Aquinas vs the Reformers on the Donum Superadditum

[TryingToLearn]

Richard Muller in his Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms in defining the donum superadditum states that,

Aquinas maintained that the donum superadditum was part of the original constitution of man and that its loss was the loss of the original capacity for righteousness. Since the superadded grace was not merited in the beginning, it cannot be regained by merit after the fall.

Then in defining the Reformed counter donum concreatum states,

The Protestant argument was that the donum gratuitum, the utterly free gift, of iustitia originalis(q.v.) was part of the original constitution of man and therefore a donum concreatum, naturale, or intrinsecum rather than something superadded to the original constitution of man. By extension, the loss of the iustitia originalis in the fall was the loss of something fundamental to the constitution of man that could be resupplied only be a divine act and not, as the semi-Pelagian tendency in late medieval Scotism and nominalism indicated, something superadded that could be regained by a minimal act of human obedience.

So, my question, then is what exactly is the difference between Thomas and the Reformers on this? Both affirm it was part of the original constitution of man and cannot be regained by obedience.

I've read elsewhere that Bavinck's critique of the donum was not accurate to what Thomas believed (so John Bolt argues) but rather was against the Catholic interpretation of Thomas at his time. That's fine and useful as far as it goes, but where can I read a Reformed critique of Thomas' actual position?

 

[RamistThomist]

So, my question, then is what exactly is the difference between Thomas and the Reformers on this? Both affirm it was part of the original constitution of man and cannot be regained by obedience.

Rome: Grace perfects nature. The donum is something added on to man.
Reformed: Grace restores nature. No need for a donum.

 

[TryingToLearn]

Rome: Grace perfects nature. The donum is something added on to man.
Reformed: Grace restores nature. No need for a donum.

What do you mean by "perfects"? It seems to me the Reformed are saying more than that grace "restores" nature unto what Adam had, rather, grace goes beyond that and brings in the inauguration of the New Creation, so in that sense, we can say it "perfects" nature unto it's original goal.

And if Aquinas affirms the donum is part of the original constitution of man, how can it be something added to it?

 

[RamistThomist]

What do you mean by "perfects"? It seems to me the Reformed are saying more than that grace "restores" nature unto what Adam had, rather, grace goes beyond that and brings in the inauguration of the New Creation, so in that sense, we can say it "perfects" nature unto it's original goal.

And if Aquinas affirms the donum is part of the original constitution of man, how can it be something added to it?

Depending on the interpretation, "perfects" implies an original lack in creation. That is why it is additum.

When Reformed use "perfects" in the sense of New Creation, they don't mean it in the same sense as Rome does.

 

[TryingToLearn]

Depending on the interpretation, "perfects" implies an original lack in creation. That is why it is additum.

When Reformed use "perfects" in the sense of New Creation, they don't mean it in the same sense as Rome does.

What is the sense that Rome means it in and how does it differ from the Reformed? And would you see Aquinas' view as different from Rome's?

Perhaps you could help me out with this other aspect of it: Both Bavinck and Owen argue that Adam possessed supernatural grace in a sense before the Fall because he possesses the Holy Spirit (Christ did as well, so I assume this is a well-supported argument), however, this confuses me as to their argument then that pre-fall supernatural grace implies man's natural state is not good. Why does non-fallen man (Adam and Christ) require the Spirit?

Similarly, it makes me unsure about the argument that the withdrawal of the donum makes God responsible for the Fall. If it is supernatural grace that is withdrawn, doesn't that mean God is not responsible for withdrawing what was not deserved? (think the hardening of Pharaoh and Luther's argument in Bondage of the Will). That seems to run counter to the Reformed explanation of God's sovereignty over sin.

 

[RamistThomist]

What is the sense that Rome means it in and how does it differ from the Reformed? And would you see Aquinas' view as different from Rome's?

Perhaps you could help me out with this other aspect of it: Both Bavinck and Owen argue that Adam possessed supernatural grace in a sense before the Fall because he possesses the Holy Spirit (Christ did as well, so I assume this is a well-supported argument), however, this confuses me as to their argument then that pre-fall supernatural grace implies man's natural state is not good. Why does non-fallen man (Adam and Christ) require the Spirit?

Similarly, it makes me unsure about the argument that the withdrawal of the donum makes God responsible for the Fall. If it is supernatural grace that is withdrawn, doesn't that mean God is not responsible for withdrawing what was not deserved? (think the hardening of Pharaoh and Luther's argument).

We'll try to unpack this. Owen and Bavinck are using "grace" in a wider sense than usual. They don't mean it in the donum sense. I'll try to explain more later. Basically Rome has been accused of seeing the human state as pure nature, which needs something added on to it.

 

[RamistThomist]

Let's look at it this way: is the image of God a "stuff" that God puts in a person? This stuff can be anything from reason, will, the soul (Calvin and Plato), etc. Rome would say yes. Most Reformed would agree with Rome to a point. I think that line is problematic.

 

[TryingToLearn]

Let's look at it this way: is the image of God a "stuff" that God puts in a person? This stuff can be anything from reason, will, the soul (Calvin and Plato), etc. Rome would say yes. Most Reformed would agree with Rome to a point. I think that line is problematic.

I certainly wouldn't want to conceive of salvation as an ontological transformation, and so wouldn't affirm the image of God as "stuff" in that sense. Redemption is certainly an ethical transformation, being restored in the image of God. I'm not sure how to articulate glorification though, as certainly that's a physical change, but I'm guessing that's not relevant here.

 

[TryingToLearn]

I hope this somewhat makes sense, but in thinking through the issue of what the point of the Holy Spirit was for Adam (as Owen and Bavinck argue; and what the point of the Spirit was for Jesus Christ), would I be correct to see the Holy Spirit given to Adam on the basis of the Covenant of Works as a sort of "sanctifying" mechanism (I use this term loosely. Maybe "progressive glorification" is what I'm driving at more accurately) similar to how grace today not only "restores" nature, but (when rightly understood) perfects it unto its eschatological goal? In other words, instead of seeing eschatology only at the end of Adam's work when only then he would be glorified, should we rather see Adam's work in a similar way that we see progressive sanctification (though not a progressive inclination away from sin, of course; rather a progressive achievement of glorification)? This way the giving of the Spirit becomes a part of the means of the achievement of the Covenant of Works for Adam (and the Covenant of Redemption for Christ).

I hope that's somewhat clear as to what I'm trying to say.

 

[TryingToLearn]

Honestly, just disregard my last comment if necessary. I'm just trying to figure out what the role of the Spirit would be for natural man. It seems we could definitely affirm the anointing aspect of the Spirit, as even men like Saul had that, so there doesn't appear to be any moral aspect to that, but rather for ministerial work (which Adam and Christ would definitely be doing in their covenants of works), but the way Owen and Bavinck (and Goodwin) speak of the Spirit with Adam seems to go beyond ministerial anointing and touches the ethical, which makes this difficult (see here for example: https://www.reformation21.org/blogs/the-gracious-covenant-of-works-1.php)

Perhaps the best thing to do is reject Bavinck and Owen's formulation and just affirm that the Spirit empowered Adam and Christ in a ministerial sense and avoid all talk that would seem to make the Spirit an alternative donum superadditum; but perhaps I'm still missing something that they see and I don't. But, back to the original topic, how does Aquinas differ from the Reformers here? By Mueller's definitions, it seems to me that Aquinas can be considered as affirming the donum concreatum