Frame: History of Western Philosophy and Theology

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RamistThomist

Puritanboard Clerk
What new material can a survey of Philosophy cover? I was wrong. Frame’s text has numerous ‘lagniappe’ that you won’t find in other texts (links to audio, references to modern Reformed thinkers, etc). In other words, it’s fun. But more importantly, it’s conducive to piety. Frame defines theology as the application, by persons, of God’s word to all of life (Frame 4). Sure, there is a Kuyperian thrust and that can be abused, but on the whole I appreciate it.

He reduces metaphysical discussions to: Is reality One, Many, or Both? *God is absolute tri-personality (16-17). He relates to his creation in terms of Lordship. Lordship is explained as authority (normative), control, and presence. I think this is a good move, but there is a subtle anti-substance metaphysic involved. Substance metaphysics would usually say that reality is “cut at the joints,” meaning a universe of parts, whole, etc. That’s fine as far as it goes and few would disagree. Traditionally, though, that concept would get applied to God.

Frame (perhaps subconsciously) does not allow that. We aren’t now speaking of God’s transcendence in a way that he is spatially “above” or separated from the universe (though certainly not identical with it). The language is no longer spatial, but covenantal.

Perspectives on Human Knowledge
*Our knowledge is related to God in 3 ways (19):
1. Control (our situation governed by his providence)
2. Authority (what God reveals in his Word and Creation)
3. Presence (Covenant)

Frame’s account is light on early philosophy and focuses more on early modern and recent philosophy. His thesis: The two renaissance themes–humanism and antiquarianism–couldn’t be integrated. Do we gain knowledge by reflecting on the past or do we gain knowledge by using our autonomous reason divorced from tradition (167)?

The Reformation

Presented alternatives in metaphysics and epistemology. Luther: in his metaphysics he turned away from the NeoPlatonic “One” and back to the absolute and personal God of revelation (169).

Calvin marks a new move: he begins his Institutes with the knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is never apart from reverence and love towards him. This also determines man’s self-knowledge: “how can we imagine knowing anything without knowing ourselves, that is, knowing our knowing” (Frame 173 n16)? Calvin’s epistemology breaks with Renaissance and medieval models. Correlated with Calvin’s absolute personal theism.

After the Enlightenment, Frame makes the rather strange suggestion that the two worst heresies the church faced are Deism and Liberalism (220). I…um…don’t know about that. But it does explain much of the book. He defines liberal as anyone who doesn’t submit to the authority of Scripture (216ff). This definition of liberalism is very important for Frame’s text and it allows him to misinterpret a number of key thinkers.

Frame has a magnificent chapter on Kant and Hegel. Without explaining Kant’s philosophy, the chapter allows Frame to make another important observation: the conservative drift in liberal theology. Liberals began to use more conservative language while retaining liberal constructs.

When Frame sticks to material in which he is an acknowledged authority, such as linguistic analysis, he shines. The chapters on Russell and Wittgenstein were outstanding. He ends his text with a survey of recent Evangelical theologians.

Evaluation

Should you buy this text? I think so. It has a number of drawbacks and he only rarely engages in more than a surface-level analysis, but it is better than most one-volume treatments. Frame includes annotated bibliographies, pictures, diagrams, and links to audio lectures.
 
For a neophyte attempting to acquire an understanding of philosophical thought, to better understand frequent references within systematic theologies, to philosophers such as Heidegger, Barth, Hegal &c, is this a good starting point ?
 
In all your reading of Frame does he interact with archetypal ectypal theology? I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way. If so the basis of his philosophy on God in my opinion should be avoided, and what sprouts from this false concept of God in se.
 
For a neophyte attempting to acquire an understanding of philosophical thought, to better understand frequent references within systematic theologies, to philosophers such as Heidegger, Barth, Hegal &c, is this a good starting point ?

Mostly yes. Heidegegger and Hegel are the most difficult philosophers in Western history. Frame is good on explaining Hegel. Not so much on Heidegger. His section on Barth is okay, but will be challenged by Barth scholars.
 
In all your reading of Frame does he interact with archetypal ectypal theology? I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way. If so the basis of his philosophy on God in my opinion should be avoided, and what sprouts from this false concept of God in se.

Indirectly yes. Frame, with Van Til and against some Clarkians, doesn't believe our knowledge can fully exhaust God. Our knowledge is analogical, so hence, there is an archetypal distinction. Frame is concerned, though, that some accounts of archetypal/ectypal distinction posit a different God, or God behind God.

Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God.
 
Indirectly yes. Frame, with Van Til and against some Clarkians, doesn't believe our knowledge can fully exhaust God. Our knowledge is analogical, so hence, there is an archetypal distinction. Frame is concerned, though, that some accounts of archetypal/ectypal distinction posit a different God, or God behind God.

Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God.

Your last line "Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God" speaks against what Frame teaches. Thus my concern that this is a basic Reformed doctrine that Frame is denying.
 
Your last line "Ectypal means knowing God according to our creaturely limits. We never transcend these in our knowledge of God" speaks against what Frame teaches. Thus my concern that this is a basic Reformed doctrine that Frame is denying.

Can you show me where he denies that? He holds to analogical knowledge of God, which is by definition ectypal. You've accurately summarized some Clarkian views, but I'm not persuaded Frame would say that (I'm open to correction). My copy of Doctrine of God is at h ome, so I will check that later.
 
Here is the offending quote:

know God as he is in himself insofar as he has revealed that in Scripture" (DG, 204).

And Frame probably has in mind Scripture's revelation of "I am that I am," which is essence language.

If what Frame means is that we have access to the inner essence of God (something no one outside of early Trinitarian debates ever cared about), then Frame is wrong. of course, he isn't arguing that. He qualifies that statement by "as he has revealed that in Scripture." I don't see the problem.
 
Mostly yes. Heidegegger and Hegel are the most difficult philosophers in Western history. Frame is good on explaining Hegel. Not so much on Heidegger. His section on Barth is okay, but will be challenged by Barth scholars.
Harder than Scotus?
 
Can you show me where he denies that? He holds to analogical knowledge of God, which is by definition ectypal. You've accurately summarized some Clarkian views, but I'm not persuaded Frame would say that (I'm open to correction). My copy of Doctrine of God is at h ome, so I will check that later.

As I said before "I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way."

This is the reference that that I gathered here on the PB, with the quote....https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/errors-of-john-m-frame.12185/#post-160362....."3. His claim that we can know God "in himself," (not something the Reformed have taught),".

I assume, with good confidence, that the moderators here would shot the above quote down if it were not true.
 
Here is the offending quote:



And Frame probably has in mind Scripture's revelation of "I am that I am," which is essence language.

If what Frame means is that we have access to the inner essence of God (something no one outside of early Trinitarian debates ever cared about), then Frame is wrong. of course, he isn't arguing that. He qualifies that statement by "as he has revealed that in Scripture." I don't see the problem.

The problem there is no qualifier to knowing God "as He is in Himself".
 
As I said before "I ask because from what little I understand gathered here on the PB, Frame really believes we can know God in an archetypal way."

And as I've shown, I don't think that is what Frame is saying for a number of reasons:
1) he has already qualified what he means by "as he has revealed himself in Scripture."
2) No one who holds to analogical knowledge can say we know God archetypally.
 
Calvin marks a new move: he begins his Institutes with the knowledge of God. Knowledge of God is never apart from reverence and love towards him. This also determines man’s self-knowledge: “how can we imagine knowing anything without knowing ourselves, that is, knowing our knowing” (Frame 173 n16)? Calvin’s epistemology breaks with Renaissance and medieval models. Correlated with Calvin’s absolute personal theism.

Can you say more about Calvin's epistemology? I've been meaning to study this subject.
 
And as I've shown, I don't think that is what Frame is saying for a number of reasons:
1) he has already qualified what he means by "as he has revealed himself in Scripture."
2) No one who holds to analogical knowledge can say we know God archetypally.

May I ask if you think there is a similarity of being between God and man? The reason I ask is because when I see someone use the idea of analogical knowledge many times they think that God thinks like us in some way and is like us in being.
 
"as he has revealed in Scripture."

The revealed is accommodated and is not Himself, in that God is wholly other. To use the phrase "as he is in himself" is inappropriate and no amount of qualification can overcome the poor phrasing he used in my opinion.
 
May I ask if you think there is a similarity of being between God and man? The reason I ask is because when I see someone use the idea of analogical knowledge many times they think that God thinks like us in some way and is like us in being.

In the Catholic sense of analogia entis, no. But in Bavinck's sense, I hold to analogical knowledge. @Ask Mr. Religion has a good summary of the issue here
https://puritanboard.com/threads/need-help-on-some-cvt-clark-questions.92879/#post-1132807
 
The revealed is accommodated and is not Himself, in that God is wholly other. To use the phrase "as he is in himself" is inappropriate and no amount of qualification can overcome the poor phrasing he used in my opinion.

If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.
 
If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.

When speaking of Our Lord one ought to not use such as befitting a teacher which I consider this to be very important. Also not owning or reading any of Frames works is the reason I asked if he delved into any ectype archetype discussion which I am grateful for your response here.
 
If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.

I suspect others who have complained about Frame saying we can know God as "He is" base there accusations on other writings besides this one poorly phrased line. This is why I asked you about his discussions of ectypal and archetype theology which appears to be scant as you said above. :)
 
If all you are getting at is that Frame used poor phrasing, sure. I wouldn't have said it that way.

When speaking of Our Lord one ought to not use such as befitting a teacher which I consider this to be very important. Also not owning or reading any of Frames works is the reason I asked if he delved into any ectype archetype discussion which I am grateful for your response here.

Fine fine threads. :) I still wonder how Frame would responded within them. I know how CVT and Clark would have, and I believe they would had benefited greatly from them. The Ectypal-Archetypal distinction appeared to have been lost on the CVT Clark times as it is today. I know when I ask my elders about this I only get a blank stare, and if not I get a rash distortion of the distinction of the ARH-ECT differences by using analogy in saying God is like us.
 
When speaking of Our Lord one ought to not use such as befitting a teacher

True, but I can find fault with every major thinker on that point. Very few theologians have a satisfactory definition of what a divine person is. Basil and Augustine explicitly said they don't know. Yet, imagine a guy at Presbytery getting up and saying, "I believe in three persons but I have no idea what a person is."

I'm not bothered by Frame on this. The ET/AT distinction is important, but if it is pressed too far, then we run the risk of having a God behind God to whom we don't have cognitive access.
 
I still wonder how Frame would responded within them. I know how CVT and Clark would have, and I believe they would had benefited greatly from them.
You will find much laboring over the matter by Frame in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God.

A sampling from various portions of Chapter One:

(e) Van Til on "analogy." Van Til does teach that all of our thinking about God is "analogical," but in his vocabulary analogical means "reflective of God's original thought."28 Because both "literal" and "figurative" language can be "analogical" in Van Til's sense, his view of analogy does not resolve the question before us. As far as I know, Van Til nowhere comments on the question of whether or not language about God can be literal.

From the #28 footnote:
28. Reflective has two senses here. In one sense, all human thought reflects God; in another other sense, only obedient, believing thought does. This distinction corresponds to the traditional tional Reformed distinction between "wider" and "narrower" senses of the image of God. Unbelieving thought does not image God's truth and goodness (except in ironic ways), but it does reflect God in its skillfulness. See our later discussion of the unbeliever's knowledge.

6. Does God's "thought-content" always differ from man's? Content played a crucial role in the OPC controversy. Van Til's followers insisted that when a man thinks about a particular rose, for example, the "content" in his mind always differs from the "content" in God's mind when He thinks about the same rose. It would be a mistake for us to assume that thought-content has a perfectly clear meaning and then to leap on one bandwagon or another. In my booklet Van Til the Theologian, I argue that the idea of "thought-content" is ambiguous. In some senses, I would argue, Van Til is right; in others, Clark. (a) Content can refer to mental images. I think Van Til has this in mind, for example, on page 184 of Introduction: "When man says that God is eternal, he can, because of his own limitations, think of God only as being very old. He can think of eternity only in terms of endless years." That statement is false, unless "think of" refers to imaging of some sort, the imagining of what it would be like for us to be eternal. If imaging is not in view, then there certainly are ways in which we can think of eternity as other than endless time. Otherwise, how do theologians (including Van Til) come to define eternity as supratemporal? If content in the controversy means "mental images," then the whole argument is speculative and foolish. We have no ground for supposing that God thinks in anything like our mental images. (Even we can think without out using images.) And even if He does, there is no reason to suppose that God's images are the same as ours or that they are not.

7. Is there a "qualitative difference" between God's thoughts and ours? Qualitative difference was the great rallying cry of the Van Til forces against the Clark party. On the one hand, Clark (we are told) held that there was only a "quantitative difference" between God's thoughts and ours, that is, that God knew more facts than we do. On the other hand, Van Til believed that the difference was "qualitative." I am willing to affirm that there is a qualitative difference between God's thoughts and ours, but I am not convinced of the value of the phrase in the present controversy. What is a "qualitative difference"? Most simply defined, it is a difference in quality. Thus a difference between blue and green could be a "qualitative difference." Such a usage, of course, is totally inadequate to do justice to the Creator-creature distinction, which the Van Til forces were trying to do. In fairness, however, we should also recognize that in English qualitative difference generally refers to very large differences in quality, not differences like that between blue and green. We tend to speak of "qualitative differences" where the differences are not capable of quantitative measurement. But even on such a maximal definition, the phrase still denotes differences within creation; it does not uniquely define the Creator-creature distinction. I therefore tend to avoid the phrase, though I have no objection to it. Although it is appropriate to use a superlative term like this to describe the Creator-creature relation, we should cure ourselves of the notion that qualitative automatically takes us outside of the sphere of intracreational relations and that no other terms may be substituted for it in such a context.34 Rather than using qualitative difference, I prefer to use terms that are more directly related to the covenantal terminology of Scripture, for example differences between Creator and creature, Lord and servant, Father and son, original and derivative, self-attesting and attested by another. other. In some contexts, those terms can also designate intracreational relations; all terms in human language can apply to something or other within creation. But when they refer to the divine-human difference, they are no less clear than qualitative difference, and in most respects, they are clearer. The suggestion that qualitative difference somehow designates a larger difference than these other terms or that it is more appropriate than the biblical terms to denote the difference in view is entirely groundless. It was most unfortunate that qualitative difference became a kind of partisan rallying cry in the OPC controversy. For such work the phrase is entirely unsuited.

From the #34 footnote:
34. This notion seems to pervade Halsey's article. He continually suggests that since I do not speak of "qualitative differences," I must hold that the differences in view are merely "quantitative." That suggestion is entirely false.
{Nb: Frame here refers to Halsey, James S. "A Preliminary Critique of 'Van Til: the Theologian'." WTJ 39 (1976): 120-36.}
 
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