Presuppositionalism Q&A

[chbrooking]

Okay, I see your point. I suppose I can leave it at that.

But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say. I cannot use the term "God", since an unbeliever may have a different conception of that. I can't use the term "creation" for the same reason. I can't use the term "logic" or "reason" or "proof". Come to think of it, I cannot use ANY term without issuing the disclaimer that I'm using that term with the assumption of Christian theism behind it. Perhaps that would be a good thing. Who knows what it would do for evangelism?

But seriously. I cannot make any claim on an autonomous foundation. And if the unbeliever starts in on me after making what is a TRUE claim (impossibility of the contrary), thinking that my claim does not rise to his autonomous notion of the possible, then we have a good starting point for our discussion. I guess I'm trying to say: Why do we have to guard our language, when we're the only ones using language right?

 

[Confessor]

But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say. I cannot use the term "God", since an unbeliever may have a different conception of that. I can't use the term "creation" for the same reason. I can't use the term "logic" or "reason" or "proof". Come to think of it, I cannot use ANY term without issuing the disclaimer that I'm using that term with the assumption of Christian theism behind it. Perhaps that would be a good thing. Who knows what it would do for evangelism?

I don't think that would be an implication. This is a special case in which saying "Christianity is necessary" is an example of an attempted "trans-worldview" statement. If you say that, you are necessarily stepping outside the bounds of a Christian presupposition and thereby attempting to posit an autonomous claim. In fact, saying "Christianity is necessary" is a tautology if it must be stated on a Christian presupposition; therefore for it not to be tautological it must be used autonomously -- quite a dilemma.

Consequently, I now propose we drop the talk of Christianity being necessary. On Christian presuppositions it is trivial; on non-Christian presuppositions it is false. We should only mention that whatever worldview the unbeliever offers can and will be defeated. Once we start talking about things that the unbeliever does not necessarily have to offer (e.g. "All non-Christian worldviews fail" rather than "All proposed non-Christian worldviews can be shown to fail"), we start talking autonomously thereby betraying our position.

 

[chbrooking]

Yes, as I use it, it is a tautology (I don't regard that as a problem). I can see what you mean about its usefulness, or lack thereof.

I'm not sure I'm willing to abandon it, however. I don't see why I must. It is true. I'm the one using language correctly. The fact that it leads to misunderstanding -- or the wasting of valuable time put elsewhere, MAY persuade me. On the other hand, I'm not sure that your statement in its lieu is definitive enough -- maybe I'm just wanting something a little more, I don't know, "in your face." Maybe that's wrong. I've got to think about it.

At any rate, I think we are in agreement on foundations and method -- even if not on the formulation of the argument at the start.

Where does that put Brian and Philip, who were politely silent while we hand an internecine battle

From Brian's last post, does that mean he's on our side of this debate? I don't see how, since when he last spoke, he still seemed to be talking about brute possibility.

What say you Brian? What say you Philip?
Are we all in agreement yet? I hope so. I'm not getting NEARLY enough work done.

*****
Incidentally, though. Wouldn't a trans-worldview statement require epistemological common ground? I'm still wrestling with this. I'm just not sure I can agree that my language must be constructed as if it were brute, when it's not -- nor can it be. I'll think about it.

 

[Philip]

First, if I get off-track here, I apologize--I always look for connections between ideas and possible consequences. I see everything as interconnected, which means that I go off on rabbit trails (I'm still doing some research into historical roots and fruits of presuppositionalism, fyi--I didn't realize Doug Wilson was a presuppositionalist).

Clark,

I think that when we are talking of possibility, we are always talking in terms of what we as humans can conceive--that is, the finite. I think that we can pass judgment within this realm over whether spherical cubes, unicorns, horses, etc can or cannot exist. Where we cannot talk of possibility is the realm where God is: that is, the infinite. There may be glimpses here and there (e.g. the numinous), but no rational comprehension (and this is where I take issue with Gordon Clark).

I do think, though, that there needs to be a distinction between how we know and why we know. How we know, which is epistemology's main focus, deals with the exact means by which we know things. For example, I know that Barack Obama is president because I read it in the news; I know that it didn't rain today because I have eyes and ears. In other words, epistemology deals with two questions: what is knowledge? and how do we know what we know?

Van Til, though, was answering the question of why we know what we know. In other words, what accounts for the reliability of the senses, rationality, etc? His epistemology, therefore, focused so much on God as the source of rationality, that it ended up answering the other questions (I think) wrongly (I think there's a whole historical thing that goes with it, but I'll save it for later).

I would also say that Christianity is necessarily true, but for different reasons.

1. Any absolute system of thought is either absolutely true (ie: every aspect of it is true) or absolutely false.
2. Christianity is an absolute system of thought.
3. Aspects of Christianity are true.
4. Christianity is absolutely true.

Brian, a critique?

But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say.

Here I think you've reached one of many logical conclusions of presuppositionalism (others that I won't go into, but that I know you disagree with). If we are to communicate at all with the unbeliever, we do have to do it on his terms, not ours. It's God's business to dictate the terms of salvation, etc to him, not the business of the apologist.

It wouldn't have been a good idea for Paul to have spoken in Aramaic or Hebrew in Athens because the Athenian philosophers spoke Greek. Likewise, we can't speak Christianese to the unbeliever because it will confuse him further.

 

[chbrooking]

So we should speak atheist??? There's no such thing as neutralese.

By the by, the not so subtle reference to Wilson should be brought forward for what it is . I'm surprised that you would try such a sophistic ploy. Bahnsen was a theonomist. I'm not. Wilson is a FV proponent. I'm not. You're not going down a slippery slope or guilt by association road are you? (not that I'm equating theonomy with FV either -- for those of you out there who might be offended.)

What do you mean by absolute? What's an aspect? What's the standard of truth?

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Gentlemen,

A lot of dialogue has taken place. I am way behind.

What say you Brian?

Clark, let me quote something from a recent post of yours and from Ben’s last post.

I guess I'm trying to say: Why do we have to guard our language, when we're the only ones using language right?

When you make the claim that “we’re the only ones using language right,” then you have just assumed the burden of proving this if you want the claim to be more than assertion. Now, it is no bother for me to say to an unbeliever it is assertion; yet, I am more than happy to give reasons why I believe it is true. So, this will take it beyond mere assertion, but my reasons in the end do not constitute an objectively certain proof. Rather, my reasons provide rational justification for believing the claim to be true. But for some reason a lot of TAG proponents find this to be anathema, and want to speak of these things as if they have an objectively certain proof. (Actually, I think the main reason they find this to be anathema is they harshly criticize other apologetic methods that only provide rational justification. They do not want to be the kettle calling the pot black – so to speak.) So, for this group of people (the Strong Modal TAG guys), I ask them to show me their objectively certain proof. In all my years discussing these things no one has been able to rise to the challenge. Normally, they present arguments as to why they don’t have to, and then claim they did.

Consequently, I now propose we drop the talk of Christianity being necessary. On Christian presuppositions it is trivial; on non-Christian presuppositions it is false…Once we start talking about things that the unbeliever does not necessarily have to offer (e.g. "All non-Christian worldviews fail" rather than "All proposed non-Christian worldviews can be shown to fail"), we start talking autonomously thereby betraying our position.

I think Ben gets this right. So, Clark, if you agree with this, then we have found common ground. If this is the case, then we should start another thread and explore the consequences of this. I think that discussion would be very edifying.

Warm Regards,

Brian

 

[chbrooking]

As you should be able to see from subsequent posts, I think we are in agreement. But I'm still not quite persuaded that we are wrong to use the strong language. Both you and Ben seem to be missing the point that when I use a term like "impossibility", I absolutely HAVE to use that term from my reference point. If the unbeliever misunderstands that, that is no different, really, than him misunderstanding my saying that Christianity is rational. He's going to say, "What! Rational! You call 1 is 3 and 3 is 1 rational!" I know that the term "impossible" will be misunderstood. So will the term "God". That's okay. That's what discussions are for. But he won't be able to make sense of what is, how you know, or how we ought to behave apart from the Christian worldview. He can try, but he will fail. Why? Because the Christian worldview is true.

I still do not see how my statement (which must be understood within my presuppositional framework to be understood truly) should put the onus on me to adopt an infinitie number of OTHER frameworks to try to disprove my position. As Ben noted, within my framework, my statement is so true, it's tautologous. If you'd like to bring a different framework to bear, and see if it holds up, feel free.

I'm not sure I know what you mean by modal TAG guys. I'm assuming you mean guys who use words like "impossibility of the contrary." And if your challenge is for me to adopt an autonomous view of possibility to prove a theonomous ontology and epistemology, I'll bet nobody has answered the call. It's an impossible one (not to mention unfair). But on my own framework, it makes sense. And I'd be happy to discuss other frameworks and how they fail.

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Philip,

I would also say that Christianity is necessarily true, but for different reasons.

1. Any absolute system of thought is either absolutely true (ie: every aspect of it is true) or absolutely false.
2. Christianity is an absolute system of thought.
3. Aspects of Christianity are true.
4. Christianity is absolutely true.

Brian, a critique?

Philip, I do not think the argument is sound. Change the term 'Christianity' to 'Judiasm'. The argument goes through. The problem is with premise 1. An absolute system of thought can have some aspects that are true and other aspects that are false.

Brian

 

[steven-nemes]

Philip, I do not think the argument is sound. Change the term 'Christianity' to 'Judiasm'. The argument goes through. The problem is with premise 1. An absolute system of thought can have some aspects that are true and other aspects that are false.

Brian

I think his point is that for the whole of a system of thought to be true, every individual assertion must be true. So, for Islam to be true, every individual critical assertion of Islam must be true. Islam can have some things right, like the universe being created by God, but if it has other things wrong, like the resurrection of Christ, then it is as a whole wrong.

 

[Confessor]

Clark,

If it's a tautology then it can't be useful. For if you tell an unbeliever that Christianity is necessary using a Christian notion of possibility and necessity, then you're really stating nothing about his worldview. If understood your statement as using an autonomous notion of possibility, then he could ask you to prove your claim (which would be impossible). If he understood your statement as using a Christian notion of possibility, then he would ask what that means for his worldview. And that that point you would say, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail." So, then, rather than going through the confusing and tautological nature of saying "Christianity is necessary," I think it would be wiser to immediately tell the unbeliever, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail."

Regarding that your statement was of a "trans-worldview" nature: I was just trying to say that using "Christianity is necessary" in an argumentatively meaningful (non-tautological) way would require that you attempt to posit epistemological common ground, in which case you'd be faking neutrality and being autonomous. In other words, I tried to say that "Christianity is necessary" is useful only if taken in a "trans-worldview" way, and the "trans-worldview" way would necessitate that it is autonomous. (By the way, this "trans-worldview" stuff is in essence the exact same thing we are discussing in the first paragraph of this post. It's not a separate issue at all.)

(not that I'm equating theonomy with FV either -- for those of you out there who might be offended.)

I would have been. I think Theonomy is a logical implication of epistemogical theonomy. But that's another topic.

----------

Philip,

I don't know if it's just my lack of exposure, but from what I have seen of Douglas Wilson, he is not much of a presuppositionalist. I saw him basically use the moral argument for God in an autonomous way.

Here I think you've reached one of many logical conclusions of presuppositionalism (others that I won't go into, but that I know you disagree with). If we are to communicate at all with the unbeliever, we do have to do it on his terms, not ours.

Here again comes the distinction between actual and espoused common ground. Christians and unbelievers will sometimes have identical meanings of certain terms superficially, but that will be in spite of the unbeliever's presupposition.

I would also say that Christianity is necessarily true, but for different reasons.

1. Any absolute system of thought is either absolutely true (ie: every aspect of it is true) or absolutely false.
2. Christianity is an absolute system of thought.
3. Aspects of Christianity are true.
4. Christianity is absolutely true.

I know you asked Brian, but I thought I might give my input:

First of all, if you mean to starkly separate systems of thought, so that an aspect of Christianity such as "the senses are reliable" cannot be used in any other worldview, then your syllogism would be valid but it would be tougher to prove. If you don't mean to starkly separate systems of thought (i.e. if there is espoused common ground), then your first premise is false, in that it is not the case that a false system must be false in every aspect (if that is what you implied). Otherwise, if you didn't imply that, then you would have a non sequitur, for you can't show that all aspects are true from the fact that some are.

 

[Philip]

By the by, the not so subtle reference to Wilson should be brought forward for what it is . I'm surprised that you would try such a sophistic ploy.

I'm not doing any guilt by association here. What I'm trying to figure out is the connection of why so many presupp folks end up as theonomists and why so many theonomists end up going toward Catholicism (I'm holding back on names here). The last thing I want is to go down a path that could lead in a direction that I don't like.

So we should speak atheist??? There's no such thing as neutralese

No, we should speak plain English, like everyone else. The problem I find with presuppositionalism is that it can't speak to the layman, only to the philosopher. Any apologetic that cannot be understood equally by a layman and an academic is useless. If you have to define every term so precisely, then you'll end up boring your audience to tears. An impractical apologetic is a useless apologetic.

As for my syllogism, I suppose I need to clarify the criteria for what I would call an "absolute system."

1. A claim to absolute exclusive truth.
2. No "out" for those who do not subscribe.
3. If any part of the whole is true, then the whole is true.

I submit that no worldview except Christianity satisfies these three criteria. Islam comes close, but it's hard to ignore the Koranic passages that prescribe the second level of heaven for "peoples of the book" (ie: Jews and Christians). In addition, in Islam, there is no certainty, due to Allah's nature.

Atheism is absolute, it could be argued, since it's a universal negative. Yet, in fact, atheism is not a system, but a proposition. Thus, it fails to meet my criteria.

I submit, that no other worldview is absolute. One should argue, not from the truth of Christianity (which begs the question) but from the uniqueness of Christianity and of Christ.

In fact, I wonder if we haven't been neglecting what should be the center of our apologetic: Christ himself. Who is Jesus? That's the question that the unbeliever has to answer.

 

[ChristianTrader]

But, and I think this is important. That would require that we clarify everything we say. I cannot use the term "God", since an unbeliever may have a different conception of that. I can't use the term "creation" for the same reason. I can't use the term "logic" or "reason" or "proof". Come to think of it, I cannot use ANY term without issuing the disclaimer that I'm using that term with the assumption of Christian theism behind it. Perhaps that would be a good thing. Who knows what it would do for evangelism?

I don't think that would be an implication. This is a special case in which saying "Christianity is necessary" is an example of an attempted "trans-worldview" statement. If you say that, you are necessarily stepping outside the bounds of a Christian presupposition and thereby attempting to posit an autonomous claim. In fact, saying "Christianity is necessary" is a tautology if it must be stated on a Christian presupposition; therefore for it not to be tautological it must be used autonomously -- quite a dilemma.

Consequently, I now propose we drop the talk of Christianity being necessary. On Christian presuppositions it is trivial; on non-Christian presuppositions it is false. We should only mention that whatever worldview the unbeliever offers can and will be defeated. Once we start talking about things that the unbeliever does not necessarily have to offer (e.g. "All non-Christian worldviews fail" rather than "All proposed non-Christian worldviews can be shown to fail"), we start talking autonomously thereby betraying our position.

But is not Paul's claim in Romans 1, one which should be construed as to apply to all people and their worldviews, Christian and non Christian?

I can have an excuse for not accepting your position even if I cannot rebut it as of right now or even ten years from now.

CT

-----Added 6/24/2009 at 09:09:35 EST-----

By the by, the not so subtle reference to Wilson should be brought forward for what it is . I'm surprised that you would try such a sophistic ploy.

I'm not doing any guilt by association here. What I'm trying to figure out is the connection of why so many presupp folks end up as theonomists and why so many theonomists end up going toward Catholicism (I'm holding back on names here). The last thing I want is to go down a path that could lead in a direction that I don't like.

Um, if you look at normal high level philosophy, you will find almost no orthodox Reformed people. So I do not see your point in critiquing presuppositionalism over and above the other viewpoints.

CT

 

[chbrooking]

Ben,

Once we have shown that the Christian theistic worldview does actually account for intelligibility, is not saying, "Any worldview that is not the Christian theistic worldview will fail to account for intelligibility" the functional equivalent of saying, "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility"?

And if so, isn't "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility" the same as "Christian theism is necessary." -- that is, if we grant that intelligibility is possible. And if it's not, why are we having this conversation?

 

[Philip]

Um, if you look at normal high level philosophy, you will find almost no orthodox Reformed people. So I do not see your point in critiquing presuppositionalism over and above the other viewpoints.

Sadly true. Things have sure changed since the days of R. L. Dabney, Jonathan Edwards, and Thomas Reid.

 

[Myshkin]

Confessor-

When you have the chance, considering this thread started as a Q&A on presuppositionalism in general, would you mind answering another (different) question or three?

1. Can you please demonstrate exactly why/how classical apologetics (CA hereafter) starts with "autonomy" ("self-law", or 'law-unto-oneself"), as presuppostionalism so often asserts?

-As one who takes the CA position, I fail to understand how CA acknowledging the truth of scripture(the "theonomic" starting point) in Romans 1 is "autonomy". If CA gets its view from scripture ("theonomy"), how is this "autonomy"?

2. May I ask from what sources you get your understanding of CA? This would be very helpful for me, because like most presuppostionalist statements of CA I hardly recognize CA for what it truly is. I know it is controversial to suggest, but I am of the opinion that Van Til exaggerated/misunderstood CA and built Presupp. on this faulty understanding. Everytime I find myself agreeing with a presupp. I think to myself "that is exactly what CA says and has always said". To twist a presupp. comment about unbelievers having any true knowledge, I would say: "any truth the presupp. position has it has borrowed from the very source it rejects (CA)."

-To be fair, my understanding of presupp. mostly comes from Van Til, Frame, Gordon Clark, and Sproul/Gerstner.

3. I learned in Logic class that a circular argument is a logical fallacy. Then I am exposed to Presupp. which says that all arguments are circular. I ask how can this be, and the answer isn't ever given to me in the form of "well, circular arguments are not logical fallacies", but rather "yes, presupp. is circular, but it is a glorious circle".

Am I being "autonomous" in my thinking that circular arguments are logical fallacies since this contradicts the presupp. ("theonomous") assertion that all arguments are circular?

Thanks.

 

[steven-nemes]

lol, "glorious circle"

 

[Confessor]

Just to let everyone know, I'm about to leave but I will respond to everything everyone has said since my last post later tonight.

 

[chbrooking]

CT,
I'm not sure I understand what you mean about Romans 1 and my position leaving the unbeliever with an 'out' based on the future. Could you elaborate.

 

[ChristianTrader]

CT,
I'm not sure I understand what you mean about Romans 1 and my position leaving the unbeliever with an 'out' based on the future. Could you elaborate.

My response was to a response to your post.

CT

 

[chbrooking]

Sorry, I still don't get it. Romans 1 is explicit that nobody has an excuse.

 

[Confessor]

Philip,

The problem I find with presuppositionalism is that it can't speak to the layman, only to the philosopher. Any apologetic that cannot be understood equally by a layman and an academic is useless.

Both classical and presuppositional apologetics can be either simple or complex. Have you seen William Lane Craig's new book on the theistic proofs? It's extremely in-depth. Mistaken, in my opinion, but in-depth nonetheless.

Also, regarding your revised syllogism, when you say, "If any part of the whole is true, then the whole is true," are you referring to the "vital" parts of Christianity, the parts that no other worldview would have, e.g. the resurrection? If so, I would agree, but I would have two observations: (1) it is no different from the typical evidential apologetic, and (2) it doesn't result in a necessary truth (unless this vital aspect can be proven with certainty).

----------

CT,

But is not Paul's claim in Romans 1, one which should be construed as to apply to all people and their worldviews, Christian and non Christian?

I can have an excuse for not accepting your position even if I cannot rebut it as of right now or even ten years from now.

If the unbeliever wants to just "hold out" for a future presupposition, then he must affirm an autonomous presupposition (one which makes such holding out intelligible). If the apologist is a good presuppositionalist, he will demonstrate that the unbeliever has no choice but to attempt to hold out while using a Christian presupposition to do so -- in which case he's not holding out at all.

----------

Clark,

Once we have shown that the Christian theistic worldview does actually account for intelligibility, is not saying, "Any worldview that is not the Christian theistic worldview will fail to account for intelligibility" the functional equivalent of saying, "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility"?

Those are equivalent, and I would reject both, because they both make claims about worldviews that the unbeliever is not obliged to offer in his own defense (the apologist would have to offer them), in which case the apologist's claim becomes either trivial or impossible to prove.

And if so, isn't "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility" the same as "Christian theism is necessary." -- that is, if we grant that intelligibility is possible. And if it's not, why are we having this conversation?

Both of those make implicit claims about worldviews that the unbeliever is not obliged to offer as well. When the apologist makes a claim, he has to ensure that he makes claims only about those worldviews that the unbeliever has to himself provide and put to the test.

----------

Allan,

Can you please demonstrate exactly why/how classical apologetics (CA hereafter) starts with "autonomy" ("self-law", or 'law-unto-oneself"), as presuppostionalism so often asserts?

Autonomy is the idea that oneself has the prerogative to interpret reality, to self-consciously construct a philosophy about the world. This is contrary to the belief that Jehovah has the prerogative, in which case we would submit to the Bible on its own authority. CA presumes that natural men are essentially right in their philosophy of the world and just need to add a few facts -- or at least they argue as if that is the case -- whereas PA presumes that natural men are completely wrong (in principle) in their entire worldview and need to drop their autonomous presupposition.

As one who takes the CA position, I fail to understand how CA acknowledging the truth of scripture(the "theonomic" starting point) in Romans 1 is "autonomy". If CA gets its view from scripture ("theonomy"), how is this "autonomy"?

If you're implying that the cosmological argument or some other theistic proof is taught as valid in Romans 1, then I would strongly disagree with that. (If you're talking about something else, please say so.)

May I ask from what sources you get your understanding of CA?

My first exposure to apologetics in general was Norm Geisler's and Frank Turek's I Don't Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist, which was thoroughly CA/evidentialist. I also used to be a big fan of William Lane Craig's apologetic and read his arguments. And I have read through a good amount of Josh McDowell's The New Evidence that Demands a Verdict, which is evidentialist.

Also, I wouldn't recommend Sproul or Gerstner in understanding presuppositionalism. From the excerpts I have seen in their Classical Apologetics, they misunderstand it.

I learned in Logic class that a circular argument is a logical fallacy. Then I am exposed to Presupp. which says that all arguments are circular.

In the way I do presuppositional apologetics, I don't even think the circularity issue would come up. The way I see it, everyone has a belief that is self-evident to him regarding who has the prerogative to interpret reality (autonomy/theonomy), and the presuppositionalist points out contradictions between this presupposition and other beliefs that the unbeliever has. The apologist then points out how his doesn't contradict. I think circularity would come up only if the argument is construed weirdly.

Personally, I don't like all the talk of circularity that has emerged in the presuppositional camp. It, like rabbit trails regarding the necessity of Christianity, only diverts from the important point: that the unbeliever is without excuse.

 

[chbrooking]

Clark,

If it's a tautology then it can't be useful. For if you tell an unbeliever that Christianity is necessary using a Christian notion of possibility and necessity, then you're really stating nothing about his worldview. If understood your statement as using an autonomous notion of possibility, then he could ask you to prove your claim (which would be impossible). If he understood your statement as using a Christian notion of possibility, then he would ask what that means for his worldview. And that that point you would say, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail." So, then, rather than going through the confusing and tautological nature of saying "Christianity is necessary," I think it would be wiser to immediately tell the unbeliever, "Any worldview you attempt to offer against Christianity will fail."

Clark,

Once we have shown that the Christian theistic worldview does actually account for intelligibility, is not saying, "Any worldview that is not the Christian theistic worldview will fail to account for intelligibility" the functional equivalent of saying, "Only the Christian theistic worldview accounts for intelligibility"?

Those are equivalent, and I would reject both.

I guess your only quibble is that you insist on the words, "that you attempt to offer". Is that right?

 

[Confessor]

I guess your only quibble is that you insist on the words, "that you attempt to offer". Is that right?

That's exactly right. If you don't specify that then the triviality/impossibility dilemma strikes again.

 

[chbrooking]

Okay. Fine. I'll leave you with the last word on that one.

 

[Confessor]

Amazing that we had that much discussion over such a small change, huh? God granted us understanding in the end.

 

[chbrooking]

So, the proof of the Christian God is the impossibility of you presenting any contrary worldview that can undergird our reasoning and experience.

How's that?

 

[Confessor]

So, the proof of the Christian God is the impossibility of you presenting any contrary worldview that can undergird our reasoning and experience.

How's that?

Didn't realize we had more to cover.

The point is that one cannot claim that the Christian God is objectively provable. Given that transcendental argumentation is indirect, it follows that a truly objective proof ("Given premises 1-5, which are necessarily true, it necessarily follows that 6") is impossible. We can't tell the unbeliever that God is provable per se, but we can show him that he has no choice but to accept His revelation.

 

[ChristianTrader]

CT,

But is not Paul's claim in Romans 1, one which should be construed as to apply to all people and their worldviews, Christian and non Christian?

I can have an excuse for not accepting your position even if I cannot rebut it as of right now or even ten years from now.

If the unbeliever wants to just "hold out" for a future presupposition, then he must affirm an autonomous presupposition (one which makes such holding out intelligible). If the apologist is a good presuppositionalist, he will demonstrate that the unbeliever has no choice but to attempt to hold out while using a Christian presupposition to do so -- in which case he's not holding out at all.

But the only way to reasonable make the claim that he is using a Christian presupposition is to prove that there can be no rational non Christian presupposition. But you say that such cannot be done.

But as an aside, do you believe that a person can defeat all unbelieving worldviews without first seeing Christianity? For example, let say that someone lives in some far out jungle, and has never seen a Bible etc. Someday a Muslim missionary comes out to his tribe and proselytizes him. Would he be able to refute him? Or would that imply that autonomy is possible?

CT

-----Added 6/25/2009 at 05:15:10 EST-----

Sorry, I still don't get it. Romans 1 is explicit that nobody has an excuse.

I agree.

As I said above, my response was not to your post, but instead to a different post that was made in response to yours.

CT

 

[Philip]

Also, regarding your revised syllogism, when you say, "If any part of the whole is true, then the whole is true," are you referring to the "vital" parts of Christianity, the parts that no other worldview would have, e.g. the resurrection?

No, I am referring to any part. That would include the ten commandments.

One thing that's unique about Christianity is precisely that it makes absolute exclusive claims to truth (another unique part is the grounding in history). My contention about Christianity is that there are two options 1) It's completely entirely true 2) It's utterly false--every bit of it. Why? Because Christianity is an absolute system. Only an absolute system can possibly be true.

 

[chbrooking]

The point is that one cannot claim that the Christian God is objectively provable. Given that transcendental argumentation is indirect, it follows that a truly objective proof ("Given premises 1-5, which are necessarily true, it necessarily follows that 6") is impossible. We can't tell the unbeliever that God is provable per se, but we can show him that he has no choice but to accept His revelation.

This is inconsistent.
I believe our disagreement is more significant than we imagined.

-----Added 6/25/2009 at 10:06:43 EST-----

Ben,
I’m concerned that you may have structured the TAG in an autonomous fashion.

The TAG has never sought to construct a syllogistic proof of the Christian God. That would require that we be bigger than God. The incomprehensibility of our God prohibits it. In other words, if we were to be able to construct such a syllogism, we would be proving that the Christian God does NOT exist. To attempt such a syllogism is to take common (epistemological) ground with the autonomist.

But this does NOT mean that Christianity is not OBJECTIVELY true. It is. How do we know? Well, ultimately we know by faith, through the ministry of the Holy Spirit.

And since Christianity is objectively true, we claim as much. And then we take all comers who would dispute that claim. I have no problem whatsoever claiming the impossibility of the contrary. I do not regard it as my obligation to prove this claim on autonomous grounds, as those grounds are ruled out by the claim itself.