Facts aren't Facts

[ChristianTrader]

Actually if you have a good epistemology, it is only one question. Otherwise, I suppose, one will just fall to pieces whenever someone starts to ask questions or present different views.

Not at all. We don't fall to pieces when other views are presented precisely because we have precommitments. These precommitments are what make any sort of judgment possible.

Your position seems to assume that people never change their minds about important and deeply held beliefs. Since they in fact do, the question is simply why such occurs? I think the cleanest way to view such is that good argumentation causes paradigm shifts to occur. This goes along with the belief that man is by nature, a rational creature.

If precommitments do not ultimately prevent one from knowing what the proper precommitments to have and the proper conclusions to make, then I am not sure how the modern project is at risk.

Because the modern project believed that it could have judgment without precommitments---it thought that absolute God-like certainty was possible for humans. It trusted human reason over Divine authority and elevated reason above all else.

But as you have stated before, we can know what precommitments to have. If we can, then how does the existence of precommitments damage the modern project?

CT

 

[Philip]

Your position seems to assume that people never change their minds about important and deeply held beliefs. Since they in fact do, the question is simply why such occurs? I think the cleanest way to view such is that good argumentation causes paradigm shifts to occur. This goes along with the belief that man is by nature, a rational creature.

Generally, not. Man is a rational creature, yes, but all this means is that man acts purposely and with intention---it does not mean that he always changes based on a line of argumentation. This happens sometimes, but in all cases this is by means of appeal to other established beliefs, commitments and motivations. You always judge from a standpoint---even rationality itself can be a pre-rational commitment: "I want to believe the most logical position possible" is a pre-rational position.

But as you have stated before, we can know what precommitments to have.

Only if we assume those precommitments. There's no neutral ground---judgment is made possible by precommitments. You're kicking against the goads here. Any sort of admission of any sort of necessity of precommitments for knowledge to be possible undermines the basic premise of the modern project of Descartes and Bacon, namely that it is possible to privilege reason over one's other faculties, do away with all previous commitments, and come out with knowledge. It's a false promise because they have a precommitment to reason---they have a desire to get away from Biblical and Church authority. They want to start from a standpoint of the self as autonomous. If you reject all of this, then you must reject modernism in all its forms. You must reject the notion that you can be like God and have absolute unquestionable certainty.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Your position seems to assume that people never change their minds about important and deeply held beliefs. Since they in fact do, the question is simply why such occurs? I think the cleanest way to view such is that good argumentation causes paradigm shifts to occur. This goes along with the belief that man is by nature, a rational creature.

Generally, not. Man is a rational creature, yes, but all this means is that man acts purposely and with intention---it does not mean that he always changes based on a line of argumentation. This happens sometimes, but in all cases this is by means of appeal to other established beliefs, commitments and motivations. You always judge from a standpoint---even rationality itself can be a pre-rational commitment: "I want to believe the most logical position possible" is a pre-rational position.

Actually generally it is true. People do always change based on a line of argumentation. The thing that people fail to see in a discussion is that a person's web of beliefs can be very complicated and very deep. Depending on where the belief lies in the web, will determine how long it takes to get a clean shot at it.

That everyone judges from a standpoint is only relevant if one cannot know what standpoint to take.

Lastly, the pre-rational commitment of which you wrote above, is the inherent commitment in man. It is simply a part of human nature.

But as you have stated before, we can know what precommitments to have.

Only if we assume those precommitments.

Now we are getting somewhere. I don't see this as the position of the historic Christian faith. We can know not just assume.

There's no neutral ground---judgment is made possible by precommitments.

There is neutral ground. This is because we can know what precommitments to have/take. Warfield was not deviating from Historic Christianity when he wrote about right reason. He simply did not execute the project well enough. If there is no neutral ground, then how do we call unbelievers to account for their rebellion?

You're kicking against the goads here. Any sort of admission of any sort of necessity of precommitments for knowledge to be possible undermines the basic premise of the modern project of Descartes and Bacon, namely that it is possible to privilege reason over one's other faculties, do away with all previous commitments, and come out with knowledge.

It only undermines if we cannot know what precommitments to take. If we can know and we know by proper use of reason, then the modern project is alive and well. You have not put forward anything, that shows such is less than the proper position to hold.

It's a false promise because they have a precommitment to reason---they have a desire to get away from Biblical and Church authority. They want to start from a standpoint of the self as autonomous. If you reject all of this, then you must reject modernism in all its forms. You must reject the notion that you can be like God and have absolute unquestionable certainty.

First, I do not claim to be like God and know everything in a completely unquestionable certainty. However it does not follow that I cannot have unquestionable certainty about various things.

Next, it does not matter where one starts. One's starting position will either be coherent or not. When it is shown to be incoherent, people will move onto something else. This can be seen in the move from premodern to modern to postmodern. As the various positions were shown to be flawed, people gave them up and moved on to something else.

Next, before one charges me with incoherence, I am not a modernist. I have written about the modern "project" and if it can be salvaged. Modernism failed due to a point that you have made several times: It did not take into account differing worldviews, precommitments etc. Whenever deep seated conflict occurred, all that could happen was that one had to call everyone else an idiot for not seeing the situation as they saw it. That got old and people moved on to postmodernism etc. My position is that yes, there are differing worldviews and precommitments, but we can know which one to follow. Given such, there is no reason to believe that the modern project is dead.

Lastly, you are correct that unbelievers desire to get away from Biblical and Church authority. The problem is that right reason points in that direction. So the unbeliever must refuse to seek and use right reason in order to stay in unbelief. Hence the phrase, "Without Excuse".

CT

 

[Philip]

Actually generally it is true. People do always change based on a line of argumentation. The thing that people fail to see in a discussion is that a person's web of beliefs can be very complicated and very deep. Depending on where the belief lies in the web, will determine how long it takes to get a clean shot at it.

Really? Most of the time my opinions change based on new experiences or on changes of heart and perspective---maybe even empathy. Generally not a direct line of logical argumentation, though.

That everyone judges from a standpoint is only relevant if one cannot know what standpoint to take.

From which standpoint does one judge which standpoint to take?

Lastly, the pre-rational commitment of which you wrote above, is the inherent commitment in man. It is simply a part of human nature.

But it isn't the only commitment, either. People have pre-rational commitments to self-preservation, concern for family and friends, and (significantly) religious commitment.

We can know not just assume.

Why is assumption not knowledge? If I assume something to be true and it is, how is that not knowledge? I act on assumptions all the time which turn out to be true on analysis, but how is the assumption not knowledge?

You have to have precommitments in order to know or scrutinize anything, including those very precommitments. You are never unbiased, never objective, because if you were, you would have no reason to make any sort of judgment at all.

If there is no neutral ground, then how do we call unbelievers to account for their rebellion?

By appealing to right reason---which they will reject, short of Divine Grace. You will never see the truth of the Gospel until God changes your heart.

It only undermines if we cannot know what precommitments to take. If we can know and we know by proper use of reason, then the modern project is alive and well. You have not put forward anything, that shows such is less than the proper position to hold.

I have done so: what I have shown is that the commitment to reason is itself pre-rational. Classical foundationalism of this kind is self-refuting. To judge anything, one must have a standard and to have a standard is to have a commitment to that standard. You cannot judge between standards without some higher-order standard, which would need yet another standard and so on. It's the age-old infinite regression that shows the nonsense of "knowing that one knows."

Lastly, you are correct that unbelievers desire to get away from Biblical and Church authority. The problem is that right reason points in that direction. So the unbeliever must refuse to seek and use right reason in order to stay in unbelief. Hence the phrase, "Without Excuse".

Ok---but what is right reason? Right reason is reason used with the right attitudes and precommitments. It is not "pure" reason and it very clearly involves bias. If we claim that one worldview is true and all others are false, that is hardly an objective or unbiased claim.

My position is that yes, there are differing worldviews and precommitments, but we can know which one to follow.

Indeed we can---given the right precommitments. My position is that precommitments (which are distinct from "worldviews") are what make any sort of rational judgment possible.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Actually generally it is true. People do always change based on a line of argumentation. The thing that people fail to see in a discussion is that a person's web of beliefs can be very complicated and very deep. Depending on where the belief lies in the web, will determine how long it takes to get a clean shot at it.

Really? Most of the time my opinions change based on new experiences or on changes of heart and perspective---maybe even empathy. Generally not a direct line of logical argumentation, though.

If new experiences change opinion, then when such is examined, it turns out that one had an internal argument where the current view was unable to maintain coherency in light of the new evidence.

Next, unless you want to see a change of heart or perspective as being random, then it is best to see the change as being in response to the current view not being able to maintain coherency in light of either new or more closely examined evidence.

That everyone judges from a standpoint is only relevant if one cannot know what standpoint to take.

From which standpoint does one judge which standpoint to take?

It is somewhat difficult to answer in a completely abstract manner...but one will have to ask given my view, what are the implications of said view, and if those implications are coherent. For example, one can ask: does my view imply that something comes from nothing, does it imply that one cannot have moral responsibility for ones actions, what does my view imply about God and is such coherent, etc.?

Lastly, the pre-rational commitment of which you wrote above, is the inherent commitment in man. It is simply a part of human nature.

But it isn't the only commitment, either. People have pre-rational commitments to self-preservation, concern for family and friends, and (significantly) religious commitment.

If you want to say that there are other pre-rational commitments, then okay. However then one must say that some are more basic than others. For example a person's religious commitment will change when/if it loses coherency for them. Next, people will show concern for family and friends, however how that concern plays out depends on what they believe is the proper way to show love or defend their family and friends. If thinks Libertarianism is the best way for society to be setup, then one will defend such, while if one thinks Conservatism is the best way, then one will defend that. The concern for family and friends didn't change, however what you believe the best way to do such did.

We can know not just assume.

Why is assumption not knowledge? If I assume something to be true and it is, how is that not knowledge? I act on assumptions all the time which turn out to be true on analysis, but how is the assumption not knowledge?

It becomes knowledge after it is put through analysis. Otherwise, one will have to call knowledge, that which turned out to be false after analysis. At the end of the day, the only way that I can see you calling such knowledge, is to believe that whatever you assume will infallibly turn out to be turn after analysis.

You have to have precommitments in order to know or scrutinize anything, including those very precommitments. You are never unbiased, never objective, because if you were, you would have no reason to make any sort of judgment at all.

It still seems that you somehow believe that precommitments cannot be examined and rejected. If your precommitments commit you to certain beliefs, then they must be rejected because they no longer maintain coherency.

If there is no neutral ground, then how do we call unbelievers to account for their rebellion?

By appealing to right reason---which they will reject, short of Divine Grace. You will never see the truth of the Gospel until God changes your heart.

No doubt, but such is irrelevant for my position. All my position needs is that people respond to reasons and reject positions that no longer maintain coherency. There are a number of ways that unbelief can be expressed. What makes the regenerate different is that they can rest in the gospel position because their rebellion has been broken. Also one must keep in mind that the Holy Spirit's work is not completely separate from good presentation of the gospel and great attacks on various modes of unbelieving thought.

It only undermines if we cannot know what precommitments to take. If we can know and we know by proper use of reason, then the modern project is alive and well. You have not put forward anything, that shows such is less than the proper position to hold.

I have done so: what I have shown is that the commitment to reason is itself pre-rational. Classical foundationalism of this kind is self-refuting. To judge anything, one must have a standard and to have a standard is to have a commitment to that standard. You cannot judge between standards without some higher-order standard, which would need yet another standard and so on. It's the age-old infinite regression that shows the nonsense of "knowing that one knows."

But such a position just simply assumes that there are no positions that one can only reject irrationally. The problem with classical foundationalism is the belief that the basic building blocks of a worldview etc are self-evident. But such is person relative. What I believe is self evident will be different from what others belief is self evident due to different upbringings, experiences etc. If one could not adjudicate between different views, then foundationalism would die. How such can be adjudicated by appealing to that which is logically basic vs. just self evidently basic. For example, believing in something coming from nothing is self contradictory when examined.

Given the move that you attempted to make here, I am unsure how you wish to maintain that somehow the created order can only rationally be interpreted in a pro Christian fashion. Yet, the normal method of accomplishing such falls to a basic post modern move.

Lastly, you are correct that unbelievers desire to get away from Biblical and Church authority. The problem is that right reason points in that direction. So the unbeliever must refuse to seek and use right reason in order to stay in unbelief. Hence the phrase, "Without Excuse".

Ok---but what is right reason? Right reason is reason used with the right attitudes and precommitments. It is not "pure" reason and it very clearly involves bias. If we claim that one worldview is true and all others are false, that is hardly an objective or unbiased claim.

Oh no doubt again. It would only be objective and unbiased, if we can know what are the right attitudes and precommitments to hold. Again pure reason can only be objected to, if one cannot use reason to attack improper attitutes and precommitments.

My position is that yes, there are differing worldviews and precommitments, but we can know which one to follow.

Indeed we can---given the right precommitments. My position is that precommitments (which are distinct from "worldviews") are what make any sort of rational judgment possible.

Okay by this point, I think I have defended my position on precommitments. How exactly do you think we can "get" to the right precommitments, if you think reason is an insufficient tool for the job?

CT

 

[Philip]

If new experiences change opinion, then when such is examined, it turns out that one had an internal argument where the current view was unable to maintain coherency in light of the new evidence.

Generally not. Such an argument is ex post facto.

Next, unless you want to see a change of heart or perspective as being random, then it is best to see the change as being in response to the current view not being able to maintain coherency in light of either new or more closely examined evidence.

Why do reasons have to be logical ones? Simply because one has a reason for a change of view that is not the result of a logical line of argumentation in no way entails that said reason is random or irrational.

It is somewhat difficult to answer in a completely abstract manner...but one will have to ask given my view, what are the implications of said view, and if those implications are coherent.

Why this standard? Why not an aesthetic standard? From where would you judge between these two standards? The trouble is that you're trying to be a classical foundationalist and it just doesn't work.

For example a person's religious commitment will change when/if it loses coherency for them.

On the contrary---people change religious commitments for all sorts of reasons. Sometimes because there's a gun to their head, or because they married into it, or because they found a particular religious community more supportive, or because said community's traditions were found to be more aesthetically pleasing.

Next, people will show concern for family and friends, however how that concern plays out depends on what they believe is the proper way to show love or defend their family and friends. If thinks Libertarianism is the best way for society to be setup, then one will defend such, while if one thinks Conservatism is the best way, then one will defend that. The concern for family and friends didn't change, however what you believe the best way to do such did.

Not necessarily---more often than not political-theoretical systems are what change in a person's view. Usually the change comes as a result of action or because of practical application. Belief-formation on all levels is an incredibly messy business---it is rarely clean or logical.

It becomes knowledge after it is put through analysis. Otherwise, one will have to call knowledge, that which turned out to be false after analysis. At the end of the day, the only way that I can see you calling such knowledge, is to believe that whatever you assume will infallibly turn out to be turn after analysis.

Oh dear, we're back to Descartes. What exactly constitutes adequate analysis here? There are plenty of assumptions that we have that are unprovable but which I would call knowledge: for example, the belief that the world is more than five minutes old (or that I am more than five minutes old) or the belief that one's faculties are in proper working order.

There are plenty of beliefs that we call knowledge that we don't ordinarily put through this kind of analysis unless we've been reading a good deal of Descartes or Hume. The question to be asked here is why we've made the sceptic king? Why do I have to satisfy a sceptic in order to call it knowledge?

It still seems that you somehow believe that precommitments cannot be examined and rejected.

Of course they can---from the perspective of other precommitments. In order to judge you must have a standard and a ground for judging. There's no such thing as God-like certainty, so you have to proceed on some assumptions.

All my position needs is that people respond to reasons and reject positions that no longer maintain coherency.

Sure they do---but that's not the only criterion used. Coherency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for someone becoming convinced of a position.

But such a position just simply assumes that there are no positions that one can only reject irrationally.

But there aren't any. Reason is used by people---it's never in a vacuum. To be rational is not the same as using reason rightly. Unless you're trying to claim that unbelievers ought to be locked up in institutions for the insane, you believe that the unbeliever is a rational agent. The very fact that you argue with the unbeliever at all is proof that you believe him to have reasons for his unbelief which you are attempting to deconstruct.

Given the move that you attempted to make here, I am unsure how you wish to maintain that somehow the created order can only rationally be interpreted in a pro Christian fashion.

I said "rightly" not "rationally." One may be perfectly rational and come to the wrong conclusions.

Again pure reason can only be objected to, if one cannot use reason to attack improper attitutes and precommitments.

Indeed reason can---it's just that it always does so from attitudes and precommitments. There's no such thing as "pure" reason. If you have any motive whatsoever for your use of reason, then it's neither pure nor unbiased nor objective.

Okay by this point, I think I have defended my position on precommitments. How exactly do you think we can "get" to the right precommitments, if you think reason is an insufficient tool for the job?

Regeneration and the illumination of the Holy Spirit. The ability to reason is as fallen as any other part of man---it too has to be renewed before it will function rightly. Christianity is the correct lens through which to view the world---but fallen man hasn't been seeing correctly.

 

[ChristianTrader]

If new experiences change opinion, then when such is examined, it turns out that one had an internal argument where the current view was unable to maintain coherency in light of the new evidence.

Generally not. Such an argument is ex post facto.

No, it is not. You may be confusing a lack of an explicit line by line argument with no reasoning at all.

Next, unless you want to see a change of heart or perspective as being random, then it is best to see the change as being in response to the current view not being able to maintain coherency in light of either new or more closely examined evidence.

Why do reasons have to be logical ones? Simply because one has a reason for a change of view that is not the result of a logical line of argumentation in no way entails that said reason is random or irrational.

What are you comparing logical to? Illogical? If you wish to compare explicit vs. non explicit, then that is fine.

It is somewhat difficult to answer in a completely abstract manner...but one will have to ask given my view, what are the implications of said view, and if those implications are coherent.

Why this standard? Why not an aesthetic standard? From where would you judge between these two standards? The trouble is that you're trying to be a classical foundationalist and it just doesn't work.

I don't think of the two standards as mutually exclusive. On what basis, do you believe in the possibility of some aesthetically pleasing standard with gaping holes in its ability to reflect reality, that someone would wish to hold? Now someone may hold to a worldview that they believe is asthetic before they are confronted or find while it lacks coherency. But such a possibility does not speak against my view.

For example a person's religious commitment will change when/if it loses coherency for them.

On the contrary---people change religious commitments for all sorts of reasons. Sometimes because there's a gun to their head, or because they married into it, or because they found a particular religious community more supportive, or because said community's traditions were found to be more aesthetically pleasing.

Why would you say that someone's religious commitment has changed when a person has a gun to their head? Why would it not simply be that their actions have changed but their commitments are what they were before the gun? It could simply be that there true commitment of "doing whatever it takes to stay alive" is shown for what it is. What a person professes is not necessarily what they believe.
I don't see any of your examples giving my view (the supremacy of coherency) any problems.

Next, people will show concern for family and friends, however how that concern plays out depends on what they believe is the proper way to show love or defend their family and friends. If thinks Libertarianism is the best way for society to be setup, then one will defend such, while if one thinks Conservatism is the best way, then one will defend that. The concern for family and friends didn't change, however what you believe the best way to do such did.

Not necessarily---more often than not political-theoretical systems are what change in a person's view. Usually the change comes as a result of action or because of practical application. Belief-formation on all levels is an incredibly messy business---it is rarely clean or logical.

You are right, things are messy in this area. However I do not see how one should come to belief that the changes are somehow irrational or random. Next, how is changes due to practical application somehow against or less rational than changes made for more strictly theoretical reasons. If your theoretical beliefs cannot handle the practical, then what good are they? Lack of coherency is just as harmful as lack of coherency is the strictly theoretical.

It becomes knowledge after it is put through analysis. Otherwise, one will have to call knowledge, that which turned out to be false after analysis. At the end of the day, the only way that I can see you calling such knowledge, is to believe that whatever you assume will infallibly turn out to be turn after analysis.

Oh dear, we're back to Descartes. What exactly constitutes adequate analysis here? There are plenty of assumptions that we have that are unprovable but which I would call knowledge: for example, the belief that the world is more than five minutes old (or that I am more than five minutes old) or the belief that one's faculties are in proper working order.

First, universal skepticism is incoherent/self-contradictory. Next, to doubt means to call into question X based on some Y, which you trust. If Y is saying that the world is or may be less than five minutes old, then the next issue is why do you believe it. There is such a thing as irrational doubt just are irrational beliefs in other areas.

There are plenty of beliefs that we call knowledge that we don't ordinarily put through this kind of analysis unless we've been reading a good deal of Descartes or Hume. The question to be asked here is why we've made the sceptic king? Why do I have to satisfy a sceptic in order to call it knowledge?

I don’t have a problem calling somethings that we call knowledge, simply opinion. Opinion does not mean that such if false or that acting on such an action is necessarily irrational etc.
Next, why wait for the skeptic to confront you, in order to do analysis? Why wait for the skeptic to come along, then do analysis and find out that what you had been doing was simply wrong?

It still seems that you somehow believe that precommitments cannot be examined and rejected.

Of course they can---from the perspective of other precommitments. In order to judge you must have a standard and a ground for judging. There's no such thing as God-like certainty, so you have to proceed on some assumptions.

All you have done here is dogmatically assert that there is nothing in which it would be irrational to doubt. Certain precommitments are inherently self contradictory. Those we can have certainty that they are in face false.

All my position needs is that people respond to reasons and reject positions that no longer maintain coherency.

Sure they do---but that's not the only criterion used. Coherency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for someone becoming convinced of a position.

Our discussion is on what makes people give up positions and not about what makes them hold a particular one. Lack of coherency is sufficient to give it up and then go looking for something else.

But such a position just simply assumes that there are no positions that one can only reject irrationally.

But there aren't any. Reason is used by people---it's never in a vacuum. To be rational is not the same as using reason rightly. Unless you're trying to claim that unbelievers ought to be locked up in institutions for the insane, you believe that the unbeliever is a rational agent. The very fact that you argue with the unbeliever at all is proof that you believe him to have reasons for his unbelief which you are attempting to deconstruct.

Yes. Those reasons either hold up under analysis or they do not. It is not irrational to hold to reasons that have not been shown to be incoherent.
Remember, the problem with the unbeliever is there lack of seeking.

Given the move that you attempted to make here, I am unsure how you wish to maintain that somehow the created order can only rationally be interpreted in a pro Christian fashion.

I said "rightly" not "rationally." One may be perfectly rational and come to the wrong conclusions.

But remember the Bible calls wrong conclusions in this area to be “Without excuse”. In other words, the Bible calls such irrational.

Again pure reason can only be objected to, if one cannot use reason to attack improper attitutes and precommitments.

Indeed reason can---it's just that it always does so from attitudes and precommitments. There's no such thing as "pure" reason. If you have any motive whatsoever for your use of reason, then it's neither pure nor unbiased nor objective.

If you wish to say that due to attitudes and precommitments, there is no “pure” reason, then okay. But even given such impure reason, there is no basis to believe that such cannot transcend the precommiments and get to truth and certainty.

Okay by this point, I think I have defended my position on precommitments. How exactly do you think we can "get" to the right precommitments, if you think reason is an insufficient tool for the job?

Regeneration and the illumination of the Holy Spirit. The ability to reason is as fallen as any other part of man---it too has to be renewed before it will function rightly. Christianity is the correct lens through which to view the world---but fallen man hasn't been seeing correctly.

According to Romans 1, Christianity is the objectively true view. To reject such entails that one behave irrationally. Therefore the phrase without excuse is used. The various worldviews of unbelief can be shown to be such. People can keep running away as their different worldviews explode. But even in unbelief, the unbeliever still responds to and rejects incoherency.

 

[Philip]

You may be confusing a lack of an explicit line by line argument with no reasoning at all.

When I hear "reasoning" I assume that you mean a logical argument. If you didn't get there by this means then you weren't reasoning---to reason is to come up with logical arguments.

What are you comparing logical to? Illogical?

Non-logical. Just because one didn't use an argument does not make one's reasons irrational or illogical.

I don't think of the two standards as mutually exclusive. On what basis, do you believe in the possibility of some aesthetically pleasing standard with gaping holes in its ability to reflect reality, that someone would wish to hold? Now someone may hold to a worldview that they believe is asthetic before they are confronted or find while it lacks coherency. But such a possibility does not speak against my view.

I'm not arguing that such a standard is contradictory to yours, but that yours is not a given. A position may be perfectly coherent and also aesthetically unpleasing and so I reject it on that ground.

It's not a supreme standard.

I don't see any of your examples giving my view (the supremacy of coherency) any problems.

Of course they do---your argument is that changes in view are always the result of someone finding one view non-coherent. All I am maintaining is that this is manifestly incongruent with the way people actually behave. Their views may change on a completely pragmatic basis or a completely aesthetic one.

However I do not see how one should come to belief that the changes are somehow irrational or random.

I have never said irrational. I said not based on reason (as in a logical argument).

Lack of coherency is just as harmful as lack of coherency is the strictly theoretical.

Part of the trouble here is that coherency merely has to do with the internal relations of a system of belief---it has nothing whatsoever to do with its relation to reality or its practicality.

First, universal skepticism is incoherent/self-contradictory. Next, to doubt means to call into question X based on some Y, which you trust. If Y is saying that the world is or may be less than five minutes old, then the next issue is why do you believe it. There is such a thing as irrational doubt just are irrational beliefs in other areas.

You still haven't answered the question: what constitutes adequate analysis for me to make a knowledge-claim? And why should I accept that this is a) an adequate standard b) a necessary standard?

I don’t have a problem calling somethings that we call knowledge, simply opinion.

In this case you've departed from ordinary usage and therefore from reality.

Next, why wait for the skeptic to confront you, in order to do analysis? Why wait for the skeptic to come along, then do analysis and find out that what you had been doing was simply wrong?

You're assuming here that his questions are legitimate, whereas what is at issue here is precisely their legitimacy. How much doubt is reasonable here?

All you have done here is dogmatically assert that there is nothing in which it would be irrational to doubt. Certain precommitments are inherently self contradictory.

This simply doesn't make sense. Precommitments can't be contradictory because they aren't propositional in nature. This is a category mistake. They can neither be false nor true.

But remember the Bible calls wrong conclusions in this area to be “Without excuse”. In other words, the Bible calls such irrational.

That's not what it says at all. We might also say that by "without excuse" the apostle means, "reasoning wrongly." To reason wrongly (that is, outside of a right relationship with God) is not the same as being irrational.

But even given such impure reason, there is no basis to believe that such cannot transcend the precommiments and get to truth and certainty.

You can't transcend that which serves as the basis for any reasoning at all. If there's no such thing as pure reason, then you can't transcend your precommitments. You and I, when reasoning, neither can nor do we cease to be Christians---we reason only as Christians, attempting to bring reason under the Lordship of Christ. Reason is not unique.

According to Romans 1, Christianity is the objectively true view.

No, it's the absolutely true view.

People can keep running away as their different worldviews explode. But even in unbelief, the unbeliever still responds to and rejects incoherency.

I'm sorry, but it just doesn't work this way. The only way that anyone will admit that they are wrong is by the power of the Spirit. You have to give up the notion that somehow this is objective or that your reason somehow is able to transcend the fact that you are a Christian. Reason is not something out there: it is a faculty for analysis which you have and use differently depending on your precommitments.

 

[ChristianTrader]

You may be confusing a lack of an explicit line by line argument with no reasoning at all.

When I hear "reasoning" I assume that you mean a logical argument. If you didn't get there by this means then you weren't reasoning---to reason is to come up with logical arguments.

Okay, I mean reasoning as you write here.

What are you comparing logical to? Illogical?

Non-logical. Just because one didn't use an argument does not make one's reasons irrational or illogical.

On what basis do you assume that no argument was given. Even if you want to say that someone thinks, "This position is less aesthetically pleasing compared to some other position, and I believe the truth will be the most asthetically pleasing, therefore I will reject the first position and accept the second one." the person still reasoned logically. If we simply want to argue about the best criteria, then that is something we can do later.

I don't think of the two standards as mutually exclusive. On what basis, do you believe in the possibility of some aesthetically pleasing standard with gaping holes in its ability to reflect reality, that someone would wish to hold? Now someone may hold to a worldview that they believe is asthetic before they are confronted or find while it lacks coherency. But such a possibility does not speak against my view.

I'm not arguing that such a standard is contradictory to yours, but that yours is not a given. A position may be perfectly coherent and also aesthetically unpleasing and so I reject it on that ground.

It's not a supreme standard.

Actually all you have done here (at best) is argue that coherency is not sufficient, but you said nothing in defense of it not being necessary. If it is necessary, then I am not sure why you would say that it is not supreme. It is perfectly fine to say that one cannot find a flaw in an argument but still not accept it due to various reasons. The issue is if someone would accept incoherency and simply make various other things supreme. It simply doesn't work that way.

I don't see any of your examples giving my view (the supremacy of coherency) any problems.

Of course they do---your argument is that changes in view are always the result of someone finding one view non-coherent. All I am maintaining is that this is manifestly incongruent with the way people actually behave. Their views may change on a completely pragmatic basis or a completely aesthetic one.

Um, why are you implying that something that fails pragmatic tests should continue to be considered a coherent position?

Next, unless you wish to make the point that one could somehow say to themselves, that a certain position is aesthetic but incoherent, therefore they will continue to accept it, then I am not sure which point you are attempting to make.

However I do not see how one should come to belief that the changes are somehow irrational or random.

I have never said irrational. I said not based on reason (as in a logical argument).

But your counters cannot be considered to be not based on reason.

Lack of coherency is just as harmful as lack of coherency is the strictly theoretical.

Part of the trouble here is that coherency merely has to do with the internal relations of a system of belief---it has nothing whatsoever to do with its relation to reality or its practicality.

Why do you think this? Where do the items in ones system of belief originate? How one sees reality is how. A worldview will be asked various questions from various different directions. Either it will be able to produce a coherent response or it will not. If it cannot then something will have to change in the system of belief.

First, universal skepticism is incoherent/self-contradictory. Next, to doubt means to call into question X based on some Y, which you trust. If Y is saying that the world is or may be less than five minutes old, then the next issue is why do you believe it. There is such a thing as irrational doubt just are irrational beliefs in other areas.

You still haven't answered the question: what constitutes adequate analysis for me to make a knowledge-claim? And why should I accept that this is a) an adequate standard b) a necessary standard?

I'm trying to get there, but I have to know where you are coming from to get there. Is there such a thing as irrational doubt? If not, then I don't think you will buy into any standard of analysis. If the answer is yes, then we are on the same team, attempting to come to a consensus on the proper standard.

I don’t have a problem calling somethings that we call knowledge, simply opinion.

In this case you've departed from ordinary usage and therefore from reality.

Philosophy is about should's as well as is. Ordinary usage is cultural dependent. If we can transcend such, then we have the ability to critique such.

Next, why wait for the skeptic to confront you, in order to do analysis? Why wait for the skeptic to come along, then do analysis and find out that what you had been doing was simply wrong?

You're assuming here that his questions are legitimate, whereas what is at issue here is precisely their legitimacy. How much doubt is reasonable here?

Wouldn't one have to do analysis in order to determine what is legit and what is not? I am with you in pushing for a transcultural standard.

All you have done here is dogmatically assert that there is nothing in which it would be irrational to doubt. Certain precommitments are inherently self contradictory.

This simply doesn't make sense. Precommitments can't be contradictory because they aren't propositional in nature. This is a category mistake. They can neither be false nor true.

But they have implications (and if you want to say they have no implications, then they are meaningless, and we should simply ignore them). As far as I can tell, you are using the term precommitments as something along the lines of instinct or urges. They are either proper or not. If they are not, then they need to be replaced by what is proper. If one can have a mixture of proper precommitments and improper precommitments, then I am not sure why you are hung up on calling some precommitments contradictory.

But remember the Bible calls wrong conclusions in this area to be “Without excuse”. In other words, the Bible calls such irrational.

That's not what it says at all. We might also say that by "without excuse" the apostle means, "reasoning wrongly." To reason wrongly (that is, outside of a right relationship with God) is not the same as being irrational.

Um but if it is not irrational, then why is it without excuse? If one can be rational and still be without excuse, then you have just reduced "without excuse" to simply being wrong. But being wrong is a much weaker claim than without excuse.

But even given such impure reason, there is no basis to believe that such cannot transcend the precommiments and get to truth and certainty.

You can't transcend that which serves as the basis for any reasoning at all. If there's no such thing as pure reason, then you can't transcend your precommitments. You and I, when reasoning, neither can nor do we cease to be Christians---we reason only as Christians, attempting to bring reason under the Lordship of Christ. Reason is not unique.

Um, just like people reason as Muslims, atheists, etc. But many also reject those precommitments and go on to other ones. You have not at any point, put forth an understanding of how such occurs. If one cannot transcend precommitments then basis for change must be random. Even if you want to say that one changes their mind based on aesthetics, one is still using something to transcend and judge one's precommitments.

According to Romans 1, Christianity is the objectively true view.

No, it's the absolutely true view.

On judgment day, will unbelievers be able to say to God that they rationally rejected natural revelation, natural theology, Christianity etc.?

People can keep running away as their different worldviews explode. But even in unbelief, the unbeliever still responds to and rejects incoherency.

I'm sorry, but it just doesn't work this way. The only way that anyone will admit that they are wrong is by the power of the Spirit. You have to give up the notion that somehow this is objective or that your reason somehow is able to transcend the fact that you are a Christian. Reason is not something out there: it is a faculty for analysis which you have and use differently depending on your precommitments.

People admit they are wrong all the time. They move from Mormonism to Atheism, to Islam to etc. The reason that they do so, is that they see flaws in their view that they cannot repair. People even reject a form Christianity because they don't have a coherent version of it.

My point is that Christianity has to answer certain questions just like every other view. It can while nothing else can.

CT

 

[Philip]

On what basis do you assume that no argument was given. Even if you want to say that someone thinks, "This position is less aesthetically pleasing compared to some other position, and I believe the truth will be the most asthetically pleasing, therefore I will reject the first position and accept the second one." the person still reasoned logically.

On the basis that this isn't the thought that goes through anyone's head. The thought is, "I find this better than my old position." One sees what is in front of one's faculties and finds oneself believing one way or another. This is why I am a direct realist, not a rationalist.

Actually all you have done here (at best) is argue that coherency is not sufficient, but you said nothing in defense of it not being necessary. If it is necessary, then I am not sure why you would say that it is not supreme. It is perfectly fine to say that one cannot find a flaw in an argument but still not accept it due to various reasons. The issue is if someone would accept incoherency and simply make various other things supreme. It simply doesn't work that way.

Of course it can: one can make multiple moves here. Maybe one believes that the inconsistency is only seeming. I know Lutherans who will play the paradox card and Catholics who will play the mystery card. It's not supreme unless it's the measure of all things---coherency is only one of many criteria used to evaluate, and it's not even the chief one. My chief criteria is whether it corresponds to reality.

Um, why are you implying that something that fails pragmatic tests should continue to be considered a coherent position?

Because coherence is merely about logical tightness and flow. A position may be perfectly coherent and also perfectly ridiculous (Leibniz' Monadology, for instance).

Next, unless you wish to make the point that one could somehow say to themselves, that a certain position is aesthetic but incoherent, therefore they will continue to accept it, then I am not sure which point you are attempting to make.

That's not what they would say at all: the point would be that coherence isn't a consideration to begin with.

Why do you think this?

Because this is the accepted definition of coherence.

Where do the items in ones system of belief originate? How one sees reality is how.

And how one sees reality depends on one's pre-rational commitments.

A worldview will be asked various questions from various different directions. Either it will be able to produce a coherent response or it will not. If it cannot then something will have to change in the system of belief.

Worldviews don't answer questions: people answer questions. And just because one cannot think of an answer to a question is no reason to reject one's worldview. Coherence, correspondence, and the other characteristics of belief-formation have nothing to do, necessarily, with the ability to answer every question, even to one's own satisfaction. There are plenty of questions in theology to which I don't have the answer and I make knowledge-claims to the effect that Christianity is true.

Is there such a thing as irrational doubt?

Absolutely. When you start questioning the existence of your hands, you've probably descended into irrationality. One can even be perfectly logical and be irrational. Plenty of mathematicians go insane.

Philosophy is about should's as well as is. Ordinary usage is cultural dependent. If we can transcend such, then we have the ability to critique such.

I'm curious as to how you hope to transcend language. Can you hope to accomplish this while still using it?

Wouldn't one have to do analysis in order to determine what is legit and what is not?

Indeed---and for such, one would have to have a preconceived standard.

But they have implications (and if you want to say they have no implications, then they are meaningless, and we should simply ignore them). As far as I can tell, you are using the term precommitments as something along the lines of instinct or urges. They are either proper or not. If they are not, then they need to be replaced by what is proper. If one can have a mixture of proper precommitments and improper precommitments, then I am not sure why you are hung up on calling some precommitments contradictory.

They don't have implications, at least not in the logical sense. They aren't urges, no: they are precisely commitments. I'm using this in the ordinary sense of the word with all that this entails, not some philosophic sense.

Proper and improper here would be categories of morality or propriety---they are pre-judgments: prejudices without which no judgment or analysis can take place. Of course they entail certain judgments---but only in tandem with other precommitments, never in isolation.

Um but if it is not irrational, then why is it without excuse? If one can be rational and still be without excuse, then you have just reduced "without excuse" to simply being wrong. But being wrong is a much weaker claim than without excuse.

Because they ought to have known. The evidence is sufficient to condemn. The unbeliever is not being irrational: he is acting in perfect accordance with his own reasons, desires, and will. To be irrational is to be insane.

But many also reject those precommitments and go on to other ones. You have not at any point, put forth an understanding of how such occurs.

Generally based on other precommitments, I would say---deeper ones.

If one cannot transcend precommitments then basis for change must be random.

How does this follow?

On judgment day, will unbelievers be able to say to God that they rationally rejected natural revelation, natural theology, Christianity etc.?

Absolutely---and that's why they have no excuse. They know full well what they are doing.

People admit they are wrong all the time. They move from Mormonism to Atheism, to Islam to etc. The reason that they do so, is that they see flaws in their view that they cannot repair. People even reject a form Christianity because they don't have a coherent version of it.

Not always. You're assuming that everyone views the world in the same rationalist enlightenment view that you and I do and this just isn't so. I'm tempted by your view precisely because to me ideas are real and logical analysis is the way I generally come to believe things. But suppose someone came up to you who saw the world not in terms of truth and falsehood but saw things in terms of good and bad taste based on completely aesthetic judgments. What would you say?

My point is that Christianity has to answer certain questions just like every other view.

I don't think Christianity is going to answer every question---I think that questioning is part of the Christian life. Faith isn't the absence of doubt but the transcendence of doubt. It means the ability not to have all of the answers while still trusting that God is good and that God is God even if you don't see it all. Remember that we don't yet see face-to-face.

 

[Afterthought]

Just a couple of more thoughts. I was still wondering about this:

As a side issue, it appears that on more than one occasion in this thread, appeal has been made to the ultimate misery of man without accepting Christianity. Is such an appeal allowed to be made in arguing for the truth of a position?

That is, can we make merely subjective appeals when arguing for the truth of a position? Or have I misunderstood something?


I was also wondering how we can tell the difference between facts and theories. Oftentimes in the sciences, I note that what once was a theory or hypothesis becomes a fact of observation later. What is the dividing line between them? This seems relevant to this thread because of the statements that say there are absolute facts, though they are arrived at through some subjective method, and also because theories becoming facts seems like an instance of creating facts.



Finally, to continue a conversation, though I don't know if Rev. Winzer will see this (maybe someone else can answer):

Ohh, so if I understand right, the unbeliever could infuse meaning into a statement, but that meaning could not be shared with another; even if two infused something with the same meaning, their background assumptions are so individualized that they still would not be able to share it?

I had understood the critique of an individual infusing meaning into something immanent to mean that the individual would then be alone because unable to share that meaning with another. What if someone said that was the point: they wanted to be alone?

Again, the point is that his transcendence has destroyed the reality that our personhood is bound to the immanent.

I've been wondering about this. Firstly, I think I am understanding this statement as meaning that a person must be transcendent to infuse meaning into something. This contradicts the reality of his or her immanence. If so then, secondly, why must one be transcendent to infuse meaning into something immanent? It seems like there should be an obvious answer to that question, but I'm having trouble seeing it.

 

[Philip]

That is, can we make merely subjective appeals when arguing for the truth of a position?

Absolutely we can. We don't have to just make logical arguments. Plenty of people have come to faith because they were "surprised by Joy" or found in the Gospel that which they had been vainly seeking elsewhere.

I was also wondering how we can tell the difference between facts and theories. Oftentimes in the sciences, I note that what once was a theory or hypothesis becomes a fact of observation later. What is the dividing line between them? This seems relevant to this thread because of the statements that say there are absolute facts, though they are arrived at through some subjective method, and also because theories becoming facts seems like an instance of creating facts.

To some degree what you are doing is confirming theories, at least in science. We don't create facts---we do discover them. The point that I was making about subjectivity is that discovery involves certain processes, certain methods, which involve personal commitments and are accepted on that basis. The acquisition of knowledge is a set of skills---this is why we have teachers and schools (or why we should): to train the young in learning to use their faculties properly.

 

[Afterthought]

Absolutely we can. We don't have to just make logical arguments. Plenty of people have come to faith because they were "surprised by Joy" or found in the Gospel that which they had been vainly seeking elsewhere.

I wonder though, are these merely subjective arguments dependent on logical arguments? Not all merely subjective arguments work (but I suppose not all logical ones do either), for example, one might be an Arminian because they like it better. So then, perhaps the subjective arguments are dependent on logic; they are valid in this case because of Christianity's claim (and many people in general, it seems) that one of the ends of men is happiness, and so we can use mere subjective appeals in arguing for Christianity's truth? The other way to test subjective arguments I guess would be to argue, "Well, you only think you like Arminianism better; you'll actually like Calvinism better."

To some degree what you are doing is confirming theories, at least in science. We don't create facts---we do discover them. The point that I was making about subjectivity is that discovery involves certain processes, certain methods, which involve personal commitments and are accepted on that basis. The acquisition of knowledge is a set of skills---this is why we have teachers and schools (or why we should): to train the young in learning to use their faculties properly.

I see. That makes some sense, with respect to the point you were making. I guess that the theories and background knowledge that facts (scientific and otherwise) are relative to would be seen as methods and processes? Because if the theories and background knowledge were not, then it seems facts would be created by a change in the theories and background knowledge they are relative to. Unless I missed something?

 

[Philip]

I wonder though, are these merely subjective arguments dependent on logical arguments? Not all merely subjective arguments work (but I suppose not all logical ones do either), for example, one might be an Arminian because they like it better. So then, perhaps the subjective arguments are dependent on logic; they are valid in this case because of Christianity's claim (and many people in general, it seems) that one of the ends of men is happiness, and so we can use mere subjective appeals in arguing for Christianity's truth? The other way to test subjective arguments I guess would be to argue, "Well, you only think you like Arminianism better; you'll actually like Calvinism better."

I think the angle you would go for in this case, though, is to show what the subjective implications of Arminianism and Calvinism are with regard to assurance and experience of God's grace. The subjective aspects of salvation are highly relevant to the issue (and are good reasons to be a Calvinist).

I guess that the theories and background knowledge that facts (scientific and otherwise) are relative to would be seen as methods and processes? Because if the theories and background knowledge were not, then it seems facts would be created by a change in the theories and background knowledge they are relative to. Unless I missed something?

Exactly: facts are not made true by one's methods of inquiry, but they are only discovered in that context by means of some method.