I feel like presup is mostly pointless

[Semper Fidelis]

I suppose I'm of the camp that most arguments about philosophical methodology to be mostly fruitless when it comes to conversion.

I've gone back and forth on whether or not I appreciate what Van Til was trying to get at. More recently, Ive found it fruitful to listen to several Reromed Forum discussions on both Vos and Van Til and the "deeper Protestant conception" about God.

I had read Van Til's chapter in The Infallible Word years ago and found it useful to understand what he is really driving at with respect to Natrual Revelation.

I think the longer I've been an Elder and the more I've studied and peached on the NT concelption of salvation as not mreely freeing us from the guilt of sin, but from its dominion, the less I am attracted to philsophical wranglings about evidence or logic as a bridge to understanding God.

I tell my kids all the time that it's not because people are too dumb to understand the logic of the Gospel, but they are under the thrall of sin and death.

It's not that I reject logic or common grace. I work as an Exec in IT and have great respect for those wo employ their minds to accomplish great things. I trust their deliberations on many matters more than I trust the arm chair ideas of many Christians who believe that their status as a Christian gives them insight on things they have never really studied.

Yet, as smart as any are, smarter than many of you, I cannot create the logical or phlosophical bridge to bring them from death to life.

Furthermore, the longer I listen to those who are convinced that people are just not using reason properly or need to understand Christianity in a certain way, the more I see them retreating from the ofensive claims of the Gospel. Ether that or, in the desire to remain completely philsophical, they'll turn the argument for God into an issue of the "most probable" explanation for reality.

I know there are some today who employ a form of what they think is a Neo-Calvinistic approach to the culture to turn Christianity into the "subversive fulfillment" of all the systems that men create to recognize the image of God and intellect of those around them. Even TAG is a bit too much into the "show me how your system works and I'll show you how it falls to pieces". in my opinion, no matter what you do, there is no way to make a bridge to life. You might convince a person he/she has built their house on sand but, apart from the Spirit of God, they are no closer to life. Christ exposed many men and some came to faith by the Spirit but others walked away sad or just angry.

I guess, in the end, I've sort of come to the point where I read Van Til trying to come up with words to point out how far men can get with modern phlosophy or even pointing out (as Vos and others have) where forms of theological mutualism end up denying the Creator/creature distinction.

In the end, I find myself to be a creature who knows his Savior not primarily becausee I know more than my neighbor or members of my family but because Christ died to set me free and sent His Spirit to convert me in the preaching of the Word. Try putting that into a logical syllogism if you like, but I cannot convert those I love by simply telling htem the facts. That said, I cannot also just deny that God exists for the sake of arguing with them in the hopes that they'll understand some bit of logic that I want them to agree with.

 

[jwright82]

It'a bit clearer but still unclear as to what "critique of TA's" is "invalidated" if they answer "yes".

In the context of this discussion, the classical apologists here were always granting that God is foundational.

As our mutual friend Jacob said very early on:



Their contention always seemed to be on what level it makes more sense to engage: the ontological or the epistemological.

So if a classical apologist answers "yes" what critique of theirs got invalidated please? Thank you.

Yeah good point. I don't completely agree with Van Til's critique of classical apologetics. So I was careful not to bring that up because its irrelevant to my point. But all critiques are invalidated in answering yes because they have to use a TA to argue against TA's. Which is a self contradiction. I hope that helps.

 

[Ulster Fry]

First, let me say I am praying for you in a hostile environment.

Second, what did I say that was "assumption"? That most secularists avoid metaphysics? That was a generalization, not the rule per se.

Third, that they would argue that whatever I define as "abstract reality" would only be "linguistic tools to describe phenomena we experience in an internal framework" is a given.

But they will either enagage in fallacy throughout their formal reasoning or they will commit contradiction or invalid construction. If you have seen none yet, it may simply be a case of not finding the right question to reveal it.

That is a long way from claiming that their alternative is logically possible (in context of deductive logic) and certainly a very very long way from saying they cannot be proven wrong - well before they have even earned serious consideration.

Thanks for your prayers, I really appreciate that.

I'm going to have to bow out here sadly, but aside from the example given regarding abstract reality, another would be that we need deductive reasoning when providing an explanation for the origin of the universe (for example, one could argue as Russell did that the universe is a simple brute fact).

Indeed I have found and written on many of the problems given for alternative explanations (for example, I recently wrote about the problems of the instantiation principle as proposed by those who take laws of nature to be necessary in a naturalistic sense), but such rebuttals can be neither exhaustive nor definitive, which is the point that I am making. You would have to give me examples, however, of the logical fallacies committed by, say a Humean such as David Lewis or a Platonist like Roger Penrose.

 

[No Other Name]

Yeah good point. I don't completely agree with Van Til's critique of classical apologetics. So I was careful not to bring that up because its irrelevant to my point. But all critiques are invalidated in answering yes because they have to use a TA to argue against TA's. Which is a self contradiction. I hope that helps.

I get it now. Your point is more regarding the OP who makes it seem as TA itself is pointless, but your point here is not really meant to be engaging the debate over which method is more constructive and efficacious. Thanks

 

[jwright82]

I get it now. Your point is more regarding the OP who makes it seem as TA itself is pointless, but your point here is not really meant to be engaging the debate over which method is more constructive and efficacious. Thanks

Exactly I'm defending the TA against the OP not the exclusivity of Van Til over another method.

 

[No Other Name]

I'm going to have to bow out here sadly

That is a shame, but understandable. Life does still go on outside PB doesn't it? Take care of yourself and may God keep you in His grace everywhere you go and in everything you do.

(for example, one could argue as Russell did that the universe is a simple brute fact)

I suppose they could argue but does that then follow that the argument is

is hard to outright 'prove' that alternative explanations for the universe are wrong

They would still be open to a question of how a changing universe that is subject to laws of cause-and-effect itself needs no cause? At what point in space, at what moment in time did the universe start to be a subject of cause-and-effect vs. its prior state of uncaused? Can they answer that with reason? Russell could not and said that needs investigated (from my memory). So until that time, there is nothing to "prove wrong" since the "hypothesis" is only an idea - not even an hypothesis - and nothing more.

I recently wrote about the problems of the instantiation principle as proposed by those who take laws of nature to be necessary in a naturalistic sense

I would love to read it.

such rebuttals can be neither exhaustive nor definitive, which is the point which I am making.

Such rebuttals need not be any more or less exhaustive or definitive as the claim that is being made.

You would have to give me examples, however, of the logical fallacies committed by, say a Humean such as David Lewis or a Platonist like Roger Penrose.

I read Lewis once and Penrose a couple of times but I am not conversant in their arguments.

The trouble I am having is that you seem to give alternative hypotheses too much credit for even existing, you seem to allow too much for "logical possibility" that is simply inherent within inductive reasoning and always seem to be taking up the burden of proof in your negative stance when you said that it is hard to "outright prove their arguments wrong".

Brother, you don't need to!

Only the God of the Bible can hold logically "all the way down" and even if no one anywhere has yet revealed the fallacy or invalidity within Lewis, Penrose or anyone else, that is due to their sophisticated subtleties and is only a matter of time. Believe in that with the certainty of your faith - the direct evidence of things unseen you hold most dearly.

God bless you

 

[RamistThomist]

David Lewis was a Humean? Granted, I've only read his Counterfactuals, and I would be lying if I said I knew what he was saying. I actually thought his modal metaphysics was closer to Anselm.

 

[Ulster Fry]

David Lewis was a Humean? Granted, I've only read his Counterfactuals, and I would be lying if I said I knew what he was saying. I actually thought his modal metaphysics was closer to Anselm.

He is indeed, and is (was) the main figure of Humean metaphysics at least when it comes to probabilities and laws of nature.

His doctrine of Humean supervenience (HS) and Best Systems Account (BSA) basically argue that laws of nature are reducible to regularities, the most consistent regularities being those that conform best to the BSA. So laws of nature aren’t really ‘laws’ in that sense.

Do you have Swinburne’s The Existence of God? He gives a good overview of the different positions (basically Humean, Platonic, and Aristotelian) and the strengths/weaknesses of each.

 

[RamistThomist]

He is indeed, and is (was) the main figure of Humean metaphysics at least when it comes to probabilities and laws of nature.

His doctrine of Humean supervenience (HS) and Best Systems Account (BSA) basically argue that laws of nature are reducible to regularities, the most consistent regularities being those that conform best to the BSA. So laws of nature aren’t really ‘laws’ in that sense.

Do you have Swinburne’s The Existence of God? He gives a good overview of the different positions (basically Humean, Platonic, and Aristotelian) and the strengths/weaknesses of each.

Is that Swinburne's longer book? I've read Is There a God. I've also read his other big book on God, but I haven't read that one.

 

[Ulster Fry]

Is that Swinburne's longer book? I've read Is There a God. I've also read his other big book on God, but I haven't read that one.

Yes it is, it’s the second of his trilogy on God’s existence. I haven’t read Is There a God? but given it’s meant to be a more popular level book I would be surprised if he had delved into contemporary metaphysics regarding things like the laws of nature. It’s quite technical though Swinburne is excellent at breaking it down and raising the issues. He himself prefers the Aristotelian/Thomist view.

 

[No Other Name]

His doctrine of Humean supervenience (HS) and Best Systems Account (BSA) basically argue that laws of nature are reducible to regularities, the most consistent regularities being those that conform best to the BSA. So laws of nature aren’t really ‘laws’ in that sense.

And why would you find this (or arguments like them) even worthy of trying to "outright prove wrong"?

For example: what would Lewis say is the difference between BSA and systems of coordinates in which laws of nature operate?

Real world application: Maxwell-Boltzmann law of distribution is consistent in determining the velocities of molecules within a gas. But what makes this primarily a "law" is not simply its consistent success but the fact it is invariant under all coordinate transformations and consistently successful in all observations.

According to Lewis for any two "worlds like ours", if the "spatiotemporal distribution of fundamental qualities is the same at each world, the contingent facts are also the same."

So, if the supervening reality of being operates such that the observable laws are consistently regular (in every conceivable "world") then it just so happens to be so? How is this explanatory in any way? How does he reconcile quantum mechanics - never mind contingent non-material entities like truth, beauty, justice (which I am sure he denies as "real" or "contingent")? Does he make any statements as to the varying "constants" of nature that is uncomfortably being discussed quietly behind closed doors?

Are you sure this is logically valid, consistent and wholly mappable on reality with no flaws anywhere that you would cite him as one that demands deeply considered reply? I mean, I am very sure he has an answer to these objections, but - while certainly a position that can be engaged with - is this really a position that needs "outright proven wrong"?

 

[Ulster Fry]

And why would you find this (or arguments like them) even worthy of trying to "outright prove wrong"?

For example: what would Lewis say is the difference between BSA and systems of coordinates in which laws of nature operate?

Real world application: Maxwell-Boltzmann law of distribution is consistent in determining the velocities of molecules within a gas. But what makes this primarily a "law" is not simply its consistent success but the fact it is invariant under all coordinate transformations and consistently successful in all observations.

According to Lewis for any two "worlds like ours", if the "spatiotemporal distribution of fundamental qualities is the same at each world, the contingent facts are also the same."

So, if the supervening reality of being operates such that the observable laws are consistently regular (in every conceivable "world") then it just so happens to be so? How is this explanatory in any way? How does he reconcile quantum mechanics - never mind contingent non-material entities like truth, beauty, justice (which I am sure he denies as "real" or "contingent"? Does he make any statements as to the varying "constants" of nature that is uncomfortably being discussed quietly behind closed doors?

Are you sure this is logically valid, consistent and wholly mappable on reality with no flaws anywhere that you would cite him as one that demands deeply considered reply? I mean, I am very sure he has an answer to these objections, but - while certainly a position that can be engaged with - is this really a position that needs "outright proven wrong"?

You misunderstand me - I neither believe that we can prove such theories wrong nor that we are required to prove them wrong. In my case, I have to deal with these positions because I am graded for it, so that's my excuse. But I don't think we can just dismiss such theories off the bat.

You're largely right about the problems with the Humean account. But the Humean will always refer back to the problem of induction. It's consistently successful in all observations...until it isn't. And that's all we have to work with. You have to understand the epistemological constraints under which they operate. In my opinion it is clear that real scientific or technological advancements cannot take place under such constraints, but there you go.

 

[No Other Name]

I think I understand you better. Again, I am praying for you and can sympathize a little having (nearly) lost my faith in grad school.

Hopefully, you take my comments as encouraging reminders and not "teaching you".

It's consistently successful in all observations...until it isn't.

... until it is again. The problem with induction is not imaginary scenarios in which the exceptions occur but the lack of exceptions which underlie a reality that is designed to limit the possibilities.

And that's all we have to work with

That's all they have to work with. The fact they insist upon constructing a system using only reason and sense perception (yet they invariably ultimately employ the method of reason-based faith eventually themselves) is a constraint of their own making. Ultimately inconsistent and futile.

May God keep you in His grace out in the wilds of academia, my brother.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I think I understand you better. Again, I am praying for you and can sympathize a little having (nearly) lost my faith in grad school.

Hopefully, you take my comments as encouraging reminders and not "teaching you".


... until it is again. The problem with induction is not imaginary scenarios in which the exceptions occur but the lack of exceptions which underlie a reality that is designed to limit the possibilities.



That's all they have to work with. The fact they insist upon constructing a system using only reason and sense perception (yet they invariably ultimately employ the method of reason-based faith eventually themselves) is a constraint of their own making. Ultimately inconsistent and futile.

May God keep you in His grace out in the wilds of academia, my brother.

Thank you, I do really appreciate these interactions, and your understanding of my situation. I will say that I am enjoying my time for the most part, it isn't all bad, but it is challenging and I'm kept on my toes. I knew what I was getting myself into, and I couldn't have done this without a prior degree in theology, which was very much in the classical theist and Reformed tradition.

I also wish I had more time to interact here in detail and give proper responses to your points but unfortunately I just don't have those opportunities right now. My apologies for not adequately addressing your points.

 

[Apologia Christou]

Based on unbelief's presuppositions, they cannot build a coherent structure on top.

But then, why does one need a coherent structure in a world without God?

So then, you would first need to prove that there is a God, so to make the fact of a coherent world or system of any value. But if you do prove God, you are not presupposing him anymore.

 

[Taylor]

But then, why does one need a coherent structure in a world without God?

That’s actually the very point. Unbelievers live and think as though the world were coherent. They think rationally and demand others do so; they behave morally and demand the same from others. So, we ask the question: Why? If there is no God, and we are all just lifeless bags of cosmic star-fizz, why should anyone live or think a particular way? You intend this question as a critique of presuppositionalism, but it’s actually the most devastating critique of unbelief.

 

[Apologia Christou]

So, we ask the question: Why? If there is no God, and we are all just lifeless bags of cosmic star-fizz, why should anyone live or think a particular way?

Well, let me play the Atheist here: Because it's good for us, and for out benefit. It all seems useful, and it works just fine. So why not continue to live like that?

And then, if you charge me with: But you have no reason for it, because after all, if there is no God, there is no objective truth and everything is meaningless - then I answer: So what? In a meaningless world without God, what's wrong with being inconsistent? We are happily inconsistent, because nothing makes objective sense anyway, it just seems like it does.

So all that is is the collision between two presupposing worldviews, one theistic and the other atheistic. And both of them, on their own grounds, are perfectly happy and consistent within their own worldviews.

 

[Taylor]

Well, let me play the Atheist here: Because it's good for us, and for out benefit. It all seems useful, and it works just fine. So why not continue to live like that?

What is “good”? I can’t make sense of atoms randomly bumping into each other being either good or bad.

And then, if you charge me with: But you have no reason for it, because after all, if there is no God, there is no objective truth and everything is meaningless - then I answer: So what? In a meaningless world without God, what's wrong with being inconsistent? We are happily inconsistent, because nothing makes objective sense anyway, it just seems like it does.

So you won’t complain if I kill you, take your money, find your children and cook them for my dinner?

So all that is is the collision between two presupposing worldviews, one theistic and the other atheistic. And both of them, on their own grounds, are perfectly happy and consistent within their own worldviews.

You said in the preceding paragraph that you are happily inconsistent. Is you say atheism is happily consistent. Which is it?

 

[Ulster Fry]

The sophisticated naturalistic philosophers are just going to dismiss any appeal to first principles. They certainly have their assumptions, but it will be something like 'science or something approximating science is our best and most successful (if not only) route to knowledge'. They put metaphysical and epistemological constraints on the whole enterprise and dismiss anything that operates outside of such constraints. Consistency is what works within those constraints. Within such a closed system, you can have consistency because you aren't appealing to first principles - it is consistent within an internal framework. To go outside of that framework, i.e. to go outside of what we find useful as humans in our everyday experience is a misunderstanding of how we use language, of what knowledge is, etc.

Again, if I had time I would give a more detailed account of this. Quine would be a particularly important naturalist philosopher who operates in this fashion, if you want to read some of his stuff and see what you think. The later Wittgenstein also.

I must add the disclaimer that I do not endorse any of this, but it isn't as straightforward to refute as one might think. There is certainly truth to the matter that we operate on different assumptions.

 

[Logan]

Who is "@Apologia Christou"?

 

[Apologia Christou]

What is “good”? I can’t make sense of atoms randomly bumping into each other being either good or bad.

Good is any thing that enhances our society, we can debate about that, and we should. And why should you make sense out of that? We decide what's good, and what's not. We evolve as a people. Today we know better than the primitive people of the past.

So you won’t complain if I kill you, take your money, find your children and cook them for my dinner?

Of course I will complain. It is scientifically proven that stealing and cooking children doesn't enhance our society. We should stick to science.

You said in the preceding paragraph that you are happily inconsistent. Is you say atheism is happily consistent. Which is it?

When I roleplayed the Atheist I was being happily inconsistent personally, but in the last sentence I was talking objectively (from our point of view), that the theist and atheist don't have any problems within their own worldviews. The problems would only arise if these two guys would embrace part of the other worldview, which they don't, since they just presuppose their own.

We could argue all day long about that, but as long as I stick to my atheist worldview, I am allowed to argue morally, logically and scientifically, while at the same time denying any absolute truth. I am inconsistent, but I don't really care, since my worldview doesn't allow for any absolute truth, which I presuppose, and continue so to do.

So presuppositionalism is really of no use here. It's the same with other religions (which is why I personally left presuppositionalism). The Muslim who presupposes his Quran, how does a presuppositionalist argue with that? How does he prove him wrong? The Quran is the word of God because the Quran says so. And that's the end of the discussion, since no one argues with God. Let's all just presuppose what is to be proved in the first place, and where would this end?

And then maybe you say: "The impossibility of the contrary". But it is the "impossibility of the contrary" according to your own worldview, and not the Atheists, or the Muslims. Since all they have to do is to presuppose a different worldview, which they do.

Who is "@Apologia Christou"?

A reformed Christian from Germany, holding the Savoy Declaration.

 

[RamistThomist]

What is “good”?

Good is a transcendental of Being.

You said in the preceding paragraph that you are happily inconsistent. Is you say atheism is happily consistent. Which is it?

I don't intend to speak for him, but 99/100 unbelievers simply won't care they are inconsistent. They should care, and they are likely sinful for not caring, but it won't faze them in the slightest.

 

[RamistThomist]

It is scientifically proven that stealing and cooking children doesn't enhance our society.

Okay, the way that sentence read on an apologetics board was funny. I did chuckle.

 

[No Other Name]

In my defense, you keep posting here so it seems fair game.

'science or something approximating science is our best and most successful (if not only) route to knowledge'

How was this principle determined scientifically? It wasn't? The I guess the framework is not so "internal" and "consistent" as they presume for themselves.

They put metaphysical and epistemological constraints on the whole enterprise and dismiss anything that operates outside of such constraints.

Arbitrary constraints of their own construction and they ignore the areas of their framework that is in fact assumptive of metaphysics and try to twist their way out of the inherent dilemma if anyone calls them out on it.

Within such a closed system, you can have consistency because you aren't appealing to first principles - it is consistent within an internal framework.

You are correct in that they ignore first principles. You are incorrect when you conclude their framework is internally consistent. It is not.

To go outside of that framework, i.e. to go outside of what we find useful as humans in our everyday experience is a misunderstanding of how we use language, of what knowledge is, etc

Sure, sure. And before this framework is constructed, Lewis/ Quine/ Russell / Wittgenstein et al will go outside the framework - outside what is "useful in everyday life" FOR us to construct the barriers within which they will ALLOW us to interact and then cry foul - cry non-sequiter - cry misunderstanding when anyone but themselves employ metaphysics or theology to the non-empirical aspects of reality (or even the empirical aspects like cosmology and quantum mechanics!)

Only THEY are allowed to do this though - a priori.

The tyranny of the secular positivist that underlies what seems logical to the unaware.

Am I missing something? How is this so hard to refute? How is this even a position requiring refutation when they themselves limit the worldview to the empirical.

If I even grant this as a position to refute I am granting a certain power to them to set up the framework for me, and I refuse to do this.

I must be missing some compelling piece of their argument. I have to be.

 

[Ulster Fry]

In my defense, you keep posting here so it seems fair game.


How was this principle determined scientifically? It wasn't? The I guess the framework is not so "internal" and "consistent" as they presume for themselves.



Arbitrary constraints of their own construction and they ignore the areas of their framework that is in fact assumptive of metaphysics and try to twist their way out of the inherent dilemma if anyone calls them out on it.


You are correct in that they ignore first principles. You are incorrect when you conclude their framework is internally consistent. It is not.


Sure, sure. And before this framework is constructed, Lewis/ Quine/ Russell / Wittgenstein et al will go outside the framework - outside what is "useful in everyday life" FOR us to construct the barriers within which they will ALLOW us to interact and then cry foul - cry non-sequiter - cry misunderstanding when anyone but themselves employ metaphysics or theology to the non-empirical aspects of reality (or even the empirical aspects like cosmology and quantum mechanics!)

Only THEY are allowed to do this though - a priori.

The tyranny of the secular positivist that underlies what seems logical to the unaware.

Am I missing something? How is this so hard to refute? How is this even a position requiring refutation when they themselves limit the worldview to the empirical.

If I even grant this as a position to refute I am granting a certain power to them to set up the framework for me, and I refuse to do this.

I must be missing some compelling piece of their argument. I have to be.

Feel free to respond to anything I say, I'm just saying I can't respond in as much detail as I would like. I usually have a few minutes for each post.

First, it wasn't determined scientifically, and someone like Quine acknowledges that. He doesn't care. It's about what works and science works. So he assumes/infers that it is the best (or only) system we have. I should note that I criticize this approach also. I'm not defending it, I'm saying that this is how they would respond.

Second, they aren't doing it arbitrarily, they are doing it based on what works, or is the most parsimonious explanation, etc. They have criteria as to why they want to take the most deflationary approach possible, not having as many metaphysical commitments etc. Again, much to criticize here.

Third, you're misunderstanding the point of an internal framework. It is consistent because it operates according to the rules within the system. If you ask an external question of an internal question, then you're committing a category error. For example, asking if numbers truly exist when using numbers in a specific context. It's irrelevant, and the mathematics remains consistent within the confines of the system it is being used for. Read Carnap's 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' for this sort of idea. Quine and the later Wittgenstein also say something similar, though differently.

Lastly, they limit it to the empirical because they say that is the only standard we have to operate from. I also disagree with this.

I must stress again that I disagree with them...I'm just trying to give some counter arguments to the ones made above. They will dismiss them for the same reasons already outlined. They don't need first principles. In fact they reject the very notion of them.

 

[Ulster Fry]

In fact, I'll give what is in my opinion a strong reason to reject the claim of the radical empiricist or naturalist. Some of the greatest breakthroughs in science were not made by people who took Quine's circular naturalized epistemology to be true and operated within the confines of such a system. In the early modern period, figures such as Newton assumed that there was, for example, a law-giver and a stable universe, leading them to make the discoveries which they did. If they took Quine's view, the principles on which they operated to make such discoveries wouldn't have occurred in the first place and no scientific progress would have been made, or would have taken a lot longer. So that's a reason to reject Quine's view.

 

[No Other Name]

It's about what works and science works.

I am glad you also decline this limited definition of "what works".

Second, they aren't doing it arbitrarily, they are doing it based on what works, or is the most parsimonious explanation, etc. They have criteria as to why they want to take the most deflationary approach possible, not having as many metaphysical commitments etc.

They say ... as they commit themselves to a metaphysics of no metaphysics in a zero-sum game that stacks the deck in their naturalistic favor and relegates any metaphysical objections to commit a "category error" based on their a priori boundary-setting.

you're misunderstanding the point of an internal framework.

If you say so. I have not studied the philosophical writings of these alleged titans of academia, but I have engaged the progeny of their intellectual pseudo-philosophy and have witnessed the fallacies of what I am laying out here.

It is consistent because it operates according to the rules within the system

Again I am glad you do not agree, but I am uncertain why you disagree.

You claim it is internally consistent, yet the rules themselves do not operate according to the rules within the system. They cannot eliminate metaphysics physically. And while they do not claim they have done so, they have set up the rules of the system outside of the rules of the system and then decided that all further discussion must now conform to the rules of the system - which is predetermined to be limited to "what works" according to them.

If you ask an external question of an internal question, then you're committing a category error. For example, asking if numbers truly exist when using numbers in a specific context. It's irrelevant, and the mathematics remains consistent within the confines of the system it is being used for.

Well yeah, but that's the con isn't it?

So if you limit the conversation to the number line and sets of numbers then you have "successfully" eliminated the ability to ask where do numbers come from. "Consistency achieved" *high-five*

But they haven't removed the need to understand where numbers come from. No, no, no. That is part of "what does not work" and they have in their infinite wisdom decided for us what "works" and what "does not work".

So consistency only holds if you accept their axiomatic place as transcendent arbiters of "what works or not".

I understand perfectly fine what is going on here. Again, I am glad you reject these arguments as well. But I am mystified why you find these arguments hard to refute.

they limit it to the empirical because they say that is the only standard we have to operate from

I love that you disagree with this as well. Christians would say God's revelation is the only standard we have to operate from. But theistic apologists do not limit the conditions for the discussion a priori - like the positivists do.

If they took Quine's view, the principles on which they operated to make such discoveries wouldn't have occurred in the first place and no scientific progress would have been made, or would have taken a lot longer. So that's a reason to reject Quine's view.

Your conclusion is scary. I am not sure this is a very strong reason to reject positivism. Are you of the opinion that if new discoveries are made (sans theological axioms) then it would be a reason to accept Quine's view?

Thank you in advance for your patience in replying. God bless you

 

[RamistThomist]

If you say so. I have not studied the philosophical writings of these alleged titans of academia, but I have engaged the progeny of their intellectual pseudo-philosophy and have witnessed the fallacies of what I am laying out here.

I have a different observation on so-called "internal consistency." It's not always easy to point out the internal inconsistencies of a worldview. I can have a relatively simple worldview based on the following:

1. 4 Persons in the Quaternity.
2. Epstein committed suicide.
3. Elections are fair.

Those three propositions are internally consistent, yet obviously false. Moreover, most worldviews will never be something like pure realism (Plato) or pure empiricism (Hume).

Internal consistency is important up to a point, but most worldviews either stand or fall long before one gets to that point.

 

[Taylor]

Good is any thing that enhances our society

This statement has not content. It is the equivalent of saying, "Good is anything that is good." Why is enhancement good?

And why should you make sense out of that? We decide what's good, and what's not. We evolve as a people.

No atheist lives as if this is true.

Of course I will complain. It is scientifically proven that stealing and cooking children doesn't enhance our society. We should stick to science.

Where do the concepts of science, proof, and good come from in a universe that is nothing but matter in motion?

Good is a transcendental of Being.

I will ask you the same question: Where does this arise from a universe that is nothing but matter in motion?

 

[Ulster Fry]

I am glad you also decline this limited definition of "what works".


They say ... as they commit themselves to a metaphysics of no metaphysics in a zero-sum game that stacks the deck in their naturalistic favor and relegates any metaphysical objections to commit a "category error" based on their a priori boundary-setting.


If you say so. I have not studied the philosophical writings of these alleged titans of academia, but I have engaged the progeny of their intellectual pseudo-philosophy and have witnessed the fallacies of what I am laying out here.



Again I am glad you do not agree, but I am uncertain why you disagree.

You claim it is internally consistent, yet the rules themselves do not operate according to the rules within the system. They cannot eliminate metaphysics physically. And while they do not claim they have done so, they have set up the rules of the system outside of the rules of the system and then decided that all further discussion must now conform to the rules of the system - which is predetermined to be limited to "what works" according to them.



Well yeah, but that's the con isn't it?

So if you limit the conversation to the number line and sets of numbers then you have "successfully" eliminated the ability to ask where do numbers come from. "Consistency achieved" *high-five*

But they haven't removed the need to understand where numbers come from. No, no, no. That is part of "what does not work" and they have in their infinite wisdom decided for us what "works" and what "does not work".

So consistency only holds if you accept their axiomatic place as transcendent arbiters of "what works or not".

I understand perfectly fine what is going on here. Again, I am glad you reject these arguments as well. But I am mystified why you find these arguments hard to refute.


I love that you disagree with this as well. Christians would say God's revelation is the only standard we have to operate from. But theistic apologists do not limit the conditions for the discussion a priori - like the positivists do.


Your conclusion is scary. I am not sure this is a very strong reason to reject positivism. Are you of the opinion that if new discoveries are made (sans theological axioms) then it would be a reason to accept Quine's view?

Thank you in advance for your patience in replying. God bless you

All I'll say to the first section of your reply that they won't accept many of the conclusions. For example, many metaphysicians are anti-metaphysics in the sense that they take a deflationary view. They see themselves as doing metaphysics, but their metaphysics is reducible to the natural world. All I can say is that if you're interested you should read their work. I'm actually not recommending that you do - I agree that a lot of this stuff isn't remotely useful and possibly more harm than good for the average Christian. There's much better stuff to read out there. But naturalism is the dominant philosophy in the West, so I have to take it seriously and respond appropriately.

As for your last point about my conclusion being scary, I really can't see how it follows that if discoveries are made through non-theological axioms that I would be forced to accept Quine's view. Here's a rough argument for what I mean:

(1) If science is most successful when it is conducted within a closed naturalistic empirical system, then we should not expect science to make significant progress outside of such a framework
(2) But science has made significant progress outside of such a framework (such as scientists making discoveries prompted by their conceptual belief that there is order in the universe)
(3) Therefore, science is not most successful when it is conducted within a closed naturalistic empirical system

(2) is an historic fact and therefore, regardless of how any future discoveries are made, it remains true. It shouldn't be if Quine et al is correct. So I don't think there is anything to fear with my argument.