Afterthought
Puritan Board Senior
Here's a thought that came up recently from reading Plato (though I know not whether Plato would have advocated his views in the direction I'm about to speak of). If there is a difference between knowledge and true opinion, and if that difference is that one is "grounded" such as one can give a reason for it (as suggested by defining knowledge as "justified true belief") while the other is not....can one only hope for a true opinion concerning the existence and being of God and things He has revealed? For if we base our belief in God's existence and being on faith only (i.e., without grounding that faith in reason), then it appears that the best we can have is a true opinion about God's existence, after which we only have a true opinion about the things He has revealed--even if we have knowledge of God's existence by some other means, anything "known" by faith would only be a true opinion, rather than knowledge. So the only way to know that God is and about God is if He directly revealed himself to a person?
My thoughts so far. It appears that defining knowledge in such a way as above excludes people knowing things by testimony. That is, it seems that testimony is not a sufficient justification of true belief. However, such a definition of knowledge seems to exclude many other things as knowledge, because we receive many things on faith: scientific discoveries, directions to get somewhere, that our parents are actually our parents. Indeed, this seems to reduce to even greater skepticism in the end: for why do we trust anything we see, hear, feel, touch, etc.? It seems it is because of our senses; we trust them to give us reliable information. So it seems we could only have true opinions about the information our senes give us, rather than knowledge?
So it seems then, that "justification" has to be broader to include credible testimony. (Perhaps that "justified" seems to connote some sort of rational argument, is one reason why I sometimes see knowledge defined as "warranted true belief" instead?) But then I get stuck here, because that means we actually know all the things we accept on credible testimony, which seems to be false in the case of some things in Scripture: some of them it seems we do know (e.g., who "father" and "mother" are; though I wonder whether we know these too, since such is based on inductive reasoning?), but others it seems we do not know (e.g., what God is, that God created the world, all the articles of faith). In short, it seems that some things we do not know, but we trust the God who does know them, and on the basis of His testimony, we believe them (and in the case of inductive reasoning, it seems we can trust that God has made us in a way that we can arrive at universals from such reasoning? In which case, we do not actually know the universals themselves? Or do we know them?).
Further, it seems that Christians do have reasons for their faith, and so such faith is grounded, but it seems one still needs to broaden the term "reasons" to include credible testimony because otherwise it would appear our faith is based on evidence, rather than trust in God and then finding evidence to confirm that trust.
I realize there's a lot here, but comments? Thoughts? Solutions? Any idea how this sort of faith I've been talking about above relates to saving faith, which has traditionally been defined to include knowledge?
My thoughts so far. It appears that defining knowledge in such a way as above excludes people knowing things by testimony. That is, it seems that testimony is not a sufficient justification of true belief. However, such a definition of knowledge seems to exclude many other things as knowledge, because we receive many things on faith: scientific discoveries, directions to get somewhere, that our parents are actually our parents. Indeed, this seems to reduce to even greater skepticism in the end: for why do we trust anything we see, hear, feel, touch, etc.? It seems it is because of our senses; we trust them to give us reliable information. So it seems we could only have true opinions about the information our senes give us, rather than knowledge?
So it seems then, that "justification" has to be broader to include credible testimony. (Perhaps that "justified" seems to connote some sort of rational argument, is one reason why I sometimes see knowledge defined as "warranted true belief" instead?) But then I get stuck here, because that means we actually know all the things we accept on credible testimony, which seems to be false in the case of some things in Scripture: some of them it seems we do know (e.g., who "father" and "mother" are; though I wonder whether we know these too, since such is based on inductive reasoning?), but others it seems we do not know (e.g., what God is, that God created the world, all the articles of faith). In short, it seems that some things we do not know, but we trust the God who does know them, and on the basis of His testimony, we believe them (and in the case of inductive reasoning, it seems we can trust that God has made us in a way that we can arrive at universals from such reasoning? In which case, we do not actually know the universals themselves? Or do we know them?).
Further, it seems that Christians do have reasons for their faith, and so such faith is grounded, but it seems one still needs to broaden the term "reasons" to include credible testimony because otherwise it would appear our faith is based on evidence, rather than trust in God and then finding evidence to confirm that trust.
I realize there's a lot here, but comments? Thoughts? Solutions? Any idea how this sort of faith I've been talking about above relates to saving faith, which has traditionally been defined to include knowledge?