I feel like presup is mostly pointless

[Ulster Fry]

Well, I am officially dumb. I have read, re-read all posts and cannot find any context clues for what "JTB" stands for.

Can some Good Samaritan help an intellectually broken and bleeding man here? Thanks in advance.

It's the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). To have knowledge, one must believe that something is true, which is indeed true, and one must be justified in believing that it is true.

 

[jwright82]

Well, I am officially dumb. I have read, re-read all posts and cannot find any context clues for what "JTB" stands for.

Can some Good Samaritan help an intellectually broken and bleeding man here? Thanks in advance.

Justified true belief is a concept that deals with whether or not someone is rational in holding a belief to be true, regardless of anything else. So the belief is taken in isolation to every other belief.
If I ate at a dirty restaurant everyday and got sick every time I could conclude upfront rationally that said type of food makes you sick, but it probably is just the restaurant. So my initial belief has rational warrant (meaning I'm not being irrational without other facts) for me believing it but ultimately is not justified true belief because it in fact is not the case.
My point was despite an appeal to JTB as "certian" knowledge begs of whether the total picture makes given whether or not CT is true or not.

 

[RamistThomist]

Well, I am officially dumb. I have read, re-read all posts and cannot find any context clues for what "JTB" stands for.

Can some Good Samaritan help an intellectually broken and bleeding man here? Thanks in advance.

Remember in math when the teacher told you to "show your work?" Same principle in knowledge.

It can get silly, such as when Bertrand Russell wrote 200 pages of symbolic logic to prove that 2 + 2 = 4.

 

[Taylor]

It can get silly, such as when Bertrand Russell wrote 200 pages of symbolic logic to prove that 2 + 2 = 4.

Well, these days, that appears to be needed. Today, you can’t even say something as obvious as 2+2=4 without some soy-boy or blue-haired basement dweller going, “iM gOnNa NeEd A pEeR rEvIeWeD sOuRcE fOr ThAt.”

 

[RamistThomist]

Well, these days, that appears to be needed. Today, you can’t even say something as obvious as 2+2=4 without some soy-boy or blue-haired basement dweller going, “iM gOnNa NeEd A pEeR rEvIeWeD sOuRcE fOr ThAt.”

Reminds me of Anthony Esolen's definition of "expert." One who has the property of knowing absolutely nothing.

 

[Phil D.]

definition of "expert." One who has the property of knowing absolutely nothing.

or, Expert: X=an unknown quantity + sp(u)rt=a drip under pressure

 

[No Other Name]

If I ate at a dirty restaurant everyday and got sick every time I could conclude upfront rationally that said type of food makes you sick, but it probably is just the restaurant. So my initial belief has rational warrant (meaning I'm not being irrational without other facts) for me believing it but ultimately is not justified true belief because it in fact is not the case.

I think I follow you and I think I agree. This analogy is not helping me though.

It is hard to say that you could conclude upfront rationally that said type of food makes you sick because you have not done any investigation yet.

If you go home and make store-bought shellfish and still get sick, maybe it is shellfish. If you go back to the restaurant and order something different than shellfish and still get sick maybe it's the restaurant.

I just see it as way too early to have any JTB getting sick every time at one restaurant ordering the same dish each time. There are still a lot of questions that can be answered by investigation.

 

[No Other Name]

Reminds me of Anthony Esolen's definition of "expert." One who has the property of knowing absolutely nothing.

Post-meta-post-postmodern.

I bet he makes more a year than I do. Seriously.

 

[jwright82]

I think I follow you and I think I agree. This analogy is not helping me though.

It is hard to say that you could conclude upfront rationally that said type of food makes you sick because you have not done any investigation yet.

If you go home and make store-bought shellfish and still get sick, maybe it is shellfish. If you go back to the restaurant and order something different than shellfish and still get sick maybe it's the restaurant.

I just see it as way too early to have any JTB getting sick every time at one restaurant ordering the same dish each time. There are still a lot of questions that can be answered by investigation.

I think I follow you and I think I agree. This analogy is not helping me though.

It is hard to say that you could conclude upfront rationally that said type of food makes you sick because you have not done any investigation yet.

If you go home and make store-bought shellfish and still get sick, maybe it is shellfish. If you go back to the restaurant and order something different than shellfish and still get sick maybe it's the restaurant.

I just see it as way too early to have any JTB getting sick every time at one restaurant ordering the same dish each time. There are still a lot of questions that can be answered by investigation.

Its not upfront its afterwards, you could judge whether or not I was rational at the time and I was. Thats the point.

 

[jwright82]

I'm still interested in who can answer the question "if there is a difference in our state of affairs as we experience them" if CT is true or false? Any critique of Van Til should be able to answer that.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I'm still interested in who can answer the question "if there is a difference in our state of affairs as we experience them" if CT is true or false? Any critique of Van Til should be able to answer that.

It depends what 'state of affairs' you mean. The reality is that there are many logically possible explanations for our existence and experiences, so it is hard to outright 'prove' that alternative explanations for the universe are wrong. One could argue that what we experience today is a necessary consequence of the physical laws and thus the emergence of life was inevitable. I think this is highly implausible, and would still require a lawgiver, but many don't.

The point is that of course, from a metaphysical perspective, I believe that the universe as we know it requires a Creator, and thus could not exist without being created and there would be no 'state of affairs' in the first place without God. However, from an epistemological perspective, there are alternative logically possible explanations for the universe, which could in theory explain our 'state of affairs' if I'm using that term as you intended it. So it is very difficult to answer definitively whether there would be a difference or not, epistemically speaking.

Take the problem of perception for example. In short, it's possible that we cannot distinguish between our 'real' experiences and hallucinations or illusions (e.g. we could be plugged into the Matrix). As most common sense realists agree, there isn't actually a good argument against this, but that's fine because belief in the objective external world is a properly basic belief and thus need no argument. I think it's a similar story here in answer to your question.

 

[jwright82]

It depends what 'state of affairs' you mean. The reality is that there are many logically possible explanations for our existence and experiences, so it is hard to outright 'prove' that alternative explanations for the universe are wrong. One could argue that what we experience today is a necessary consequence of the physical laws and thus the emergence of life was inevitable. I think this is highly implausible, and would still require a lawgiver, but many don't.

The point is that of course, from a metaphysical perspective, I believe that the universe as we know it requires a Creator, and thus could not exist without being created and there would be no 'state of affairs' in the first place without God. However, from an epistemological perspective, there are alternative logically possible explanations for the universe, which could in theory explain our 'state of affairs' if I'm using that term as you intended it. So it is very difficult to answer definitively whether there would be a difference or not, epistemically speaking.

Take the problem of perception for example. In short, it's possible that we cannot distinguish between our 'real' experiences and hallucinations or illusions (e.g. we could be plugged into the Matrix). As most common sense realists agree, there isn't actually a good argument against this, but that's fine because belief in the objective external world is a properly basic belief and thus need no argument. I think it's a similar story here in answer to your question.

Nice response. Thank you my aim was against Christian criticism against Van Til. But your last point we already have anti-matrix arguments which are similar to what I'm doing. If Van Til is wrong, not on everything, and the transcendental argument is wrong no matter how the Christian critics answers my question their wrong.
If they answer yes to my question their criticism is wrong because that's a transcendental argument proving Van Til is right, at least possibly. If they answer no than they prove Van Til's criticism right (and Dooyeweerd’s criticism as well and Christian Orthodoxy wrong). Either way Van Til is right.

 

[jwright82]

Also if you notice the full statement I gave was "state's of affairs as we experience them" which is reality in both the objective and subjective sense.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Nice response. Thank you my aim was against Christian criticism against Van Til. But your last point we already have anti-matrix arguments which are similar to what I'm doing. If Van Til is wrong, not on everything, and the transcendental argument is wrong no matter how the Christian critics answers my question their wrong.
If they answer yes to my question their criticism is wrong because that's a transcendental argument proving Van Til is right, at least possibly. If they answer no than they prove Van Til's criticism right (and Dooyeweerd’s criticism as well and Christian Orthodoxy wrong). Either way Van Til is right.

You'll have to spell this one out a bit for me if you get the chance. Though I'll try and give a few thoughts.

So as a Christian I am going to say that reality is objective, and that without God there would be no 'states of affairs as we experience them' because God is the Creator and sustainer of all things. But I still believe that I am operating from the same epistemic principles as everybody else, for the most part, though the Christian is endowed the the Holy Spirit which, as the WSC puts it, convinces us of our sin and misery, enlightens our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renews our wills. However, the laws of logic, and perceptual experience, are the same for the believer and the unbeliever (yet of course sin clouds our judgment). The work of the Holy Spirit is distinctive in what is changed in us. Our reason is renewed towards heavenly things. It wouldn't change how I drive a bus or conduct a lab experiment in terms of method, though it would (or ought to) change my attitude in doing such things.

 

[RamistThomist]

Van Til is right, at least possibly. If they answer no than they prove Van Til's criticism right (and Dooyeweerd’s criticism as well and Christian Orthodoxy wrong). Either way Van Til is right.

Not exactly. Your first disjunct was "Van til is possibly right." At most, even if your argument is correct, all you can prove from the disjunctive syllogism is that Van Til was possibly right.

Similar to that, I think Van Til's negative argument against autonomous worldviews might have something to it. But as Frame pointed out, that has no bearing on whether the the TAG is correct.

 

[jwright82]

Not exactly. Your first disjunct was "Van til is possibly right." At most, even if your argument is correct, all you can prove from the disjunctive syllogism is that Van Til was possibly right.

Similar to that, I think Van Til's negative argument against autonomous worldviews might have something to it. But as Frame pointed out, that has no bearing on whether the the TAG is correct.

But you haven't answered the question. How would state's of affairs as we experience them be different if CT were false? Either way you answer the Van Til's right.
If yes to my question than thats a transcendental analysis of reality and you have a hard time maintaining an argument, transcendental argument, can't be developed from that. If no than your in Van Til's critique, either way he's right. That's my point.

 

[jwright82]

You'll have to spell this one out a bit for me if you get the chance. Though I'll try and give a few thoughts.

So as a Christian I am going to say that reality is objective, and that without God there would be no 'states of affairs as we experience them' because God is the Creator and sustainer of all things. But I still believe that I am operating from the same epistemic principles as everybody else, for the most part, though the Christian is endowed the the Holy Spirit which, as the WSC puts it, convinces us of our sin and misery, enlightens our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renews our wills. However, the laws of logic, and perceptual experience, are the same for the believer and the unbeliever (yet of course sin clouds our judgment). The work of the Holy Spirit is distinctive in what is changed in us. Our reason is renewed towards heavenly things. It wouldn't change how I drive a bus or conduct a lab experiment in terms of method, though it would (or ought to) change my attitude in doing such things.

Completely agree, if logic or whatever isn't affected by CT being false. Would logic be the same if CT were false? That's the point, either way Van Til's apologetic is right.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Completely agree, if logic or whatever isn't affected by CT being false. Would logic be the same if CT were false? That's the point, either way Van Til's apologetic is right.

I'm not following your claim that Van Til is right either way. Are you arguing that Van Til is right necessarily?

 

[RamistThomist]

But you haven't answered the question. How would state's of affairs as we experience them be different if CT were false? Either way you answer the Van Til's right.
If yes to my question than thats a transcendental analysis of reality and you have a hard time maintaining an argument, transcendental argument, can't be developed from that. If no than your in Van Til's critique, either way he's right. That's my point.

I’ll be honest. I’m not following

 

[jwright82]

I'm not following your claim that Van Til is right either way. Are you arguing that Van Til is right necessarily?

Yes, in his fundamental apologetics (ie transcendental argument) not everything, he is correct. I noticed that you haven't answered the original question, my point is Van Til's transcendental argument is right necessary.

 

[jwright82]

I’ll be honest. I’m not following

If you answer the original question either yes or no you prove the transcendental argument is correct.

 

[No Other Name]

So many questions here.

The reality is that there are many logically possible explanations for our existence and experiences, so it is hard to outright 'prove' that alternative explanations for the universe are wrong.

This seems wrong to me insomuch as I am unaware of any logical alternative explanation for the universe that is valid, consistent, and evidenced by both modern-day and historical exhibits of evidence. Any alternative hypothesis must be proven reasonable before even being considered let alone "proven wrong". Unless I am missing something?

At most, even if your argument is correct, all you can prove from the disjunctive syllogism is that Van Til was possibly right.

But if at most all Jamey can prove is Van Til was "possibly right" doesn't that disqualify Jamey's argument as a disjunctive syllogism by definition?

How would state's of affairs as we experience them be different if CT were false?

I think for this question to be as gripping as you imagine, it needs to be more coherent. It seems to me no one is answering either "yes" or "no" yet due to a fundamental misunderstanding of your premise. Are "state's [sic] of affairs" referring to observed reality, abstract reality, all of the above? Are you indeed trying to construct a disjunctive syllogism? Are you saying "P1 or Q1" between Van Til (P1) and the classicalists (Q1)? It doesn't seem like it.

Are you saying "P2 or Q2" between CT (P2) and anything "not CT" (Q2) and then claiming that if anyone even engages that construction, then P1 is correct (!) which seems like begging the question (at worst). At best, it needs further explanation or construction. I could be missing something.

 

[Ulster Fry]

So many questions here.



This seems wrong to me insomuch as I am unaware of any logical alternative explanation for the universe that is valid, consistent, and evidenced by both modern-day and historical exhibits of evidence. Any alternative hypothesis must be proven reasonable before even being considered let alone "proven wrong". Unless I am missing something?

Yes, logical possibility is different from metaphysical possibility. I mean, the bar for logical possibility is extremely low. Basically anything that isn't a contradiction is logically possible. For example, it is logically possible that flying pigs exist, though we have very good reason to deny the existence of such entities. You would have to prove that there is a logical contradiction for any non-theistic account of the universe. I assume that's what Jamey is trying to put forward.

What you seem to be arguing against is the likelihood of alternative explanations for the existence of the universe, though there are many naturalistic alternatives, some more plausible than others. None are without their own problems.

 

[No Other Name]

For example, it is logically possible that flying pigs exist, though we have very good reason to deny the existence of such entities.

Only because of the nature of induction. Since this claim can only be engaged inductively, it is trivially true that there is a modicum of possibility due to our limited natures.

You would have to prove that there is a logical contradiction for any non-theistic account of the universe.

Ah but to account for the universe, one must engage in deductive reasoning. When non-theists engage in formal logic about abstract reality, they cannot help but avoid contradiction or tautology or a number of other fallacies. That is usually why they tap-dance around abstract reality and they like staying in realms of astrophysics etc. since

1) most have no expertise in the field itself
and 2) they get to claim anything as "logically possible" within the inherent inductive reasoning of the scientific fields.

So I guess my point here is that not only do alternative hypotheses not require proof that they are wrong, but they must carry a metaphysical qualification that reveals fatal fallacies before they can ever really get going. Some secular hypotheses reject this burden altogether needing absolutely no engagement at all (let alone proof that they are wrong). eg, the "multi-verse".

 

[Ulster Fry]

Only because of the nature of induction. Since this claim can only be engaged inductively, it is trivially true that there is a modicum of possibility due to our limited natures.


Ah but to account for the universe, one must engage in deductive reasoning. When non-theists engage in formal logic about abstract reality, they cannot help but avoid contradiction or tautology or a number of other fallacies. That is usually why they tap-dance around abstract reality and they like staying in realms of astrophysics etc. since

1) most have no expertise in the field itself
and 2) they get to claim anything as "logically possible" within the inherent inductive reasoning of the scientific fields.

So I guess my point here is that not only do alternative hypotheses not require proof that they are wrong, but they must carry a metaphysical qualification that reveals fatal fallacies before they can ever really get going. Some secular hypotheses reject this burden altogether needing absolutely no engagement at all (let alone proof that they are wrong). eg, the "multi-verse".

I honestly do not want to be defending non-theists (I've spent the past year attacking naturalism in a philosophy department with a heavy bias towards naturalism) but I don't think this is correct for the most part. There are many contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of science who do have a background in science for a start. They would reject a lot of the assumptions you make here, especially the deflationists.

For example, what do you mean by 'abstract reality'? They might argue that what you are really talking about is a linguistic tool as used by humans to describe phenomena we experience in an internal framework.

 

[jwright82]

So many questions here.



This seems wrong to me insomuch as I am unaware of any logical alternative explanation for the universe that is valid, consistent, and evidenced by both modern-day and historical exhibits of evidence. Any alternative hypothesis must be proven reasonable before even being considered let alone "proven wrong". Unless I am missing something?


But if at most all Jamey can prove is Van Til was "possibly right" doesn't that disqualify Jamey's argument as a disjunctive syllogism by definition?


I think for this question to be as gripping as you imagine, it needs to be more coherent. It seems to me no one is answering either "yes" or "no" yet due to a fundamental misunderstanding of your premise. Are "state's [sic] of affairs" referring to observed reality, abstract reality, all of the above? Are you indeed trying to construct a disjunctive syllogism? Are you saying "P1 or Q1" between Van Til (P1) and the classicalists (Q1)? It doesn't seem like it.

Are you saying "P2 or Q2" between CT (P2) and anything "not CT" (Q2) and then claiming that if anyone even engages that construction, then P1 is correct (!) which seems like begging the question (at worst). At best, it needs further explanation or construction. I could be missing something.

Ok let me take a different approach because obviously I'm being confusing, which is no one's fault but my own. My point is that Van Til's transcendental argument is true regardless.
Let's answer "no" to my question. Again when I said "state's of affairs" I always followed with "as we experience them". Both have to be taken together. You could say reality if you want.
So "no" nothing would be different if CT were false. That means logic, morality, meaning, science would all be the same. There would be no difference between our world and that world. But that assumes logic, morality, meaning, and science have self existence because they would necessarily be true in and of themselves. An attribute we only ascribe to God. Van Til called that autonomy or self law (basically self existence). Dooyeweerd called that "idolatry" because we're ascribing divine attributes to non divine things.
Let's say "yes" things would be different. Ok how so? Once the the person answers their engaged in transcendental analysis of reality. Which is the first step in a TA. Once they do that they have invalidated their critique of TA's. Basically why can you do it but I can't?
Hence my point. Either way you answer my question you prove Van Til right on this point. Does that make more sense?

 

[Ulster Fry]

Ok let me take a different approach because obviously I'm being confusing, which is no one's fault but my own. My point is that Van Til's transcendental argument is true regardless.
Let's answer "no" to my question. Again when I said "state's of affairs" I always followed with "as we experience them". Both have to be taken together. You could say reality if you want.
So "no" nothing would be different if CT were false. That means logic, morality, meaning, science would all be the same. There would be no difference between our world and that world. But that assumes logic, morality, meaning, and science have self existence because they would necessarily be true in and of themselves. An attribute we only ascribe to God. Van Til called that autonomy or self law (basically self existence). Dooyeweerd called that "idolatry" because we're ascribing divine attributes to non divine things.
Let's say "yes" things would be different. Ok how so? Once the the person answers their engaged in transcendental analysis of reality. Which is the first step in a TA. Once they do that they have invalidated their critique of TA's. Basically why can you do it but I can't?
Hence my point. Either way you answer my question you prove Van Til right on this point. Does that make more sense?

You specified above that you are only using this argument for the Christians, correct? Because there's a lot of hidden assumptions here that the non-theist is going to reject (such as attributing necessity to God, if they reject any concept of God in the first place).

But if Van Til's TAG only works against Christians (if it even does that), what's the point? It's just confirmation bias then.

 

[No Other Name]

I honestly do not want to be defending non-theists (I've spent the past year attacking naturalism in a philosophy department with a heavy bias towards naturalism) but I don't think this is correct for the most part. There are many contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of science who do have a background in science for a start. They would reject a lot of the assumptions you make here, especially the deflationists.

For example, what do you mean by 'abstract reality'? They might argue that what you are really talking about is a linguistic tool as used by humans to describe phenomena we experience in an internal framework.

First, let me say I am praying for you in a hostile environment.

Second, what did I say that was "assumption"? That most secularists avoid metaphysics? That was a generalization, not indicative of possible individuals per se.

Third, that they would argue that whatever I define as "abstract reality" would only be "linguistic tools to describe phenomena we experience in an internal framework" is a given.

But they will either enagage in subtle fallacy throughout their formal reasoning or they will commit contradiction or invalid construction. If you have seen none yet, it may simply be a case of not finding the right question to reveal it.

That is a long way from claiming that their alternative is logically possible (in context of deductive logic) and certainly a very very long way from saying they cannot be proven wrong - well before they have even earned serious consideration.

 

[No Other Name]

Ok let me take a different approach because obviously I'm being confusing, which is no one's fault but my own. My point is that Van Til's transcendental argument is true regardless.
Let's answer "no" to my question. Again when I said "state's of affairs" I always followed with "as we experience them". Both have to be taken together. You could say reality if you want.
So "no" nothing would be different if CT were false. That means logic, morality, meaning, science would all be the same. There would be no difference between our world and that world. But that assumes logic, morality, meaning, and science have self existence because they would necessarily be true in and of themselves. An attribute we only ascribe to God. Van Til called that autonomy or self law (basically self existence). Dooyeweerd called that "idolatry" because we're ascribing divine attributes to non divine things.
Let's say "yes" things would be different. Ok how so? Once the the person answers their engaged in transcendental analysis of reality. Which is the first step in a TA. Once they do that they have invalidated their critique of TA's. Basically why can you do it but I can't?
Hence my point. Either way you answer my question you prove Van Til right on this point. Does that make more sense?

It'a bit clearer but still unclear as to what "critique of TA's" is "invalidated" if they answer "yes".

In the context of this discussion, the classical apologists here were always granting that God is foundational.

As our mutual friend Jacob said very early on:

Even classical guys like myself believe logic depends on God in the order of being.

Their contention always seemed to be on what level it makes more sense to engage in the defense: the ontological or the epistemological.

So if a classical apologist answers "yes" what critique of theirs got invalidated please? Thank you.

 

[jwright82]

You specified above that you are only using this argument for the Christians, correct? Because there's a lot of hidden assumptions here that the non-theist is going to reject (such as attributing necessity to God, if they reject any concept of God in the first place).

But if Van Til's TAG only works against Christians (if it even does that), what's the point? It's just confirmation bias then.

Oh I'm defending Van Til's apologetics to Christians. It works quite well against non Christians. But my point is that any Christian critics of TA either employ it, in self contradiction, or end up in an unorthodox theological place. So to answer the OP is presuppositionalism pointless, no its unavoidable.