The Linguistic and Logical Improprieties of the Theistic Proofs

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Just to be fair, general scientific consensus can be coherent or incoherent. Just because it is the consensus does not mean very much.

Next, if we agree that the universe began to exist, then we can start asking what began it, or what caused it (and what characteristics that causer/creator has)

For the record, I was only bringing up the scientific consensus as being the materialistic take on the matter, not on what everyone should believe. Secondly, yeah, we could begin to ask what caused it, but we cannot get much further than that. As I have been saying, all the cosmological argument proves is a first cause, and nothing else.

My point here, is that there are no objections to ruling all alternatives out and then sticking with what is left. There is no need for positive vs. negative proof. There is just need for proof and justification.

I understand the methodology you are presenting: if the supernatural did not exist, then materialism would be the only option remaining, and thus it alone should be believed. I am saying instead that the fact that we do not certainly know that the first cause is supernatural is not tantamount to the fact that nothing supernatural exists. Consequently, there is no necessary materialism.

His point, is to see what he can argue and prove using just General Revelation. The question we have before us, is how far can he go.

...and he cannot go further than "first cause", or anywhere near "God" -- all he can posit is that there was some first cause, and offer nothing more about the nature of this first cause.

He is not pretending anything. The issue is simply appealing to what people know by SD and Natural Revelation.

He is falsely saying that causation entails God's existence, when all it entails is a first cause. Even if he doesn't mean it, he is still saying so. He is not presenting a theistic proof in the least.

You stated, "Let us say that Aquinas 'proves' that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?"

My answer: If he were to argue that an eternal being existed, and he called it God (rather than "an eternal being"), then his argument would be false. It would not be false that an eternal being existed in that situation, however.

Why would it be false? Is something else eternal besides God? Is something else infinite besides God? If not, then when one refers to eternal, one is referring to God, right?

God is much more than just eternal. Therefore, if he were to argue that the existence of something eternal was tantamount to the existence of God, then he would be making a false argument.

Nothing else is eternal or infinite besides God (in reality), but people can still offer concepts of infinite entities which rival God. In fact, if he were to say that the existence of an eternal being equaled God's existence, then he would be presupposing that the Bible is accurate in its portrayal of the living God; i.e. he would be presupposing the truth of the Bible. :cool:
 
Just to be fair, general scientific consensus can be coherent or incoherent. Just because it is the consensus does not mean very much.

Next, if we agree that the universe began to exist, then we can start asking what began it, or what caused it (and what characteristics that causer/creator has)

For the record, I was only bringing up the scientific consensus as being the materialistic take on the matter, not on what everyone should believe. Secondly, yeah, we could begin to ask what caused it, but we cannot get much further than that. As I have been saying, all the cosmological argument proves is a first cause, and nothing else.

How do you know how much farther we can or cannot go? Why am I so limited?

For example, is it possible for the first cause to not be eternal?

My point here, is that there are no objections to ruling all alternatives out and then sticking with what is left. There is no need for positive vs. negative proof. There is just need for proof and justification.

I understand the methodology you are presenting: if the supernatural did not exist, then materialism would be the only option remaining, and thus it alone should be believed. I am saying instead that the fact that we do not certainly know that the first cause is supernatural is not tantamount to the fact that nothing supernatural exists. Consequently, there is no necessary materialism.

Tell me why I cannot know whether or not the first cause was or was not supernatural?

...and he cannot go further than "first cause", or anywhere near "God" -- all he can posit is that there was some first cause, and offer nothing more about the nature of this first cause.

Here you are just making assertions based on some theory of knowledge. What theory of knowledge is that, and why should I accept it. If I accept a different theory of knowledge, then I could come to a different conclusion.

Or put another way, it does not seem that your theory of knowledge is necessary, so tell me why it is so.

He is falsely saying that causation entails God's existence, when all it entails is a first cause. Even if he doesn't mean it, he is still saying so. He is not presenting a theistic proof in the least.

If you reject causation, then you have to reject knowledge. If you reject knowledge then you could not even speak to defend your position, because to do so presupposes knowledge that is being conveyed.

You stated, "Let us say that Aquinas 'proves' that God is eternal. That is somehow false because God is more than just eternal?"

My answer: If he were to argue that an eternal being existed, and he called it God (rather than "an eternal being"), then his argument would be false. It would not be false that an eternal being existed in that situation, however.

Why would it be false? Is something else eternal besides God? Is something else infinite besides God? If not, then when one refers to eternal, one is referring to God, right?

God is much more than just eternal. Therefore, if he were to argue that the existence of something eternal was tantamount to the existence of God, then he would be making a false argument.

God is more than eternal, however being eternal does not imply just being eternal, it implies much besides that.

Nothing else is eternal or infinite besides God (in reality), but people can still offer concepts of infinite entities which rival God. In fact, if he were to say that the existence of an eternal being equaled God's existence, then he would be presupposing that the Bible is accurate in its portrayal of the living God; i.e. he would be presupposing the truth of the Bible. :cool:

How could they presuppose the Bible being accurate when you have already agreed that they can evaluate and accept the argument without even knowing that the Bible exists.

How do you presuppose the accuracy of something that you don't know.

CT
 
Originally Posted by Hilasmos
If we say the universe is self-caused, then causal conditions that currently exist are not conditions for an event to happen since an event did happen without any conditions present (namely the universe began). That is, it's beginning would be a brute fact. But, in that case, every event follows as a brute fact. Since there are causal conditions that appear to require the universe to evolve in a certain manner (e.g., the laws of physics), it is apparent that we do not in fact live in this kind of universe.

Originally Posted by Confessor
Are you saying that if the universe were self-caused, every event within the universe would have to be self-caused as well? If so, how does that follow? If not, please explain.

Well, I am saying that there would be self-caused events in the world, which is contrary to the rationality of science, based on the fact that what came into existence was an evolving universe. That is, it wasn't a static universe that came into existence but a universe "in motion" (evolving); and if done as a brute fact, the evolutionary effects taking place at event1 would proceed, and exist at t1, with no causal conditions (e.g. apart from the laws of physics), which is irrational.

The evolving universe that came into existence at t1, if it appears rational (which it does), would have to evolve by mathematical logic brute factly, and not because it is governed by laws. In that case, no causal conditions are established for events t2 and t3...They would also require to exist according to brute facts that just happen, or appear, to follow mathematical logic.
 
How do you know how much farther we can or cannot go? Why am I so limited?

For example, is it possible for the first cause to not be eternal?

Well, all that the argument proves is a first cause. If you were to add (sound) premises and a (sound) conclusion that the first cause is eternal, then it's another story.

Tell me why I cannot know whether or not the first cause was or was not supernatural?

Just like my above answer: the supernatural aspect of the first cause is not concluded in the argument. All that is concluded is that a first cause existed. To speculate on top of that without sound premises is foolish.

Here you are just making assertions based on some theory of knowledge. What theory of knowledge is that, and why should I accept it. If I accept a different theory of knowledge, then I could come to a different conclusion.

Or put another way, it does not seem that your theory of knowledge is necessary, so tell me why it is so.

I am not speaking of any specific epistemology, just what the argument does or does not prove. All the cosmological argument can prove is a first cause. To start adding godly or divine or eternal or infinite (etc.) characteristics is without warrant.

If you reject causation, then you have to reject knowledge. If you reject knowledge then you could not even speak to defend your position, because to do so presupposes knowledge that is being conveyed.

I am not rejecting causation in the least. I am rejecting that causation (viewed from a "neutral" or "autonomous" framework) entails the existence of God. All it could possibly entail is a first cause.

God is more than eternal, however being eternal does not imply just being eternal, it implies much besides that.

Then make sure you include these implications as premises in a modified, improved cosmological argument.

Nothing else is eternal or infinite besides God (in reality), but people can still offer concepts of infinite entities which rival God. In fact, if he were to say that the existence of an eternal being equaled God's existence, then he would be presupposing that the Bible is accurate in its portrayal of the living God; i.e. he would be presupposing the truth of the Bible. :cool:

How could they presuppose the Bible being accurate when you have already agreed that they can evaluate and accept the argument without even knowing that the Bible exists.

How do you presuppose the accuracy of something that you don't know.

That is the point! No one can inferentially arrive at the logical conclusion of God's existence apart from supernatural revelation! Natural theology is a failure.

They can evaluate and accept the argument as proving the empty entity of a first cause (and this only by God allowing them Christian knowledge [i.e. knowledge based on Christian presuppositions] through common grace), but not God, not even close.

-----Added 12/11/2008 at 01:24:49 EST-----

Well, I am saying that there would be self-caused events in the world, which is contrary to the rationality of science, based on the fact that what came into existence was an evolving universe. That is, it wasn't a static universe that came into existence but a universe "in motion" (evolving); and if done as a brute fact, the evolutionary effects taking place at event1 would proceed, and exist at t1, with no causal conditions (e.g. apart from the laws of physics), which is irrational.

Why couldn't the one instance at t1 be a self-causation? Why does it necessarily entail future examples of self-causation? Why does it necessarily entail one future example of self-causation?

That is, just because the universe is not static, but rather is in motion, it does not follow that there could not be one self-causing force at t1. The fact's being "contrary to the rationality of science" is not an applicable objection because science cannot possibly deal with the state of a singularity and thus cannot make any possible judgments of how causality was or should have been at t1.

The evolving universe that came into existence at t1, if it appears rational (which it does), would have to evolve by mathematical logic brute factly, and not because it is governed by laws. In that case, no causal conditions are established for events t2 and t3...They would also require to exist according to brute facts that just happen, or appear, to follow mathematical logic.

What do you mean by "evolving by mathematical logic brute factly," and as as a result of that "no causal conditions are established for t2 and t3"? I'm not sure what exactly to picture in my mind when you speak of the evolving universe, brute fact, and mathematical logic (although I have a pretty good idea of "evolving universe).
 
How do you know how much farther we can or cannot go? Why am I so limited?

For example, is it possible for the first cause to not be eternal?

Well, all that the argument proves is a first cause. If you were to add (sound) premises and a (sound) conclusion that the first cause is eternal, then it's another story.

The whole discussion is not really the cosmological/ontological/or teleological arguments, but instead what one can know by natural theology/natural revelation.

Your argument seems to be something along the line of thinking that it is a problem that Genesis does not teach everything about world and God, therefore the Bible is not useful.

Tell me why I cannot know whether or not the first cause was or was not supernatural?

Just like my above answer: the supernatural aspect of the first cause is not concluded in the argument. All that is concluded is that a first cause existed. To speculate on top of that without sound premises is foolish.

You made the claim that one cannot know one way or the other if the first cause was supernatural or not. Why do you make that claim?

I am not speaking of any specific epistemology, just what the argument does or does not prove. All the cosmological argument can prove is a first cause. To start adding godly or divine or eternal or infinite (etc.) characteristics is without warrant.

But if being the first cause implies that one is eternal, then the cosmological argument proves both, right?

I am not rejecting causation in the least. I am rejecting that causation (viewed from a "neutral" or "autonomous" framework) entails the existence of God. All it could possibly entail is a first cause.

Why? Are you using induction again?

Then make sure you include these implications as premises in a modified, improved cosmological argument.

But if you accept X as true, then you have to accept all that is implied by it being true. A new argument would not be necessary, but instead just an explanation of what you already are on the hook for holding.

That is the point! No one can inferentially arrive at the logical conclusion of God's existence apart from supernatural revelation! Natural theology is a failure.

You have definitely not demonstrated such. All you keep doing is saying, "If one is autonomous, one cannot know X or Y or Z." Why not?

They can evaluate and accept the argument as proving the empty entity of a first cause (and this only by God allowing them Christian knowledge [i.e. knowledge based on Christian presuppositions] through common grace), but not God, not even close.

It could only possibly be empty if natural revelation/SD did not exist. Since that is false, I do not see what you are trying to say?

CT
 
The whole discussion is not really the cosmological/ontological/or teleological arguments, but instead what one can know by natural theology/natural revelation.

Okay, if in any natural-theological arguments, one were to attempt to prove anything other a than a first cause, source of design, etc., one would have to positively prove that this cause or source of design (etc.) is divine, eternal, etc. The whole point is that we don't get to automatically assume more than we prove. We stick only with what natural theology proves. Insofar as natural theology proves very little, we cannot say that "God exists" as a result.

Your argument seems to be something along the line of thinking that it is a problem that Genesis does not teach everything about world and God, therefore the Bible is not useful.

Well, if someone were to try to prove something that Genesis did not teach, then I would not accept it. Applying this principle to natural theology, we should only accept the actual conclusions of it and nothing more.

You made the claim that one cannot know one way or the other if the first cause was supernatural or not. Why do you make that claim?

I'm not trying to make a sweeping statement here; all that I am saying is that insofar as the cause is not proven to be natural or supernatural in the argument, we cannot assume it is one or the other without begging the question.

But if being the first cause implies that one is eternal, then the cosmological argument proves both, right?

Yes, if that is proved.

I am not rejecting causation in the least. I am rejecting that causation (viewed from a "neutral" or "autonomous" framework) entails the existence of God. All it could possibly entail is a first cause.
Why? Are you using induction again?

No, because the cosmological argument does not positively prove that God exists. The conclusion of the cosmological argument is that a first cause exists. To add anything else without sound premises or valid logic would not constitute an argument.

But if you accept X as true, then you have to accept all that is implied by it being true. A new argument would not be necessary, but instead just an explanation of what you already are on the hook for holding.

If you think so, then put the implications into the argument.

That is the point! No one can inferentially arrive at the logical conclusion of God's existence apart from supernatural revelation! Natural theology is a failure.
You have definitely not demonstrated such. All you keep doing is saying, "If one is autonomous, one cannot know X or Y or Z." Why not?

Because X or Y or Z are not positively proven.

They can evaluate and accept the argument as proving the empty entity of a first cause (and this only by God allowing them Christian knowledge [i.e. knowledge based on Christian presuppositions] through common grace), but not God, not even close.
It could only possibly be empty if natural revelation/SD did not exist. Since that is false, I do not see what you are trying to say?

When I refer to the first case being an "empty entity," I mean that we know pretty much nothing about it (Is it natural or divine? Is it God? etc.) purely from natural revelation, and consequently it is useless information -- it is a blank entity.

As Van Til said, and I think Bahnsen affirmed, natural theology should rather be called "natural atheology."
 
1) What is a positive vs. a negative proof?
2)You said that we know nothing about the first cause by natural revelation. Why do you believe such?

CT
 
1) What is a positive vs. a negative proof?
2)You said that we know nothing about the first cause by natural revelation. Why do you believe such?

(1) All that I mean by a positive proof is proof itself. That is, if some natural-theological argument establishes that a first cause exists, but does not go further in establishing that this first cause is God, then we do not have sufficient grounds to say that God exists as a result of that argument. We have equal grounds to say that a magic rabbit is the first cause, the universe is self-caused, God is the first cause, etc.

(2) Since we only the fact of the first cause's existence and nothing more, then we know essentially nothing about the first cause -- i.e. besides the fact that it exists. This does not help in any type of worldview discussion, as materialists will believe in a first cause too. In fact, you could say that the identity of the first cause...is...dependent...on...your...presupposition. :cool: Thus, we know nothing substantive about the first cause, since it is entirely contingent on one's presupposition, proving worthless in any apologetical argumentation.
 
1) What is a positive vs. a negative proof?
2)You said that we know nothing about the first cause by natural revelation. Why do you believe such?

(1) All that I mean by a positive proof is proof itself. That is, if some natural-theological argument establishes that a first cause exists, but does not go further in establishing that this first cause is God, then we do not have sufficient grounds to say that God exists as a result of that argument. We have equal grounds to say that a magic rabbit is the first cause, the universe is self-caused, God is the first cause, etc.

I reject that you have equal grounds to call all those things the first cause. Why should I accept your assertion?

(2) Since we only the fact of the first cause's existence and nothing more, then we know essentially nothing about the first cause -- i.e. besides the fact that it exists. This does not help in any type of worldview discussion, as materialists will believe in a first cause too. In fact, you could say that the identity of the first cause...is...dependent...on...your...presupposition. :cool: Thus, we know nothing substantive about the first cause, since it is entirely contingent on one's presupposition, proving worthless in any apologetical argumentation.

It seems that you are close to falling into fideism. Prove or justify that the first cause could be something other than God?

If you can't then I do not see your objection to natural theology.

CT
 
I reject that you have equal grounds to call all those things the first cause. Why should I accept your assertion?

My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.

It seems that you are close to falling into fideism. Prove or justify that the first cause could be something other than God?

If you can't then I do not see your objection to natural theology.

...or presuppositionalism. I am merely trying to show the weaknesses of traditional natural theology and evidentialism.

I don't have to prove that the first cause can be something other than God. Using the presuppositions typically espoused in natural theology, God is not a "default position" in which all other options must be disproven; He must be positively proven as the likely first cause. Until you establish God's existence on top of the first cause's existence, I have absolutely no reason to believe in God's existence (based on natural theology, that is).

In fact, since there is no rational connection (on autonomous presuppositions) from the first cause's existence to God's existence, I have no reason to believe that He exists as a result of natural theology. Consequently, if one were to try to tell me that I ought to believe God existed as a result of natural theology, I could simply tell him that he ought to believe that the first cause is a magic rabbit -- if there is no connection between a first cause and God, and God must be believed; then by the same principle I can tell someone to believe in a magic rabbit.

In other words, I am not trying to argue that God is not the first cause, or that anyone can definitively prove that something other than God is the first cause. I am trying to argue instead that we cannot definitively prove (with autonomous presuppositions as typically used in natural theology) that God exists beyond establishing the existence of a first cause, and therefore the unbeliever would have no reason to accept it. Natural theology -- apart from Christian presuppositions -- is a failure.
 
I reject that you have equal grounds to call all those things the first cause. Why should I accept your assertion?

My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.

And my point is that if the other options are not plausible, then natural theology has to lead to the same God found in the Bible.

Or put another way, if natural theology shows that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture, then I have no idea what your objection is.

It seems that you are close to falling into fideism. Prove or justify that the first cause could be something other than God?

If you can't then I do not see your objection to natural theology.

...or presuppositionalism. I am merely trying to show the weaknesses of traditional natural theology and evidentialism.

What you are trying to do and what you are doing at not necessarily the same thing.

I don't have to prove that the first cause can be something other than God. Using the presuppositions typically espoused in natural theology, God is not a "default position" in which all other options must be disproven;

I am not saying that you have to make God the default. I am saying make something else the default first cause, then if that leads to contradictions then you have to reject it. If the other positions, are incoherent, then you must accept God as the first cause, right?

He must be positively proven as the likely first cause. Until you establish God's existence on top of the first cause's existence, I have absolutely no reason to believe in God's existence (based on natural theology, that is).

If self-causation etc are incoherent, then you have your proof, right?

In fact, since there is no rational connection (on autonomous presuppositions) from the first cause's existence to God's existence, I have no reason to believe that He exists as a result of natural theology.

You are making an assertion again. You keep saying that natural theology can lead to whatever. I am just asking you to show me that it can lead to whatever, no just assert it.

Consequently, if one were to try to tell me that I ought to believe God existed as a result of natural theology, I could simply tell him that he ought to believe that the first cause is a magic rabbit -- if there is no connection between a first cause and God, and God must be believed; then by the same principle I can tell someone to believe in a magic rabbit.

Is positing a magic rabbit as first cause, coherent? Tell me about this magic rabbit that is the first cause.

In other words, I am not trying to argue that God is not the first cause, or that anyone can definitively prove that something other than God is the first cause. I am trying to argue instead that we cannot definitively prove (with autonomous presuppositions as typically used in natural theology) that God exists beyond establishing the existence of a first cause, and therefore the unbeliever would have no reason to accept it. Natural theology -- apart from Christian presuppositions -- is a failure.

You keep saying something cannot be proven. Why should I believe you? Just because you say so?

CT
 
My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.
And my point is that if the other options are not plausible, then natural theology has to lead to the same God found in the Bible.

You misunderstood me when I said they are not plausible. They are absolutely plausible in the sense that the cosmological argument "proves" the other options as much as it proves God -- nothing besides the first cause's existence is proven from the argument. Since a magic rabbit in the sky is a ridiculous notion, and since it is just as legitimate a conclusion from the cosmological argument as "God exists" is, then that constitutes as a reductio ad absurdum on the argument, rendering the argument powerless as a theistic proof. If a magic sky-rabbit is a plausible conclusion of the argument as the argument currently is, then the argument as it currently is is absurd and needs to be modified or discarded.

Or put another way, if natural theology shows that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture, then I have no idea what your objection is.

That's my point -- it doesn't. Beyond the proven premise "a first cause exists," there is nothing to preclude the options of self-causation, a magic rabbit, etc. Natural theology does not show that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture.

I am not saying that you have to make God the default. I am saying make something else the default first cause, then if that leads to contradictions then you have to reject it. If the other positions, are incoherent, then you must accept God as the first cause, right?

There are an infinite number of possibilities that I can conceive of besides God as being a potential first cause. Theoretically, yeah, if you were to eliminate all other options, then you would be left with the Christian God. Good luck with that endeavor.

If self-causation etc are incoherent, then you have your proof, right?

But even self-causation is not incoherent (it better not be or God could not exist). We only posit this because we have not observed self-causation within our universe, but it doesn't follow that the universe as a whole entity cannot cause itself. We have no inductive data to make any kind of judgment on whether or not the universe as a whole can cause itself.

You are making an assertion again. You keep saying that natural theology can lead to whatever. I am just asking you to show me that it can lead to whatever, no just assert it.

Okay, this is starting to get frustrating, so I'll try to lay out my case point by point:
  • The cosmological argument proves that a first cause exists.
  • The cosmological argument does not prove that this first cause is the Christian God.
  • There are other possibilities of what this first cause may be.
  • Therefore, it is improper for the cosmological argument, after proving the first cause's existence, to state that "God exists."

If you think the first cause's existence necessitates God's existence, then put it into the argument. Otherwise, as the argument stands right now, it cannot righteously be called a theistic proof.

Is positing a magic rabbit as first cause, coherent? Tell me about this magic rabbit that is the first cause.

All I know is that he is the first cause. That is all the cosmological argument has proven.

(See why we can't say "God exists" as a conclusion of that argument?)

You keep saying something cannot be proven. Why should I believe you? Just because you say so?

Because I'm not saying that something cannot be proven, only that something has not been proven. The cosmological argument proves a first cause exists. The cosmological argument does not prove that God exists. Therefore, it should not say "God exists" as the conclusion of the argument.

However, if you think there is a necessary correlation between the first cause and God (such that God is the only candidate for being the first cause), then put it into the argument. As of now, it is not there, and it is improper to call the argument a theistic proof. Do you understand the point I am trying to make?
 
My point is that if we get to assume from the premise "a first cause exists" that God exists, then we can also by the same principle declare those other things a first cause -- since God's existence is not proven in the argument, only a first cause's existence is. I am not saying the other ones are actually plausible solutions.
And my point is that if the other options are not plausible, then natural theology has to lead to the same God found in the Bible.

You misunderstood me when I said they are not plausible. They are absolutely plausible in the sense that the cosmological argument "proves" the other options as much as it proves God -- nothing besides the first cause's existence is proven from the argument. Since a magic rabbit in the sky is a ridiculous notion, and since it is just as legitimate a conclusion from the cosmological argument as "God exists" is, then that constitutes as a reductio ad absurdum on the argument, rendering the argument powerless as a theistic proof. If a magic sky-rabbit is a plausible conclusion of the argument as the argument currently is, then the argument as it currently is is absurd and needs to be modified or discarded.

For the magic rabbit to be a legitimate conclusion, it must not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know that it does not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know what features the magic rabbit has and what features it does not have, right? Because if you don't then you would not know if a contradiction was entailed or not, right?

Or put another way, if natural theology shows that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture, then I have no idea what your objection is.
That's my point -- it doesn't. Beyond the proven premise "a first cause exists," there is nothing to preclude the options of self-causation, a magic rabbit, etc. Natural theology does not show that it is a contradiction to believe that the first cause is something other than the God revealed in Scripture.

So are you against natural theology, because you have not seen it do some things to your satisfaction, or are you against it because it cannot do some things to your satisfaction?

Next, lets say that I prove that I have a functioning car. I do not then have to prove to you that it has a steering wheel, four tires etc. I can explain to you what is entailed by a car, but it does not require a separate argument.

Next, self-causation is a contradiction. I do not have to experience a contradiction in order to know that a contradiction is false. If you want to argue the point, then good luck on defeating non Christian worldviews.

I am not saying that you have to make God the default. I am saying make something else the default first cause, then if that leads to contradictions then you have to reject it. If the other positions, are incoherent, then you must accept God as the first cause, right?
There are an infinite number of possibilities that I can conceive of besides God as being a potential first cause. Theoretically, yeah, if you were to eliminate all other options, then you would be left with the Christian God. Good luck with that endeavor.

Are the possibilities, coherent. If they are not, then you really cannot conceive of them.

It also seems that you do not know what one can know by natural theology, so why are you so negative on the whole project. Perhaps you just have not seen it done well.

If self-causation etc are incoherent, then you have your proof, right?
But even self-causation is not incoherent (it better not be or God could not exist).

God is not self caused. He is independent and eternal. If one is eternal then one does not need a cause. Conversely, if one is not eternal, then one does need a cause.

We only posit this because we have not observed self-causation within our universe, but it doesn't follow that the universe as a whole entity cannot cause itself. We have no inductive data to make any kind of judgment on whether or not the universe as a whole can cause itself.

Is it coherent to say that it is possible to have a ball is red all over and blue all over at the same time in the same fashion, but we just have not seen it yet?

Induction is not the only way to know something.

You are making an assertion again. You keep saying that natural theology can lead to whatever. I am just asking you to show me that it can lead to whatever, no just assert it.
Okay, this is starting to get frustrating, so I'll try to lay out my case point by point:

  • 1
  • The cosmological argument proves that a first cause exists.
    2
  • The cosmological argument does not prove that this first cause is the Christian God.
    3
  • There are other possibilities of what this first cause may be.
  • Therefore, it is improper for the cosmological argument, after proving the first cause's existence, to state that "God exists."

Premise 3 is the one with serious problems. As I explained above, a contradiction has a probability of 0. Therefore you will need to know the features of the other possibilities in order to rule out contradictions. Can you share those features with me?

If you think the first cause's existence necessitates God's existence, then put it into the argument. Otherwise, as the argument stands right now, it cannot righteously be called a theistic proof.

Do you know what something has to be in order to be the first cause? If not then, how do you know that there are other possibilities other than God?

Is positing a magic rabbit as first cause, coherent? Tell me about this magic rabbit that is the first cause.

All I know is that he is the first cause. That is all the cosmological argument has proven.

(See why we can't say "God exists" as a conclusion of that argument?)

Okay, if the magic rabbit is the first cause, then show me why you are not just referencing the God of the Bible by an odd name?

You keep saying something cannot be proven. Why should I believe you? Just because you say so?

Because I'm not saying that something cannot be proven, only that something has not been proven. The cosmological argument proves a first cause exists. The cosmological argument does not prove that God exists. Therefore, it should not say "God exists" as the conclusion of the argument.

However, if you think there is a necessary correlation between the first cause and God (such that God is the only candidate for being the first cause), then put it into the argument. As of now, it is not there, and it is improper to call the argument a theistic proof. Do you understand the point I am trying to make?

Unless you can show that there is another candidate, then you should accept the conclusion, right?

CT
 
For the magic rabbit to be a legitimate conclusion, it must not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know that it does not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know what features the magic rabbit has and what features it does not have, right? Because if you don't then you would not know if a contradiction was entailed or not, right?

He looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he's magic. No contradictions so far.

You're actually requesting a rather odd amount of knowledge: unless we know everything about everything, we cannot know there is not a contradiction and consequently we cannot accept it?

Besides, you're missing my point entirely. If we get to arbitrarily jump from "a first cause exists" to "God exists," then another person has the same right to jump from "a first cause exists" to "a magic sky rabbit exists." There isn't actually any ground to believe in a magic sky rabbit, and likewise there is not any ground from this argument to believe in God. It is not a theistic proof.

So are you against natural theology, because you have not seen it do some things to your satisfaction, or are you against it because it cannot do some things to your satisfaction?

I'm against it because (1) it treats lesser authorities as greater authorities (which we discussed in the other thread) and (2) it doesn't prove what it claims to prove.

Next, lets say that I prove that I have a functioning car. I do not then have to prove to you that it has a steering wheel, four tires etc. I can explain to you what is entailed by a car, but it does not require a separate argument.

I don't care whether it's in a different argument or not. Just show me why "a first cause exists" necessitates "God exists."

Next, self-causation is a contradiction. I do not have to experience a contradiction in order to know that a contradiction is false. If you want to argue the point, then good luck on defeating non Christian worldviews.

Self-causation is only incoherent insofar as you limit all possible knowledge to what you can induce from the observable world.

Are the possibilities, coherent. If they are not, then you really cannot conceive of them.

It also seems that you do not know what one can know by natural theology, so why are you so negative on the whole project. Perhaps you just have not seen it done well.

Yes, the possibilities are coherent. Being weird or uncommon does not equal being contradictory.

Also, please drop the red herring and claim that I am negative simply because "I don't know natural theology" or "I haven't seen it done right."

God is not self caused. He is independent and eternal. If one is eternal then one does not need a cause. Conversely, if one is not eternal, then one does need a cause.

Self-caused, self-existent, you know what I meant. The singularity can be self-existent for all we know.

Is it coherent to say that it is possible to have a ball is red all over and blue all over at the same time in the same fashion, but we just have not seen it yet?

Induction is not the only way to know something.

But when the premise is explicitly inductive, then we are limited to what we can induce. Self-existence is not an inherently impossible concept, such as the red/blue example.

Premise 3 is the one with serious problems. As I explained above, a contradiction has a probability of 0. Therefore you will need to know the features of the other possibilities in order to rule out contradictions. Can you share those features with me?

The magic sky rabbit is purple and he looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he has really long claws.

Do you know what something has to be in order to be the first cause? If not then, how do you know that there are other possibilities other than God?

No, I don't know what exactly a first cause has to be in order to be a first cause. I know there are other possibilities because I can conceive of them.

Okay, if the magic rabbit is the first cause, then show me why you are not just referencing the God of the Bible by an odd name?

Because the description of the rabbit is different from the description of Jehovah.

Unless you can show that there is another candidate, then you should accept the conclusion, right?

If all other possibilities were logically ruled out, then we would have to accept God. If others cannot be thought of at the moment, we do not have to accept God. Furthermore, I can think of others.

Do you honestly think God is the only conceivable and coherent candidate to be the first cause? You can't expect unbelievers to accept this, unless they are being extremely inconsistent in their unbelief.
 
babydummy.gif
 
For the magic rabbit to be a legitimate conclusion, it must not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know that it does not entail a contradiction, right? So you must know what features the magic rabbit has and what features it does not have, right? Because if you don't then you would not know if a contradiction was entailed or not, right?

He looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he's magic. No contradictions so far.

So far, not so good. Is it possible for the first cause to be material vs. being immaterial?

You're actually requesting a rather odd amount of knowledge: unless we know everything about everything, we cannot know there is not a contradiction and consequently we cannot accept it?

That is part of my point. When you say something is possible, then you are making the positive claim that it is not a contradiction. When you make that claim then you can be attacked and forced to defend it. If you do not know anything (or very little) about the magic rabbit, then why are you making the claim that it is the first cause?

If you do not know what is implied by saying that something is the first cause, then how do you have the right to say that something is a first cause as opposed to something else?

If this is the case, then why are you arguing about the impropriety of the cosmological argument if you do not understand what it's purpose is and what it is saying. It is something like saying, that you do not know what black is but I am not black.

Besides, you're missing my point entirely. If we get to arbitrarily jump from "a first cause exists" to "God exists," then another person has the same right to jump from "a first cause exists" to "a magic sky rabbit exists." There isn't actually any ground to believe in a magic sky rabbit, and likewise there is not any ground from this argument to believe in God. It is not a theistic proof.

Who said anything about arbitrary? Does your disagreement cause something to be arbitrary?

My point here is that when you say something else can be that first cause, you have the obligation to defend that position, as much as I have an obligation to defend the position that God is that first cause. You do not have the right to just say, "I can imagine", without examining what it is that you are saying that you are imagining. I am asking you to be presuppositional through and through, and not just partially.

So are you against natural theology, because you have not seen it do some things to your satisfaction, or are you against it because it cannot do some things to your satisfaction?

I'm against it because (1) it treats lesser authorities as greater authorities (which we discussed in the other thread) and (2) it doesn't prove what it claims to prove.

We discussed it (1) in the other thread, but I definitely still disagree with your position; we can get back to it later.
2)Is just a restatement of your view of empiricist viewpoint, which is definitely not self evident.

I don't care whether it's in a different argument or not. Just show me why "a first cause exists" necessitates "God exists."

We are going to get to that in a bit. The first step is to shut off objections (show that you do not know what you think you know), then move forward. If one moves forward too fast, the objections will keep popping up.

Self-causation is only incoherent insofar as you limit all possible knowledge to what you can induce from the observable world.

Nope, the problem is that the meaning is incoherent. It has nothing to do with where you are at or which world your in.

Self causation either means:
1)You already exist, then you cause yourself to exist. - But since you already exist, you did not cause yourself to exist.
2)You did not exist, but you cause yourself to exist - In this case, you have nothing doing something. What does nothing doing something even mean? Or put another way, you have being coming from non-being.
-That would deny causation and intelligibility presupposes causation. We could go on, but hopefully we do not have to continue.

Are the possibilities, coherent. If they are not, then you really cannot conceive of them.

It also seems that you do not know what one can know by natural theology, so why are you so negative on the whole project. Perhaps you just have not seen it done well.

Yes, the possibilities are coherent. Being weird or uncommon does not equal being contradictory.

It is true that being weird does not equal being contradictory, but it really seems that you do not know enough about magic rabbit to sustain the claim that he/she is the first cause. If you do not know what is or is not possible, then we can go from there.

Also, please drop the red herring and claim that I am negative simply because "I don't know natural theology" or "I haven't seen it done right."

You are the empiricist, or at least hold to empiricist principles when they suit you. These conclusions come from those principles.

Self-caused, self-existent, you know what I meant. The singularity can be self-existent for all we know.

Self-caused and self-existent are two vastly different concepts. If you want to drop self-caused due to the conceptual problems, that would be fine. If you claim that the singularity is the first cause instead of the rabbit, then tell me about it, so we can examine it, to see if it can be the first cause.

But when the premise is explicitly inductive, then we are limited to what we can induce. Self-existence is not an inherently impossible concept, such as the red/blue example.

Self-existence is not a problem, but actually a necessity. (If something is not self-existent then you run into being from non-being again) Self-causation is the problem.

The magic sky rabbit is purple and he looks like a rabbit for the most part, except he has really long claws.

Does he grow? Does he age? How big is he?

No, I don't know what exactly a first cause has to be in order to be a first cause. I know there are other possibilities because I can conceive of them.

But if you don't know what it is, then how do you know that you are not conceiving a contradictory set of affairs?

Is it not like conceiving someone under 100 feet tall, but not knowing what a foot is?

Okay, if the magic rabbit is the first cause, then show me why you are not just referencing the God of the Bible by an odd name?

Because the description of the rabbit is different from the description of Jehovah.

Fair enough. We finally agree on something.

Unless you can show that there is another candidate, then you should accept the conclusion, right?

If all other possibilities were logically ruled out, then we would have to accept God. If others cannot be thought of at the moment, we do not have to accept God. Furthermore, I can think of others.

Do you honestly think God is the only conceivable and coherent candidate to be the first cause? You can't expect unbelievers to accept this, unless they are being extremely inconsistent in their unbelief.

I do honestly believe that such is the case. I do wish that unbelievers are consistent in their belief, because it allows the error of their ways to be shown easier.

CT
 
For brevity's sake, I'll limit this discussion to this point, since it is most crucial. A lot of the rest is ad hominem, or red herrings, or just plain obstinacy (speaking of which, do you think I am making some crucial attack on the rational foundations of your faith? If so, I'll stop).

If you do not know what is implied by saying that something is the first cause, then how do you have the right to say that something is a first cause as opposed to something else?

This is the crux of my argument against the theistic proofs.
 
For brevity's sake, I'll limit this discussion to this point, since it is most crucial. A lot of the rest is ad hominem, or red herrings, or just plain obstinacy (speaking of which, do you think I am making some crucial attack on the rational foundations of your faith? If so, I'll stop).

If you do not know what is implied by saying that something is the first cause, then how do you have the right to say that something is a first cause as opposed to something else?

This is the crux of my argument against the theistic proofs.

If this is the crux of your argument, are you saying that one cannot know what is implied by a first cause, or just that you personally do not know?

If it is the former, then I would like to see an argument that one cannot know such. If it is the later, then you should be asking if someone could help you to see what can be known by natural theology instead of claiming that there are natural theology cannot do X and it cannot do Y.

My crux is that you should be more presuppositional not less. You move too quickly between, I do not know, to it cannot be known.

CT
 
If this is the crux of your argument, are you saying that one cannot know what is implied by a first cause, or just that you personally do not know?

If it is the former, then I would like to see an argument that one cannot know such. If it is the later, then you should be asking if someone could help you to see what can be known by natural theology instead of claiming that there are natural theology cannot do X and it cannot do Y.

My crux is that you should be more presuppositional not less. You move too quickly between, I do not know, to it cannot be known.

I am saying that the theistic proofs in their present form do not imply that the first cause is God. They state the fact of the first cause's existence and leave it at that.

I am not saying that the first cause cannot be God. I am saying that the first cause has not yet been proven to be God.

If you think natural theology can establish the first cause as God, then please demonstrate it. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim.
 
If this is the crux of your argument, are you saying that one cannot know what is implied by a first cause, or just that you personally do not know?

If it is the former, then I would like to see an argument that one cannot know such. If it is the later, then you should be asking if someone could help you to see what can be known by natural theology instead of claiming that there are natural theology cannot do X and it cannot do Y.

My crux is that you should be more presuppositional not less. You move too quickly between, I do not know, to it cannot be known.

I am saying that the theistic proofs in their present form do not imply that the first cause is God. They state the fact of the first cause's existence and leave it at that.

I am not saying that the first cause cannot be God. I am saying that the first cause has not yet been proven to be God.

If you think natural theology can establish the first cause as God, then please demonstrate it. The burden of proof is on the person making the claim.

So if you say that the first cause could be anything (magic rabbits etc) are you not making a claim that anything is consistent with the first cause? (So you are saying that you understand what a first cause is and are able to evaluate the implications. and those implications are not inconsistent with Mr. Rabbit)

At bottom, if you do not know/assume anything to be true, then you could not make an objection to any claim.

Anyway, let us start pretty low.

Is it possible that nothing is eternal?

CT
 
So if you say that the first cause could be anything (magic rabbits etc) are you not making a claim that anything is consistent with the first cause? (So you are saying that you understand what a first cause is and are able to evaluate the implications. and those implications are not inconsistent with Mr. Rabbit)

At bottom, if you do not know/assume anything to be true, then you could not make an objection to any claim.

Anyway, let us start pretty low.

Is it possible that nothing is eternal?

I am not making the claim that the first cause can be anything, only that the first cause must be positively demonstrated to be something more than a first cause if one were to claim such. I only said that the sky-rabbit can be a plausible first cause if we are allowed to jump from "a first cause exists" to the fact that something is that specific first cause. I was making a reductio ad absurdum on the fact that "God exists" is the conclusion of the cosmological argument -- the premise should rather be "a first cause exists."

No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.
 
So if you say that the first cause could be anything (magic rabbits etc) are you not making a claim that anything is consistent with the first cause? (So you are saying that you understand what a first cause is and are able to evaluate the implications. and those implications are not inconsistent with Mr. Rabbit)

At bottom, if you do not know/assume anything to be true, then you could not make an objection to any claim.

Anyway, let us start pretty low.

Is it possible that nothing is eternal?

I am not making the claim that the first cause can be anything, only that the first cause must be positively demonstrated to be something more than a first cause if one were to claim such. I only said that the sky-rabbit can be a plausible first cause if we are allowed to jump from "a first cause exists" to the fact that something is that specific first cause. I was making a reductio ad absurdum on the fact that "God exists" is the conclusion of the cosmological argument -- the premise should rather be "a first cause exists."

So one can say that a first cause exists, but then not say that something particular fills that role? You say that is a jump? Do you know what a first cause is? If you don't then how do you know its a jump?

No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.

Okay, is it possible that matter is eternal (aka: materialism is true)

CT
 
So one can say that a first cause exists, but then not say that something particular fills that role? You say that is a jump? Do you know what a first cause is? If you don't then how do you know its a jump?

It's alright to make the jump as long as it is logically justified. If you have reasons to go from "a first cause exists" to "God exists" then by all means tell me. Otherwise, I'm going to stick with what I know from the argument and say that a first cause exists, nothing more.

No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.

Okay, is it possible that matter is eternal (aka: materialism is true)

Apart from Christian presuppositions, I don't know how I could disprove this. A singularity could be eternal or self-existent.
 
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No, it is not possible that nothing is eternal.

Okay, is it possible that matter is eternal (aka: materialism is true)

Apart from Christian presuppositions, I don't know how I could disprove this. A singularity could be eternal or self-existent.

When you say Christian presuppositions, what do you mean? Are you saying something other than the Bible says so?

Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.

CT
 
When you say Christian presuppositions, what do you mean? Are you saying something other than the Bible says so?

Basically, that the entirety of the Bible is true.

Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.

It has infinite density because it has an infinitesimally small volume and some amount of mass. I have no idea how time would behave in a singularity. I cannot think of a reason to deny its eternality "before" the Big Bang supposedly occurred.
 
When you say Christian presuppositions, what do you mean? Are you saying something other than the Bible says so?

Basically, that the entirety of the Bible is true.

Alright. I am not sure how one differentiates between your position and fideism but we shall come back to that at some point.

Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.

It has infinite density because it has an infinitesimally small volume and some amount of mass. I have no idea how time would behave in a singularity. I cannot think of a reason to deny its eternality "before" the Big Bang supposedly occurred.

Infinite density, implies no volume, right? If there is volume, then density is at best just very high and not infinite. Or put another way, how do you differentiate between something immaterial and something with infinite density?

Next, there is the problem of going from the singularity to non singularity. It looks like one runs into the problem of uncaused cause/or nothing doing something again.

CT
 
Alright. I am not sure how one differentiates between your position and fideism but we shall come back to that at some point.

R.C. Sproul and all the authors of Classical Apologetics would agree with you here. But presuppositionalism is not fideism.

Infinite density, implies no volume, right? If there is volume, then density is at best just very high and not infinite. Or put another way, how do you differentiate between something immaterial and something with infinite density?

Yeah, it has no volume. That doesn't mean it's not material.

Next, there is the problem of going from the singularity to non singularity. It looks like one runs into the problem of uncaused cause/or nothing doing something again.

Something in the singularity could set the whole thing off.
 
Alright. I am not sure how one differentiates between your position and fideism but we shall come back to that at some point.

R.C. Sproul and all the authors of Classical Apologetics would agree with you here. But presuppositionalism is not fideism.

If you argue that you hold your position because ever other system is incoherent, that is not fideism. If you hold your position, because every other positions, leads to skepticism, then that is not fideism.

But it seems that your position is something other than either one of those.

Infinite density, implies no volume, right? If there is volume, then density is at best just very high and not infinite. Or put another way, how do you differentiate between something immaterial and something with infinite density?

Yeah, it has no volume. That doesn't mean it's not material.

So what is the difference between material with no volume and immaterial? So you have a material something without mass and without volume? In the previous post, I asked a question here. You seemed to answer, it is material because its material.

What do you mean by the term material vs. the term immaterial?

Next, there is the problem of going from the singularity to non singularity. It looks like one runs into the problem of uncaused cause/or nothing doing something again.

Something in the singularity could set the whole thing off.
If you want to say that the immaterial is eternal and gave rise to the material, then alright, but one could not be a materialist anymore.

CT
 
If you argue that you hold your position because ever other system is incoherent, that is not fideism. If you hold your position, because every other positions, leads to skepticism, then that is not fideism.

But it seems that your position is something other than either one of those.

I have gone in-depth on what exactly my position is in other threads. If you want me to repeat it here, I can.

So what is the difference between material with no volume and immaterial? So you have a material something without mass and without volume? In the previous post, I asked a question here. You seemed to answer, it is material because its material.

What do you mean by the term material vs. the term immaterial?

In a singularity mass is present but takes up negligible volume. If it were immaterial mass would not be present (I don't know of any "rules" regarding the volume of immaterial entities, so I'll be quiet about that).

I am not saying that it's material because it's material; I am saying that it is material because it coheres with the definition of "material." It has matter. Hence, it is material.

If you want to say that the immaterial is eternal and gave rise to the material, then alright, but one could not be a materialist anymore.

I'm not saying that. The singularity is material.
 
If you argue that you hold your position because ever other system is incoherent, that is not fideism. If you hold your position, because every other positions, leads to skepticism, then that is not fideism.

But it seems that your position is something other than either one of those.

I have gone in-depth on what exactly my position is in other threads. If you want me to repeat it here, I can.

I know what your position is. It can be reduced down to non Christian belief is wrong because if you do not see that Christianity is true and all alternatives are false, then you are just wrong. (The whole: we have paradoxes, while others have contradictions issue)

So what is the difference between material with no volume and immaterial? So you have a material something without mass and without volume? In the previous post, I asked a question here. You seemed to answer, it is material because its material.

What do you mean by the term material vs. the term immaterial?

In a singularity mass is present but takes up negligible volume. If it were immaterial mass would not be present (I don't know of any "rules" regarding the volume of immaterial entities, so I'll be quiet about that).

Actually Hawkins claims infinite density which implies zero mass and zero volume. But if one wants to just say very high density instead of infinite, fine.

So you have the force pulling the singularity in being = to the force wanting to expand. You have an equilibrium. So one needs to propose that a push was given to the system in order to break the equlibrium. But the system is all there is, so there is nothing to give it the push.

All the while the universe is running down (entropy)which implies that if it is material that is eternal, the universe would have already run down.

CT

-----Added 12/13/2008 at 07:58:27 EST-----

Next, tell me about the singularity, as far as you understand it.

It has infinite density because it has an infinitesimally small volume and some amount of mass. I have no idea how time would behave in a singularity. I cannot think of a reason to deny its eternality "before" the Big Bang supposedly occurred.

Sorry I missed this at the time. Infinitesimally small volume does not imply infinite density. I think you are trying to say "arbitrarily small" (as small as you want to go). Think the difference between an really really big number and infinity. You can always think of a larger number than a really really big number but you can't do the same with infinity.

CT
 
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