An Atheist's God

[sotzo]

I want to gather some insight on an argument for God's existence I've been thinking about. This may not be a novel argument so please tell me if this work has already been done and I'll check that out. Otherwise, what follows is what I've been considering. Logicians, I'll take all the help I can get from you - unfortunately, my logic training ceased at "Therfore, Socrates is mortal" type stuff and I think I'll want to put this into formal statements/conclusions. Also, what follows may simply be working through Bahnsen's TAG and/or presuppositionalism in general.

After reading much of atheistic polemics and listening to debates, I realized that they spend alot of time arguing for the non-existence of God based on characteristics God would have if he, in fact, did exist. Their statements go something like:

(1) If God existed, he would not allow evil in the world
(2) There is evil in the world
(3) Therefore, God does not exist

Many other types of arguments in this form are offered...the only difference is that the "then" in the if/then statement in premise 1 changes...for example, "then he would write in big letters in the sky" or "then he would not have given us a Bible thousands of years old that was subject to misinterpretation".

Now, before we go further, it could simply be said on the basis of Rom 1, that we would expect such talk as our atheist friend speaks as if there is some transcendent law, yet will not acknowledge the Lawgiver. But if we wanted to offer him a formal argument for the existence of God on the basis of his syllogisms (per above), could we give one that shows that by even giving such a syllogism he is actually defining God by giving attributes He would have if He existed..and that this is the same thing as saying that God exists since? If there is such an argument and if it is true that every possible "then" in premise 1 puts the atheist in this situation, then it seems to me this (new?) formal argument could be normative.

Thoughts? Let me know where I need to provide clarification.

 

[panta dokimazete]

So, are you trying to propose that the syllogism begin with:

1) If morality exists, then a moral God exists

(As an adder to the discussion - Here is an expansion on POE logical arguments.)

 

[BobVigneault]

For evil to exist there must also be good,
For good to exist there must be a moral code,
For a moral code to exist, there must be a law giver.

 

[BrianLanier]

I want to gather some insight on an argument for God's existence I've been thinking about. This may not be a novel argument so please tell me if this work has already been done and I'll check that out. Otherwise, what follows is what I've been considering. Logicians, I'll take all the help I can get from you - unfortunately, my logic training ceased at "Therfore, Socrates is mortal" type stuff and I think I'll want to put this into formal statements/conclusions. Also, what follows may simply be working through Bahnsen's TAG and/or presuppositionalism in general.

After reading much of atheistic polemics and listening to debates, I realized that they spend alot of time arguing for the non-existence of God based on characteristics God would have if he, in fact, did exist. Their statements go something like:

(1) If God existed, he would not allow evil in the world
(2) There is evil in the world
(3) Therefore, God does not exist

Many other types of arguments in this form are offered...the only difference is that the "then" in the if/then statement in premise 1 changes...for example, "then he would write in big letters in the sky" or "then he would not have given us a Bible thousands of years old that was subject to misinterpretation".

Now, before we go further, it could simply be said on the basis of Rom 1, that we would expect such talk as our atheist friend speaks as if there is some transcendent law, yet will not acknowledge the Lawgiver. But if we wanted to offer him a formal argument for the existence of God on the basis of his syllogisms (per above), could we give one that shows that by even giving such a syllogism he is actually defining God by giving attributes He would have if He existed..and that this is the same thing as saying that God exists since? If there is such an argument and if it is true that every possible "then" in premise 1 puts the atheist in this situation, then it seems to me this (new?) formal argument could be normative.

Thoughts? Let me know where I need to provide clarification.

You might need to specify what such an argument would look like, but it seems to me that no such argument would work. If we follow your program above, here is an argument using the same form:

(1) If Santa Claus existed, he would not allow bad boys and girls to receive presents under their tree at Christmas.
(2) Bad boys and girls do receive presents under thier tree at Christmas.
(3) Therefore, Santa Claus does not exist.

So, the (a)santa-clausian would be in be affirming Santa Claus merely by being in this situation?

Maybe I am misunderstaning you?

 

[sotzo]

You might need to specify what such an argument would look like, but it seems to me that no such argument would work. If we follow your program above, here is an argument using the same form:

(1) If Santa Claus existed, he would not allow bad boys and girls to receive presents under their tree at Christmas.
(2) Bad boys and girls do receive presents under thier tree at Christmas.
(3) Therefore, Santa Claus does not exist.

So, the (a)santa-clausian would be in be affirming Santa Claus merely by being in this situation?

Maybe I am misunderstaning you?

This is helpful...thanks.

If using God as the predicate in Premise 1, though, we are assuming the atheist is referring to a being who is capable of taking some sort of action that has not occurred (ie, eradicated evil, written in the sky). If the atheist wanted to claim that Santa Clause would do these things, then it seems the syllogism you constructed above would work. Which would seem to suggest that following his line of thinking that God could /should do these things would make your construction valid in a debate.

Your syllogism seems to fail because the atheist would not grant that a being called Santa Clause would do these things, therefore, making for an invalid Premise 1. Which is my original point, to wit, that the atheist's negative statement about the things God would do if he existed ends up proving his existence, because in that scenario he is agreeing that Premise 1 is indeed valid.

Thoughts?

 

[J. David Kear]

The original logical argument would (should) be rejected because the first premise is false. i.e. If God existed, he would not allow evil in the world.

Usually the argument would be stated more like:

Premise 1: If God were all-powerful, he would be able to prevent evil.
Premise 2: If God were all-good, he would desire to prevent evil.
Conclusion: If this God existed there would be no evil.
Premise 3: Evil is present.
Conclusion: There is no all-powerful, all-good God.

I might suggest something like the following argument:

Premise 1: If evil exists there must be an objective standard.
Premise 2: Evil does exist.
Conclusion: Therefore, an objective standard exists.
Premise 3: Atheists have no objective standard with which to appeal.
Conclusion: Atheists must abandon their own worldview in order to formulate the original argument.

I just threw these together off the cuff and I am sure there would be some philosophical debate over the validity of the argument. However, this could be a good starting point in the “answer the fool according to his folly” side of apologetics.

DK

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Gentlemen,

Which is my original point, to wit, that the atheist's negative statement about the things God would do if he existed ends up proving his existence, because in that scenario he is agreeing that Premise 1 is indeed valid.

It seems you are saying if one affirms the truth of an implication, then one affirms the antecedent of the implication. If this is what you are suggesting, then you are mistaken. If this not what you are suggesting, then can you clarify? The atheist's argument you presented in the initial post is valid. The Christian will deny premise 1 and thereby claim the argument is unsound while the atheist will affirm premise 1 claiming the argument is sound.

Now, a good presuppositional approach to the argument would be to consider what is presupposed by the premises and argument forms. For example, if the athiest is going to affirm that premise 2 is true, then he must be able to account for evil. If evil presupposes God, then one can show that premise 1 is false given premise 2. Other approaches would be to argue along the lines that the argument assumes some objective basis for rational argumentation. One might argue that this in turn argues for the existence of God and thereby negating premise 1 if premise 2 is affirmed.

Brian

Brian

 

[sotzo]

It seems you are saying if one affirms the truth of an implication, then one affirms the antecedent of the implication.

No, not saying that...that would be a contradiction.

But I think the last part of your post crystallized it for me and I see that actually what I am getting at is the presupp approach.

So what we are doing when we hear the atheist's syllogism as presented in the OP, is simply asking the atheist to account for why God would necessarily have the attribute or action so prescribed to Him. In other words, we are pushing back and asking on what ground the atheist believes that God would necessarily "prevent evil" or "write in big letters in the sky".

Is this correct?

Where I was trying to go was to show that by even giving an attribute / action of God, the atheist was defining God, thereby, assuming a possible world in which God could exist...therefore, at least, a strong (as opposed to weak) atheism is defeated by the very statement of the argument.

 

[Theogenes]

Joel,
The problem is in the atheist's first premise. They assume that God wouldn't allow evil. We know by Revelation (the Scriptures) that God not only allows evil but ordains it.
In other words, why should the atheist be allowed to define what God can and can't do?!?

Jim

 

[J. David Kear]

The atheist's argument you presented in the initial post is valid. The Christian will deny premise 1 and thereby claim the argument is unsound while the atheist will affirm premise 1 claiming the argument is sound.

The argument may be valid structurally meaning that if all the premises are true the conclusion would be true. The issue is that the premise is false making the conclusion therefore false. I think we are saying the same thing; it is a valid argument with a false premise and conclusion.

An Atheist can assert that premise 1 is true but that does little good if they can't confirm that it is true. If the argument is intended to be persuasive or convince anyone they would first have to agree to all the premises.

In other words, we are pushing back and asking on what ground the atheist believes that God would necessarily "prevent evil" or "write in big letters in the sky".

Because the Atheist needs us (or the debate hearers) to agree to the premises, he is using what he thinks we believe about God (because, of course, he believes nothing about God himself).

To me the more important push back is asking on what grounds can he appeal to the concept of evil. How in his worldview is evil possible? When it is found that he cannot support the concept of evil within his worldview then we can explore the worldview that he has temporarily adopted in order to make the argument possible: the Christian worldview.

DK

 

[Brian Bosse]

Sotzo,

No, not saying that...that would be a contradiction.

It's not that it would be a contradiction; rather, it would be affirming something that is hypothetical without proper warrant.

In other words, we are pushing back and asking on what ground the atheist believes that God would necessarily "prevent evil" or "write in big letters in the sky".

This is not what I was saying. The atheist might argue that if God exists, and if He is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, then He would necessarily prevent evil. Rather, what I am saying is that if the atheist asserts that premise 2 is true, then he is necessarily asserting that there is something called 'evil'. Well, if that is the case, then what is presupposed for there to be something called 'evil'? Also, if the atheist presents the syllogism as somehow being a reason why we ought to be persuaded by his argument, then he is necessarily presupposing some objective "oughtness". Where does he get this "oughtness" from?

Where I was trying to go was to show that by even giving an attribute / action of God, the atheist was defining God, thereby, assuming a possible world in which God could exist...therefore, at least, a strong (as opposed to weak) atheism is defeated by the very statement of the argument.

The atheist may be using a definition of some theist to support his argument. I often will use someone else's definitions to show them absurd by deriving a contradiction. My hypothetical assumption of these definitions does not mean that I accept them. An atheist's use of someone's definition for God does not equate to an assertion that God exists in some possible world.

Sincerely,

Brian

 

[BrianLanier]

It seems you are saying if one affirms the truth of an implication, then one affirms the antecedent of the implication.

No, not saying that...that would be a contradiction.

But I think the last part of your post crystallized it for me and I see that actually what I am getting at is the presupp approach.

So what we are doing when we hear the atheist's syllogism as presented in the OP, is simply asking the atheist to account for why God would necessarily have the attribute or action so prescribed to Him. In other words, we are pushing back and asking on what ground the atheist believes that God would necessarily "prevent evil" or "write in big letters in the sky".

Is this correct?

Where I was trying to go was to show that by even giving an attribute / action of God, the atheist was defining God, thereby, assuming a possible world in which God could exist...therefore, at least, a strong (as opposed to weak) atheism is defeated by the very statement of the argument.

Brian (the other one) is on the right track. Though, the atheist could say that they have an objective for morality, i.e., moral realism. But that's ok because you could just point out the problems with that.

I do want to comment on this last statment of yours. I don't think it follows that a "strong" atheism is defeated by assuming that there is a possible world in which God exists, where God has attributes other than he does, e.g., writing big letters in the sky, not allowing any evil to exist, etc. Most atheists don't say that it is impossible for God to exist (that is he still could exist in some possible world along with spiderman and godzilla), but just that he *doesn't* exist in the actual world. Now, you could use Plantinga's OA and say that if God exists in a possible world, then he exists in all possible worlds, but that is different than what you are describing.

 

[sotzo]

Brian:

Thanks for your help here...please bear with me for a few more question

It's not that it would be a contradiction; rather, it would be affirming something that is hypothetical without proper warrant.

Wouldn't it be a violation of the law of non-contra and therefore indeed a contradiction? Seems that's what happens by default if I agree to the truth of A but also agree to it's antecedent (non-A), I am contradicting myself. I may be confusing antecedent with opposite as logic terms.

This is not what I was saying. The atheist might argue that if God exists, and if He is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, then He would necessarily prevent evil. Rather, what I am saying is that if the atheist asserts that premise 2 is true, then he is necessarily asserting that there is something called 'evil'. Well, if that is the case, then what is presupposed for there to be something called 'evil'? Also, if the atheist presents the syllogism as somehow being a reason why we ought to be persuaded by his argument, then he is necessarily presupposing some objective "oughtness". Where does he get this "oughtness" from?

But the atheist is already in trouble with his Premise 1 because he is stating a fact about the way the world would be, regardless of Premise 2. I know the syllogism doesn't stand on a single premise, but in even making a statement about an attribute of God (that He could prevent evil), I'm still not seeing how the atheist isn't positing something about a possible world and, therefore, already opening the door to God's existence even before premise 2. If I said, "If Santa exists, then I should see reindeer tracks in my front yard" I am granting that there is a proof upon which I would accept Santa's existence.

So, I don't see how a strong atheist can move from Premise 1 to 2 without automatically becoming a weak atheist.

The reason I am thinking about this BTW is due to the so-called "new atheism"..folks such as Harris, Dawkins and Hitchens...these men are not open to the possibility (or so they say) yet they carry on with these initial premises and still maintain they are consistent.

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Sotzo,

Wouldn't it be a violation of the law of non-contra and therefore indeed a contradiction? Seems that's what happens by default if I agree to the truth of A but also agree to it's antecedent (non-A), I am contradicting myself. I may be confusing antecedent with opposite as logic terms.

You and I are understanding our terms differently. I am using the term 'implication' to mean an "if...then..." statement such as "If it rains, then I will get wet." 'It rains' is the antecedent of the implication, and 'I will get wet' is the consequent of the implication. I do think you are confusing 'anticedent' with 'negation' (opposite).

But the atheist is already in trouble with his Premise 1 because he is stating a fact about the way the world would be, regardless of Premise 2.

Yes and no. The atheist may be only stating a fact on the way the world would be given certain conceptions of God that the atheist himself may or may not accept. For instance, given that the theory of evolution is true, then human beings have no more intrinsic worth than a rock. This proposition is a fact in some sense; yet, I do not think the antecedent, "the theory of evolution is true," is true. You see, "If A, then B" can be a true statement even though 'A' is false. In fact, in the sentential calculus all implications with false antecedents are true without any regard for the consequent. In other words, if 'A' is false, then any statement in the form "If A, then..." is a true statement! This non-intuitive result causes some controversy amongst logicians.

I know the syllogism doesn't stand on a single premise, but in even making a statement about an attribute of God (that He could prevent evil), I'm still not seeing how the atheist isn't positing something about a possible world and, therefore, already opening the door to God's existence even before premise 2.

Typically, in possible world semantics if 'X' is possible, then 'X' exists in at least one possible world, and if 'X' is necessary, then 'X' exists in all possible worlds. Also, 'X' is possible if and only if 'X' is not logically incoherent. So, a square circle is not possible and does not exist in any possible world because it is a logically incoherent concept. However, a unicorn, although it does not exist in the real world (a possible world itself) does exist in at least one possible world. The laws of logic are necessary, and therefore exist in all possible worlds.

With that said, when the atheist states "If (A) God exists, then (B) there would be no evil" the atheist is not asserting the truth of either 'A' or 'B'. He is not even asserting its possibility. Consider this, "if (A) a square circle exists, then (B) my name is mud." This is a true proposition. However, both 'A' and 'B' are false. Not only that 'A' is not possible. That is to say, 'A' does not exist in any possible world. So, I stated a true statement (by the way, it is true in all possible worlds), yet the antecedent is not possible.

If I said, "If Santa exists, then I should see reindeer tracks in my front yard" I am granting that there is a proof upon which I would accept Santa's existence.

I do not think so. Let's say you accept this implication as true. Then let's say that in the night there is a big snow storm and in the morning you notice reindeer tracks in your front yard. Does it follow that Santa exists? No way! The reason for this is because there is more than one way for reindeer tracks to appear in your front yard. I might have in the night laid the tracks myself, or by coincidence reindeer may have wandered out of the forest into your yard to feed on a bush full of barries.

Now, your line of thinking is good in that you are trying to understand the implications of the argument being put forth in the first place. That is to say, you sense that when the atheist makes an argument like this there is something more foundational that is necessary for him to make such an argument. You are correct! However, what you have put forth so far is incorrect. Again, here are some foundational things that the atheist is assuming by putting forth the argument...

Rationality: The atheist assumes that the argument form he is presenting is valid.
Ethics: The atheist assumes some ethical norm because he thinks you "ought" to be persuaded by this rational argument. Not only that, he wants to say premise 2 is true, therefore he assumes some objective basis by which there is something called 'evil.'
Induction/continuity of identity over time: The atheist assumes that the argument form will remain valid over time, that the typographical symbols used in his argument don't change their meaning over time, etc...

These are just some things that are necessarily assumed for the atheist to make his argument. The presuppositonal argument form would be to take a hard look at these assumptions and argue that they do not comport with other things the atheist assumes like "how can there be 'oughtness' in his worldview?" So, I like the way you are thinking, but I think you just need to tighten up some things.

I would like to comment on the presuppositional apologetic. I like it. I think it is good. However, one must be very precise when using this method0. The method has become quite well known in atheist circles, and if you are not precise, over state your case, etc..., then the sophisticated atheist will pounce on you.

Sincerely,

One Who Has Been Pounced on More Than Once

 

[sotzo]

Yes and no. The atheist may be only stating a fact on the way the world would be given certain conceptions of God that the atheist himself may or may not accept. For instance, given that the theory of evolution is true, then human beings have no more intrinsic worth than a rock. This proposition is a fact in some sense; yet, I do not think the antecedent, "the theory of evolution is true," is true. You see, "If A, then B" can be a true statement even though 'A' is false. In fact, in the sentential calculus all implications with false antecedents are true without any regard for the consequent. In other words, if 'A' is false, then any statement in the form "If A, then..." is a true statement! This non-intuitive result causes some controversy amongst logicians.

I see your point, which is really to say an argument can be valid and simultaneously unsound. But I still think my point is driving at something else...what I'm driving at is not the argument itself, but the motivation and epistemological ground behind the argument. The former applies to the reasons for submitting an argument for consideration and the latter applies to the conditions of proof concerning any given subject.

I'm not seeing your evolution if/then statement is an applicable parallel. When the atheist says, "If there was a God, he would show me in big letters in the sky", he is in essence saying "there is a condition upon which I would believe God exists and that condition is skywriting." To equate with this scenario your analog "if/then" above on evolution would read something like "if the theory of evolution is true then we would find transition species in the fossil record". I'm not saying that holding to a factual antecedent (in this case, God) necessarily results from stating the "if/then". What I am saying is that the submitting of the "if/then" indicates a motivation to believe should the conditions of the argument be satisfied. And, to me, this appears to demonstrate that the "if/then" is Premise 1 de facto excludes a strong atheism.

The 2nd characteristic of the atheist's argument is related to the "motivation factor", to wit, that there is an a priori assumption of the epistemological grounds upon which the argument is sound. This is closely related to the motivation behind positing the argument in the first place, but is also a bit different. Specifically in stating Premise 1, the atheist is saying not only that he has demonstrated a motivation to have God's existence demonstrated, but he has also demonstrated the grounds on which that motivation will be satisfied.

So, to summarize my admittedly unrehearsed thinking above, what I'm trying to show is that by stating only Premise 1, the atheist is showing both his motivation for and his epistemoloigcal ground upon which he would believe God exists.

Now going back to my Santa syllogism that included the reindeer, by stating that syllogism I am not arguing that there could not be other reasons for the reindeer tracks. What I am saying is that, by stating that syllogism, I am showing my cards as to what would motivate me to belief and the grounds upon which I would move toward that belief (ie, I guess this is like Plantinga's warrant). Otherwise, if I seriously made this syllogism in a debate about Santa Clause and evidence could be offered on my stated grounds, I would automatically lose the debate if I didn't accept such evidence.

Of course, it is the very epistemological grounds on which we take the atheist to task. But this does not mean that, in principle, a strong atheism is not already defeated by the mere statement of Premise 1.

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Sozo,

I see your point, which is really to say an argument can be valid and simultaneously unsound.

This really was not my point, but what you say here is true.

… what I'm driving at is not the argument itself, but the motivation and epistemological ground behind the argument…When the atheist says, "If there was a God, he would show me in big letters in the sky", he is in essence saying "there is a condition upon which I would believe God exists and that condition is skywriting"…What I am saying is that the submitting of the "if/then" indicates a motivation to believe should the conditions of the argument be satisfied... Specifically in stating Premise 1, the atheist is saying not only that he has demonstrated a motivation to have God's existence demonstrated, but he has also demonstrated the grounds on which that motivation will be satisfied…by stating only Premise 1, the atheist is showing both his motivation for and his epistemoloigcal ground upon which he would believe God exists.

I think you are mistaken here. The atheist, rather than providing a condition under which he might believe, is providing a condition that has a consequence he thinks he can contradict and thereby prove the negation of the antecedent. It is the classical form of Modus Tollens, and is the basis for Aristotle’s Reductio Ad Absurdum method. It does not necessarily follow that the atheist is providing a condition under which he would believe.

Premise 1: If A, then B.
Premise 2: ~B.
Conclusion: ~A

Your position seems to be that by stating premise 1, one is granting that there is a condition to believe A, namely B. This is a fallacy. You cannot ascribe intent to premise 1. There is no psychological necessity involved in uttering premise 1. There could be a myriad number of reasons why premise 1 was given, and it is not the case that one of those reasons is necessarily the explication of grounds upon which to believe A. (That last sentence is terrible. Sorry about that.)

Sincerely,

Brian