It is asked: 1. Is the decree of God his very essence? The difference of opinions
XXVIII. It is asked, first, whether the decree of God is his very essence. Among the Greeks the question was once raised whether the essence and will of God were the same thing, with some denying and affirming, as is apparent in Justin Martyr, or whoever is the author of the book Questions for the Greeks.
11 Concerning this question subsequent fathers, especially Augustine in his book On the Essence of God, and likewise the Scholastics, John of Damascus, Lombard, Aquinas, and others, responded in the affirmative.
12 The Remonstrant Apologists, so that they may have the Socinians more favorable to them, and so that they may more strongly impugn the simplicity of God and more easily obtain the mutability of the divine decrees, deny it.
13 The Socinians more openly deny it and refer to accidents in God, to the end that they may overturn the simplicity of God, and his immutability.
14 The Reformed acknowledge that the things decreed differ essentially from the divine essence, and likewise that the tendency of the decree indefinitely toward some object is not indeed the very essence of God, but yet is for the constitution of the decree entirely required, because otherwise there would be a decree that decreed nothing.
15 However, with respect to the act of decreeing, they acknowledge that the decree is the same as the essence, except that considered absolutely and in itself the essence does not connote the tendency toward this or that object which the decree formally considered implies. From this there are not lacking among the Reformed those who distinguish between the essence and the decree, yet in this way, that thereby they do not allow any composition in God, because that tendency is nothing except a relation, which properly speaking has no entity whereby it could make him composite.
The reasons
The reasons of the Reformed, whereby the decree is the same thing as the essence of God, are sought: (1) from the divine simplicity, through which he rejects all accidents, just as we demonstrated in its own place in the chapter on the simplicity of God;
16 (2) from his infinity, which does not allow a difference of things, or parts, or any composition, as we showed in its own place;
17 (3) from the fact that the decree in God is nothing except his intellect and will, which without a doubt coincide with his essence; (4) because accidents, which by their nature imply imperfection, do not square with the most perfect one.
Objections
Nor is it valid to argue to the contrary: (1) that there are many decrees in God, whereas the essence is only one. For if by decrees you understand the things decreed, there are certainly many, and they are in fact different from his essence and from each other; if you understand the tendency toward the objects, whereby the decrees are many, then that is not a thing different from the essence, nor an accident, but only a relation, which only distinguishes but does not compose; but if by decrees you understand the decreeing act, it is nothing except the very essence of God insofar as it is conceived by us as active concerning the futurity of things. (2) That the decrees in God are free, whereas the essence is necessary. For the act of decreeing does not exist in God freely but necessarily, just as also the faculty of decreeing exists in rational creatures; nor is the tendency of the act toward some object free in God, but necessary, because he cannot decree unless there is something to decree, although the tendency of the decreeing act toward this object rather than that one is free, and most free. However, we call this tendency not the essence of God, but only the act of decreeing insofar as it is conceived by us with a relation to the thing decreeing or the thing decreed.
2. Are all the decrees of God eternal? The opinion of our adversaries
XXIX. It is asked, second, whether all the decrees of God are eternal. The Pelagians, Socinians, and Remonstrants, so that they may more easily hold (1) that the decrees of God are not God himself, (2) that the free choice of man consists in independent indifference, which the eternity of the divine decrees would destroy, and (3) that there are decrees that arise day by day according to the pleasure of human choice, do acknowledge that there are some divine decrees that were from eternity, such as the decrees of creating, conserving, and governing the world, of giving and sending Christ into the world, of giving eternal salvation to the obedient, and of other things which do not affect the indifference of free choice; but notwithstanding, they deny that all the decrees are eternal.
The opinion of the Reformed with their reasons
The Reformed on the contrary state that each and every decree of God is eternal, because: (1) per the preceding section, the decrees of God are God himself, and for this reason, if God is eternal then his decrees are also eternal. (2) From eternity he foreknew all future things (Acts 15:18), nor could he have foreknown them except from the decree. (3) By the contrary hypothesis, from eternity all the way to the generation of these decrees in time, God would have been ignorant, unthinking, and uncertain of very many things that would occur. (4) God would have received in time, and would daily receive, the majority of the perfections which are in the knowledge of the things not decreed from eternity, and for that reason from eternity he would not have been most perfect, and thus not God. (5) Our adversaries, by their own contrary hypothesis, establish a more than Stoic necessity. For if what is now in time was to be future from eternity, and that futurity does not depend upon the free decree of God, it could not depend upon anything other than future things themselves. Accordingly, if they were to be future from eternity before and without the decree, then not even God himself could have established something different from them, and God would be subject to their futurity.
Objections
If they should object to the contrary that: (1) God alone is eternal, but the decrees are not God; therefore, they are not eternal, I respond: (a) We have already demonstrated in the previous section that the decrees are God himself, and how they are such. (b) Our adversaries themselves acknowledge that certain decrees of God are from eternity; therefore at least certain decrees will be God himself; and if certain ones are, then why not all of them? (c) The apostle in Ephesians 3:11 says that notwithstanding the fact that the decrees were made, nevertheless they are eternal: κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων, ἣν ἐποίησεν, “according to the eternal purpose, which he made.” Therefore (d) for the apostle, “which he made” means nothing other than “which he conceived.” (2) Because the decrees of God are free, therefore they are not eternal. I respond: (a) By the confession of our adversaries, some decrees of God are from eternity, therefore eternity is not repugnant to freedom, or all the decrees of God will not be free. (b) Therefore they are free insofar as they come not from a necessity of the divine nature but from rational complacency, to which it is not repugnant one whit that they are from eternity. (c) Therefore they are free not with respect to the act of decreeing but with respect to their determined tendency toward this or that object. (3) There is no contingent or voluntary effect from eternity; but the decrees of God are contingent and voluntary effects. For every such effect is posterior to its cause. I respond: (a) A decree, insofar as the word speaks of a thing decreed, is posterior to its cause and thus is not eternal. But a decree insofar as the word speaks of the decreeing act is by no means posterior to the thing decreed, but coexistent with the decreeing act. (b) A decree is posterior to the decreeing act only in the order of nature, but not in the order of time, just as rays are posterior to the sun not in the order of time, because they coexist with it, but only in the order of nature. (4) Some decrees are posterior to others, for which reason not all the decrees are eternal, because in eternity there is no prior and posterior. I respond: (a) There are prior and posterior decrees if you attend to the thing decreed, but not if you attend to the decreeing act, for God decreed all things by a single and most simple act. (b) There are prior and posterior decrees only from our mode of conceiving them, but not on the part of the decree itself. (c) There are decrees prior and posterior to each other in the order of nature, but not in the order of time. (5) Certain decrees of God occur in time; therefore not all the decrees are from eternity. The prior premise is evident from Jeremiah 18:11 and 31:28 as well as Deuteronomy 28:63. I respond, Those texts speak not about decrees but about promises and threats, which differ from decrees as much as heaven from earth.
3. Are there conditioned decrees of God? The differences of opinion
XXX. It is asked, third, whether there are conditioned decrees of God. The Pelagians and the Pelagianizers, the Socinians and Arminians, the papists, the Lutherans, and as many as are outside the Reformed church, so that they may more easily guard man’s independent free choice and the idea that God decreed to save each and every person, state that there are conditioned decrees of God, antecedent and consequent decrees, whereby God decided to save each and every person if only they should will to believe and to repent. The Reformed, if by decree is understood the thing decreed, acknowledge that there are conditioned decrees, insofar as God from eternity willed that certain things would be accomplished by a previous condition, for example, that this one or that one will be saved by his previous faith and repentance. But if by decree is understood the decreeing act of God, they deny that it depends upon any condition.
The reasons of the Reformed
They do so because: (1) the decree of God is his will: “according to the counsel of his will” (Eph. 1:11). However, we have already demonstrated above in book 2, chapter 15, §§XXVII–XXIX, that there is not such a conditioned will in God. (2) The decree of God is God himself, per §XXVIII above. For this reason if God does not depend on a condition, neither will his decree. (3) The absolutely first and independent being cannot in any way be dependent on another without contradiction, and consequently neither can he be so with respect to his decree. (4) A decree existing from eternity, which we demonstrated in the previous section, cannot depend on a condition that will arise in time. (5) This conditioned decree, on account of its condition, would be made in time, and in the arena, as it were.
18 (6) He will not be able to foreknow and predict before they happen the occurrence of things which depend upon man’s free choice, because that foreknowledge depends upon the absolute decree alone, and consequently, ignorance will occur in God, and thus imperfection in the most perfect one. Finally, (7) all things are absolute with God (Ps. 115:3; Isa. 46:10; Job 42:2).
An objection
Nor is it valid to argue on the contrary that the divine decree is frequently changed and suspended upon a condition to be supplied by the creatures (Jer. 18:7–10), since it is not the decree that is changed or suspended upon a condition whenever God promises something good or threatens something evil, but rather the thing decreed. I need not add that the decree differs from the promises as much as heaven from earth, because the former was from eternity, but the latter occur in time, hence while the latter are suspended upon conditions, and on account of them are changed, the decrees are not immediately suspended upon conditions or changed.
4. Is there a decree congruent to circumstances?
The opinion of the Remonstrants and Jesuits
XXXI. It is asked, fourth, whether there is a decree congruent to circumstances. The Remonstrants and the Jesuits, so that in the matter of conversion they would seem on one hand not to attribute entirely nothing to the decree and to divine grace, and on the other hand to take away nothing from independent human choice, state that among men one has before his regeneration a nature more inclined to conversion than another, and if he should be called in a manner congruent to this nature in circumstances of time, place, and motives, he will obey this congruent calling, will freely convert himself, and from the strength of his free choice will determine himself to faith and repentance. They state that God has decreed that he will call in a manner congruent to this nature.
The thought of the Reformed with their reasons
The Reformed on the contrary state that all men through the fall are equally dead and inept for believing, however they are finally called, and thus this decree is inept in many ways, because: (1) as we said, Scripture teaches that all men are dead in sin (Eph. 2:1–3), and as a result are equally inept for any spiritual good, even for the least good thought (1 Cor. 2:14; 2 Cor. 3:5; Rom. 8:7–8; Titus 3:3; Jer. 13:23; Gen. 6:5; 8:21; and other passages). (2) Scripture teaches that the decree is prior to the circumstances and to conversion (Acts 13:48; Rom. 8:29–30). (3) The same Scripture refers the determination of the will to conversion to grace alone effectively bending the will (Phil. 2:12–13; Prov. 21:1; Rom. 15:18; 1 Cor. 15:10). (4) This congruent decree makes the independent and absolutely first God, who coincides with his own decree, dependent and subsequent to suitable and congruent circumstances, so that his decree conforms to them. (5) Antecedent to the divine decree, it makes a connection, even a certain and inseparable connection, between those congruent circumstances and, for example, the spontaneous conversion of Peter; and thus seeking to avoid the necessity which arises from an absolute decree, they fall into a more than Stoic fate. Or (6) it presupposes an uncertain connection, which accordingly God could not foresee certainly in order to establish a certain decree congruent to those circumstances; and thus they destroy the omniscience of God, for what is not certain also cannot be foreknown certainly. (7) It attributes conversion and faith independently to human choice, just as on the other hand it makes God dependent upon the same.
The foundation of our adversaries’ opinion
There is nothing they may plead in favor of their congruent decree, except that it is suited to preserving free choice. To this we respond that our adversaries falsely presuppose that the liberty of our choice consists in mere independent indifference, whereas it in fact consists in the faculty of acting from rational complacency, which the absolute decree of God does not destroy, indeed does not even wound, insofar as he decreed from eternity that, for example, Peter would believe and repent freely, or from counsel.
5. Is there an antecedent and general decree? The difference of opinions
XXXII. It is asked, fifth, whether there is an antecedent and consequent, general and special decree of God. The same Remonstrants and Jesuits, so that they may assist their idea of independently indifferent choice, and in addition may hold to a general predestination, election, and reprobation, which are not so much concerned with persons as with the state of persons, think that God by an antecedent and general decree established, for example, that all who believe will be saved, and by a consequent and special decree that Peter, because he wills to believe, will be saved.
The arguments of the Reformed
The Reformed do not acknowledge an antecedent and general decree, because: (1) all general knowledge arises through discursive reasoning and abstraction from particulars, and this discursive reasoning implies dependency upon particulars, and also ignorance, insofar as in reasoning, knowledge is acquired which was not had previously. (2) This general decree would be useless, inasmuch as it presupposes a subsequent distinct and special decree which restricts that prior one and all but corrects it, and thus effectively abolishes it. (3) It is redundant, for when there is a special decree which is occupied with each and every individual thing, then a general decree is of no use, for the one who knows each and every thing by a single and most simple act, and indeed knows them in himself, does not need to have a general concept. (4) A genus is a non-being, and thus he would have a decree of which there was no object, and thus a decree that was not a decree would be a decree. Indeed, (5) such a decree is asserted that would be unworthy of God, inasmuch as to him nothing is general, nothing indeterminate, nothing dependent upon another or upon individual things. Finally, (6) neither is it congruous with his infinite perfection to decree by an antecedent and general decree, for example, salvation for each and every person, which he already foreknows from eternity will never occur.
Objection
If they should object to us that those passages of Scripture which seem to breathe of something general in God, for example John 3:16, “That whoever believes should not perish but have eternal life,” and verse 36, “He who does not obey the Son shall not see life,” and likewise Acts 10:43, “That whoever believes in him has forgiveness of sins through his name,” and several others which are of this kind, it must be observed that these passages do not speak about decrees but about general promises and threats, which God uses with men so that he may assist the infirmity of those who cannot perceive each and every thing other than under general terms.
6. Is there a mutable decree of God?
XXXIII. It is asked, sixth, whether there is a mutable decree of God. The Socinians, Arminians, Jesuits, Lutherans, and other Pelagianizers, for the sake of a free choice that is equally mutable by the hour, upon which the decrees of God depend, and also because they teach that conditioned, universal election, on account of its condition not being fulfilled, is changed into reprobation, teach mutable decrees.
The reasons of the Reformed
The Reformed state that every decree of God is immutable, because: (1) every decree of God is God himself, as we demonstrated in §XXVIII. For this reason, if God is immutable, then his decree is also immutable. (2) Every decree of God is eternal, per §XXIX, but in eternity there is no vicissitude of change. (3) He would be changed by another prior to himself, and thus God would not be the absolutely first being. (4) He would be changed either into something better, which does not and cannot exist; or into something worse, which also cannot be, for thus God would be corrupted; or into something equally good, which likewise does not exist. (5) Scripture pronounces not only God to be thoroughly immutable in general (Mal. 3:6; James 1:17), but specifically his decree as well (Isa. 46:10; Ps. 33:12; Heb. 6:17; and other places).
The source of the objections
Nor do they have anything that they may object except those Scripture passages which only argue that the promises and threats are conditioned, which differ from the decrees as heaven from earth, although neither are those promises and threats, though indeed conditioned, properly said to be changed. If there are any controversies left over, those will be solved, Lord willing, in their own places under predestination, election, and reprobation.
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