Aquascum's objections to Scripturalism

[Magma2]

I think that was Dr. Sudduth's point and that vanilla epistemic scripturalists lose their ability to say whether *any* extra-biblical proposition is true or false (as it reduces to opinion as you have stated) and in that way, it defeats itself. So it seems that the deliverances of the sciences and other such evils that scripturalists yell about would be on the same epistemic footing as scripturalism, as both are extra-biblical.

Then why is it that Dr. Sudduth and other of Clark´s critics seem only capable of leveling abusive ad hominem attacks and vain and petty caricatures of Clark´s position like the ones you provide above? Why haven´t such critics and so-called "œworld class philosophers" spent their time trying to overcome, say, Clark´s arguments in support of the proposition that science is always false? After all, Clark did write a monograph on the topic; Philosophy of Science and Belief in God (http://www.trinitylectures.org/product_info.php?cPath=21&products_id=127).

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

I think this can be a fruitful line of conversation.

1)Can one know that scripturalism is true

If one cannot know then it is just an opinion to be accepted or rejected at will.

2)Can one know that a necessary part of the definition of knowledge is infallible certainty.

If one cannot know such, then all the times that Clarkians call something an opinion vs. knowledge, is just them expressing their opinion, which can again be accepted or rejected at will.

I think those are very good questions as they highlight some of the problems.

Everything you said I agree with. But it is also true for any rational system of thought. When it comes to the systems axioms, we must simply believe them or not. We can not justify knowing them.

Now, we must be careful about what know and believe mean. Most often we mean "know" to mean nothing more than "very certain" the we can know Scripturalism. But I'm not using that definition of "know" because that would be equivocating. I'm using "know" in the sense of justifiably true from prior true propositions. Now if you object, just consider the question "how do we know". There is no objection to the question, and it demands we give a justification from prior knowledge about how we know something. But when it comes to the axioms of a system - we can not justify this from a priori knowledge. The axiom is the starting point and must be assumed. We can argue for the efficacy of the axioms, but we can never prove them.

What we say we know must be justified from a priori knowledge or it's really an opinion - no matter how certain our belief in it. Axioms - for all systems are opinions. Knowledge, for all systems, are justifiable from prior true propositions. Axioms for all systems can not be justified.

So Scripturalism is no different than any other rational epistemology. We can not "know" any system of epistemology is true, we always assume it. So the criteria for choosing an epistemology has to be something other than "knowing" it's true. For Christians, we believe the Bible is the Word of God because this is the work of the Holy Spirit. It is not justified from a priori knowledge. And this is import: if we could justify the truth of the Bible from a priori knowledge (that is apart from the working of the Spirit), then we would have the innate power to save ourselves without the God. We would be our own saviors.

Scripturalism is not really some aberration, it's a formulation of our situation from the beginning of Christendom. We are saved by faith alone, and this is a gift from God. We can not prove the axiom of belief in the Scriptures, our in the Gospel, because we can not justify our own faith. If we would justify faith, we'd save ourselves. This is a violation of Christianity.

There are many interesting implications of Scripturalism. And it is very systematic and coherent and comprehensive. - but we can not go wrong in making God's revelation the foundation of what we can know.

BTW. I have read ALL of Dr. Sudduth's objections several times along with Aquascum's and Paul Mantea's (sp?) post "Why I'm Not a Ch*#$###ian" and I see they are really saying the same things. I think if anything, they seem to be sharing the same arguments and same errors. And it's easy to agree with them by accepting some of their assertions. The problem is their assertions misrepresent Scripturalism in some key ways, and ignore the role of axioms. (Find the word axiom in them and you will see what I mean.)

I'm not saying that I'm undeniable right, but I am saying that the arguments they have given are undeniable flawed. They have not nailed down anything, much less scratched anything.

If you think I'm confused, I understand why. Their arguments are rather obscure and difficult to follow at times. Dr. Sudduth's arguments are much cleaner and systematic, but are full of unfamiliar terms that he does not define. I'm looking forward to reading his next book because I think it will fill in many of the blanks and I think it will support many assertions of Clarkians and Scripturalism. Aquascum's papers are long and complicated but fail from the start (having cut off the snake's heard, it matters not how well constructed the body is). I've read all he said, and there are other problems as Jon has noted in brief, but since they do not apply, I haven't bothered with them. Paul's arguments I'd need to read again to make sure I am representing them accurately, but I think he used the same augments about incoherence as Aquascum and others.

Actually Jon has given some of the best arguments showing some of the gaps in Scripturalism. I don't think the gaps are necessarily as large as he does - but I agree that they could be filled in better.

Well, if anyone has other references the show problems with Scripturalism, please let me know. Or let me know if Aquascum or anyone else has any new things to say.

 

[Don]

Originally posted by Magma2

Since Aquasum wants to remain anon...., suffice it to say, he IS a world class philosopher. BTW, too cowardly to use his real name; that wasn't very nice, was it?

Everyone´s entitled to their opinions. I´m sure there was a time when men praised Protagoras as a world class philosopher too, but then Plato recognized that he was just a world class sophist. And, yes, I consider a man who hides behind an alias and will not put his own name to his work a coward.

I'm not sure what point this proves, how it rescues scripturalism, or how it is even relevant. That's fine, consider him a coward, who cares what you think. That coward still annihilated scripturalism, Cheung et al, and it doesn't look like any substantial response is forthcoming. (Talk about 'abusive ad hominems).

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

 

[Don]

Originally posted by Magma2

I think that was Dr. Sudduth's point and that vanilla epistemic scripturalists lose their ability to say whether *any* extra-biblical proposition is true or false (as it reduces to opinion as you have stated) and in that way, it defeats itself. So it seems that the deliverances of the sciences and other such evils that scripturalists yell about would be on the same epistemic footing as scripturalism, as both are extra-biblical.

Then why is it that Dr. Sudduth and other of Clark´s critics seem only capable of leveling abusive ad hominem attacks and vain and petty caricatures of Clark´s position like the ones you provide above? Why haven´t such critics and so-called "œworld class philosophers" spent their time trying to overcome, say, Clark´s arguments in support of the proposition that science is always false? After all, Clark did write a monograph on the topic; Philosophy of Science and Belief in God (http://www.trinitylectures.org/product_info.php?cPath=21&products_id=127).

Could you substantiate any of these charges (abusive ad hominem, etc)? But whether you could or not, it still doesn't automatically negate any of their critiques.

I appreciate the link but I already have that book.

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by Don

I think this can be a fruitful line of conversation.

1)Can one know that scripturalism is true

If one cannot know then it is just an opinion to be accepted or rejected at will.

2)Can one know that a necessary part of the definition of knowledge is infallible certainty.

If one cannot know such, then all the times that Clarkians call something an opinion vs. knowledge, is just them expressing their opinion, which can again be accepted or rejected at will. [/quote]


Hi Hermonta,

Yes, I think that was Dr. Sudduth's point and that vanilla epistemic scripturalists lose their ability to say whether *any* extra-biblical proposition is true or false (as it reduces to opinion as you have stated) and in that way, it defeats itself. So it seems that the deliverances of the sciences and other such evils that scripturalists yell about would be on the same epistemic footing as scripturalism, as both are extra-biblical. If the Scripturalist then tries to assert that scripturalism is true or that he can know that it's true, he winds up in self-referential incoherency. Either way, he is defeated.

Don

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don] [/quote]

Which is why this is an argument against some Scripturalist and not necessarily Scripturalism. And it is almost always easier to find flaws in particular statements rather then really going after the system in question.

The "epistemic footing" of Scripturalism is the same as any rational system. However, empiricism (the presuppositions of Science) can not justify any knowledge whatsoever. So natural science fails to get out of the gates, so to speak.

Scripturalism asserts that it is true because that how axioms work. The axiom of empiricism say knowledge comes from sensory experience alone. How do they know? They can't! They believe. But even if we assume the axiom of empiricism, it's really a big mystery how one gets knowledge from sensations - since they are categorically different. Not just apples and oranges, but apples and awareness.

So if you think Scripturalism is self defeating because it can not account for itself - well then ALL systems of knowledge fail and we know nothing at all. This criteria in fact defeats all systems of thought since none can account for themselves without being circular.

 

[Don]

[/quote]
Which is why this is an argument against some Scripturalist and not necessarily Scripturalism. And it is almost always easier to find flaws in particular statements rather then really going after the system in question.

The "epistemic footing" of Scripturalism is the same as any rational system. However, empiricism (the presuppositions of Science) can not justify any knowledge whatsoever. So natural science fails to get out of the gates, so to speak.

Scripturalism asserts that it is true because that how axioms work. The axiom of empiricism say knowledge comes from sensory experience alone. How do they know? They can't! They believe. But even if we assume the axiom of empiricism, it's really a big mystery how one gets knowledge from sensations - since they are categorically different. Not just apples and oranges, but apples and awareness.

So if you think Scripturalism is self defeating because it can not account for itself - well then ALL systems of knowledge fail and we know nothing at all. This criteria in fact defeats all systems of thought since none can account for themselves without being circular. [/quote]


Anthony,

I will take your word that you read all of the relevant critiques, but understand my doubt since you have constantly shown an ignorance of what they have written.

No one, to my knowledge, has asserted what you are negating here "Which is why this is an argument against some Scripturalist and not necessarily Scripturalism", and I think a fair reading of the comments and critiques would satisfy that. That is why I attributed *vanilla* epistemic scripturalism to you when you commented that you could not *know* whether your axiom is true, yet you could believe it anyway. And if "..natural science fails to get out of the gates" then so has Scripturalism, as they are both extra-biblical propositions. This position has been defeated, the others that Sudduth and Aquascum speak of are defeated. The burden is on you to come up with a *version* of Scripturalism that is not. I don't see how this is really any different than what Jon said yesterday.

And again, for you to say that "ALL systems of knowledge fail and we know nothing at all" is to actually show that you do not 'understand the nature of axioms' and is an inductive generalization, which you reject and despise, since you have not examined *ALL* systems. Anyway, this is still no savior for scripturalism.

In the meantime, you can believe in Scripturalism while I'll maintain my belief in Invisible Pink Unicorns, and though we have not found the 'correct' goggles to view them, it's just a matter of time before we do.

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

 

[Civbert]

Please do some study on the meaning of axioms (presuppositions and first principles are similar terms). Don't take my word for it. And please read my arguments on how one discover their own axioms.

Jon's blog has some excellent articles on epistemology, knowledge, and presuppositions.

Also there is a difference between knowledge and belief which you seem to miss. We often say we have "faith in Jesus" and "we know Jesus". What is the difference? This is critical. Only the Scripturalist can justify the second. There is a lot of baggage in those two phrases and you need to unpack them. Scripturalism can do this without equivocation or resorting to neo-orthodox mystical terms.

I don't think you have address the content of my arguments - which makes me doubt that you have read or understood them. But if you have and do, please show me what my errors are. Assertions are not arguments so if you have a counter argument to my arguments I'd appreciate you giving it. I've demonstrated the errors in Aqua, Sudduth, and Paul's arguments and you have only asserted that I have not. Please explain.

If you don't understand my arguments there is no shame in saying so and asking for clarification. I'm not confused, but that does not mean you will not find my arguments confusing (and if you do, so might others). So rather than asserting that I'm confused, ask me questions that will help you understand my arguments.

 

[Magma2]

Could you substantiate any of these charges (abusive ad hominem, etc)? But whether you could or not, it still doesn't automatically negate any of their critiques.

Saying things like "œvanilla epistemic scripturalists lose their ability to say whether *any* extra-biblical proposition is true or false" is a good example of the kind of abusive ad hominem argument I had in mind as is referring to "œthe deliverances of the sciences and other such evils" is merely to create a caricature of Clark´s position as if it were so easily and cavalierly dismissed.

I appreciate the link but I already have that book.

Good. Maybe others don´t and they´ll actually read it. Clark nowhere characterizes the conclusions of the sciences as "œevil," far from it, but had you read the book you would have known that. Or, if you have, you made my point.

 

[Don]

Good. Maybe others don´t and they´ll actually read it. Clark nowhere characterizes the conclusions of the sciences as "œevil," far from it, but had you read the book you would have known that. Or, if you have, you made my point.

Well I wasn't going to respond anymore as I think this thread has run it's course. Then I saw this comment, and it is almost hilarious. I never meant that literally, Sean but whatever dude. (I have seen this from you on different boards)

Anyway, stop taking all these sideroads and actually come up with something substantive. If you can, maybe someone will respond...

*edited*

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by Don

Good. Maybe others don´t and they´ll actually read it. Clark nowhere characterizes the conclusions of the sciences as "œevil," far from it, but had you read the book you would have known that. Or, if you have, you made my point.

Well I wasn't going to respond anymore as I think this thread has run it's course. Then I saw this comment, and it is almost hilarious. I never meant that literally, Sean and I think a fair reading would show that. (I have seen this from you on different boards)

Anyway, stop taking all these sideroads and actually come up with something substantive. If you can, maybe someone will respond, because I am no longer responding to you. I have seen how you act at other places, so no thanks....

I don't get it. You're now asking Sean not to respond to your request to respond? That is funny.

It's ironic that you are accusing Sean of not posting anything substantive when he is merely responding to your requests for more information. Is your asking Sean to stop taking side-roads nothing but a unsubstantial side-road?

Is this post of mine an abuse ad hominem? I suppose it's a bit of a jab. But since I'm not making any argument here - not even saying anything substantive, it is just a continuation of the side road on which you are also driving on.

I think that's funny. The jokes on me too!

If anyone wants to come along they can respond to the response to that response. As long as they don't post anything substantive.

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Civbert]

 

[Don]

Originally posted by Civbert

Originally posted by Don

Good. Maybe others don´t and they´ll actually read it. Clark nowhere characterizes the conclusions of the sciences as "œevil," far from it, but had you read the book you would have known that. Or, if you have, you made my point.

Well I wasn't going to respond anymore as I think this thread has run it's course. Then I saw this comment, and it is almost hilarious. I never meant that literally, Sean and I think a fair reading would show that. (I have seen this from you on different boards)

Anyway, stop taking all these sideroads and actually come up with something substantive. If you can, maybe someone will respond...

I don't get it. You're now asking Sean not to respond to your request to respond? That is funny.

It's ironic that you are accusing Sean of not posting anything substantive when he is merely responding to your requests for more information. Is your asking Sean to stop taking side-roads nothing but a unsubstantial side-road?

Is this post of mine an abuse ad hominem? I suppose it's a bit of a jab. But since I'm not making any argument here - not even saying anything substantive, it is just a continuation of the side road on which you are also driving.

I think that's funny.

If anyone wants to come along they can respond to the response to that response. As long as they don't post anything substantive.

This is incredible! Calling aquascum a coward and making blanket accusations of abusive ad hominems and then repeating yourself when not dealing with any of the actual arguments raised is not substantial. I now see why aquascum may want to remain anonymous.

See ya

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by Don

Originally posted by Civbert

Originally posted by Don

Good. Maybe others don´t and they´ll actually read it. Clark nowhere characterizes the conclusions of the sciences as "œevil," far from it, but had you read the book you would have known that. Or, if you have, you made my point.

Well I wasn't going to respond anymore as I think this thread has run it's course. Then I saw this comment, and it is almost hilarious. I never meant that literally, Sean and I think a fair reading would show that. (I have seen this from you on different boards)

Anyway, stop taking all these sideroads and actually come up with something substantive. If you can, maybe someone will respond, because I am no longer responding to you. I have seen how you act at other places, so no thanks....

I don't get it. You're now asking Sean not to respond to your request to respond? That is funny.

It's ironic that you are accusing Sean of not posting anything substantive when he is merely responding to your requests for more information. Is your asking Sean to stop taking side-roads nothing but a unsubstantial side-road?

Is this post of mine an abuse ad hominem? I suppose it's a bit of a jab. But since I'm not making any argument here - not even saying anything substantive, it is just a continuation of the side road on which you are also driving.

I think that's funny.

If anyone wants to come along they can respond to the response to that response. As long as they don't post anything substantive.

This is incredible! Calling aquascum a coward and making blanket accusations of abusive ad hominems and then repeating yourself when not dealing with any of the actual arguments raised is not substantial. I now see why aquascum may want to remain anonymous. Sean can respond all he wants, but I will not.

See ya

Don, I was hoping you'd see the humor in my last post. Sure it was a jab at you. But it was ironic because it applies to me too. Laugh a little, see the irony of this situation. We're both driving on the same side-road - posting these pointless little comments (the last three of four - not all of them). As long as we're not saying anything substantial, we might as well laugh at ourselves a little.

Just ribbing you some and hoping you'll lighten up. I need to do the same sometimes.

huh? come on....gives us a smile.

... ... ... ...

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Magma2

1)Can one know that scripturalism is true

Can one know that the Scriptures are true? Becasue that is what you're asking, since per Clark the Scriptures are the axiom on which the Christian system rests. In his debate with Mavrodes Clark called the axiom he was contending for the "Westminister Principle" (if you want to read an exchange between two real "world class" philosophers, see Mavrodes attack on Scripturalism at http://www.trinityfoundation.org/new_article.php?id=2 and Clark's reply at http://www.trinityfoundation.org/new_article.php?id=1).

So what does the Confession say?

We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverend esteem of the holy scripture, and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole, (which is to give all glory to God,) the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.

Are you attempting to say that you know scripturalism is true because the Holy Spirit has told you so?

2)Can one know that a necessary part of the definition of knowledge is infallible certainty.

Infallible certainty is not a necessary part of the definition of knowledge. Knowledge is justified true belief. Certainty is a psychological state of mind, but only propositions can be either true or false.

[/quote]

Fair enough. Then my question is what do you mean by the term "opinion?" The way the term is usually used is to say that you are somehow unsure about the truth of a certain statement.

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Fair enough. Then my question is what do you mean by the term "opinion?" The way the term is usually used is to say that you are somehow unsure about the truth of a certain statement.

This was probably not meant for me but....

The only epistemological difference between a proposition that is knowledge and one that is opinion, is knowledge propositions can it be deduced from a prior knowledge propositions. Knowledge is justified true belief. Opinion is belief.

Axioms are unique "opinions" in that we must and do necessarily assume they true or there can be no knowledge to deduce. That we can not prove axioms is a red herring that Aquascum says makes Scripturalism untenable. If he is consistent, he will admit that all rational theories on knowledge are therefore untenable.

To directly address your comment about the meaning of opinion, you are right, normally an opinion means the truth of a statement is uncertain. But the technicalle (or epistemological) meaning of opinion means only a belief in the truth of a proposition that is not proven or provable true. "Certainty" is a psychological state of feeling sure. But in the epistemological sense of knowledge and opinion, certainty is not an issue. The issue is: can something believe be justified true, or do we just believe it is true.

Axioms can not be justified (proven). That does not have any bearing on how certain we can believe them. You can not justify knowing a plane can fly you from here to LA, but you may be very certain of the opinion if you're not afraid to take the trip. Certainty is not a necessary component of opinion or even knowledge.

Cheung says all extra-biblical propositions - those that are not Scripture or deduced therefrom - are "at best, unjustified opinions." Now if Aquascum were being faithful to the clear intent of Cheung, he would have to be clear that Cheung is not including the Axiom of Scripture among these propositions. For instants: all men are sinners. What about Jesus? Well clearly the statement does not intend to include Jesus. Aquascum has taken Cheung's words and applied them where they were not intended, and he is being disingenuous in doing this.

Aquascum's mixing of the technical meaning of opinion with the psychological sense invalidates his arguments. He can not have it both ways not matter how Cheung used the term he quoted. He must consider the intent of the author or his logic is flawed. And Aquascum's logic is flawed unless he is willing to say all knowledge is impossible.



[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Civbert]

 

[Magma2]

Let me answer your questions in reverse order:

Fair enough. Then my question is what do you mean by the term "opinion?" The way the term is usually used is to say that you are somehow unsure about the truth of a certain statement.

I work in right wing grassroots politics. I work for groups that want to curb the unfettered and unbridled power of labor unions, to protect the right of Americans to keep and bear firearms, to end abortion-on-demand, to reduce the tax burden on American families and minimize the size of government, to curb illegal immigration, and the list goes one. Consequently, most people I come in contact with have some very definite opinions about any number of things and don´t seem unsure in the least. Frankly, in my opinion that most of their opinions are true most of the time. Further, as you can imagine, I have many opinions of my own about any number of things from the mundane to the marginally profound, but where opinions may or may not be true, knowledge is always true. For what it's worth I like to think all my opinions are true, but I realize that is just sinful human pride. Therefore, since I accept axiomatically that the Bible alone is the Word of God and that knowledge requires an account, unless an opinion can be accounted for per the Scriptures, my chosen axiom by God´s grace, I see no reason to call it knowledge.

Now, the problem is how does someone account for opinions or beliefs apart from Scripture; i.e., per a different starting point or axiom or set of axioms? Don seems to take umbrage at the notion that science does not arrive at knowledge, but rather deals with hypotheses which may or may not be true (sounds like an opinion, doesn´t it) But if science, which is arguably the crown of empirical presuppositions and the center of human pride fails to account for the truth of its conclusions, why do we call such guesses, as educated as they may be, knowledge?

In any case, the long an short is that if opinions never rise to the level of knowledge, this is not to suggest that they don´t function extremely well most of the time and in many areas of life. But knowledge, if we´re going to call it that, requires an account.

Are you attempting to say that you know scripturalism is true because the Holy Spirit has told you so?

I don´t know that it was an attempt, but merely an assertion which is made per the Confession. But rather than having me drone on with an answer, and since I evidently can´t even answer Don´s questions to me without irritating him, I let Clark answer your question from his reply to Mavrodes (which I cited above):

Mavrodes briefly alludes to detailed difficulties in the problem of the canon. He could have mentioned others, and I have no interest in minimizing them. He also chiefly and rightly insists on the importance of the canon, for if "Romans and Isaiah were not canonical, while Tobit and II Maccabees were, then [our] faith and practice might also be somewhat altered." Then, repeating the objection he says, "The Westminster Principle, then, makes the question of canonicity crucial, and simultaneously makes it unanswerable."

With commendable perceptiveness Mavrodes notices that Abraham also poses the same unanswerable question: "How did Abraham know that it was God who called him to Mt. Moriah, rather than the devil?" But though Mavrodes candidly admits that he cannot answer, an answer is required. Carnell once tried to answer it by appealing to anticipatory ideas of decency; but rather clearly such ideas would have led Abraham to conclude that the command to sacrifice Isaac came from Satan.

Mavrodes still further generalizes the question: "How [do] we come to know God?" This question too, as it includes its subsidiary forms, is one to be emphasized. Until a theologian has answered this question, he has no ground for objection to any view. He may express dissatisfaction with the Westminster principle; he may say, "I just don't believe it"; but he can have no logical reasons or well based objections. Dissatisfaction, if it occurs, should rather be directed against failure to answer these questions. To sit speechless cannot be accepted as our goal. Those who discuss religious problems, whether they be Calvinists or humanists, must be pressed to explain how God can be known---or, in the latter case, how values can be known when there is no God. The battle is between views or answers; the battle is not between a view and silence.

Now, as it appears, I have a view to propose. It is the Westminster Principle, or the Axiom, for I believe they are identical. This Principle, so my argument runs, does not founder on the contradiction Mavrodes indicated. Recall that he set in opposition the Principle that all truth must be deduced from Scripture and a list of canonical books for which no verses can be cited. This seems to me to be a misunderstanding of the Confession.

There are two reasons why this seems to be a misunderstanding. In the earlier part of this reply, I argued that Mavrodes treated the Axiom as if the Bible were a mere word without content. Obviously from a word, nothing can be inferred. But such a nominalistic procedure is clearly not intended. Similarly, the Confession, when it says that all things necessary for the glory of God can be deduced from Scripture, does not use Scripture as an empty word. The Confession goes further, as I did not, and defines what it means by Scripture. The canonical list therefore is not a theorem deduced from the Axiom; it is a part of the Axiom itself in that it is the definition of its chief term. Hence the related objections fall away.

Although this seems to be sufficient to answer Mavrodes' logical difficulties, there is a second point necessary to remove some lingering dissatisfaction. Mention has been made of Abraham and his conviction that God, not Satan, was speaking. This is essentially similar to the conviction that the Bible is the word of God and not the lying words of the devil.

Relative to this matter, the Confession makes a statement Professor Mavrodes did not quote. I urge my readers to consider it carefully, for it indicates how one comes to believe that the Bible is the word of God, or, in more technical language, how one comes to adopt the Axiom. Chapter One, section five says: "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverend esteem of the holy scripture [though today many people would pay no attention to any Church, particularly to those who believe the Bible]; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts [each of which the humanists contest], . . . are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts."

It may not be amiss at this point to expand the historical reference. The Westminster Confession is not the only Reformation creed, nor is it alone in this assertion. Permit therefore one or two additional citations.

The Belgic Confession (A.D. 1561) after mentioning the sixty-six books, continues in Article V, "We receive all these books, and these only, as holy and canonical . . . believing without any doubt all things contained in them, not so much because the Church receives and approves them as such, but more especially because the Holy Ghost witnesseth in our hearts that they are from God, whereof they carry the evidence in themselves. For the very blind are able to perceive that the things foretold in them are fulfilling [les choses adviennent qui y sont prédites]."

Perhaps someone might interpret the last sentence of this Article as inconsistent with the testimony of the Spirit. But even on this interpretation, which is not a necessary one, it is clear that the identity of the canon does not rest on a barely discernible, indeed a hypothetical Jewish council. The Reformation thus escaped the frustration of historicism.

The French Confession of Faith (A.D. 1559) also says, "We know these books to be canonical ... not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church, as by the testimony of the Holy Spirit, who enables us to distinguish them from other ecclesiastical books . . ."

The statements of these creeds mean that adherence to Scripture is not a deduction from sensory experience, nor the result of anticipations of decency, nor even of archaeological confirmation. Confidence in Scripture is the result of the inward working of the Holy Ghost. Note particularly that this illumination of the Spirit is not an additional revelation. He does not give us any additional information. He does not witness to our spirits, but with our spirits (Rom. 8:16), and here explicitly by and with the word (cf. Can I Trust My Bible, chapter one, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired," Moody Press, 1963).

This too is how Abraham knew it was God and not Satan who commanded him to kill Isaac. Anticipations of decency, religious experience, joy, pain, and crisis, which Professor Mavrodes goes on to mention, would all have suggested that the command to kill Isaac came from Satan. Similarly Edwin A. Burtt in Types of Religious Philosophy argues that Christ advocated an immoral labor and economic theory, and on other grounds too experience shows that Christ is inferior to modern ideals. When such humanists are convinced also that the Bible is historically inaccurate and is full of contradictions, it is clear that "the consent of the parts and the heavenliness of the matter" cannot be made into convincing arguments. Neither argument nor (what is the same thing) preaching can produce faith. Faith is the immediate result of regeneration. God changes our minds and causes us to believe.

This work of the Holy Spirit does not occur without preaching and argument. Though belief is caused by the Holy Spirit alone, the content of the belief is presented by human messengers. Abstractly God might have used some other method of propagating the Gospel; to say this is the way it is done is not to limit God's power -- it merely describes his method.

This method, which becomes the method of the preacher, needs one final clarification before the concluding paragraph is reached. The difficulties with the canon are well known; destructive criticism is our daily enemy; archaeology gives us cause for rejoicing. But if we depend on the testimony of the Spirit, can we discuss these details with non-Christians, or must we ignore the objections? Does not Reformed theology cut the lines of communication?

To which my reply is: Let us use as much archaeological evidence as we can find. Let us go into great detail on J, E, D, and P. We shall discuss the presence of camels in Egypt in 2000 B.C., and the hypothetical council of Jamnia. But our arguments will be entirely ad hominem. We shall show that the principles our opponents use destroy their own conclusions; that their critical procedures on Genesis cannot be applied to Homer's Iliad; that their historiography ruins Caesar's Gallic Wars. The argument is ad hominem and elenctic. When finally the opponent is reduced to silence and we can get in a word edgewise, we present the word of God and pray that God cause him to believe.

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Magma2]

 

[Don]

[/quote]

Don, I was hoping you'd see the humor in my last post. Sure it was a jab at you. But it was ironic because it applies to me too. Laugh a little, see the irony of this situation. We're both driving on the same side-road - posting these pointless little comments (the last three of four - not all of them). As long as we're not saying anything substantial, we might as well laugh at ourselves a little.

Just ribbing you some and hoping you'll lighten up. I need to do the same sometimes.

huh? come on....gives us a smile.

... ... ... ... [/quote]


I'm not mad brother! I did respond with a little too much emotion so I apologize to everyone...

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Don]

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Civbert

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Fair enough. Then my question is what do you mean by the term "opinion?" The way the term is usually used is to say that you are somehow unsure about the truth of a certain statement.

This was probably not meant for me but....

You both have used the term "opinion" in a negative term, so it was not necessary directed at you

The only epistemological difference between a proposition that is knowledge and one that is opinion, is knowledge propositions can it be deduced from a prior knowledge propositions. Knowledge is justified true belief. Opinion is belief.

You can get justified true belief and not have knowledge, as seen by the standard gettier cases. One can also make the argument that one can have knowledge without justification in certain cases. (As an aside, it seems that that some definitions are used as if they are the only definitions possible, and they really are not. If I wish to define knowledge as something other than what you wish to define it is as, then we just have to disagree.)

Axioms are unique "opinions" in that we must and do necessarily assume they true or there can be no knowledge to deduce.

Fair enough, so I guess the question is if "scripturalism" is one of those opinions that without it, no knowledge could be possible.

That we can not prove axioms is a red herring that Aquascum says makes Scripturalism untenable. If he is consistent, he will admit that all rational theories on knowledge are therefore untenable.

The problem here is that you are attempting to offer an internal critique of Aquascum's plan of attack, while using your own presuppositions. You must remember that aquascum et. al those who oppose scripturalism have a bunch of tools that you dont have in your tool box. Your refusual to acknowledge them does not make those tools valid or invalid. You have to fight him using the tools of his system not the tools of yours, if you critique is to have any force.

His argument is that you have to claim certain things on your system in order to have a coherent system. If your system is not coherent "on your own terms, then that is your problem not his.

To directly address your comment about the meaning of opinion, you are right, normally an opinion means the truth of a statement is uncertain. But the technicalle (or epistemological) meaning of opinion means only a belief in the truth of a proposition that is not proven or provable true.

Unless you can somehow force me to accept that definition, then all you have done is give me your opinion which I can reject or accept. And I reject your definition.

I do not have to give you a syllogism in order to know something. I can just say "I saw you do it, therefore I know you did it."

"Certainty" is a psychological state of feeling sure. But in the epistemological sense of knowledge and opinion, certainty is not an issue. The issue is: can something believe be justified true, or do we just believe it is true.

Here is a link to a good discussion on the issue of certainty. I think you are conflating two different kinds of certainty:

http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2005Certainty.htm

Axioms can not be justified (proven). That does not have any bearing on how certain we can believe them. You can not justify knowing a plane can fly you from here to LA, but you may be very certain of the opinion if you're not afraid to take the trip. Certainty is not a necessary component of opinion or even knowledge.

Alright, then you really have no objection than calling something arrived at inductively as knowledge, besides a base assertion.

Cheung says all extra-biblical propositions - those that are not Scripture or deduced therefrom - are "at best, unjustified opinions."

That is false, because the proposition that X is a murderer is not found in scripture but we can be justified in saying that X is so, if we go about the method of justification properly.

CT

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Magma2
Let me answer your questions in reverse order:

Fair enough. Then my question is what do you mean by the term "opinion?" The way the term is usually used is to say that you are somehow unsure about the truth of a certain statement.

I work in right wing grassroots politics. I work for groups that want to curb the unfettered and unbridled power of labor unions, to protect the right of Americans to keep and bear firearms, to end abortion-on-demand, to reduce the tax burden on American families and minimize the size of government, to curb illegal immigration, and the list goes one. Consequently, most people I come in contact with have some very definite opinions about any number of things and don´t seem unsure in the least. Frankly, in my opinion that most of their opinions are true most of the time. Further, as you can imagine, I have many opinions of my own about any number of things from the mundane to the marginally profound, but where opinions may or may not be true, knowledge is always true.

According to your definition. According to others, knowledge is defeatable. You have defend your position that knowledge is not defeatable.

For what it's worth I like to think all my opinions are true, but I realize that is just sinful human pride. Therefore, since I accept axiomatically that the Bible alone is the Word of God and that knowledge requires an account, unless an opinion can be accounted for per the Scriptures, my chosen axiom by God´s grace, I see no reason to call it knowledge.

So you are using your opinions to define knowledge, which a person can accept or reject?

Also when you say knowledge requires an account, what do you mean by the term, account?

Now, the problem is how does someone account for opinions or beliefs apart from Scripture; i.e., per a different starting point or axiom or set of axioms? Don seems to take umbrage at the notion that science does not arrive at knowledge, but rather deals with hypotheses which may or may not be true (sounds like an opinion, doesn´t it)

If that is you definition of how opinion is defined

But if science, which is arguably the crown of empirical presuppositions and the center of human pride fails to account for the truth of its conclusions, why do we call such guesses, as educated as they may be, knowledge?

The issue is can one justify (at least some propositions) that science gives. The answer is yes. At the very least you can establish them by peer review, which is consistent with the two or more witness requirement for establishing things into the public record. Is it possible to get such wrong, yep. But so.

The difference between opinion and knowledge is the doing of due dilligence to reach a conclusion. We are disagreeing over what due dilligence must be done.

In any case, the long an short is that if opinions never rise to the level of knowledge, this is not to suggest that they don´t function extremely well most of the time and in many areas of life. But knowledge, if we´re going to call it that, requires an account.

Again you need to define account, and then on top of that, you need to show that it is somehow necessary that I accept that definition.

Are you attempting to say that you know scripturalism is true because the Holy Spirit has told you so?

I don´t know that it was an attempt, but merely an assertion which is made per the Confession. But rather than having me drone on with an answer, and since I evidently can´t even answer Don´s questions to me without irritating him, I let Clark answer your question from his reply to Mavrodes (which I cited above):

Mavrodes briefly alludes to detailed difficulties in the problem of the canon. He could have mentioned others, and I have no interest in minimizing them. He also chiefly and rightly insists on the importance of the canon, for if "Romans and Isaiah were not canonical, while Tobit and II Maccabees were, then [our] faith and practice might also be somewhat altered." Then, repeating the objection he says, "The Westminster Principle, then, makes the question of canonicity crucial, and simultaneously makes it unanswerable."

With commendable perceptiveness Mavrodes notices that Abraham also poses the same unanswerable question: "How did Abraham know that it was God who called him to Mt. Moriah, rather than the devil?" But though Mavrodes candidly admits that he cannot answer, an answer is required. Carnell once tried to answer it by appealing to anticipatory ideas of decency; but rather clearly such ideas would have led Abraham to conclude that the command to sacrifice Isaac came from Satan.

Mavrodes still further generalizes the question: "How [do] we come to know God?" This question too, as it includes its subsidiary forms, is one to be emphasized. Until a theologian has answered this question, he has no ground for objection to any view. He may express dissatisfaction with the Westminster principle; he may say, "I just don't believe it"; but he can have no logical reasons or well based objections. Dissatisfaction, if it occurs, should rather be directed against failure to answer these questions. To sit speechless cannot be accepted as our goal. Those who discuss religious problems, whether they be Calvinists or humanists, must be pressed to explain how God can be known---or, in the latter case, how values can be known when there is no God. The battle is between views or answers; the battle is not between a view and silence.

Now, as it appears, I have a view to propose. It is the Westminster Principle, or the Axiom, for I believe they are identical. This Principle, so my argument runs, does not founder on the contradiction Mavrodes indicated. Recall that he set in opposition the Principle that all truth must be deduced from Scripture and a list of canonical books for which no verses can be cited. This seems to me to be a misunderstanding of the Confession.

There are two reasons why this seems to be a misunderstanding. In the earlier part of this reply, I argued that Mavrodes treated the Axiom as if the Bible were a mere word without content. Obviously from a word, nothing can be inferred. But such a nominalistic procedure is clearly not intended. Similarly, the Confession, when it says that all things necessary for the glory of God can be deduced from Scripture, does not use Scripture as an empty word. The Confession goes further, as I did not, and defines what it means by Scripture. The canonical list therefore is not a theorem deduced from the Axiom; it is a part of the Axiom itself in that it is the definition of its chief term. Hence the related objections fall away.

Although this seems to be sufficient to answer Mavrodes' logical difficulties, there is a second point necessary to remove some lingering dissatisfaction. Mention has been made of Abraham and his conviction that God, not Satan, was speaking. This is essentially similar to the conviction that the Bible is the word of God and not the lying words of the devil.

Relative to this matter, the Confession makes a statement Professor Mavrodes did not quote. I urge my readers to consider it carefully, for it indicates how one comes to believe that the Bible is the word of God, or, in more technical language, how one comes to adopt the Axiom. Chapter One, section five says: "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverend esteem of the holy scripture [though today many people would pay no attention to any Church, particularly to those who believe the Bible]; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts [each of which the humanists contest], . . . are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts."

It may not be amiss at this point to expand the historical reference. The Westminster Confession is not the only Reformation creed, nor is it alone in this assertion. Permit therefore one or two additional citations.

The Belgic Confession (A.D. 1561) after mentioning the sixty-six books, continues in Article V, "We receive all these books, and these only, as holy and canonical . . . believing without any doubt all things contained in them, not so much because the Church receives and approves them as such, but more especially because the Holy Ghost witnesseth in our hearts that they are from God, whereof they carry the evidence in themselves. For the very blind are able to perceive that the things foretold in them are fulfilling [les choses adviennent qui y sont prédites]."

Perhaps someone might interpret the last sentence of this Article as inconsistent with the testimony of the Spirit. But even on this interpretation, which is not a necessary one, it is clear that the identity of the canon does not rest on a barely discernible, indeed a hypothetical Jewish council. The Reformation thus escaped the frustration of historicism.

The French Confession of Faith (A.D. 1559) also says, "We know these books to be canonical ... not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church, as by the testimony of the Holy Spirit, who enables us to distinguish them from other ecclesiastical books . . ."

The statements of these creeds mean that adherence to Scripture is not a deduction from sensory experience, nor the result of anticipations of decency, nor even of archaeological confirmation. Confidence in Scripture is the result of the inward working of the Holy Ghost. Note particularly that this illumination of the Spirit is not an additional revelation. He does not give us any additional information. He does not witness to our spirits, but with our spirits (Rom. 8:16), and here explicitly by and with the word (cf. Can I Trust My Bible, chapter one, "How May I Know the Bible is Inspired," Moody Press, 1963).

This too is how Abraham knew it was God and not Satan who commanded him to kill Isaac. Anticipations of decency, religious experience, joy, pain, and crisis, which Professor Mavrodes goes on to mention, would all have suggested that the command to kill Isaac came from Satan. Similarly Edwin A. Burtt in Types of Religious Philosophy argues that Christ advocated an immoral labor and economic theory, and on other grounds too experience shows that Christ is inferior to modern ideals. When such humanists are convinced also that the Bible is historically inaccurate and is full of contradictions, it is clear that "the consent of the parts and the heavenliness of the matter" cannot be made into convincing arguments. Neither argument nor (what is the same thing) preaching can produce faith. Faith is the immediate result of regeneration. God changes our minds and causes us to believe.

This work of the Holy Spirit does not occur without preaching and argument. Though belief is caused by the Holy Spirit alone, the content of the belief is presented by human messengers. Abstractly God might have used some other method of propagating the Gospel; to say this is the way it is done is not to limit God's power -- it merely describes his method.

This method, which becomes the method of the preacher, needs one final clarification before the concluding paragraph is reached. The difficulties with the canon are well known; destructive criticism is our daily enemy; archaeology gives us cause for rejoicing. But if we depend on the testimony of the Spirit, can we discuss these details with non-Christians, or must we ignore the objections? Does not Reformed theology cut the lines of communication?

To which my reply is: Let us use as much archaeological evidence as we can find. Let us go into great detail on J, E, D, and P. We shall discuss the presence of camels in Egypt in 2000 B.C., and the hypothetical council of Jamnia. But our arguments will be entirely ad hominem. We shall show that the principles our opponents use destroy their own conclusions; that their critical procedures on Genesis cannot be applied to Homer's Iliad; that their historiography ruins Caesar's Gallic Wars. The argument is ad hominem and elenctic. When finally the opponent is reduced to silence and we can get in a word edgewise, we present the word of God and pray that God cause him to believe.

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Magma2]

Is there something in there that defends the claim that I must accept scripturalism if I accept that the Bible is the infallible word of God or that if I fight scripturalism, then I am fighting the Holy Spirit?

 

[Magma2]

According to your definition. According to others, knowledge is defeatable. You have defend your position that knowledge is not defeatable.

Not sure what you´re asking?

So you are using your opinions to define knowledge, which a person can accept or reject?

Again, not sure what you´re asking? Opinions don´t define knowledge. Knowledge is a true opinion with an account of it´s truth.

Also when you say knowledge requires an account, what do you mean by the term, account?

I´m not using account in any specialized way, I just mean a reasoned argument.

If that is you definition of how opinion is defined

An opinion is "œa belief or conclusion held with confidence but not substantiated by positive knowledge or proof." Again, not anything specialized.

The issue is can one justify (at least some propositions) that science gives. The answer is yes. At the very least you can establish them by peer review, which is consistent with the two or more witness requirement for establishing things into the public record. Is it possible to get such wrong, yep. But so.

Well, you´re wrong. Science cannot justify even one of the propositions it "œgives." Karl Popper said science is nothing more than hypotheses and their refutations. The conclusions of science are always tentative and Clark demonstrates in great detail why the conclusions of science are always false. I recommend you read his book The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God.

The difference between opinion and knowledge is the doing of due dilligence to reach a conclusion. We are disagreeing over what due dilligence must be done.

Correct. You evidently believe that the testimony of two or more witnesses or the conclusion reached at the end of a fallacious argument qualifies as due diligence. Valid deductions from true premises will always result in true conclusions. OTOH if witnesses and peer reviews get things wrong, on what basis can you know that they get things right?

Again you need to define account, and then on top of that, you need to show that it is somehow necessary that I accept that definition.

It´s not necessary that you accept anything.

Is there something in there that defends the claim that I must accept scripturalism if I accept that the Bible is the infallible word of God or that if I fight scripturalism, then I am fighting the Holy Spirit?

I think the Scripturalism of Gordon Clark is biblical. I think the problem is that very few have actually read Clark. Instead they read his critics.

 

[Magma2]

Unless you can somehow force me to accept that definition, then all you have done is give me your opinion which I can reject or accept. And I reject your definition.

Sorry Anthony, just a quick question for Hermonta.

If you don´t accept how the word "œopinion" has been defined, that´s fine. No one has asked you to accept this definition. If you´d care to offer another one, why don´t you share it?

I do not have to give you a syllogism in order to know something. I can just say "I saw you do it, therefore I know you did it."

So are you going to equate opinions with knowledge? I guess you would. But, let me ask, how do you know you saw him "œdo it"?

 

[Civbert]

Thanks for the detailed reply. I'll take this one chunk at a time if that's OK. If I miss something critical, let me know.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert
The only epistemological difference between a proposition that is knowledge and one that is opinion, is knowledge propositions can it be deduced from a prior knowledge propositions. Knowledge is justified true belief. Opinion is belief.

You can get justified true belief and not have knowledge, as seen by the standard gettier cases. One can also make the argument that one can have knowledge without justification in certain cases. (As an aside, it seems that that some definitions are used as if they are the only definitions possible, and they really are not. If I wish to define knowledge as something other than what you wish to define it is as, then we just have to disagree.)
...CT

First Gettier was offering a smoke and mirrors situation - his classical case against "knowledge is justified true belief" depends on his understanding of the terms of the definition - a basically, I think he was blowing smoke.

Also, you were asking for me to define my view of "opinion" as a Scripturalist, or how I think Scripturalism uses the term. If you want to disagree with my definitions, that's OK, but we need to be careful. If you argue against my logic, you need to adopt my definitions as I use them to show my reasoning is faulty. And while you have not done that here, that is what Aquascum did to Cheung.

And I can not use force my definitions of the terms you are using to critique your arguments, if adopting your definitions makes your arguments sound. To be just, I need to understand your definitions and see if your logic is sound or faulty using your terms as you define them. That is why the phrase "for the sake of arguments, let us agree....".

[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Civbert]

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert

Axioms are unique "opinions" in that we must and do necessarily assume they true or there can be no knowledge to deduce.

Fair enough, so I guess the question is if "scripturalism" is one of those opinions that without it, no knowledge could be possible.

...
CT

I don't know. But I do believe it is the case.

While I think there is a kind of innate knowledge, that we do not get from Scripture - this can not be justified in an epistemological sense. And God certainly has not revealed all of His knowledge since there are still some things only known by God. So other than possible innate propositions, I do not believe there is any other way for a person to "know" outside the Axiom of Scripture.

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert

That we can not prove axioms is a red herring that Aquascum says makes Scripturalism untenable. If he is consistent, he will admit that all rational theories on knowledge are therefore untenable.

The problem here is that you are attempting to offer an internal critique of Aquascum's plan of attack, while using your own presuppositions. ....

That's actually what Aquascum has done. Remember, he is critiquing Scripturalism as Cheung expresses it. But he does so by ignoring Cheung's intent. It's easy to make someone position look bad if you conveniently ignore what the person is trying to convey.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader
...You must remember that aquascum et. al those who oppose scripturalism have a bunch of tools that you dont have in your tool box. Your refusual to acknowledge them does not make those tools valid or invalid. ...

Tools are not the issue. If you mean he's using his own smoke and mirrors, that I agree with. But if Aquascum is really a knowledgeable philosopher, and yet he believes that you can ignore how axioms work with systems of thought, then it's like trying to fix a car with paper tools and saying "see, it doesn't work".

Originally posted by ChristianTrader
... You have to fight him using the tools of his system not the tools of yours, if you critique is to have any force....

It's not his system that is in questions, it the system called Scripturalism that is being argued about. No, the burden is on Aquascum to use the correct tools of Scripturalism - to understand how presuppositionalism works. He needs to understand how axioms work (a concept he conveniently ignores) and how this works within Scripturalism. After all - it's Aquascum that is claiming that Scripturalism is incoherent - but its only incoherent if we adopt Aquascum's terms - his system of paper tools.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader
His argument is that you have to claim certain things on your system in order to have a coherent system. If your system is not coherent "on your own terms, then that is your problem not his.

Ah you see, Aquascum is making a claim here, not giving an augment - a claim is just an assertion. And he claims that Scripturalism makes claims that it simply does not make. At best, he has shown some errors in Cheung's explanations, but Aquascum did this by misrepresenting Cheung's intentions, and saying that Scripturalism demands that it can prove itself internally. This is just not true. And it is not true for any other rational system. So all Aquascum has done is shown a mistake made by Cheung. This does no damage to Scripturalism itself.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert

To directly address your comment about the meaning of opinion, you are right, normally an opinion means the truth of a statement is uncertain. But the technical (or epistemological) meaning of opinion means only a belief in the truth of a proposition that is not proven or provable true.

Unless you can somehow force me to accept that definition, then all you have done is give me your opinion which I can reject or accept. And I reject your definition.

I don't have to force you to do accept anything. But you must adopt my definitions to show that my arguments are fallacious.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

I do not have to give you a syllogism in order to know something. I can just say "I saw you do it, therefore I know you did it."

Really? Prove you saw what you claim. I'm sure you believe you saw what you saw, but since you can't prove it, it is unjustified opinion - on my terms. And this is about Scripturalism. If you want to offer an alternative, you are free to use your own terms. But you may not impose your definitions onto my system.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert

"Certainty" is a psychological state of feeling sure. But in the epistemological sense of knowledge and opinion, certainty is not an issue. The issue is: can something believe be justified true, or do we just believe it is true.

Here is a link to a good discussion on the issue of certainty. I think you are conflating two different kinds of certainty:

http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2005Certainty.htm

I can't have conflated two kinds of certainty since you never gave me your definition, and I could only assume what you meant by "certain". My use was consistent. I'll check out the article though.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert

Axioms can not be justified (proven). That does not have any bearing on how certain we can believe them. You can not justify knowing a plane can fly you from here to LA, but you may be very certain of the opinion if you're not afraid to take the trip. Certainty is not a necessary component of opinion or even knowledge.

Alright, then you really have no objection than calling something arrived at inductively as knowledge, besides a base assertion.

Huh? This does not follow. My example showed that you could NOT know the plane was safe to fly on, but you could be certain or hold that opinion. My system, my terms.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert

Cheung says all extra-biblical propositions - those that are not Scripture or deduced therefrom - are "at best, unjustified opinions."

That is false, because the proposition that X is a murderer is not found in scripture but we can be justified in saying that X is so, if we go about the method of justification properly.

CT

As I showed earlier - we don't "know" X is a murderer, we can only believe X a murderer. At most, we can know X is possible a murderer. It's not knowledge that X is a murder, but knowledge that X is possibly a murderer - which is no longer inductive (no claim is made that "X is a murder" is a fact).

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Magma2

According to your definition. According to others, knowledge is defeatable. You have defend your position that knowledge is not defeatable.

Not sure what you´re asking?

[/quote]

My point is that it seems that you wish to be a definitions "nazi". The issue is if that is a justified position or if you can know that a certain definition is correct. If you cannot control the definitions then the house of cards folds.

So you are using your opinions to define knowledge, which a person can accept or reject?

Again, not sure what you´re asking? Opinions don´t define knowledge. Knowledge is a true opinion with an account of it´s truth.

Something must define knowledge. What is it that defines knowledge? And must I accept your definition of it? If not then I just reject your definition and then the game is done.

Also when you say knowledge requires an account, what do you mean by the term, account?

I´m not using account in any specialized way, I just mean a reasoned argument.

But that must be unpacked. For example, I would say that a reasoned account me of my knowledge that my friend Jeremy was at the movie theater with me at 7:00 pm tonight, is that I saw him there, with me. Would you agree with that?

If that is you definition of how opinion is defined

An opinion is "œa belief or conclusion held with confidence but not substantiated by positive knowledge or proof." Again, not anything specialized.

Positive knowledge? Give me an example?

The issue is can one justify (at least some propositions) that science gives. The answer is yes. At the very least you can establish them by peer review, which is consistent with the two or more witness requirement for establishing things into the public record. Is it possible to get such wrong, yep. But so.

Well, you´re wrong. Science cannot justify even one of the propositions it "œgives." Karl Popper said science is nothing more than hypotheses and their refutations.

And I can agree or disagree with him, right? There is also the issue of what does Popper mean by the term science. There are two main aspects of science, the theorizing of why something occurs and the observation that something occurs under a certain condition. My statement holds in the latter viewpoint, while Popper was addressing the former.

The conclusions of science are always tentative and Clark demonstrates in great detail why the conclusions of science are always false. I recommend you read his book The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God.

I understand his anti-realist position, but he goes a bit farther than he needs to go. That the conclusions are tentative is true but always false is a different matter.

The difference between opinion and knowledge is the doing of due dilligence to reach a conclusion. We are disagreeing over what due dilligence must be done.

Correct. You evidently believe that the testimony of two or more witnesses or the conclusion reached at the end of a fallacious argument qualifies as due diligence.

It is only fallacious if I put it forwards as a deductive argument. If I dont, then I do not overpromise what I can deliver. All you are saying is that the argument is not deductive, which is true but then the question is, So What?

You need to remember that philosophy was done long before Clark and will be done, long after Clark or Robbins.

Valid deductions from true premises will always result in true conclusions.

Very true.

OTOH if witnesses and peer reviews get things wrong, on what basis can you know that they get things right?

Are you asking me for an infallibility criteria? For that would be point three of aquascum's critique of scripturalism.

The knowing would come from more observations. Until the previous observations were shown to be faulty either through bad equipment, fraud etc. We are justified in calling the statements true.

Again you need to define account, and then on top of that, you need to show that it is somehow necessary that I accept that definition.

It´s not necessary that you accept anything.

Alright, then I can just openly say that I reject scripturalism for reasons X, Y and Z (including the issue of bad definining of terms) and there is no high horse you could stand on to refute me, because the definitions etc are just your opinion.

Is there something in there that defends the claim that I must accept scripturalism if I accept that the Bible is the infallible word of God or that if I fight scripturalism, then I am fighting the Holy Spirit?

I think the Scripturalism of Gordon Clark is biblical. I think the problem is that very few have actually read Clark. Instead they read his critics.

But you do not know it to be true, so its an issue of accepting your opinion over someone else', right?

CT

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Magma2

Unless you can somehow force me to accept that definition, then all you have done is give me your opinion which I can reject or accept. And I reject your definition.

Sorry Anthony, just a quick question for Hermonta.

If you don´t accept how the word "œopinion" has been defined, that´s fine. No one has asked you to accept this definition. If you´d care to offer another one, why don´t you share it?

I would loosely define it as a "gut feeling or thought based on the totality of your knowledge but without having studied the issue to much an extent".

But as I said that is very loose.

I do not have to give you a syllogism in order to know something. I can just say "I saw you do it, therefore I know you did it."

So are you going to equate opinions with knowledge? I guess you would. But, let me ask, how do you know you saw him "œdo it"?

I saw you do it. I do not have to go any farther.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Civbert
Thanks for the detailed reply. I'll take this one chunk at a time if that's OK. If I miss something critical, let me know.

Originally posted by ChristianTrader

Originally posted by Civbert
The only epistemological difference between a proposition that is knowledge and one that is opinion, is knowledge propositions can it be deduced from a prior knowledge propositions. Knowledge is justified true belief. Opinion is belief.

You can get justified true belief and not have knowledge, as seen by the standard gettier cases. One can also make the argument that one can have knowledge without justification in certain cases. (As an aside, it seems that that some definitions are used as if they are the only definitions possible, and they really are not. If I wish to define knowledge as something other than what you wish to define it is as, then we just have to disagree.)
...CT

First Gettier was offering a smoke and mirrors situation - his classical case against "knowledge is justified true belief" depends on his understanding of the terms of the definition - a basically, I think he was blowing smoke.

Almost everything comes down to definitions. We are operating with different defs and until you force me over to yours, there really is not much that you can argue or say to me.

I also do not think that he was blowing smoke. But that is just my opinion.

Also, you were asking for me to define my view of "opinion" as a Scripturalist, or how I think Scripturalism uses the term. If you want to disagree with my definitions, that's OK, but we need to be careful. If you argue against my logic, you need to adopt my definitions as I use them to show my reasoning is faulty. And while you have not done that here, that is what Aquascum did to Cheung.

Actually you are just wrong here. I am doing more than one thing. First I am attempting to show that you offer a critique of opposing systems while assuming that scripturalism and its defs are true. That is not how you do an internal critique. If you want to critique my system then you will have to allow me to have my definitions and then see where I end up.

Secondly, I am offering a critique of your defense of scripturalism. Scripturalism (as well as all other systems) promise a number of things. When it is pointed out that some things that scripturalism promises, it cannot deliver, then the response is that no on else can do it either. That response doesnt gain anything, it is just a reductio on scripturalism. That response presupposes that scripturalism is true and therefore everyone else has to play by its rules.

For a system to be coherent it must deliver what it promises. If other systems do not promise the same things as another system, then that is no problem to point out that it does not deliver it.

Another aspect of the same issue is that other systems have other tools than scripturalism. If scripturalism cannot deliver something using its tools but someone else can using their own tools, then that is just more problems with scripturalism.

And I can not use force my definitions of the terms you are using to critique your arguments, if adopting your definitions makes your arguments sound. To be just, I need to understand your definitions and see if your logic is sound or faulty using your terms as you define them. That is why the phrase "for the sake of arguments, let us agree....".
[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Civbert]

Exactly.

 

[Civbert]

ChristianTrader,

If a system of epistemology is the issue, then we need to examine it by it's own terms. What you seem to be doing is saying - I believe in empiricism therefore Scripturalism is false. Well I can say I love is a hairy dog, therefore you don't love me.

Do you see what I mean? You certainly can not defeat Scripturalism by assuming a contrary definition of knowledge - that would be begging the question.

But if you want to go there - how do you know what you saw?

 

[Civbert]

...

And I can not use force my definitions of the terms you are using to critique your arguments, if adopting your definitions makes your arguments sound. To be just, I need to understand your definitions and see if your logic is sound or faulty using your terms as you define them. That is why the phrase "for the sake of arguments, let us agree....".
[Edited on 2-17-2006 by Civbert]

Exactly.

First - Scripturalism is the system of question - so it's terms are the ones we must use - it's methods, it's definitions, it's axioms. Agreed?

Second - you need to demonstrate that Scripturalism has made a promise it can not keep, not assert it. Agreed?

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by ChristianTrader
...
Another aspect of the same issue is that other systems have other tools than Scripturalism. If Scripturalism cannot deliver something using its tools but someone else can using their own tools, then that is just more problems with Scripturalism.

Even so, it does not invalidate or disprove or show any incoherence in Scripturalism. And really, that's the only argument that available against Scripturalism. For instance - it does not allow that one can know oneself. Well that's a real bummer, but it's not a defeater. It might also mean you can not "know" by mere observation, but again this is a bummer, not a defeater. I don't mean to get technical with you but bummers are not defeaters.


But if you want to show that other systems can deliver the goods, you can not do that by changing the definition of knowledge to win your case. This is epistemology - knowledge is the question. Changing the definition of knowledge midstream is equivocating. (I'm not necessarily saying you are doing that, but it's a common tactic.)

So we are back to picking a definition of knowledge and sticking with it if we are going to argue about Scripturalism or compare it to any other epistemology.

Again you need to answer the question - how do you know what you see? It's not enought to just say you see therefore you know. That's not an argument.

 

[Don]

Well it looks like I'm back for a little while...

Even so, it does not invalidate or disprove or show any incoherence in Scripturalism. And really, that's the only argument that available against Scripturalism. For instance - it does not allow that one can know oneself.

How do you know all this Anthony? Is this deducible from Scripture or stated in Scripture? Is this really the *only* argument *available* against Scripturalism? Is it validly deducible from Scripture or stated directly in Scripture that this is the *only* argument available against Scripturalism? Let me remind you that these are all *extra-biblical* propositions and are therefore your opinion and you do not actually *know* any of them. And can someone tell me what opinions are like?

If you want to change your position and claim that you know these, then that's fine with me as you'll end in self-referential incoherence.

Well that's a real bummer, but it's not a defeater. It might also mean you can not "know" by mere observation, but again this is a bummer, not a defeater. I don't mean to get technical with you but bummers are not defeaters.

Where is the Scripture verse that says 'bummers are not defeaters'? Or how is that validly deduced from Scripture? Is this your opinion again?

But if you want to show that other systems can deliver the goods, you can not do that by changing the definition of knowledge to win your case. This is epistemology - knowledge is the question. Changing the definition of knowledge midstream is equivocating. (I'm not necessarily saying you are doing that, but it's a common tactic.)

Again, how can you make these requirements of anyone when they are not validly deduced from Scripture or stated in Scripture? Do you *know* what equivocating is or do you have an *opinion* of what it is? If you know it, how did you deduce it?

Again you need to answer the question - how do you know what you see? It's not enought to just say you see therefore you know. That's not an argument.

Where is this bible verse? Where is the deduction from Scripture that Hermonta needs to answer this question?

Since we can only know things either validly deduced from Scripture or stated in Scripture, I want to see some 'deductions', now!

If any of this is just your 'unjustified opinion', then who cares about it? *This can be said for every one of your statements that are not deducible from Scripture or stated in Scripture and you will end in radical skepticism*.

I've been reading through some of the posts, and have seen several *inductive generalizations*. These are not knowledge Anthony, you know when you say that *all* systems fail and the like - and we know that induction is all wet, so no more claims to knowledge like this.



*edited*

*Now if you just want to say that you have confidence in your opinions and it's not really knowledge, then I want to ask how this 'confidence' was obtained. How did you gain *any* epistemic credentials for having any more confidence in these opinions*

If you want to that it's functional and just works, then science and many other theories work, so what gives Scripturalism any more validity.

The answers to the above paragraphs would need to be validly deducible from Scripture or stated in it.

Oh and please deduce the laws of logic from scripture as well without *PRESUPPOSING* them either before or while you are deducing them!

Regards,
Don

[Edited on 2-18-2006 by Don]