Grounds for divorce

[py3ak]

1. I'm not sure what this proves - that exceptive clause is followed by the conjunctive clause "and marry another." It is all one connected statement.
2. I do think of adultery as being exclusively sexual in nature - isn't it always so when referring to human-to-human relationships throughout Scripture? Is there a place in Scripture where it is not? As I've mentioned above, I believe there can be dispute over what constitutes adultery and I have suggested that there may be a "lower bar" than how it is commonly defined today. Again note Christ's words in Matt.5.32: "But I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife except it be for fornication [πορνεία = sexual promiscuity of any type] causeth her to commit adultery [μοιχάομαι = breaking the covenantal bond]: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced, committeth adultery." That adultery can happen prior to marriage proper is discussed in WCF 24.5: "Adultery or fornication, committed after a contract, being detected before marriage, giveth just occasion to the innocent party to dissolve that contract. In the case of adultery after marriage, it is lawful for the innocent party to sue out a divorce, and after the divorce to marry another, as if the offending party were dead." To allow for a non-sexual definition of "adultery" or a broader usage of adultery to include "all grave infidelity to the marriage" seems as harmful as expanding the Biblical teaching on abandonment in I Cor. to include other forms of abuse or neglect. Considering how often marriage, adultery, and divorce are used to teach us about our relationship to God, we need to take care how we define such issues (consider Hosea or Romans 7.1-4).

It is one connected statement. That's why it can't be used to prove that there's a different criterion for divorce vs. remarriage. Your approach attaches the exceptive clause exclusively to the remarriage phrase. Put that in light of Deuteronomy 24, where divorce is assumed and regulated, and you can see why, where divorce is appropriate, remarriage is allowed.

There's a reason we distinguish fornication from adultery. The difference is not that fornication is okay, but that the addition of a covenant adds a particular character of unfaithfulness and betrayal to the commission of fornication. If the only item in a marriage covenant were a promise not to have sex with anyone else, then nothing else would be a breach of the covenant. However, that is not the only commitment made in a marriage covenant. That would be the basis for a metonymic use of adultery.

Speaking of "expanding" presupposes the correctness of your position. There's also a danger of artificial restriction. Someone could argue, "I'm perfectly willing to live with my wife" who nonetheless had diminished her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage. Saying "I don't mind if she stays" is not actually the same thing as living up to the commitments made. And such a diminution meant even a slave-wife could go out free (Exodus 21:7-11). On the basis of that passage, we can identify "abandonment" as broader than simply physical departure.

 

[Northern Crofter]

It is one connected statement. That's why it can't be used to prove that there's a different criterion for divorce vs. remarriage.

So then wouldn't your approach (the exceptive clause is attached to the putting away/divorce) to Christ's words in Matt. 19 have to limit the grounds for all divorce to adultery?

Isn't the plain reading of v.9 ("I say therefore unto you, that whosoever shall put away/divorce/ἀπολύω his wife, except it be for whoredom/fornication/πορνεία, and marry another, commiteth adultery/marital unfaithfulness/μοιχάομαι: and whosoever marrieth her which is divorced, doth commit adultery.") something like this: whoever divorces for reasons other than sexual transgression and remarries is guilty of adultery, and whoever they remarry is also guilty of adultery?

I'm not trying to belabour the point, I'm just trying to wrap my head around the different interpretations of Christ's words and how they relate to Moses' - something I think M. Henry was trying to expound but which I find difficult to accept as consistent. I think this all really rests on how we understand Christ's "Ye have heard that it was said," statements in Matthew 5.

 

[Polanus1561]

"Whoever drives on this road except an ambulance driver on call and exceeds the speed limit is breaking the law.” Clearly, this does not mean that ambulance drivers who break the speed limit here are breaking the law. This is understood because we naturally reframe the negative prohibition into positive information. I.e., those under the exception (ambulance drivers) are to reframe the whole statement for themselves positively so that they know they are allowed to speed. They are allowed to commit an act which other people, not under the exception, transgress the law in. The positive force is that exceeding the speed limit is allowed in the ambulance driver’s circumstances. If one grants the principles and conclusion in this example, then it follows that the one justly divorced similarly learns from Matthew 19:9 that remarriage is allowable. He has rightly reframed the negative prohibition to a positive allowance (remarriage). Further, it is more organic to see the disciples’ response (v.10) referring to the teaching on divorce—not remarriage. It was the ‘problem’ of a narrow view of divorce that led to their despondency."

My summary of Thomas Edgar’s argument in Carl J. Laney et al., Divorce and Remarriage: Four Christian Views, ed by. H. Wayne House (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 1990), 158-162.

 

[py3ak]

So then wouldn't your approach (the exceptive clause is attached to the putting away/divorce) to Christ's words in Matt. 19 have to limit the grounds for all divorce to adultery?

Isn't the plain reading of v.9 ("I say therefore unto you, that whosoever shall put away/divorce/ἀπολύω his wife, except it be for whoredom/fornication/πορνεία, and marry another, commiteth adultery/marital unfaithfulness/μοιχάομαι: and whosoever marrieth her which is divorced, doth commit adultery.") something like this: whoever divorces for reasons other than sexual transgression and remarries is guilty of adultery, and whoever they remarry is also guilty of adultery?

I'm not trying to belabour the point, I'm just trying to wrap my head around the different interpretations of Christ's words and how they relate to Moses' - something I think M. Henry was trying to expound but which I find difficult to accept as consistent. I think this all really rests on how we understand Christ's "Ye have heard that it was said," statements in Matthew 5.

No, because the universe of discourse within which this speech occurs includes Deuteronomy 24, the Mosaic legislation generally, and the approach to divorce of Christ's Jewish contemporaries. In the context of correcting their misappropriation of Moses, Christ affirms that because of the original institution of marriage, legitimate grounds for divorce have to be a serious violation of the marriage covenant. Divorcing someone without adequate reason just involves you in betraying the marriage covenant.

A metonymic use of adultery is already established by the 7th Commandment, where we properly understand that it is more than the narrowest definition of adultery that is prohibited.

This statement in Matthew is not meant to be the only word on the subject; in addition to the slightly different account in Mark 10, Paul approaches it from a different angle a little later on and with a different presenting problem.

 

[JD]

I'm super late in joing this thread, and I may have missed it, but I haven't seen anyone refer to the Confession yet.

I attended a conference this past fall and in one of the breakout sessions Dr. Jeffrey Stivason of RPTS taught on Marriage and Divorce from WCF Ch. 24:

I found it very instructive and especially appreciated how he continued to defer to church discipline for handling edge cases in the Q&A.