RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
R. J. Rushdoony: The Institutes of Biblical Law. Nutley, N.J.: The Craig Press, 1973.
I put off reviewing this work, either here or on amazon, for over fifteen years. Even in my recon days, this book had too many conceptual problems to warrant “free praise.” We will get to those problems in a minute. It would be futile (and intellectually impossible) to give an adequate review and summary of this work.
It parallels Calvin by title. Part of the book is a running (if massively flawed) commentary on the Ten Commandments. RJR defines and elaborates the Ten Commandments by the case laws. As one expects from Christian Reconstructionists, RJR intends for God’s law to “govern all of society” (Rushdoony 2, passim). As such, “biblical law” is often broader than what is spelled out in Torah, and that ambiguity could be a problem later. In other words, RJR runs the risk of the motte-and-bailey fallacy.
Another good part of this book is RJR gives hard and long (and often painful) reflection on tough areas of Scripture. If you have an ethical question about the Bible, odds are RJR covered it somewhere. His reasoning may be terrible (it often is), but at least he tried to cover it.
Now the problems with the book:
1) A good way to summarize RJR’s theology is “He was a man who knew so much yet understood so little.” I get the impression when reading RJR’s exposition on the case laws that he simply thinks they can “just apply” today. Here is what I mean. RJR is a presuppositionalist. And while he knows better than to approach Scripture as a blank slate,” that is often what he does. Even the better theonomists, who say that the case laws only apply in their new covenant context, never tell us what that new covenant context is. Yes, there are a few examples in the New Testament, but that only covers a few laws. For the most part, the New Testament really is not helpful on interpreting all of the laws. This is damning to the theonomic position as such.
2) While RJR rejects the distinction between civic law and moral law, he still accepts the overall distinctions within the law. This means he will approach the law (sort of apropos to the point above) as a late-modernity Westerner. As a result, he will have no idea on how to deal with some laws. For example, the law on finding a bird’s nest on the ground: Is it moral, civic, or ceremonial? How do you know? Or take even the sacrificial laws. While we say a sacrifice typifies and pre-figures Christ, which is true, is it simply a moral law? I think it is a civic law as well. This helps separate Israel from the nations.
3) Now we come to RJR’s infamous position on the food laws. He thinks they still apply. This is really embarrassing. The new testament repeals these laws in several places. But there is a deeper problem involved. Is the food law a ceremonial law or a civic law or both? It has elements of both. While it does anticipate the future work of redemption, it is mainly to separate Israel from the nations. The “bad foods you can’t eat” are actually symbols of the Gentile nations.
4) RJR’s critique of natural law is misleading (679-693). If by natural law he means something like what Thomas Jefferson promoted, he might be correct. It is autonomous. But that is not how natural law was always interpreted. The Patristics and Medievals had no problem going to nature because they said nature participates in God, so in a sense they were going to God for their source of law.
5) RJR is not always consistent on which laws continue to apply and why. When some thinkers question whether a law still applies, he charges them with “setting aside God’s law,” yet RJR apparently does the same thing on numerous points: the Sabbath (128ff), quarantine (293), and aspects of slavery (485).
Rushdoony’s ultimate problem is the metaphysics of the land. The following ideas are from some online suggestions by former theonomists.
***For one thing, Jesus’ death and resurrection have changed the world.
In Israel — but only in Israel — if you accidentally killed your best friend’s brother, you had to run to the nearest city of refuge, which would be within about 6 hours hard running from wherever you were … and your best friend had to chase you. He could run slowly, knowing that you’re innocent. But he had to chase you there and if he caught you, he would kill you.
Why? Because his brother’s blood was crying from the ground for vengeance from Yahweh, and Yahweh would take that vengeance upon Israel.
You’d get to the city of refuge, they’d take you in, there would be a trial (and your best friend, the prosecutor, might even testify to your total innocence: “I saw it all and it was an accident”). And then you’d be allowed to stay in the city of refuge till the high priest died.
If you left the city, your best friend could chase you back or put you to death, because the brother’s blood was crying for vengeance. But the high priest’s death would cover the blood that you had (accidentally) shed, so that now you could return to your inheritance … and if your best friend found you the moment you stepped out of the city, he wouldn’t kill you. You were free.
All of that has changed. Jesus the High Priest has died. The new land is, in a sense, the whole world and in another sense the church, and blood doesn’t cry out from the ground now as it once did.
So, too, we don’t have to do the “unsolved murder” stuff in the Law, where the elders from the nearest city offer an animal so that its blood covers the bloodshed and God doesn’t carry out vengeance upon them. (Is that a moral, ceremonial, or civil law? Yes. All three.)
Jesus’ death and resurrection changes things with regard to blood, with regard to the land (no more levirate marriage!), with regard to worship, with regard to lots of stuff.
That’s one answer. Another is that some things in the Law applied only to Israel or within the land (or within the holy war camp) and wouldn’t apply to us today (or to godly Gentiles back then).
Yet another is that the Law itself is couched in symbolic terms. It talks about fire breaking out in thorns and spreading to your neighbor’s property. That is not simply a law about fire spreading to your neighbor’s property. It’s a fire in thorns, and that ties in to Genesis 3.
The Law in Exodus-Deuteronomy is not simply a list of do’s and don’ts (“the moral law”), nor is it like a legal code of judicial laws. There’s lots of other stuff woven into it. Lots of symbolic language. Lots of stuff that’s crucial in any law code — like water rights! — that is missing altogether.
Conclusion
Should you read this book? No. Even if I were a theonomist I would hesitate to recommend this work. RJR’s reading of church history is suspect, his interacting with the other side is almost non-existent, and his promoting dietary laws is just plain wrong.
Other parts are just baffling. He praises the church in Armenia for offering sacrifices. I do not know if they did that, nor do I know why RJR thought that was a good thing after the death and resurrection of Christ.
I put off reviewing this work, either here or on amazon, for over fifteen years. Even in my recon days, this book had too many conceptual problems to warrant “free praise.” We will get to those problems in a minute. It would be futile (and intellectually impossible) to give an adequate review and summary of this work.
It parallels Calvin by title. Part of the book is a running (if massively flawed) commentary on the Ten Commandments. RJR defines and elaborates the Ten Commandments by the case laws. As one expects from Christian Reconstructionists, RJR intends for God’s law to “govern all of society” (Rushdoony 2, passim). As such, “biblical law” is often broader than what is spelled out in Torah, and that ambiguity could be a problem later. In other words, RJR runs the risk of the motte-and-bailey fallacy.
Another good part of this book is RJR gives hard and long (and often painful) reflection on tough areas of Scripture. If you have an ethical question about the Bible, odds are RJR covered it somewhere. His reasoning may be terrible (it often is), but at least he tried to cover it.
Now the problems with the book:
1) A good way to summarize RJR’s theology is “He was a man who knew so much yet understood so little.” I get the impression when reading RJR’s exposition on the case laws that he simply thinks they can “just apply” today. Here is what I mean. RJR is a presuppositionalist. And while he knows better than to approach Scripture as a blank slate,” that is often what he does. Even the better theonomists, who say that the case laws only apply in their new covenant context, never tell us what that new covenant context is. Yes, there are a few examples in the New Testament, but that only covers a few laws. For the most part, the New Testament really is not helpful on interpreting all of the laws. This is damning to the theonomic position as such.
2) While RJR rejects the distinction between civic law and moral law, he still accepts the overall distinctions within the law. This means he will approach the law (sort of apropos to the point above) as a late-modernity Westerner. As a result, he will have no idea on how to deal with some laws. For example, the law on finding a bird’s nest on the ground: Is it moral, civic, or ceremonial? How do you know? Or take even the sacrificial laws. While we say a sacrifice typifies and pre-figures Christ, which is true, is it simply a moral law? I think it is a civic law as well. This helps separate Israel from the nations.
3) Now we come to RJR’s infamous position on the food laws. He thinks they still apply. This is really embarrassing. The new testament repeals these laws in several places. But there is a deeper problem involved. Is the food law a ceremonial law or a civic law or both? It has elements of both. While it does anticipate the future work of redemption, it is mainly to separate Israel from the nations. The “bad foods you can’t eat” are actually symbols of the Gentile nations.
4) RJR’s critique of natural law is misleading (679-693). If by natural law he means something like what Thomas Jefferson promoted, he might be correct. It is autonomous. But that is not how natural law was always interpreted. The Patristics and Medievals had no problem going to nature because they said nature participates in God, so in a sense they were going to God for their source of law.
5) RJR is not always consistent on which laws continue to apply and why. When some thinkers question whether a law still applies, he charges them with “setting aside God’s law,” yet RJR apparently does the same thing on numerous points: the Sabbath (128ff), quarantine (293), and aspects of slavery (485).
Rushdoony’s ultimate problem is the metaphysics of the land. The following ideas are from some online suggestions by former theonomists.
***For one thing, Jesus’ death and resurrection have changed the world.
In Israel — but only in Israel — if you accidentally killed your best friend’s brother, you had to run to the nearest city of refuge, which would be within about 6 hours hard running from wherever you were … and your best friend had to chase you. He could run slowly, knowing that you’re innocent. But he had to chase you there and if he caught you, he would kill you.
Why? Because his brother’s blood was crying from the ground for vengeance from Yahweh, and Yahweh would take that vengeance upon Israel.
You’d get to the city of refuge, they’d take you in, there would be a trial (and your best friend, the prosecutor, might even testify to your total innocence: “I saw it all and it was an accident”). And then you’d be allowed to stay in the city of refuge till the high priest died.
If you left the city, your best friend could chase you back or put you to death, because the brother’s blood was crying for vengeance. But the high priest’s death would cover the blood that you had (accidentally) shed, so that now you could return to your inheritance … and if your best friend found you the moment you stepped out of the city, he wouldn’t kill you. You were free.
All of that has changed. Jesus the High Priest has died. The new land is, in a sense, the whole world and in another sense the church, and blood doesn’t cry out from the ground now as it once did.
So, too, we don’t have to do the “unsolved murder” stuff in the Law, where the elders from the nearest city offer an animal so that its blood covers the bloodshed and God doesn’t carry out vengeance upon them. (Is that a moral, ceremonial, or civil law? Yes. All three.)
Jesus’ death and resurrection changes things with regard to blood, with regard to the land (no more levirate marriage!), with regard to worship, with regard to lots of stuff.
That’s one answer. Another is that some things in the Law applied only to Israel or within the land (or within the holy war camp) and wouldn’t apply to us today (or to godly Gentiles back then).
Yet another is that the Law itself is couched in symbolic terms. It talks about fire breaking out in thorns and spreading to your neighbor’s property. That is not simply a law about fire spreading to your neighbor’s property. It’s a fire in thorns, and that ties in to Genesis 3.
The Law in Exodus-Deuteronomy is not simply a list of do’s and don’ts (“the moral law”), nor is it like a legal code of judicial laws. There’s lots of other stuff woven into it. Lots of symbolic language. Lots of stuff that’s crucial in any law code — like water rights! — that is missing altogether.
Conclusion
Should you read this book? No. Even if I were a theonomist I would hesitate to recommend this work. RJR’s reading of church history is suspect, his interacting with the other side is almost non-existent, and his promoting dietary laws is just plain wrong.
Other parts are just baffling. He praises the church in Armenia for offering sacrifices. I do not know if they did that, nor do I know why RJR thought that was a good thing after the death and resurrection of Christ.
