Does Poythress’ Shadow Cast Different Lines?

[RamistThomist]

I am referring to Vern Poythress’ Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses. I have much admiration and respect for Dr Poythress. He is a godly gentleman and a scholar. His work still sets a feast for the Church.

His work can be classified as an exegetical treatment of biblical law. I will not try to analyze and defend/refute every aspect of Poythress’ work. Poythress also goes to great lengths to show his affinities and similarities with theonomy. For the most part I agree with him. Poythress has lately been cited as an authority in the Theonomy debate. While granting some of his rebuttals to Bahnsen (just for argument’s sake), I propose that some of Poythress’ formulations have logical difficulties. I am indebted to Bahnsen’s No Other Standard.

The Myth of “Victimless Crimes.”

According to Poythress, however, the state’s right to punish offenses “covers only those cases in which human beings are injured” (p. 135). This is a speculative theological premise for which Poythress offers no Biblical warrant whatsoever. This is another way of saying that crime can never be an assault against God’s honor. But this point needs to be proven, not assumed.


The Kline Influence

Poythress can claim: “Paradoxically, I can also agree with a good deal in Kline’s intrusionist
approach” (p. 343; cf. p. 399). To quote Bahnsen,

“Kline holds that the civil state, as an institution of common grace, is categorically not under the specially revealed guidance of Moses to Israel as a holy, redemptive nation; the community life-norms of Israel were uniquely for Old Testament Israel, anticipating the Final Day of wrath. Poythress, on the other hand, openly affirms the general validity and applicability of the civil laws of Israel for nations today. To say, then, that he agrees with Kline’s intrusionist position is simply incoherent – asserting and denying the same premise” (NOS, 295).

In other words, when you affirm and deny the same premise (as Poythress does), you introduce a contradiction into the argument. When you introduce a contradiction into the premises you can then prove anything you want in the conclusion (by means of addition and disjunctive syllogism).

Conclusion
I only write this as a stopper to references to Poythress’ definitive response to Theonomy (neverminding the parts where he calls himself a theonomist).

 

[MW]

Bahnsen correctly pointed out in No Other Standard that Poythress' approach enabled the interpreter to make of the text of Scripture whatever he wills -- or something to that effect. In other words,, if Poythress and Kline are correct then there are no objective controls on which all interpreters can agree as they approach the text. We are basically left with allegory. This is a problem with the redemptive historical approach in general. It seems to leave out of view the fact that Scripture does not only have an eschatological focus, but was also given to thoroughly equip the man of God for good works in his station in life.

 

[timmopussycat]

I am referring to Vern Poythress’ Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses. I have much admiration and respect for Dr Poythress. He is a godly gentleman and a scholar. His work still sets a feast for the Church.

His work can be classified as an exegetical treatment of biblical law. I will not try to analyze and defend/refute every aspect of Poythress’ work. Poythress also goes to great lengths to show his affinities and similarities with theonomy. For the most part I agree with him. Poythress has lately been cited as an authority in the Theonomy debate. While granting some of his rebuttals to Bahnsen (just for argument’s sake), I propose that some of Poythress’ formulations have logical difficulties. I am indebted to Bahnsen’s No Other Standard.

His appendix on "pleroo" in Matt. 5:17, although not a thorough treatment of the two key verses, is one of the two main exegetical arguments against Bahnsen's Theonomy now available. Those claiming that Bahnsen's attempt to refute it in "NO OTHER STANDARD" seem not to have read it carefully.

The Myth of “Victimless Crimes.”

According to Poythress, however, the state’s right to punish offenses “covers only those cases in which human beings are injured” (p. 135). This is a speculative theological premise for which Poythress offers no Biblical warrant whatsoever. This is another way of saying that crime can never be an assault against God’s honor. But this point needs to be proven, not assumed.

Your conclusion does not quite follow. You missed one of P's premises on p. 133 "Any sin injures God in the sense of being an offense against him and an abomination to him...It aims at overthrowing God as God, by making oneself or some idol into a god. Since the sinner attempts to destroy God, the fit penalty is the destruction of the sinner in hell-or else the destruction of the substitute, namely, in the death of Christ..." Poythress does in, ch. 10 and Appendix A, attempt to provide proof for the point that such a crime today does not require judicial action by the state. I am not happy with his attempt.

The Kline Influence

Poythress can claim: “Paradoxically, I can also agree with a good deal in Kline’s intrusionist
approach” (p. 343; cf. p. 399). To quote Bahnsen,

“Kline holds that the civil state, as an institution of common grace, is categorically not under the specially revealed guidance of Moses to Israel as a holy, redemptive nation; the community life-norms of Israel were uniquely for Old Testament Israel, anticipating the Final Day of wrath. Poythress, on the other hand, openly affirms the general validity and applicability of the civil laws of Israel for nations today. To say, then, that he agrees with Kline’s intrusionist position is simply incoherent – asserting and denying the same premise” (NOS, 295).

In other words, when you affirm and deny the same premise (as Poythress does), you introduce a contradiction into the argument. When you introduce a contradiction into the premises you can then prove anything you want in the conclusion (by means of addition and disjunctive syllogism).

This is not a strictly accurate reading of Poythress. With the first comment cited, he is not necessarily accepting the cited premise claimed Klinean by Bahnsen. We don't know whether P is approving that premise or some of K's work in detail that show that particular life norms are or are not restricted to OT Israel

Conclusion
I only write this as a stopper to references to Poythress’ definitive response to Theonomy (neverminding the parts where he calls himself a theonomist).

I call myself a theonomist too and for the same reason. But we mean the older sense of the word. Both P and I find our ethical norms in God. But neither of us accepts the ethical view of Christian Reconstruction's preferred hermeneutic for determining how Mosaic judicials apply today.

 

[RamistThomist]

I am referring to Vern Poythress’ Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses. I have much admiration and respect for Dr Poythress. He is a godly gentleman and a scholar. His work still sets a feast for the Church.

His work can be classified as an exegetical treatment of biblical law. I will not try to analyze and defend/refute every aspect of Poythress’ work. Poythress also goes to great lengths to show his affinities and similarities with theonomy. For the most part I agree with him. Poythress has lately been cited as an authority in the Theonomy debate. While granting some of his rebuttals to Bahnsen (just for argument’s sake), I propose that some of Poythress’ formulations have logical difficulties. I am indebted to Bahnsen’s No Other Standard.

His appendix on "pleroo" in Matt. 5:17, although not a thorough treatment of the two key verses, is one of the two main exegetical arguments against Bahnsen's Theonomy now available. Those claiming that Bahnsen's attempt to refute it in "NO OTHER STANDARD" seem not to have read it carefully.

I actually agreed with you, Tim.

The Myth of “Victimless Crimes.”

According to Poythress, however, the state’s right to punish offenses “covers only those cases in which human beings are injured” (p. 135). This is a speculative theological premise for which Poythress offers no Biblical warrant whatsoever. This is another way of saying that crime can never be an assault against God’s honor. But this point needs to be proven, not assumed.

Your conclusion does not quite follow. You missed one of P's premises on p. 133 "Any sin injures God in the sense of being an offense against him and an abomination to him...It aims at overthrowing God as God, by making oneself or some idol into a god. Since the sinner attempts to destroy God, the fit penalty is the destruction of the sinner in hell-or else the destruction of the substitute, namely, in the death of Christ..." Poythress does in, ch. 10 and Appendix A, attempt to provide proof for the point that such a crime today does not require judicial action by the state. I am not happy with his attempt.

Even if my conclusion doesn't follow, you seem to agree with me that this is one of Poythress' weaker areas. Therefore, I won't belabor the point.

The Kline Influence

Poythress can claim: “Paradoxically, I can also agree with a good deal in Kline’s intrusionist
approach” (p. 343; cf. p. 399). To quote Bahnsen,

“Kline holds that the civil state, as an institution of common grace, is categorically not under the specially revealed guidance of Moses to Israel as a holy, redemptive nation; the community life-norms of Israel were uniquely for Old Testament Israel, anticipating the Final Day of wrath. Poythress, on the other hand, openly affirms the general validity and applicability of the civil laws of Israel for nations today. To say, then, that he agrees with Kline’s intrusionist position is simply incoherent – asserting and denying the same premise” (NOS, 295).

In other words, when you affirm and deny the same premise (as Poythress does), you introduce a contradiction into the argument. When you introduce a contradiction into the premises you can then prove anything you want in the conclusion (by means of addition and disjunctive syllogism).

This is not a strictly accurate reading of Poythress. With the first comment cited, he is not necessarily accepting the cited premise claimed Klinean by Bahnsen. We don't know whether P is approving that premise or some of K's work in detail that show that particular life norms are or are not restricted to OT Israel

Conclusion
I only write this as a stopper to references to Poythress’ definitive response to Theonomy (neverminding the parts where he calls himself a theonomist).

I call myself a theonomist too and for the same reason. But we mean the older sense of the word. Both P and I find our ethical norms in God. But neither of us accepts the ethical view of Christian Reconstruction's preferred hermeneutic for determining how Mosaic judicials apply today.

That's fine. And I do think me pointing out the logical difficulties (and I didnt quote all of what I could) in Poythress affirming both Bahnsen and K is valid. But your disagreement seems to be in degree, not kind.