Originally posted by Ron
There are only two worldviews. One says that Scripture is the necessary precondition for the justification of intelligible experience and the other says that it´s not. Accordingly, all that needs to be defeated is the one worldview that argues that knowledge, ethics and reality are intelligible apart from revelation.
The argument that was employed earlier in this thread was correct. It was essentially: "For x (some aspect of human experience) to be the case, y must also be the case since y is the precondition of x. Since x is the case, y is the case." Page 79 of Festschrift
As a formal proof, this argument takes the following form:
Prove A: The Christian God exists.
Step 1 ~A: (Assume the opposite of what we are trying to prove): The Christian God does not exist.
Step 2 (~A--> B): If God does not exist, then there is no intelligible experience since God is the precondition of intelligibility
Step 3 (~B): There is intelligible experience (Contradiction!)
Step 4 (~ ~A): It is not the case that God does not exist (Modus Tollens on 2 and 3)
Step 5 (A):= God does exist (Law of negation.)
It would not do to write: "if causality (C), then God (G)"¦," for this only communicates that G is a necessary condition for C (and C is a sufficient condition for G); it does not address the transcendental challenge - that the consequent is a necessary precondition for C, hence the need for a semantic revision of modus ponens. {For instance, if one is regenerate, then he is in Christ; it is also true that if one is in Christ, then he is regenerate. What is the logical order? Does regeneration presuppose being in Christ or is a precondition for being in Christ regeneration? Well of course, regeneration is logically prior to being in Christ, but this is not grasped by a simple "if p then q" proposition. We are in Christ because we are regenerate; we are not regenerate because we are in Christ. Similarly, God's revelation is the necessary precondition for intelligible experience, but we cannot articulate this truth by "if causality, then God," since necessary conditions need not be prior to that which they are a condition, hence the need for a slight semantic variation such as: causality presupposes God's revelation, or God's revelation is the precondition for causality.}
Many Christians might hold to the above argument, which is transcendental in nature. A common debate among certain apologists will be over whether step 2 can be shown to be philosophically certain.
Immediately below is what I believe to be a feeble justification for step 2 of the above proof but I have seen it enough that I believe it is worth interacting with.
Premise 1: Within the worldview of Christianity intelligibility can be justified.
Premise 2: All worldviews that we have been confronted with cannot justify intelligibility.
Conclusion: Since we cannot deny intelligibility, and since only the Christian worldview so far can justify it, then the Christian worldview is true.
Some believe that step-2 of proof can be inductively justified because every worldview that a particular apologist had encountered has been refuted. It is argued by such apologists that the "œrational inference" that God exists is based upon a statistical-confidence one might have from refuting many opposing worldviews. One of the problems I have with this justification is how can an inductive argument justify the God of Christianity when it cannot justify the heart of Christianity, the Resurrection of Christ? In other words, the inductive justification of step-2 presupposes uniformity in nature, yet the existence of the Christian God requires discontinuity, the Resurrection! How does one plan on justifying discontinuity on the basis of induction, apart from presupposing the self-attesting word of God as the foundational truth by which one can even draw rational inference, which can only be done by presupposing the uniformity of nature! Although the unbeliever cannot account for uniformity, he is no less justified in arguing for uniformity than the Christian who argues for it on the basis of an inductive claim. Not to mention, the conclusion of the proof for step 2, which is "œthe Christian worldview is true," exceeds the scope of the premises!
The conclusion that the Christian worldview is more reasonable than the non-Christian worldview remains unjustified because the question of whether one is even philosophically justified in his use of induction has not been established. There are no freebies in Philosophy, as Dr. Bahnsen used to say.
3 Critical points:
1. In step-3 of the proof it is affirmed that there is intelligible experience, which presupposes true a priori categories of thought that can interpret the facts of a mind-independent world according to actual, objective truth.
2. The proof itself presupposes the intelligibility of deductive reasoning.
3. In the justification of step-2 the precondition of intelligible inductive inference is presupposed.
Accordingly, in order to rationally infer that God´s existence is "philosophically uncertain" yet "œmost probable," one must first presuppose that which the conclusion does not afford "“ God´s actual, ontological existence, which is the necessary precondition for inductive inference! This problem is insurmountable. In arguing for the high probability of God´s existence, the apologist, like the unbeliever who argues against God´s existence, presupposes God´s actual existence. The proof, which concludes with minimal philosophical uncertainty that God exists, begins by presupposing the actual certainty of God´s existence in order to employ both deduction (the proof) and induction (the justification for step 2). Accordingly, one´s presupposition of God´s actual existence ends up contradicting his conclusion that God´s existence is not actually certain. Accordingly, one would have to revise his presupposition-hypothesis to one of "œGod might not exist." In doing so, one will not be able to justify actual induction or deduction. In sum, in order to infer that God´s existence is philosophically uncertain, one must first borrow from a worldview that comports with philosophical certainty so that there can be philosophical uncertainty.
The justification for step two of the proof is simply: God's word teaches two worldviews; God's word is true; therefore, it is true that there are two worldviews. Accordingly, the Christian need not evaluate an infinite number of worldviews anymore than he needs to witness an infinite amount of deaths to know that all men are mortal. We have an appeal for such a premise, God´s word. Moreover, induction requires as a necessary precondition something more than a conceptual scheme for God´s existence. Note well that the transcendental proof, which is deductive in nature and can be simply demonstrated through either modus ponens or modus tollens analogues, requires an ontological God who has revealed himself to men.
The problem many people have is that they don't appreciate that when we get to the ultimate truth claims proof must be circular. For the empiricist, observation is the final appeal. For others, logic is ultimate. The problem is that logic does not comport with a mere conceptual necessity for God, let alone a conceptual necessity that is only probable! Logic is only justifiable by presupposing Scripture.
We must begin our reasoning with the ontological Trinity who has revealed himself in Scripture. My proof is sound in that the form is valid and the premises true. NOTE: The truth of any deductive conclusion is not predicated upon anyone's agreement of the truth of the premises. Accordingly, since unbelievers will not accept the truth claims of the Bible and, therefore, step 2 of the proof, the only thing the Christian can do is refute the hypothetical competitors. In doing so we don´t gain more philosophical confidence that God exists. We merely demonstrate the veracity of TAG to a watching world. Finally, we do not arrive at premise-2 by borrowing from another worldview in order that we might reason inductively. We know our premises by our first principle, God's clear revelation of himself to us in Scripture.
Finally, some might say that since men are fallible men cannot be certain about anything, let alone their proof for God´s existence. I would like to see one put this assertion into a formal argument. Can the skeptic be certain of that claim? Do foibles logically necessitate uncertainty about all things? If so, then the Bible is wrong when it states that we can know we have eternal life? Doesn´t the Christian know that his redeemer lives? Doesn't the fallible Christian know that fallible men chose the correct books for the canon under God´s sovereign guidance?
I´ve probably said enough, especially for my first post on this site. However, there should be much to launch from into further discussion.
Ron
[Edited on 3-1-2006 by Ron]
