Argument for God's Existence from Goodness

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Afterthought

Puritan Board Senior
God is Goodness by divine simplicity, even as God is Truth itself. One argument for God's existence is from the nature of truth. The argument goes that truth is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable and is not matter. Ergo, truth is God. Likewise, I wonder whether the same argument could be made for goodness (or even justice or wisdom or knowledge)? I don't have the details worked out yet (i.e., I don't know have it worked out yet how I would argue that existence of moral standard implies goodness must be infinite, eternal, unchangeable, and not matter but mind), so there might be a hitch somewhere here.

However, I wonder whether the argument from truth (or goodness) suffers from another problem: could the existence of absolute falsehood (or absolute evil) likewise be argued to imply a Spirit that is falsehood (or evil) itself? A way out of this would be to argue that evil and falsehood are not entities themselves: they are the corruption or exaggeration of the good or truth. Hence, an absolute evil or falsehood would not imply an infinite, eternal, and unchangeable spirit that is them.

But how would one argue that falsehood or evil are non-entities? This would seem to be true theologically: if they were entities, God would have to create them (indeed, this seems to lead to the conclusion that whatsoever is false does not exist in the same manner that evil does not; and so it would seem falsehood is meaningless?). Or maybe there is another way to get around this difficulty?


I don't have time for a detailed post (you can find the argument from truth somewhere in Gordon Clark's writings and in Ronald Nash's Life's Ultimate Questions), so hopefully, this compact post will do. Otherwise, I'll just have to come back and re-write some things in more detail when I get time.
 
I think that argument is made by Clark at the end of Christian View of Men and Things in answer to scepticism.

This argument would classify as a foundationalist argument, which accomplishes a similar object to the ontological argument. The main objection to the ontological argument is that it jumps from thought to reality. Of course, the denial of the existence of God does the same thing, which is what the ontological argument exposes as the basic weakness of the unbeliever's reasoning. At any rate, such a charge cannot stand against the foundationalist argument, because in foundationalism there are certain beliefs which are assumed to be true, and any belief assumed to be true affirms the existence of truth. In a foundational belief, there is a claim being made for the existence of something which has not been demonstrated to exist; and yet, if its existence is denied, the claim for its existence cannot be made. The foundational argument for the existence of God regards the existence of God as a foundational belief; i.e., without belief in the existence of God, no claim either for or against His existence could be made. So that the unbeliever, in attempting to deny the existence of God, must, in making that attempt, affirm the existence of God.

The argument basically is that truth presupposes a mind that knows it; eternal, unchangeable truth presupposes an eternal, unchangeable mind that knows it; and apart from this eternal unchangeable mind there could be no truth in the proper sense of the term.

Can this be applied to the attribute of goodness in relation to morality? I believe so. Goodness presupposes a will to do good; eternal unchangeable goodness presupposes an eternal unchangeable will to do good; and apart from this eternal unchangeable will there could be no goodness in the proper sense of the term.
 
There are a number of interesting things we could discuss. For now, why does goodness presuppose a will to do good? I see the analogy with truth presupposing a mind to know it, but why does "will" come in place of "mind"? Better asked, I would think that goodness would just presuppose a mind that knows it?

However, changing "mind" to "will" in the argument might rescue the argument from the following problem: What about positive law? And what about the fact that even the moral law is not eternal, since it sprang into being with the creation. For that matter, truths of the world and the conceptualized theology for the creature sprang into being with the creation too, so it would seem that truth also is not eternal. So where is this eternal goodness and eternal truth? Even the law of noncontradiction is nothing but a conceptualization of God's truth for the creature? It would seem the only requirement is that goodness and truth are the same at all times, places, and conditions; but this is satisfied by springing into existence with the creation; hence, they are not, strictly speaking, eternal or unchangeable or infinite.

And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?
 
For now, why does goodness presuppose a will to do good? I see the analogy with truth presupposing a mind to know it, but why does "will" come in place of "mind"? Better asked, I would think that goodness would just presuppose a mind that knows it?

I suppose it is the difference between rationality and morality. Rationality is intelligence embracing the truth. Morality is will inclining to the good. In a discussion of morality the will is the primary object. It is will that grounds moral agency.

And what about the fact that even the moral law is not eternal, since it sprang into being with the creation.

We are looking at foundations of morality, not the morality itself. Where is the foundation for moral law if there is not a will to do good? And the very act of "creation" decides the point because it establishes a Creator-creature relation which obliges the lesser to the greater. A different doctrine of beginnings establishes a different relationship with its own set of ethical implications.

Positive law is based in the moral, and supposes there are specific acts and circumstances within the moral imperative which require positive determination. E.g., the second command lays down the moral rule that God institutes His own worship; positive law institutes what the specific acts of worship will be.

For that matter, truths of the world and the conceptualized theology for the creature sprang into being with the creation too, so it would seem that truth also is not eternal.

There is an equivocation here. The truth as the thing known is eternal; the truth as known by the subject is not eternal. It is the first we are looking at. The second would not be possible without the first. The qualities of it are external to us; hence we seek to know it and do not assume it as identical with ourselves. The same would apply in the case of goodness.

Even the law of noncontradiction is nothing but a conceptualization of God's truth for the creature?

Whose conceptualisation? If every human mind is bound to it, and there is no "collective" human mind, it is obvious that another mind has conceptualised it, and such a mind as can affirm it applies at all times and all places without change. This could only be the mind of an Infinite, Eternal, and Unchangeable Being. Point established.

And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?

Yes.
 
Well, this has certainly taken an interesting and unexpected (to me) twist!

Firstly, (perhaps this has been answered, but I have not understood yet) besides the fact that no one (that I can think of) holds the belief I am about to outline (perhaps some cult in the future will), why does the mind/will need to be eternal/unchangeable? If the qualities of truth/goodness are simply that they are the same at all times, places, conditions, then doesn't it suffice for the will/mind to spring into being with the universe and/or exist as long as the universe and be the same in all times, places, and conditions (which is not necessarily the same as infinite, eternal, and unchangeable; it just contingently does not change for the history of the universe) to affirm that truth/goodness applies in all times, places, conditions?

Secondly, it would seem that the argument from goodness/truth accomplishes only one thing: to show that the infinite, eternal, unchangeable is part of our foundational beliefs. Hence, those who deny such suppress the truth. But in accomplishing this, if these arguments are valid, then our reason (a part of natural revelation; I know there is more to natural revelation but we would not expect a part of it to contradict other parts) is also forced to conclude that dualism is the reality. An unbeliever might even say that the Christian is suppressing the truth, since our foundational beliefs require the existence of an eternal, unchangeable mind and will for falsehood and evil. Special revelation would not help, since we could not be sure if the evil mind and will gave it to us; and the arguments do not help against skepticism, since the evil mind and will could be deceiving us. But regardless, it is usually acknowledged that a monotheistic Deity is the object of natural revelation? So if our reason is concluding dualism, it seems something is funny here. What do you make of this/how would you resolve this problem?
 
then doesn't it suffice for the will/mind to spring into being with the universe

The truth of an "universe" requires epistemic validation. How can you speak of it as "one?" According to whose mind is it "one?" Is the universe infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? That would be impossible if it "sprang into being." It exhibits the qualities of space, time, and change. It demonstrates multiplicity and diversity. What gives unity to these? It must be a mind which is independent of and greater than this "universe." Besides, the universe is not a personal entity. "Truth" is a personal quality. It is known by persons. The mind that knows must be a person who can reveal his mind to others.

Special revelation would not help, since we could not be sure if the evil mind and will gave it to us

At that point you could say, first, that a good and powerful God who made all things, and made men to know the truth and walk in it, could reasonably be thought to exercise His goodness and power to overcome evil and deceit in order to manifest His glory; and special revelation would be the effective way of accomplishing this. Then, secondly, one would reasonably suppose that this revelation would give self-authenticating marks of being the revelation of a great and good Creator. Then, thirdly, holy Scripture exhibits these marks both in its matter, as a revelation of invincible grace and inexorable justice, and in its manner, as speaking with majesty, purity, and unity, to the glory of God.
 
MW said:
The truth of an "universe" requires epistemic validation. How can you speak of it as "one?" According to whose mind is it "one?" Is the universe infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? That would be impossible if it "sprang into being." It exhibits the qualities of space, time, and change. It demonstrates multiplicity and diversity. What gives unity to these? It must be a mind which is independent of and greater than this "universe." Besides, the universe is not a personal entity. "Truth" is a personal quality. It is known by persons. The mind that knows must be a person who can reveal his mind to others.
Hm, I'm going to need to give this a think on how this shows the mind/will must be eternal/unchangeable and not merely the same at all times, places, conditions. I might have to get back to it on (my geographical location's) Monday.

MW said:
At that point you could say, first, that a good and powerful God who made all things, and made men to know the truth and walk in it, could reasonably be thought to exercise His goodness and power to overcome evil and deceit in order to manifest His glory; and special revelation would be the effective way of accomplishing this. Then, secondly, one would reasonably suppose that this revelation would give self-authenticating marks of being the revelation of a great and good Creator. Then, thirdly, holy Scripture exhibits these marks both in its matter, as a revelation of invincible grace and inexorable justice, and in its manner, as speaking with majesty, purity, and unity, to the glory of God.
If our reason concludes dualism, then the evil will and good will have to be at war, so how do we know the good will can succeed in producing a special revelation? I suppose from the fact that the universe is not chaotic, we might suppose one of these wills is indeed more powerful, although I'm not sure how we would determine which will is more powerful (maybe the fact that things exist; an evil will necessarily wants to destroy?). But we argued for dualism from our foundational beliefs; how have our foundational beliefs led us astray?

Moreover, special revelation helps us escape concluding dualism by providing premises (an originally good Creation) that annuls our reasoning from our foundational beliefs. But again, these are our foundational beliefs; how could special revelation contradict them, anymore than it could contradict the law of non-contradiction? Or put another way, how is special revelation contradicting natural revelation, if natural revelation suffices to reveal God is? I have an inkling of a thought that this might be similar to how special revelation shows "ex nihilo nihil fit" is shown to not be an absolute conclusion but limited to nature, but I don't have this thought worked out yet. Or maybe that our conclusion about an evil will is not strictly required by the foundation, but rather, we have snuck in a foreign premise somewhere....in which case our foundational beliefs should not lead us to conclude dualism in the first place. Hm.
 
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MW said:
The truth of an "universe" requires epistemic validation. How can you speak of it as "one?" According to whose mind is it "one?" Is the universe infinite, eternal, and unchangeable? That would be impossible if it "sprang into being." It exhibits the qualities of space, time, and change. It demonstrates multiplicity and diversity. What gives unity to these? It must be a mind which is independent of and greater than this "universe." Besides, the universe is not a personal entity. "Truth" is a personal quality. It is known by persons. The mind that knows must be a person who can reveal his mind to others.
Perhaps I am still not understanding, or I did not write what I intended to say. When I talked about a mind springing into being with the universe, I meant a personal mind that--independent of the world, universe, time, space (whatever we want to call it) springing into being--sprang into being coincidently with the universe; which mind happens to know all things concerning the world and itself, and for the history of the universe, this mind just so happens to be the same in all times, places, and conditions. Such is all that is necessary as a precondition for truth (or goodness, if we substitute will for mind). Writing this out more explicitly, this seems ridiculous, but the problem with this is still on the tip of my tongue (so to speak), rather than something that I can see clearly.


Edit: Actually, I may have figured it out. The problem with this is: how does this mind know all things? It cannot be by process, else the mind would not be the same at all times. So it must know all things by intuition. (Insert missing premise that I cannot think of right now) Ergo, this mind must have necessary existence and be eternal, unchangeable.

Edit 2: Okay, I understand now. If the mind sprang into being at the same time as the universe, the mind could not know (unless it knew by process, which requires a change) how long the universe had been around. While the mind theoretically would know all things, practically, the mind would itself require another mind to validate the fact that it sprang into existence with the universe--a fact that this lesser mind could not possibly know, since it came into being coincidentally with the universe.


Okay, that leaves the problem with our foundational reasoning to think about still!
 
Raymond, Yes, a mind that springs into being is not an eternal mind.

On your dualism, (1) Is this dualism good or bad? Either way, the individual has to attribute a moral value to the dualism which demonstrates that moral values exist apart from the dualism. It effectively requires the existence of goodness over the dualism. (2) But you haven't really set forth a dualism. While the world exists, and the existence of the world is seen as something good, that general goodness is manifested over any particular display of evil. At that point it is clear that evil is first and foremost a privation of good. It is not an entity in itself, but a corruption of a good entity. So there is no actual dualism. A proper dualism would require two absolute entities.
 
MW said:
(2) But you haven't really set forth a dualism. While the world exists, and the existence of the world is seen as something good, that general goodness is manifested over any particular display of evil. At that point it is clear that evil is first and foremost a privation of good. It is not an entity in itself, but a corruption of a good entity. So there is no actual dualism. A proper dualism would require two absolute entities.
Ah, this is where I am getting confused. Earlier, we had established by our foundational beliefs that an eternal, unchangeable will to evil follows from the fact that evil is the same in all times, places, and conditions. That seems imply an absolute evil entity exists. So how does this not set forth a dualism?

Also, could you draw out your argument some more for evil being a privation of the good? This was my initial thought, but I wasn't sure how to argue for it, and I am not entirely following your reasoning here. The existence of the world is good; I think that can be established because one requires being in order to say that the existence of the world is not good, i.e., the goodness of one's judgment is being relied upon in declaring being to be evil. I am not sure how this implies evil is a privation of the good though; it seems just to require that good is strong enough to suppress evil to allow for the existence of the world.
 
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Also, could you draw out your argument some more for evil being a privation of the good?

Perhaps I could appeal to the reasoning in Augustine's Enchiridion, where he discusses the problem of evil. The quotation below is from the Outler translation. The portions in bold bring out the main lines of reasoning.

11. In this universe, even what is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, commends the good more eminently, since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when compared to the bad things. For the Omnipotent God, whom even the heathen acknowledge as the Supreme Power over all, would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil. What, after all, is anything we call evil except the privation of good? In animal bodies, for instance, sickness and wounds are nothing but the privation of health. When a cure is effected, the evils which were present (i.e., the sickness and the wounds) do not retreat and go elsewhere. Rather, they simply do not exist any more. For such evil is not a substance; the wound or the disease is a defect of the bodily substance which, as a substance, is good. Evil, then, is an accident, i.e., a privation of that good which is called health. Thus, whatever defects there are in a soul are privations of a natural good. When a cure takes place, they are not transferred elsewhere but, since they are no longer present in the state of health, they no longer exist at all.

CHAPTER IV. The Problem of Evil

12. All of nature, therefore, is good, since the Creator of all nature is supremely good. But nature is not supremely and immutably good as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created things can be diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still, however much it is diminished, something must remain of its original nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its "nature" cannot be destroyed without the thing itself being destroyed. There is good reason, therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise. When, however, a thing is corrupted, its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so much, a privation of the good. Where there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted, this will then be an incorruptible entity natura incorruptibilis, and to this great good it will have come through the process of corruption. But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease having some good of which it cannot be further deprived. If, however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is no good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. Wherefore corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the thing itself. Every actual entity natura is therefore good; a greater good if it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good even when corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist.

13. From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good. This leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, in so far as it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from something good. This is because every actual entity is good omnis natura bonum est. Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic judgment which reads: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the sweet bitter."23 Moreover the Lord himself saith: "An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart."24 What, then, is an evil man but an evil entity natura mala, since man is an entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity, what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked. Rather, he is a good entity in so far as he is a man, evil in so far as he is wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic judgment: "Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil." For this amounts to finding fault with God's work, because man is an entity of God's creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in this particular man because he is a wicked person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective one, in so far as it is an entity, is good. In so far as it is defective, it is evil.

14. Actually, then, in these two contraries we call evil and good, the rule of the logicians fails to apply.25 No weather is both dark and bright at the same time; no food or drink is both sweet and sour at the same time; no body is, at the same time and place, both white and black, nor deformed and well-formed at the same time. This principle is found to apply in almost all disjunctions: two contraries cannot coexist in a single thing. Nevertheless, while no one maintains that good and evil are not contraries, they can not only coexist, but the evil cannot exist at all without the good, or in a thing that is not a good. On the other hand, the good can exist without evil. For a man or an angel could exist and yet not be wicked, whereas there cannot be wickedness except in a man or an angel. It is good to be a man, good to be an angel; but evil to be wicked. These two contraries are thus coexistent, so that if there were no good in what is evil, then the evil simply could not be, since it can have no mode in which to exist, nor any source from which corruption springs, unless it be something corruptible. Unless this something is good, it cannot be corrupted, because corruption is nothing more than the deprivation of the good. Evils, therefore, have their source in the good, and unless they are parasitic on something good, they are not anything at all. There is no other source whence an evil thing can come to be. If this is the case, then, in so far as a thing is an entity, it is unquestionably good. If it is an incorruptible entity, it is a great good. But even if it is a corruptible entity, it still has no mode of existence except as an aspect of something that is good. Only by corrupting something good can corruption inflict injury.

15. But when we say that evil has its source in the good, do not suppose that this denies our Lord's judgment: "A good tree cannot bear evil fruit."26 This cannot be, even as the Truth himself declareth: "Men do not gather grapes from thorns," since thorns cannot bear grapes. Nevertheless, from good soil we can see both vines and thorns spring up. Likewise, just as a bad tree does not grow good fruit, so also an evil will does not produce good deeds. From a human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil could have arisen in the first place except from the nature--good in itself--of an angel or a man. This is what our Lord himself most clearly shows in the passage about the trees and the fruits, for he said: "Make the tree good and the fruits will be good, or make the tree bad and its fruits will be bad."27 This is warning enough that bad fruit cannot grow on a good tree nor good fruit on a bad one. Yet from that same earth to which he was referring, both sorts of trees can grow.
 
Thank you, that is very useful. To my mind, if evil is not an entity, one cannot argue for the existence of an eternal, unchangeable will for evil, as one can argue for goodness, since evil does not, properly speaking, exist, whereas goodness does. So that seems to settle the holes in the argument.

However, in case there is something I am missing still, it would be helpful to see where you were going with this argument before I got confused. I had said that evil being the same in all times, places, conditions implied and eternal, unchangeable will to evil. You agreed. Doesn't this mean our foundational reasoning shows an absolute will to evil exists? Clearly, you disagree, and you gave some points against dualism. But that leaves me wondering: Why does an eternal, unchangeable will to evil not imply dualism?
 
Why does an eternal, unchangeable will to evil not imply dualism?

Such a will does not exist. Goodness is eternal and unchangeable because it exists in an eternal and unchangeable being who only wills the good. Even when He permits evil He only does so for the purpose of doing good. There is no being who eternally and unchangeably wills evil; ergo, evil is not eternal and unchangeable. All will to evil that we see in the world is mixed and restrained by the good providence of God.
 
Afterthought said:
And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?
MW said:

Do you still agree with this? Or have I completely misunderstood to what you were saying "Yes?" Wait. Were you simply saying "yes" to the fact that the argument could be made, not that the argument was valid?


While I have you here, what would be an example of eternal, unchangeable goodness?
 
Afterthought said:
And what about the difficulty about evil or falsehood? Since evil or falsehood is always evil or false in all times, places, and conditions, it would seem that the same argument could be made for an eternal, unchangeable will or mind for evil or falsehood?
MW said:

Do you still agree with this? Or have I completely misunderstood to what you were saying "Yes?" Wait. Were you simply saying "yes" to the fact that the argument could be made, not that the argument was valid?

I must have misunderstood the intent of your question, for which I apologise. I thought it was intended as an ad absurdum argument against the denial of eternal goodness; as if to say that without "goodness" there would be no way of defining the limitations of evil. We then went on to the fact that evil is the privation of good, and good stands over against evil, which imposes limitations upon evil.
 
While I have you here, what would be an example of eternal, unchangeable goodness?

"The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand." This brings out the personal nature of goodness, which shows the importance of the Trinity for understanding the nature of goodness, truth, etc. Without the Trinity there is no foundation for the "personal" quality of virtue. This is important for understanding the "Theos" of the Theistic arguments.
 
MW said:
I must have misunderstood the intent of your question, for which I apologise. I thought it was intended as an ad absurdum argument against the denial of eternal goodness; as if to say that without "goodness" there would be no way of defining the limitations of evil. We then went on to the fact that evil is the privation of good, and good stands over against evil, which imposes limitations upon evil.
Ah, I see. My apologies too for not being more clear! The ensuing discussion was very useful though, and thinking of my question as an ad absurdum argument is also helpful, since I am not sure what object could be an example of eternal unchangeable goodness.


MW said:
"The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand." This brings out the personal nature of goodness, which shows the importance of the Trinity for understanding the nature of goodness, truth, etc. Without the Trinity there is no foundation for the "personal" quality of virtue. This is important for understanding the "Theos" of the Theistic arguments.
Very interesting! However, if we are arguing from our foundational beliefs and the Trinity is specially revealed, what example of eternal unchangeable goodness could be used? (Edit: On second thought, I might be overthinking things; eternal unchangeable goodness is not required for the argument to be made; only goodness that is the same in all times, places, conditions. This then requires an eternal will to goodness as we had before with the eternal Mind and unchangeable truth.)

By "personal" quality of virtue, you mean virtue that is attached to a person, as opposed to some impersonal Form (or whatever other impersonal object philosophers have cooked up over the years)? I'm not sure I'm asking the question properly, but I have often found it difficult to describe what is meant by a "personal" quality.
 
However, if we are arguing from our foundational beliefs and the Trinity is specially revealed, what example of eternal unchangeable goodness could be used?

The Trinity as revealed is a matter of special revelation, and we could not know the Trinity apart from special revelation, but the pre-condition of personal knowledge is a matter of general revelation; this is a result of rationality being part of the image of God in personal man. Foundational beliefs are preconditions of rationality. If beliefs are personal and require personal revelation then there must be a personal aspect which is pre-conditional to revelation.

By "personal" quality of virtue, you mean virtue that is attached to a person, as opposed to some impersonal Form (or whatever other impersonal object philosophers have cooked up over the years)? I'm not sure I'm asking the question properly, but I have often found it difficult to describe what is meant by a "personal" quality.

Knowledge itself is part of what we call a person. The ability to know is a personal ability. For man to know truth means the truth is knowable, and it is knowable only because a person makes it known to man. So the very fact man knows anything reveals a revealer.
 
I will need to think about the last post some more. It does seem though that these foundational arguments have the possibility of arguing for God's existence in the incommunicable attributes, the communicable attributes (at the very least goodness; it seems to me, although it might be a harder argument to make, similar arguments could be made concerning the other attributes; or maybe even just arguing for one, "truth," would be enough. Divine simplicity seems to imply that all perfections are in essence one; and indeed, it seems whatever is true, is good, wise, etc.), immateriality, and personality!

I am still grasping why a personal revelation is required for truth to be known, and I will think about it some more. Do you know if Gordon Clark or someone else discusses this matter? This concept is definitely a weak point for me. I have a stronger intuition for "goodness" in this matter. A standard of goodness could exist without our knowledge; "is" never gives us an "ought;" so if we are to know what the standard of goodness requires in some particular situation, somewhere the "oughts" need to be revealed to us, even if they are just basic moral intuitions plus the ability to reason that come with our mental equipment. But if something is revealed to us, something must have revealed it, and I cannot see how a revealer of this standard of goodness could be an impersonal entity; maybe some sharp skeptic might have an idea of how.


Edit: Perhaps the only thing missing from these foundational arguments is that all these qualities must be found in one entity, i.e., that God is one. Could there be more than one infinite, eternal, unchangeable? I know the classical answer is "no," but I never found the reasons I've heard (i.e., that the two entities would have to be identical) to be convincing/did not understand why those reasons were convincing.
 
Gordon Clark's axiomatic presuppositionalism includes the notion that logic is eternal with God, that our logic is univocally the same as God's, and that the difference is in the quantity of propositions known; so I cannot recommend going any further with Clark down that road. We must accept the Creator-creature distinction and that we are bound to ectypal theology.

Simplicity is in God Himself; but as He reveals Himself to us God voluntarily condescends to a variety of relations and actions which are accommodated to our creaturely limitations; and so although the attributes are one in God, they are still different to us, and we are obliged to trace through the differences as revealed.

Knowing requires subject and object. That much is accepted by all philosophers. That being the case, knowledge functions with a conscious distinction of persons. So personhood is inherent in the very concept of knowledge.

With regards to your edit, if we just take the word "infinite," it will be obvious that an entity which fills and transcends all space must be alone. Two infinite entities filling and transcending all space is impossible.
 
MW said:
With regards to your edit, if we just take the word "infinite," it will be obvious that an entity which fills and transcends all space must be alone. Two infinite entities filling and transcending all space is impossible.
This should be obvious, but I'm not seeing it: Why is it impossible? An infinite entity is immaterial, so unlike a material entity, they could overlap (for lack of a better word) in their filling and transcending of all space? I don't see where one infinite entity filling and transcending all space necessarily imposes limitations on the other infinite entity's filling and transcending all space. We as humans would not be able to disentangle and distinguish them by where the entities are located, but whether more than one infinite entity can exist is a question of being, not our ability to distinguish them.
 
An infinite entity is immaterial, so unlike a material entity, they could overlap

The very idea of "overlap" creates dimensions of space, and these impose a limitation upon it. But it might be clearer if we consider the will. Does this hypothesised second infinite essence have a will? Is this will dependent on the will of the first infinite essence? If yes, then it is not infinite. If no, then the first essence must be finite, because it has a will that is limited by the hypothesised other infinite essence. There can only be one infinite being.
 
MW said:
The very idea of "overlap" creates dimensions of space, and these impose a limitation upon it. But it might be clearer if we consider the will. Does this hypothesised second infinite essence have a will? Is this will dependent on the will of the first infinite essence? If yes, then it is not infinite. If no, then the first essence must be finite, because it has a will that is limited by the hypothesised other infinite essence. There can only be one infinite being.
I don't see how "overlap" creates dimensions of space any more than saying a being fills and transcends space. These two beings fill and transcend space and so fill and transcend (? Oh! Maybe that is the problem, but it is not fully clear to me yet that such is required by two beings filling and transcending space independently of and co-extensively with each other...) each other?

So far as the will goes, why can't both wills be independent and so not be limited by each other? It could be that these two wills are harmonious; considering that Goodness and Truth should agree with each other, we have no reason to believe they would will different things.
 
I don't see how "overlap" creates dimensions of space any more than saying a being fills and transcends space. These two beings fill and transcend space and so fill and transcend (? Oh! Maybe that is the problem, but it is not fully clear to me yet that such is required by two beings filling and transcending space independently of and co-extensively with each other...) each other?

So far as the will goes, why can't both wills be independent and so not be limited by each other? It could be that these two wills are harmonious; considering that Goodness and Truth should agree with each other, we have no reason to believe they would will different things.

You suggest there might be an "overlap." Overlap two sheets of paper in your mind. The concept of the overlap creates something greater than either one of the sheets of paper. You cannot have something greater than infinity. Clearly, then, the idea of an overlap of infinities is a contradiction in terms. We can only conceive of one infinity.

How can an infinite essence be independent of another infinite essence? The infinite essence did not will that other infinite essence. This means it is limited as to what it wills. At the point it has not willed something which exists it is limited in its will and therefore not infinite.
 
MW said:
You suggest there might be an "overlap." Overlap two sheets of paper in your mind. The concept of the overlap creates something greater than either one of the sheets of paper. You cannot have something greater than infinity. Clearly, then, the idea of an overlap of infinities is a contradiction in terms. We can only conceive of one infinity.

How can an infinite essence be independent of another infinite essence? The infinite essence did not will that other infinite essence. This means it is limited as to what it wills. At the point it has not willed something which exists it is limited in its will and therefore not infinite.
Well, maybe overlap isn't quite the right word. Maybe something more like interpenetration? I'm trying to get the idea that both beings occupy the same space; there is no place where both beings are not. And that both beings transcend space so that their beings are coextensive with each other. An analogy would be mixing two liquids in a bucket with holes. The liquids interpenetrate each other both inside the bucket and outside the bucket where the liquid is pouring out through the holes. They occupy the same location both inside the bucket (space) and wherever they transcend the bucket, they continue to interpenetrate each other equally.

Obviously, the analogy breaks down: liquids are material objects, so they do not literally occupy the same space; and mixtures can be imperfect, so there could be one liquid where the other liquid is not. But we are speaking of immaterial entities and an exact interpenetration.


Oh, I think I see what you are getting at with the will. One infinite essence did not will the other into existence (since they are hypothetically independent), so there is something that the infinite essences cannot will; hence, a limited will. And since willing into being is not a non-thing, this stays safe of the "rock too big to lift" paradoxes? Unless it is a self-contradiction to will another independent being, in which case willing the existence of this other being is a non-thing, and so it is not a limitation of the will for this other being to exist?
 
May I suggest that your terms and analogies are breaking down precisely because the suggestion of two infinite essences is irrational. Now you have introduced the idea of "mixture." That is effectively what the interpenetration of essences is. Interpenetration is "personal" action, not an "essential" one. As a personal action it allows for the maintenance of individual personal properties. But the interpenetration of two essences or two natures creates a sui generis, or what you have called a "mixture." And at the point they interpenetrate you will have created a new essence which marks a new beginning of time, and this now rules out the attributes of eternity and immutability.
 
Well, from searching around, it certainly seems all agree--theist and otherwise--that two infinite essences is irrational. I still don't get it, but I'm also out of ideas of how to figure out why I don't get it, i.e., what premise(s) am I missing? I'll think about it and return on Monday! (I'm still thinking about the idea of knowledge requiring a revealer; I'm almost there in understanding that.)
 
I might have a line of reasoning which can simplify it a little, and bring it back on topic.

The topic is "goodness." Can there be more than one essence that is infinitely good of itself? No. If one essence has all goodness in and of itself, then another essence cannot have all goodness in and of itself. The goodness that is in the other essence would not originally be in the first essence, and so it could not be said that the first essence had all goodness in and of itself.

Foreseeing a question about the term "of itself," let me add, that infinite goodness must be such that it is not derived from another. Insofar as it was derived or drawn from another it would not be infinite of itself, and it would also lack the attributes of eternity and immutability.
 
I might have a line of reasoning which can simplify it a little, and bring it back on topic.

The topic is "goodness." Can there be more than one essence that is infinitely good of itself? No. If one essence has all goodness in and of itself, then another essence cannot have all goodness in and of itself. The goodness that is in the other essence would not originally be in the first essence, and so it could not be said that the first essence had all goodness in and of itself.

Foreseeing a question about the term "of itself," let me add, that infinite goodness must be such that it is not derived from another. Insofar as it was derived or drawn from another it would not be infinite of itself, and it would also lack the attributes of eternity and immutability.

I remember a tread a while back about knowing God "in se" and the subject came up about how Jesus said that only God was good. Now knowing that Jesus is both human and divine I know He would affirm that He is good in His divine essence. Would Jesus affirm that He was good in Himself apart from His divine nature? In asking this I in no way wish to divide but only distinguish the two natures of our Lord.
 
I might have a line of reasoning which can simplify it a little, and bring it back on topic.

The topic is "goodness." Can there be more than one essence that is infinitely good of itself? No. If one essence has all goodness in and of itself, then another essence cannot have all goodness in and of itself. The goodness that is in the other essence would not originally be in the first essence, and so it could not be said that the first essence had all goodness in and of itself.

Foreseeing a question about the term "of itself," let me add, that infinite goodness must be such that it is not derived from another. Insofar as it was derived or drawn from another it would not be infinite of itself, and it would also lack the attributes of eternity and immutability.

I remember a tread a while back about knowing God "in se" and the subject came up about how Jesus said that only God was good. Now knowing that Jesus is both human and divine I know He would affirm that He is good in His divine essence. Would Jesus affirm that He was good in Himself apart from His divine nature? In asking this I in no way wish to divide but only distinguish the two natures of our Lord.
]

In "essence" I think my question boils down to creaturely goodness which is derived from the divine and the goodness of God which is not derived. For Our Lord Jesus assumed flesh, which like Adam, was good.
 
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