Zenas
Snow Miser
I bring this up here, as possible amici of the position might not have access to the Politics and Government Forum.
It was brought up at some point last week or the week before, in response to a presuppositional assertion that the Humanist cannot logically account for morality within our culture, that Social Contract Theory provides such an end. I would like to rebut this assertion with another presuppositional response. Any who can give an answer or criticism of my response, please do, even though, I assume, no one here is an active proponent of this sociological and particularly criminological theory. A criticism is nonetheless welcomed, as I am sure both I and others will encounter the assertion of this theory in apologetical endeavors for years to come. Let us then be prepared to give an answer when the occasion demands it.
Social Contract Theory, from my understanding so correct me if I am mistaken, is the theory that our society is ordered in such a way that each individual member contained therein has agreed with the others to abide by certain standards or societal norms, in exchange for which, they will be left in relative peace with those around them. Violation of the standards or norms will begat retributive punishment from the other members of society. This is the "social contract" that we have all implicitly agreed to by living in society.
It is offered generally as a means by which one can account for morality sans an objective moral qualifier, i.e. Creator. The mandate to not kill, steal, or rape are all societal norms which we have all agreed not to violate for our own good, to the benefit of ourselves and everyone around us. All of this is steeped on the presupposition that it is good and moral not to violate the Social Contract, or, the fall back position, that one should not violate it if they want to preserve their life.
The first presupposition, that it is good and moral not to violate the Social Contract, admittedly, might be a straw man. If indeed this is not a tenant that the proponent holds, then he will undoubtedly use the fall back position, so far as I can surmise, for no other position seems tenable in order to enforce the idea that the Contract must be upheld. In lieu of this, the first position uses circular reasoning, as should be plain to see.
In seeking to explain the source of moral behavior, one must already have a source for moral behavior in order to assert that it is good and moral to hold to the Cotnract. If the Contract is the source for moral behavior, then preceeding the Contract, there is no societal norm with which to hold someone to their word of upholding the Contract. Simply put, prior to the Contract which dictates morality, there has to be a pre-existing morality in order to bind someone to their agreement. It is only after the Contract has been entered into and agreed to that morality can then stem and, as an analysis of the next position will show, no morality has been achieved at all, but merely a loose agreement to "play nice".
The second possible presupposition that one could assume in order to hold one to the Contract is that it will put them in danger of losing their life or happiness should they violate the Contract. This assumes that one will get caught, however. There are many theives, murderers, rapists, etc. who "get away with it". Should they or should they not have violated the Social Contract? If they shouldn't have, why? They face no fear of punishment and, it cannot be said that violating the agreement is wrong because the agreement itself is what dictates as to what is right or wrong. You cannot appeal, as was shown before, to pre-existing morality in order to bind someone to the Contract when the Contract is what begats morality. Additionally, if it is true that one can do a crime and remain anonymous, then they have nothing to fear in the way of retribution, so then what should bind one to do what is "morally right"?
Indeed, it may be wholly beneficial to the individual to eliminate someone else if they can get away with it without facing some sort of correction from their peers. If one is competing with a co-worker for a higher paid position, and he knows he can kill his co-worker or otherwise sabotage him so that he can get the position, all the while remaining safe from punishment, what, in the Theory, can compel him not to do so? It would be beneficial to him, and he cannot be caught, ergo to what would the Humanist appeal in order to denounce his conduct, or will this be another case of "Sure, go for it." as I had read in another thread where a Humanist responded to the question of "Can I rape children?"
It was brought up at some point last week or the week before, in response to a presuppositional assertion that the Humanist cannot logically account for morality within our culture, that Social Contract Theory provides such an end. I would like to rebut this assertion with another presuppositional response. Any who can give an answer or criticism of my response, please do, even though, I assume, no one here is an active proponent of this sociological and particularly criminological theory. A criticism is nonetheless welcomed, as I am sure both I and others will encounter the assertion of this theory in apologetical endeavors for years to come. Let us then be prepared to give an answer when the occasion demands it.
Social Contract Theory, from my understanding so correct me if I am mistaken, is the theory that our society is ordered in such a way that each individual member contained therein has agreed with the others to abide by certain standards or societal norms, in exchange for which, they will be left in relative peace with those around them. Violation of the standards or norms will begat retributive punishment from the other members of society. This is the "social contract" that we have all implicitly agreed to by living in society.
It is offered generally as a means by which one can account for morality sans an objective moral qualifier, i.e. Creator. The mandate to not kill, steal, or rape are all societal norms which we have all agreed not to violate for our own good, to the benefit of ourselves and everyone around us. All of this is steeped on the presupposition that it is good and moral not to violate the Social Contract, or, the fall back position, that one should not violate it if they want to preserve their life.
The first presupposition, that it is good and moral not to violate the Social Contract, admittedly, might be a straw man. If indeed this is not a tenant that the proponent holds, then he will undoubtedly use the fall back position, so far as I can surmise, for no other position seems tenable in order to enforce the idea that the Contract must be upheld. In lieu of this, the first position uses circular reasoning, as should be plain to see.
In seeking to explain the source of moral behavior, one must already have a source for moral behavior in order to assert that it is good and moral to hold to the Cotnract. If the Contract is the source for moral behavior, then preceeding the Contract, there is no societal norm with which to hold someone to their word of upholding the Contract. Simply put, prior to the Contract which dictates morality, there has to be a pre-existing morality in order to bind someone to their agreement. It is only after the Contract has been entered into and agreed to that morality can then stem and, as an analysis of the next position will show, no morality has been achieved at all, but merely a loose agreement to "play nice".
The second possible presupposition that one could assume in order to hold one to the Contract is that it will put them in danger of losing their life or happiness should they violate the Contract. This assumes that one will get caught, however. There are many theives, murderers, rapists, etc. who "get away with it". Should they or should they not have violated the Social Contract? If they shouldn't have, why? They face no fear of punishment and, it cannot be said that violating the agreement is wrong because the agreement itself is what dictates as to what is right or wrong. You cannot appeal, as was shown before, to pre-existing morality in order to bind someone to the Contract when the Contract is what begats morality. Additionally, if it is true that one can do a crime and remain anonymous, then they have nothing to fear in the way of retribution, so then what should bind one to do what is "morally right"?
Indeed, it may be wholly beneficial to the individual to eliminate someone else if they can get away with it without facing some sort of correction from their peers. If one is competing with a co-worker for a higher paid position, and he knows he can kill his co-worker or otherwise sabotage him so that he can get the position, all the while remaining safe from punishment, what, in the Theory, can compel him not to do so? It would be beneficial to him, and he cannot be caught, ergo to what would the Humanist appeal in order to denounce his conduct, or will this be another case of "Sure, go for it." as I had read in another thread where a Humanist responded to the question of "Can I rape children?"