If atheism were disproven, but without proving God...

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I said earlier that explaining causality was like explaining the principle of non-contradiction or why an infinite set cannot be made through successive addition. And by causality, I mean specifically that things do not begin or occur by nothing.

You must remeber that simply using logic or an idea like causality never explains why there is such things to begin with. The materialist cannot explain what logic is in an unproblimatic way. So they use logic but they cannot account for why logic exists in the first place. They believe that all logic is electrical impulses in our brain but how can account fo rthe universal use of logic by human beings? What if my impulses are different from yours, that means different logics? These are all problems with contemporary theories of mind from a materalistic point of view.

Atheists generally accept that things do not come into existence uncaused, but they suppose that this can happen at the quantum level. I think your point may be that they accept principles of causality in everyday life, even though they cannot explain why they do.

That is correct to a degree but I would add that they cannot explain why we believe in causality at all, not if causality exists only the why question.

Or it may be that they are the kind of atheist who strongly maintains the principle of causality, but nevertheless holds to an infinite regressive universe or multiverse (same idea if multiverse is causally connected). But then he cannot explain why the principle of causality is such. BUT neither can he explain why contradictions are necessarily false. They just are.

Yeah his or her problem would be explaining why an infinite series of dependent things doesn't require an explinaition. Most scientific atheists simply ignore questions of metaphysics but they can give no reason to do so except a very circuler arguement that if science can't answer it no one can.

Again though you must give an account of why there is logical or scientific laws to begin with. That is interpreting the reality we all experience. So there are no givens, like logic or causality, in this sense that we cannot ask questions about them at all. That does not mean that the unbeleiver cannot do science or reason only that they cannot explain why such things exsist in a meaningful way to begin with.

BUT then again, if he is a committed rationalist, he would also see that a first cause is necessary, even if he will not admit it.

I am not a rationalist, or anyother western or eastern epistomology, so I can't say. I agree with Van Til's Revealational Epistomology. No revealation from, natural or special, God no knowledge. The unbeleiver will never admit to the christian God, they will use their God given image to atempt to undermine what they know to be true.

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But in that case, our response is to present the Biblical narrative of creation-fall-redemption-consummation.

I don't quite get you here?

Making sense is subjective. The metanarrative of Scripture makes sense to me, but to Bertrand Russell, it did not. Making sense is a function of one's paradigm.

I think you are getting hungup on thinking that there is no connection between worldviews or paradigms and reality. Van Til and all other thinkers who have or will use the TA maintain that there is. We must think and talk about the same reality we experience so a given worldview either will or will not be able to explain the reality that they are trying to. This is not a worldview verses worldview argument it is a worldview verses reality argument.

But it's only interesting to a select group of people.

So, how does that get them off the logical hook here? Why are they immune from such questions?

But it's a tool that only works correctly from correct premises. Without a correct starting premise, the syllogism is flawed.

I agree but that has nothing to do with the unbeleiver being able to say why logic exists as we experience it?

To which the multiverse theorist will inevitably reply that the question is unanswerable---remember also that multiverse theorists are largely scientistic in their paradigm and as such, there is no room for God, at least not the God of Christian theism.

So how can a scientist scientifically prove that any question that science can't answer cannot be answered, that is circuler reasoning?

All this is to say, without a word from the outside, no atheist is going to buy your argument, even if you deconstruct his. He still has warrant for using reason, even if he can't explain it metaphysically---most atheists haven't studied metaphysics extensively anyway.

If by word from the outside you mean the Holy Spirit regenerating them than fine your are right but if you mean something else than I would point out that my goal is not to convince rebellious covenant breakers of what they know to be true but only to silience the mouth of naysayers and strengthen the faith of the beleiver.
 
To disprove a negative is to prove a positive.

Exactly! I am re-reading Bahnsen's Always Ready, and he begins by gloriously debunking the myth of neutrality. I would heartily recommend this book- it is easily accessible, intellectually engaging, and Chroistocentrically devotional!
 
The materialist cannot explain what logic is in an unproblimatic way.

How is the word "logic" used? (I'm finding Wittgenstein an interesting study)


So they use logic but they cannot account for why logic exists in the first place.

So if I don't know who Alexander Graham Bell was, I have no warrant for using a telephone?


Most scientific atheists simply ignore questions of metaphysics but they can give no reason to do so except a very circuler arguement that if science can't answer it no one can.

And some simply think the questions irrelevant.


Van Til and all other thinkers who have or will use the TA maintain that there is. We must think and talk about the same reality we experience so a given worldview either will or will not be able to explain the reality that they are trying to. This is not a worldview verses worldview argument it is a worldview verses reality argument.

So then what's wrong with classical apologetics? My whole beef with Van Til is that if his macro picture is correct, then classical-vs-presuppositional apologetics is just a question of expediency in a given situation. Yet Van Til acts as if presuppositional apologetics is the only valid way.


So, how does that get them off the logical hook here? Why are they immune from such questions?

Because the questions are irrelevant. Logic can't answer boredom.


I agree but that has nothing to do with the unbeleiver being able to say why logic exists as we experience it

Does logic exist? What sort of entity is it? Is it a function of language?


I would point out that my goal is not to convince rebellious covenant breakers of what they know to be true but only to silience the mouth of naysayers

Good luck. The naysayers will never be silent: hence why the apologetic project continues.
 
To disprove a negative is to prove a positive.

Exactly! I am re-reading Bahnsen's Always Ready, and he begins by gloriously debunking the myth of neutrality. I would heartily recommend this book- it is easily accessible, intellectually engaging, and Chroistocentrically devotional!

I will have to check that book out. I only have his book Van Til reader and his Theonomy book. But you inspired me to put that on books to get list. Thank you!
 
How is the word "logic" used? (I'm finding Wittgenstein an interesting study)

Well you know I am pleased that someone else enjoys studying him. It used in the sense of both our general reasoning skills as well as complex logical laws and principles.


So if I don't know who Alexander Graham Bell was, I have no warrant for using a telephone?

You are talking about something different than a metaphysical explinaition. I have been reading a lot about Plantinga and some critics point out that in his earlier writings he uses the very strong epistemological term justification, which I take to mean truth or a true beleif, to the softer epistemologolical term of warrant. I say strong and soft because the demands of a true beleif are much higher than those of warrant. I can have plenty of warrant to believe something that turns out to be false. But arguing for warrant is like saying so what? O.K. they have warrant for their beleif, what I want to know is they justify or prove that their beleif is true? They believe in morality now prove their beleif.

And some simply think the questions irrelevant.

Agreed but how does that make the question irrelevant? If we agree that there is a world outside of our minds than we are at least implicitly commited to an idea that some of our opinions about things, especially things we don't understand, are irelevant to how things are. You may have had this problem like me, have you ever had to answer to family or friends on why you are majoring in philosophy (I believe that is it, if not than you should)? I have had so many people ask me that who though that it is stupid. My late father got into a debate with me over this and from his perspective he had made lots of money and become a successfull home builder here in Florida. He thought that that gave great perspective on everything.

What said to me was this "Why philosophy? Isn't that like belly buttons and everyone has got one?" Well I responded that that was not the kind of philosophy I was refering to. So he had plenty of warrant for his beleif given his experience of philosophy, or lack there of, but that was completly irelevant to whether or not his opinions about Philosophy were true or justified beleifs. So I guess that is my question for you and for Plantinga, so what (I know that sounds harsh, it just accured to me, please know that I mean no offense and have nothing but respect for you)

So then what's wrong with classical apologetics? My whole beef with Van Til is that if his macro picture is correct, then classical-vs-presuppositional apologetics is just a question of expediency in a given situation. Yet Van Til acts as if presuppositional apologetics is the only valid way.

He would say the only consistantly Reformed way and he would point out the that classical apologetics fails to what it philosophicaly claims it can do.

Because the questions are irrelevant. Logic can't answer boredom.

How are epistemological questions irelevant given the weakness of the whole warrant system of epistemology that I pointed out?

Does logic exist? What sort of entity is it? Is it a function of language?

These sorts of questions are relevant to christian philosophers to be sure but the apologist isn't neccessaraly intrested in them because he or she is interested in logic or reasoning as we experience it. So the problems are somewhat transcendentaly proving something or explaining it, it never answers every question about it.



Good luck. The naysayers will never be silent: hence why the apologetic project continues.

Agreed, VanTillians san sometimes talk like he is the end all of apologetics. He and his more mellow followers probably won't say it. The apologetical task will never be finished because we are finite creatures and cannot know everything so the unbeleiver will be silienced in the sense that they will never be able to answer these questions, but they will always try. Again he felt that he was more faithful to reformed theology and better philosophicaly speaking but I don't think he viewed himself as the end of apologetics. You need to study K. Scott Oliphant and William Edgar at WTS in Philidelphia, much more balanced view than like Bahnsen (but Bahnsen is very good in his own right). You can go to WTS website here to listen to lectures by speakers, you have to sighn up but it is free, Westminster Theological Seminary - Media Center.
 
It used in the sense of both our general reasoning skills as well as complex logical laws and principles.

What do we mean by a logical law? Is this merely a rule that governs how I reason? Or do you mean something more than this?


justification, which I take to mean truth or a true beleif

You're confusing your terms here. Justification is usually taken to be that which separates knowledge from mere true belief. Warrant is simply a softer version of the same thing.

Agreed but how does that make the question irrelevant?

"Because it makes my head hurt and interferes with my lunch."

You may have had this problem like me, have you ever had to answer to family or friends on why you are majoring in philosophy (I believe that is it, if not than you should)?

Yes. Generally I defuse the question with my ready answer involving transferrable analytical and communication skills.

O.K. they have warrant for their beleif, what I want to know is they justify or prove that their beleif is true? They believe in morality now prove their beleif.

Moral sense---conscience, naturally. Again, it's a metaphysical story that one can tell (and Plantinga tells it eloquently) about how warrant functions.

Why does one have to have an argument for every belief? We've gone back to Descartes and the way of doubt, it seems.

So the problems are somewhat transcendentaly proving something or explaining it, it never answers every question about it.

I'm still unconvinced, though, that it is necessary to have a transcendental explanation to have knowledge. All that one needs for a knowledge-claim is warrant.

The apologetical task will never be finished because we are finite creatures and cannot know everything so the unbeleiver will be silienced in the sense that they will never be able to answer these questions

Answering your objections is irrelevant. The apologetic task is to answer his objections and show him Christ.
 
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What do we mean by a logical law? Is this merely a rule that governs how I reason? Or do you mean something more than this?

Following more of Dooyeweerd here I would say that it is the logical aspect of creation, one might argue its supporiority to other aspects or not. That is to say its the study of logic itself that discovers logical laws.

You're confusing your terms here. Justification is usually taken to be that which separates knowledge from mere true belief. Warrant is simply a softer version of the same thing.

Well I always read that knowledge is a justified true beleif but whatever as long as you understand that I am asking harder questions than just warrant, which is a much softer version. I can have all kinds of warrant for many untrue beleifs so it cannot be the same as knowledge.

"Because it makes my head hurt and interferes with my lunch."

I will say that this seems dangerously close to the fallacy of absurdity (simply claiming that a question, opinion, beleif, or whatever is absurd without showing why from a logical point of view). It also is another thought experiement of the difference and defincencies of placing all the emphasis on warrant. They may be warranted to say that but they don't know what their talking about. Plus practically speaking I never get that deep with someone who can't understand it. I always adjust my depth of argumentation for the audiance. What good would it do me to argue about precondistions with someone who knows nothing about TA.

Yes. Generally I defuse the question with my ready answer involving transferrable analytical and communication skills.

Me too, which only proves that a discussion can be adjusted for the level of sophistication of the participants, or onlookers

Moral sense---conscience, naturally. Again, it's a metaphysical story that one can tell (and Plantinga tells it eloquently) about how warrant functions.

Ah moral sense, you asked what was wrong with classical apologetics (CA), or I would feel more comfortable saying in traditonal forms of CA since I don't rule out that a truly reformed CA is possible, and that is one of them. CA (as it has been traditionaly formulated) is committed to autonomy because it must make things like conscience or reason ultimate in their own right. Conscience or reason cannot be questioned because that underminds what CA is trying to do or its method. Even though different people disagree on what is moral or reasonable, the CA is committed to defending the autonomy of the individual because their method falls apart if they don't.

The problem is they cannot be an ultimate referance point for morality or reason, which is why we have been going round and round over these issues. Conscience and reason are derivitave and not ultimate. Theologically the doctrine of total depravity and the Creator/creature distinction guarantee that they cannot be ultimate (only God is ultimate). The philosophical questions and problems that I have been raising only point to this theological truth.

In a sense this is Van Til's point, our theology must determine how we use philosophy to defend the faith. Now I hold it, with Frame, that there can be other methods besides the TA but they cannot change our theology. I am not acussing you of that only citing a potential problem, I prefer renaming Van Til's criticisms of CA with citing them as problems that the classical apologist must be aware of.

Why does one have to have an argument for every belief? We've gone back to Descartes and the way of doubt, it seems.

Not neccessarly, although you have a valid concern. We are discuccing only those beleifs that produce an apologetical situation. Or beleifs of a more philosophical nature. In the apologetical situation Van Til is only saying that the TA, or TC, is the best method for "reminding" the unbeleiver of:
1. The fact that they know they are made in God's image
2. Are living in God's creation
3. They cannot interpret that creation truthfully as anything other than God's creation

I'm still unconvinced, though, that it is necessary to have a transcendental explanation to have knowledge. All that one needs for a knowledge-claim is warrant.

Sure and I would say that the only ground for warrant is the three points I mentioned above. If you believe other than this than you are assuming a neutral realm of facts that are not creational, that is they cannot be interpreted as only created but interpreted truthfully from any point of view. But than the apologest must deny one or more of the three points I mentioned above. At that point in theory your philosophy dictates your theology which is backwards.

Answering your objections is irrelevant. The apologetic task is to answer his objections and show him Christ.

Well I would argue that apologetics is both offensive and defensive. Of course we must answer their objections. If I have lead you to believe that Van Til advocated doing apologetics by never answering objections by saying "you cannot even explain the reason you are using to criticize me so I don't need to answer your objection", than I am sorry. No that is not what he or I meant. I hope that clarifies.
 
Following more of Dooyeweerd here I would say that it is the logical aspect of creation, one might argue its supporiority to other aspects or not. That is to say its the study of logic itself that discovers logical laws.

So logical laws are not a function of propositions and therefore of language, right?


I can have all kinds of warrant for many untrue beleifs so it cannot be the same as knowledge.

You can also be justified in untrue beliefs.

Suppose that I walk into a room where a light fixture has been cleverly made to look like a skylight. So, I look up and say "oh, it must be sunny outside" even though (unbeknownst to me) it is, in fact, raining. Was I justified in my belief, despite the fact that the belief was untrue? Justification has nothing to do with truth-value. That's why knowledge is never defined as "justified belief."


Conscience and reason are derivitave and not ultimate.

Epistemologically or metaphysically? Order of being or order of knowing?

We are discuccing only those beleifs that produce an apologetical situation.

But in calling their warrant into question, we end up calling every belief into question. The content of these beliefs is what is at issue.

Sure and I would say that the only ground for warrant is the three points I mentioned above.

What exactly do you mean by "ground for warrant"? The ground for arguing a lack of warrant (the de jure argument) is that one or more faculties are not functioning properly.
 
So logical laws are not a function of propositions and therefore of language, right?

It is ironic that you bring up Wittgenstein because I actually read the later Wittgenstein through the lens of Dooyeweerd, and I read Dooyeweerd through the lens of the later Wittgenstein. So I would side with Wittgenstein here and say "sure it is a function of language" but we think in a language. That is the reason why the question of what is the relationship between language and reality for the later Wittgenstein is a moot one. I agree with Hilary Putnam at this point who said something like "what we call reality and language are so closely united that there is no point in seperating them."

Which I interpret as saying that we all must think (in a language) and talk about the same stuff. So logic in its specialized language game is about propositions, hence metaphysically Dooyeweerd's logical aspect of creation. But for Dooyeweerd we go through through the day experiencing, and with Wittgenstein talking about (overlapping language games), all the aspects of creation rolled into one like different threads on a rope, I believe Wittgenstein uses the same metaphor for all the language games.

You can also be justified in untrue beliefs.

Suppose that I walk into a room where a light fixture has been cleverly made to look like a skylight. So, I look up and say "oh, it must be sunny outside" even though (unbeknownst to me) it is, in fact, raining. Was I justified in my belief, despite the fact that the belief was untrue? Justification has nothing to do with truth-value. That's why knowledge is never defined as "justified belief."

Point taken and maybe my use of the word has been cause for confusion, would you prefer I use true and false, or knowledge verse no knowledge? And I know my grammer and spelling are horrible, I need to get back into college.

Epistemologically or metaphysically? Order of being or order of knowing?

This for Van Til, and me, is more an issue of authority and autonomy. That is to say is our conscience an ultimate authority, not does it give us moral knowledge, in all matters of ethics? If it is than that is autonomy, this is why the unbeleiver needs a "good reason" to except any evil, or what they find as evil, in the world being allowed by God, as if God owed them a moral explination because "it doesn't makes sense to them". Also for Van Til he would argue that epistemology and metaphysics can be distinct in theory only. Actually they are one in the grand scheme of things, this is why he would argue that what is true in one affects what is true in the other.

But in calling their warrant into question, we end up calling every belief into question. The content of these beliefs is what is at issue.

Can't I call into question the truth-value of these beleifs by attacking their epistemological foundation? Does this call into question their warrant for any beleif, sure but that is the consequence of having a bad foundation to start with. I would say that they still have warrant by virtue of being created in the image of God, even though they deny this in theory. You see the issue is not why they have warrant and true beleifs but how they can have waraant and true beleifs without?

Proper function theories explain only so far back but they do not answer questions of authority and they don't take into considerstion, properly that is, total depravity (which is a theological fact). K. Scott Oliphant studyed under Plantinga and has a lot of respect for him. In an essay he wrote he said in a footnote that Plantinga's model might work with some modifications, these being theological modifications and the insuing philosophical implications.

Sighn up for the WTS philidelphia media center, only if you want to of course, and go here to Dr. Oliphant's talks and find the one near the bottom entitled Plantinga and the Problem of Beleiving in God, Westminster Theological Seminary - Media Center. You can hear what his criticisms are of him. I heard him say affectionatly that "if Plantinga would have gotten a theology degree first (or something like this) he would have revolutionized the philosophical world". By that he tounge and cheek meant that we must move from good theology to then good philosophy and Plantinga is amazing in philosophy just not in theology.

What exactly do you mean by "ground for warrant"? The ground for arguing a lack of warrant (the de jure argument) is that one or more faculties are not functioning properly.

Exactly what I said above, it is only by virtue of the fact that we live in God's creation and are made in his image that any of us can have warrant or truth. Proper functioning theories don't give the ultimate reason why we can have warrant, so I mean that it is these two truths (plus common grace, I forgot that one) that we, beleiver and unbeleiver, can have any warrant at all. Your theories are nice explinations in the short term so to speak but in the long term they don't answer all the questions, if that makes sense?
 
Point taken and maybe my use of the word has been cause for confusion, would you prefer I use true and false, or knowledge verse no knowledge? And I know my grammer and spelling are horrible, I need to get back into college.

Your use of the word has been simply wrong. The difference between warrant and justification is this: justification presumes that the burden of proof is on the knower, while warrant presumes that it is on the skeptic.

This for Van Til, and me, is more an issue of authority and autonomy. That is to say is our conscience an ultimate authority, not does it give us moral knowledge, in all matters of ethics?

This whole question, though, assumes that there is a shared view of authority.

Can't I call into question the truth-value of these beleifs by attacking their epistemological foundation?

I'd say that resorting to the tactics of Freudians, Marxists, and Nietzchians is rather low. To attack warrant is not to attack truth-value, but simply to attack whether their beliefs are in the realm of legitimate discourse.

Proper function theories explain only so far back but they do not answer questions of authority

James, my point is that these questions beg the question in favor of Christian theism. A savvy atheist is going to see right through it.
 
Your use of the word has been simply wrong. The difference between warrant and justification is this: justification presumes that the burden of proof is on the knower, while warrant presumes that it is on the skeptic.

But you never answered my question. What word would you prefer I use to convey what I'm saying? Their beleifs are false, does that work? I used those words the way that Bahnsen and Van Til did, if they don't use those words the same way that Plantinga does than O.K., but I have have read other philosophers use those words in the same way.

This whole question, though, assumes that there is a shared view of authority.

Actually it assumes two different views of authority the beleiver and the unbeleiver.

I'd say that resorting to the tactics of Freudians, Marxists, and Nietzchians is rather low.

How I am I resorting to their tactics? Though I do like all of these thinkers at times, Nietzche the most.

To attack warrant is not to attack truth-value, but simply to attack whether their beliefs are in the realm of legitimate discourse.

I agree, but lets be concerned with truth-value than. You cannot argue that an unbeleiver has true beleifs about reality in an ultimate sense?

James, my point is that these questions beg the question in favor of Christian theism. A savvy atheist is going to see right through it.

In a way your right, how could creation not beg the question in favor of Christian theism, since we know in advance the impossibility of the contrary? That is really in a way what Van Til's major goal was, to force us to aknowlaedge upfront (in our apologetics and philosophy) what we know to be true in theology, we cannot set it aside and act like creation is something other than creation. I know it may seem unfair to pit you with these questions which put in a place where you are seemingly put between a rock and a hard place theologically but that is Van Til's point, if you try to ride the razor's edge you will fall (philosophically and theologically speaking) on one side or the other.
 
What word would you prefer I use to convey what I'm saying?

Justification is traditionally understood as that which separates mere true belief from knowledge---this is the consistent historical usage, going back to Plato. Warrant is a version of the same quality that places the burden of proof on the skeptic rather than the knower.

Frankly, the only term I can think of that conveys what I understand you to mean is "sound argument" (a valid argument in which all premises are true), however this would disqualify nearly all beliefs.

Actually it assumes two different views of authority the beleiver and the unbeleiver.

Explain, please.

How I am I resorting to their tactics?

You are attempting to disqualify a certain set of beliefs from the realm of the discourse by assuming from the outset that they don't belong there. It's similar to the way that Freud dismisses Christian belief by claiming that it is misplaced sexual lust; Marx does the same thing, except for him it's misplaced social discontent; for Nietzche, Christianity is an attempt by the weak to tie the hands of the strong---i.e. it's about power. To a savvy atheist, that's what the de jure question will sound like: just another form of the same fallacious argument---assume that the opponent's position is wrong and come up with a story about a malfunctioning cognitive faculty or attempt to gain power.

In a way your right, how could creation not beg the question in favor of Christian theism, since we know in advance the impossibility of the contrary?

I'm not talking about creation: I'm talking about the question that you ask about creation. The question assumes that there must be some authority. The atheist sees it as you trying to grab power.
 
Justification is traditionally understood as that which separates mere true belief from knowledge---this is the consistent historical usage, going back to Plato.

That is how I have always used it. My point is I know that they already have no justification for their beleifs. The TA and TC point out that they have no warrant or justification unless Christian theism is true.

Explain, please.

Certianly, the unbeleiver assumes they are the ultimate authority in all matters. Their conscience and reason are ultimate in every sense and they believe that appealing to those are sufficient enough answer every objection to that authority. The beleiver assumes that their conscience and reason are derivitave in the sense that they derive their authority from God. Murder is wrong not because reason or our conscience says so but because God says so. It can be no other way.

You are attempting to disqualify a certain set of beliefs from the realm of the discourse by assuming from the outset that they don't belong there. It's similar to the way that Freud dismisses Christian belief by claiming that it is misplaced sexual lust; Marx does the same thing, except for him it's misplaced social discontent; for Nietzche, Christianity is an attempt by the weak to tie the hands of the strong---i.e. it's about power. To a savvy atheist, that's what the de jure question will sound like: just another form of the same fallacious argument---assume that the opponent's position is wrong and come up with a story about a malfunctioning cognitive faculty or attempt to gain power.

No what I'm saying is that the unbeleiving worldview cannot be true no matter what. They can offer their ideas in the realm of discourse all they want, but it is of no value they are wrong. That is a theological truth that we know is true. The TA and TC is only a working out of how one argues philosophically from these theological truths.

I'm not talking about creation: I'm talking about the question that you ask about creation. The question assumes that there must be some authority.

But you are talking creation, anytime you talk about what is you are talking about creation. That is the point.

The atheist sees it as you trying to grab power.

They can argue that all they want to, I am much more versed in postmodern philosophy than analytic philosophy so I can handle it. To argue for a "grab of power" is almost impossible to argue, and in my 3-4 years of defending the faith from a presupositional point of view I have never met an atheist who could survive the presupositional challange.
 
Murder is wrong not because reason or our conscience says so but because God says so.

So God could make murder not wrong? Or might it be better to say that murder is an offense to God's nature?

My point is I know that they already have no justification for their beleifs. The TA and TC point out that they have no warrant or justification unless Christian theism is true.

How would the falsity of Christian theism disprove proper function?

Certianly, the unbeleiver assumes they are the ultimate authority in all matters.

In which case any appeal to God's authority is moot. Further, given this assumption, no TA on your part is possible. On this assumption, a TC must make sense to them subjectively for it to work.

They can argue that all they want to

That's the trouble, James: you don't have to argue it. It's an assertion.

in my 3-4 years of defending the faith from a presupositional point of view I have never met an atheist who could survive the presupositional challange.

Most likely because they were unfamiliar with the method. Most atheists I have met are analytic/scientistic and wouldn't understand the TC if it were presented. The most likely claim would be that there is a fallacy involved.
 
You must remeber that simply using logic or an idea like causality never explains why there is such things to begin with... Again though you must give an account of why there is logical or scientific laws to begin with.

Hi James, you and Philip have had a lot to say since I last checked in. I want to focus on this one point you responded with.

Explaining why contradictions are false is quite different from explaining something that could have been different in another world like the color of the sky. Contradictions are necessarily false in this world and in any that is to come. How the law of non-contradiction relates to the character of God is something which I do not feel I can explain. It seems somehow like one of those paradoxes that asks if God is all powerful then he could create a stone he couldn't lift. Anyways, even if I cannot explain the exact relationship between logic and the logos, it is plainly true that a contradiction is false, things don't happen without a cause, and an infinite set is not made through sucessive addition. Now if the atheist must deny one or all three of these in order to remain an atheist, then so be it, "for the fool has said in his heart there is no God."

Going back to the first post in the thread, neither am I a rationalist, but neither do I fail to see how pure reason shows that atheism is absolutely false.
 
So God could make murder not wrong? Or might it be better to say that murder is an offense to God's nature?

The question is could God do anything he wants to do as the Creator? Now he has covenantly bound himself to act in certian ways but we must careful when we start talking about God being "bound" by logic or an appeal to his abstarct nature, that is more than likely idoltry. This implies that he must neccessaraly act in certian ways. Are you correct in appealing to his nature, yes. But what we know of his nature is analogically revealed to us in anthropomorphic language, we don't actually know him as he really is.

How would the falsity of Christian theism disprove proper function?

Can creation, which includes modules to properly function, be anything other than creation? Van Til wanted to drive this point home that we must start with our theology, work out the philosophical implications of it, and than develop an apologetic from that. I recently came to this conclusion after looking at his presentation of material in both his Christian Apologetics and The Defense of the Faith. He lays out his chapters in basicaly this form.

Proper function wouldn't exist unless chritian theism is true, which we know it is. Showing this logically is a different matter, one that I will devote myself to developing in our subsequent posts, but not impossible. This is why Van Til chose the TA as his preferred method of argument because he knew, as we all should know, that the unbeleiver cannot possibly make sense out of creation without contradicting their own presupossitions and borrowing ideas, or capital, from the christian faith unconciesly or not not.

In which case any appeal to God's authority is moot. Further, given this assumption, no TA on your part is possible. On this assumption, a TC must make sense to them subjectively for it to work.

Not exactly. When you put reason in perspective as not autonomous than appealing to God's authority in certian instances, like the problem of evil, makes sense even if they don't want to admit it. Is Kant right and the human mind is the source of all order in the universe, which in effect makes us gods? Or is Van Til right in pointing out that human reason is not that great and is more a tool for us to use in making sense of creation? Now this could be a false dichotomy but remeber that there is no definant contradiction in what you and Plantiga are trying to do and what Van Til and I are trying to do. I see no no real reason why I cannot agree with you and Van Til at the same time because you and he are talking about 2 different levels of epistemology.

That's the trouble, James: you don't have to argue it. It's an assertion.

That is fine, don't confuse a practical application of the method with a fault in the method. And arguing by assertion is wrong for both the beleiver and the unbeleiver.

Most likely because they were unfamiliar with the method. Most atheists I have met are analytic/scientistic and wouldn't understand the TC if it were presented. The most likely claim would be that there is a fallacy involved.

I would refer them to work done by analytical philosophers like Strawson and Van Fraassen in this area. Just because most analytical philosophers are unfamilar with this type of argument has no bearing on its worth or validity. Even Frame in an article, that I will post when I can find it again, admits that he was wrong in assuming that the TA was no different than any other direct argument but he felt that direct arguments could produce the same same results.

And which fallacy would I be guilty of? If they pointed it out to me than I would adress it. Being a VanTillian doesn't get you off the hook to answering objections to the christian faith or presenting positive arguments in favor of its truth.

---------- Post added at 10:57 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:49 AM ----------

Hi James, you and Philip have had a lot to say since I last checked in. I want to focus on this one point you responded with.

Explaining why contradictions are false is quite different from explaining something that could have been different in another world like the color of the sky. Contradictions are necessarily false in this world and in any that is to come. How the law of non-contradiction relates to the character of God is something which I do not feel I can explain. It seems somehow like one of those paradoxes that asks if God is all powerful then he could create a stone he couldn't lift. Anyways, even if I cannot explain the exact relationship between logic and the logos, it is plainly true that a contradiction is false, things don't happen without a cause, and an infinite set is not made through sucessive addition. Now if the atheist must deny one or all three of these in order to remain an atheist, then so be it, "for the fool has said in his heart there is no God."

Going back to the first post in the thread, neither am I a rationalist, but neither do I fail to see how pure reason shows that atheism is absolutely false.

I agree with what you say here but remeber that I am defending the TA that Van Til used here. What a TA does not do is remove the warrant for an unbeleiver to use say science or morality in their everyday life. It only shows that they cannot ultimatly explain why these things are here. The problem with causality is not not is there no such a thing as causality but why is there such a thing? Is Hume right and it is a mere convention we have, or assumption that is unproven? Or is there some reason, outside of creation (the creator), why we can rationaly explain why causality is here?

The problem with the cosmological argument is not that it corecctly assumes that God is the first cause of the universe but that it assumes causality to be true upfront. Hume is all that is required to dismantle that assumption. Unbeleiving philosophies will never be able to explain why there is such a thing as causality, or anything else, because they base their arguments on a different foundation than christian theism, which we know to be true prior to any arguments.
 
But what we know of his nature is analogically revealed to us in anthropomorphic language, we don't actually know him as he really is.

But we know Him as He is revealed. We must be careful that we don't treat analogical language as if it were equivocal (and let us not forget the Divine origin of language itself). We know in a creaturely way, yet we do know. God's decrees are not arbitrary (Islam): they flow from the Divine reason, which is part of the Divine nature.

Can creation, which includes modules to properly function, be anything other than creation?

Again, the possibility of this question presupposes Christian theism. Joe Atheist reverses the question---the fact that his theory has less explanatory power is not an argument against it.

I see no no real reason why I cannot agree with you and Van Til at the same time because you and he are talking about 2 different levels of epistemology.

I think my point is that the TA and TCs are only capable of making sense to a Christian.

When you put reason in perspective as not autonomous than appealing to God's authority in certian instances, like the problem of evil, makes sense even if they don't want to admit it.

But they never will, which is my point. When your first premise is the autonomy of your own reason, anything that contradicts it will be rejected out of hand---it's not in the realm of rational discourse.

And which fallacy would I be guilty of?

I know many philosophers who would most likely accuse you of equivocation on multiple points.
 
But we know Him as He is revealed. We must be careful that we don't treat analogical language as if it were equivocal (and let us not forget the Divine origin of language itself). We know in a creaturely way, yet we do know. God's decrees are not arbitrary (Islam): they flow from the Divine reason, which is part of the Divine nature.

Yes but that revealation is always anthropomorphic.

Again, the possibility of this question presupposes Christian theism. Joe Atheist reverses the question---the fact that his theory has less explanatory power is not an argument against it.

Can the atheist ever correctly interpret creation as anything other than creation? If not than we christian have the upper hand logicaly.

I think my point is that the TA and TCs are only capable of making sense to a Christian.

No the theological truths lead to using philosophy in a way that leads to the TA or TC and that is a correct and valid logical form.

But they never will, which is my point. When your first premise is the autonomy of your own reason, anything that contradicts it will be rejected out of hand---it's not in the realm of rational discourse.

Can autonomous reason do what it is trying to do? If it can't than they have a challange to their own objections.

I know many philosophers who would most likely accuse you of equivocation on multiple points.

Well I do not see where I changed the meaning of a term halfway through an argument. I do not keep up with the whole debate on foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, which I should repent of and are doing thanks to you, and yall's use of certian terms but that doesn't make me guilty of the fallacy of equivocation.
 
Yes but that revealation is always anthropomorphic.

Yet at the same time accurate---one must never mistake it for equivocation (which seems to be the direction you're going).

Can the atheist ever correctly interpret creation as anything other than creation?

Explain exactly what you mean by this. Certainly he will never understand the ultimate telos of creation. But then again, he thinks the question senseless.

No the theological truths lead to using philosophy in a way that leads to the TA or TC and that is a correct and valid logical form.

Thank you for making my point.

Can autonomous reason do what it is trying to do?

Unfortunately, yes. It attempts to suppress the truth in unrighteousness and does so quite successfully.

Well I do not see where I changed the meaning of a term halfway through an argument.

They do it with the (deductively valid) ontological argument---they will do it even further with a transcendental argument.
 
Yet at the same time accurate---one must never mistake it for equivocation (which seems to be the direction you're going).

Analogical knowledge does not equal equivocal knowledge. There is no absolute choice between univocal or equivical knowlegde, the later Wittgenstein would agree.

Explain exactly what you mean by this. Certainly he will never understand the ultimate telos of creation. But then again, he thinks the question senseless.

What I mean is this, can a human make sense out of creation without ever appealing to creation as creation? That is to say is the world so nuetral that it can accommodate a multitude of interpretaions? Does his thinkng that the question is senseless make it senseless?

Thank you for making my point.

What point is that?

Unfortunately, yes. It attempts to suppress the truth in unrighteousness and does so quite successfully.

How can it? It is subject to what Van Til called the rational/irrational distinction in aoutonomous thought. It cannot "successfully" do anything at all.

They do it with the (deductively valid) ontological argument---they will do it even further with a transcendental argument.

I must say that I do not see that.
 
Analogical knowledge does not equal equivocal knowledge.

Indeed not. However, your exaggeration of it seems to lead in that direction.

can a human make sense out of creation without ever appealing to creation as creation? That is to say is the world so nuetral that it can accommodate a multitude of interpretaions?

What do you mean by "make sense of"? To make sense of something means to interpret it. I thought the whole point of presuppositionalism is that this is precisely what the unbeliever does!

What point is that?

That only through theology does the TA make sense at all.

Does his thinkng that the question is senseless make it senseless?

Objectively, no. Subjectively, yes. I can ask a perfectly sensical question in German (I'm studying the language) and the average American would be unable to understand it. Doesn't make it objectively nonsensical, but subjectively the effect is the same.

How can it?

That's another debate entirely. According to Romans 1, though, it seems that autonomous reason has been catastrophically successful in deluding itself and suppressing the truth.
 
Would this be a bridge between presuppositional and classical apologists?

"The apologist can argue transcendentally that human logic and science have no adequate foundation apart from the Word of the true and living God. [What he cannot do is] make human logic and science his self-authenticating authorities and then use these to prove God. ... To say that logic and science are God-neutral common ground is to deny the existence of the sovereign God of Scripture for whom and through whom and to whom are all things. To say that the impersonal axioms of logic and science are the most basic principles of reality is to deny the Christ who is before all things, and in whom all things consist. ... In its quest for common ground with the skeptic, evidentialism makes concessions that compromise the very essence of Biblical Christianity ... Not only does evidentialism concede too much, it seeks to prove too little. The most evidentialism claims to be able to do is to prove the probable truth of Christianity. But if Christianity is only probably true, then Christianity is also possibly false." (Grover Gunn, "A short explanation and defense of presuppositional apologetics," [Southern Presbyterian Press].)

"It was Rene Descartes in the seventeenth century who most clearly divorced knowledge from revelation and laid the foundations upon which many after him would build. Descartes sought to establish certainty by doubting everything that could be doubted in order to reconstruct knowledge on unquestionable foundations. His method fueled an entire movement in Western culture and philosophy called the Enlightenment. Catholic theologian Hans Kung describes the result: 'With Descartes, European consciousness in a critical development reached an epochal turning point. Basic certainty is no longer centered on God, but on man. In other words, the medieval way of reasoning, from certainty of God to certainty of the self, is replaced by the modern approach, from certainty of the self to certainty of God.' Descartes proved a perhaps inadvertent midwife in producing our cultural moment of skepticism. Following Descartes, what counts for knowledge today no longer seeks its ultimate criterion in God and revelation, but it remains centered on the subject, deconstructing everything else by means of corrosive doubt." (Joe Boot, "Broader cultural and philosophical challenges," in Ravi Zacharias (Ed.) Beyond Opinion: Living the Faith We Defend [Thomas Nelson, 2007], p. 156.)

"I believe that by recovering the value of faith in Christ for knowledge we can face our skeptical, doubt-filled time with confidence and find our way out of the humanistic quagmire. Otherwise, even with the best intentions we will become impotent allies of secularism. I believe that Augustine, Pascal, and others who have a similar direction of thought—placing faith commitment prior to true understanding as the sun by which all other facts are illumined—help to give us the tools needed in our day. As an apologist who has defended the faith in many contexts, I am utterly convinced that we need to return to the transcendent, triune God made manifest in Jesus Christ as our criterion in both apologetic message and method." (Ibid., p. 161.)


That only through theology does the TA make sense at all.

The situation is even more desperate: it is only through theology that anything make sense at all.
 
Objectively, yes. Subjectively, not necessarily.

"Subjectively" is autobiographical information, which is fundamentally irrelevant when produced by an unregenerate mind deluded in sin, from those who suppress the truth they know about God by their wickedness and whose mind is thereby darkened and confused. Such a person might imagine something "makes sense" to their thinking, but that is neither compelling nor intelligible. "Claiming to be wise, they became fools." And I should think we dishonor God if we set aside what makes sense by his word to entertain the contorted imaginings of an unregenerate mind who makes crooked the straight path of the Lord.

Rather we should honor God by setting forth the truth faithfully, speaking what is objectively true into the imago Dei which constitutes every person. "For though we walk in the flesh, we are not waging war according to the flesh. For the weapons of our warfare are not of the flesh but have divine power to destroy strongholds. We destroy arguments and every lofty opinion raised against the knowledge of God, and take every thought captive to obey Christ" (2 Cor 10:3-5). It is by proclaiming the truth that we most faithfully defend the truth, caring more about being faithful to God than about being sensitive to imaginings of the unregenerate.

"Objectively" is fundamentally relevant, for its subject is divine truth; "subjectively" is fundamentally irrelevant, for its subject is sinful flesh.
 
"subjectively" is fundamentally irrelevant, for its subject is sinful flesh.

If this is your opinion, then you will never try to convince anyone. Do you try to speak persuasively? If so, then you speak to subjectivity. When we do apologetics, we must always remember that we are rarely actually speaking about the logical problems---we are simply trying to clear them away so that the real issue is exposed.

Let's take the problem of evil: nine times out of ten when this question is raised, whether by Christians or non-Christians, there is real pain involved---there's a story involved. And unless you are willing to deal with it existentially, you will never address the real issue. Setting forth the truth faithfully means caring not only for objective arguments, but for the subjects created in the imago Dei to whom these arguments are addressed. One must speak not only to the head but to the heart. Not every argument is useful for every person: some need an argument for the existence of God. Others need to be shown His goodness, etc. The minute that we forget that apologetics speaks subjectively too, we have lost our way.
 
Indeed not. However, your exaggeration of it seems to lead in that direction.

Since we are discussing this on a different thread we can discuss it there if you are all right with that?

[What do you mean by "make sense of"? To make sense of something means to interpret it. I thought the whole point of presuppositionalism is that this is precisely what the unbeliever does!

Exactly to interpret it. If I because of my presupossitions interpret a train as being a an illusion that I am a dead duck when I walk out in front of it. We can interpret reality any way we want but reality is one way and we have to correctly interpret it to survive in it. Reality is the anchor of interpretaion. We all must think and talk about the same stuff.

That only through theology does the TA make sense at all.

No I would say that the TA has made sense to all philosophers up until the analytical movment, which they are thankfully coming around to to. I can appreciate your concerns with the TA but you have to my knowledge presented no logical problem with the form of the argument I gave you, it is one thing to disagree with the content of the argument another to disagree with the form of it.

Objectively, no. Subjectively, yes. I can ask a perfectly sensical question in German (I'm studying the language) and the average American would be unable to understand it. Doesn't make it objectively nonsensical, but subjectively the effect is the same.

But objectivly is all that matters. I mean sure someone who doesn't know any better can be warranted to believe just about anything but they are still wrong.

That's another debate entirely. According to Romans 1, though, it seems that autonomous reason has been catastrophically successful in deluding itself and suppressing the truth.

But has it been successful despite of itself or consistantly with it self?
 
We can interpret reality any way we want but reality is one way and we have to correctly interpret it to survive in it. Reality is the anchor of interpretaion. We all must think and talk about the same stuff.

Correct---to a point. I don't see how atheism will lead one to walk out in front of a train (nihilism, possibly would, but that's just one form). I see quite a few atheists surviving fairly well.

but you have to my knowledge presented no logical problem with the form of the argument I gave you

Yeah I have: the problem is that it gives me no reason to believe. All you've proven is "I have a consistent theory." Big deal. The conclusion isn't compelling to anyone but yourself. It isn't logically compelling (this is also the reason, by the way, why I don't like Kant). The "justification" here is merely interesting to a certain brand of philosopher.

But objectivly is all that matters.

Ah, so if the atheist doesn't speak English, you speak to him in English because "objectively is all that matters"? Do I really need to go into why the proposition is absurd? You can't communicate with someone unless you speak the same language. If they are wrong, then you must show that you are correct if you want to convince them. Right now we're getting real close to Barth-style fideism (is bringing Barth in the Van Tillian equivalent of Godwin's Law?).

But has it been successful despite of itself or consistantly with it self?

Consistently with itself. According to Romans 1, this is part of what the wrath of God looks like: God gives us over to sin and we are allowed to continue to deceive ourselves.
 
Correct---to a point. I don't see how atheism will lead one to walk out in front of a train (nihilism, possibly would, but that's just one form). I see quite a few atheists surviving fairly well.

No, no, no. I am refering to someone who has inccorrect presupossitions about reality and trying to consistantly live them out.

Yeah I have: the problem is that it gives me no reason to believe. All you've proven is "I have a consistent theory." Big deal. The conclusion isn't compelling to anyone but yourself. It isn't logically compelling (this is also the reason, by the way, why I don't like Kant). The "justification" here is merely interesting to a certain brand of philosopher.

You don't understand how a presupossition works out logically. I think I have a better example of it. In Russell's analysis of the statment "the present king of France is bald" is false because there is no present king of france, but the falsity of this stament implies that it is true. But that is equally false because it cannot be true that "the present king of France is bald". So we are at an impasse, how can both statments be false at the same time, which implies the truth of the oppisite statment?

Well viewing logically in a presupossitional way avoids this confusion. The two different statments are not false but meaningless. If presupossition is in this form y being true or false presuposses x being true. X is true therefore y can either true or false.

1. (y)"the present king of France is bald" presuposses the truthvalue of the statment (x)"there is a present king of France"
2. There is no present King of therefore x is false
3. x is false therefore y is neither true nor false, or y is meaningless

This is a much better way to analyze statments of this kind. Therefore unless God's existance is irrelavant to everything else than we must presuposse that in order for to make sense out of anything in creation.

Ah, so if the atheist doesn't speak English, you speak to him in English because "objectively is all that matters"? Do I really need to go into why the proposition is absurd? You can't communicate with someone unless you speak the same language. If they are wrong, then you must show that you are correct if you want to convince them. Right now we're getting real close to Barth-style fideism (is bringing Barth in the Van Tillian equivalent of Godwin's Law?).

Why does your first statment seem to imply that I am saying that only english is the language that is objective? What I am pointing out is a weakness in you overemphasis of the idea of warrant. You seem to be making it the end all of epistemological considerations. You are right in arguing for its legitemacy but I think as a concept it becomes irrelavant when we move into tougher epistemological consideration like knowledge and truth. Barth and Van Til are so far aprt in their theologies that there is no comparison, Van Til's book on Barth is very good you may want to pick it up.

Consistently with itself. According to Romans 1, this is part of what the wrath of God looks like: God gives us over to sin and we are allowed to continue to deceive ourselves.

Oh I don't disagree, the schizophrinic's beleifs about things are subjectivly consistant but objectivly wrong. Your are still stuck with the idea that we are merely looking for coherence in our worldviews and that ends up with us comparing worldviews with eachother only. But remember that we are also and more importantly comparing them with reality.
 
I am refering to someone who has inccorrect presupossitions about reality and trying to consistantly live them out.

Which ones are you referring to, exactly? I see plenty of people living pretty consistently with themselves at the center of their own universe.

In Russell's analysis of the statment "the present king of France is bald" is false because there is no present king of france, but the falsity of this stament implies that it is true. But that is equally false because it cannot be true that "the present king of France is bald". So we are at an impasse, how can both statments be false at the same time, which implies the truth of the oppisite statment?

Very simply: we deny the referential theory of language. Talking about something does not imply its existence---it's conceptual confusion at its worst and most pedantic.

I can have (and have had) lively debates over the subject of whether balrogs have wings, regardless of the fact that balrogs only exist in the lengendarium of Tolkien's Middle Earth.

Why does your first statment seem to imply that I am saying that only english is the language that is objective?

It doesn't. My point is that the objective truth of a statement has nothing to do with whether it will make sense to me.

You are right in arguing for its legitemacy but I think as a concept it becomes irrelavant when we move into tougher epistemological consideration like knowledge and truth.

We have gone around and around on this. The fact is that warrant is sufficient for a knowledge-claim until you present enough of a counter-argument to convince a person that his position is not the case. The burden (for one who is warranted in a belief) is one of disproof.

Your are still stuck with the idea that we are merely looking for coherence in our worldviews and that ends up with us comparing worldviews with eachother only. But remember that we are also and more importantly comparing them with reality.

But this is exactly the trouble: the paranoid schizophrenic is interpreting reality in light of his delusion. The only way to cure it is to get rid of the source---to cure the delusion.
 
Which ones are you referring to, exactly? I see plenty of people living pretty consistently with themselves at the center of their own universe.

Well I was refering to hypothetical ones but ok. The atheist, is it possible to affirm what Romans tells us about general revealation and what man immediatly knows concerning God and argue that they can have any warrant for their beleifs based on atheistic presupossitions? Can they go through correctly interpreting things and die, then meet their maker and have any warrant at all? Is the Buhddist really warranted to believe as they do yet at the same time and in the same relationship the bible tells us indirectly that they are not?

Very simply: we deny the referential theory of language. Talking about something does not imply its existence---it's conceptual confusion at its worst and most pedantic.

You are missing the point. If I ask whether or not Jack still beats his wife, it matters not how much I can say about said hypothetical wife if in fact Jack is not married. I can dream up all sorts of interesting things and talk on and on about Jack's hypothetical wife and why he should not treat in such a way but all that is meaningless in in fact Jack has no wife. Russell's analysis fails at this point which is why we must bring the logical idea of presupossition to make more sense out of it.

I can have (and have had) lively debates over the subject of whether balrogs have wings, regardless of the fact that balrogs only exist in the lengendarium of Tolkien's Middle Earth.

The logic is still sound here, all talk about barlogs would not be false but meaningless if Tolkien had never invented them. Their existance is not the point but does anytalk about them presuposse that Tolkien invented them?

It doesn't. My point is that the objective truth of a statement has nothing to do with whether it will make sense to me.[/QUOTE}

True but I am talking something else. Making sense out of creation means correctly interpreting it.

[We have gone around and around on this. The fact is that warrant is sufficient for a knowledge-claim until you present enough of a counter-argument to convince a person that his position is not the case. The burden (for one who is warranted in a belief) is one of disproof.

In all fairness we have gone round and round about many things, which in my case at least has only forced me to be better so thank for your very wise criticisms. On warrant though you seem to not allow for logical evidence at all in any consideration of warrant. For instance pointing out to someone that they are committing a logical fallacy in a beleif that they had warrant for previously seems to me to be sufficient evidence that they no longer have said warrant. But you have never to my knowledge admited such a thing.

You have it seems to me argued for warrant also in such cases where the only evidence avaible for warrant is based on ignorance, like someone who knows nothing about philosophy claiming it is pointless. If I as someone who has studyed philosophy a great deal encounter such a person I need only point out that they know nothing about philosophy and that eliminates all warrant for their beleif until they study up and present evidence to justify their claim. Both of those arguments are logical in nature. But in our discussions you seem to rule out such arguments on grounds like "the person finds such questions stupid", which seems to me to only base warrant on more ignorance which would make the whole thing irrational.

But this is exactly the trouble: the paranoid schizophrenic is interpreting reality in light of his delusion. The only way to cure it is to get rid of the source---to cure the delusion.

Yes but how will do they function on their beleifs?
 
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