Apologetic Game Changing Book?

[owenanderson]

meaning of "know"

hello all,

maybe we can clarify what we mean by "know". In philosophy we use this term to contrast with "opinion" or "belief." Thus, a person "knows" if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true.

Are we saying that all persons know God in this sense of the word?

 

[MW]

maybe we can clarify what we mean by "know". In philosophy we use this term to contrast with "opinion" or "belief." Thus, a person "knows" if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true.

Are we saying that all persons know God in this sense of the word?

Yes; hence the act of deliberate and unrighteous suppression.

We can illustrate this from the way philosophy uses the terms "know" and "true." The very idea of knowing something requires the existence of an Absolute which can verify the reality of the referent in all times (eternity), places (infinity), and conditions (immutability).

 

[owenanderson]

knowing and proving

So if they know it in this sense of the term, then they must be able to prove it is true. Are we saying that all persons can prove that it is true that God exists? Speaking for my students, they have a hard time even proving that they exist

While it is true that "truth" requires some standard, most people (again, consider my students) are unable to articulate this and are not aware of it. Of the others that are, many have given non-theistic accounts of the absolute, such as Plato's forms/demiurge, or Brahman of Hinduism. Hence, it wouldn't be enough to say that people "know" God (as a true, justified belief) because their truth claims require an absolute, since much more is meant by "God" than "the absolute."

Perhaps a different sense of the term "know" is what is meant?

 

[MW]

So if they know it in this sense of the term, then they must be able to prove it is true. Are we saying that all persons can prove that it is true that God exists? Speaking for my students, they have a hard time even proving that they exist

Yes; every time they make a truth statement they are proving an infinte, eternal, and unchangeable Mind exists.

The irony here is that your joke is actually serious. They cannot prove they exist without the existence of God.

 

[owenanderson]

proof

Maybe we'll have to define what is meant by "prove." In observing them we would say they are proving this, like by observing a rock in motion we say it proves the laws of motion. But they cannot prove it in the sense of answering a question, and thus they do not "know." So they prove it externally, but they cannot prove it internally.

Also, an absolute Mind is not the same as God, much more would be needed. But you're right that a person could stop at an absolute mind and say this is enough for truth.

So can we say that although they live in the world, they do not understand the world?

 

[MW]

I think "prove" can be used in its ordinary signification as rationally demonstrate. A person can make no truth claim unless he has an ultimate reference point whereby to verify what is said. The Bible presents us with two alternatives -- God and destruction. If a man denies God he chooses destruction, and that includes rationality. Scepticism is in fact the annihilation of reason.

The incommunicable attributes of God are shown by means of negation. Infinity, eternity, and immutability are required because they are negations of the creature's imperfections. The communicable attributes are shown by means of affirmation, whereby the creature's personal qualities are perfected. So not only the Absolute Mind, but Personal Being is also demonstrable from the creature's own personal existence. From the communicable attributes we are then able to prove that God would reveal Himself. From there we can show that the Bible reveals this God.

 

[owenanderson]

prove

We have two lines going now, what it takes to show that God exists, and whether or not all persons can internally prove that God exists. I like the method you are using, which is that we can show, step by step, that theism is the only conclusion. Maybe we can identify the steps so that we can make sure we have addressed all relevant challenges from other worldviews?

But the other issue is whether all persons know God in the sense of believing that God exists, and being able to prove that God exists. I take it as obvious that many people do not claim to believe that God exists, and instead claim to believe something else (as you pointed out earlier). While in this condition, these people are not able to prove that God exists. If they were asked to do so, they would not be able to do so. Now, this condition might change later, they might come to be able to do so. And in the very state of denying God's existence this might prove something about God (in the same way that the rock in motion proves the laws of motion). But the sense of "proving" we are speaking about is that the person can offer a proof, as in a math student being able to prove a theorum on an exam.

Certainly not all persons are able to offer a proof that God exists in this sense. And this means that they do not "know" God in the sense of having a true, justified belief. Indeed, the people I'm thinking of would say "I don't believe it, and I can't prove it is true."

 

[MW]

Are there really two lines here? Not if we take presuppositions into account. What does it take to show God exists? It cannot be done because unbelievers use their rationality to justify their own autonomy. They do this whether they formally believe in God or not. Yet the autonomous use of reason internally proves that God exists. Their very attempt to rationalise their autonomy evidences their irrationality and proves theonomy. The reason is that there are only two alternatives -- God or destruction.

In what manner did Jesus Christ press His claims on Pilate? He testified, "Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice." How did Pilate seek to rid himself of the claims of Christ? He ridiculed the notion of truth. In other words,, he destroyed the very foundation on which his own rationality could be sustained. This is what every unbeliever is forced to do in oder to maintain autonomy. But as soon as he does this he destroys his own humanity and his claim to reason.

I think our first task is not to prove the existence of God; one could accomplish this while still supporting man's autonomy. We should be aiming to prove the autonomist's suppression of the truth. The unbeliever's unrighteous suppression of the truth is an undeniable, experiential argument for the existence of God and at the same time preliminary to the gospel call to repent.

 

[owenanderson]

Yes, I think there are two lines going. On the one hand you're offering what you consider to be a successful proof, which we could look at to see if it is successful. On the other hand, we're discussing what it means to "know." When you say "it cannot be done," I think you're shifting to speaking about how to persuade a person, and I agree this might not be able to be done. But I'm asking about a proof, not what persuades.

I agree with you that persons undermine their own rationality with autonomy, although I think you've skipped some steps in showing this, trying to get too quickly from the nihilism of autonomy to theism.

From my previous post I'm still not clear as to whether you think the person who claims to not believe that God exists, and also is unable to give a proof that God exists, "knows" that God exists?

 

[MW]

From my previous post I'm still not clear as to whether you think the person who claims to not believe that God exists, and also is unable to give a proof that God exists, "knows" that God exists?

Yes, he "knows" that God exists. His autonomous reasoning is in fact a suppression of that knowledge and the clearest argument for the existence of God. E.g., a materialist argues seeing is believing. If we were to prove God exists according to this basis we could not prove the God of the Bible because God is invisible, without body, parts, or passions. What shall we say? We point to the fact that beliefs and ideals are not seen yet believed by the materialist. He believes seeing is believing, yet he does not see this belief. His belief system points to a world beyond the material. No matter how coherently rational he has made his materialist system, the system itself is irrational when related to ultimate reality. We cannot "know" anything when self is made the starting point. All knowledge points beyond self to a perfect reference point. That point is always God.

 

[owenanderson]

This is a different meaning of the term "know" than I asked about earlier. Remember, in that case knowledge means a true, justified belief. But in the example you gave, the materialist does not believe that God exists, nor can he (at that moment) explain why it is true that God exists.

But what you are doing is showing that the materialist's own beliefs are self-contradictory, and so he cannot consistently maintain that only the material world exists. He believes an error. But unless he comes to believe that God exists and comes to be able to prove this, he does not "know" in the sense of having a true, justified belief about God. Instead, he is a witness to the truth of God. But he does not seek, does not understand, and does not do what is right.

Given this assertion (that none understand), I take the suppression spoken about in Romans 1 to be occurring through the offering up of alternative views to God the creator. So, the materialist suppresses the truth by claiming that only the material world exists.

From the subject's point of view (in your example the materialist) he does not know because he does not believe and cannot prove, but objectively it can be shown that consistency requires theism.

 

[MW]

But what you are doing is showing that the materialist's own beliefs are self-contradictory, and so he cannot consistently maintain that only the material world exists.

But the demonstration of self-contradictory beliefs takes place on the basis that he has beliefs which prove the existence of God. I cannot prove them self-contradictory otherwise.

 

[owenanderson]

Right, his beliefs can be used to prove the existence of God, but he himself has not yet seen this or done that work. If I give my students a blank piece of paper and say "prove that God exists," they will not be able to do this. In this sense, they don't know it. And yet, if it is clear, then they should be able to do it (just like they should be able to tell me what 2+2 is), and so they are inexcusable.

I think this reveals the full reality of moral evil, both in the intellect and in the will.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

When I was in graduate school one of my professors told me I was an intellectual pelagian because of my views about reason and inexcusability. I don't think this is true. I think it can be the case both that it is clear to reason, and that humans are predestined.
Owen

S/he probably said this because one of your key premises affirms that moral responsibility presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). This is seen in your ‘Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function’ paper, when you wrote that “Inexcusability presupposes ability: if a person is inexcusable in their failure to know God then they must have been able to know God.” The view that moral responsibility presupposes the PAP is inconsistent with theistic determinism (predestination) and other aspects of Calvinism. Not only that, but given Frankfurt type counterexamples, it seems such a view is misplaced.

 

[ChristianTrader]

When I was in graduate school one of my professors told me I was an intellectual pelagian because of my views about reason and inexcusability. I don't think this is true. I think it can be the case both that it is clear to reason, and that humans are predestined.
Owen

S/he probably said this because one of your key premises affirms that moral responsibility presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). This is seen in your ‘Beyond Plantinga and Improper Function’ paper, when you wrote that “Inexcusability presupposes ability: if a person is inexcusable in their failure to know God then they must have been able to know God.” The view that moral responsibility presupposes the PAP is inconsistent with theistic determinism (predestination) and other aspects of Calvinism. Not only that, but given Frankfurt type counterexamples, it seems such a view is misplaced.

I think the cleanest response is the Edwardian counter that one does what they desire the most. Because we are slaves to sin, we desire sin and not doing what we ought to do. If we desired good, then we would be doing good. To reject this viewpoint, one basically runs into hypercalvinism.

The problem is not a defect in general revelation or a defect in our reasoning ability. So you have ability and you have predestination.

CT

 

[Cheshire Cat]

I think the cleanest response is the Edwardian counter that one does what they desire the most. Because we are slaves to sin, we desire sin and not doing what we ought to do. If we desired good, then we would be doing good. To reject this viewpoint, one basically runs into hypercalvinism.

The problem is not a defect in general revelation or a defect in our reasoning ability. So you have ability and you have predestination.

CT

Hi CT, Edwardsian counter to what or who? Although that is a form of compatibilism, I don't see how it negates my point...

If one claims something like," "S is morally responsible for * iff S had to ability to * or not *", they are clearly assuming some kind of PAP or "ought implies can.""

Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.

So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."

Quotes are from Paul M. I could reformulate them in my own words and then give him props, but I couldn't have said it better myself.

 

[ChristianTrader]

I think the cleanest response is the Edwardian counter that one does what they desire the most. Because we are slaves to sin, we desire sin and not doing what we ought to do. If we desired good, then we would be doing good. To reject this viewpoint, one basically runs into hypercalvinism.

The problem is not a defect in general revelation or a defect in our reasoning ability. So you have ability and you have predestination.

CT

Hi CT, Edwardsian counter to what or who? Although that is a form of compatibilism, I don't see how it negates my point...

If one claims something like," "S is morally responsible for * iff S had to ability to * or not *", they are clearly assuming some kind of PAP or "ought implies can.""

If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?

Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.

Where above was this denied?

So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."

a)
Where above was this denied?

Quotes are from Paul M. I could reformulate them in my own words and then give him props, but I couldn't have said it better myself.

I know and I am as bewildered by seeing it here as when I saw it elsewhere.

CT

 

[Cheshire Cat]

If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?

The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".

Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.

Where above was this denied?

This passage contradicts the PAP, which seems to be affirmed by Anderson in the quote I provided in my original post.

So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."

Where above was this denied?

See my above response.

Quotes are from Paul M. I could reformulate them in my own words and then give him props, but I couldn't have said it better myself.

I know and I am as bewildered by seeing it here as when I saw it elsewhere.

CT

Don't be.

 

[ChristianTrader]

If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?

The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".

The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.

CT

 

[MW]

If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?

Good question.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?

The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".

The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.

CT

Where does he affirm that old version of compatibilism?

 

[owenanderson]

Pap

I definitely do not hold to PAP, and am a compatibalist. I do not believe one could affirm the Westminster Confession and be a libertarian or pelagian. I think CT has said it well above, as has the Westminster Confession. I don't believe the ought/can principle requires PAP or pelagianism. My grad advisor said that because he was used to being around Calvinists who, like the one that tried to discourage William Carey, say "if God wants to covert the heathen he will do it himself." Its unfortunate that this is what Calvinists are known for in academia. That is one reason I appreciate Warfield, because he affirmed that although it is the Spirit that brings the increase, the Spirit uses Paul as the planter and Apollos as the waterer.

That paper on Quodlibet has been revised and now appears as a chapter in my book "Reason and Worldviews." I believe that book, and my new one "The Clarity of God's Existence" address some of these questions.

Hope this helps.

 

[owenanderson]

Clarity

The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".

The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.

CT

Where does he affirm that old version of compatibilism?

I discuss it in my book "The Clarity of God's Existence: The Ethics of Belief After the Enlightenment."

 

[owenanderson]

I agree, this seems to solve the problem.

If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?

Good question.

 

[ChristianTrader]

The problem is that this doesn't satisfy the type of ability being affirmed in the PAP. The type of ability affirmed in the PAP is that one's ability to do otherwise must be a "live option".

The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do. If that does not satisfy something else, then so be it. His attack is on the position that even if one wanted to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, that person would not be able to do so. This does not dismiss the case that a person's will is enslaved to sin and that they are in need of regeneration.

CT

Where does he affirm that old version of compatibilism?

The problem is where does he affirm or imply PAP? He affirms the complete sovereignty of God, Predestination, and Human Responsibility. He also affirms that unbelief is inexcusable. How can one affirm all four things and not come to ought equals (some sort of) can? If ought does not equal (some form of) can then it seems that you have an excuse.

CT

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Posted on behalf of Paul M...

Also, such a principle is unbiblical, "since, as acts 17:30 tells us for instance, "In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent." But man is unable to repent apart from the work of the Holy Spirit! But surely they will be held accountable and "inexcusable" for violating this command from God.

CT: "Where above was this denied?"

Me: From OA's book Reason and Worldviews: "Problematically, he maintains that the natural man cannot comprehend what he ought to comprehend of God. This is extremely problematic because it means that while humans ought to comprehend God, they cannot. How can they be held responsible?"

Clearly OA just said that if one OUGHT to x, then they CAN do x; otherwise, "how can they be morally responsible." This at least affirms "ought implies can", and probably PAP. Since it affirms "ought implies can" then that's one place where "the above was denied."

So, either (a) men can be inexcusable and morally responsible for what they are unable to do, or (b) men are "able" to repent apart from the regenerating work of the Spirit."

CT: "a) Where above was this denied?

Me: Now you can clearly see. I have more juicy morsels from his book. Stay tuned.

CT: "The only thing being affirmed by Anderson (or as I read him) is that one is able to do what one wants to do."

Me: (a) like fly to the moon by flapping their arms?, and (b) libertarians can affirm this with agent causation (cf. Kane: Intro to Free will). Therefore, you've not done enough to exculpate OA or yourself.

CT: "If one distinguishes between natural ability/inability vs. moral ability/inability as Edwards did, then what exactly is the problem?"

Me: The only way one has the ability to do otherwise, naturally or morally, is if the decree had been different. Some Reformed folk seem to want a libertarianism in one realm but not in another. Furthermore, Edwardsian compatibilaism has been called into question. To keep asserting it violates OA's repeated complaints against dogmatism and begging the question in his Reason and Worldviews. Just because you say the name "Edwards," doesn't mean one has to bow down and shudder in fear. The Bible teaches compatibalism, it doesn't necessarily specify *which kind*. We're free to build better conceptions. This entails (as OA would be fond to say) that, presumably, Edwards wasn't God, which would entail that he wasn't infallible.

OA: I definitely do not hold to PAP, and am a compatibalist.

Me: That may be, but some are seeing some inconsistencies with your *affirmation* of compatibilism and some of your *other* statements. Just *saying* you're a compatibilist doesn't absolve you from criticism. The same remarks could be lodged against D.A. Carson in some places given some of his statements on free will and compatibilism...and his sometimes affirmation of middle knowledge.

OA: " I don't believe the ought/can principle requires PAP or pelagianism."

Me: (a) that's debatable as many libertarian action theorists have pointed out (cf. the Wideker Mckenna vol. _Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities), and (b) it isn't clear that you've denied the ought-implies-can maxim; indeed, it looks like you've just affirmed it. O-I-C is refuted by (i) Frankfurt counter-examples and (ii) the Acts 17 passage cited above.

OA: "Its unfortunate that this is what Calvinists are known for in academia."

Me: It's unfortunate that we are laughed at and mocked even when they have characterized us correctly. "Academia" scoffs at predestination as morally repugnant and determinism as either (a) philosophically absurd when dealing with a libertarian or (b) if dealing with a materialist determinist they view it as immoral since it is a person who could have ordained otherwise doing the determining rather than blind laws of nature. So, since "academia" laughs at us anyway, I find your appeal to them in this instance a fallacious scare tactic.

OA: "That is one reason I appreciate Warfield, because he affirmed that although it is the Spirit that brings the increase, the Spirit uses Paul as the planter and Apollos as the waterer."

Me: But that's a reason I appreciate those hundreds of years before Warfield. The majority of competent Reformers have always affirmed secondary causation. So it duplicitous to act as if Warfield is at odds with most Calvinists.

OA: "I agree, this seems to solve the problem."

Me: I and many others disagree.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Posted on behalf of PM...

On page 1 of that thread OA stated,

"Thus, a person 'knows' if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true."

Does he know that? Can he prove it? Does he know his proof? Can he prove it? Does he know his second proof? Prove it. And so on...

He's also assuming internalism with this. Unfortunately, internalism is on the outs. For example, Michael Bergman has dealt externalism some major blows. See his _Justification Without Awareness_. One might also read the arguments of Plantinga, Sudduth, Anderson, Welty, etc.

Another problem is that OA argues that "all men" are "inexcusable" because God's existence is "clear" and they can know it via "right reason." But are we to assume that young children and mentally handicap people are excusable?? If not, then it is not clear that "all men" can know God, nor that "all men" are inexcusable because God's existence is clear and they can know it.

More to the point, can young children not know God? I mean, OA spoke of how hard it was for college students to prove such things as their existence (which seems odd because they'd have to exist to prove it or doubt it). I doubt any child could "prove" that God exists along OA's rigorous lines.

What's also strange is that he claims we should be able to prove God like 2+2=4. Not only is this proof actually a lot harder to do than most people think (for example, the majority of people that would try to prove this would appeal to some empirical argument, say, 2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples), I'd love to see OA's proof for God that is such that one would be be epistemically certain that he exists. No one has done this in the entire history of apologetics.

He furthermore places a ton of confidence in basic laws of thought, esp. the universality of the LNC. But dialetheists would differ. OA may claim that they refute themselves but that is probably based on a view of logic which is explosive. To assume this with a dialetheist would be question begging by assuming the falsity of paraconsistent logic. OA frequently complains about other apologetic methods that assume the truth of their view according to their worldview. But OA assumes the truth classical logic and Aristotle's proof of the LNC over against a dialetheist worldview (and obviously the comeback to this that if it were true it would be false is based on misunderstanding dialetheism for trivialism, so put that counter on the shelf).

Now, dialetheism may be false, but one just can't assume it. Moreover, OA has the problem of showing how each and every single worldview, and variations within each, are false or contradictory. I refer readers to Sean Choi's critique of the TAG on this exact matter in the book Reasons for Faith (ed. Geisler and Meister).

 

[MW]

Me: From OA's book Reason and Worldviews: "Problematically, he maintains that the natural man cannot comprehend what he ought to comprehend of God. This is extremely problematic because it means that while humans ought to comprehend God, they cannot. How can they be held responsible?"

Clearly OA just said that if one OUGHT to x, then they CAN do x; otherwise, "how can they be morally responsible." This at least affirms "ought implies can", and probably PAP. Since it affirms "ought implies can" then that's one place where "the above was denied."

This is simply the classic way of stating the problem. Shouldn't you be addressing his answer to the problem?

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Posted on behalf of PM...

The problem is where does he affirm or imply PAP? He affirms the complete sovereignty of God, Predestination, and Human Responsibility. He also affirms that unbelief is inexcusable. How can one affirm all four things and not come to ought equals (some sort of) can? If ought does not equal (some form of) can then it seems that you have an excuse.

CT

First off, people can be inconsistent, second, there are some major and detailed arguments that show "ought-implies-can" assumes PAP (to my knowledge, Andrew Baily is the only determinist who holds both, and he admits he's got an uphill battle), third, Acts 17 showed that "ought implies can" is false. But, if one chooses to ignore that, there's "Be thou perfect as your heavenly father is perfect." And, there's Frankfurt too. Fourth, it seems original sin is compromised since we ought to, as our confessions and catechisms teach, both do (or not fail to do) and be what God requires. Infants are born with a sin nature, heald guilty for that, yet they can't do anything about being born with said nature.

 

[Christusregnat]

One other thing: Owen's books seems to have awaken me from my Theonomic slumbers. A key point made in his books concern the relationship between general and special revelation. General revelation has actual content to which people are responsible and are inexcusable for rejecting. It also puts some constraints on what special revelation looks like. Put another way, there is and has to be a natural law.

For me, Theonomy has its true bite only when one rejects natural law. Without natural law, one either has Theonomy or chaos. With natural law, one does not have to push so hard for continuity between the Old Testament and New Testament. One can then accept that some things were special for the jewish administration in the OT and don't need to be explicitly repealed in order to question the validity. If one attempts something like this without a robust natural law, then one is back again looking chaos in the face.

CT

Hermonta,

I am intrigued by your statements, and they prompt a few questions:

1. What do you mean by "natural law"; can you define?

2. What is the means by which one may determine which "natural laws" are to be chosen? For instance, do we choose Hume's version, or the Marquis de Sade's? By what standard do we decide?

3. Does law (whether natural or otherwise) have any place in glorifying God, or in enjoying Him forever? If so, what rule hath God given to direct us in the use of such laws?

4. What is the method that natural man uses to ascertain "natural law"? Does he intuit natural law, empirically judge which laws are natural, democratically decide, or is it subject to a rational process? If so, who's reason is to be used?

5. If law is natural, why is nature so lawless?

6. Can natural man be subject to natural law? Can natural man ascertain natural law?

7. Can you explain an exegetical defense for your responses to the above questions?

8. How do you link Paul's use of general revelation as a means of condemntation with a positive system of law?

Interested in your thoughts.

Cheers,