Aristotelian Terms Common in Theology

Status
Not open for further replies.

Prufrock

Arbitrary Moderation
Since Reformed theology makes use of many Aristotelian terms and categories in its quest for precision, it has been suggested that a small collection of terms with brief definitions might be helpful for reference. The following will serve as a quick start:

1. Final Cause -- "the end; that for the sake of which a thing is." Aristotle provides the example that health is thus the cause of walking, i.e., it is the cause for which one does the act. Or, in Christian terms, the glory of God is the final cause of God's salvific acts.

2. Efficient Cause -- "that from which the change, or the resting from change first begins." The sculptor is thus the cause of the bronze statue; or the Christ making satisfaction is the efficient cause of our justification.

3. Formal Cause -- "the form or pattern, i.e, the definition of the essence." Therefore, the shape of the above statue is its cause.

4. Material Cause -- "that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being." Thus, bronze is the cause of a statue; or, alternatively, the word of God is the material cause of faith.

5. The distinction between equivocal and univocal terms is important:

  1. Things are named equivocally when, "though they have a common name, the definition corresponding to the name differs for each." Aristotle uses the example of a real man and a figure in a picture -- both can be termed animal, though the corresponding definitions of each will differ.
  2. Things are denominated univocally when they "have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common." Thus, he claims that both an ox and a man are called animal, and the definition of the term is the same respecting both.
 
AND get this book: [ame=http://www.amazon.com/Dictionary-Latin-Greek-Theological-Terms/dp/0801020646]Amazon.com: Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology: Richard A. Muller: Books[/ame]
 
Paul on #3, could you give an example of a theological statement as you did with the others? Thanks for this.

If I understand it right, it would be something like:

God is God because he is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, etc.

foo is bar because foo possesses characteristics x, y, and z, which are definitive of bar--in programming terms. :)
 
Jonathan, thanks for the programming terms. Though it elucidated nothing for me, it did make me smile to say 'phoo phoo phoo'.

You think then that form or pattern has to do with attributes?
 
Jonathan, thanks for the programming terms. Though it elucidated nothing for me, it did make me smile to say 'phoo phoo phoo'.

:)

You think then that form or pattern has to do with attributes?


Part of the definition is "a definition of the essence". God is defined, at least in Scripture, by His attributes. And I think they're a part of His "form or pattern".

More examples could be found, e.g. humans are created because they have a beginning. "A beginning" is part of the form/pattern of the category "created things". So because humans have a beginning, they are created.
 
'God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.'

This is the 'formal cause' of God?

I'm trying to clarify because to think of 'causes' or 'becauses' for God Himself, Who Is, is confusing in other regards. And I'm confused as to how this relates to the 'God's will is His nature' discussions, or if it should be kept separate?
 
'God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.'

This is the 'formal cause' of God?

I'm trying to clarify because to think of 'causes' or 'becauses' for God Himself, Who Is, is confusing in other regards. And I'm confused as to how this relates to the 'God's will is His nature' discussions, or if it should be kept separate?

Let me see...

Our justification can be said to be "by works" (Jas. 2:18-26) because our works are the formal cause of our faith--without works, our faith would not be faith. The works don't actually cause faith, but they are a necessary part of "real" faith, without which faith is dead.
 
Our justification can be said to be "by works" (Jas. 2:18-26) because our works are the formal cause of our faith--without works, our faith would not be faith. The works don't actually cause faith, but they are a necessary part of "real" faith, without which faith is dead.

This is actually the Roman definition of faith -- they claim that the form of faith is charity; for the Reformed (though there is often minor divergence over the best manner of expressing it), trust is the form or formal cause of faith.
 
Our justification can be said to be "by works" (Jas. 2:18-26) because our works are the formal cause of our faith--without works, our faith would not be faith. The works don't actually cause faith, but they are a necessary part of "real" faith, without which faith is dead.

This is actually the Roman definition of faith -- they claim that the form of faith is charity; for the Reformed (though there is often minor divergence over the best manner of expressing it), trust is the form or formal cause of faith.

Maybe I'm not getting the concept of a formal cause then. What's wrong with my example?
 
Jonathan, perhaps if we examine all the causes of one particular thing there will be more clarity. For instance, Faith:
  • The efficient cause (or that which produces it or makes it so) is the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.
  • The material cause, or the matter with which it is concerned, is the word of God.
  • The final cause, or the end for which it is, is the justification and salvation of believers.
  • The formal cause is variously expressed as assent or trust (depending on whether one places faith more as an act of the mind or of the will).

If we use the example of a bronze statue of the President to honor his election: the material cause is the bronze; the efficient is my sculpting it; the final is the honor of the President; and the formal is the shape of the President himself. Whether the statue were made of wood or bronze, the form would still be the President.
 
Thanks for posting these. Reading through Henry Alting's Methodus Theologicae Didacticae, Johannes 'a Marck's Christianae Theologiae Medulla and Ames's Marrow of Theology, I come across these terms frequently. It should be noted that use of Aristotelian terminology does not mean the same as accepting Aristotelian Philosophy or synthesizing it with Theology.

I agree with Patrick; if you are a student of Reformed Dogmatics, get Muller's dictionary. It is one of the most helpful tools available for the understanding of Protestant Theology.
 
I think Jonathan was saying that all the data we have 'filling in' our idea of something is part of its form or pattern. But I think this would actually make the other causes be part of the formal cause, as they are part of that data. Whereas from the example given, the formal cause has more to do with the overall shape, distinguishable from the other causes, rather than all the things filling it in?

Would it not be more accurate to say then that the 'formal cause' of God is 'Divinity' -- rather than listing attributes that fill in our understanding of 'divinity'? I know that His attributes are His essence, but this isn't so in the case of creatures and seems more confusing.

Also do theologians often talk of these things with reference to God Himself? It seems confusing to me to try to speak in this way of God 'by definition' -- His essence is self existence -- and because His essence and esse and attributes etc are indivisible unlike ours? I wondered if I am just slow to understand [I mean, I know I am, but if in this instance it's my understanding making things more difficult] or perhaps God transcends this kind of distinguishing of causes?

-----Added 7/22/2009 at 02:39:48 EST-----

(PS. I feel badly for diverting the thread from being a resource. Would it be preferable for the questions to be in a separate thread?)
 
Last edited:
Here is a dictionary of philosophical terms and how they are used in theology.

[ame=http://www.amazon.com/Terms-Philosophy-Their-Importance-Theology/dp/0664225241]Amazon.com: 101 Key Terms in Philosophy and Their Importance for Theology: Clark, Kelly James: Books[/ame]
 
I think Jonathan was saying that all the data we have 'filling in' our idea of something is part of its form or pattern. But I think this would actually make the other causes be part of the formal cause, as they are part of that data. Whereas from the example given, the formal cause has more to do with the overall shape, distinguishable from the other causes, rather than all the things filling it in?

Would it not be more accurate to say then that the 'formal cause' of God is 'Divinity' -- rather than listing attributes that fill in our understanding of 'divinity'? I know that His attributes are His essence, but this isn't so in the case of creatures and seems more confusing.

Also do theologians often talk of these things with reference to God Himself? It seems confusing to me to try to speak in this way of God 'by definition' -- His essence is self existence -- and because His essence and esse and attributes etc are indivisible unlike ours? I wondered if I am just slow to understand [I mean, I know I am, but if in this instance it's my understanding making things more difficult] or perhaps God transcends this kind of distinguishing of causes?

Heidi, I will try to address this topic (causality and God) more fully later, if no one else more able has beat me to it by then. For now I hope this short answer will suffice -- in traditional scholastic terminology, it was inappropriate to speak of a formal cause of God, as that would denote a superiority of the form over God; but God is inferior to nothing, ergo etc.
 
n traditional scholastic terminology, it was inappropriate to speak of a formal cause of God, as that would denote a superiority of the form over God; but God is inferior to nothing, ergo etc.

That's very concise and helpful; thanks.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top