RamistThomist
Puritanboard Assessor
Ten years ago, when I was debating online converts to Eastern Orthodoxy, I devoted some thought to the essence/energies distinction. Actually, it had been on my radar since 2009. While I no longer have any interest in such debates, I thought it might be helpful to put analyses into one place. For this piece, I am drawing heavily upon David Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West, Gregory Palamas’s Triads, and Robert Jenson’s Systematic Theology.
Exposition
Aristotle appears to be the first to use the word energia (or any of its semantic cognates). Aristotle’s use suggests something along the lines of actuality and activity. Other thinkers took the word and gave it different applications, but the term itself did not have much of a philosophical impact until Middle Platonism.
Whatever else we might think of the term “energies,” and despite its Aristotelian provenance, it is certainly a biblical category. Paul uses the term in 1 Corinthians 12. καὶ διαιρέσεις ἐνεργημάτων εἰσίν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς θεός, ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. Moreover, energies can be participated in, something impossible if they are identical to the divine essence Of course, much of the debate hinges on whether Palamas and Paul are using the term in the same way. I do not think there are.
At its most basic, the essence/energies distinction addresses a tension in classical theism. If God is unknowable in his essence, then how can we know him? Eastern Christians said we know him by his “energies” or operations (see St Basil the Great, Letter 234). More importantly, they were keen to point out that the energies themselves were also fully God. This safeguarded another important value: God reveals God.
Palamas and the Triads
Palamas begins his work with a helpful survey of terminology. For one, the heart is the rational faculty (I.2.iii; p. 42). This is absolutely correct and quite close to a Hebraic anthropology. Further, I also agree that “the divine” (my words, not his) has penetrated all of created reality (1.ii.6; 45). Before we begin, we must note his use of the term hyperousia: The essence is beyond the Godhead (2.iii.8; p. 57). (The reader is also encouraged to consult Plato’s Republic 549b for an earlier use of the term). This is key to his whole construction
Palamas, as is the case with the West, asserts the divine essence to be completely simple and there is no way we can participate in it. If we did, either a) we would be part of God or b) the essence isn’t really simple. Palamas solves this problem by adding a third category: energies or activity. It is close to the term power. Power, understood in the ancient world, was something close to a substance (Barnes 36). It was similar to a “fluid” or “electricity,” to use an anachronism. More formally, it was the capacity to effect change. Such a view was still operative in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa.
Palamas says the energies are en-hypostatic (3.i.9, p. 71). This saves him from the immediate charge of Neo-Platonism. It raises the question: which hypostasis(es)? He answers: The Spirit sends it out in the hypostasis of another (ibid).
This might seem abstract, and it certainly is, but it makes sense of some of the biblical narrative. For one we physically see the God’s glory. Moses saw God’s glory with his eyes. Western writers, or so it seems with Augustine (see On the Trinity III.2.24), would say that Moses only saw a mystical replica of God’s glory. Eastern writers say it was a bodily vision. For example, on the Mt of Transfiguration, did the disciples see the glory around Jesus or did they see a spiritual replica of the glory? I actually think the East is closer to the point on this one.
Evaluation
Before we criticize Palamas, it is important to recognize that he agrees with Western Christendom on key points: God is utterly simple and we cannot know the divine essence. Palamas, despite his other moves, is not as radical as he might appear to be.
I do not know how seriously I can take Palamas’s claim that he is not dependent on philosophy like the West is. His doctrine of essence, energies, motion, salvation as transformation are all highly technical philosophical concepts. Even if “hyper-ousia” is a valid theological concept, it is taken from Plato’s Republic (Plato 549b). Further, on p. 105 Palamas refers to God as “Prime Mover.” How is this not using Aristotle? I am not saying he is an Aristotelian–I do not think he is–but his project could not have gotten off of the ground were it not for Aristotle.
How coherent is it to call the energies “hypostatic” (p. 57, II.iii.8) while insisting that hypostasis does not mean what hypostasis means when it refers to the Trinity? I realize that Meyendorff glosses “hypostatic” to mean “real existence” (p. 131 n .2), but in the context of the Trinity we now have nature, hypostases, and hypostatic energies (which are not the same as hypostases). Is it any wonder that Latin critics drew the inference of a “fourth hypostasis?”
True, Palamas explains this by saying the light is “enhypostatic” . Robert Jenson has suggested that Palamas places the divine energies outside the gospel narrative (Jenson 157). I do not think Palamas’s move is as crass as Jenson suggests, but the problems are there. Following Maximus, it appears that Palamas sees the events in the gospel narratives as symbols of higher reality (3.i.13, p. 74).
Does it really make sense to say that God is both beyond knowledge and beyond unknowing (p. 32; 1.iii.4)? I realize Meyendorff glosses this as a Ps. Dionysian move, which it is, but that only raises further problems. If God is ineffable (Meyendorff, 121 n.9), then what’s the point of even speaking of God? I simply do not accept that the “knowledge-which-transcends” apophatic and cataphatic knowledge is not merely another form of cataphatic knowledge, for it ends with positive descriptions of God. That is not an insurmountble problem, but we need to call it what it is.
And a common criticism of Palamas: If God’s essence is unknowable, how does Palamas know that it is unknowable (Lacugna)? To be fair, Palamas does anticipate this criticism. Palamas notes that any answer he gives must be “tentative.” He then gives a very important answer–we know God “by the disposition of created things” (2.iii.68, p. 68). In other words, we know God by his works, not by peering into his nature. There is an important truth to this, and Palamas would have done well to finish the thought: if we are truly to know God by his works then we must look to his covenant and to the finished work of Christ. Of course, such a move is counter to any talk of apophaticism and essence-beyond-essence. Palamas does not continue the thought.
Now to the heart of the criticism: ousias do not have “interiorities.” In other words, there is not a subsection of ousia apart from the life of that ousia. If Palamas wants to say that the energies make the ousia present, fine. But if he says that, then one really does not have warrant to speak of a superessential, ineffable ousia by itself, for the very point of the energies and of ousia in general is that it is not by itself.
Perhaps the most damaging criticism of Palamas is the divorcing of economy and ontology. Related to this is that the energies seem to replace the role of the Persons in the divine economy. For example, the energies are not unique to a single person but common to all three who act together. This is not so different from the standard Western opera ad intra indivisible sunt. Catherine Lacugna notes, “the proprium of each person…fades into the background” (Lacugna, 195). By contrast, the Cappadocians would say we distinguish the Persons by their propria–by their hypostatic idiomata. For example, the Son’s personal property is in being begotten, and so on. In Palamas, though, this role has been moved to the energies.
Apropos above, and echoing Robert Jenson, if the Persons are eclipsed by the energies and remain “above” the biblical narrative, in such case that we can no longer identity the persons by their hypostatic propria, we can only conclude that Palamism, despite its best intentions, is a more frozen form of modalism than anything Augustine or Aquinas ever dreamed of.
Conclusion
I do think we can still speak of “energies.” For one, it is a biblical term. Moreover, it points to (and remains a pointer) that the world we live in is “open” to the divine. Maintaining this, however, does not require a commitment to a particular view of the essence and energies.
Bibliography
Augustine, On the Trinity. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.
Barnes, Michel. Dunamis. Catholic University of America.
Bradshaw, David. Aristotle East and West. Cambridge University Press.
Basil of Caesarea. Select Works and Letters. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.
Jenson, Robert W. Systematic Theology vol 1. Oxford University Press.
LaCaguna, Catherine. God for Us. Harper San Francisco.
Palamas, Gregory. Triads. trans. John Meyendorff. St Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Plato. The Republic.
Williams, Rowan. “The Philosophical Structures of Palamism,” Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977): 27-44D
Exposition
Aristotle appears to be the first to use the word energia (or any of its semantic cognates). Aristotle’s use suggests something along the lines of actuality and activity. Other thinkers took the word and gave it different applications, but the term itself did not have much of a philosophical impact until Middle Platonism.
Whatever else we might think of the term “energies,” and despite its Aristotelian provenance, it is certainly a biblical category. Paul uses the term in 1 Corinthians 12. καὶ διαιρέσεις ἐνεργημάτων εἰσίν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς θεός, ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. Moreover, energies can be participated in, something impossible if they are identical to the divine essence Of course, much of the debate hinges on whether Palamas and Paul are using the term in the same way. I do not think there are.
At its most basic, the essence/energies distinction addresses a tension in classical theism. If God is unknowable in his essence, then how can we know him? Eastern Christians said we know him by his “energies” or operations (see St Basil the Great, Letter 234). More importantly, they were keen to point out that the energies themselves were also fully God. This safeguarded another important value: God reveals God.
Palamas and the Triads
Palamas begins his work with a helpful survey of terminology. For one, the heart is the rational faculty (I.2.iii; p. 42). This is absolutely correct and quite close to a Hebraic anthropology. Further, I also agree that “the divine” (my words, not his) has penetrated all of created reality (1.ii.6; 45). Before we begin, we must note his use of the term hyperousia: The essence is beyond the Godhead (2.iii.8; p. 57). (The reader is also encouraged to consult Plato’s Republic 549b for an earlier use of the term). This is key to his whole construction
Palamas, as is the case with the West, asserts the divine essence to be completely simple and there is no way we can participate in it. If we did, either a) we would be part of God or b) the essence isn’t really simple. Palamas solves this problem by adding a third category: energies or activity. It is close to the term power. Power, understood in the ancient world, was something close to a substance (Barnes 36). It was similar to a “fluid” or “electricity,” to use an anachronism. More formally, it was the capacity to effect change. Such a view was still operative in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa.
Palamas says the energies are en-hypostatic (3.i.9, p. 71). This saves him from the immediate charge of Neo-Platonism. It raises the question: which hypostasis(es)? He answers: The Spirit sends it out in the hypostasis of another (ibid).
This might seem abstract, and it certainly is, but it makes sense of some of the biblical narrative. For one we physically see the God’s glory. Moses saw God’s glory with his eyes. Western writers, or so it seems with Augustine (see On the Trinity III.2.24), would say that Moses only saw a mystical replica of God’s glory. Eastern writers say it was a bodily vision. For example, on the Mt of Transfiguration, did the disciples see the glory around Jesus or did they see a spiritual replica of the glory? I actually think the East is closer to the point on this one.
Evaluation
Before we criticize Palamas, it is important to recognize that he agrees with Western Christendom on key points: God is utterly simple and we cannot know the divine essence. Palamas, despite his other moves, is not as radical as he might appear to be.
I do not know how seriously I can take Palamas’s claim that he is not dependent on philosophy like the West is. His doctrine of essence, energies, motion, salvation as transformation are all highly technical philosophical concepts. Even if “hyper-ousia” is a valid theological concept, it is taken from Plato’s Republic (Plato 549b). Further, on p. 105 Palamas refers to God as “Prime Mover.” How is this not using Aristotle? I am not saying he is an Aristotelian–I do not think he is–but his project could not have gotten off of the ground were it not for Aristotle.
How coherent is it to call the energies “hypostatic” (p. 57, II.iii.8) while insisting that hypostasis does not mean what hypostasis means when it refers to the Trinity? I realize that Meyendorff glosses “hypostatic” to mean “real existence” (p. 131 n .2), but in the context of the Trinity we now have nature, hypostases, and hypostatic energies (which are not the same as hypostases). Is it any wonder that Latin critics drew the inference of a “fourth hypostasis?”
True, Palamas explains this by saying the light is “enhypostatic” . Robert Jenson has suggested that Palamas places the divine energies outside the gospel narrative (Jenson 157). I do not think Palamas’s move is as crass as Jenson suggests, but the problems are there. Following Maximus, it appears that Palamas sees the events in the gospel narratives as symbols of higher reality (3.i.13, p. 74).
Does it really make sense to say that God is both beyond knowledge and beyond unknowing (p. 32; 1.iii.4)? I realize Meyendorff glosses this as a Ps. Dionysian move, which it is, but that only raises further problems. If God is ineffable (Meyendorff, 121 n.9), then what’s the point of even speaking of God? I simply do not accept that the “knowledge-which-transcends” apophatic and cataphatic knowledge is not merely another form of cataphatic knowledge, for it ends with positive descriptions of God. That is not an insurmountble problem, but we need to call it what it is.
And a common criticism of Palamas: If God’s essence is unknowable, how does Palamas know that it is unknowable (Lacugna)? To be fair, Palamas does anticipate this criticism. Palamas notes that any answer he gives must be “tentative.” He then gives a very important answer–we know God “by the disposition of created things” (2.iii.68, p. 68). In other words, we know God by his works, not by peering into his nature. There is an important truth to this, and Palamas would have done well to finish the thought: if we are truly to know God by his works then we must look to his covenant and to the finished work of Christ. Of course, such a move is counter to any talk of apophaticism and essence-beyond-essence. Palamas does not continue the thought.
Now to the heart of the criticism: ousias do not have “interiorities.” In other words, there is not a subsection of ousia apart from the life of that ousia. If Palamas wants to say that the energies make the ousia present, fine. But if he says that, then one really does not have warrant to speak of a superessential, ineffable ousia by itself, for the very point of the energies and of ousia in general is that it is not by itself.
Perhaps the most damaging criticism of Palamas is the divorcing of economy and ontology. Related to this is that the energies seem to replace the role of the Persons in the divine economy. For example, the energies are not unique to a single person but common to all three who act together. This is not so different from the standard Western opera ad intra indivisible sunt. Catherine Lacugna notes, “the proprium of each person…fades into the background” (Lacugna, 195). By contrast, the Cappadocians would say we distinguish the Persons by their propria–by their hypostatic idiomata. For example, the Son’s personal property is in being begotten, and so on. In Palamas, though, this role has been moved to the energies.
Apropos above, and echoing Robert Jenson, if the Persons are eclipsed by the energies and remain “above” the biblical narrative, in such case that we can no longer identity the persons by their hypostatic propria, we can only conclude that Palamism, despite its best intentions, is a more frozen form of modalism than anything Augustine or Aquinas ever dreamed of.
Conclusion
I do think we can still speak of “energies.” For one, it is a biblical term. Moreover, it points to (and remains a pointer) that the world we live in is “open” to the divine. Maintaining this, however, does not require a commitment to a particular view of the essence and energies.
Bibliography
Augustine, On the Trinity. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.
Barnes, Michel. Dunamis. Catholic University of America.
Bradshaw, David. Aristotle East and West. Cambridge University Press.
Basil of Caesarea. Select Works and Letters. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.
Jenson, Robert W. Systematic Theology vol 1. Oxford University Press.
LaCaguna, Catherine. God for Us. Harper San Francisco.
Palamas, Gregory. Triads. trans. John Meyendorff. St Vladimir’s Seminary Press.
Plato. The Republic.
Williams, Rowan. “The Philosophical Structures of Palamism,” Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977): 27-44D
