development of a tool, be it calculus, logic, or a hammer. To discover is to observe a separable pattern withing the orderliness of creation, and to invent is to systematize those observations into a device demonstrated to effectuate a desirable effect upon the environment. For abstract tools, the systemization involves clarifying and vindicating laws of universal application within certain parameters. This is also true of physical tools, with the added step of manufacturing, using providentially available resources.
 
If two fish swim in a cove on Day 5, and there is no human to count them, have they lost the property of "1+1=2"?
The property of individual distinguishment from environment is an example of the orderliness of creation. (This is generally true, at least, on the human scale. At very much larger and very much smaller scales, things get a bit fuzzy.) The property of notable similarities to other units is distinct enough and widespread enough throughout creation to make it worthwhile to construct sets for the purpose of classification. But, I ask: Who does the observing? Who does the distinguishing? Who does the classification? Who does the abstracting? Who engages in thought experiments to imagine the effect of patterns in unobservable situations? Logic does not, indeed cannot, exist outside the mind of man (within human-scale creation). God ordained that the readily-observable creation is by characterized by orderliness; but, then, to His even greater glory, He created man in His own image,-- not to be able to create ex nihilo, definitely not -- but to be able to use, and to be interested in using, the resources of providence to bring into existence a form, a function, an insight, which did not previously exist. God did not tell Adam that two fish were better than one; he had to figure that out himself.
 
From my understanding of philosophical definitions, the Trinity is not a paradox.

A paradox is an apparent contradiction that upon closer scrutiny, yields resolution. Rather, it is a mystery in that it holds no apparent contradiction yet cannot be fully understood until more information is forthcoming in glory.

This means that the Godhead is indeed able to be analyzed by logic to reveal there is no violation of the law of noncontradiction in order to strengthen faith for the future further revelations to come.
I am baffled by the assertion that the Trinity "holds no apparent contradiction." Perhaps you could explain this? The Trinity is a Being which is simultaneously one and three in His intrinsic nature, which is a nonlogical proposition. We would accept this claim about no other being. What am I missing?

The law of noncontradiction has been adverted to more than once in this thread, so it might bear a closer look:

"According to Aristotle, first philosophy, or metaphysics, deals with ontology and first principles, of which the principle (or law) of non-contradiction is the firmest. Aristotle says that without the principle of non-contradiction we could not know anything that we do know. Presumably, we could not demarcate the subject matter of any of the special sciences, for example, biology or mathematics. . . . According to Aristotle, the principle of non-contradiction is a principle of scientific inquiry, reasoning and communication that we cannot do without." (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-noncontradiction/)

It hardly needs to be said that the law of noncontradiction is an essential pillar in logic and for the scientific enterprise in general. However, as Christians, do we not blanch at the Aristotelian claim that this law is the ultimate arbiter of truth?

"Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. For by it the elders obtained a good testimony. By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which are visible." (Hebrews 11:1-3 NKJ)

The law of noncontradiction, though essential to the discipline of human intellectual pursuits, is simply inadequate -- indeed misleading -- for establishing the fundamental principles of the faith. To be sure, logic firmly based upon the law of noncontradiction is necessary for the erection and codifying of systematic theology and for the application of pastoral theology. Nonetheless, the fundamental Christian doctrines supply the premises for logic, because their truth is presupposed; they are not the conclusions of logic objectively applied.
 
The Trinity is a Being which is simultaneously one and three in His intrinsic nature, which is a nonlogical proposition.

You're missing the distinction between "essence" and "person".

If we said that the Trinity were three in essence and one in essence simultaneously, we'd have a contradiction.

If we said that the Trinity were three in person and one in person simultaneously, we'd hae a contradictoon.

But rather, the Trinity is one in essence and three in person. No contradiction.
 
To discover is to observe a separable pattern withing the orderliness of creation

Agreed.
The property of individual distinguishment from environment is an example of the orderliness of creation.

Yes which is a priori to the mind of man.
Logic does not, indeed cannot, exist outside the mind of man (within human-scale creation)

Wait, is it possible you simply mean that logic is not concrete and simply abstract? I agree, but bristle against logic not existing apart from man wholesale. If creation sings of the order of the mind of the Creator, then logic is a principle of knowledge of the order that is inherent within the character of God.

Otherwise, you allow for order outside the mind of man - but by implication it would have to be an order without logic if you simultaneously construct a barrier that places logic only within the mind of man. How can there be order outside man, and that order not have logical properties inherent to itself - and yet still be ordered outside man?

This would lead to a universe in which only a human-environment interaction allows for order and thereby, if no human is present then no order can be existent.

It would seem you have a different answer to what happens if a tree falls in a forest and no one is there. An answer very different from the physics of sound waves.


However, as Christians, do we not blanch at the Aristotelian claim that this law is the ultimate arbiter of truth?

Blanch if you feel the inclination. For one, I am unsurprised a pagan like Aristotle makes such a claim. Yet it is a trivial matter to make an adjustment on Aristotle that finds that the law of noncontradiction is a first principle that is always true, but the Bible is the ultimate arbiter of truth. So there will be no contradiction between its claims and its correctly deduced teachings (like the Trinity).

Nonetheless, the fundamental Christian doctrines supply the premises for logic, because their truth is presupposed; they are not the conclusions of logic objectively applied.

Doctrines supply the premises for logic? Rather, they affirm a God of order and logic - not that He is subject to these principles but that these principles are inherent in His nature.

As for the second clause, this seems to be a false dichotomy, but I could be mistaking what you mean. The truth of doctrines and the laws of logic are not separated as if one comes from the other. Rather, the truth of doctrines - as proclaimed by Scripture - are factually logical and reveal the character of the God who wrote the Bible as a Being of order and logic.

If God is a Being of order and logic so that His creation and His Word are ordered and logical,

then order and logic are part of His attributes - either in a manner that can be categorized singularly in and of itself (as Poythress argues) or - at the very least - can be deduced from broader categories like His knowledge, wisdom, sovereignty, and His dominion.
 
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Poythress says that not only does God ordain the laws of logic but that God is a God of order so logic is necessarily part of His nature. Even if you stop short of an attribute per se, you must see that all knowledge and wisdom belongs to Him (Job 12:13) and depends on Him, not man.
Major premise: "God ordain(s) the laws of logic." Yes, this is true. Minor premise: "God is a God of order." More precisely stated: God created the universe orderly at the human scale. Conclusion: "o logic is necessarily part of His nature." The conclusion is not valid, because the Creator and creation do not necessarily partake of the same characteristics. For instance, physical creation is mortal, but God is not. This conclusion may be demonstrated as untrue by a counterexample: The outcome, indeed the purpose, of logic is to guide the thinker into reliable new insights that he previously lacked. Yet, God does not require new insights. He knows the end from the beginning. To postulate, then, that logic is part of God's nature is to contradict His omniscience.

Furthermore, it cannot be demonstrated that logic is intrinsically included within the creation order; because, like all abstractions from creation, the existence of the laws of logic can only be demonstrated through their effects. In this case, the effects observed are the clarity and effectiveness of the thinking of the one who uses the laws. To state the obvious, this test requires a thinker.

"[A]ll knowledge and wisdom . . . depends on [God], not man." This is a false dichotomy, because intellectual discipline depends upon God, but, to the glory of the Creator and of Providence, it also depends upon man.
 
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I do not see the Incarnation as paradox, nor do I see divinity and humanity as apparently contradictory. Ironically, that is a very Hellenistic idea, things being defined by their negation or contradiction. There is no apparently contradictory reason why a divine person cannot assume a human nature in conjunction to his divine nature.
All right. Let's try it this way: Should the Incarnation not be apparently contradictory, as you say, then it must be logically analyzable. If it is logical, then it can be reduced to a syllogism. So, I challenge you to confirm your claim by crafting a syllogism that is both valid and true, and that presents the conclusion where a single being is both fully God and fully man.
 
If it is logical, then it can be reduced to a syllogism.

This might be true of "arguments" as a category of objects, understanding "logical" as "logically valid." I would hesitate on even this though, and modify the claim to "logical arguments can be reduced to a sequence of syllogisms." However, propositions (which are certainly logical - though "validity" simply does not apply to propositions, "truth" does) are not syllogisms.

I must admit that I am rather confused by what you've been trying to say here. So let's see if we can clarify what you are attempting to say. There are a number of things that you could be trying to claim. For example:
Putative claim 1: logic is not applicable in theology.
Putative claim 2: theological doctrines are not derivable from the universalistic/natural premises known as the laws of logic
Putative claim 3: logic is an unreliable tool for categorizing ectypal knowledge because the body of true ectypal knowledge contains something that the laws of logic imply is false
Putative claim 4: logic is an unreliable tool for categorizing ectypal knowledge because the entire body of true ectypal knowledge cannot be reduced to a subset of true ectypal premises.

I'm sure we could come up with some additional interpretations of what you're trying to claim. But it's better if you clarify for us in more detail. It really sounds like you are trying to claim either 1 or 3. If you are trying to claim either of those however, you are explicitly at odds with Westminster: "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture."

If your claim is 2 or 4, then you are misstating your claim. That's simply not the definition of "logical" or "logically analyzable." Actually, logic accounts for both 2 and 4, specifically in being a tool. 4 is basically the incompleteness theorem...which doesn't make something illogical or opposed to logic. 4 might make ectypal knowledge itself "non-deductive," but that is still a far cry from illogical.

So, I challenge you to confirm your claim by crafting a syllogism that is both valid and true, and that presents the conclusion where a single being is both fully God and fully man.
As I attempted to briefly state, this is a nonsensical sentence (propositions are not syllogisms). But if you want a syllogism on the topic...
Major: if a divine person assumes a human nature to himself, then that divine person possesses a complete divine nature and a complete human nature.
Minor: the divine person "the Son" assumed a human nature to himself.
Conclusion: the divine person "the Son" possesses a complete divine nature and a complete human nature.

Perhaps your confusion is on the actual claim of Christological dogma, in the language of "fully" human or "fully" divine. There are two different meanings that could hypothetically be attributed to the adverb.
Meaning 1: "A is fully X" means that X comprehends the total reality of A.
Meaning 2: "A is fully X" means that A possesses a complete X, rather than a partial X.

Should you use the first meaning, of course you see a contradiction. However, this is not what Christological dogma claims. Christological dogma uses the second meaning: that what the Son has is 1) a complete divine nature (not a partial divine nature), and 2) a complete human nature (not a partial human nature). For the Son to possess both complete natures is certainly no logical contradiction. And this is Christological dogma. The expression "fully God and fully man" is a possible way to state the dogma, but a somewhat unhelpful and oversimplified way to do so precisely because it causes these confusions.
 
On the contrary, this syllogism has four terms, making it formally invalid.
1) Justice
2) requires condign punishment.
3) The Father
3) punished the Son for other people's sins.

You are correct. I was emotionally involved in refuting his claim that these premises were "universally true" while he presumed that they were whole statements that could be wielded as propositions. And I missed the forest for that particular tree.
 
"[A]ll knowledge and wisdom . . . depends on [God], not man." This is a false dichotomy, because intellectual discipline depends upon God, but, to the glory of the Creator and of Providence, it also depends upon man.

There is no dichotomy within my original sentence.

Proverbs 2:6-8 says all knowledge and wisdom belong to God. (Job 12:13 is a more indirect proof text, my mistake).

By extension, when any man engages in knowledge and wisdom it is an act dependent on Creator God. Without God, knowledge and wisdom are not even possible. The fact that man needs to engage in knowledge and wisdom in order to glorify His Creator still puts man dependent on knowledge, wisdom, and the laws of logic - not the other way around.
 
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All right. Let's try it this way: Should the Incarnation not be apparently contradictory, as you say, then it must be logically analyzable. If it is logical, then it can be reduced to a syllogism. So, I challenge you to confirm your claim by crafting a syllogism that is both valid and true, and that presents the conclusion where a single being is both fully God and fully man.
Your use of the term being is ambiguous. It could refer to person or nature.
 
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