Christian-Theistic Evidences (Van Til)

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RamistThomist

Puritanboard Clerk
Van Til, Cornelius. Christian-Theistic Evidences. In Defense of the Faith vol. 6. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978.

In popular opinion, if Van Til’s presuppositional method is true, then what is the use of evidences? Indeed, we are told that Van Til wrote an entire book on evidences. So he did. The book itself is quite interesting and worth your time. Among Van Til’s works, it is not that difficult. We will see at the end if he gave a positive case with evidences.

Butler

I think CVT does a decent job summarizing Butler’s approach. I, for one, have never found Butler’s approach all that tempting, nor would, I imagine, many classical apologists today. For Butler, analogical reasoning is “reasoning about unknown possibilities from the known constitution of nature” (Van Til, 2).

With Van Til I agree that Butler’s analogy for a future life is quite weak. I cannot imagine anyone who seriously employs this today.

Hume’s Scepticism

Hume’s foundation: what is the nature of the connection between ideas? If an idea recalls another idea, it is a general idea. On the other hand, there is no connection between particular ideas (18). Our ideas are merely contiguous. The relevance to Butler is obvious: “there is simply no logical relation between the past and future” (19). Moreover, probability, so crucial to Butler’s project, cannot really explain the relations between ideas.

How seriously should one take Hume’s criticisms of Butler? Hume’s epistemology has not held up very well through the centuries. I am not defending Butler, but if one can prove that Hume’s epistemology is bunk, then why should we be particularly impressed with his criticisms of Butler?

Idealistic Reconstruction

These idealists agreed with Hume’s critique of Butler, but did not think Hume’s sceptism was warranted. Kant is CVT’s target here.

I do not care too much for discussions of Kant. Far more interesting, however, is CVT’s discussion of James Orr. He notes, probably correctly, Orr’s “Hegelian or idealist argument” (37). CVT wonders whether Hegelian arguments are safe enough to use to dismantle Kant. Hegelians sought to unify “pure rationality” (Plato’s world of forms) with fact. What the Hegelians would soon realize is that “pure being” is just as unintelligible as “pure nothing.”

CVT then gives a good analysis of F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. One may surmise that CVT got his idea of “brute fact” from these men. He hints as much (41). For example, you cannot count unless you already had the idea of a number system. These men came very close to overcoming the limitations of pure rationality.

Unfortunately, as CVT points out (but perhaps does not fully use), such a view more or less vanquishes the need for any facts (42). If every fact must be placed into a system of interpretation before it can have any meaning, then it is hard to see, if pressed consistently, why such a fact should be needed at all. That’s not CVT’s main criticism. The main problem for idealism is that it sees “the Absolute growing out of our own conception of reality.” The problem is obvious: how can the Absolute make sense of facts when it itself emerges from our own system of facts?

Christianity and its Factual Defense

CVT is quite clear “that if we seek to defend the Christian religion by an ‘appeal to the facts of experience’ in accord with the current scientific method, we shall have to adulterate Christianity beyond recognition” (49). Rather, we begin with another set of facts, the first of which is our being chosen by God. As all facts are created by God, “fact and interpretation are co-extensive” (51).

Indeed, he says “For us there can be no true interpretation of facts without miracle” (52). Whether this statement is true or not, this is not usually how miracles work. If one needs the proper framework to interpret a miracle, it’s not clear then why one needs a miracle.

Van Til does allow that we can appeal to facts, just not to brute facts (57). Rather, we appeal to God-interpreted facts. Any interpretation must line up with God’s interpretation. The rather obvious question, which he does not pursue, is how do we know our interpretation is God’s interpretation? The rest of the chapter is a juxtaposition of attacks on brute fact, limiting concepts, and bare possibility.

Actual Evidences

One might think upon reading this chapter title CVT would give actual evidences for God or show how evidences function within a larger system. He does not. He surveys current conceptions of God (usually immanentistic) by leading thinkers and why they are bad.

Creation and Providence

CVT examines the idea of causation. CVT ties Kant’s view of causation with Leibniz. I think there is something to that. Geisler himself made a similar criticism of Leibniz: such a view of causation is immanentistic. CVT shows how idealist systems cannot have a creation because the Absolute is always already unfolding. The closest Van Til gets to offering evidence iis his claim that man must first see himself as a creature.

Where Van Til is Correct

I agree that “facts” must also involve, at least in theory, a philosophy of fact (33).

Criticisms

Van Til said that those who seek a priori proof of God prove too much. In other words, if God’s existence is necessary, so is man’s (25). What I think he means is that God’s existence is correlative to man’s on this scheme. It is not clear how it is. Maybe on Leibniz’s scheme it is.

CVT said Aquinas assumed “the virtual identity of his intellect” with that of God’s (36). This is almost certainly false. In fact, it sounds a lot like Gordon Clark.

Conclusion

As it stands this book is quite interesting. CVT gives many lucid discussions of Idealism and British Hegelianism. One should note, however, that this book does not seek to give evidences for Christianity. What it does it evaluate the philosophies of fact of the leading thinkers of the day.
 
Thank you for this review. As you note, Cornelius Van Til talks about evidences but doesn't offer any evidences for Christianity. Van Til does allow that we can appeal to facts and causation but then goes off into circular thinking about how we know our interpretation of facts is God’s interpretation of facts.

There has been a resurgence of interest in Bishop Joseph Butler's Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed among contemporary conservative Anglican thinkers. Both Thomas Reid and Joseph Butler continue to have followers today.
 
Van Til does allow that we can appeal to facts and causation but then goes off into circular thinking about how we know our interpretation of facts is God’s interpretation of facts.
To be clear, CVT deliberately engages in circular reasoning, and even calls his reasoning circular. He rightly understands that all reasoning is ultimately circular, and that therefore what must be avoided is vicious circularity.
 
To be clear, CVT deliberately engages in circular reasoning, and even calls his reasoning circular. He rightly understands that all reasoning is ultimately circular, and that therefore what must be avoided is vicious circularity.

That may be so, but Van Til's disciples tell us, "Van Til didn't ignore evidences. He wrote a book on them." But when you read the book, he doesn't offer any evidences. Maybe he was right on the circular aspect, but the title of the book (or syllabus) is misleading.
 
That may be so, but Van Til's disciples tell us, "Van Til didn't ignore evidences. He wrote a book on them." But when you read the book, he doesn't offer any evidences. Maybe he was right on the circular aspect, but the title of the book (or syllabus) is misleading.
Not sure how the title is misleading. He discusses the place of evidence in the Christian apologetic, no?
 
Not sure how the title is misleading. He discusses the place of evidence in the Christian apologetic, no?

I suppose that's fine, but whenever we criticize CVT on evidence (or the lack thereof), we are always told, "But he wrote a book one evidences."
 
I suppose that's fine, but whenever we criticize CVT on evidence (or the lack thereof), we are always told, "But he wrote a book one evidences."
And as you said, “So he did.” I just get the sense that some are criticizing this work because he doesn’t offer a list of evidences a la Josh McDowell. But just because he didn’t list a bunch of evidence for the Christian faith doesn’t mean the book isn’t about evidence.
 
And as you said, “So he did.” I just get the sense that some are criticizing this work because he doesn’t offer a list of evidences a la Josh McDowell. But just because he didn’t list a bunch of evidence for the Christian faith doesn’t mean the book isn’t about evidence.

Fair enough. In that sense the book is about evidence.
 
When you read the book, VanTil doesn't offer any evidences; instead he offers philosophical criticisms of those who do offer evidences.
To be clear, CVT deliberately engages in circular reasoning, and even calls his reasoning circular. He rightly understands that all reasoning is ultimately circular, and that therefore what must be avoided is vicious circularity.
Taylor is correct. In this book his commitment to circular reasoning is on display. Evidences are not on display.
 
In this book his commitment to circular reasoning is on display.
Which is a good thing, because all reasoning is necessarily circular. Van Til just admits it and then establishes why Christian reasoning is the only reasoning that isn’t viciously circular.
 
Classical logic says that there are axioms and conclusions deduced from them by proof and demonstration. Axioms -> conclusions. To me that seems like a line, and not a circle.
What Taylor is getting at is that we cannot argue to our starting points. Otherwise, we would have a different starting point. So, the question is not about using syllogisms, but about the prior question of what basis we have to use syllogisms. It is a meta question. To the rationalist, for example, one can ask this simple question, "Can you prove that rationality, logic, etc., should be your starting point without using logic and rationality to do so?" Obviously that cannot happen. It is circular.

For the Christian, the circularity is not as vicious because there is an outside-of-us origin of all truth, namely, God, and He has revealed Himself to us. He is the origin of truth, logic, rationality, etc. So we rest on revelation, natural and revealed, than which nothing can be more foundational.
 
What Taylor is getting at is that we cannot argue to our starting points. Otherwise, we would have a different starting point. So, the question is not about using syllogisms, but about the prior question of what basis we have to use syllogisms. It is a meta question. To the rationalist, for example, one can ask this simple question, "Can you prove that rationality, logic, etc., should be your starting point without using logic and rationality to do so?" Obviously that cannot happen. It is circular.

For the Christian, the circularity is not as vicious because there is an outside-of-us origin of all truth, namely, God, and He has revealed Himself to us. He is the origin of truth, logic, rationality, etc. So we rest on revelation, natural and revealed, than which nothing can be more foundational.
Traditionally "circular reasoning" means that the premises of syllogism a are the conclusions of syllogism b, the premises of which are the conclusions of syllogism a. What you are describing is not circular reasoning, but a closed system of logic. The distinction is important.
I find it troubling that Van Til constantly muddied the waters in his writing by using unclear or incorrect terminology. "All reasoning is circular." "God is one person and three persons." "Unbelievers can't think a true thought." "Unbelievers can think true thoughts as far as they go." What would it have cost him to simply say "Axioms are indemonstrable," as logicians had been saying since Aristotle, and then "therefore they must be derived from God as creator"? It certainly would have saved a lot of ink in the disputes that have been raging since the 1920's because he set his followers in dogmatic opposition to classical logical and theological categories.
 
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