Me Died Blue
Puritan Board Post-Graduate
It seems to me that a lot of the theonomic debate hinges on the interpretation of "general equity," since we all agree that such a thing biblically remains binding today. The disagreement seems to primarily be that non-theonomists take the general equity of the judicial laws to simply be the moral law, no more, no less; whereas the theonomists take the general equity of the judicial laws to be more specific applications of the moral law, found in the underlying principles seen in the various judicial laws. I summarized my reasons for seeing both Scripture and Westminster as supportive of the latter interpretation near the end of a past thread, and have never seen them answered, which is why I am bringing them up now:
Regarding Westminster's interpretation, here is how I see the issue:
Regarding the Scriptural foundation for that interpretation of Westminster, here is how I see the issue:
Regarding Westminster's interpretation, here is how I see the issue:
Originally posted by Me Died Blue
Another thing that sheds light on that issue is the Westminster Divines' interpretation of the case laws. If, as you say, they were not chiefly an application of the moral law, but were a completely separate category, why are there so many case laws appealed to in the Catechisms to define the boundaries set by each commandment of the Decalogue? Furthermore, there are two important inconsistencies that cannot be accounted for under your interpretation of WCF.XIX: Firstly, if the "general equity" in section IV is, as you say, merely referring to the moral law as contained in the Decalogue, and not to its applications in the case laws, then why did the Divines purposefully note its continuity in section IV in accordance with their talk of the judicial laws, when the very next section is wholly devoted to the continuity of the moral law? Under your interpretation of "general equity," the last part of section IV is useless and redundant in light of section V. The second inconsistency under your interpretation is something Paul (Manata) pointed out above, which is the difference in the use of the term "abrogated" in reference to the ceremonial laws, and "expired" in reference to the judicial laws. If they both cease to apply to the lives of New Testament saints in the same way, then why the difference in terms, and so close to each other as well? Maybe the Divines just felt like playing some useless word games that day.
As to Rutherford's statement, he said, "the whole bulk of the judicial law, as judicial, and as it concerned the Republic of the Jews only, is abolished, though the moral equity of all those be not abolished" (emphasis mine). To see what he meant by that last phrase, it is quite interesting to note that all the subsequent examples he gives of case laws being expired are all in reference to specific cultural-Jewish aspects of them, while he never discredits the use of the principles that may be derived from them.
Regarding the Scriptural foundation for that interpretation of Westminster, here is how I see the issue:
Originally posted by Me Died Blue
As far as the Scriptural reasons for the cultural-Jewish aspects of the judicial law being rescinded, but the underlying principles remaining, one example of the truth of that principle is found in 1 Corinthians 9:9-14. Here Paul discards the cultural element from Deuteronomy 25:4, and yet applies the law principally. Likewise, he quotes that same passage from Deuteronomy on par with a quotation from Matthew 10:10 when instructing Timothy in 1 Timothy 5:18. He does the same type of application of the case law of Deuteronomy 22:10 in an extended way in 2 Corinthians 6:14.
Furthermore, Jesus often inserted references to the case laws right in the middle of references to the laws of the Decalogue, such as in Mark 10:19, where "Do not defraud" from Deuteronomy 24:16 is referenced. He also sent the lepper in Mark 1:44 to follow a Mosaic law. Likewise, in Mark 7:6-13 and Matthew 15:3-9, in rebuking the Pharisees, Jesus referred to the fifth commandment, but made no distinction between that and his reference to the penal sanction specifying capital punishment.
The point of all those references to case laws is found in Matthew 5:18-19: "For truly, I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not an iota, not a dot, will pass from the Law until all is accomplished. Therefore whoever relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever does them and teaches them will be called great in the kingdom of heaven." We know this cannot mean every detail of the law just as it was lived out in the Old Testament, else Paul and Jesus would be fools for making new applications of them and rendering other details of them as expired (such as the ox in the field). What, then, is to be taken from the universal wording of that passage? "Not an iota, not a dot." Since the entire law is validated for our standards of direct living, yet not every law was applied by New Testament writers in the same way it had been in the Old, the only conclusion that makes sense of both the universal language in Matthew 5 and the new applications such as those cited above is that every law has a binding application to us, but that the external outworking of that application can take on different forms with the culture. And that is the theonomist's position. If, however, the case laws have been fully abolished in their entirety as non-theonomists claim, then the universal language used in that passage, as well as the various applications made by Christ and Paul, are absurd.