I feel like presup is mostly pointless

[RamistThomist]

For example, in your Sproul-Gerstner video, Gerstner claims at the outset he would provide irrefutable proof of biblical inspiration. Yet from 14:17-15:45, when Sproul challenges him that he is not providing irrefutable evidence, Gerstner admits the point and shifts the burden of proof to his interlocutor. He seems to be suggesting that "if one believes biblical reports in some instances, he should believe biblical reports that Jesus did miracles." This certainly appears to be inductive reasoning. Is this not an accurate portrayal of what is happening?
Though I hold to Gerstners approach, I noticed that too

 

[Apologia Christou]

That particular argument isn't circular but the overall method is. If your arguing for the truth of CT you assume logical faculties, reliability of senses, uniformity of nature, etc. Those things would not exist without CT being true. Unless the truth or falsity of CT has no bearing on the existence of those things. Metaphysicaly/epistemologically CT must be true in order for you to construct any argument whatsoever hence a form of circularity is inevitable. You can never get around the fact of CT as a prerequisite for argumentation to be possible. So that fact is one you have to admit to to be orthodox regardless.
Now if the only difference here is a matter of method than fine we can discuss that but until you answer yes or no to my original question we cannot move forward.

Excuse me, what is CT? Classical Theism?

I assume certain things, like the basic reliability of sense perception, the law of cause and effect, and the law of non-contradiction. But I am with the Atheist here, he assumes them too, and we go on from there to the argumentation which, as you saw, is not circular.

Now, if you want to say that those things weren't possible in a world without God, I totally agree with you. But this is exactly what we are trying to show to the Atheist. And here we differ, as to how we show it to him. But again: When I from here on go on like the presuppositionalist, I will not be able to show anything to him, because he can then simply assume his atheism, and get away with it. And I don't want that happening. Whereas, when I from here proceed like the classical apologist, he will either have to concede the point, and that the logical conclusion, given our premises, is the existence of God; or he can deny the existence of God still by throwing away one or more of the three premises and thereby throwing himself into the nirvana of unreasonableness, because no one can live for 15 minutes with denying these; or he can deny the existence of God by simply assuming atheism.

Now you may say: So both encounters end the same way. No, they don't. Because in scenario 1 he gets away with it, in scenario 2 he does not. He has an excuse in the first instance, but not in the second. If he stands before God one day, he will not be judged by the first, but by the second apologetic encounter. The presuppositionalist has given him the necessary bushes to hide from God.

For example, in your Sproul-Gerstner video, Gerstner claims at the outset he would provide irrefutable proof of biblical inspiration. Yet from 14:17-15:45, when Sproul challenges him that he is not providing irrefutable evidence, Gerstner admits the point and shifts the burden of proof to his interlocutor. He seems to be suggesting that "if one believes biblical reports in some instances, he should believe biblical reports that Jesus did miracles." This certainly appears to be inductive reasoning. Is this not an accurate portrayal of what is happening?

In the beginning Gerstner means the overall argument of the inspiration of the Bible, this comes to absolute proof. Later, from 14:17 onwards, the discussion is about the historical reliability of the Bible (one part of the overall argument, indeed the first one), in this instance with regards to the miracles. Here Sproul is saying that just because the Bible records miracles, doesn't make it so. But the problem is he doesn't have any evidence to support this claim. All that is is closing both eyes and ears to the historical record of the New Testament, as if that doesn't exist, or doesn't have any weight, and this simply because he has never experienced a miracle himself. And this is directly contrary to the evidence we do have. It's like saying that just because Josephus, Pliny and Tacitus say something, doesn't make it so. Okay, but how do you justify that claim? Anyone can say anything and go away with it, as long as he doesn't have to provide any evidence to support his claim.

 

[Knight]

In the beginning Gerstner means to the overall argument of the inspiration of the Bible, this comes to absolute proof. Later, from 14:17 onwards, the discussion is about the historical reliability of the Bible (one part of the overall argument, indeed the first one), in this instance with regards to the miracles. Here Sproul is saying that just because the Bible records miracles, doesn't make it so. But the problem is he doesn't have any evidence to support this claim. All that is is closing both eyes and ears to the historical record of the New Testament, as if that doesn't exist, or doesn't have any weight, and this simply because he has never experienced a miracle himself. And this is directly contrary to the evidence we do have. It's like saying that just because Josephus, Pliny and Tacitus say something, doesn't make it so. Okay, but how do you justify that claim? Anyone can say anything and go away with it, as long as he doesn't provide any evidence to support his claim.

This doesn't answer my question. By that point in the video, Sproul qua interlocutor had allowed that miracles were possible. That was not in question. The question is how Gerstner proposed to prove that "Jesus performed miracles." At this point, it appears Gerstner shifts the burden of proof and/or uses inductive reasoning. Again, is this not an accurate portrayal of what happened?

 

[Apologia Christou]

This doesn't answer my question. By that point in the video, Sproul qua interlocutor had allowed that miracles were possible. That was not in question. The question is how Gerstner proposed to prove that "Jesus performed miracles." At this point, it appears Gerstner shifts the burden of proof and/or uses inductive reasoning. Again, is this not an accurate portrayal of what happened?

Sure, they are debating the historical account of the New Testament at that point. And since the historical evidence is on Gerstners side, if Sproul wants to have it that these miracles didn't occur (as recorded), he would first of all have to provide something substantial to the discussion. Therefore the burden of proof is on him.

At this point all they do is history.

 

[Knight]

Sure, they are debating the historical account of the New Testament at that point. And since the historical evidence is on Gerstners side, if Sproul wants to have it that these miracles didn't occur (as recorded), he would first of all have to provide something substantial to the discussion. Therefore the burden of proof is on him.

At this point all they do is history.

I'll put it this way: is it possible that Jesus did not perform miracles?

 

[Apologia Christou]

I'll put it this way: is it possible that Jesus did not perform miracles?

I mean sure, it's possible that when I wake up tomorrow I wake up as Godzilla.

But is that probable or reasonable? No.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I'll put it this way: is it possible that Jesus did not perform miracles?

Of course it is possible, just as it is possible that the entirety of my conscious experience is a simulation.

Absolute certainty isn't available to any of us. Except God. Otherwise, what is the point of faith? The good thing is that one can have as close to absolute certainty as is reasonable to expect. For example, maybe I have such a strong sense of God's providential care in my life that it is as real and meaningful to me as basic sense perception. Any naturalist arguments seem almost a joke in comparison.

 

[Knight]

I mean sure, it's possible that when I wake up tomorrow I wake up as Godzilla.

But is that probable or reasonable? No.

If the arguments you have in mind for the inspiration of the Bible are probabilistic, I don't understand why you think such arguments count as "irrefutable proof."

Of course it is possible, just as it is possible that the entirety of my conscious experience is a simulation.

Absolute certainty isn't available to any of us. Except God. Otherwise, what is the point of faith? The good thing is that one can have as close to absolute certainty as is reasonable to expect. For example, maybe I have such a strong sense of God's providential care in my life that it is as real and meaningful to me as basic sense perception. Any naturalist arguments seem almost a joke in comparison.

I am absolutely certain about the truth of Christianity.

 

[Apologia Christou]

If the arguments you have in mind for the inspiration of the Bible are probabilistic, I don't understand why you think such arguments count as "irrefutable proof."

Given the evidence, it is irrefutable. You have every reason in the world to believe the bible to be the word of God.

I am absolutely certain about the truth of Christianity.

So why do you still need to hope, then? Does Romans 8:24 apply to you?

 

[Ulster Fry]

I am absolutely certain about the truth of Christianity.

Not even going to try and take that away from you, and commend you for your faith. Though I think if this was the common experience for the Christian, the creeds would read 'I know with absolute certainty that there is a God the Father Almighty' etc etc.

I would also like to qualify my comments on possibility above that I'm dealing with logical possibility. I explained earlier in the thread the bar for that is almost pointlessly low. And I also did wonder to myself whether one could provide some sort of extremely long argument that was rooted in the modal ontological argument and somehow connected to the Incarnation. Maybe. I mean, the ontological argument certainly appears to establish that it is impossible for God not to exist (which gets going as soon as one accepts the possibility that a necessary being, God, exists) but I'm not sure that's going to be satisfactory for the naturalist or even the presuppostionalist.

 

[Knight]

Given the evidence, it is irrefutable. You have every reason in the world to believe the bible to be the word of God.



So why do you still need to hope, then? Does Romans 8:24 apply to you?

When you admit that it is possible that Jesus did not perform miracles, you have thereby admitted that you cannot "prove" your position. An unbeliever who - as you yourself alluded to in post 167 - is willing to go extremes might, in response to your apologetic, say that they will not believe in anything that has not been proved. What would you say to them?

Hope and certainty are not contradictories. Do you think 2 Peter 1:10 is impossible to obey?

 

[jwright82]

Excuse me, what is CT? Classical Theism?

I assume certain things, like the basic reliability of sense perception, the law of cause and effect, and the law of non-contradiction. But I am with the Atheist here, he assumes them too, and we go on from there to the argumentation which, as you saw, is not circular.

Now, if you want to say that those things weren't possible in a world without God, I totally agree with you. But this is exactly what we are trying to show to the Atheist. And here we differ, as to how we show it to him. But again: When I from here on go on like the presuppositionalist, I will not be able to show anything to him, because he can then simply assume his atheism, and get away with it. And I don't want that happening. Whereas, when I from here proceed like the classical apologist, he will either have to concede the point, and that the logical conclusion, given our premises, is the existence of God; or he can deny the existence of God still by throwing away one or more of the three premises and thereby throwing himself into the nirvana of unreasonableness, because no one can live for 15 minutes with denying these; or he can deny the existence of God by simply assuming atheism.

Now you may say: So both encounters end the same way. No, they don't. Because in scenario 1 he gets away with it, in scenario 2 he does not. He has an excuse in the first instance, but not in the second. If he stands before God one day, he will not be judged by the first, but by the second apologetic encounter. The presuppositionalist has given him the necessary bushes to hide from God.



In the beginning Gerstner means the overall argument of the inspiration of the Bible, this comes to absolute proof. Later, from 14:17 onwards, the discussion is about the historical reliability of the Bible (one part of the overall argument, indeed the first one), in this instance with regards to the miracles. Here Sproul is saying that just because the Bible records miracles, doesn't make it so. But the problem is he doesn't have any evidence to support this claim. All that is is closing both eyes and ears to the historical record of the New Testament, as if that doesn't exist, or doesn't have any weight, and this simply because he has never experienced a miracle himself. And this is directly contrary to the evidence we do have. It's like saying that just because Josephus, Pliny and Tacitus say something, doesn't make it so. Okay, but how do you justify that claim? Anyone can say anything and go away with it, as long as he doesn't have to provide any evidence to support his claim.

Okay so two things only I need to say. By admitting that yes those things would not exist as they are you've just done a transcendental analysis of reality, the first step in a transcendental argument. Yet curiously you arbitrarily deny the ability to move to a transcendental critique of the unbeliever and the transcendental argument for the inescapable truth of Christian theism. This truth is the reason for the very possibility of those things.
Now from there your point two. The only reason for these things seems to be based on your often straw man argument that the TA is simply a conflict and comparison of presuppositions in a vacuum. Hence giving the Atheist just as much right to stand behind "the bushes of his unbelieving worldview". You've been corrected on that so many times by me and others that there's no reason to go into it. State's of affairs are State's of affairs. Since that is the playground of analyzing worldviews and you already conceded that reality would be different if CT were false, it seems odd to continue to criticize Van Til's argument.
I don't know who these presuppositionalists are that you're referring to but you have managed to disprove them. Unfortunately that's not Van Til, myself, Knudsen, Frame, Bahnsen, Oliphant, or Edgar. So again nothing for me to comment on, I don't know maybe specify who they are so we know who your talking about. But claiming the above list affirms that is a straw man argument.

 

[jwright82]

Excuse me, what is CT? Classical Theism?

I assume certain things, like the basic reliability of sense perception, the law of cause and effect, and the law of non-contradiction. But I am with the Atheist here, he assumes them too, and we go on from there to the argumentation which, as you saw, is not circular.

Now, if you want to say that those things weren't possible in a world without God, I totally agree with you. But this is exactly what we are trying to show to the Atheist. And here we differ, as to how we show it to him. But again: When I from here on go on like the presuppositionalist, I will not be able to show anything to him, because he can then simply assume his atheism, and get away with it. And I don't want that happening. Whereas, when I from here proceed like the classical apologist, he will either have to concede the point, and that the logical conclusion, given our premises, is the existence of God; or he can deny the existence of God still by throwing away one or more of the three premises and thereby throwing himself into the nirvana of unreasonableness, because no one can live for 15 minutes with denying these; or he can deny the existence of God by simply assuming atheism.

Now you may say: So both encounters end the same way. No, they don't. Because in scenario 1 he gets away with it, in scenario 2 he does not. He has an excuse in the first instance, but not in the second. If he stands before God one day, he will not be judged by the first, but by the second apologetic encounter. The presuppositionalist has given him the necessary bushes to hide from God.



In the beginning Gerstner means the overall argument of the inspiration of the Bible, this comes to absolute proof. Later, from 14:17 onwards, the discussion is about the historical reliability of the Bible (one part of the overall argument, indeed the first one), in this instance with regards to the miracles. Here Sproul is saying that just because the Bible records miracles, doesn't make it so. But the problem is he doesn't have any evidence to support this claim. All that is is closing both eyes and ears to the historical record of the New Testament, as if that doesn't exist, or doesn't have any weight, and this simply because he has never experienced a miracle himself. And this is directly contrary to the evidence we do have. It's like saying that just because Josephus, Pliny and Tacitus say something, doesn't make it so. Okay, but how do you justify that claim? Anyone can say anything and go away with it, as long as he doesn't have to provide any evidence to support his claim.

CT is Christian Theism. Is that more helpful?

 

[Apologia Christou]

When you admit that it is possible that Jesus did not perform miracles, you have thereby admitted that you cannot "prove" your position. An unbeliever who - as you yourself alluded to in post 167 - is willing to go extremes might, in response to your apologetic, say that they will not believe in anything that has not been proved. What would you say to them?

Given your extreme presuppositions, I did not prove anything, since you require absolute knowledge and certainty. I think the presupposition camp is the only place where this is actually practiced.

What I would say to an unbeliever who comes with that statement? I tell him, that he has to become a presuppositionalist if he wants to believe anything, because that is the only place where there is this supposed absolute certainty, and so the only way to acquire any knowledge. Or, actually, he doesn’t have to become one, he (by his own profession and practice) already is one.

Hope and certainty are not contradictories. Do you think 2 Peter 1:10 is impossible to obey?

I know they are not, and John tells us that we can know, too. But I think you confuse this kind of knowledge with the knowledge and absolute certainty that is of God alone. We believe in Gods word, and there is a kind of certainty in that, also our graces evidence the fact that we are of God, and then there is the immediate witness of the Spirit (I know this is debated) that we belong to God. All of this is a kind of knowledge to the believer that he belongs to God, but I don’t think this is of the same nature as the absolute certainty that is of God and in God alone. Because after all, we know all of this by faith, in one form or another.

But yeah, I will do some further reading in presuppositionalism, since some objections are frequently incoming, and then later maybe coming back again. Thanks for the discussion. God bless.

 

[Knight]

Given your extreme presuppositions, I did not prove anything, since you require absolute knowledge and certainty. I think the presupposition camp is the only place where this is actually practiced.

What I would say to an unbeliever who comes with that statement? I tell him, that he has to become a presuppositionalist if he wants to believe anything, because that is the only place where there is this supposed absolute certainty, and so the only way to acquire any knowledge. Or, actually, he doesn’t have to become one, he (by his own profession and practice) already is one.

I suppose that settles why I think presuppositionalism is the apologetic route to go.

I know they are not, and John tells us that we can know, too. But I think you confuse this kind of knowledge with the knowledge and absolute certainty that is of God alone. We believe in Gods word, and there is a kind of certainty in that, also our graces evidence the fact that we are of God, and then there is the immediate witness of the Spirit (I know this is debated) that we belong to God. All of this is a kind of knowledge to the believer that he belongs to God, but I don’t think this is of the same nature as the absolute certainty that is of God and in God alone. Because after all, we know all of this by faith, in one form or another.

Our certainty is dependent on God, and in this way it of course differs from God's own certainty. I doubt that is what Ulster Fry meant to when he denied absolute certainty in his reply to me. I have never intimated we could have certainty without faith or without depending on God.

 

[RamistThomist]

What I would say to an unbeliever who comes with that statement? I tell him, that he has to become a presuppositionalist if he wants to believe anything, because that is the only place where there is this supposed absolute certainty, and so the only way to acquire any knowledge. Or, actually, he doesn’t have to become one, he (by his own profession and practice) already is one.

Whether this is what true presuppositionalism teaches or not, this is exactly the script that former presups who have become Orthodox or Roman Catholic have used. Almost word-for-word.

 

[jwright82]

Okay. I see what you are saying. I was thinking ahead. The presup's argument usually boils down to the fact that atheists cannot prove the consistency of their worldview. They can say, as John Frame pointed out to Bahnsen, that the atheists's inconsistency does not actually prove God exists. By contrast, because I use the cosmological and other arguments, I can do that.

So your saying an indirect proof is impossible?

 

[jwright82]

Whether this is what true presuppositionalism teaches or not, this is exactly the script that former presups who have become Orthodox or Roman Catholic have used. Almost word-for-word.

What does that have to do with scholarly presuppositionalist? If its whoever those people are and/or obnoxious internet trolls that are in view than shouldn't the critics specify that?
Its seems all to often this is how these discussions go. It starts out hard against presuppositionalism than by the end of it some concessions are made about how its internet trolls their talking about.
Why not start out specifying that its not scholars in view but trolls and they wouldn't go on so long. If that had been made upfront I would have never even participated because I don't defend those people. I wonder how many other defenders would waste their time as well.

 

[Ulster Fry]

I think it's more that the quest for Absolute Certainty leads people into those sorts of rabbit holes. This was a point I was thinking about raising as a response above; does absolute certainty in the truth of Christianity include the right denomination? Sacramentology? Different denominations will assert that the sacraments performed in other denominations are invalid. That's a problem. What about the correct interpretation of Scripture? Evangelicals alone disagree on these things. And if there isn't absolute certainty in those areas...why not?

The reality is that many people do end up asking themselves this question (myself having been one of them), and the next thing they believe that they have found their Absolute Certainty...it's found in the authoritative claims of Rome or Constantinople.

I think appealing to Absolute Certainty is potentially very dangerous. We are fallen creatures; doubts will always arise, and we do not know what tomorrow brings. It could be crushing for someone who has a feeling of absolute certainty one day, and then they lose that feeling of absolute certainty the next (which shows they never had absolute certainty in the first place). This happens. That's why faith is the much surer foundation - I know that I will have periods of doubt, confusion, anger, grief, despair. It is my faith in One who is the same yesterday, today, and forever that brings me comfort, having faith that He will carry me through to the end. That gives me far greater hope than any sort of Absolute Certainty which my puny mind claimed to possess. In fact, I think this is exactly why God hasn't given it to us, so that we do place our hope in Him rather than some sort of supposedly airtight epistemological method.

 

[Apologia Christou]

The only reason for these things seems to be based on your often straw man argument that the TA is simply a conflict and comparison of presuppositions in a vacuum. Hence giving the Atheist just as much right to stand behind "the bushes of his unbelieving worldview".

Excuse me, what exactly is TA?

I guess your argument is, that the atheist is not allowed to simply assume an arbitrary worldview? And the apologist is allowed to do that, because it is in some way coherent and it makes sense in the case of the apologist?

Well, if this is the case, then my question would be: why do you think that you would have to assume a worldview that makes sense out of anything?

 

[Apologia Christou]

What about the correct interpretation of Scripture

Exactly, how do you know with absolute certainty the truth of Christianity, if this is all based on your interpretation?

God can make you know? Well, I guess God can do anything. But how do you know that he actually does make you know? Because he says so in his Word? Okay, but again, this is just your interpretation.

I don't know how you would get out of this.

 

[Apologia Christou]

I think appealing to Absolute Certainty is potentially very dangerous.

I don't know, but it seems to me that as soon as you appeal to absolute certainty you are acting is if you are God and therefore taking a position which is really none of your business. And therefore you are arguing with people as if you are God and requiring proof which in our everyday life is not possible nor reasonable to obtain.

This kind of argumentation seems to leave the bounds of creaturely beings. You are not God, and therefore God certainly doesn't want you to act like that, and to argue like that.

 

[jwright82]

Excuse me, what exactly is TA?

I guess your argument is, that the atheist is not allowed to simply assume an arbitrary worldview? And the apologist is allowed to do that, because it is in some way coherent and it makes sense in the case of the apologist?

Well, if this is the case, then my question would be: why do you think that you would have to assume a worldview that makes sense out of anything?

A TA is a transcendental argument. I've been laying it out for many pages. But you are still operating under the straw man of worldview vs worldview in a vacuum, could you please deal with my insistence on reality and states of affairs as being how we evaluate a worldview. Look I have disproven your point multiple times could please drop it and move on. What then is your point?
Please we can't get past these frivolous disagreements if you insist on a straw man argument I have refuted since the beginning. No perhaps I'm being confusing, very possible, but I need to know whats confusing to clear it up? States of affairs (reality) to judge one's worldview by disproves you argument. Its not worldviews competing in a vacuum. So if there's something I'm being confusing about please tell me.

I absolutely reject, with (Van Til, Knudsen,Edgar, Oliphant, Frame, Bahnsen, Anderson, Bosserman, etc.) these gentlemen your interpretation of the transcendental argument. Could you interact with them and their thought. None of us agrees with your assessment of the transcendental argument so could you adjust your arguments to prove what your saying instead of just asserting it?

 

[Apologia Christou]

could you please deal with my insistence on reality and states of affairs as being how we evaluate a worldview

Okay, but why does the Atheist have to submit to your standards of evaluating worldviews?

 

[Apologia Christou]

And even if he does, why do you think that he interprets "reality" and "state of affairs" in the same way as you? Maybe, or probably, reality for him is just a whole bunch of accidents, without any meaning whatsoever. And so he choses his worldview accordingly, some random and meaningless kind of atheism.

 

[RamistThomist]

What does that have to do with scholarly presuppositionalist? If its whoever those people are and/or obnoxious internet trolls that are in view than shouldn't the critics specify that?
Its seems all to often this is how these discussions go. It starts out hard against presuppositionalism than by the end of it some concessions are made about how its internet trolls their talking about.
Why not start out specifying that its not scholars in view but trolls and they wouldn't go on so long. If that had been made upfront I would have never even participated because I don't defend those people. I wonder how many other defenders would waste their time as well.

There aren't that many scholarly presups after Frame. Anderson, Welty, and maybe a few others. That was one of the problems with the Stein debate. No one after Bahnsen could really carry his mantle at that level. We often attack pop level presups because that is the norm. Frame is on his way out. Anderson and Welty do good work, but there aren't many like them. Classical apologists, representing the historic position of the church, have more to draw from.

 

[RamistThomist]

So your saying an indirect proof is impossible?

I suppose it is possible. I don't think much about it, since I have arguments that I believe are much better.

 

[jwright82]

Okay, but why does the Atheist have to submit to your standards of evaluating worldviews?

What do they not live in reality? Do they live in an aquarium? I apologize if that seems smart alic but I think what your getting at is an atheist who just refuses to have conversations because these mythical people can just sit there and say my worldview is different than yours and I'm happy with it. Why would you try to engage in anymore conversation? Why would classical apologetics work better in that situation and why would presuppositionalism not work? If they don't want they don't have to talk. Again not trying to be smart alic but why are we concerned about weird people hypothetically?

 

[jwright82]

I suppose it is possible. I don't think much about it, since I have arguments that I believe are much better.

Than thats a methodological disagreement over the argument. I say your subjective preferences are valid, use what you like. I never criticize, as far as I'm aware, classical apologetics. In fact I think I've said many times I favor Frame's critique of Van Til here. For the record I would stand shoulder to shoulder with you defending the faith. We need to get past this infighting and make an effort to understand one another.

 

[RamistThomist]

Why would classical apologetics work better in that situation and why would presuppositionalism not work? If they don't want they don't have to talk. Again not trying to be smart alic but why are we concerned about weird people hypothetically?

It seems that classical apologetics can make a constructive argument for God's existence, whereas presuppositionalism continues to show inadequacies in the unbeliever's worldview. Even if an unbeliever concedes defeat on that point, he can (rightly) say, "But you haven't actually proven your God. You've just shown mine is wrong."