Is classical apologetics Pelagian at root?

[mgeoffriau]

So if we reject the idea of "bare facts" or "independent facts", and embrace "system truths" (returning my previous comment that Van Til favored a coherence theory of truth), then it seems like we are forced to conclude not only that the unbeliever has no justification for the things he knows, but that he actually does not know them.

Still agree?

 

[Whitefield]

So if we reject the idea of "bare facts" or "independent facts", and embrace "system truths" (returning my previous comment that Van Til favored a coherence theory of truth), then it seems like we are forced to conclude not only that the unbeliever has no justification for the things he knows, but that he actually does not know them.

Still agree?

Sounds very much like Van Til to me. I think Van Til actually challenged a student in a classroom setting to give him an example of a "bare fact." If I remember the audio correctly, the student couldn't do it.

 

[mgeoffriau]

So if knowledge is impossible for the unbeliever,

or in other words, if the unbeliever is incapable of correctly interpreting facts,

or in other words, if any interpretive activity by the unbeliever produces untruth:

Then how can the believer communicate with the unbeliever? In what way are the believer's words meaningful and not simply absurd or void?

 

[Whitefield]

So if knowledge is impossible for the unbeliever,

or in other words, if the unbeliever is incapable of correctly interpreting facts,

or in other words, if any interpretive activity by the unbeliever produces untruth:

Then how can the believer communicate with the unbeliever? In what way are the believer's words meaningful and not simply absurd or void?

The presuppositional is not trying to reason with the unbeliever, but simply to say the unbeliever is starting in the wrong place. How can one deny the ultimate "fact" in the universe, and then hope to find any true facts afterwards? (The rocket is pointed in the wrong direction at launch.) Both can make reference to the oak tree in the backyard, but they are not really talking about the same thing. The unbeliever sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn; the believer sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn and gives glory to the One who created it from nothing.

 

[mgeoffriau]

The presuppositional is not trying to reason with the unbeliever, but simply to say the unbeliever is starting in the wrong place. How can one deny the ultimate "fact" in the universe, and then hope to find any true facts afterwards? (The rocket is pointed in the wrong direction at launch.) Both can make reference to the oak tree in the backyard, but they are not really talking about the same thing. The unbeliever sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn; the believer sees a vertical growth of wood which came from an acorn and gives glory to the One who created it from nothing.

[Emphasis in first line is mine]

Isn't Van Til claiming a bit more than this, though? If all that can be accomplished is publicly stating truth with no expectation that it will be intelligible by unbelievers, then why does he find fault with classical apologists?

I think he does claim something greater -- that the transcendental argument is intelligible by unbelievers and that real communication is possible -- what I can't figure out is how this is possible according to his formulation of the unbeliever's intellect and psychology.

 

[Confessor]

Every premise has a basic axiom at its foundation (the computer in front of you is not a figment ... so you extend a system of thought based on evidence of the physical world being "real" and so your statement of the computer is valid.)

Yet, I don't think it's proper to say that any propositions we gain from sensory perception are derived from an axiom. It's not as if we consciously think, "I have taken as an axiom that sensory perception is reliable; I seem to perceive a computer; therefore I am justified in believing that a computer exists." The belief that I am seeing a computer is itself properly basic; it's not necessary to get a more basic axiom from which we derive it.

I think this is an important point to make, because I would say that Christians are to take Scriptural authority as properly basic; it doesn't have to be derived from anything else.

Hmmm... I didn't know that my signature line was a quote, though I suppose it could be very close to something someone else has said. I said something akin to it when I was in the midst of my first beloved wife dying of cancer. It was years long. During that time, I could hardly read a Bible, and prayer was mostly crying to the God that was in control without any words that would form. I had been "training for war" long before that particular battle started. The fact that I could only keep focused for a very short time was the battle. I was living on trust in God that I had developed over years of preparing. I had not known the purpose of the preparation, but I was grateful that God had given me grace to prepare before need it.

If there is a quote that is similar, please direct me to it. I would LOVE to know the person that thinks the same way I do.

I was assuming it was a quote; I do not know of an actual quote similar to it. But thank you for telling the story behind it...that is heartwrenching.

-----Added 5/25/2009 at 01:16:24 EST-----

Then how can the believer communicate with the unbeliever? In what way are the believer's words meaningful and not simply absurd or void?

Did you see the distinction I made between the unbeliever's espoused and practiced worldview? Iff the unbeliever were consistent with his unbelieving principles, it would in fact be impossible to communicate with him. But he is not consistent with his principles, by God's grace. Therefore, the presuppositional apologist attempts to show the unbeliever the logical implications of his espoused worldview (viz., that knowledge is impossible); then, when the unbeliever sees that he has knowledge despite his faulty worldview, he can repent to the God who kept him from an entirely consistent rebellion.

 

[Whitefield]

Isn't Van Til claiming a bit more than this, though? If all that can be accomplished is publicly stating truth with no expectation that it will be intelligible by unbelievers, then why does he find fault with classical apologists?

His problem with classical apology is that it thinks the unbeliever is headed in right direction and only needs help along the intellectual way. For presuppositionalist the unbeliever is pointed in the wrong direction and must be challenged at the very starting line. The presuppositionalist takes the noetic effect of sin very seriously, the classical apologist often acts like it isn't there.

 

[Reformed Thomist]

The classical position is rooted in the recognition that faith rests upon knowledge. In order to believe what God says (Divine Revelation, God's Word, God's communication to man) we must first know or at least have a natural awareness (whether a posteriori or a priori) that God is, that is, that God exists. To put it another way, I must first 'believe in God' (the Divine existence) before I can 'believe God' (the Divine testimony). Without the former (which always comes before the latter) faith would be a kind of aberration.

This schema mirrors simple ‘human’ faith: Jimmy must know that Dave exists (believe in Dave) before Jimmy can believe what Dave tells him about so-and-so (believe Dave). The same goes for Jimmy’s relationship with God. Having an awareness of the reality of God (general) comes before believing that God chose to become Man and die for our sins on the Cross (specific).

 

[cih1355]

I'm just wondering what exactly the classical arguments can prove.

They try to prove that there is a First Cause, Necessary Being, an Intelligent Designer, or a Moral Lawgiver. After the classical apologist uses the classical arguments, he will then use other arguments to prove that the First Cause, Necessary Being, Intelligent Designer, or Moral Lawgiver is the God of the Bible. The classical apologist uses one set of arguments that deal with whether or not God exists and another set of arguments that deal with the identity of God.

I know this is what they try to prove. I didn't ask what they try to prove, but what can they prove (e.g., to the unregenerate and unbeliever)? For instance the ontological argument begins with a fundamental assumption, and if the listener (e.g., Kant, "existence is not a property of an object") doesn't accept that fundamental argument the entire "proof" falls the floor. The cosmological falters before the question "who caused God?" (since the first premise in the cosmological argument is "Everything that exists has a cause of its existence.") The teleological must assume design in everything, but is unsure of how to answer the challenge, "why do you assume order constitutes design?" The moral argument, the argument from religious experience, and the argument from miracles are so subjective that they carry no real weight in proving the objective. I find it difficult to believe that any of these arguments can be persuasive given human total depravity and the noetic effects of sin.

They only prove that something caused the universe to come into existence or that something caused moral values to come into existence. However, this does not mean that the unbeliever will be pointed in the right direction. The unbeliever's god will not be the Christian God. The unbeliever's god will be a false god.

Those classical arguments do not persuade non-Christians to repent and believe in Christ.

 

[Reformed Thomist]

Those classical arguments do not persuade non-Christians to repent and believe in Christ.

No, of course not. But they may be what provides the necessary groundwork for the gift of faith and repentance to be received.

-----Added 5/25/2009 at 05:14:09 EST-----

They only prove that something caused the universe to come into existence or that something caused moral values to come into existence. However, this does not mean that the unbeliever will be pointed in the right direction. The unbeliever's god will not be the Christian God. The unbeliever's god will be a false god.

That's only if one stops at the Cosmological or Teleological Arguments -- 'therefore, the First Cause/Highest Being exists'. But natural theology proper does not end there. After the existence of this Cause/Being has been established, we are to tackle Its attributes, in a 'geometrical' fashion, logically flowing from the established fact of existence and the existent's work (the world). For instance, from what is established by the Cosmo./Teleo. Arguments, it can inferred eventually, along the line, that this Being is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Pretty soon 'It' starts to sound a lot like the God of classical theism. If the philosophical enterprise is successful it will not be proving 'the Christian God' in particular (but rather the 'monotheistic' God), but it will show Atheism to be an untenable position, Atheism being the rejection of the existence of the God of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

 

[Confessor]

This schema mirrors simple ‘human’ faith: Jimmy must know that Dave exists (believe in Dave) before Jimmy can believe what Dave tells him about so-and-so (believe Dave). The same goes for Jimmy’s relationship with God. Having an awareness of the reality of God (general) comes before believing that God chose to become Man and die for our sins on the Cross (specific).

This is not necessary, nor is it common in real life. That is, when I am taking advice from my mother, I don't stop myself and say, "Wait, I have to make sure this person giving me advice exists; I better make sure she exists to ensure that the information I got was indeed from her." In fact, we consider people who do that to be rather weird.

If it is plainly evident, or if it is properly basic, that the Bible is God's Word and thereby ultimately authoritative, then God's existence can be understood from that knowledge. (It would be a near misnomer to say we derive God's existence from the knowledge that the Bible is God's Word, because the inference is so obvious.)

In other words, although a person must exist in order for us to take advice from him, that we know we have received advice from him would logically lead to the proposition that such a person exists. A person's existence must logically precede his giving of advice/revelation, but that doesn't deny the veracity of the conditional proposition, "If person X gives advice/revelation, then person X exists."

-----Added 5/25/2009 at 11:52:38 EST-----

That's only if one stops at the Cosmological or Teleological Arguments -- 'therefore, the First Cause/Highest Being exists'. But natural theology proper does not end there. After the existence of this Cause/Being has been established, we are to tackle Its attributes, in a 'geometrical' fashion, logically flowing from the established fact of existence and the existent's work (the world). For instance, from what is established by the Cosmo./Teleo. Arguments, it can inferred eventually, along the line, that this Being is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. Pretty soon 'It' starts to sound a lot like the God of classical theism. If the philosophical enterprise is successful it will not be proving 'the Christian God' in particular (but rather the 'monotheistic' God), but it will show Atheism to be an untenable position, Atheism being the rejection of the existence of the God of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

(I bolded what you had italicized so it would show in the quotation.)

I would contend that the results offered in natural theology, even after the specification you mentioned that might pinpoint this being's attributes, are too generic and therefore too subject to the unbeliever's presupposition. This is especially true when you consider that the unbeliever can manhandle the conclusions you have at any step of the way; that is, if you try to prove a certain characteristic for the First Cause you just proved in the cosmological argument (i.e., you're trying to add on to the cosm. argument), you have to assume that the unbeliever will not relegate the First Cause to some other humanistic tenet and then "start fresh" with your new argument. It's hard to build this supposed basis from which you can add characteristics when you allow unbelievers their presuppositions, for they can wreak havoc at any step of the way.

Furthermore, unbelievers can always relegate the different conclusions of different arguments to different entities: e.g., the First Cause and Lawgiver you might prove in natural theology can be two different things in the secularist worldview. This tactic can make unbelief much more tenable, because it gives more options for the unbeliever.

 

[Brian Withnell]

Fair point, let me rephrase more specifically:

Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?

I would haste to broaden your question.

Can anyone, believer or unbeliever, know true facts about reality?

In a sense nobody knows true facts (i.e., knows perfectly) reality; we all have the remnant of sin that corrupts all our faculties. Everything we do is imperfect, and only by grace do we get anything "right".

 

[Reformed Thomist]

Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?

I would haste to broaden your question.

Can anyone, believer or unbeliever, know true facts about reality?

In a sense nobody knows true facts (i.e., knows perfectly) reality; we all have the remnant of sin that corrupts all our faculties. Everything we do is imperfect, and only by grace do we get anything "right".

Yay for fideism and skepticism. This seems to be what we end up with with presuppositionalism.

 

[Reformed Thomist]

If it is plainly evident, or if it is properly basic, that the Bible is God's Word and thereby ultimately authoritative, then God's existence can be understood from that knowledge. (It would be a near misnomer to say we derive God's existence from the knowledge that the Bible is God's Word, because the inference is so obvious.)

In other words, although a person must exist in order for us to take advice from him, that we know we have received advice from him would logically lead to the proposition that such a person exists. A person's existence must logically precede his giving of advice/revelation, but that doesn't deny the veracity of the conditional proposition, "If person X gives advice/revelation, then person X exists."

I would challenge the premise that the Bible being God's Word is 'plainly evident' or, in Plantingian terms, 'properly basic'. I might say that of God's existence (a preamble to the articles of faith, in Thomistic terms), but not of an article of faith. Articles of faith are so-called because they are not plainly evident. They are so not plainly evident that individuals require Divine assistance to give assent to them -- they need to be Elect (which is not required in order to merely accept that the existence of God is a fact, since Jews and Muslims believe this).

 

[Confessor]

I would challenge the premise that the Bible being God's Word is 'plainly evident' or, in Plantingian terms, 'properly basic'. I might say that of God's existence (a preamble to the articles of faith, in Thomistic terms), but not of an article of faith.

The usual objection to any given proposition's proper basicality is that such a proposition is not universally accepted. But this objection has manifold problems. (Just in case universal acceptance was what you had in mind.)

Articles of faith are so-called because they are not plainly evident.

This would require a good deal of defining your terms. Otherwise, I see no reason that all articles of faith, as a category, must be disallowed from the descriptor of "plainly evident."

They are so not plainly evident that individuals require Divine assistance to give assent to them -- they need to be Elect (which is not required in order to merely accept that the existence of God is a fact, since Jews and Muslims believe this).

But isn't it true that all unbelievers ought to accept the authority of the Bible? If there is not some obvious veracity to the proposition that the Bible is God's Word, then unbelievers would not be morally obliged to accept it as such. But they are obliged; therefore there is some obvious veracity to the proposition.

More importantly, the regeneration wrought by the Holy Spirit does not necessarily add some innocent belief to the person's noetic collection (contrary to Plantinga); it changes the willful aversion that we have as sinners to God. That is, we already understand in some sense as unbelievers that we ought to accept the Bible, yet we irrationally rebel -- and the Holy Spirit changes our hearts in this matter, allowing us to give a warm assent to the proposition that we already ascertain to be true (and that proposition is that the Bible is God's Word).

In other words, it is not the case that regeneration gives us the belief that the Bible is God's Word. Rather, we already believe this in a sense, and upon regeneration our assent to this proposition is changed.

-----Added 5/26/2009 at 09:36:15 EST-----

Can the unbeliever know true facts about reality? Or is all of his supposed knowledge actually just false beliefs because of the improper context?

I would haste to broaden your question.

Can anyone, believer or unbeliever, know true facts about reality?

In a sense nobody knows true facts (i.e., knows perfectly) reality; we all have the remnant of sin that corrupts all our faculties. Everything we do is imperfect, and only by grace do we get anything "right".

Yay for fideism and skepticism. This seems to be what we end up with with presuppositionalism.

To judge from Brian's qualified comment that skepticism ensues, and to go even further and apply your conclusion to the entirety of presuppositionalism, is an error. Brian said that there is a sense in which we know nothing, because we do not know any proposition in its fullest sense (e.g., in relation to all other true propositions). This notably precludes skepticism, for Brian said nothing about whether we can know anything true. That is, although someone may not know a proposition in its fullest sense, they can know it in a more superficial sense; and this is still indeed knowledge.

And, honestly, I have no idea how you went from Brian's quoted post to your statement that all of presuppositionalism seems to result in skepticism and fideism. But that topic seems to be more fitting in a separate thread.

 

[Philip]

As I jump into this, I realize that I am a bit over my head.

The usual objection to any given proposition's proper basicality is that such a proposition is not universally accepted.

If I have been taught all my life to assume that Santa Claus exists, would that be properly basic? That's my objection.

But isn't it true that all unbelievers ought to accept the authority of the Bible? If there is not some obvious veracity to the proposition that the Bible is God's Word, then unbelievers would not be morally obliged to accept it as such. But they are obliged; therefore there is some obvious veracity to the proposition.

If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.

That is, we already understand in some sense as unbelievers that we ought to accept the Bible, yet we irrationally rebel -- and the Holy Spirit changes our hearts in this matter

Interesting that the Holy Spirit changes our hearts, not our heads. It's non-rational both ways because our irrationality is what makes us human--it's part of the image of God.

In other words, it is not the case that regeneration gives us the belief that the Bible is God's Word. Rather, we already believe this in a sense, and upon regeneration our assent to this proposition is changed.

I cannot disprove this statement, but neither can it be proved. It's poor grounding.

As a Reformed Christian, I would agree with Van Til and Clark that ultimately it is the Holy Spirit who does the convincing. However, they do reduce apologetics to practical fideism (in Van Til's case) and skepticism (Clark). That is, Van Til may deny the claim that he is a fideist, but he leaves no logical reason to believe from common ground. If all truth really is God's truth, then he ought to be using arguments from common sense to prove that it's true. Likewise, Clark may deny that he is a skeptic, yet in everything except his acceptance of Revelation, he is a more consistent Cartesian than Descartes.

My job as an apologist is to give the non-Christian no excuse for not believing. It is not to simply tear down presuppositions (for an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions--I believe it's called inductive logic) but to present a rational alternative with good reasoning behind it. If proper reasoning presupposes God, then there is no harm in proving His existence, given that the reasoning process itself presupposes His existence.

 

[Beth Ellen Nagle]

If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.

What exactly is a "presuppositional thomist"?

 

[chbrooking]

If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.

...

Interesting that the Holy Spirit changes our hearts, not our heads. It's non-rational both ways because our irrationality is what makes us human--it's part of the image of God.

...

My job as an apologist is to give the non-Christian no excuse for not believing. It is not to simply tear down presuppositions (for an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions--I believe it's called inductive logic) but to present a rational alternative with good reasoning behind it. If proper reasoning presupposes God, then there is no harm in proving His existence, given that the reasoning process itself presupposes His existence.

I would argue that you've misunderstood your job. He is already without excuse. God has taken care of that. Your job is to unmask him. To demonstrate that he is suppressing the truth that he actually knows.

Once you permit the unbeliever to sit in judgment on whether or not God exists, you've denied the God of the scriptures. You've denied his transcendence, his aseity, his sovereignty, etc. You're never going to end up with the God of the scriptures, since you are arguing for a 'god' that doesn't exist. CVT rightly saw that the unbeliever borrows the tools necessary for reasoning from the very God he denies.

Undermine his ability to know anything by making him defend the foundation of his predication and leave him with two options: Know nothing or know Christ. Leaving him with probabilities (which is the most you might do from common ground) isn't sufficient even for the task you've claimed is your task as an apologist.

But do, please, shed light on what you mean by a 'presuppositional thomist'. If you mean that you are in favor of the use of evidence, but you are a presuppositionalist, then you aren't any different from CVT, who also approved of such use of evidence.

 

[Philip]

I would argue that you've misunderstood your job. He is already without excuse. God has taken care of that. Your job is to unmask him. To demonstrate that he is suppressing the truth that he actually knows.

Depends what is meant by knowledge. If it's absolute indubitable intellectual certainty, then obviously the unbeliever does not have knowledge, since he has no intellectual assent.

If knowledge means a reasonable certainty, here too the unbeliever cannot have knowledge since there is no intellectual assent. The unbeliever is blissfully ignorant of the truth and is ignorant of his own free will. The Holy Spirit has to provide a longing for truth, which is why apologists are sent to give reasons to believe.

Once you permit the unbeliever to sit in judgment on whether or not God exists, you've denied the God of the scriptures. You've denied his transcendence, his aseity, his sovereignty, etc. You're never going to end up with the God of the scriptures, since you are arguing for a 'god' that doesn't exist.

If I argue to theism, to trinitarianism, and then to Christianity, it seems that I am arguing for the God of the Scriptures. Anselm of Canterbury demonstrated such a method quite well in his writings.

CVT rightly saw that the unbeliever borrows the tools necessary for reasoning from the very God he denies.

Then why shouldn't we argue from that common ground? The Heavens declare the glory of God, therefore our job is to point it out.

Undermine his ability to know anything by making him defend the foundation of his predication

This is, to my mind, both the strength and the weakness of the presuppositional method. On the one hand, it can tear down strongholds of unbelief, but on the other hand, it is beyond the scope of an apologist to tear down every possible stronghold. There are always more options.

But do, please, shed light on what you mean by a 'presuppositional thomist'.

It means that I favor arguments, but recognize that presuppositions skew our perception of the world. The question then becomes, does the perception square with reality. Islam is an internally consistent set of propositions--but it falls apart when it is shown up against the light of reality (not to mention history). Reality is truth and all truth is God's domain and therefore the domain of God's people.

For example, I use the modal ontological argument (which Kant failed to even address--possibly because he didn't know of its existence) to prove the presuppositional point that God's existence is self-evident from the very concept of God. To even think of God is to assume that He necessarily exists.

We cannot come to absolute certainty in a purely rational manner--for even God is not purely rational (God is love and love is not logical). We can, however, come to reasonable certainty.

 

[Confessor]

Welcome to the PB Philip!

If I have been taught all my life to assume that Santa Claus exists, would that be properly basic? That's my objection.

It wouldn't be properly basic, but it'd be rationally justified (i.e. you wouldn't have violated any noetic duties in coming to a belief in Santa).

If it were that self-evident, then there would be no need for apologetics. The purpose of apologetics is to give them no excuse--which is why I am a presuppositional thomist.

First, as Clark and Beth have surely had at the back of their minds when they asked what a "presuppositional Thomist" was, I'm fairly certain that such a term is an oxymoron. Both the Clarkian and Van Tillian schools of presuppositionalism repudiated Thomism. However, it might be the case that you have integrated some amount of presuppositionalism in such a way that the two are not dissonant. If so, I would enjoy to hear how.

Clark addressed the second point I was going to make.

Interesting that the Holy Spirit changes our hearts, not our heads. It's non-rational both ways because our irrationality is what makes us human--it's part of the image of God.

Irrationality is part of the image of God? Can you please elaborate on this. I would disagree, given that truth and knowledge ("God is a god of knowledge") are generally considered good things; and irrationality is antithetical to them.

I cannot disprove this statement, but neither can it be proved. It's poor grounding.

If you believe that men ought to believe that the Bible is the Word of God without its being proven evidentially, then it would seem that the statement is proved, correct?

As a Reformed Christian, I would agree with Van Til and Clark that ultimately it is the Holy Spirit who does the convincing. However, they do reduce apologetics to practical fideism (in Van Til's case) and skepticism (Clark). That is, Van Til may deny the claim that he is a fideist, but he leaves no logical reason to believe from common ground. If all truth really is God's truth, then he ought to be using arguments from common sense to prove that it's true.

Are you aware of Van Til's distinction between metaphysical and epistemological common ground -- or as I prefer to call them, actual and espoused common ground?

My job as an apologist is to give the non-Christian no excuse for not believing. It is not to simply tear down presuppositions (for an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions--I believe it's called inductive logic) but to present a rational alternative with good reasoning behind it. If proper reasoning presupposes God, then there is no harm in proving His existence, given that the reasoning process itself presupposes His existence.

1. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions, and your labeling it as inductive logic does not help me. Can you perhaps give an example?

2. A presuppositionalist would agree that proper reasoning presupposes God -- therefore it follows that reasoning that does not presuppose God is improper! (If proper reason, then God; ~God; therefore ~proper reason.) Hence a Van Tillian will call out the unbeliever on his false assumptions.

Depends what is meant by knowledge. If it's absolute indubitable intellectual certainty, then obviously the unbeliever does not have knowledge, since he has no intellectual assent.

He must have some amount of intellectual assent, given that he suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. One cannot suppress something without possessing it, and one cannot possess a truth without some sort of intellectual assent to it.

If I argue to theism, to trinitarianism, and then to Christianity, it seems that I am arguing for the God of the Scriptures. Anselm of Canterbury demonstrated such a method quite well in his writings.

The problems of this methodology are twofold: (1) If you begin by telling the unbeliever that his principles and assumptions regarding reality are not flawed at the outset, then you cannot consistently tell them they are flawed at the conclusion; it is impossible to tell an unbeliever at the beginning "reason does not necessarily presuppose God" and then tell him at the conclusion "reason necessarily presupposes God." (2) You will never get near the end of such a method if you have an unbeliever who is anywhere near consistent in his unbelief. The conclusions at each step are far too malleable.

I would be curious as to how you prove trinitarianism on top of theism, though.

This is, to my mind, both the strength and the weakness of the presuppositional method. On the one hand, it can tear down strongholds of unbelief, but on the other hand, it is beyond the scope of an apologist to tear down every possible stronghold. There are always more options.

I would disagree...there aren't that many flavors of unbelief today. If you tear down evolutionism, then you've just disproven the view of a vast majority of unbelievers in America. And there's only so much to the history of philosophy. And there are many similarities between different schools of unbelief. Etc.

Islam is an internally consistent set of propositions--but it falls apart when it is shown up against the light of reality (not to mention history).

There is still a sense in which presuppositionalism deals with external consistency, though not to the extent that classical apologetics does. I hope this thread can be of some help.

For example, I use the modal ontological argument (which Kant failed to even address--possibly because he didn't know of its existence) to prove the presuppositional point that God's existence is self-evident from the very concept of God.

I have not yet studied Plantinga's modal ontological argument for God, so I will reserve judgment on anything specific about that. But I can say that such an argument does not make God's existence self-evident. (It is self-evident, but not for that reason.) For a proposition to be self-evident, it must be the case that upon understanding what a proposition means (not exhaustively), the person believes it. Therefore, the soundness of the modal ontological argument would not make "God exists" self-evident. No argument can possibly make a proposition self-evident.

for even God is not purely rational (God is love and love is not logical)

If you attempted to lay this out in syllogistic form, you would see that you're committing a fallacy of equivocation. The "love" that is signified when predicated of God and the "love" that is signified in "love is not logical" are different.

 

[Whitefield]

We cannot come to absolute certainty in a purely rational manner--for even God is not purely rational (God is love and love is not logical). We can, however, come to reasonable certainty.

Interesting syllogism: (modus ponens)

G is L
L is ~l
therefore G is ~l

.... in other words ....

God is love,
love is not logical,
therefore God is not logical.

Is that the conclusion you want to assert? If not, then one of the premises has to be rejected.

As Ben points out: the equivocation leads to the assertion: God is illogical love.

 

[harvelljr]

I am going to post a response, even though I know that you all are over my head in this discussion, yet I will still speak, though I guess a fool ought to stay quite sometimes:

Presuppositional apologetics was a good method to use, probably in the early church and onward for several centuries, this does not however, suppose that some did not argue from natural revelation.

The fact being that, then the main apologies were written against other monotheistic religions, such as Judaism and Islam. But as Avery Cardinal Dulles so aptly put it in his "A History of Apologetics":

"Apologetics in the early modern period takes on a very different shape than it had had in earlier centuries. For the [Church] Fathers it was debate about the relative merits of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. For the medieval theologians, apologetics was a contest among the three great montheistic faiths--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--all of which appealed to historical revelation. But after the Renaissance, apologetics had to address thinkers who rejected revelation entirely and who in some cases denied the existence and knowability of God. For the first time in history, orthodox Christians felt constrained to prove the existence of God and the possibility and fact of revelation."

[Before I go any further I want to say that I know Avery Cardinal Dulles is a Catholic, but I am reading this history written by him, for an assignment that I was given through Ligonier ministries].

Today we live in a society that does not hold the scriptures as authoritive, matter of fact there are many Pastors who do not believe that the scriptures are the inpsired word of God, which is a sad fact indeed.

But I see apologetics arguing between two positions up through its history. It has developed as the doctrine of soteriology has by being caught between several views. Just as the doctrine of salvation has been in dispute between Pelagianism and Augustinism or Semi-Pelagianism [Arminianism, Catholicism]and Calvinism, even so apologetics has been caught between the views of reason and faith. Yet there are some that believe that we have a reasonable faith.

In my study of apologetics I have found that the Bible gives reasonable or historical evidences for believing in Christ. There is eye witness testimony, the proofs from fulfilled prophecies, miracles, and the fact of the resurrection. I see this because I am saved. I see this because I have faith in God. But there are millions living in today's society that have been taught that there is no God or that this world has come into being by itself.

I asked my neice the other week a question from science and then showed how the Bible refutes what science believes in that area, yet she still believed what the schools told her because that is what she has been taught.

Therefore for one to use presuppositional apologetics is, if you were to ask me, a circular argument or uses circular reasoning. Presuppositionalism in today's society is a method that tries to convince men that the Bible is true because it it says it is true, when those same men do not believe in the authority of the scriptures but rather in the authority of science, the schools, etc...

So now we argue from the same method that has been one of the methods used up through the history of apologetics and that is the method of reason. We show that we have a rational, logical faith. We show that science is secular science is wrong and that Christian science is right and is gaining grounds if not excelling those who argue from evolutionary beliefs. This is the reason my neice could argue that the teacher was right because she has been indoctrinated and not educated. We have to realize that what we are debating is a religion in and of itself, but this religion has no god, nor does it have proofs to back it up, only vain beliefs.

This being because man has suppressed the truth of scripture. Man does not want God to exist. Ben asked a question earlier:

"However, what I was saying is that any proofs of a Creator-Judge (e.g. the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God) necessarily fall short of bringing people to repentance. And if apologetics is incapable of that, then it is failing in its purpose of silencing the unbeliever. Such apologetics would tell the unbeliever that he is generally right in his worldview, because honestly those arguments prove next to nothing. (E.g. a secular humanist can view man as the "divine" Lawgiver and matter itself as the First Cause.)"

If Ben expects apologetics to bring people to repentance, then he is practising a futile art. Apologetics does not bring men to repentance, this is the purpose of the word of God and the work of the Holy Spirit. But apologetics is used to defend the faith of Christianity from attacks from outside the Christian faith. Therefore, if someone states that this world is eternal, then I can show from science that this world is going to end. By using the laws of themodynamics that shows that the amount of usable energy is winding down and will com to an end one day. Then as I silence the unbeliever from the stance of natural reason, I have the opportunity to give him the very word of the living God and to make an impact on him with scripture.

You see most today think that science has put to silence the scriptures and has proved that the Bible is not true.

One day I used the method of showing an unbeliever the historical reliability of the scriptures through manuscript evidence. Did this convert him? No. But he did start reading the Bible and matter fact read it all the way through and would even come ask questions while he was reading it, but unfortunately he still is not born again.

You see there are no atheist. People may claim atheism, but they no in the heart that God exist and they surpress that truth in order to live the way they want to without having to be accountable to anyone.

Maybe I should not have spoken up but I want to say that Classical apologetics is a good method to use, but if we are looking for new births through apologetics then we have the wrong views because it is only through the preaching of the word that men are born again, but apologetics helps us get our foot in the door in order that we might present that word.

 

[Confessor]

The fact being that, then the main apologies were written against other monotheistic religions, such as Judaism and Islam. But as Avery Cardinal Dulles so aptly put it in his "A History of Apologetics":

"Apologetics in the early modern period takes on a very different shape than it had had in earlier centuries. For the [Church] Fathers it was debate about the relative merits of paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. For the medieval theologians, apologetics was a contest among the three great montheistic faiths--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--all of which appealed to historical revelation. But after the Renaissance, apologetics had to address thinkers who rejected revelation entirely and who in some cases denied the existence and knowability of God. For the first time in history, orthodox Christians felt constrained to prove the existence of God and the possibility and fact of revelation."

Thanks for the quotation. What he says doesn't really make a problem for presuppositionalism; in fact, it helps it out. Part of presuppositionalism is stressing the fact that without the starting point of divine revelation from God, we cannot understand the world. Presup involves arguing that the only possibility of knowledge is built on divine revelation. And, if presup is successful, a stronger argument for revelation cannot be made.

I asked my neice the other week a question from science and then showed how the Bible refutes what science believes in that area, yet she still believed what the schools told her because that is what she has been taught.

I don't doubt that she ought to have accepted the Biblical testimony immediately (because it is the Word of God whether she likes it or not). However, please keep in mind that presup is not simply "This is what the Bible says, and if you disagree you're wrong." Rather, in your niece example, a presuppositionalist might have shown her how depending on science and its autonomous presuppositions is nonsensical -- In other words,, showing her that her choice to trust the authority of atheistic scientists rather than the authority of God's Word leads to the destruction of knowledge.

I hope you can see from this example that presuppositionalism is not circular in any fallacious sense.

This being because man has suppressed the truth of scripture. Man does not want God to exist. Ben asked a question earlier:

If Ben expects apologetics to bring people to repentance, then he is practising a futile art. Apologetics does not bring men to repentance, this is the purpose of the word of God and the work of the Holy Spirit.

I of course agree with you that apologetics per se does not bring anyone to repentance. My point is that if apologetics does not/cannot give the unbelievers reasons why he ought to repent, then it fails in its purpose.

One day I used the method of showing an unbeliever the historical reliability of the scriptures through manuscript evidence. Did this convert him? No. But he did start reading the Bible and matter fact read it all the way through and would even come ask questions while he was reading it, but unfortunately he still is not born again.

I am glad this occurred, but honestly the only reason I can say it did occur is because the atheist was inconsistent in his unbelief. Historical reliability, while it is useful and has its place (usually in "defensive" apologetics), simply does not entail truthfulness, nor does it entail divine authorship. Were God not to restrain the man's unbelief, the unbeliever would have (rationally) continued about his life without caring about historical reliability.

Furthermore, I would say you were arguing as an inconsistent presuppositionalist. A presupper, if he were to use historical evidences as a means of "offensive apologetics" (though I never would because the conclusions can too easily be interpreted away by the unbeliever, as I've seen done), would essentially argue, "Given Biblical authority, this historical evidence makes good sense; given non-Biblical authority, this historical evidence doesn't really make good sense." In other words,, the presupper would argue for Biblical authority (1) as a "package deal" and (2) not as a mere conclusion, but a starting point -- the unbeliever has to look through the lens of Scripture to make sense of anything.

While this might sound bold or arrogant, I would go so far as to say that all successful evidentialists are inconsistent presuppositionalists (just as all saved Arminians are inconsistent Calvinists).

 

[harvelljr]

As I have shown, I was merely giving observations mainly from experience. I have studied apologetics some, but now more in-depth concerning the historical aspects and the arguments between faith and reason, so though you have made some good points I will concede that I would not even know where in the world to begin my defense against it.

I just know that R. C. Sproul is a Classical apologist and that I am a big fan of his and follow his teachings. Who knows, though, I might after coming to more perfect knowledge, reject the classical approach.

However, towards your last comment: I never stated that the unbeliever that I used manuscript evidence on was an atheist, but only an unbeliever.

 

[Philip]

As Ben points out: the equivocation leads to the assertion: God is illogical love.

My argument was badly phrased. However, I think I do need to make a distinction between illogic and non-logic. Love is not necessarily illogical, but is never completely logical. Show me a good logical reason why a just God would love and choose to save sinners (for He does not need them for any reason) and I'll show you Arminianism.

First, as Clark and Beth have surely had at the back of their minds when they asked what a "presuppositional Thomist" was, I'm fairly certain that such a term is an oxymoron.

It means, in essence, that no worldview or set of presuppositions is self-contained or completely disconnected from general revelation and therefore, general revelation may be used to lead a person to Scriptural revelation.

Irrationality is part of the image of God? Can you please elaborate on this. I would disagree, given that truth and knowledge ("God is a god of knowledge") are generally considered good things; and irrationality is antithetical to them.

I said non-rational not irrational. It is irrational for me to go jump off a cliff right now. It is non-rational for me to jump off a diving board right now. I have no logical reason to jump off a diving board, but I have every logical reason to avoid jumping off a cliff. One acts based on emotion (e.g. jumping off a diving board is fun) while the other acts against knowledge (jumping off a cliff will get me killed).

If you believe that men ought to believe that the Bible is the Word of God without its being proven evidentially, then it would seem that the statement is proved, correct?

The Bible is its own evidence--if interpreted correctly. The trouble is that nonbelievers bring their presuppositions to the text and are therefore blind to it.

Are you aware of Van Til's distinction between metaphysical and epistemological common ground -- or as I prefer to call them, actual and espoused common ground?

No, I hadn't. However, I would hesitate to draw that distinction for this reason: whatever actual common ground there is must, under presuppositionalism, be interpreted. If I come to the Bible with higher critical presuppositions, then I will interpret accordingly. My education has prevented me from seeing reality.

However, once the walls of higher criticism have been torn down, there is a problem. How do I approach the Bible? If I do not interpret, then it will make no sense, since interpretation is making sense of something. I must therefore be given a good reason to adopt a certain framework for interpretation.

I'm not sure what you mean when you say that an invalid set of presuppositions can lead to true conclusions, and your labeling it as inductive logic does not help me. Can you perhaps give an example?

Certainly:

1: Balls are round
2: Round things are not flat
3: Therefore the world is round

Obviously invalid, yet the conclusion is true.

Inductive logic is always invalid deductively. Example:

1: CNN said that Barack Obama is President of the United States
2: CNN is generally a reliable source for this kind of fact
3: Therefore Barack Obama is President of the United States

Not valid, but true nevertheless.

A presuppositionalist would agree that proper reasoning presupposes God -- therefore it follows that reasoning that does not presuppose God is improper! (If proper reason, then God; ~God; therefore ~proper reason.) Hence a Van Tillian will call out the unbeliever on his false assumptions.

1) if A then B
2) B
3) Therefore A

Fallacious. Proper reasoning presupposes God, but simply assuming God does not guarantee proper reasoning. Karl Barth believed in God and rejected reason altogether.

I would argue that since all proper reasoning presupposes God a) all who reason properly presuppose God, even unconsciously. I do not expect to meet Plato in Heaven, but his reasoning is, on occasion, flawless. b) an apologist may therefore use reasoning. Did Anselm presuppose God in the Proslogion? Yes, because he reasoned properly and reached a true conclusion (God exists).

There is still a sense in which presuppositionalism deals with external consistency, though not to the extent that classical apologetics does.

In theory--but rarely in practice. Logical consistency proves little, as I said before.

"Twas brillig and the slithey toves,
Did gyre and gymbol in the wabe,
All mimsy were the borogroves,
And the mome-wraths outgrabe." ~Lewis Carroll

Perfectly logical and internally consistent--and also complete nonsense. All that logic can show is that a set of presuppositions is internally consistent. It says nothing about the truth of those presuppositions.

If you begin by telling the unbeliever that his principles and assumptions regarding reality are not flawed at the outset, then you cannot consistently tell them they are flawed at the conclusion

If certain of them were not correct, there would be no argument. You have already said that proper reasoning presupposes God, so if I reason properly, then I have already presupposed God and he, in reasoning with me, is presupposing God. Argument is God's ground.

I think C. S. Lewis's fictional devil Screwtape summed it up nicely (in his twisted way):

"It sounds as if you supposed that argument was the way to keep him out of the Enemy's [God's] clutches . . . The trouble with argument is that it moves the whole struggle on to the Enemy's own ground. He can argue too; whereas in really practical propaganda of the kind I am suggesting He has been shown for centuries to be greatly the inferior of Our Father Below. By the very act of arguing, you awake the patient's reason . . . Even if a particular train of thought can be twisted so as to end in our favour, you will find that you have been strengthening in your patient the fatal habit of attending to universal issues and withrawing his attention from the stream of immediate sense experiences . . . Do remember you are there to fuddle him."

He must have some amount of intellectual assent, given that he suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. One cannot suppress something without possessing it, and one cannot possess a truth without some sort of intellectual assent to it.

I think the suppression could be termed as "willful ignorance."

You will never get near the end of such a method if you have an unbeliever who is anywhere near consistent in his unbelief.

If he won't believe, that's between Him and God. I'm just the messenger. As I also recall, Lewis (who is, by the grace of God, now a Calvinist) did it quite well in Mere Christianity (granted, his logic was inductive--but I have considered his moral argument for the existence of God as an alternative to the ontological).

I would be curious as to how you prove trinitarianism on top of theism, though.

Work on that argument is in progress and is tied up in the metaphysical debate between pluralism and monism.

But I can say that such an argument does not make God's existence self-evident.

To an extent, I argee with you. God's existence would be self-evident without argument. However, the argument leaves no loopholes for denying such to be the case.

If you attempted to lay this out in syllogistic form, you would see that you're committing a fallacy of equivocation.

As stated above, it was badly worded on my part.

 

[Whitefield]

As Ben points out: the equivocation leads to the assertion: God is illogical love.

Show me a good logical reason why a just God would love and choose to save sinners (for He does not need them for any reason) and I'll show you Arminianism.

His choosing logically fit with "the most wise and holy counsel of his own will."

 

[Confessor]

I said non-rational not irrational. It is irrational for me to go jump off a cliff right now. It is non-rational for me to jump off a diving board right now. I have no logical reason to jump off a diving board, but I have every logical reason to avoid jumping off a cliff. One acts based on emotion (e.g. jumping off a diving board is fun) while the other acts against knowledge (jumping off a cliff will get me killed).

A lot of distinctions could be made here, but as long as we agree that God is not irrational we are in good shape.

The Bible is its own evidence--if interpreted correctly. The trouble is that nonbelievers bring their presuppositions to the text and are therefore blind to it.

Yes, so therefore we critique the unbeliever's presuppositions rather than reason from them.

No, I hadn't. However, I would hesitate to draw that distinction for this reason: whatever actual common ground there is must, under presuppositionalism, be interpreted.

The distinction that Van Til makes is that if the believer and unbeliever were consistent in their principles, then neither would have any common ground at all. The unbeliever would know nothing at all, not even that he knows nothing! That is the espoused common ground, and it is what the apologist tries to point out by hypothetically drawing out the implications of unbelief.

The actual common ground is what common ground actually exists because God in His grace restrains the unbeliever from being entirely consistent in his unbelief. In terms of polemical apologetics (i.e., critiquing the unbeliever's presupposition), these would be the "immutable facts" that I mentioned in the external consistency thread.

Take an example of this distinction: the unbeliever might assume that a providential God is not behind every fact. As a result, he would believe that Chance is. If he believes that Chance is behind every fact, then it would follow that universal, prescriptive laws of logic would not be able to exist in his worldview (this is the lack of espoused common ground). However, he does believe in universal, prescriptive laws of logic -- in fact, he can't help but believe in them. The "immutable fact" (from the external consistency thread) that laws of logic exist is an instance of actual common ground. It is the "bridge" so to speak that the presuppositionalist uses to launch a polemic on the unbeliever. Actual common ground are those beliefs held in common despite and not because of his unbelieving presupposition.

As a result of this distinction, which is quite crucial to presuppositionalism, you can see that saying something like "whatever actual common ground there is must, under presuppositionalism, be interpreted" is not a hindrance at all to presup. We show unbelievers that the actual common ground can be interpreted according to unbelieving presuppositions, except that doing so would destroy knowledge.

Certainly:

1: Balls are round
2: Round things are not flat
3: Therefore the world is round

Obviously invalid, yet the conclusion is true.

Inductive logic is always invalid deductively. Example:

1: CNN said that Barack Obama is President of the United States
2: CNN is generally a reliable source for this kind of fact
3: Therefore Barack Obama is President of the United States

Not valid, but true nevertheless.

Okay, I understand that. But why is that a problem with presuppositionalism?

1) if A then B
2) B
3) Therefore A

Fallacious. Proper reasoning presupposes God, but simply assuming God does not guarantee proper reasoning. Karl Barth believed in God and rejected reason altogether.

I'm sorry if I didn't make myself clear, but by ~God, I meant "not-God." My argument was therefore a valid structure, modus tollens: If proper reason, then God; not-God; therefore not-proper reason.

And Karl Barth was wrong. He did not assume the God of the Bible, but some dream concoction of Him. (A key tenet of presuppositionalism is to note that we are not arguing for some generic theism, but for Biblical Christianity at every point. When a presupper says, "God exists," that means the same thing as "The Bible is true.")

an apologist may therefore use reasoning.

I think you might be misunderstanding presup. We do not argue against "reasoning." We argue against reasoning from the basis of unbelieving presuppositions (assuming that God is not necessarily the providential organizer of the universe, assuming that laws of logic are self-existent rather than necessarily created by God, etc.).

In theory--but rarely in practice. Logical consistency proves little, as I said before.

No offense, but did you read that thread? I personally think it is monumental as far as presuppositionalism goes. I struggled for a long time in understanding how presup is not a "dream system" dealing only with internal consistencies, yet avoiding the flaws in evidentialism pointed out by presup. I struggled to provide a fusion between the two. I thought I found a good balance, and that is the thread I posted to you. Please read it if you don't mind.

If certain of them were not correct, there would be no argument.

Yes, that is why presuppers don't allow argument on autonomous presuppositions -- there is no argument that can proceed from them. The fact that some people continue to reason autonomously does not somehow show that the autonomous presupposition is correct!

You have already said that proper reasoning presupposes God, so if I reason properly, then I have already presupposed God and he, in reasoning with me, is presupposing God. Argument is God's ground.

This begs the question. You are assuming that you're reasoning properly and then saying that you must be presupposing God. As for "argument is God's ground," I agree; but it doesn't follow that argument from any presupposition is legit.

I think the suppression could be termed as "willful ignorance."

It depends on what you mean by "ignore." If you mean an ignorance that does not involve some acknowledgment of the truth, then I would disagree. Again, it does not make sense to say that one is suppressing a truth that one does not possess in some sense.

If he won't believe, that's between Him and God. I'm just the messenger.

No, that's not the point I was making. I realize that the unbeliever can just close his eyes to the whole apologetical endeavor -- that applies equally well to presup. But what I am critiquing is the fact that classical apologetics cannot actually yield an argument for the truthfulness of Christianity. It just can't happen. It's impossible to start by telling the unbeliever "your belief that God is not necessarily sovereign over reasoning is fine" and end by telling him that it's not fine. If God is sovereign over reasoning at the end, He's sovereign at the beginning. And our apologetics should reflect that.

 

[Philip]

Yes, so therefore we critique the unbeliever's presuppositions rather than reason from them.

Here's where I think we differ: no set of presuppositions is completely disconnected from reality. Therefore, every set of presuppositions contains some truth, however twisted and perverted it may be. The apologist may seize upon that truth and argue from it.

The distinction that Van Til makes is that if the believer and unbeliever were consistent in their principles, then neither would have any common ground at all.

Yes they would. Consistent Islam and consistent Christianity do have common ground: I do not argue the existence of God with a Muslim, but the nature of God.

The only case that might be made for such a position is that of Friedrich Nietzche who actually lived consistently with Atheism: he went insane. There is no arguing with an insane person. If there is no common ground, then there is no apologetic whatsoever.

The actual common ground is what common ground actually exists because God in His grace restrains the unbeliever from being entirely consistent in his unbelief.

Consistent Islam would still contain elements of God's truth (seeing as it is a Christian heresy). There is consistency outside of Christianity.

Take an example of this distinction: the unbeliever might assume that a providential God is not behind every fact. As a result, he would believe that Chance is. If he believes that Chance is behind every fact, then it would follow that universal, prescriptive laws of logic would not be able to exist in his worldview (this is the lack of espoused common ground).

The laws of logic do not "exist" in any ordinary sense: they are merely true descriptions of the way things must necessarily be. Even chance would operate according to the laws of logic, since chance could still not produce B and ~B at the same time. The laws of logic are true regardless of any other factor.

In reading through your writing, I came across this:

I believe I have found it, and the answer is what I term to be primary interpretations. Primary interpretations are interpretations which have not yet gone through the filter of our presuppositions and therefore cannot yet be distorted by our depravity.

Any interpretation is in itself a product of presuppositions. There are no "primary interpretations" in your sense for the simple reason that if there is an interpretation, then it must have been filtered already. Interpretation entails presupposition. At best, "Primary interpretations" are in themselves presuppositions.

Although the unbeliever naturally sees all facts through his yellow glasses, there is a point at which God’s grace restrains him from distorting some facts, and it is those points which we attack.

What I would argue is that the grace of God keeps those yellow glasses from being a complete distortion. Somehow God's truth manages to sneak into every set of presuppositions.

This begs the question. You are assuming that you're reasoning properly and then saying that you must be presupposing God. As for "argument is God's ground," I agree; but it doesn't follow that argument from any presupposition is legit.

Granted, but argument from any true presupposition is legit.

It depends on what you mean by "ignore." If you mean an ignorance that does not involve some acknowledgment of the truth, then I would disagree. Again, it does not make sense to say that one is suppressing a truth that one does not possess in some sense.

In a very loose sense, I suppose. I would call it suppressing the truth to deny that eating a hamburger is bad for me even though I refuse to look at the calorie count. I don't have knowledge of the truth, but I could, and still refuse to look for it.

But what I am critiquing is the fact that classical apologetics cannot actually yield an argument for the truthfulness of Christianity. It just can't happen. It's impossible to start by telling the unbeliever "your belief that God is not necessarily sovereign over reasoning is fine" and end by telling him that it's not fine. If God is sovereign over reasoning at the end, He's sovereign at the beginning. And our apologetics should reflect that.

But if I was saying that his belief that God is not necessarily sovereign is fine, then I wouldn't argue the point. My arguing the point proves that I don't think it's fine. If I thought your presuppositionalism was fine, I wouldn't be arguing it.

Incidentally, I find it rather interesting that no presuppositionalist considers the modal ontological argument to be valid, despite the fact that it can only argue for the Christian God, as He is the Greatest Possible Being (the first premise of the argument). It's possibly because few realize that Anselm had two arguments (even Kant completely overlooked the modal argument). This is the presuppositionalist's dream: an argument for God's existence that presupposes His sovereignty and can only be talking about the Christian God.

 

[chbrooking]

Philip,
I'm basically an observer to the conversation. I am most definitely a presuppositionalist. Ben is doing a find job of representing the position. So I won't pile on, except to point out that Islam and Christianity share nothing. Christianity does not have a non-immanent monad as its God. That is, we do not share belief in the existence of God, because the very term must contain its definition. To say that we share belief in the existence of God is to equivocate on the term God.

Incidentally, one of Islam's core tenets (presuppositions) is that nothing which might be said of God may be said of man and vice versa. But that precludes revelation completely. Their system is internally inconsistent.

 

[Philip]

Islam and Christianity share nothing. Christianity does not have a non-immanent monad as its God. That is, we do not share belief in the existence of God, because the very term must contain its definition. To say that we share belief in the existence of God is to equivocate on the term God.

Then I will rephrase--we agree on the existence of a God. It is the nature of that God that we are debating. It's quibbling to suggest that such a debate is a debate over God's existence: we are debating precisely whether God is a non-immanent monad. I don't argue for the existence of God with a Muslim for the same reason that I don't argue the divinity of Christ with a Catholic.

The Muslim already believes that God exists--I am merely proving that God is not who the Muslim thinks Him to be. I am arguing, in fact, that the non-immanent monad is not the greatest possible being and therefore cannot be God.

Incidentally, one of Islam's core tenets (presuppositions) is that nothing which might be said of God may be said of man and vice versa. But that precludes revelation completely. Their system is internally inconsistent.

Actually, that inconsistency is (paradoxically) consistent. Since Islam denies reason utterly, it would be inconsistent for it to be consistent. Thus, it is actually consistent.