jwright82
Puritan Board Post-Graduate
Yes and no. I would like to think of the statement the way Wittgenstein (I) thought of the Tractatus: it's a ladder to get one somewhere and then to be discarded.
Yeah but one cannot metaphorically abandon metaphysics like that, he still did metaphysics and tried to deny it when he realized he had egg on his face.
All that is needed for internal justification is a) consistency with other propositions (non-contradiction) b) connection with some other premise in the set. External justification is, of course, properly basic.
Well this definantly has the seeds of Van Tillianism in it.
The sensus here is our moral sense---conscience. Because of it, moral judgements are justified whether or not there is a clear theory to support them. There may be some implicit standard, but standards and theories are not necessarily the same. All theories are standards, but not all standards are theories. If there is no higher standard which can be appealed to reasonably, even an internal critique is impossible.
I think I am starting to get you. Yes you are correct to assume that if you have a moral sense and it tells you something is right or wrong than yes that would technically justify the moral statment but a theory of ethics must be determined to decide if the moral sense is functioning properly. Plus how do you square total depravity with this?
I didn't say unquestionable---what the sensus model does is to turn the question from one of a de jure objection of justification into a de facto objection of actuality.
In Christian terms, the sensus Divinitatus (as per Plantinga's Aquinas/Calvin model) makes it so that the only objection to Christian belief could be arguments for why Christian belief is false. The only cogent objection to this model (I believe) would be to argue against theism directly. The only way to prove the model false would be to prove that there is no God.
I get you now, I misunderstood you, I don't know enough about Plantinga's project to rightly criticize it but I would still wonder how he would square up with the reformed conffessions on total depravity, maybe that is one of those corrections you alluded to making if so than I would be curious to hear. K. Scott Oliphant criticizes Plantinga at this point by saying that the fall stopped our sensus from functioning properly.
On the immaterialist non-theist model, we have to answer it by attacking the existence of a non-personal realm of transcendent . . . stuff (such a great metaphysical word, "stuff").
Yes that would be my method as well and yes "stuff" is a great metaphysical word.