steven-nemes
Puritan Board Sophomore
It seems to me that presuppositionalists claim that revelation is necessary for knowledge; if there is no revelation, there is no knowledge.
Why is that?
Why is that?
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Could it be that all truth is God's Truth?
It is from revelation that God, and thus Truth, is known. It is from reason that God, and Truth, becomes knowable.
AMR
It seems to me that presuppositionalists claim that revelation is necessary for knowledge; if there is no revelation, there is no knowledge.
Why is that?
Could it be that all truth is God's Truth?
It is from revelation that God, and thus Truth, is known. It is from reason that God, and Truth, becomes knowable.
AMR
Could it be that all truth is God's Truth?
It is from revelation that God, and thus Truth, is known. It is from reason that God, and Truth, becomes knowable.
AMR
That's not really an answer. I can believe things that are true but not know them.
How are non-revelational epistemologies impossible or deficient?
I honestly don't know what this has to do with requiring revelation or not, which was the original question, Steven.
What's your objection to the presuppositionalist requirement that all knowledge is revelational? (special and general both, as I pointed out earlier) Surely you're not trying to construct some sort of apologetic built on "neutral ground"?
I honestly don't know what this has to do with requiring revelation or not, which was the original question, Steven.
What's your objection to the presuppositionalist requirement that all knowledge is revelational? (special and general both, as I pointed out earlier) Surely you're not trying to construct some sort of apologetic built on "neutral ground"?
I am asking why non-revelational epsitemologies are deficient. It seems to be the presup argument that if God does not exist and (therefore) nothing is revealed to man, then man cannot know anything.
Thanks for your recommendation!
I have a book by Bahnsen called "Always Ready" and I did enjoy reading. I don't think I'll be able to buy any books any time soon, though, as school has started and I'm low on money.
Could you briefly summarize his points, if you have the time?
As for your original query, even the law of contradiction, apart from general revelation, would reduce to inductive inference since nobody has tested every instance of the law. Yet even induction is only irrational to maintain if God [hasn't--you wrote has, but I am assuming you meant hasn't] revealed the uniformity of nature. Accordingly, all worldviews that do not begin with revelation fail. They cannot account for universal laws of logic or rational, inductive inference. One would have to be omniscient to know or even rationally infer anything. You might begin by positing something that can be known apart from revelation.
I honestly don't know what this has to do with requiring revelation or not, which was the original question, Steven.
What's your objection to the presuppositionalist requirement that all knowledge is revelational? (special and general both, as I pointed out earlier) Surely you're not trying to construct some sort of apologetic built on "neutral ground"?
I am asking why non-revelational epsitemologies are deficient. It seems to be the presup argument that if God does not exist and (therefore) nothing is revealed to man, then man cannot know anything.
You should get this book:
Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, Greg L. Bahnsen
Besides being an absolutely superb book overall, in the first appendix, Bahnsen deals explicitly with this question.
It seems to me that presuppositionalists claim that revelation is necessary for knowledge; if there is no revelation, there is no knowledge.
What about my current belief that I am in a room? I believe I am in a room; it appears to me that I am, I don't have any reason to think I am being deceived, and so on; I am not experiencing cognitive dysfunction; I happen to actually be in a room. Therefore I know I am in a room.
That seems easy, and no need of anything to be revealed to me.
Or perhaps this. I currently believe I have been sitting here for more than 5 minutes. I don't see any reason to think my memories are unreliable, any reason to think that the world was created 4 minutes ago, and so on; I am not experiencing cognitive dysfunction; I kept a timer next to me and watched it for the whole of what appears to be 5 minutes 10 seconds. It actually is the case that I have been sitting here for more than 5 minutes. Therefore I know I have been sitting for more than 5 minutes.
Hello Ron,
I appreciated your post. I do not have time to interact with it right now, but will try to post something by tomorrow.
Sincerely,
Brian
Richard,
Thanks for the thoughts. I trust Brian would agree that for finite men to know anything there must be a deposit of all knowledge, and that such a deposit is located in the Divine Mind. Without such a deposit, for man to know anything he would have to know everything, but since God knows everything, he can grant us knowledge without our having the ability to search an infinite number of alternatives that might otherwise undermine the knowledge we might possess. What is entailed by our knowledge, however, is a justification of the truth believed. That justification (or affirmation if you will), the faculty of reason cannot supply. The affirmation of the truth is neither part of the mind, nor part of the propostion, nor found within the belief. It is a revelational justification that has its source not in our being as image bearer but in God alone.
I've made reference to the law of contradiction. Our justification for our belief in that law-truth cannot be sourced to the human mind, lest we end up being the justification of an attribute of God, logic. Folly? The justification for the law of contradiction comes to us from outside ourselves. Indeed it must. It comes from God. It is not a part of the mind, yet rather an enabler of the mind.
Blessings,
Ron
I was not close to your area otherwise I would have tried to make contact.
I guess one may choose to define “presuppositionalist” any way one likes, but I would suggest that Clark, following Augustine on this matter, as well as Van Til were not as all-encompassing as you might have us to believe.
VanTil as quoted by Ron said:We may characterize this whole situation by saying that the creation of God is a revelation of God. God revealed himself in nature and also revealed himself in the mind of man. Thus it is impossible for the mind of man to function except in the atmosphere of revelation. And every thought of man when it functioned normally in this atmosphere of revelation would express the truth as laid in the creation by God. We may therefore call a Christian epistemology a revelational epistemology.
Is all this any more than the assertion that there is an eternal, immutable Mind, a Supreme Reason, a personal, living God? The truths of propositions that may be known are the thoughts of God, the eternal thoughts of God. And insofar as man knows anything he is in contact with God’s mind. Since, further, God’s mind is God, we may legitimately borrow the figurative language, if not precise meaning, of the mystics and say, we have a vision of God.
Moreover, if appropriate faculties are sufficient, then why don't men with appropriate faculties have all the knowledge they'll ever have upon having such faculties? Obvously, there must be at least another variable in the equation, like God's determination to enlighten, which is peculiar to a revelational epistemology.
I would hope you would agree that all knowledge presupposes the law of contradiction, which cannot be arrived at by a posteriori means; yet rather requires a general revelation, which you might be including in your view of sound mental faculties.