Dichotomism or Monism

[Stowaway]

Grace and peace!

I've been reading Anthony Hoekema's book Created in God's Image, which, in my overall opinion, is an excellent treatment of Christian anthropology. However, I just want to makes some observations about his analysis of the question between trichotomy or dichotomy. He rejects the idea trichotomy as almost all orthodox theologians have, but then he goes on to say the following:

"It is my conviction, however, that we should reject dichotomy as well as trichotomy. As Christian believers we should certainly repudiate dichotomy in the sense in which the ancient Greeks taught it." Hoekema

He went on to talk about the Greeks, and I agree with him that we should have a much higher opinion of God's creation than the Greeks did. Plato, for instance, considered the body as being of an inferior substance, and furthermore, the Greeks didn't have any belief consistent with the resurrection.

I also agree with Hoekema that there are a number of dangerous doctrines that can be associated with idea of dichotomy just as much with that of trichotomy. However, the improper application of a concept is no reason to reject the concept itself. The question isn't whether or not the distinction can be twisted by false teachers, but whether the Bible actually applies principles to soul/spirit which could not equally be applied to the body, or vice-versa.

Then Hoekema goes on to say:

"But even aside from the Greek understanding of dichotomy, which is clearly contrary to Scripture, we must reject the term dichotomy as such, since it is not an accurate description of the biblical view of man. The word itself is objectionable. It comes from two Greek roots: diche, meaning 'twofold' or 'into two'; and temnein, meaning 'to cut.' It therefore suggests that the human person can be cut into two 'parts.' But man in this present life cannot be so cut." Hoekema

I believe his argument would have been more convincing if he wouldn't have had to use the qualifier "in this present life." Of course he did so because the principle has limited application beyond this present life. Before the resurrection, the body in the grave is separate from the spirit (see Phil. 1:24, for instance). Therefore, on that ground alone, the dichotomous distinction has a theological application.

Hoekema also seems to be claiming to know something that even the apostle Paul didn't claim when he said, "I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth) such an one caught up to the third heaven." (2 Corinthians 12:2) In addition to the apostle's account, Herman Bavinck also speaks of the possible separation of body and spirit: "[The human being as spirit] is similar to the angels, also being able to think about spiritual and heavenly things, and also, if necessary, to exist without the body." (Reformed Dogmatics, "The Whole Person as the Image of God" -- translated from Portuguese version)

The only other theologian that I know of that holds to a similar view to Hoekema's is Berkouwer whose reasons for rejecting dichotomism are similar to those of Hoekema. Berkouwer refers to Bavinck for support, saying:

"Thus Bavinck attacks trichotomy not with the argument that Scripture knows nothing of three substances, and refers to two only, but rather with the argument that it knows nothing of any original dualism between spirit and matter." Berkouwer (Man: The Image of God, p. 209)

I believe he's referring to the following comment by Bavinck:

"Trichotomism, which is fundamentally rooted in the dualism of Plato and has repeatedly found acceptance in the schools of Gnostic and Theosophic thought, sees here two distinct substances. But that is wrong. Hebrews 4:12 and 1 Thessalonians 5:12 don't contain any more a list of constitutive elements of the human being than, shall we say, Luke 10:27, and therefore prove nothing." (Reformed Dogmatics, "The Whole Person as the Image of God" -- translated from Portuguese version)

It strikes me as kind of odd that Bavinck is refuting trichotomism by attacking Plato's dualism. (In contrast, Charles Hodge speaks of Plato's doctrine of the "threefold constitution of man.") However, in the cited passage, Bavinck isn't speaking of the dichotomy between spirit and matter, as Berkouwer says. Rather, he's denying that soul and spirit can be regarded as two distinct substances. Referring to Genesis 2:7, Bavinck speaks of God's breath as the "principle of life" which is sometimes referred to as the soul and other times as the spirit, depending on the context. In other words, he denies that the words have equivalent meanings, but, even so, they refer to the same principal of life which is connected to the body:

"But the human being is a 'soul' because, from the beginning, his spiritual component (in contrast to the spiritual component of angels) is adapted and organized for a body and is tied, both by his intellectual and spiritual life, to external sensory faculties;" (Reformed Dogmatics, "The Whole Person as the Image of God" -- translated from Portuguese version)

Although I agree with most of Hoekema's reasons for wanting to reject the dichotomous position, there are occasions where the distinction is supported by Scripture.

Please let me know if I'm mistaken.

Thanks!
Mike

 

[Toasty]

2 Corinthians 5:8 teaches that there is a distinction between body and soul. To be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord. Hoekema does teach that man has two aspects, but he would not use the word "dichotomy" to describe that.

 

[Stowaway]

2 Corinthians 5:8 teaches that there is a distinction between body and soul. To be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord. Hoekema does teach that man has two aspects, but he would not use the word "dichotomy" to describe that.

Thanks for the response, Henry!

I personally see no reason to reject the word simply because its etymology. In fact, when I die I'd prefer the separation to be by "cutting" than by tearing, for instance.

 

[MW]

It has been some years since I read this book, but I think what Hoekema is getting at is that man is an unified being and that Scripture only speaks of man as having two parts which can be separated in a functional way because of the introduction of sin. Even the complete separation at death requires an extraordinary act to sustain it.

 

[Stowaway]

It has been some years since I read this book, but I think what Hoekema is getting at is that man is an unified being and that Scripture only speaks of man as having two parts which can be separated in a functional way because of the introduction of sin. Even the complete separation at death requires an extraordinary act to sustain it.

Like I said, I agree with him wanting to treat man as a unified being, except when such a distinction is warranted by Scripture. The only real issue I have seems to be just a question of words... whether to use the word dichotomy or not.

However, I'm don't what you mean by "can be separated in a functional way..." What sort of separation would that be? And how does the separation at death require an extraordinary act to sustain it?

Thanks,
Mike

 

[MW]

However, I'm don't what you mean by "can be separated in a functional way..." What sort of separation would that be? And how does the separation at death require an extraordinary act to sustain it?

God did not make "souls" to function independently of a body. The intermediate solution to the dilemma of a disembodied soul in 2 Cor 5 is the provision of a new house which is eternal in the heavens.

 

[Stowaway]

God did not make "souls" to function independently of a body.

But in what way do souls function independently of a body? How do you know that souls aren't perfectly suited for the functioning or lack thereof that takes place in the afterlife?

However, whatever sustenance may be required, it's God who does it, and I suppose that all divine works could be called extraordinary. No argument there.

These questions really seem aside from the main point though.

Having thought a little more about the subject, it seems that Hoekema's approach to the question is a little inconsistent. When he said "But man in this present life cannot be so cut," it seems that that might be a valid approach if he were speaking of a word whose scope was limited to this present life. However since the question of dichotomy isn't limited to just this life, what's the point in trying to bring that in as justification for the choice of the word? What I would consider more consistent would be one of two choices: He could either choose a word that recognized the distinction in the afterlife (and extraordinary events like what may have occurred with Paul), or he could reject the word "dichotomy" without any such justification and admit that it only accurately describes our composition for most practical purposes.

To me it's kind of like refusing to call water a compound. Under just about every imaginable circumstance of my life, I can treat water as if it weren't a compound. However, if I should find myself in a serious laboratory situation, it might cease to be reasonable to continue with such a refusal. I might finally have to break down and acknowledge it for what it is.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

Worth a read:

http://kimriddlebarger.squarespace.com/theological-essays/trichotomy.pdf

 

[MW]

These questions really seem aside from the main point though.

They seem to me to be fairly basic to the discussion. If the soul could naturally function without the body is the body even a "part" of the man? The body could be regarded as an appendage to his life and personality rather than an integral part of it. Denial of the necessity of the body would lead to an immaterial monism.

 

[Stowaway]

Worth a read:

http://kimriddlebarger.squarespace.com/theological-essays/trichotomy.pdf

Thanks, Mr Religion!

I agree. That's a very good article.

 

[Stowaway]

They seem to me to be fairly basic to the discussion. If the soul could naturally function without the body is the body even a "part" of the man? The body could be regarded as an appendage to his life and personality rather than an integral part of it. Denial of the necessity of the body would lead to an immaterial monism.

Fine. Not that I agree that it implies immaterial monism (at least not while we're alive), but if you want to approach it that way, I'll repeat my questions:

In what way do souls function independently of a body? How do you know that souls aren't perfectly suited for the functioning or lack thereof that takes place in the afterlife?

Thanks!
Mike

 

[MW]

How do you know that souls aren't perfectly suited for the functioning or lack thereof that takes place in the afterlife?

If they were so suited the body would be a prison which entraps the soul and death would be a release from this prison -- ideas which are thoroughly refuted and rejected by Scripture.

 

[Stowaway]

If they were so suited the body would be a prison which entraps the soul and death would be a release from this prison -- ideas which are thoroughly refuted and rejected by Scripture.

I think its perfectly likely that souls are well suited for the afterlife even though the body is a not a prison. In other words, the fact that the body is not a prison does not in itself imply anything with respect to how well suited the soul is for the afterlife. Here's what Hodge has to say about it:

"The common Protestant doctrine on this subject is that 'the souls of believers are at their death, made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory; and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection.' According to this view the intermediate state, so far as believers are concerned, is one of perfect freedom from sin and suffering, and of great exaltation and blessedness. This is perfectly consistent with the belief that after the second coming of Christ, and the resurrection of the dead, the state of the soul will be still more exalted and blessed." Charles Hodge (Part IV, Sec. 1)

And whether the soul is suited for an existence apart from the body or not, either way, it just seems to confirm that man is a dichotomy.

Thanks,
Mike

 

[Pilgrim Standard]

These questions really seem aside from the main point though.

They seem to me to be fairly basic to the discussion. If the soul could naturally function without the body is the body even a "part" of the man? The body could be regarded as an appendage to his life and personality rather than an integral part of it. Denial of the necessity of the body would lead to an immaterial monism.

Pastor, is an amputee less a person? I obviously ask rhetorically, but only to understand the argument. Does the argument reduce to only that amount of anatomy which is necessary to sustain temporal life?

 

[MW]

Pastor, is an amputee less a person? I obviously ask rhetorically, but only to understand the argument. Does the argument reduce to only that amount of anatomy which is necessary to sustain temporal life?

This would go towards confirming the point in that a person's being is not dependent on this "appendage" though his well-being might be affected by it. It is noteworthy that our Lord parabolically spoke in the same terms of life and members, indicating that the material part of man is essentially involved in the concept of human life.

 

[Stowaway]

Charles Hodge speaks about this subject in detail in a section entitled "The State of Believers After Death" in his commentary on 2 Corinthians. The specific question he was addressing was the meaning of the expression "building of God" in the verse:

"For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." 2 Corinthians 5:1

He refutes the idea that this could refer to the resurrection body or any other body for that matter. One reason He provides is that the Bible only speaks of the nature body and the spiritual body (which would be the resurrection body):

"It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." 1 Corinthians 15:44

Arguing against the position of Hermann Olhausen, whose maxim was "no body no soul," Hodge said:

"His utterly unsatisfactory attempt to reconcile this contradiction in his theory is, first, that self-consciousness in departed spirits is very obscure — a mere dreamy state of existence; and secondly, that it must be assumed that a relation continues between the soul and the elements of its decaying body in the grave. This is a perfect collapse of the theory. If it involves either of these consequences, that the soul is unconscious after death, or that its life is in connection with its disorganized body, and conditioned by that connection, then it comes in direct conflict with the Scripture, and is exploded as a mere product of the imagination. If the Bible teaches or assumes that a body is necessary to the self-consciousness of the soul, or even to its power to perceive and to express, to act and to be acted upon, then it would be not only natural but necessary to understand the apostle to teach in this passage that the moment the soul leaves its present body it enters into another." Charles Hodge

Thus, in answer to the question he proposed, Hodge concludes that the "building of God" is heaven itself:

"The body is compared to a house in which the soul now dwells, heaven is the house into which it enters when this earthly house is dissolved. Our Lord told his sorrowing disciples that they should soon be with him, that in his Father’s house, whither he went, there were many mansions, and that he would receive them unto himself." Charles Hodge

And later:

"The apostle is speaking of the grounds of consolation in the immediate prospect of death. He says in effect that the dissolution of the body does not destroy the soul or deprive it of a home. His consolation was that if unclothed he would not be found naked. While at home in the body he was absent from the Lord, but as soon as he was absent from the body he would be present with the Lord." Charles Hodge

 

[earl40]

However, I'm don't what you mean by "can be separated in a functional way..." What sort of separation would that be? And how does the separation at death require an extraordinary act to sustain it?

God did not make "souls" to function independently of a body. The intermediate solution to the dilemma of a disembodied soul in 2 Cor 5 is the provision of a new house which is eternal in the heavens.

Is this "new house" some type of physical body? I only ask because it appears you are implying that the soul, that is with The Lord after death, has some type of new body.

 

[MW]

Is this "new house" some type of physical body?

No; it is best understood as referring to the intermediate state, which is so called because it is the time between death and the resurrection of the body. It is a state with extraordinary provisions to support and house the soul in its unnatural condition of disembodiment. Final and full blessedness is only enjoyed when the soul is reunited with its glorified body at the resurrection.

 

[earl40]

Is this "new house" some type of physical body?

No; it is best understood as referring to the intermediate state, which is so called because it is the time between death and the resurrection of the body. It is a state with extraordinary provisions to support and house the soul in its unnatural condition of disembodiment. Final and full blessedness is only enjoyed when the soul is reunited with its glorified body at the resurrection.

Thank you for clearing this up. I have run across some say that it some type of physical body based on 2 Cor 5.

 

[Andrew P.C.]

Maybe I am not understanding the argument, but if we were saying that man is a dichotomy, does this imply that man is separated into two categories, I.E. the flesh and the spirit? I know that some early church fathers have made the argument that man is mind, body, and soul. Would that be a trichotomy?

On one hand, we see that man is one being. This would include body and soul. Without the soul, there is no man, but can we say without the body, there is no man? We aren't souls pre-existant to the body. That would make us eternal. We do exist forever after God has made us. Yet, I see that there is a connection with the body and the soul. Most importantly, as saints, that connection is solely because of Christ's Resurrection (Holy is His name). What about Christ? I know the immediate answer would be that He is God (and Amen to that), but He also took on flesh. I think that a re-visitation to Chalcedon (451) is important for this discussion as well. Christ does not have two separate beings or persons within himself, but he is one person, with two natures. I think starting with who Christ is would help us understand who man is and will become. Knowing that Christ also took on human nature (in the Incarnation), when he died and laid there in the tomb, how was he separated from His body? I find this interesting since I think it is important in our discussion as well.

 

[Stowaway]

Maybe I am not understanding the argument, but if we were saying that man is a dichotomy, does this imply that man is separated into two categories, I.E. the flesh and the spirit? I know that some early church fathers have made the argument that man is mind, body, and soul. Would that be a trichotomy?

A number of the church fathers held the tripartite view (body, soul and mind/spirit) probably due to the influence of Greek philosophy. It didn't arise as a theological issue until Apollinaris started teaching that the incarnation of Christ consisted of taking a human body and soul but not the human spirit. This was considered a heretical doctrine because it denied that Christ took on our whole nature and thus implied that Christ's work excluded the redemption of the human spirit:

"If anyone has put his trust in Him as a Man without a human mind, he is really bereft of mind, and quite unworthy of salvation. For that which He has not assumed He has not healed; but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved." Gregory of Nazianzus (Epistle 101)

From that point on, orthodox Christianity has rejected the tripartite view. However, Berkouwer points out that originally Apollinaris held to a bipartite view, so his doctrine didn't require that particular anthropology. Therefore, the bipartite doctrine can just as easily be associated with false doctrine as the tripartite doctrine. Of course, I agree with that, but Berkouwer and Hoekema took it a step further, saying that we should reject dichotomism as well and teach a monistic view of man.

At this point I think it amounts to nothing more than a question of terminology, because Hoekema's rejection of the word dichotomy was based on a principle whose application was limited to men who are alive and denies the possibility that Paul's experience (2 Corinthians 12:2) was out of the body:

"It comes from two Greek roots: diche, meaning 'twofold' or 'into two'; and temnein, meaning 'to cut.' It therefore suggests that the human person can be cut into two 'parts.' But man in this present life cannot be so cut." Hoekema

Although I agree that we need to be careful of false doctrine, I can't see doing so by choosing a word that doesn't really account for man in the totality of his existence. That led to questions about the state of man in the intermediate stage between death and the resurrection. Everyone seems to agree that at that stage, man has a soul separate from his body. That demonstrates that man can be divided from his body at death, which wouldn't be possible unless man normally consisted of two parts.

Thanks!
Mike

 

[MW]

That demonstrates that man can be divided from his body at death, which wouldn't be possible unless man normally consisted of two parts.

On this reasoning one could conclude from the miracle of Jesus walking on water that such an action would not be possible unless man normally had the ability to defy gravity.

We have to reckon with the fact that something extraordinary is taking place when the soul is sustained in a state of disembodiment. This state is not "normal" for man. If it were normal, all kinds of mystical and magical notions would be possible.

 

[Stowaway]

On this reasoning one could conclude from the miracle of Jesus walking on water that such an action would not be possible unless man normally had the ability to defy gravity.

I agree that saying "wouldn't be possible" didn't express my point well. What I was trying to point out is that the Bible makes a clear distinction between the soul and the body.

This state is not "normal" for man.

I didn't say that it was.

 

[Stowaway]

B. B. Warfield gives a nice summary of Augustine's most fundamental beliefs about the subject:

"Augustine defends his attitude of uncertainty, and enumerates the points as to which he has no doubt: viz., that the soul is spirit, not body; that it is rational or intellectual; that it is not of the nature of God, but is so far a mortal creature that it is capable of deterioration and of alienation from the life of God, and so far immortal that after this life it lives on in bliss or punishment for ever; that it was not incarnated because of, or according to, preceding deserts acquired in a previous existence, yet that it is under the curse of sin which it derives from Adam, and therefore in all cases alike needs redemption in Christ." B. B. Warfield (Studies in Tertullian and Augustine, p. 250)