Is the ontological argument irrelevant?

[Apologist4Him]

The ontological argument goes as follows:
1- It is possible that God exists
2- If it's possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world.
3- If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.
4- If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
5- Therefore, God exists.

Which God exists? We’re light years from proving whatever God exists is God according to Calvinism. But, the problems run deeper I think. The argument is based on “possibility”. To quote myself, from my blog:

“You see my friends, either Christianity is true or it is not, there is no “probability” about it. None of the writers of Scripture speak of their faith in God in terms of probability. Would the apostles have suffered and given their lives up for a God they thought might exist, or probably, most likely exists? Absolutely not!

To the Romans the Apostle Paul declares:
“Yet in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him who loved us.For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come,nor height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”Romans 8:37-39 (NKJV)

To the Colossians the Apostle Paul writes:
“that their hearts may be encouraged, being knit together in love, and attaining to all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the knowledge of the mystery of God, both of the Father and of Christ, 3 in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” Colossians 2:2-3 (NKJV)

To the Philippians the Apostle Paul writes:
“I thank my God upon every remembrance of you,always in every prayer of mine making request for you all with joy,for your fellowship in the gospel from the first day until now,being confident of this very thing, that He who has begun a good work in you will complete it until the day of Jesus Christ;” Philippians 1:3-6

Finally, “Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for” Heb 11:1 (ESV)”

Another objection concerns premise 3 "If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in all possible worlds.” How do we make the logical leap from God possibly existing in a single world, to God existing in all possible worlds? I think most people can conceive of a possible world where God does not exist, at least one, especially since the argument leaves room for doubt, and we’ve all struggled with doubt at various times. The argument leaves the back door open for the skeptic to make their exit, because the “possibility” is decided on autonomous grounds.

Know the good thing in this argument is that it puts the burden of proof on the atheist, whom have to prove that it is not possible that God exists - meaning, that the concept of God is self-contradictory or impossible.

All the atheist has to do, to throw the argument back, is ask the question, “is it possible God does not exist?” And we’re back to carrying the burden.

Now, I do not know of any sucessful argument to show that the very idea of God is absurd and impossible, so it seems that God does, matter fact, exist.

Perhaps not successful in one sense, but in another sense the traditional arguments in themselves, leave room for doubt, and those spaces are the springboards for non-Christians to plant their seeds of doubt. The “Invisible Pink Unicorn” (IPU) or Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM) may not be a successful arguments, but they certainly do make a point concerning the traditional arguments.

We could create an ontological argument against God's existence, however, which would go as follows:
1- It is possible that God doees not exist.
2- If its possible that God does not exist, then God does not exist in some possible world.
3- If God does not exist in some possible world, than God does not exist in all possible worlds.
4- If God does not exist in all possible worlds, than God does not exist in the possible world.
5- Therefore, it is possible that God does not exist.

The argument is coherent, so we need only to judge it's premises.

Premise 3 is suspicious in both formulations in my honest opinion.

As a theist, it's my job to deny 1, and affirm that it is not possible that God does not exist, but how can this by done? Seems to me that to prove that God's existense is necessary in all possible worlds is an impossible task. How can I prove that something is impossible in all possible worlds? Seems to me that there is no way to prove that God must exist in all possible worlds without using steps 2 to 5 in the ontological argument to prove that God is a necessary being.

Well said, you are correct it is an impossible task, for it requires exhaustive knowledge which we do not have.

So, what is really important in the whole argument is wheter God's non-existence is possible in some world. But how can this be proven without other argument for God's existence?

So far as ontological argument are concerned, I’ve always preferred the argument from causality, and I think it does a better job of demonstrating a “necessary being”, but even so, that argument is also light years from the Reformed faith.

The only way to prove God's existence is not impossible positively (for the lack of good arguments showing that the concept God is a incoherent one does not prove that it's not) is to prove that God does exist in some possible world, and to do this we must prove God's existence in the actual world (how can we prove that it is possible that God exists in any other possible world without reasoning in circles?), and to do this we need to use some other argument for God's existence, like the Moral Argument or the Teleological Argument.

Even strings of traditional arguments fall short. If we prove God necessary exits, and that He is the source of moral absolutes, the almighty lawgiver, the almighty watchmaker, we’re still light years from the Reformed faith. The same God could be the God of Deism, and if God isn’t interested why should the atheist become interested? Once again the back door is open and our friend is on the move.

What is the Ontological argument worth for, then, if it's crucial premiss cannot be proven without recurring to other arguments for God? Isn't the ontological argument better as a argument for God's aseity? Or am I just bad at thinking?

Brother, without a doubt you are good at thinking, and I thought your post to be laid out rather well. The root of the problem is that in the traditional arguments, we’re allowing the non-Christian to be the autonomous judge of whether God exists or not, and we are giving up the common ground, that is that humanity was specially created in the image of God. We do not hold that it’s possible people were created in the image of God, we take the affirmative yes people were created in the image of God. Ontological Arguments, Teleological Arguments, Moral Arguments, etc. are perfectly valid….within a Christian worldview. But the reason we can appreciate them, where others do not, is because we already believe.

 

[Philip]

but in another sense the traditional arguments in themselves, leave room for doubt

Consider this scenario, though: you and I are having a discussion over some topic, where both of us have a vested interest in our position. Let's also say that, in actuality, your position is correct and you pull out a flawless argument that, in theory, would blow my position out of the water. However, such an argument is not necessarily sufficient to convince me because I have a vested interest in my position. Doubt doesn't necessarily mean that an argument is flawed---it may simply be that arguments aren't sufficient to convince.

The root of the problem is that in the traditional arguments, we’re allowing the non-Christian to be the autonomous judge of whether God exists or not, and we are giving up the common ground, that is that humanity was specially created in the image of God.

He does this anyway---it's not a question of whether you allow him to do so: he does so. He does not require your permission. No, the unbeliever is not, in actuality, in a position to judge God, but that's between him and God---you are still required to give an answer. In doing this, we affirm the common ground of the image of God: without this common ground, there would be no possibility of argument.

 

[Apologist4Him]

Consider this scenario, though: you and I are having a discussion over some topic, where both of us have a vested interest in our position.

In other words,, neither party is "neutral", I wholeheartedly agree!

Let's also say that, in actuality, your position is correct and you pull out a flawless argument that, in theory, would blow my position out of the water. However, such an argument is not necessarily sufficient to convince me because I have a vested interest in my position. Doubt doesn't necessarily mean that an argument is flawed---it may simply be that arguments aren't sufficient to convince.

Absolutely, the actual lack of neutrality, whether spoken or unspoken, most definitely plays a role in whether a person is convinced or not.

Brother Philip, the context for doubt here concerns the existence of God. Doubt concerning the existence of God is not only a flaw, it is a sin, it is to suppress the truth of God's existence in unrighteouness. Nowhere in Scripture is doubting the existence of God praised. Quite the contrary is true. Leaving non-Christians room to suppress the truth of God's existence is a flaw, a major one.

He does this anyway---it's not a question of whether you allow him to do so: he does so. He does not require your permission. No, the unbeliever is not, in actuality, in a position to judge God, but that's between him and God---you are still required to give an answer. In doing this, we affirm the common ground of the image of God: without this common ground, there would be no possibility of argument.

Of course they do it anyway, of course they do not require our permission. However, for us, in entertaining the notion of uncertainty about God, we entertain the notion of uncertainty about man being made in the image of God. Without the certainty of God's existence, there is no certainty of common ground, just the autonomy of "I think therefore I am".

 

[John Bunyan]

Know the good thing in this argument is that it puts the burden of proof on the atheist, whom have to prove that it is not possible that God exists - meaning, that the concept of God is self-contradictory or impossible.

All the atheist has to do, to throw the argument back, is ask the question, “is it possible God does not exist?” And we’re back to carrying the burden.

Now, I do not know of any sucessful argument to show that the very idea of God is absurd and impossible, so it seems that God does, matter fact, exist.

Perhaps not successful in one sense, but in another sense the traditional arguments in themselves, leave room for doubt, and those spaces are the springboards for non-Christians to plant their seeds of doubt. The “Invisible Pink Unicorn” (IPU) or Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM) may not be a successful arguments, but they certainly do make a point concerning the traditional arguments.

I think I've found the answer to my original question. Something is possible if all its characteristics are not logically impossible and can coexist with it other. So, if anyone says "such and such is not possible", then he is the one who must give me a good argument showing that "such and such" is self-contradictory or that any of its characteristics are inherently impossible (like the idea of a married bachelor). So, in dealing with possibilities, the denier is always the one with the burden of proof (meaning that belief in impossibility is not the default position).

Now back to the OA itself.

I will try, in this post, to show why (3) makes sense. We're talking, here, about an Anselmian insight into theology (sometimes called Maximal Being Theology), which states that God is the greatest conceivable being. Now, it is greater to exist in all possible worlds (notice that a possible world is not a universe, but a description of reality) than in just one, so the greatest conceivable being, if possible, must exist in all possible worlds (otherwise it wouldn't be the greatest conceivable being). It is greater to be concrete than abstract, all-loving than partially-loving, etc.

So when we know that "It is possible that a maximally great being exists" or "It is possible that the greatest conceivable being exists", it follows necessarily that the greatest conceivable exist in at least one possible world, so that being must exist in all possible worlds (as the very definition of God as the greatest conceivable being already includes necessary existence in it).
Otherwhile, if the proposition "It is not possible that the greatest conceivable being exists", it follows necessarily that he doesn't exist (for if this being doesn't exist in one possible world, than it cannot exist in any world at all).

The only proposition that people (a.k.a.: atheists) usually argue about is (1).
That's why the ontological argument makes sense.

In other words (quoting from WLC's website, where I first heard of philosophical apologetics)
"For example, his objection to (2) is based upon an apparent unfamiliarity with possible worlds semantics. To say that some entity exists in a possible world is just to say that such an entity possibly exists. It isn’t meant that the entity actually exists somewhere. Look again at my explanation: “To say that God exists in some possible world is just to say that there is a possible description of reality which includes the statement ‘God exists’ as part of that description.” Only if that description is true will the entity, in this case God, actually exist. So (2) is definitionally true.

Again, (3) is virtually definitionally true. A maximally great being is one that has, among other properties, necessary existence. So if it exists in one world, it exists in all of them! In that sense, such a being is different than contingent beings, which exist in only some possible worlds. A unicorn, for example, exists in some possible world, but not in all of them, for its existence is possible but not necessary."

Believe me, I am not a big fan of Gaunilo's argument. I don't think bringing up the greatest possible island idea does anything to really address the OA.

There is one thing that came to mind during our discussion. Much like the CA, the OA seems to be valid (or at least has yet to be proven invalid). And even though these arguments do not specifically describe the Triune God of Scripture, they seem to be akin to General Revelation. That is, the validity and soundness of these arguments for the existence of God testify to the fact that God has revealed himself to the world (generally speaking) in such a way that the unbelievers are without excuse, and cannot fully dismiss or discard the truth that they suppress (they cannot invalidate the OA and the CA). Though these arguments for God's existence do not specifically reveal the Triune God of Scripture, they reveal enough of Him so that the unbeliever is condemned by ignoring the evidence of his creator.

Thoughts?

I agree. The CA, for example, is only denied to avoid God's existence. Any unbiased rational person would conclude, from the CA, that God is real, yet people go to extremes like saying that the universe is only an illusion, or that it came from nothing, through nothing and for no purpose whatsoever.

We need to keep in mind, however, that the OA, the CA and all of these natural theology arguments are not intended to be used against islam or mormonism, but against atheism. They are absolutely irrelevant in our evangelism towards muslims or jews, for they already believe in God. Atheists, however, can and should be confronted with these arguments, to be shown that there is no excuse to unbelief (they love to say that "there is no evidence", and with these and other arguments we show them that this makes no sense).

With muslims and jews we should proceed like the apostles, arguing from fulfilled prophecy, miracles and historical reliability.

 

[Loopie]

I agree. The CA, for example, is only denied to avoid God's existence. Any unbiased rational person would conclude, from the CA, that God is real, yet people go to extremes like saying that the universe is only an illusion, or that it came from nothing, through nothing and for no purpose whatsoever.

We need to keep in mind, however, that the OA, the CA and all of these natural theology arguments are not intended to be used against islam or mormonism, but against atheism. They are absolutely irrelevant in our evangelism towards muslims or jews, for they already believe in God. Atheists, however, can and should be confronted with these arguments, to be shown that there is no excuse to unbelief (they love to say that "there is no evidence", and with these and other arguments we show them that this makes no sense).

With muslims and jews we should proceed like the apostles, arguing from fulfilled prophecy, miracles and historical reliability.

Keep in mind though that according to the Christian worldview, there is no such thing as a perfectly unbiased or 'neutral' person. People are either believers or unbelievers; rebels, or children of God. They do indeed go to 'extremes' in order to justify their rebellion, because they are absolutely unwilling to bend the knee to God.

I agree that the OA and CA are not especially helpful when witnessing to Jews, Mormons, or Muslims. But that is why I always try to engage in a form of presuppositional apologetics, which can mold itself to whatever situation you are facing. The only worldview that truly makes sense, and can account for everything in the world, and in history (while being consistent externally and internally) is the Christian worldview. You are absolutely right that in the case of Mormons, Muslims, and Jews, we can look at prophecy, archeaology, and historical data to show them that only the Christian worldview can make sense of the 'evidence' that we see around us (such as the evidence for Christ's existence, death, and resurrection).

By the way, we don't just use prophecy, miracles, and historical reliability in our discussions with Jews and Muslims. Those things are just as helpful in our discussions with atheists. Fulfilled prophecy, the reliability of scripture, and the historical evidence for miracles are things that atheists have to deal with as well.

 

[Philip]

Brother Philip, the context for doubt here concerns the existence of God. Doubt concerning the existence of God is not only a flaw, it is a sin, it is to suppress the truth of God's existence in unrighteouness. Nowhere in Scripture is doubting the existence of God praised. Quite the contrary is true. Leaving non-Christians room to suppress the truth of God's existence is a flaw, a major one.

Granted---but all that this means is that faith is the transcendence of doubt. It doesn't mean that you are capable of presenting an argument that is airtight, nor does it mean that such an argument would be convincing. The room for doubt is the result of man's sin. But where there is room for doubt, there is room for faith which comes by hearing God and trusting Him.

However, for us, in entertaining the notion of uncertainty about God, we entertain the notion of uncertainty about man being made in the image of God.

What do we mean here by "uncertainty?" If what you mean is that you must not present an argument capable of being doubted, there's no such thing. Everything is dubitable by a consistent skeptic. By presenting an argument at all, you concede the unbeliever's ability to form judgments: that is what an argument is. An argument is aimed at persuasion, which assumes an audience capable of reasoned judgment.

Back to the OA: I do think it germane to point out Anselm's context and intent. Anselm's Proslogion is presented as a series of arguments in the form of prayers, and the ontological argument is one of these. He does not present the argument in the absence of faith but rather as (in his own words) fides quaerens intellectum.

I do not endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate thy sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I believe,—that unless I believed, I should not understand.

I would suggest that the apologist should be arguing with this attitude regardless of what argument he uses. We argue in faith.

 

[Apologist4Him]

Granted---but all that this means is that faith is the transcendence of doubt. It doesn't mean that you are capable of presenting an argument that is airtight, nor does it mean that such an argument would be convincing.

There is a difference between being able to present an airtight argument, and whether or not such an argument can be argued. Truth is truth, whether or not anyone is convinced. Afterall, even airtight arguments lack the power to regenerate the unregnerate. Our duty is to speak the truth in love, and leave the persuading up to God the Holy Spirit.

What do we mean here by "uncertainty?" If what you mean is that you must not present an argument capable of being doubted, there's no such thing. Everything is dubitable by a consistent skeptic. By presenting an argument at all, you concede the unbeliever's ability to form judgments: that is what an argument is. An argument is aimed at persuasion, which assumes an audience capable of reasoned judgment.

What I mean by uncertainty is simply implied from positing our sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immutable Creator of the universe in terms of "possibilities". By presenting an argument, I concede the unbeliever is created in the image of God, and in using his reasoning, he is borrowing from the only true worldview, the Christian worldview, God's worldview. An argument aimed at persuasion, assumes several things, other minds with which to debate, shared language, shared rationality, and truth are all necessary preconditions for an intelligible debate, and they all presuppose the existence of the Ontological Trinity. The question is not whether the skeptic can reason, but can the skeptic account for his rationality, and any answer he gives assumes one thing, autonomy, that his rationality is independent of God, that he needs no God to be rational. Are we biblical in our approach, giving God all of the glory, if we assume rationality as a common ground, when Christian rationality is accounted for by the existence of a rational God, all while accepting and conceding the non-Christian denial of God as the source of, and with their reasoning? I am sorry brother Philip, but I do not think so.

I would suggest that the apologist should be arguing with this attitude regardless of what argument he uses. We argue in faith.

Please do not assume or judge the attitude or motives of my heart. I only post because I love the Lord and honestly do care about what my Reformed brothers and sisters think. I care enough that I would try to correct a brother, to try to bring him or her closer to the truth, because the closer we are to truth, the closer we are to the Lord Jesus. I apologize if my style of posting rubs you the wrong way, I might be more of a preacher than a teacher, I cannot say for sure, all depends. One of my desires is to rescue Van Tillian apologetics from the ivory tower seminarians and academic philosophical journals and teach the average layman the Van Tillian apologetic, kind of like Dr. Bahnsen did, though I will never come close to his intellect, knowledge, qualifications/degrees etc. God has often created awareness of my limitations, at the same time, I am what I am by the grace and mercy of God. Please pray for me brother, without going into details, I have many many needs, going through a good deal of hardships. most of all, I need to depend on the grace of God to see me through.

 

[Supersillymanable]

I keep hearing people say you can simply throw the argument back, when I think this is a misunderstanding of the argument.

If one simply comes back and says "Is it possible God does not exist", all they're doing is questioning the conclusion, as the conclusion is that it is not possible that God does not exist. The simple reason that they cannot throw the question back, is because existence is a property a being that it infinitely great would have. To then ask, is it possible he does not exist, doesn't affect the argument, because we already asked that question ourselves at the start, concluding he must in fact exist. The simple possibility of him existing leads us to the conclusion that he must do.

The atheist cannot simply throw that question out, he has to show that God is not a coherent idea or being. Only then does the argument fail (because then he is unable to exist). The possibility of not existing leads to the possibility of existence, and so leaves us with the present conclusion of the argument.

I hope that all makes sense...

 

[John Bunyan]

What do we mean here by "uncertainty?" If what you mean is that you must not present an argument capable of being doubted, there's no such thing. Everything is dubitable by a consistent skeptic. By presenting an argument at all, you concede the unbeliever's ability to form judgments: that is what an argument is. An argument is aimed at persuasion, which assumes an audience capable of reasoned judgment.

What I mean by uncertainty is simply implied from positing our sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immutable Creator of the universe in terms of "possibilities". By presenting an argument, I concede the unbeliever is created in the image of God, and in using his reasoning, he is borrowing from the only true worldview, the Christian worldview, God's worldview. An argument aimed at persuasion, assumes several things, other minds with which to debate, shared language, shared rationality, and truth are all necessary preconditions for an intelligible debate, and they all presuppose the existence of the Ontological Trinity. The question is not whether the skeptic can reason, but can the skeptic account for his rationality, and any answer he gives assumes one thing, autonomy, that his rationality is independent of God, that he needs no God to be rational. Are we biblical in our approach, giving God all of the glory, if we assume rationality as a common ground, when Christian rationality is accounted for by the existence of a rational God, all while accepting and conceding the non-Christian denial of God as the source of, and with their reasoning? I am sorry brother Philip, but I do not think so.

I believe that it's actually the unbeliever that is conceding to the christian worldview when he assumes rationality. Also, how does one concede to the denial of God when he assumes reason to be thrustable? The reason why reason can be trusted is because it comes from God - once more, the unbeliever believes in reason without no good reason, since he denies the very grounds of rationality. When arguing in rational terms, we do nothing but use our God-given abilities, how is this wrong?
If the skeptic has an inconsistent position, that's his problem - and we can point this out to him.
It is important to realize that everything that is true is possible.
Also, I don't think that any of the arguments cited here (two versions of the OA and the CA) leave room for denying God's existence. If proven wrong, they would only show that these are not good reasons to believe in God, not that He doesn't exist. And I don't think that something being possible entails that its negation is also possible. An equation, for example, is either necessarily true or necessarily false. If the equation is true, then its falsehood is impossible (and vice-versa).

The possibility of not existing leads to the possibility of existence, and so leaves us with the present conclusion of the argument.

That's true in relation to epistemic possibility, but I'm not so sure if it holds true when talking about metaphysical possibility.

 

[moral necessity]

Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.

I suppose, if he operates "in a world", and by definition he is also outside and independent of it, that would make more sense to me. And, if he creates worlds, then he created this one and is involved within its realm as well.

Just another thought...

 

[Philip]

What I mean by uncertainty is simply implied from positing our sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immutable Creator of the universe in terms of "possibilities".

Are we going to say that God is not a possible being, then? Have we said domething untrue of God, here?

The question is not whether the skeptic can reason, but can the skeptic account for his rationality, and any answer he gives assumes one thing, autonomy, that his rationality is independent of God, that he needs no God to be rational.

But in presenting an argument, you concede that he can form judgments and reach these conclusions. The trouble is that you believe that if we present a direct argument, we've conceded, in principle, his autonomy. I would submit that we have not. The unbeliever must recognize God Himself before he will recognize God-as-source-of-cognitive faculties. For me to do otherwise would be to present a kind of "God-of-the-gaps" where God fills in for places I can't explain---and that would present a false picture of faith. I believe in God because I have been born again and because of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit in my life and through Scripture.

Please do not assume or judge the attitude or motives of my heart.

I do not presume to do so, brother. My post was directed at those who think that, somehow, the OA is an example of theological autonomy when in reality it is a supreme example of faith seeking understanding.

 

[Philip]

Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.

The language of "Possible worlds" simply refers to "states of affairs." One might say that there is no possible state of affairs in which God does not exist.

 

[Unoriginalname]

Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.

But wouldn't worlds in this construct just mean possible other realities? I understand the weakness of the vocabulary here but it is ultimately a thought experiment that needs to condescend to some degree.

 

[moral necessity]

Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.

The language of "Possible worlds" simply refers to "states of affairs." One might say that there is no possible state of affairs in which God does not exist.

If that's the case, then it makes more sense...

Blessings!

 

[moral necessity]

Also...to say that there is a world in which God exists, seems odd to me. God does not only exist "in a world". He creates worlds, and therefore must exist outside and independent of them.

But wouldn't worlds in this construct just mean possible other realities? I understand the weakness of the vocabulary here but it is ultimately a thought experiment that needs to condescend to some degree.

Agreed...I suppose I was taking the language more literally...

Blessings...

 

[Apologist4Him]

Are we going to say that God is not a possible being, then? Have we said domething untrue of God, here?

No, God actually exists, it is not possible that He does not exist.

But in presenting an argument, you concede that he can form judgments and reach these conclusions. The trouble is that you believe that if we present a direct argument, we've conceded, in principle, his autonomy. I would submit that we have not. The unbeliever must recognize God Himself before he will recognize God-as-source-of-cognitive faculties. For me to do otherwise would be to present a kind of "God-of-the-gaps" where God fills in for places I can't explain---and that would present a false picture of faith. I believe in God because I have been born again and because of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit in my life and through Scripture.

I believe you are confusing the issue, OA is a "God of gaps" argument (as in which God?), and the version presented is based on WLC's Molinism. "The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world." - Wiki

 

[Apologist4Him]

So which God is possible in which possible world? I can imagine a world ruled by a supremely evil god, where the roles are switched, can you? I have heard it said that for a god to be God, God MUST be maximal, but where is the necessity? Why must God even be Triune if we're talking about possible gods. Atheists and agnostics claim the Christian concept of God is a logical contradiction, how is an OA gonna bring them any closer to our concept of God?

 

[Philip]

No, God actually exists, it is not possible that He does not exist.

In which case, we have not spoken falsely in saying that God is a possible being. If it is not possible that God does not exist, then it is possible (as well as necessary) that He exists. In starting from possibility, we are not speaking falsely, indeed we are helping to explain God's necessity. We don't end with possibility.

OA is a "God of gaps" argument (as in which God?), and the version presented is based on WLC's Molinism.

Two things:

a) I find it hard to believe that the version of the OA that I put forth was Molinist given that it's a form of Anselm's argument, and to call Anselm a Molinist would be anachronistic. Further, the variations on Anselm were actually proposed to me by a professor who is both confessional and who also has put forward a number of arguments against Molinism.

b) OA is not a God of the Gaps argument, even if it were true that it could, say, apply to the god of deism. God-of-the-gaps arguments present God as a stopgap explanation: when you can't explain something, you play the "God did it" card. In this style of argumentation, you treat God as a working hypothesis, not as a person to be believed in for His own sake.

 

[Apologist4Him]

a) I find it hard to believe that the version of the OA that I put forth was Molinist given that it's a form of Anselm's argument, and to call Anselm a Molinist would be anachronistic

Except that I realize St. Anselm predates Luis de Molin. Anselm's argument is not framed in probability language, his argument is as follows:

1. Our understanding of God is a being than which no greater can be conceived.
2. The idea of God exists in the mind.
3. A being which exists both in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only in the mind.
4. If God only exists in the mind, then we can conceive of a greater being—that which exists in reality.
5. We cannot be imagining something that is greater than God.
6. Therefore, God exists.

Where does Anselm's OA use the term "possible"? Where does his argument mention "other worlds"? It does not. You are mixing the two.

b) OA is not a God of the Gaps argument, even if it were true that it could, say, apply to the god of deism. God-of-the-gaps arguments present God as a stopgap explanation: when you can't explain something, you play the "God did it" card. In this style of argumentation, you treat God as a working hypothesis, not as a person to be believed in for His own sake.

True, but I use the phrase in a different way as well, to bring attention to the "gaps" between the beliefs one holds and what an argument or string of arguments attempt to prove. Atheists and agnostics sometimes call these "leaps of faith".

 

[John Bunyan]

But in presenting an argument, you concede that he can form judgments and reach these conclusions. The trouble is that you believe that if we present a direct argument, we've conceded, in principle, his autonomy. I would submit that we have not. The unbeliever must recognize God Himself before he will recognize God-as-source-of-cognitive faculties. For me to do otherwise would be to present a kind of "God-of-the-gaps" where God fills in for places I can't explain---and that would present a false picture of faith. I believe in God because I have been born again and because of the internal witness of the Holy Spirit in my life and through Scripture.

I believe you are confusing the issue, OA is a "God of gaps" argument (as in which God?), and the version presented is based on WLC's Molinism. "The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this "choosing" of a particular world." - Wiki

Actually the argument as I have used in this post was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga, a reformed philosopher.

So which God is possible in which possible world? I can imagine a world ruled by a supremely evil god, where the roles are switched, can you? I have heard it said that for a god to be God, God MUST be maximal, but where is the necessity? Why must God even be Triune if we're talking about possible gods.

Supreme evil is not a great-making property. Do you suggest God is less than maximal?

Atheists and agnostics claim the Christian concept of God is a logical contradiction, how is an OA gonna bring them any closer to our concept of God?

And for this they present no good argument. Saying something is a logical contradiction doesn't make it a logical contradiction.

 

[Apologist4Him]

Actually the argument as I have used in this post was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga, a reformed philosopher.

I thought you said "In other words (quoting from WLC's website, where I first heard of philosophical apologetics)" As in William Lane Craig, a Molinist. As much as I would like to think Alvin Plantinga is on our side, Alvin Plantinga also spent 28 years teaching at University of Notre Dame, a Catholic University. Further one of his philosophical goals was to further the notion of compatibility between TOE and Christianity, his philosophy of origins, is pro-theistic evolution. On one hand I can appreciate his efforts against naturalism, on the other hand, I simply do not agree with his TE conclusions.

 

[Philip]

Where does Anselm's OA use the term "possible"?

I said it was "a form of" Anselm's argument---the reason for use of the word "possible" is to exclude impossibility from the discussion. If something is not possible, it is impossible. God is not impossible, therefore God is possible. I can conceive of plenty of impossible things (spherical cubes, for instance), but I want to make clear that God is not one of them.

Where does his argument mention "other worlds"?

Where did mine? I discussed contingent vs. necessary existence, following the logic of Anselm's second ontological argument.

AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God. ~Proslogion Chapter 3

 

[John Bunyan]

Actually the argument as I have used in this post was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga, a reformed philosopher.

I thought you said "In other words (quoting from WLC's website, where I first heard of philosophical apologetics)" As in William Lane Craig, a Molinist. As much as I would like to think Alvin Plantinga is on our side, Alvin Plantinga also spent 28 years teaching at University of Notre Dame, a Catholic University. Further one of his philosophical goals was to further the notion of compatibility between TOE and Christianity, his philosophy of origins, is pro-theistic evolution. On one hand I can appreciate his efforts against naturalism, on the other hand, I simply do not agree with his TE conclusions.

It was from his website, but the argument was created by Plantinga. A lot of people use Plantinga's argument.

 

[Apologist4Him]

It seems to me, that when I look at the Ontological Argument, a few things come to mind:

1) If ANY being is defined as having 'necessary existence', then it must exist. This follows from the OA, since the OA argues that there is some possible world (alternate universe) where a being of necessary existence exists. If there is some possible world where such a being exists, then this must be true in all possible worlds (I think we need to go into more detail about why, if something is true in some possible world, that it MUST be true in ALL possible worlds).

2) I understand that some opponents of the OA argue that they can 'conceive' of beings that don't exist. I mean, there are numerous super heroes and super beings in comic books that simply do not exist. Is there some alternate universe where these things DO exist? If the atheist believes that a maximally great being (with necessary existence) is just a figment of human imagination, then it does not necessarily follow that such a being exists. I mean, it would seem that the atheist could liken the conception of a maximally great being with the concept of a comic book character. Simply because all-powerful, god-like characters exist in comic books does not mean that they exist in reality (or even in some other possible world). Essentially, the person who uses the OA must work with his opponent to figure out what it means to be a maximally great being. Interestingly, this would require a Christian to go to scripture first (a sort of presuppositional apologetics), in order to describe what a maximally great being looks like. The OA is only really helpful or useful in light of what we as Christians know from scripture about God (the maximally great being).

I thought about mentioning Marvel and DC super heroes or Greek gods from mythology. Thunder and Lightening exist, therefore Thor necessarily exists.

 

[John Bunyan]

It seems to me, that when I look at the Ontological Argument, a few things come to mind:

1) If ANY being is defined as having 'necessary existence', then it must exist. This follows from the OA, since the OA argues that there is some possible world (alternate universe) where a being of necessary existence exists. If there is some possible world where such a being exists, then this must be true in all possible worlds (I think we need to go into more detail about why, if something is true in some possible world, that it MUST be true in ALL possible worlds).

2) I understand that some opponents of the OA argue that they can 'conceive' of beings that don't exist. I mean, there are numerous super heroes and super beings in comic books that simply do not exist. Is there some alternate universe where these things DO exist? If the atheist believes that a maximally great being (with necessary existence) is just a figment of human imagination, then it does not necessarily follow that such a being exists. I mean, it would seem that the atheist could liken the conception of a maximally great being with the concept of a comic book character. Simply because all-powerful, god-like characters exist in comic books does not mean that they exist in reality (or even in some other possible world). Essentially, the person who uses the OA must work with his opponent to figure out what it means to be a maximally great being. Interestingly, this would require a Christian to go to scripture first (a sort of presuppositional apologetics), in order to describe what a maximally great being looks like. The OA is only really helpful or useful in light of what we as Christians know from scripture about God (the maximally great being).

I thought about mentioning Marvel and DC super heroes or Greek gods from mythology. Thunder and Lightening exist, therefore Thor necessarily exists.

Neither greek gods nor marvel super heroes have necessary existence as part of their nature. And Marvel and Dc heroes are all physical beings, therefore it is logically impossible that they exist in all possible worlds (there are possible worlds without anything physical). Also, if someone exists necessarily it is not a greek god, as their whole cosmogeny declared that their gods were contingent beings born from the ever-existing chaos.

 

[Apologist4Him]

Neither greek gods nor marvel super heroes have necessary existence as part of their nature.

How do you know?

And Marvel and Dc heroes are all physical beings, therefore it is logically impossible that they exist in all possible worlds (there are possible worlds without anything physical).

Why is it necessary that they exist in all possible worlds, are we not concerned with the actual world, the world as it is? How many actual worlds can exist? How many can be verified to exist?

Also, if someone exists necessarily it is not a greek god, as their whole cosmogeny declared that their gods were contingent beings born from the ever-existing chaos.

How about Eternity? (practically a visual representation of Pantheism)

 

[John Bunyan]

Neither greek gods nor marvel super heroes have necessary existence as part of their nature.

How do you know?

By their very descriptions. They all begin to exist, therefore they must be contingent beings, not necessary ones.

And Marvel and Dc heroes are all physical beings, therefore it is logically impossible that they exist in all possible worlds (there are possible worlds without anything physical).

Why is it necessary that they exist in all possible worlds, are we not concerned with the actual world, the world as it is? How many actual worlds can exist? How many can be verified to exist? [/Quote]
They don't exist in all possible worlds. That's my point. You're the one trying to mock the ontological argument with a Gaunillo kind of analogy. That's the point: they're not necessary beings, therefore the ontological argument has nothing to do with them.
Also, I don't believe you understand 'possible world semantics'. You're confusing a possible world with another universe, or something like this. Possible world = possible description of reality. Existing in a possible world = being true in a possible description of reality.

Also, if someone exists necessarily it is not a greek god, as their whole cosmogeny declared that their gods were contingent beings born from the ever-existing chaos.

How about Eternity? (practically a visual representation of Pantheism)

"Eternity came into existence when the universe was formed". Therefore Eternity has a beggining, therefore Eternity can't logically be a necessary being. And Eternity is also not a greek god.

The OA works only for a maximally great being. You can invent some other being and say he's maximally great, if you want, but them you would only be inventing new names for God.

 

[J. Dean]

Keep something in mind: no matter how clever or sound the argument, a diehard atheist will find an excuse to disbelieve, even at the risk of looking like a fool in the process.

 

[Apologist4Him]

By their very descriptions. They all begin to exist, therefore they must be contingent beings, not necessary ones.

good answer

They don't exist in all possible worlds. That's my point. You're the one trying to mock the ontological argument with a Gaunillo kind of analogy. That's the point: they're not necessary beings, therefore the ontological argument has nothing to do with them.

You responded to a post that was not directed to you, I had a laugh with a brother in agreement on this, and it sounds like you took it serious, sorry. I have noticed large portions of my responses glossed over and ignored. Loopie did a good job of showing the circularity of the OA, and even in your opening post you provide a valid counter response to OA. *shrug*

Also, I don't believe you understand 'possible world semantics'. You're confusing a possible world with another universe, or something like this. Possible world = possible description of reality. Existing in a possible world = being true in a possible description of reality.

Perhaps not, I take it impossible worlds cannot co-exist with possible worlds. One of the points I was driving at is this: for all we know, in another universe there could be some very different worlds from our own, after all, we are venturing into the unknown, the speculative when we start talking about possibilities. I've honestly not dabbled much with middle knowledge and Molinism, only enough to know that it is a component of the LFW defense, and is popular among OVT's.

"Eternity came into existence when the universe was formed". Therefore Eternity has a beggining, therefore Eternity can't logically be a necessary being. And Eternity is also not a greek god.

The link is to a fictional character in the Marvel Universe, I know this. The real eternity has no essence or being and by definition has no beginning nor end. Have you ever wondered where Heaven begins and where it ends..or does it?

The OA works only for a maximally great being. You can invent some other being and say he's maximally great, if you want, but them you would only be inventing new names for God.

Sounds like something I used to say to unconvinced Atheists and agnostics. As Loopie pointed out before me, at maximum OA proves a mysterious unknown generic deity, sorry but that is the truth.

 

[Philip]

I take it impossible worlds cannot co-exist with possible worlds. One of the points I was driving at is this: for all we know, in another universe there could be some very different worlds from our own, after all, we are venturing into the unknown, the speculative when we start talking about possibilities.

The possible worlds discussion isn't speculation and here's why: when we talk about possible worlds in this context, we are simply ruling out the impossible. No possible world, for instance, could contain spherical cubes---spherical cubes cannot exist. Impossible worlds cannot exist at all: they are states of affairs which would be contradictory. Talking about possibility does not necessarily imply Molinism, merely that one is acquainted with modern thought in this area (Leibniz, for instance).

As Loopie pointed out before me, at maximum OA proves a mysterious unknown generic deity, sorry but that is the truth.

I disagree---it proves a God who is there.

Loopie did a good job of showing the circularity of the OA

All he showed was that it makes a move from definition to reality that, in this case, is justified by the nature of necessity.