Derrida and Van Til compared and contrasted.

[Philip]

Yes. I am only suggesting a two tier justification.

Why only two? That seems an arbitrary place to stop. Further, putting God in as a justification seems to make God into a convenient explanation.

The alternative seems to be that the man is warranted in believing that the mirage is water because he believes its water.

He's warranted in believing it because he sees it and has no good reason to distrust the input of his senses (yet).

 

[Hilasmos]

Oh, and my justification for this justification is that God exists.

 

[Loopie]

If I claim that there is a desk in front of me, what makes it true? The fact that there is, in fact, a desk in front of me. In an ultimate sense this is because God decreed this, but in the most immediate sense, the truth-maker is the fact itself.

I will happily agree with you here. Yes, there are secondary causes, as well as mediums.

I also don't mind saying that certain facts are human constructs: for example, I am currently in the State of Georgia. However, the borders that define the State of Georgia are a human construct and depend on there being a government which all acknowledge has authority over this state. When we talk about truth-makers, we are simply talking about why X is X in an immediate sense.

I agree with you here as well, and I am glad that you clarified your position that X is X in an 'immediate' or apparent sense.

Again, we're skirting Divine occasionalism here. The logical conclusion of this is that there is no causal relationship between my seeing the desk and my having knowledge that the desk is there---instead, my seeing the desk is an occasion for God to impose knowledge upon my mind. If we go further with this, when I read Scripture, my knowledge of God is occasioned by my reading of the Word, but is, in fact, imposed on me by God on that occasion. Sound familiar? (this is the view of Karl Barth, by the way)

I have never held to this view, and if my arguments have made it seem like I do, that was not my intention. It would be similar to discussing human action with a hard-determinist (just as Vincent Cheung. He argues that when man acts sinfully, it is God who is DIRECTLY causing the man not only to have a sinful desire but to also have a sinful act. He would actually argue that God IS the author of sin. I myself hold to a compatibilist view, and I think that this would be true concerning our understanding of knowledge. Yes, I would never deny that man can actually know things. I was only trying to show that man has ALWAYS 'known' God first. It would be impossible for a man to know something without knowing God in his sense of the divine. This is not to be confused as me saying that God 'knows' something FOR you, or anything similar to what Barth would say.

I don't think I need to explain why this is absurd. Further, when we talk about revelation, we are talking about God revealing Himself. When we talk about general revelation, we are talking about the way that God reveals Himself in creation. We are not talking about God showing me that there is a desk---we are talking about God showing me something of Himself in the created order through the medium of the desk. Revelation is a medium.

Wholeheartedly agree.

When we talk about God's sovereignty in knowledge, we are talking about attitudes toward it and the way that we recognize our dependence upon God and thank Him for our belief-oriented capabilities. I suppose that it's true that there is sovereign decree involved here, but that's not the reason for it.

I am not sure what you mean when you say: "that's not the reason for it." I mean, it like saying: what is the reason why Jesus died on the cross? Well, the 'immediate' reason is that the Romans and Jewish leaders put him there because they wanted him dead. The ultimate reason is that God had preordained that this would happen as part of his redemptive plan. In the same way, I agree that you YOURSELF know things in an immediate sense, but in an ultimate sense the REASON you know anything is that God decreed and ordained that you would. What I mean by God 'revealing' things is not the way Barth means the term. What I mean is that if God has decreed for me not to know something, then I will not know it. If God decrees that I will be born blind, never knowing things in a visual sense, than I will not know them. I think we should indeed draw a parallel between God's relationship between us and our choices as well as us and our knowledge.

Consider this:

If God has decreed X, X is true
If God has not decreed X, X is not true
Therefore, if X is true, God has decreed it

This establishes only that God wills whatsoever comes to pass. It does not follow, though, that God is the direct cuase of everything, nor does it make Him the truth-maker. It merely means that nothing comes to pass without God allowing it.

Completely agree. Again, I never said he was the DIRECT cause of everything. I have always believed in secondary causes (which are also believed by Edwards, Van Til, and others).

Then here's my advice to you: get to know these disciplines as disciplines so that you avoid making mistakes. If you're going to talk about epistemology, start reading up on it, get to know its methods and in particular, find out the issues that Christian epistemologists are addressing. Warranted Christian Belief by Plantinga is a good start.

Believe me Philip, I have read a good amount of information and plan to read much more. You make it sound as if I never even cracked open a book about epistemology. Please do not jump to conclusions, and I ask that you show at least some respect in the same way that I have shown you respect. I mean, we ALL could use a little more learning, and I doubt that any of us have read ALL the writings on a particular topic to no longer need to read anymore. Have you read them all? Have you read ALL of Oliphint, Van Til, or Bahnsen? Whether you did or not, I won't patronize you by suggesting that you need to 'start reading up on it', as if this is something you have never done before.

 

[Hilasmos]

Why only two? That seems an arbitrary place to stop. Further, putting God in as a justification seems to make God into a convenient explanation.

Because all knowledge and wisdom are hid in God, ultimate justification, and to those to whom it is revealed through revelational means, the second.

He's warranted in believing it because he sees it and has no good reason to distrust the input of his senses (yet).

When you function like human beings normally function you are warranted to think how humans normally think given the data that is normally availabe within the normally functioning world. Again, that just doesn't seem to be a profound way to view truth. Knowledge, in that light, becomes no more meaningful than the knowledge of Apes.

Why doesn't he have a good reason to distrust his senses beyond the fact that he doesn't distrust his senses?

 

[Philip]

I agree that you YOURSELF know things in an immediate sense, but in an ultimate sense the REASON you know anything is that God decreed and ordained that you would.

Why is this a helpful point, though? God's decree is not the reason---it is simply a necessary factor. Yes, God created the world such that I know certain things and not others, but that's not the reason.

Have you read ALL of Oliphint, Van Til, or Bahnsen?

I've read a fair amount in Van Til and Bahnsen, as well as much of Frame's commentary on Van Til.

The reason why I suggested reading more mainstream epistemology is this: throughout this discussion you've been throwing around terms like "knowledge" without bothering to consider the ordinary use and the result has been confusion all around. This is a problem that I've found in my study of Van Til---he also takes words out of their ordinary context and redefines them, and I'd like to suggest that if you're going to be presenting Van Til, you have to do so without using words in this special Van Tillian sense that no one else uses. Otherwise equivocation is going to get the best of you.

Because all knowledge and wisdom are hid in God, ultimate justification, and to those to whom it is revealed through revelational means, the second.

Which means are revelational though? And who will judge you epistemically if you fail to provide this justification?

Again, that just doesn't seem to be a profound way to view truth.

So? I'm not interested in sounding profound. I'm interested in figuring out how it works. This argument is purely aesthetic in nature and while that can be a good thing, aesthetic qualities of an explanation have nothing to do with their validity.

Knowledge, in that light, becomes no more meaningful than the knowledge of Apes.

I don't think that. Why should I?

Why doesn't he have a good reason to distrust his senses beyond the fact that he doesn't distrust his senses?

What reason does he have? The question here boils down to where the burden of proof lies. I would suggest that the burden of proof lies on the skeptic. Who made the skeptic king? Why should I have to submit all beliefs before his judgment? My contention is that warranted beliefs should be counted as rational knowledge-claims until proven otherwise. That is, the only way to show our subject that his belief is false is to actually take him to the place where he thought he saw water and explain the optical illusion that he saw.

 

[Loopie]

Philip,

I certainly will continue reading more mainstream epistemology (both Christian and non-Christian). I have read Kant, Hume, Aristotle, Plato, Ayn Rand, John Stuart Mill, and William James (on the non-Christian side), and Van Til, Clark, Bahnsen, Lewis, and William Lane Craig (on the Christian side). I understand your concern about terms such as 'knowledge' being used in different ways. But then again, this is true for other discussions as well. Terms such as 'will', 'choice', 'good', 'evil', 'freedom', 'author' have common usage and deeper usage. The Bible contains this as well, and the same word for knowledge can be used in reference to human knowledge that is gained, or God's knowledge that is eternal. It can also refer to that sensus divinitatis as well. Certainly it is important to be concise in every discussion, and I think we are all guilty of equivocation in some degree.

 

[Philip]

I certainly will continue reading more mainstream epistemology (both Christian and non-Christian). I have read Kant, Hume, Aristotle, Plato, Ayn Rand, John Stuart Mill, and William James (on the non-Christian side), and Van Til, Clark, Bahnsen, Lewis, and William Lane Craig (on the Christian side).

That's fine so far as historical philosophy is concerned (though I don't know of any philosophers who actually take Ayn Rand seriously). I would add W.V.O. Quine and G.E. Moore to the list (I'm actually revisiting Quine for part of my thesis).

Certainly it is important to be concise in every discussion, and I think we are all guilty of equivocation in some degree.

True, I think we just need to be on guard about it and define things distinguish between varieties when we come to those points.

 

[Loopie]

Believe me, I have had a difficult time taking Ayn Rand seriously. The problem is she is becoming more popular in the mainstream (particularly with the movie Atlas Shrugged). Essentially she is the sworn enemy of Kant. If Kant believes that the right thing to do is pure altruism, she would say that the right thing to do is pure selfishness. I suppose her argument is very similar to extreme Libertarians, or anarcho-Capitalists, who believe that capitalism should be left completely unrestrained, so that each person's selfishness will 'compete' with everyone else, and you will have a perfect balance (or something similar). In fact, I have three atheist friends who constantly try to defend her worldview, and remind me to read more of her books (which I grudgingly do so that I can show them her errors and inconsistencies).

 

[Philip]

In fact, I have three atheist friends who constantly try to defend her worldview, and remind me to read more of her books (which I grudgingly do so that I can show them her errors and inconsistencies).

In my experience, to mount an adequate critique of someone's position, you have to understand it, and you won't understand it until you understand the real appeal and find yourself in the place where the critique a position mounts of yours starts to sound plausible.

 

[Hilasmos]

So? I'm not interested in sounding profound. I'm interested in figuring out how it works. This argument is purely aesthetic in nature and while that can be a good thing, aesthetic qualities of an explanation have nothing to do with their validity.

The word profound may not be the best choice. Perhaps a better way to say it is that it trivializes the biblical notion of truth and knowledge.

Originally Posted by Hilasmos
Knowledge, in that light, becomes no more meaningful than the knowledge of Apes.

I don't think that. Why should I?

Because Prov. 1:7 is in your Bible and it does not say the beginning of knowledge is beliefs formed from (undefined) properly functioning cognitive faculties.

 

[Philip]

Because Prov. 1:7 is in your Bible and it does not say the beginning of knowledge is beliefs formed from (undefined) properly functioning cognitive faculties.

In what sense, though, is this verse using the word knowledge. I would suggest that it's not talking about knowledge of facts. It says:

"The fear of the Lord is the beginnging of knowledge
But fools despise wisdom and instruction"

In other words, this is talking about wisdom. When I do epistemology, I'm talking about the ordinary ways in which we use the word "knowledge," and we have to make these distinctions. The verse is not saying the fools don't know anything, it means that they don't understand it because they despise wisdom. True understanding starts with the fear of the Lord. It's not talking about all the range of meanings in the ordinary uses of the word "knowledge."

 

[Hilasmos]

It's not talking about all the range of meanings in the ordinary uses of the word "knowledge."

Agreed, that is why I said "as I define knowledge" from the start. Why call warranted beliefs knowledge? Why not just call them warranted beliefs that are believed to be true until they are believed not to be true. That type of circle doesn't deserve to be equated with "knowledge," in my opinion. It doesn't get outside of the subjective box that truth needs -- again, just how I am viewing and understanding it, which of course doesn't mean anything.

That is, the only way to show our subject that his belief is false is to actually take him to the place where he thought he saw water and explain the optical illusion that he saw.

Or rather, this would introduce the concept that he has reason to distrust his cognitive faculties and therefore has reason to distrust the new set of stimulai represented by the person explaining what mirages are. Of course, once this is admitted he has reason to distrust all that was said above and is stuck in a circle of irrationalism. I play the skeptic card, you play the opposite, and my reason for doing so is no less arbitrary than yours, so how do we escape arbitrariness? If non-skepticism is more intutitive it is only because we are in God's world with a knowledge of God -- again, just how I am viewing it currently.

 

[Philip]

Why call warranted beliefs knowledge?

I didn't say warranted beliefs, I said warranted true beliefs. I said warrant is all that is needed for an agent to be rational in making a knowledge-claim. One can be rational and still end up believing something false. I don't think people before Copernicus were any less rational than we are, even though they believed that the sun goes around the earth.

Or rather, this would introduce the concept that he has reason to distrust his cognitive faculties and therefore has reason to distrust the new set of stimulai represented by the person explaining what mirages are. Of course, once this is admitted he has reason to distrust all that was said above and is stuck in a circle of irrationalism.

No he doesn't---he is just made aware that in this instance he did not have all relevant information. Showing him the optical illusion still involves his senses: he has to use his senses in order to understand that his senses were deceived. This is the rational skepticism of the lawyer or the detective---it is not the irrational skepticism of the professional skeptic. This isn't arbitrary: it's practical.

 

[Hilasmos]

No he doesn't---he is just made aware that in this instance he did not have all relevant information.

I fail to see how your restating it makes the situation any different. How would he determine that he now has all the relevant information; just moments ago, what appeard to be common sense was a pure illusion. Lawyer/detective skepticism has prebuilt rules, or presuppositions, and I have no reason to believe this man has these. He may, but if he does, they are arbitrary. The term "practical" is no less laiden with presuppositions.

 

[Hilasmos]

I didn't say warranted beliefs, I said warranted true beliefs.

I was thinking in regards to the perspective of the knower.

 

[Philip]

How would he determine that he now has all the relevant information

As a methodological assumption, you should proceed on the basis that your faculties are working correctly until there is good reason to think otherwise. Anything else is just silly.

The term "practical" is no less laiden with presuppositions.

Your point?

I was thinking in regards to the perspective of the knower.

If one has no reason to think that one's faculties are not functioning properly, I see no real problem with proceeding on the assumption that they are, in fact, functioning properly until there's good reason to think otherwise. This is the way we ordinarily operate until we start listening to skeptics.

 

[Hilasmos]

As a methodological assumption, you should proceed on the basis that your faculties are working correctly until there is good reason to think otherwise.

In other words, continue operating in accordance with your subconcious knowledge of God?

Anyways, I have side tracked the issue enough into the abyss. Thanks.