Berkhof on Simplicity

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Justified

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I am finding Berkhof a little unclear about divine simplicity and wanted your input in understanding him. He confesses some form of it here: From the simplicity of God it follows that God and His attributes are one. The attributes cannot be considered as so many parts that enter into the composition of God, for God is not, like men, composed of different parts" (Systematic Theology, pp.44-45)

But then he states this: "It was further asserted by the Scholastics that the whole essence of God is identical with each one of the attributes, so that God's knowing is God, God's willing is God, and so on. Some even went so far as to say that each attribute is identical with every other attribute, and that there are no logical distinctions in God. This is a very dangerous extreme" (Ibid., p. 45).

What is the exact difference between the former (Berkhof's position and the latter). While knowing and understanding that the understanding of divine simplicity has not been necessarily monolithic in the Christian tradition, I thought that most positions confessed the latter (i.e., God's attributes are identical to his essence, and thus his attributes, absolutely considered, are identical).
 
The follow on to the second quote from Berkhof contains the answer to your question:

"While it may be said that there is an interpenetration of the attributes in God, and that they form a harmonious whole, we are moving in the direction of Pantheism, when we rule out all distinctions in God, and say that His self-existence is His infinity, His knowing is His willing, His love is His righteousness, and vice versa. It was characteristic of the Nominalists that they obliterated all real distinctions in God. They were afraid that by assuming real distinctions in Him, corresponding to the attributes ascribed to God, they would endanger the unity and simplicity of God, and were therefore motivated by a laudable purpose. According to them the perfections of the Divine Being exist only in our thoughts, without any corresponding reality in the Divine Being. The Realists, on the other hand, asserted the reality of the divine perfections. They realized that the theory of the Nominalists, consistently carried out, would lead in the direction of a pantheistic denial of a personal God, and therefore considered it of the utmost importance to maintain the objective reality of the attributes in God. At the same time they sought to safeguard the unity and simplicity of God by maintaining that the whole essence is in each attribute: God is All in all, All in each. Thomas Aquinas had the same purpose in mind, when he asserted that the attributes do not reveal what God is in Himself, in the depths of His Being, but only what He is in relation to His creatures. "
 
The follow on to the second quote from Berkhof contains the answer to your question:

"While it may be said that there is an interpenetration of the attributes in God, and that they form a harmonious whole, we are moving in the direction of Pantheism, when we rule out all distinctions in God, and say that His self-existence is His infinity, His knowing is His willing, His love is His righteousness, and vice versa. It was characteristic of the Nominalists that they obliterated all real distinctions in God. They were afraid that by assuming real distinctions in Him, corresponding to the attributes ascribed to God, they would endanger the unity and simplicity of God, and were therefore motivated by a laudable purpose. According to them the perfections of the Divine Being exist only in our thoughts, without any corresponding reality in the Divine Being. The Realists, on the other hand, asserted the reality of the divine perfections. They realized that the theory of the Nominalists, consistently carried out, would lead in the direction of a pantheistic denial of a personal God, and therefore considered it of the utmost importance to maintain the objective reality of the attributes in God. At the same time they sought to safeguard the unity and simplicity of God by maintaining that the whole essence is in each attribute: God is All in all, All in each. Thomas Aquinas had the same purpose in mind, when he asserted that the attributes do not reveal what God is in Himself, in the depths of His Being, but only what He is in relation to His creatures. "

Unfortunately, he doesn't really tease out what he exactly means by "the whole essence is in each attribute." That doesn't make much sense to me apart from saying that God's essence is identical to his essence, such that he is his power, willing, etc. But if God is identical to his attributes, then it follows that his attributes should be identical with one another, which is what he thinks he wants to avoid. What exactly does Berkhof-- and most classical theist Christians throughout the ages-- mean by identity. I wonder if there are certain senses of identity that they are working with that I do not understand. I take Leibniz' law as pretty commonplace as far as identity goes, but I don't know if Christian theologians of the past had different conceptions of identity.
 
Per Shedd:
"The attributes are not parts of the essence, of which this latter is composed. The whole essence is in each attribute, and the attribute in the essence. We must not conceive of the essence as existing by itself and prior to the attributes, and of the attributes as an addition to it. God is not essence and attributes, but in attributes.

...We must not conceive of the essence as existing by itself and prior to the attributes, and of the attributes as an addition to it. God is not essence and attributes, but in attributes. The attributes are essential qualities of God. Hence Augustine, the Schoolmen, Calvin, and Melanchthon say that “divine excellences are the very essence.” Turretin (3.5.7) remarks that “God’s attributes cannot differ really (realiter) from the essence or between themselves as one thing differs from another thing.”

...These attributes are the divine essence, whole and entire, contemplated in a particular mode of external operation."
- Shedd, William G. (2011-07-19). Dogmatic Theology P&R Publishing.

God is His attributes and His attributes constitute His essence.
 
Turretin (3.5.7) remarks that “God’s attributes cannot differ really (realiter) from the essence or between themselves as one thing differs from another thing.”
It seems Turretin seems to think that there is no real (realiter) distinction between the attributes. Does that allow for a formal or logical distinction between them, though?

A couple things give me pause regarding Berkhof's remarks. First, he assumes the nominalists are the ones desiring to hold the identity thesis of the attributes. Anselm himself (a platonic realist of the Augustinian sort) believed the identity thesis, however. He believed that properly understand existent justice, existent goodness, et al. were really identical with one another. Our understanding, because we are finite creatures, is multiform, whilst they are uniform in God. Second, he assumes that identifying God's essence with his willing and knowing leads to some sort pantheism. This is only true if we refuse to distinguish actions from their effects and the subject of knowing from the object. There is no separate act of willing per se, since God's eternal act is one, metaphysically indivisible act, though there are many temporal effects.

The best way I have been interpreting Berkhof's and Shedd's statements is that, while not being committed to the identity thesis, they are at least committed to the following: (1) God is without parts, (2) He has no accidents, (3) He is identical to his essence, (4)His essence is identical to his attributes, and (5) his attributes are not identical to one another.

It seems that (4) entails ~(5), however.
 
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