How the Moral Law relates to Genesis 2:16-17?

[JTB.SDG]

Fellas,

I've come to really love John Colquhoun, reading through his "Treatise and the Law and the Gospel." One of the questions I was wrestling through was how the Moral Law related to the special command God gave to Adam. In particular, did the Covenant of Works BEGIN with Adam's creation or the command not to eat of the fruit? Colquhoun explained it this way: The Moral Law was written in Adam's heart at creation, but this Moral Law TOOK THE FORM of the Covenant of Works at Genesis 2:16-17. As I understand Colquhoun, he also defines the nature of the Moral Law as the command of perfect, perpetual, and personal obedience. (Bear with me, almost done; here's the important part). He puts it in other words also, saying that before Genesis 2:16-17, the command to Adam was simply: Obey; but after Genesis 2:16-17 it became: "Obey and live" (IE, obey in order to live). In his words: “The law of God is to be taken, either materially, as merely directing and obliging the rational creature to perfect obedience; or formally, as having received the form of a covenant of works. Now it is the law, not formally, but materially considered, that was inscribed on the heart of man in his creation." He then goes on to say: "The law of creation, or of the Ten Commandments, was, in the form of a covenant of works, given to the first Adam, after he had been put into the garden of Eden. . ." (IE, Genesis 2:16-17).

OKAY, SO HERE's THE RUB. To me this made a ton of sense and I so appreciated Colquhoun's explanation of these things. But rereading the Confession, I'm wondering if his definition of the Moral Law (and thus, explanation of all of this) is in accordance with the Westminster Confession? The Confession defines the Moral Law as INHERENTLY including the sanction of death and reward of life upon the condition of obedience (WLC 93). But again, Colquhoun seems to define the Moral Law as including this component (of death or life upon terms of obedience) ONLY INSOFAR AS IT TOOK ON THE FORM OF THE COVENANT OF WORKS in Genesis 2:16-17. Other places in the Confession though, seem to back up the way that Colquhoun explains it; it tells us that Adam had the Law of God written on his heart at creation (WLC 19; WCF 4:2) and that God gave to Adam a Law AS a covenant of works in Genesis 2:16-17 (WCF 19:1), which, we're told later in 19:2, is the Moral Law (correct?) Any thoughts here?

One other question related to all of this: What would have happened had Adam sinned AGAINST THE MORAL LAW before God gave the command in Genesis 2:16-17?

Thanks for taking the time to read...

 

[Contra_Mundum]

WCF 19 begins, "God gave Adam a law ["this law, commonly called moral," 19:3], as a covenant of works."

Ergo, it is the added CoW that is under consideration (and not the created-upright moral intuition of man, Ecc.7:29; cf, WCF 4.2, where states, "Besides this law written in their hearts, they received a command"), that is tied to the promises and threats stated.

Not sure whether the hypothetical is worth pondering.... Both parts seem required. Man "could never have any fruition of him as their blessedness and reward, but by some voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant," WCF 7.1.

 

[MW]

Reformed divines use "moral law" in different senses, as Boston observes in his Notes on the Marrow where he clears the Marrow of antinomianism at this point. The first part of the answer of the LC is the moral law in the strict sense. The second part of the answer contains the sanction annexed to the law, which is sometimes called the moral law but in a looser sense. It is likely that the answer contains this fuller definition because the Catechism will go on to speak of the law in its different forms and uses to the regenerate and unregenerate.

Reformed theologians in the main consider the sanction to be non-essential to the law. E.g., Ralph Erskine, Sermons, 1:261: "the greatest of our divines assert, ‘that a law may be without a sanction.’"

Those who lean either antinomian or neonomian will regard the sanction as something essential to the law as a law, that is, they claim it will have no force as a law without a sanction. The antinomian holds the believer is free from the precepts of the law, which he claims must be in order for the believer to be freed from the sanction. On the other side the neonomian binds the believer to the conditional quality of the law which is entailed in the sanctions. The orthodox stand in the middle and distinguish between the law and its sanction or covenant form, as Colquhoun has done.

 

[JTB.SDG]

WCF 19 begins, "God gave Adam a law ["this law, commonly called moral," 19:3], as a covenant of works."

Ergo, it is the added CoW that is under consideration (and not the created-upright moral intuition of man, Ecc.7:29; cf, WCF 4.2, where states, "Besides this law written in their hearts, they received a command"), that is tied to the promises and threats stated.

Not sure whether the hypothetical is worth pondering.... Both parts seem required. Man "could never have any fruition of him as their blessedness and reward, but by some voluntary condescension on God's part, which he hath been pleased to express by way of covenant," WCF 7.1.

Bruce,

So you are affirming, right, that the Moral Law was written on Adam's heart at creation, and then this same Law was later, in Genesis 2:16-17, then given to Adam AS (or "in the form of") the Covenant of Works, right? (as Colquhoun argues). So that the Moral Law in and of itself INHERENTLY contains no threats or promises, but that those threats and promises are only *annexed* to the Moral Law as it was given in the form of the Covenant of Works in Genesis 2:16-17; is that correct?

Usually I'm not a fan of speculation, but I asked the last question because it seems to carry implications based on how we view the Moral Law as it relates to the Covenant of Works. In the sermon I preached this last Sunday, I wanted to say something I thought was true but then had second thoughts about it because I wasn't sure if it was true or not. What I wanted to say was that (from Galatians 5:13-15), the freedom we have in Christ, what can it be compared to? It can be compared to the state of Adam in the garden BEFORE Genesis 2:16; for before Adam was given the Law AS a Covenant of Works, he was indeed under the Moral Law as a RULE of life, even as we are now through faith in Christ, but he was at that time not under the Law as a Covenant of Works. I think Colquhoun implicitly argues for this in his book. IE, before Genesis 2:16-17, God's ordinance for Adam was simply "Obey Me", but with and following Genesis 2:16-17 it became, "Obey Me in order to live." Does that make sense? Do you think the illustration is a true one? Or was Adam's situation before the prohibition different?

 

[JTB.SDG]

Reformed divines use "moral law" in different senses, as Boston observes in his Notes on the Marrow where he clears the Marrow of antinomianism at this point. The first part of the answer of the LC is the moral law in the strict sense. The second part of the answer contains the sanction annexed to the law, which is sometimes called the moral law but in a looser sense. It is likely that the answer contains this fuller definition because the Catechism will go on to speak of the law in its different forms and uses to the regenerate and unregenerate.

Reformed theologians in the main consider the sanction to be non-essential to the law. E.g., Ralph Erskine, Sermons, 1:261: "the greatest of our divines assert, ‘that a law may be without a sanction.’"

Those who lean either antinomian or neonomian will regard the sanction as something essential to the law as a law, that is, they claim it will have no force as a law without a sanction. The antinomian holds the believer is free from the precepts of the law, which he claims must be in order for the believer to be freed from the sanction. On the other side the neonomian binds the believer to the conditional quality of the law which is entailed in the sanctions. The orthodox stand in the middle and distinguish between the law and its sanction or covenant form, as Colquhoun has done.

Rev Winzer,

You are speaking about LC 93, is that right? To clarify, you are saying that the first part of LC 93 is speaking of the Moral Law APART FROM the promises and threats of life and death (IE, as it was indeed written on Adam's heart at creation; cf. Colquhoun's "materially"); while the last part of LC 93 is speaking of the Moral Law AS IT TOOK THE FORM OF the Covenant of Works (IE, Colquhoun's "formally")?

And that most Reformed theologians consider the threats/promises annexed (IE, Genesis 2:16-17) as indeed not something INHERENT to the Moral Law, but rather just that--annexed to the Moral Law, correct?

Love the last paragraph and agree wholly with that understanding; Colquhoun again uses the language of the Law AS A RULE OF LIFE versus the Law AS A COVENANT OF WORKS. Are believers under the Law? You have to ask, "in what sense?" If in the sense of under the Law as a Covenant of Works (IE, Do this and live), then certainly not; but if in the sense of under the Law as a rule of life (IE, Do), then they certainly are. Thanks again, JB

 

[Contra_Mundum]

I would attend to Rev. Winzer's observations before mine, though I think my first comment was consonant with his first. Frankly, I'm just trying to be minimally descriptive; he's putting your author along with others into a historical framework. And I suppose you may be trying to finesse Colquhoun more than appropriate.

Rev. Winzer in another thread repeatedly referenced Ezk.18:4, "The soul that sinneth he shall die." That's axiomatic. And, "Sin is not imputed where there is no law, " Rom.5:13. So I argue, if hypothetically someone broke the moral law even apart from a positive command, surely he died.

But, I don't see what is to be gained by anything more than an analytic division between man as created and man in covenant. By way of illustration, computers have a) operating system, and b) software. It's the latter that turns the tool into something more than a gadget with potential. Technically, an operating system failure is just as fatal as if the software crashes the hard drive.

I'm saying that man in creation formation is made upright (call it operating system); then he is constituted in covenant with God (call it software installation). The former is for or unto the latter, so discussing man's moral agency apart from covenant is (to my mind) like talking about a working computer with an operating system yet no known function (aside from proper and rudimentary working order).

So, I suppose I'm not at ease with the notion that the freedom we have in Christ is properly compared to a consideration of man in a pre-covenant state. I think too much is being made (i.e. going beyond analytic division) of man in a "state" that in historic terms is but a fraction of man's first day of existence. No, I don't think it reasonable to think Paul sees the freedom of redeemed man (in the covenant of grace) as returning him to a kind of edenic tabula rasa.

I think we should just consider the two covenants (Works & Grace) as fundamental to true theology, and work from the distinctions that arise from comparing them.

 

[MW]

The connection between the moral law and its sanctions with the form of a covenant is discussed in the Marrowmen's Answers to the 12 Queries put to them by the Commission of General Assembly, Queries 3-5. These can be found both in Boston's Marrow, in Works 7:470-474, and John Brown (Whitburn), Gospel Truth accurately stated and illustrated, pp. 153-159.

I personally would not draw any contrasts with the pre-covenant condition of man seeing as it is hypothetical what may have transpired without a probation. The reality of probation means that the natural-moral law required special revelation in order to lead man to eschatological rest, and this special revelation took the form of a covenant.

With regard to sin not being imputed where there is no law, it is clear that the law in this instance must at least include the "positive" prohibition because it is the guilt of one act of disobedience which is imputed, and it is imputed to those who did not sin in the same way as Adam, whereas men sin against the moral law every day.

 

[JTB.SDG]

Bruce,

I'm not intending to swim away into strange waters, I hope I'm not; I'm just trying to understand these things because I'll need to teach on them. I was just trying to note the analogy: Believers in Christ are indeed under the Law MATERIALLY (Colquhoun's language; IE, Obey), but not FORMALLY (Obey and live). So was Adam before Genesis 2:16. Believers are under the Law as a RULE of life but not as a COVENANT of Works; so was Adam before Genesis 2:16, it seems, but perhaps in a different way. Really, this question to me was more secondary, and requires a lot of discussion; it was wrong of me to throw this in with the other question.

The main thing I just wanted to be straight about was the distinction between the Moral Law as written in Adam's heart at creation and as it took the form of the Covenant of Works in Genesis 2:16-17.

Am I on track when I say that you are both (Bruce, Matthew) affirming the following:

The Moral Law was written on Adam's heart at creation, and then this same Law was later, in Genesis 2:16-17, then given to Adam AS (or "in the form of") the Covenant of Works? So that the Moral Law in and of itself inherently contains no threats or promises, but that those threats and promises are only *annexed* to the Moral Law as it was given in the form of the Covenant of Works in Genesis 2:16-17? Does that sound about right?

Appreciate the time of you both.

 

[MW]

That sounds right in the main. I would not think "AS" was intended to convey the idea of a repetition of the moral law so much as showing that the positive prohibition was founded on the moral law and became as it were the focal point of it. When man ate the forbidden fruit it is then said that he disobeyed the moral law, and some theologians go into detail to show how disobeying this commandment entailed disobeying each of the ten commandments.

It is a question whether a covenant exists where there is a promise and a condition or requires something else to formalise it. If the latter it would be possible to conceive of a moral law with a sanction that is not a covenant, but the absence of a formal enactment in the case of Adam could call into question whether this was a covenant.

 

[JTB.SDG]

Thank you for the help.