Genus/Species and God

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Goodcheer68

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Im reading James Dolezal’s book God Without Parts that argues for the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity. The book is pretty deep but I'm getting through it. There are however, a couple of things in the book that I'm not sure I am fully understanding. I understand for the most part that God’s existence is His essence which we cannot say of any other being. At the very least all other beings participate in existence which makes them composite beings. The strand of argument that I'm trying to get a clearer picture on is with the Genus/Species categories. The book argues something like the following: God is not a Genus nor can be therefore He is simple. What exactly is this line of reasoning getting at? Is it meaning that because genus is a common grouping of a variety of species (which also share similarities in their natures) and God’s being is like no other that he is not able to be logically and ontologically grouped with any other being? Or am I way off? Help me to understand the Genus/Species distinctions as it pertains to God.

Thanks
 
What are the species in the construction he is arguing against? Is he arguing that we are not to think of God as a genus and the Persons of the Trinity as species?
 
This is probably straight Aquinas:

I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus “being”, because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity — i.e. essence — must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

(ST P1, Q3, A5)
 
In other words, God is a simple and uncompounded spiritual being. By simple we do not mean God is dim-witted. Nor do we mean that God is easy to understand.

Simple, as a divine attribute, is the opposite of composite, the opposite of compounded. God is not made up of parts, composed of a genus (class), differentiations of species by attributes within a genus, and so on.

Together, form/matter composites may be defined according to genus and species. Genus is the more generic term used to set off a group of similar things from other groups, while species picks out individuals within the genus by their specific differences. Genus refers to the matter of a thing, and the specific difference to its form.

So a man, for example, is made up of soul (form) and body (matter), and this essence is defined as rational (species) animal (genus). Here the term “human” can be predicated of many individuals but not limited to any one of them (as if, to be Socrates is to be human may convert to being human is to be Socrates).

HT: Beaumont, Analogical God Talk
 
God is I Am Who I Am, is He not? His existence is just beyond any label that we wish to place Him under?

Sort of. Being is sometimes used to include all that is. If we place God in that category then we have identified creature and Creator. So they sought to get around that by saying God is outside of Being.
 
Sort of. Being is sometimes used to include all that is. If we place God in that category then we have identified creature and Creator. So they sought to get around that by saying God is outside of Being.
God is and should always be seen as being beyond us, period.
 
God is a Spirit. If God is not a genus, how might we understand the Catechism question? Does it err on its own? (Perhaps we must understand the Catechism in light of the Confession: God is a most pure Spirit. Or we must understand the Catechism simply to mean a personal immaterial being...although that seems to put God into the species of personal immaterial beings, of which there are other species.)

Edit: Actually, Thomas Aquinas may have already answered the question. As soon as we start to give a definition of God, we are putting him into a genus. So it is inevitable that we start referring to God as "a Spirit" or even "a most pure Spirit."

"Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition."
 
God is and should always be seen as being beyond us, period.
David,

Brother, we need to tread lightly here, qualifying that which we assert briefly. Not a few who stumble across our often naked assertions, will fall into error. It is better that we be more verbose explaining our terse pronouncements, than to avoid the possibly of leading others to sin. We are all prone to creating intellectual idols of God or Our Lord Jesus Christ in the idol factories of our minds, and then go off worshipping them, at our temporal and/or eternal peril.

God's ineffability (incapable of being expressed in words), is not a warrant to seek to know something true about Him, truths that are didactically (intended to teach) expressed in Holy Writ.

To imply God is "beyond us, period" relegates God to a being we can have no true comprehension about concerning who He really is, especially when God explicitly teaches us all that we need to know about Him. It is certainly true that we cannot fully apprehend who God is, for it that were possible, we, in effect, would mini Gods.

Unsurprisingly, Job never received direct answers to His questions from God. Rather Job was treated to an explanation describing God's transcendence, a lengthy reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) if you will, answers that rightly left Job speechless in the knowledge of how foolish his demands were upon God. Therefore, always keeping in mind the Creator-created distinction should restrain our human desires to place God in the dock (on trial), demanding that He give an account to us.
 
David,

Brother, we need to tread lightly here, qualifying that which we assert briefly. Not a few who stumble across our often naked assertions, will fall into error. It is better that we be more verbose explaining our terse pronouncements, than to avoid the possibly of leading others to sin. We are all prone to creating intellectual idols of God or Our Lord Jesus Christ in the idol factories of our minds, and then go off worshipping them, at our temporal and/or eternal peril.

God's ineffability (incapable of being expressed in words), is not a warrant to seek to know something true about Him, truths that are didactically (intended to teach) expressed in Holy Writ.

To imply God is "beyond us, period" relegates God to a being we can have no true comprehension about concerning who He really is, especially when God explicitly teaches us all that we need to know about Him. It is certainly true that we cannot fully apprehend who God is, for it that were possible, we, in effect, would mini Gods.

Unsurprisingly, Job never received direct answers to His questions from God. Rather Job was treated to an explanation describing God's transcendence, a lengthy reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) if you will, answers that rightly left Job speechless in the knowledge of how foolish his demands were upon God. Therefore, always keeping in mind the Creator-created distinction should restrain our human desires to place God in the dock (on trial), demanding that He give an account to us.
We can know God and who He is by the scriptures and especially in the person of Jesus Christ, but that there will always be with God that aspect of Him still beyond us.
 
Edit: Actually, Thomas Aquinas may have already answered the question. As soon as we start to give a definition of God, we are putting him into a genus. So it is inevitable that we start referring to God as "a Spirit" or even "a most pure Spirit."

"Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition."

So based on this and what Patrick said I was/am on the right track with understanding what Dolezal is trying to get at with the Genus/species distinctions.
 
Yes, the idea is that God is not part of a larger class (genus) but distinguished from other members of that class by a specific difference.
 
We can know God and who He is by the scriptures and especially in the person of Jesus Christ, but that there will always be with God that aspect of Him still beyond us.

Exactly, this is where archetypal and ectypal thinking comes. All we know of God is accommodated, and this stooping down is not as He is in Himself.
 
I don't see how "God is Spirit" is better with regards to genus/species. Not only is it unconfessional language, but either one still ends up with God being a species of immaterial beings (taking "Spirit" to mean a quality of God, like God is light or love, and then separately noticing God is a distinct being from elsewhere in Scripture; concluding then that God is an immaterial personal being) or one ends up with all immaterial beings being emanations of God's being (taking "Spirit" to mean God is immateriality, like God is truth itself).
 
I don't see how "God is Spirit" is better with regards to genus/species. Not only is it unconfessional language, but either one still ends up with God being a species of immaterial beings (taking "Spirit" to mean a quality of God, like God is light or love, and then separately noticing God is a distinct being from elsewhere in Scripture; concluding then that God is an immaterial personal being) or one ends up with all immaterial beings being emanations of God's being (taking "Spirit" to mean God is immateriality, like God is truth itself).

God is spirit is indeed better than God is a spirit. For the later insinuates God is like angels. God in His divine essence is a spirit, and angels derive their spiritual essence from God. The best we can do or know God is by analogy.
 
I'm also currently working closely on this book by Dolezal.

In that section, he is essentially denying of God 6 different models of composition.
1. Bodily Parts
2. Matter and Form
3. Supposit and Nature
4. Genus and Species
5. Substance and Accident
6. Essence and Existence

In the specific sub-section on 'Genus and Species', he mentions that all non-divine beings are defined within a species in a genus. That cannot be said of God.

His basic point here is that God cannot be reduced to some specific class of being, nor can he be contracted into a particular genus by some specific difference. As in the quote by Bavinck at the end of this section, God does not belong to a member of any genus nor any species of a genus.

A species necessarily contains additional characteristics (parts) in addition to the genus. Such cannot be said of God.

In the middle section, Dolezal (citing Aquinas) gives three reasons for denying God is composed of a genus and specific difference.
1. The species-genus composition is in fact a conceptual act-potency composition respectively.
2. If there is any genus God would have to be in, the genus would be called "being". Yet being or non-being are not specific differences, thus being cannot be properly called a genus. Things participate in being differently than a species participates in genus.
3. A species consists of additional characteristics on top of the characteristics which define a genus. This is impossible in God.

Hope that helps. It does take a couple of readings in the various sections to grasp the metaphysical concepts in this book, but I have found that it can be the most rewarding. One thing I found helpful is that I often have to properly understand the earlier concepts before I progress to the next section, as the later sections build upon the foundation laid down by the previous sections. (There were times when I had to properly revisit some earlier sections I had previously glossed over, simply because I got hopelessly lost in the later section.)



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If you are familiar with Van Til, in Van Til-speak, there is a Creator/creature distinction fundamental to reality. Each being is either in the former or latter category, but we cannot group Creator and creature into the same category of 'Being' and proceed to say 'things true about being in general.' As stated above, God is sui generis, utterly Independent, and exists a se. No other being has these attributes; all other beings are dependent upon Him. This is why God is not an instance of the class 'Being in general' -- He (as Creator) is essentially unique from all other (created) beings.

God is also not an instance of a class in the sense that 'God' is the class (or genus), and the Christian God is one instance (or species), the Islamic 'god' is another instance (or species), the Hebrew God another, etc. In which case, to identify the Christian God distinctly we would have to add attributes to those of the class--thus making God composite/complex rather than simple. Van Til (and later, Bahnsen) would apply this truth when teaching that we do not first argue for the existence of 'A' god, and then proceed to distinguish 'THE' Christian God. Instead, we argue first, last, and only, for God as revealed to us in Scripture. Van Til makes this point well in the beginning of The Defense of the Faith.

If you haven't read Dolezaal's God Without Parts I would highly recommend starting there -- and follow his advice, perhaps, about reading Weinandy too.
 
I'm also currently working closely on this book by Dolezal.

In that section, he is essentially denying of God 6 different models of composition.
1. Bodily Parts
2. Matter and Form
3. Supposit and Nature
4. Genus and Species
5. Substance and Accident
6. Essence and Existence

In the specific sub-section on 'Genus and Species', he mentions that all non-divine beings are defined within a species in a genus. That cannot be said of God.

His basic point here is that God cannot be reduced to some specific class of being, nor can he be contracted into a particular genus by some specific difference. As in the quote by Bavinck at the end of this section, God does not belong to a member of any genus nor any species of a genus.

A species necessarily contains additional characteristics (parts) in addition to the genus. Such cannot be said of God.

In the middle section, Dolezal (citing Aquinas) gives three reasons for denying God is composed of a genus and specific difference.
1. The species-genus composition is in fact a conceptual act-potency composition respectively.
2. If there is any genus God would have to be in, the genus would be called "being". Yet being or non-being are not specific differences, thus being cannot be properly called a genus. Things participate in being differently than a species participates in genus.
3. A species consists of additional characteristics on top of the characteristics which define a genus. This is impossible in God.

Hope that helps. It does take a couple of readings in the various sections to grasp the metaphysical concepts in this book, but I have found that it can be the most rewarding. One thing I found helpful is that I often have to properly understand the earlier concepts before I progress to the next section, as the later sections build upon the foundation laid down by the previous sections. (There were times when I had to properly revisit some earlier sections I had previously glossed over, simply because I got hopelessly lost in the later section.)



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God is the First Causer, He is Spirit, He is beyond all as He alone is Eternal and uncreated.
 
Which of course God is indeed "wholly other".

Depends on how that is glossed. Is God so wholly other that nothing can be predicated of him, including the claim that God is wholly other? That's a reason that Reformed orthodox avoided that kind of language about God.
 
Depends on how that is glossed. Is God so wholly other that nothing can be predicated of him, including the claim that God is wholly other? That's a reason that Reformed orthodox avoided that kind of language about God.

The reformed have the idea in the confessions of "wholly other"...."This communion which the saints have with Christ, does not make them in any wise partakers of the substance of His Godhead; or to be equal with Christ in any respect: either of which to affirm is impious and blasphemous.

One may avoid the use of the phrase "wholly other", but the definition of the phrase means exactly that God is such. in my opinion most Christians think it is appropriate to use the "The Image of God" as if men can posses what God ALONE has in Himself.

The loss of this proper type of thinking makes God in man's image which runs rampant in todays thinking.
 
One may avoid the use of the phrase "wholly other", but the definition of the phrase means exactly that God is such. in my opinion most Christians think it is appropriate to use the "The Image of God" as if men can posses what God ALONE has in Himself.

The problem is, if you say "wholly other" in theological conversation today it automatically means Karl Barth unless you immediately qualify otherwise. On the other hand, if you say archetypal, it doesn't mean Karl Barth.
 
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