A Brief Explanation of Van Tilian Presuppositional

Sorry if this is off-topic (just tell me if it is), but where do Clark and Van-Til diverge in the above points?

 

I think a better description of TAG would be:

P1) X (is the case) if and only if God (is the case)
P2) X (is the case)
C) therefore: God (is the case)
​

I don't know why this is called the "transcendental" argument. It is merely to say that God is necessary (ontologically) for there to be objective knowledge, morality, truth, etc.

The difference between Van Til and Gordon Clark would be that Clark would say:

God's revealed Word is necessary (epistemically) for there to be objective knowledge, morality, truth, etc. ​

Now the atheist still has the option of saying there is no objective moral truth, or that all knowledge is individually subjective, or admit that his worldview does not allow him to know if either exist. And some atheists do claim this. So this argument only works against atheist who assume there is objective knowledge and morality by exposing this internal contradiction.

 

Reply

It is transcendental by the evaluation laid out by Kant. When Kant answered Hume that there are two epistemic categories for knowledge, Kant answer Hume by saying that there are more than two categories for knowledge. He then formulated a transcedental method of answering Hume in his "Critique fo Pure Reason." The two are synthetic and analytic propositions. Analytic are a prioir; and synthetic reasoning is a posteori. Kant then stated that some propositions are analytic a posterori, and vise-versa. This in turn formulated a transcendental nature to epistemology. In this case, God is necessary for intelligable experience. This is a necessary presupposition, according to Van Til/Bahnsen/Frame.

 

Moral neutrality does not exist because we are all sinners. "Neutral" objective reality does exist. The sun shines whether we observe it or not. Also, if common ground exists, some neutrality exists. So this slogan is incorrect.

I'm not sure why this matters. Why would one think otherwise?

Most people have a spontaneous view of reality based on social conformity. That is not a "worldview," because that implies reflection.

Actually, it is anti-foundational as it goes around deconstructing everything in sight, then tells you to believe a Bible that is full of paradoxes.

I'm not sure I follow. Can you give me some examples of piece-meal apologetics?

What does that prove? Are you saying that neutrality is possible?

So is general revelation an exception to that "no neutrality" stuff up top?

If the other person figures out you are making a slippery-slope argument, you may have some trouble. This is not necessarily fallacious, but the guy may see no reason to be consistent to his own beliefs.

Besides, Van Tillianism leads to absurdity, futility of thought, and irrationality because it claims the Bible is full of paradoxes. So it fails its own challenge.

Why is this better than what Anselm proposed?

What does this get you? You still have to show the mind's existence best explains the phenomenon of consciousness.

Since you brought it up: If God is both one and many in that sense, than God is the God of modalism.

 

Why do I care what Kant thinks? Why is he the benchmark of philosophy? If you say that due to Kant, we must throw out catholic orthodoxy and take up fideism, then you might as well say that he has refuted the faith. I refuse to do that.

 

Clark believed that the Bible is the Word of God revealed to man -- and that therefore it must be coherent, not a maze of paradoxes. While I still say he was a fideist, he is a bit easier to swallow. Happily, plenty of Van Tllians don't take up "paradox," "one and many" and other eccentricities.

In my humble opinion, the two most perceptive presuppositionalists were influenced by Clark: Carl Henry and Ronald Nash. I consider Henry the greatest Southern Baptist in history.

 

Chris,
Do you agree with Bavinck, that mystery is the vital element of Dogmatics?

CT

 

Excellent question. While Bavinck was a greater man than me, I humbly submit that he was wrong here. Even so, I believe some of his successors took that part of his systematic to an extreme he never intended.

If mystery means that God reveals things that would otherwise by unknown to fallen human reason, I like it better. If it means that God tells us two contradictory things, then Barth wins.

 

No van tillian accepts actual contradictions. Van Til and Rushdoony wrote books against Barth. They probably aren't closet Barthians.

 

Why would you think that quoting Kant or any other philosopher in support of a point, to be an endorsement for every *other* point made by that same individual? It seems to me that Mr. Martinez was just explaining *why* someone would consider that type of argument transcendental.

It seems rather silly to me to say "Why do I care what X thinks?"

 

A paradox might as well be a contradiction. If the Bible is not coherent enough to be read then either:

a.) it can't be the Word of God,
b.) it only points to the Word, which is kerygmatic,
c.) we need the Magisterium as an anointed interpreter, or
d.) it is a useful myth that teaches us lessons about ourselves.

Barth said A and B. Scott Hahn says C. Liberals say D. Van Til wanted to say instead that Scripture is a paradoxical Word, which brings us right back where we started.

 

Why is something that is paradoxical also something that is incoherent?

See James Anderson's book, Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, and Epistemic Status for a good Van Tillian thinker (with many helpful does of Plantinga!) that "takes up 'paradox'".

From the description (of the book):

"How can Jesus be fully human and fully divine? How can God be Three-in-One? James Anderson develops and defends a model of understanding paradoxical Christian doctrines according to which the presence of such doctrines is unsurprising and adherence to paradoxical doctrines can be entirely reasonable. As such, the phenomenon of theological paradox cannot be considered as a serious intellectual obstacle to belief in Christianity. The case presented in this book has significant implications for the practice of systematic theology, biblical exegesis, Christian apologetics and philosophy."

 

Van Til denied A, B, C, and D.

 

He never answered the question. He claimed that the Bible is somehow the Word of God, even though it is incoherent as propositional revelation.

 

Wait, wait, are you saying that Van Til proposed an apologetic which was supposed to function by pointing out slippery slopes and internal inconsistencies in other systems while simultaneously championing internal consistencies in his own, and then claiming the unique right to throw out a trump card making his own inconsistencies "apparent" and those of the other systems actual?

 

Can you show me where he said the bible is incoherent?

 

Do you believe that there are certain things about God that man cannot fully comprehend?

 

Gentlemen,

Can I play?

I have not taken the time to read through the thread, so please be patient with me. Allow me to present a definition...

Apparent Contradiction: 'P' is apparently contradictory to person 'X' within system 'S' if and only if person 'X' cannot see how 'P' is not inconsistent within system 'S'.

The first thing one should note about this definition is its subjective nature. Person 'Y' may be able to make 'P' consistent within system 'S', and as such 'P' is not apparently contradictory to person 'Y'. Yet, 'X' may be ignorant of what 'Y' knows, and therefore for person 'X' 'P' is apparently contradictory. Here is another definition...

Real Contradiction: 'P' is a real contradiction within system 'S' if and only if 'P' is not consistent with system 'S'.

Contrary to the earlier definition, this definition is objective in nature in that it does not deal with the perceptions of individuals. It should be noted that all real contradictions are apparent contradictions, but not all apparent contradictions are real contradictions. With this ground work laid I would like to posit a couple of propositions and get your reactions...

A: It is possible that there is some 'P' that is an apparent contradiction to person 'X' and not an apparent contradiction to person 'Y'.

B: It is possible there is some 'P' that is an apparent contradiction to a finite person 'X' such that 'P' cannot be resolved in the mind of person 'X' due to person 'X's finitude, but for God 'P' is not a real contradiction.

C: In terms of case B, the Hypostatic Union in conjuction with the Trinity is one such 'P'.

Sincerely,

Brian