John Frame Sent me this

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T.A.G.

Puritan Board Freshman
This was on the topic of being impossible from personableness to come from impersonal

Yes, I agree with Schaeffer on that. He had a lot of influence on the moral argument that I use in Apologetics to the Glory of God. Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc. On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).

what does he mean that if there is no morality, there can be no thought and if no thought then no causation? What does morality have to do with these, is he speaking of morality in a different term?

Thanks

also feel free to give me your thoughts!!!!!
 
I took Apologetics with him recently, and what I believe he is getting at is that thinking is inherently a moral activity. In other words, by even saying that certain ways of thinking are right/wrong (even using the language of logical/illogical), we are making a moral judgment. Accordingly, without morality, thinking has no basis and can't be done. If thinking can't be done, how can one discuss causation?
 
what does he mean that if there is no morality, there can be no thought and if no thought then no causation?
Based on what he said I think he kind of answered you in saying this:
With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc
Although I have not read that particular work and I am unfamiler with Schaeffer's exact argument, so I cannot comment on those. Did Schaeffer lay this out The God Who Is There? If so than where?
 
I took Apologetics with him recently, and what I believe he is getting at is that thinking is inherently a moral activity. In other words, by even saying that certain ways of thinking are right/wrong (even using the language of logical/illogical), we are making a moral judgment. Accordingly, without morality, thinking has no basis and can't be done. If thinking can't be done, how can one discuss causation?

That's how I understand it too. Sometimes these concepts are so simple that we miss them.

Basically, when you are actually thinking, you are discerning a right conclusion from a wrong one. If there is no right and wrong, that is, if you reject such a standard, then you cannot actually think.
 
ok so let me ask a obvious question, how does this affect causation by not having a morality?
 
ok so let me ask a obvious question, how does this affect causation by not having a morality?

Skyler makes the point well. I don't know that he's saying causation itself is directly affected by not having morality. Rather, he's saying that if there is no morality, there are no laws for thought. If there are no laws for thought, then there is no way to rightly assert any causative relationship between thing.
 
I'm not convinced. He seems to be equating a logical inference with a moral judgment. Declaring something logically correct or incorrect is not the same a declaring it morally right or wrong.
 
The law of causality is a tautology: an effect, by definition, must have a cause.

Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.

Why? What is it about thought that makes it normative?
 
Yeah I do not know if I can buy it, I want to buy it but I am not sure if i can.
Any other takers?
 
I'm not convinced. He seems to be equating a logical inference with a moral judgment. Declaring something logically correct or incorrect is not the same a declaring it morally right or wrong.

Are we not required to make correct judgments? If I were to argue like this: "The Bible is true. The Bible says Jesus is God. Therefore, Jesus is not God," wouldn't that be more than just a logical problem? If one is obligated to reason in certain ways, then that is a moral issue.
 
I'm not convinced. He seems to be equating a logical inference with a moral judgment. Declaring something logically correct or incorrect is not the same a declaring it morally right or wrong.

How can you declare something correct or incorrect without appealing to the concept of right and wrong?

When you say "morally right or wrong", is that really any different from saying "right or wrong?"

In other words, I think Frame is saying the act of discernment of correct or incorrect is fundamentally moral, because, quite simply, moral means deciding what is right or wrong.
 
The law of causality is a tautology: an effect, by definition, must have a cause.

I don't think Frame would deny that. But if I am not obligated to reason in certain ways, I could simply claim that an effect didn't have a cause, and who would be able to challenge me? The point is, we are obligated to reason in certain ways, and therefore I can't make assertions about causality if no such obligation exists.

Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.

Why? What is it about thought that makes it normative?

Well, I think we would agree that one must reason in certain ways. I can't just say, "A is B and not B" about a given topic. If I am obligated to reason in accordance with the laws of thought, then there is a moral dimension. Where Frame goes with this is that we are to reason in accord with God's revelation. Accordingly, if we don't reason in accord with that, then we can't meaningfully claim a basis for our thinking, and thus can't make assertions about causality (or anything else).
 
I don't think Frame would deny that. But if I am not obligated to reason in certain ways, I could simply claim that an effect didn't have a cause, and who would be able to challenge me? The point is, we are obligated to reason in certain ways, and therefore I can't make assertions about causality if no such obligation exists.

What type of obligation are we talking here? Moral or practical?

You are equivocating between two different kinds of normativity: that which you must not do and that which you cannot do.
 
What type of obligation are we talking here? Moral or practical?

You are equivocating between two different kinds of normativity: that which you must not do and that which you cannot do.

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "practical obligation."

I don't think I'm equivocating the two. I'm not talking about what you cannot do, but rather what you should not do. If you say, "A is B and not B," and I say, "No, that's wrong," I'm not talking about what you cannot do (you are able to argue however you want to), but rather what is wrong, that is, what you should/must not do. And that is Frame's point: if you ought to reason in a certain way, then that introduces a moral dimension to it. Without that moral "ought," you have no basis for the laws of thought. Without the laws of thought, you have no basis for meaningful assertions. Sure, you can still think and make assertions. But if one denies that there is morality, that there is an "ought," then there is no basis for thinking or assertions.
 
I think one way to clear the metaphysical cobwebs here is to remember that value statements (right vs. wrong, correct vs. incorrect, good vs. bad, right conclusions vs. wrong conclusions) all occuppy to a greater or lesser degree a common language game. All this means is that they are used in roughly the same way. Since the use of a word determines its meaning than these value statements are all used for basically the same purpose, although this does not imply that the are all interchangeble with eachother. This, in my opinion, clears the whole distinction between value judgements in logic, right conlusion vs. wrong conclusion, and the distinction in morality, morally right vs. morally wrong. The point is they are all value judgements. This is how I would proceed to develop this argument because as far as I know Frame does not use the later Wittgenstien's philosophy like I just did.

This is not to say that I completly agree with his argument only that the point I made might clearup some of the unecessary metaphysical cobwebs that this argument brings up. After going to Schaeffer and going to Frame's book on Van Til I think I might understand the whole personal from impersonal argument a little better than I did. According to both these men the Christian faith is unique because it assumes that our personality was created by an absolute personal being vs. some kind of impersonal explination. Even Islam doesn't have this kind of personality because, as I understand them, allah is practically wholly other. No part of human language can concieve of him in any way shape or form. So this means he cannot reveal anything about himself to us, and selfrevealation is essential to the very notion of personality. How do you what another person is thinking unless they reveal it to you?

In the Christian WV God condescends to us in His selfrevealation to analogically reveal things about Himself to us. This personal interaction is wholly unique. As far as impersonal explinations go Schaeffer put it this way, on one side you have the personal giving rise to the personal and on the on the other you have some form of the impersonal giving rise to the personal. The basic problem, that I see, for anyone interested in an impersonal explination for the personal is that they seem to get themselves into the heap paradox.

The heap paradox is basically this, I take a plate and a grain of sand and I drop the grain of sand onto the plate and I ask you if this is a heap of sand? You say no, so I repeat until you decide that X number of grains of sand equals a heap. The paradox is lets say hypothetically that 239 grains of sand doesn't equal a heap but 240 does? This is the whole quantitative vs. qualitative distinction. At what point does a difference in quantity, grains of sand, equal a difference in quality or kind, not-heap vs. heap?

I would apply this to any version of an impersonal explination of the personal this way, take any impersonal force and ask if by itself this force, material or immaterial, equals personality? They either explain why or say no. Repeat until they can prove that this many impersonal things in relation to eachother equal what we experiance as personality. This puts them on the defensive vs. us on the defensive. At what point does a difference in quantity, number of impersonal things in relation to eachother, equal a difference in quality or kind, personal vs. impersonal?
 
Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.
 
Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.

I think that is a succinct way of describing the confusion. But I think Frame is talking about one level higher: what is driving us to evaluate true/false?

In other words, why is this distinction important? At the very simplest, it seems it is important because it ought to be important. I think the various attacks on objective truth often have the goal of making us forget that the desire itself to discern truth is because we intuitively or innately think it is a good thing to do. An empirical or practical argument for the desire doesn't easily explain it. The notion that "we use logic because it works--if it doesn't work, we will try something else" is itself an acknowledgment of the "goodness" of having something that works.
 
This was on the topic of being impossible from personableness to come from impersonal

Yes, I agree with Schaeffer on that. He had a lot of influence on the moral argument that I use in Apologetics to the Glory of God. Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc. On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).

what does he mean that if there is no morality, there can be no thought and if no thought then no causation? What does morality have to do with these, is he speaking of morality in a different term?

Thanks

also feel free to give me your thoughts!!!!!

Frame is a master of conclusions--premises, not so much.
In other words, he makes a lot of arguments, but he doesn't do much work substantiating their premises or replying to counter-arguments. I say this as long-time student of Frame's work. This massive argument is one such example in my opinion
 
Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.

I think that is a succinct way of describing the confusion. But I think Frame is talking about one level higher: what is driving us to evaluate true/false?

In other words, why is this distinction important? At the very simplest, it seems it is important because it ought to be important. I think the various attacks on objective truth often have the goal of making us forget that the desire itself to discern truth is because we intuitively or innately think it is a good thing to do. An empirical or practical argument for the desire doesn't easily explain it. The notion that "we use logic because it works--if it doesn't work, we will try something else" is itself an acknowledgment of the "goodness" of having something that works.

When you said "what is driving us to evaluate true or false" this really hit me. I think maybe this argument does hold some weight, will continue to reflect and read others.

---------- Post added at 04:09 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:08 PM ----------

This was on the topic of being impossible from personableness to come from impersonal

Yes, I agree with Schaeffer on that. He had a lot of influence on the moral argument that I use in Apologetics to the Glory of God. Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc. On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).

what does he mean that if there is no morality, there can be no thought and if no thought then no causation? What does morality have to do with these, is he speaking of morality in a different term?

Thanks

also feel free to give me your thoughts!!!!!

Frame is a master of conclusions--premises, not so much.
In other words, he makes a lot of arguments, but he doesn't do much work substantiating their premises or replying to counter-arguments. I say this as long-time student of Frame's work. This massive argument is one such example in my opinion

So do you think the argument holds any weight?
 
I think that is a succinct way of describing the confusion. But I think Frame is talking about one level higher: what is driving us to evaluate true/false?

The motivation for why we do what we do might be said to be the realm of psychology, not philosophy. I'm not arguing that the answer you would give is inadequate, just that the question may be perceived as irrelevant.
 
So do you think the argument holds any weight?

I take it that the arguments are:

Basically: without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.
On your specific question: personality cannot be reduced to impersonal forces (Schaeffer: matter, motion, time and chance), because personality presupposes morality (above).

One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.
 
One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.

I'm not sure that this is a fair characterization of Frame's work. Have you read The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God? He does offer arguments to support these things. He's an incredibly busy man, so he didn't respond with full details to the original inquiry. I don't have the time to go searching through his books, but he has indeed made the arguments. He didn't just state these conclusions in his books. You may disagree with him. But he has argued these points in his books and lectures.
 
One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.

I'm not sure that this is a fair characterization of Frame's work. Have you read The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God? He does offer arguments to support these things. He's an incredibly busy man, so he didn't respond with full details to the original inquiry. I don't have the time to go searching through his books, but he has indeed made the arguments. He didn't just state these conclusions in his books. You may disagree with him. But he has argued these points in his books and lectures.

yes this is true.
 
One might agree with the conclusions--say, that morality ultimately requires the God of the Bible--but doubt that any argument was given. The above conclusions might hold weight, but what are the arguments? And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.

I'm not sure that this is a fair characterization of Frame's work. Have you read The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God? He does offer arguments to support these things. He's an incredibly busy man, so he didn't respond with full details to the original inquiry. I don't have the time to go searching through his books, but he has indeed made the arguments. He didn't just state these conclusions in his books. You may disagree with him. But he has argued these points in his books and lectures.

I didn't mean Frame offers no arguments, but that no arguments (above) were given, at least not in the original description. I also don't mean to knock Frame's work. But books like DKG are general and extremely wide-ranging. Each discussion is as succinct as it can be (see, e.g., his augments against traditional theories of knowledge and justification wrapped-up into 109-122). So he just doesn't have time or space for extended arguments. You might agree with every assertion in "without an absolute-personal God, there can be no morality. Without morality, there can be no thought. With no thought there can be no assertions about causality, etc.," but it begs for supporting premises.
 
I also don't mean to knock Frame's work.

And my impression of Frame's work is typically that there are many nice conclusions, but too few supporting arguments.

The problem is in your use of the word 'typically'. This statement is, by nature, a generalization -- and I'm not sure it's a fair one.

You might be right. But in the conclusion(s) the OP cited, what are the arguments? Or what are Frame's arguments?
 
Isn't the difference between true/false and right/wrong the difference between is and ought? If we say that is and ought are distinct, surely true/false and right/wrong must be distinct.
You are right. But I did clarify by saying that these words were not always interchangeble, this implies distinctions. Sorry I guess I should have elaborated more on that. In that part of my post I was simply trying to point out that exact absolute static division between these words only leads to metaphysical confusion. If you look through the posts above mine you will see people using true/false right/wrong in interchangeble ways. The distinction between is and ought is an important one but I would say that it is a distinction within the language-game of value judgements, and therefore you must take this into consideration when trying to absolutly seperate truth/false from the value judgment language game.
 
Oh I wasn't disputing that. I agree that the argument needs a bit of elucidation to be persuasive. I was just trying to help you see where your comment might have benefited by particularity and restraint.

You might be right. But in the conclusion(s) the OP cited, what are the arguments? Or what are Frame's arguments?
 
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