I'm not sure I "get" compatibilism

[Mathetes]

Just to be sure, I very much hold to God's great sovereignty and His meticulous predestining of all things. However, I also know that the main Reformed confessions assert that man is free (although not in the Arminian sense), such as in the LBCF:

"God has indued the will of man, by nature, with liberty and the power to choose and to act upon his choice. This free will is neither forced, nor destined by any necessity of nature to do good or evil."

or Westminster:

"God has endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined good, or evil."

I myself am content to leave it at that, however, I find it difficult to explain to those who don't believe. As many of you are probably aware, this line of thought is often taken by others as an outright contradiction.

I wonder, then, if our decisions and actions are something that God allows to take their course (within limitations), rather than by commanding them to happen. Let me (try to) clarify. In the example of Pharoah, instead of commanding Pharoah's heart, "you WILL NOT let the Jews go free," He could have simply let Pharoah's animosity towards them run its course. Nevertheless, He could have also closed off the alternatives - that is, He could have made it such that options like letting the Jews go free were undesireable or unfeasible to Pharoah (interestingly, letting Pharoah become so hostile that he killed all the Jews was also off the table). So the Egyptian king was free to follow his own desires, but the Lord could also have sealed off the other doors of his heart (so to speak), so he could only freely choose from so many options - maybe even only one. In this way, the will (or the agent) is free, but they're only free to choose the options God allows them. Perhaps our free actions are involved with God's predestination in that they are like pieces that He has arranged in a grand jigsaw puzzle.

My main concern is with the origins of our thoughts and actions. Do they originate with God or with ourselves? If God plants our ideas and thoughts in our hearts, and also brings them about, then the notion of free will or free agents seems quite strange. I think we would then be doing things not of our choosing. But if He allows our thoughts and actions to come about from our own hearts and minds, yet within His restrictions, this seems to make a bit more sense.

I realize that this may go beyond what the Scriptures have to say on the matter; but this line of thought was actually brought about by passages like Proverbs 21:1, "The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the LORD; he turns it wherever he will," and 16:9, "The mind of man plans his way, But the LORD directs his steps." These verses don't say that God causes man's plans, or commands them, but rather He guides and directs. He erects the walls of the maze, if you will. Can such a thing still be called "meticulous predestination," though?

I realize also that my language is probably not really exegetically precise. Still, I'll try to clarify if need be. So any thoughts? Do I appear to have the sense of it, or am I careening way off the rails?

 

[Afterthought]

I don't know if this might help with the question, but from what I understand... Everything that comes to pass has been decreed. With respect to the decree, all things occur necessarily. However, the decree takes into account means and second causes. These second causes may occur freely, contingently, or necessarily. The decree does not override the nature of those second causes but makes use of them to bring to pass what was decreed (the second causes, their operation, and the outcome of the second causes are decreed too, of course). So with respect to the first cause, all things occur necessarily; with respect to the second causes, they take place according to the nature of the second causes. Because these second causes were decreed to work according to their own nature and generate events freely, contingently, or necessarily (depending on the nature of the second cause), the freedom or contingency of these second causes is not only not destroyed but established by the decree. Hence the WCF:

"God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

It seems that any dissatisfaction may be traced to thinking that predestination equals determinism, or that God can only deterministically bring things to pass if what He decreed will occur with certainty. Hence, I'm not sure I "get" compatibilism (which seeks to reconcile free will with determinism, when the real question is that of the decree's relation to the nature of second causes; perhaps "compatibilism" extends its definition in the theological context) either. (I suppose some may also dislike the idea of "free" or "contingent" causes) But nevertheless, I think that the "compatibilist" response to the issue is by redefining free will as to "the person did what he or she wanted without external constraint or being coerced", and hence, though events fall out deterministically, the person always does what the person wants and so free will is not taken away.

You may find these previous threads interesting or helpful: http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/does-real-chance-exist-69845/ http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/sovereignty-establishing-free-will-62841/ http://www.puritanboard.com/f29/luther-vs-edwards-69510/ http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/hume-free-action-67173/

 

[Mathetes]

Thanks for your reply, I'll have to mull it over a bit. Overall, though, I think it helps to establish at least some of what I posted.

I'm not sure that I understand your distinction between compatibilism and determinism, since my reckoning is that compatibilism is a form of soft determinism (as opposed to a hard determinism, like fatalism). But I don't want to get too hung up on labels at this point.

 

[A5pointer]

Is this too simple? God decrees ALL that comes to pass, Man acts freely, Man is accountable for actions. End of story. Don't try to "reason it"

 

[Afterthought]

I'm not sure that I understand your distinction between compatibilism and determinism, since my reckoning is that compatibilism is a form of soft determinism (as opposed to a hard determinism, like fatalism). But I don't want to get too hung up on labels at this point.

Yes, that is correct. Compatibilism reconciles free will with determinism by stating that some sort of free will is compatible with some sort of determinism, i.e., that both free will and determinism are true. The product ends up being a soft determinism. My apologies if I made it seem otherwise.

 

[Mathetes]

Is this too simple? God decrees ALL that comes to pass, Man acts freely, Man is accountable for actions. End of story. Don't try to "reason it"

As I mentioned in the original post, that's not too simple for me. However, it may be too simple for the person we're explaining God's sovreignty to. Especially since "decree" can carry the connotation of "fatalistically make something happen" for some.

 

[Loopie]

If I may jump in, I recently did a research paper for my Master's Degree on the topic of Compatibilism, and would be happy to share it with anyone on the board for their edification. From my understanding, Compatibilism simply is determinism whereby humans are still responsible for their actions. Some might call it 'soft-determinism', but it is still determinism (in the sense that God has decreed and ordained all things using secondary means and causes). The 'free will' that compatibilism affirms is articulated very well by Jonathan Edwards in his book Freedom of the Will. Ultimately, man is free in so far as he is able to accomplish the desires of his heart. This freedom though is not libertarian free-will.

 

[reaganmarsh]

I highly commend to you Jonathan Edwards' Freedom of the Will; it is essential reading. I'd also encourage you to consult Boettner's Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, particularly chapters 15-16, as they address your question quite directly.

An excerpt from Boettner which you may find helpful:

Man possesses a fixed will against God, and instinctively and willingly turns to evil. he is an alien by birth, and a sinner by choice. The inability under which he labors is not an inability to exercise volitions, but an inability to be willing to exercise holy volitions. This led Luther to declare, "Free-will is an empty term, whose reality is lost. And a lost liberty, according to my grammar, is no liberty at all." In matters pertaining to his salvation, the unregenerate man is not at liberty to choose between good and evil, but only to choose between greater and lesser evil, which is not properly free will...His will is free in the sense that it is not controlled by any force outsied of himself. As a bird with a broken wing is free to fly, but is not able, so the natural man is free to come to God, but is not able. How can he repent of his sin when he loves it? How can he come to God when he hates him? This is the inability of the will under which man labors (Jn 3.19, 5.40). Man's ruin lies mainly in his perverse will. He cannot come, because he will not...(Rom 8.7). To assume that because man has the ability to love, he therefore has the ability to love God, is about as wise as to assume that because water has the ability to flow, it can flow uphill; or to reason that because a man has power to cast himself from the top of a precipice to the bottom, he therefore has equal power to transport himself from the bottom to the top. (Boettner, Reformed Doctrine of Predestination, 62-63).

 

[Mathetes]

His will is free in the sense that it is not controlled by any force outsied of himself. As a bird with a broken wing is free to fly, but is not able, so the natural man is free to come to God, but is not able.

This is kind of what I was getting at, and it helps to clarify. Thanks. That said, some unbelievers will still say that the choices we make aren't real choices (given compatibilism) since the agent could not have done differently, but I think they're operating with a faulty definiton of "choice."

As for Edwards, I do have the book, it's been sitting on my shelf for a few years, but I only managed to get about halfway through it. Something about 18th century philosophical verbiage manages to confound me. Maybe I'll give it another attempt.

 

[Mushroom]

That said, some unbelievers will still say that the choices we make aren't real choices (given compatibilism) since the agent could not have done differently, but I think they're operating with a faulty definiton of "choice."

Romans 9:19 ff answers that objection very clearly.

 

[reaganmarsh]

His will is free in the sense that it is not controlled by any force outsied of himself. As a bird with a broken wing is free to fly, but is not able, so the natural man is free to come to God, but is not able.

This is kind of what I was getting at, and it helps to clarify. Thanks. That said, some unbelievers will still say that the choices we make aren't real choices (given compatibilism) since the agent could not have done differently, but I think they're operating with a faulty definiton of "choice."

As for Edwards, I do have the book, it's been sitting on my shelf for a few years, but I only managed to get about halfway through it. Something about 18th century philosophical verbiage manages to confound me. Maybe I'll give it another attempt.

Edwards defines the freedom of the will as the mind choosing. It is a legitimate choice; however, it is limited in that the unregenerate mind will always choose according to its nature (ie, to please the flesh, Rom 8.5-8). Real responsibility requires real choice; however, God is sovereign over the available options at any given time, and as Christ asked asked the Pharisees, "How can you, being evil, choose that which is good?" A lost man's choice will always be toward himself and his interests -- toward pleasing the flesh. Thus the promise of the New Covenant, that God places his Spirit within us and moves us to be careful to keep his laws. We are enslaved to our sins until Christ sets us free.

 

[reaganmarsh]

That said, some unbelievers will still say that the choices we make aren't real choices (given compatibilism) since the agent could not have done differently, but I think they're operating with a faulty definiton of "choice."

Romans 9:19 ff answers that objection very clearly.

Amen to that, Brad.

 

[chuckd]

This was discussed a few months ago: http://www.puritanboard.com/f48/did-god-ordain-adams-fall-78694/

Turretin's Institutes is recommended. I typed up 9.7 (How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?) for anyone who wants it. PM me.

 

[Steve Paynter]

Many helpful things about compatibilism have been said in this thread. One thing to emphasise, I think, is that compatibilism is the position that the Bible teaches both that God sovereignly determines everything, and that people are responsible for their own actions and inactions, and, hence both are compatible truths, even if we can't explain how they are compatible. It is a kind of agnosticism! It is humble submission to the explicit teaching of the Bible and its mysteries, and is the exact opposite of "logically consistent systematic thinking" that non-Calvinists often accuse us of.

D.A. Carson gives an essentially equivalent definition of compatibilism. He explains that compatibilism is the holding of two truths: i) God is sovereign over creation, including the choices and actions of human beings, but not in such a way as to undermine human responsibility; ii) human beings are responsible for their choices and actions, but not in such as way as to ever make God's will for them ultimately contingent. He adds that a hermeneutical principle which should go along with these two statements is that inferences from these truths should only be made if there are biblical passages making use of these truths in that way. The danger is that otherwise, conclusions will be drawn from God's sovereignty that will deny human responsibility, or that human responsibility will be used to undermine God's sovereignty.


I have seen compatibilism criticised in an Arminian book. The author in question was Jack W. Cotterall in “The Nature of Divine Sovereignty”, in Clark H. Pinnock (Ed), “The Grace of God, The Will of Man: A Case for Arminianism”, Academie Books, Zondervan (Grand Rapids: Michigan), 1989. On page 100, he asserts that "Those who argue for both determinism and free will are sometimes called compatibilists (after the idea that that determinism is compatible with free will.)" While Cotterall shows awareness that no Calvinist believes in a libertarian freedom of the will which can act outside of God’s decree, he persists in calling compatibilists (according to his definition) inconsistent because (as he rightly observes) Calvinism is incompatible with libertarian freedom. Cotterall misses the point that Calvinists do not claim that God’s sovereignty is compatible with human freedom, but with human responsibility.

Such "responsibility" is often based on the idea of free agency (we have the freedom to do what we want, but not the freedom to choose what we want) ... but that is not strictly a part of compatibilism itself.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

I think some folks fail to see the error in their presuppositions. On the one hand, we have no problem believing that our Almighty God can speak the universe into existence, ex nihilo. After all, He is most powerful and should be able to pull this off, no?

Yet, when it comes to our fallen natures and the accompanying desire for complete autonomy, we struggle to accept that this same Almighty God is capable of holding us accountable for our moral choices even while sovereignly bringing about those choices in the manner He has decreed. The fact of the matter is that it is the decree of God that actually establishes, versus overthrows, our liberty of spontaneity, the ability to choose as we are most inclined to choose when we so choose.

I think the real issue underlying the topic is that we want to know "how" God pulls this off. If folks will stop a minute and think about it, I doubt that they would conclude that God is not capable of pulling it off, but they cavil at the fact that God has not explained "how", contra Deut. 29:29. Hence we end up with all the usual "robot" canards raised by the libertarian free willers who fail to consider the contradiction in their reasoning as illustrated above.