Hello Matthew,
Do you believe God knows Socrates is mortal through the syllogism which starts with all men are mortal? If not, then you know very well what is meant by infinite meaning. God knows all things at once. Man's knowledge by means of propositional truth is partial. I don't think this is as hard for you to comprehend as you are suggesting.
First off, I am not sure what you mean by that last sentence. I have tried to be genuine and sincere in this conversation. I hope you are not suggesting otherwise.
Secondly, it seems as if you are talking about
how God knows the meaning of the sentence “Socrates is mortal” rather than His knowing the meaning of the sentence itself. It sounds as if you are saying that given any proposition X, the
way God knows X is different than the
way mankind knows X. Mankind might know X at the end of a syllogism, but God knows X immediately in the sense that it is ever present to Him; however, it does not necessarily follow from this that God’s knowledge of X in and of itself is altogether different than man’s knowledge of X - and it certainly does not clarify what you mean by "infinite meaning". Consider the following two arguments…
Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Premise 2: Socrates is a man.
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.
Premise 1: If Socrates is not mortal, then Socrates did not die.
Premise 2: Socrates did die.
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.
These are two different ways a person can come to the knowledge that “Socrates is mortal”; yet, it seems reasonable to think that the content conveyed by the conclusion is the same in each syllogism. So, even if God knows the meaning of the sentence “Socrates is mortal” immediately and in context with all other true propositions, this in itself does not entail that God’s knowledge of the proposition is utterly dissimilar to ours. Does God know with infinite meaning the meaning of "Socrates is mortal"?
Please pay attention to terms of reference. The absolute differences were pointed out. It was stated from the outset that the subject knowing is Infinite Creator. If you don't agree that is an absolute difference then you have a theological problem. One should not appeal to God's immanence to deny His transcendence.
It sounds as if you are admonishing me to pay closer attention. In an effort to accept your admonishment, allow me to go back to the quote under question. Here is the first part...
…we have to raise the issue of "perspective" and "relation," which opens the door to the "personal" side of knowledge, and this personal side cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God and man are absolutely different.
You are trying to explain from the personal side of knowledge why man’s knowledge and God’s knowledge cannot “in any sense be the same.” The reason for this is because “God and man are absolutely different.” Here is the rest of the paragraph…
God's perspective is infinite and eternal and He stands related to the truth as the Creator and Revealer. Man's persepctive is finite and temporal, and he stands related to the truth as created and receiver.
It sounds like you are saying that “God and man are absolutely different” in the sense that “God’s perspective is infinite and stands in relation to truth as the creator, while man’s perspective is finite and stands in relation to truth as the created.” If this is so, then you are saying…
“The personal side of knowledge cannot in any sense be the same for God and man for the simple reason that God’s perspective is infinite and stands in relation to truth as the creator, while man’s perspective is finite and stands in relation to truth as the created.”
Here is your argument…
Premise 1: God’s perspective is infinite and stands in relation to truth as the creator.
Premise 2: Man’s perspective is finite and stands in relation to truth as the created.
Conclusion: God’s knowledge of truth cannot in any sense be the same as man's.
This argument is not valid. You immediately went on to say…
Given God's perspective and relation to the truth, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.
This is like saying, “Given premise 1, it is obvious that He does not conceive of the truth in propositional form except insofar as He accommodates the truth to human capacity and for the purpose of covenant relationship.” I have two thoughts about this:
(1) This, too, is an invalid argument, and as such is not so obvious.
(2) Given your exception clause, apparently in some sense God does conceive of truth in propositional form. But this seems to contradict the conclusion of your argument above. I appreciate your admonition to pay closer attention, but maybe the issue of my misunderstanding has less to do with my lack of attention and more to do with your communication? Just a thought.
I haven't presented a formal argument so you have no formal logic to criticise. Sorry to spoil your party.
An argument does not need to be a formal argument for it to be invalid. All kinds of implicit arguments are made in discussions like these. This lack of explicitness becomes the seedbed to all kinds of fallacious thinking.
Brian