It appears Cheung has replied

[tellville]

I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
in his popularity (whether positive or negative).

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by tellville]

 

[Don]

Originally posted by tellville
I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
in his popularity (whether positive or negative).

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/

Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this. Not only is it irrelevant by not answering the critiques of Aquascum and others, Cheung takes too much for granted by assuming that in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it, which is nothing more than an internalist constraint on justification that he'll need to prove.

by the way, you may want to check the signature requirements!

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by Don

Originally posted by tellville
I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
in his popularity (whether positive or negative).

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/

Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this. Not only is it irrelevant by not answering the critiques of Aquascum and others, Cheung takes too much for granted by assuming that in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it, which is nothing more than an internalist constraint on justification that he'll need to prove.

by the way, you may want to check the signature requirements!

I don't consider it irrelevant since the "you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable" is still the most common objection to Cheung's epistemology. And that is only one of the points he made.

As for "in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it" - isn't that one of the objectives of philosophy? That Cheung actually can answer the question "how he knows" where most fail, seems to be a an argument in Cheung's favor. If an epistemology can not answer the basic question "how do you know?" then what good is it? Only God can get away with answers like "I know what I know".

Would you mind explaining the "internalist constraint"? I've seen that phrase tossed about without any explanation - I'm beginning to wonder if anyone knows what it means.

 

[Don]

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by Civbert

Originally posted by Don

Originally posted by tellville
I thought some people might like this given the recent surge
in his popularity (whether positive or negative).

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2006/03/01/the-fatal-maneuver/

Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this. Not only is it irrelevant by not answering the critiques of Aquascum and others, Cheung takes too much for granted by assuming that in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it, which is nothing more than an internalist constraint on justification that he'll need to prove.

by the way, you may want to check the signature requirements!

I don't consider it irrelevant since the "you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable" is still the most common objection to Cheung's epistemology. And that is only one of the points he made.

As for "in order for me to know something, I have to show how I know it" - isn't that one of the objectives of philosophy?

Actually perhaps you could say that it is one objective, but you are making the claim that you have to give a (1-2-3 step) type of explaination in order to claim knowledge. Here you are confusing sufficient with necessary.

That Cheung actually can answer the question "how he knows" where most fail, seems to be a an argument in Cheung's favor.

He can give an answer, the issue is if its good answer or not.

If an epistemology can not answer the basic question "how do you know?" then what good is it? Only God can get away with answers like "I know what I know".

Actually no one just says "I know what I know", it usually is, "I know X because if I do not know X, then knowledge basically evaporates. It is usually embedded into a Reductio.

Would you mind explaining the "internalist constraint"? I've seen that phrase tossed about without any explanation - I'm beginning to wonder if anyone knows what it means.

Basically it is that you must be able to give a step by step argument for how you know something in order to know it.

CT

 

[Magma2]

Yeah, Anthony posted it on the other thread. It is pretty much irrelevant. He brings up the 'old' objection of 'well, you use your senses to read the bible, therefore, the senses are reliable' (this is a paraphrase). Though people have used this in the past, it begs the question and I think many of his critics admit this.

You´re wrong Don. To this day I get this very same objection constantly from Clark´s detractors. Just because Cheung isn´t writing for your benefit, doesn´t mean that someone might not so benefit. I know you´re so very impressed with Pondscum´s regurgitation of Sudduth, but some of us think him irrelevant. Then again some people are enamored by the irrational and obtuse meandering of C. Van Til too.

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Magma2]

[Edited on 3-3-2006 by Magma2]

 

[Don]

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by Don]

 

[turmeric]

Who's Pondscum? Did you know Sudduth is on this board? I saw his name the other day, if it's the same one. Some of you are making apologetics look like a most unpleasant and unedifying topic, but I hope no one is put off of it by that.

 

[Robin]

I'm with you, Meg! Apologetics is quite meaningful....

However, let's notice things like the hubris displayed by guys like Cheung, that are very telltale, bad signs.

He comes off as so very full of himself in his writings. (Anyone here see that?)

After a few e mails from him, I learned that he's definitely invested in promoting himself and what amounts to his own "denomination" type thing.

How unfortunate, indeed.....

Robin

 

[turmeric]

Yes, but where did Sudduth go? I'm quite certain I saw his name here the other day. Maybe he wants to be anonymous? I'm not crazy, really, I'm not...

I don't know much about this stuff, just saw the rules that say if you don't want to debate don't go here, exiting now.

 

[RamistThomist]

Sudduth said he was busy and probably wouldn't be able to contribute to every discussion.

 

[RamistThomist]

Originally posted by turmeric
Who's Pondscum? Did you know Sudduth is on this board? I saw his name the other day, if it's the same one. Some of you are making apologetics look like a most unpleasant and unedifying topic, but I hope no one is put off of it by that.

Granted it can be irriatating at time with all the nitpicking, but we should consider this (which both clarkians and van tillians will agree):
Bad arguments do not glorify God and best, and are dishonest at worst. We dare not insult the intelligence of those created imago dei.

 

[tellville]

Sorry, I don't know why my signature didn't appear. It's there now!

[Edited on 3-2-2006 by tellville]

 

[Bryan]

Paul has responded to Cheung

I'm not convinced either way on this debate yet.

Bryan
SDG

 

[ChristianTrader]

Dracula Rises From Grave

http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/03/dracula-rises-from-grave.html

This is a good article that really takes Cheung to task (again)

CT

 

[Magma2]

I´m not aware of any Van Tilians who admit that induction is fallacious. Indeed, it´s fallacious to say induction is fallacious. That commits a category mistake.

. . .To compare and contrast induction with deduction does not, of itself, show that one mode of reasoning is superior to another. That requires a supporting argument.

If p then q

q Therefore p


I guess for Van Tilians asserting the consequent is not a fallacy. After all if truth is analogous and all Scripture is apparently contradictory pretty much anything goes. Nonsense has come. If the above article is a good example of taking Cheung to task, I can see he needn´t be too concern.

 

[Ron]

Cheung allows for it to be true that I see a red car. For Cheung, it is true that we actually see a red car that might or might not physically exist, yet we cannot know what we see, a real car or an illusion. His point is that we cannot know that our mind is actually corresponding to an actual material car, so we cannot know - that although it is true we see a red car - that a red car physically exists. If we stand firmly within Cheung's worldview we should find that he cannot know that red cars actually exist anymore than he can know that unicorns actually existing. Accordingly, for Cheung, the irreducible truth is that we can know that we see a red car but cannot know that one physically exists when we see one. Presumably he believes he can also know that he sees himself pay money to fill up his red car with gas. He feels he can also know that he sees that he drives the red car to the store for groceries. Cheung believes that he knows that he sees a lot of things but feels that he cannot know that those things that he experiences are actually occurring in what, a physical way? Well then what is he predicating when he grants that he knows (which presupposes it is true) that we see a red car? Does he not know that the car that he sees is physical? If Cheung does not know that his mind corresponds to the physical world (if it is even true that there is a physical world within Cheung's worldview), then what does it actually mean that it is true that he sees a red car?

Here's the rub:

1. If it is actually true that the red car is indeed physical, then it is philosophically false that Cheung sees a red car if what Cheung means by this is that it is true that he sees a red car that is not physical. That much is obvious.

2. If the red car is not physical, then it is philosophically false that Cheung sees a red car if what Cheung means by this is that it is true that he sees a red car that is physical. This too is obvious.

3. Cheung believes that we are not able to assign a known truth value to the physicality of the red car, yet a truth value must exist for it is either true that the red car physically exists or it is false. So, what can it possibly mean that Cheung "œsees a red car?" Cheung cannot know what that proposition means! It´s a meaningless predication in other words.

Should we suppose that Cheung means that he "œmight" see a physical red car? It can´t mean this for it is philosophically false that Cheung "œmight" see a red car, because "œmight" is philosophically antithetical to the ontological truth value of what Cheung actually sees, whether what he sees is physical or illusory. If it is true that either the car is physical or not physical, then it is philosophically false that the car he sees might be physical or not physical. This is akin to the objection to the Molinist's use of might-counterfactuals. (E.g., if it is true that I will choose X, then it is false that I might or might not choose X.) All this to say, Cheung can't have it both ways. If it is true that the car might not actually exist, then it is philosophically false that he might see a non-physical red car or a physical red car. Cheung either sees one or the other, either an illusion or a physical car, which makes it false that he might see one or the other. Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning. Nor may we put men to death for murder if we can't know the ontological truth value of what can be seen.

Ron

---------

With respect to induction, I´ve posted on this site:

Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A has more veracity..." is of course"¦ sound. To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequent has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery. As GHK noted, science has great value but it´s always wrong! The value of science is due to the fact that asserting the consequent allows for rational inference because the antecedent is shown to have more veracity whenever the consequent is asserted.

The above quote is an excerpt from another thread that might have relevance here:

Originally posted by Ron
In light of Civbert and Puritanhead's discussion from page one:

Does one know that the President of the United States in the 1980´s had the initials R.R. if he thinks that Roy Rogers was President then?

Let´s talk about time.

1. Justification: Inductive inference that the clock is working based upon history
2. Belief: Believe as true the time the clock indicates, which is 12:00
3. Truth: It is 12:00

Someone might say that since all the criteria have been met, one can know it is 12:00 given inductive-knowledge. However, the 3 criteria allow one to say that he knows it is 12:00 even when relying upon a broken clock! Shouldn't this intuitively bother us? Can we "know" things based upon false information? The problem with induction is that inferences that are rational to maintain can always be false.

Let me try to make this even more glaring. Let´s say there is another man in the room who has strong reason to believe that the clock is broken. Accordingly, this man will not rely upon the clock. In fact, this man believes that any justification of the time based upon the clock will be unwarranted. The point should be obvious. The man who is most informed about the clock is not able to know the time, whereas the man with less information about the clock can "œknow" the time if inductive inference allows for such knowledge! If anyone is looking for a reductio, then here it is. Given and inductive-knowledge, having less information can be a necessary condition for more knowledge, and having more information can cause one to rationally lose the knowledge he once had! Ignorance truly can be bliss. It´s one thing to have a rational inference about a truth value and quite another thing to have knowledge of a truth value.

Now let me sum this up. The first man´s inference about the clock was rational because based upon history the clock had an extremely high probability of working; say 99.9%. The second man had an entirely different rational inference based upon his history with broken clocks. He believed that there was less than 1% chance of the clock working the day after he observed it not working. Both men were making rational inferences based upon their finite perspectives and information. At the very least, given inductive-knowledge, deductive or revelatory knowledge becomes something of a different order and not merely a difference in degree. We need to distinguish the two. I prefer reserving the term knowledge to more than inductive inferences, allowing for rational inferences that yield to the maximal degree what John Frame might call "œpsychological certainty" as opposed to epistemic certainty, or knowledge rightly called.

Can anyone be certain of the time?

Let´s say that there is one clock in the world that is the standard of time. In other words, let´s assume that it indicates the "œtrue time." Now let´s say we were to hook up a digital transmitter to the clock that would output the time to a series of data acquisition systems all running in parallel. Would all of the systems record the same time at any exact instance? No. How can we arrive at the true time then? Some might take the median time of all the times recorded as call it the true time. Someone else might take the arithmetic mean and someone else the mode. Let´s say we were to conclude that at a particular instance the true time was 12:00 noon +/.000000000000000000000000001 milliseconds. How many points of time can fit between that very variance? Well an infinite number of course. Accordingly, what is the probability of one knowing the true time? Well 1/infinity of course. Well, what is 1/infinity? Well zero of course. Consequently, no matter what the time is, nobody knows the true time!

Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A has more veracity..." is of course the basis for science and sound. To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequence has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery.

Ron

 

[Civbert]

As far as red cars go, or anything else one perceive, one can never know if there is a physical object the corresponds to the mental image or not. For it is the mental image that we have in our minds, and not the object itself. I'm here, the physical object is over there (as far as I can tell), and is not in my mind. All Cheung does, along with Gordon Clark, is say that knowledge that comes only from perceptions is unreliable. Unlike reading, or hearing language (which conveys information by symbols), perceptions of physical attributes like color, movement, texture, are not "knowable" but are really opinions (weak or strong) we have based on our interpretations about the immediate physicality of what we perceive.

I've noticed that all the Gettier examples (that questions the definition of knowledge as"justified true belief") are always based on perceptions (empirical knowledge). A man driving along sees a series of barns (except with one exception they are facades". Or a man see a friend across a room that is really a manikin (while his friend hides behind a partition). Gettier's examples really show that we can not justify the truth of empirical knowledge. He never gives and example - a man reads the phrase "red car is a VW" on a paper poster, but really it's a image of the words projected on a screen. The man still sees the same phrase, and it still has the same meaning.

My point is the Scripturalism makes the Scripture the axiom of knowledge. The knowledge from Scripture is propositional. The difficulties of epistemology are usually found in trying to justify what we perceive in the physical world. By Scriptural knowledge is spiritual, intellectual, rational, and really does not care if we can know if we are seeing "red cars" that are physical realities or optical illusions. The issues of Scripture are our relationship to God, Christ, sin, justification, atonement, good works, obedience. These are the issues that we need to know the truth about - and truth is goal of epistemology.

posted by Ron

Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning. Nor may we put men to death for murder if we can't know the ontological truth value of what can be seen.

That's an interesting statement. I don't know if one needs to "know" epistemologically that one has sinned to be punished for sinning. First I'm unsure that God requires us to be "aware" of our sin. We are born into sin, guilty from conception. We may not become "aware of our nature, but we still may "know" our sin nature. I believe we have innate knowledge of "God" and our "sin nature" that we suppress. I don't think we need to be conscience of this knowledge - we "know" even though we are "unaware" because we suppress some truths we hold. But this does not apply to Chueng's epistemology - which is about how one may "justify" the truth of ones beliefs.

Scripturalism is a means of logically justifying the truth of propositions believed. One can still know truths without being "aware" of how one justifies that knowledge. Epistemology aims to differentiate between things we can justify knowing and things we can believe but must say are opinions because we can not justify them as true. Some things we believe may be true, but we can not account for them from a reliable foundation.

So even if one can not know "epistemologically" if one has stolen a "red car", that does not mean one is innocent of stealing. One can know one has stolen, and that stealing is a sin. The Bible does not say we can not know our own actions, even if it is doubtful one can judge ones own heart. So self awareness of ones intents is not a prerequisite of being guilty of committing a particular sin. No one can judge a mans heart.

 

[Magma2]

Finally, induction always operates under the formal fallacy of asserting the consequent. It would be misleading, however, to say that inductive reasoning is always fallacious. Rather, by repeated tests through asserting the consequent a veracity of belief can be in order. "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A" is of course fallacious. However: "œIf A, then B; B therefore, A has more veracity..." is of course"¦ sound.

Hi Ron. I will say up front I´m not at all interested in defending or debating Cheung, since I haven´t read anything more than a couple of his blogs, most of which I have agreed with, however your above observation is a bit confusing. Soundness means that the argument is valid and all of the premises are true. I don´t think "œhas more veracity" qualifies but rather hedges. The question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "has more veractiy," but is it true. Also, doesn´t one have to first know the truth to be able to judge if something better conforms to it or not?

To say that science is always wrong because it asserts the consequent has great shock value but all it really reduces to is that induction is not deduction, which is no great discovery. As GHK noted, science has great value but it´s always wrong! The value of science is due to the fact that asserting the consequent allows for rational inference because the antecedent is shown to have more veracity whenever the consequent is asserted.

Now if you mean GHC above then I am willing to debate him. I don´t recall anywhere Clark arguing that the value of science is because it "œallows for rational inference because the antecedent is shown to have more veracity whenever the consequent is asserted"? Do you have a citation? OTOH Clark did give this example of the usefulness of science and nothing in it suggests that one false example has any more veracity than any other false example.

How science can be useful though false is illustrated in a delightful textbook on inductive logic. Milk fever, the illustration goes, until late in the nineteenth century, was a disease frequently fatal to cows. A veterinarian proposed the theory that it was caused by bacteria in the cows´ udders. The cure therefore was to disinfect the cow, which the veterinarian proceeded to do by injecting Lugol solution into each teat. The mortality under this treatment fell from a previous ninety percent to thirty. Does not this success full treatment prove that the bacteria were killed and that Lugol cured the disease? Unfortunately another veterinarian was caught without the Lugol solution one day, and he injected plain boiled water. The cow recovered. Had water killed the bacteria? What is worse, it was found later that air could be pumped into the cows´ udders with equally beneficial results. The original science was wrong, but it cured the cows nonetheless.

A closer examination of the logic of verification should be made. In the example above, the first veterinarian probably argued: If bacteria cause milk fever, Lugol solution will cure; the disinfectant does cure it; therefore I have verified the hypothesis that bacteria cause milk fever. This argument, as would be explained in a course of deductive logic, is a fallacy. Its invalidity may perhaps be more clearly seen in an artificial example: If a student doggedly works through Plato´s Republic in Greek, he will know the Greek language; this student knows Greek; therefore he has read Plato´s Republic. This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, and it is invalid whenever used. But it is precisely this fallacy that is used in every case of scientific verification. If the law of gravitation is true, a freely falling body will have a constant acceleration, and the eclipse will begin at 2:58:03p.m.; but freely falling bodies do have a constant acceleration and the eclipse did begin at 2:58:03 p.m.; therefore the law of gravitation is true. Or, if the periodic table of atomic weights is true, a new element of such and such a weight must exist; this new element has now been discovered; therefore the period table is verified. And, if I eat roast turkey and plum pudding, I lose my appetite; I have lost my appetite; therefore, we had roast turkey for dinner. All these arguments are equally invalid. But sometimes there is an adverse reaction if it is claimed that verification never proves the truth of a scientific law. Is it worse to "attack" science, or to "murder" logic?

The value of science is not that it arrives at something closer to the truth or that one scientific argument has more veracity than another, but rather does it works. Biblically speaking science is a tool so that man may have dominion over his environment and subdue it. The idiolatry Clark exposed is the idea that science is a means by which truth can be discovered "“ even something just closer to the truth.

 

[Ron]

As far as red cars go, or anything else one perceive, one can never know if there is a physical object [that] corresponds to the mental image or not. For it is the mental image that we have in our minds, and not the object itself.

Civbert,

That the object is not in our mind simply confuses the issue. If you cannot distinguish between objects and images, then what you would be distinguishing between are images that appear to correspond with objects and images that do not appear to correspond with objects. In other words, it´s not merely an image in your mind but an image that has a truth value that corresponds with an object, whether that truth value is true or false. If you cannot know the truth value of the object, then you cannot know whether you stole an object, yet sin presupposes we can know these things.

That's an interesting statement. I don't know if one needs to "know" epistemologically that one has sinned to be punished for sinning.

The Bible distinguishes between sins such as actual steeling and sins of conscience. For one to try to steel an illusory red car would not be an actual sin of steeling. Moreover, the Bible speaks of actual restitution, which presupposes actual knowledge of steeling, which presupposes knowledge of objects.

So even if one can not know "epistemologically" if one has stolen a "red car", that does not mean one is innocent of stealing.

Innocence is an ontological status that we can know for it presupposes knowledge of guilt as opposed to ontological guilt without knowledge; this presupposes that one can have certainty (i.e. know) whether he stole, which presupposes knowledge of objects.

What kills me in all of this is that I get the impression that many believe that knowledge of objects involves induction!

One can know one has stolen, and that stealing is a sin.

Knowing truth values of physical objects is a necessary condition for one to know he has stolen. So to concede the latter as you have, you concede the former.

Hi Ron.

Hi Sean.

Soundness means that the argument is valid and all of the premises are true. I don´t think "œhas more veracity" qualifies but rather hedges. The question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "has more veractiy," but is it true.

This is simply a semantic difference in one sense since "œsound" typically refers to deductive arguments. Nonetheless, you believe in rational inference. You base such rational inference on asserting the consequent. The more consequents that can be asserted that support the inference, the more rational the inference. Consequently, I don´t think that the following is dealing with my issue: "œthe question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "˜has more veracity,´ but is it true." The question we are trying to answer is whether this deductive fallacy enables us to determine by rational inference what should be believed, which is not an endeavor to find out what is actually true and, therefore, knowable. I´m concerned with whether it is true that it is more rational to maintain X. The truth value has to do with the rationality of a belief, not the truth of that which cannot be known.

Also, doesn´t one have to first know the truth to be able to judge if something better conforms to it or not?

By rational inference, I am not trying to determine what is true or knowable. I am trying to determine what is rational to maintain, but not by comparing it to some ideal or truth for none is knowable. If something is rational, then it might come close to what might be true. Notwithstanding, in no way can one compare the inference to the truth, for as you well noted the truth cannot be known.

Clark did give this example of the usefulness of science and nothing in it suggests that one false example has any more veracity than any other false example.

Science is useful, as you agree. Again though, nobody is comparing something "œfalse" with something "œfalse." Induction allows us to infer what is rational to believe, though if our beliefs are without mathematical tolerance, for instance, they will always be false. However, through induction it is true that it is rational that the light go on when I flip the switch. The truth value has to do with what is rational to believe.

BTW, Clark´s Lugol solution story has no bearing on what I am saying. I concur with his point.

The value of science is not that it arrives at something closer to the truth or that one scientific argument has more veracity than another, but rather does it works. Biblically speaking science is a tool so that man may have dominion over his environment and subdue it.

If induction aids in dominion, then induction shows what has more veracity, i.e., what should be believed in the effort to gain dominion. If you understand me, you will have no issue. I believe what the truth might be, but I am not comparing inductive inference with what I know to be true since I don't know what is true. If science is useful, then it must give us conclusions that are rational to hold, no more no less.

Ron

 

[Magma2]

Quote:
Soundness means that the argument is valid and all of the premises are true. I don´t think "œhas more veracity" qualifies but rather hedges. The question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "has more veractiy," but is it true.


This is simply a semantic difference in one sense since "œsound" typically refers to deductive arguments. Nonetheless, you believe in rational inference. You base such rational inference on asserting the consequent. The more consequents that can be asserted that support the inference, the more rational the inference. Consequently, I don´t think that the following is dealing with my issue: "œthe question isn´t does something better conform with truth, i.e., "˜has more veracity,´ but is it true." The question we are trying to answer is whether this deductive fallacy enables us to determine by rational inference what should be believed, which is not an endeavor to find out what is actually true and, therefore, knowable. I´m concerned with whether it is true that it is more rational to maintain X. The truth value has to do with the rationality of a belief, not the truth of that which cannot be known.

I would think some level of semantic precision is warranted and without it I think there is a tendency to confuse. As you know Clark was not very interested in what people believe since people believe a myriad of false propositions. His concern was how truth can be known and it is not true that asserting the consequent can ever provide a rational basis of what should be believed. I would refer you to his Phil of Science. I don´t have the book in front of me, but I think you´ll find that Clark very much agreed with Karl Popper when he said; "It can even be shown that all [scientific] theories, including the best, have the same probability, namely zero." You might recall Clark´s discussion of the number of possible lines through any point on a graph, etc.

Quote:
Also, doesn´t one have to first know the truth to be able to judge if something better conforms to it or not?


By rational inference, I am not trying to determine what is true or knowable. I am trying to determine what is rational to maintain, but not by comparing it to some ideal or truth for none is knowable. If something is rational, then it might come close to what might be true. Notwithstanding, in no way can one compare the inference to the truth, for as you well noted the truth cannot be known.

Again, some of the confusion, at least for me, has to do with your use of terms, therefore I´m more than willing to say my problem with your post has to do with semantics. When I think of what is rational I tend to think of soundness in the usual sense and validity in the formal sense. I see now that's not how you were using these terms.

Quote:
The value of science is not that it arrives at something closer to the truth or that one scientific argument has more veracity than another, but rather does it works. Biblically speaking science is a tool so that man may have dominion over his environment and subdue it.


If induction aids in dominion, then induction shows what has more veracity, i.e., what should be believed in the effort to gain dominion.

Again, maybe it's just semantics again. My dictionaries defines veracity as:
1 : devotion to the truth : TRUTHFULNESS
2 : power of conveying or perceiving truth
3 : conformity with truth or fact : ACCURACY
4 : something true <makes lies sound like veracities>

I don´t see how an induction which aids in dominion has more veracity? For example, I spent a number of years working framing houses but I wouldn´t say that my Estwing curved handle framing hammer has more veracity since it allowed me to drive a nail faster than my straight handle Vaughn. I think it would be more accurate to say that it is perhaps more rational to use what works and what works better than a straight handled Vaughn

Thanks for clarifying.

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by Ron

As far as red cars go, or anything else one perceive, one can never know if there is a physical object [that] corresponds to the mental image or not. For it is the mental image that we have in our minds, and not the object itself.

Civbert,

That the object is not in our mind simply confuses the issue. If you cannot distinguish between objects and images, then what you would be distinguishing between are images that appear to correspond with objects and images that do not appear to correspond with objects. In other words, it´s not merely an image in your mind but an image that has a truth value that corresponds with an object, whether that truth value is true or false.

But what you have in mind is an image of something, and one can not always tell the difference between the images based on objects and images based on illusions. We do not need to either. We can know what we intended, or attempted to do with the object we might perceive.

Originally posted by Ron

If you cannot know the truth value of the object, then you cannot know whether you stole an object, yet sin presupposes we can know these things.

Ron

Sin is committed the moment we determined we were going to steal the object. Before one commits any sin, one determines to act, and sets oneself to carry out the action. So even if the image of the object is based on an illusion, or on an object, the sin is committed before the physical action take places. The mental action is the sin.

To sin, you don't need to "know" anything about the object. All you need to have is "believe" that the object belongs to your neighbor. If you "believe" the object is your neighbors, and you determine to steal it, you do not need to "know" what the object is, or even "know" the object belongs to your neighbor. What you do "know" is that you stole (or determined to steal) something you "believed" was not yours. You know you have sinned, in deed or thought, regardless of your ability to have "empirical knowledge" or knowledge of objects from perceptions.

It's important to differentiate between empirical "knowledge", and "belief". Knowledge is justified true belief, and belief is what one believes true even without justification. While Chueng's Scripturalism does not justify empirical knowledge (based solely on perceptions), it does allow that one can "believe" what one sees. And that's all that is necessary for one to commit sins with respect to objects one believes they perceive. If you believe you have stolen a red car, you have sinned - you don't get a pass if you stole a green car, or a red bike, or even if it was your own car you took. You believe you stole the car because that was what you had determined to do, and it is what you believe you did, and in so choosing to steal, you sin.

[Edited on 3-8-2006 by Civbert]

 

[Ron]

To sin, you don't need to "know" anything about the object. All you need to have is "believe" that the object belongs to your neighbor. If you "believe" the object is your neighbors, and you determine to steal it, you do not need to "know" what the object is, or even "know" the object belongs to your neighbor. What you do "know" is that you stole (or determined to steal) something you "believed" was not yours. You know you have sinned, in deed or thought, regardless of your ability to have "empirical knowledge" or knowledge of objects from perceptions.

Civbert,

You skirted the issue for some reason. To commit a sin of *actual* steeling as opposed to *illusory* steeling, an *actual* object must exist. To *actually* fornicate out of wedlock requires *actual* impropriety of the actual *flesh*.

You're a skeptic Civbert.

Ron

 

[Civbert]

Originally posted by Ron

To sin, you don't need to "know" anything about the object. All you need to have is "believe" that the object belongs to your neighbor. If you "believe" the object is your neighbors, and you determine to steal it, you do not need to "know" what the object is, or even "know" the object belongs to your neighbor. What you do "know" is that you stole (or determined to steal) something you "believed" was not yours. You know you have sinned, in deed or thought, regardless of your ability to have "empirical knowledge" or knowledge of objects from perceptions.

Civbert,

You skirted the issue for some reason. To commit a sin of *actual* steeling as opposed to *illusory* steeling, an *actual* object must exist. To *actually* fornicate out of wedlock requires *actual* impropriety of the actual *flesh*.

You're a skeptic Civbert.

Ron

"Mat 5:28 "But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. "

No "actual flesh" here, only the thought - yet the actual sin of adultery has been committed. Sin is committed in the mind before it is acted on by the body. You don't even need to "know" you looking at an "actual" woman to lust for her - you can sin with a virtual woman. You wouldn't excuse using p0rnography because it used images and text and claim only prostitution is sinful because it uses "actual" women would you?

Sin does not require "knowledge" of the existence of objects. So an epistemology the denies that we can have "knowledge of objects" does not effect our knowledge of sin.

If I am skeptical, it is that I am skeptical that we can know things empirically. But I believe we can know things by the revelation of Scripture. And this true knowledge is much more beneficial than anything we might try to induce from our sensory perceptions. We can not induce the doctrine of the Trinity or Limited Atonement from physical sensations. We can know truth only by God's revelation and Spirit to read/hear and understand Scripture and it's implications.



[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]

 

[Civbert]

To return to your original post on red cars and stealing, you said:

Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning.

The you argued that "actually steeling" presumes an "actual object" is stolen for it to be a sin of "actual steeling" - and therefore if we can not know there is an actual object to steel, we can't know if we have sinned (according to Chueng's epistemology).

My response is:

A: We don't need to "know"if we have acted out particular instances of sins to "know" we have "all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God". The fact that we Scripture tells us we have sinned is enough to prove to us that we have sinned and are guilty and accountable. (See Rom 3:23)

B: We don't need to commit the physical act of steeling a physical object to commit the actual sin of steeling. The sin is first committed in the mind - and once that is done, no physical action needs follow for it to be accounted to us as sin. (See Mat 5:28)

Do you disagree with A and B? If you agree with both, them maybe I have not understood you argument and you might want to rephrase your objection to Chueng's epistemology.

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]

 

[Ron]

Ron Stated: You skirted the issue for some reason. To commit a sin of *actual* steeling as opposed to *illusory* steeling, an *actual* object must exist. To *actually* fornicate out of wedlock requires *actual* impropriety of the actual *flesh*.

Civbert Replies: "Mat 5:28 "But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. "

Wow, this is truly an amazing reply. I argue that the Bible speaks of actual *physical* actions of adultery and actual *physical* actions of theft, which demonstrate the precondition of knowing that *actual* objects exist, and in your massive equivocation you address sins of the heart that do not presuppose actual *physical* actions! Don´t just ignore what I have said; try hard to internalize your equivocation of thought, which is obvious to Nate and Ct.

If I am skeptical, it is that I am skeptical that we can know things empirically.

You´re not a skeptic in your heart of hearts, Civbert. You´re a skeptic in your hardness of heart "“ in your creed "“ denying what you know to be true, which is that you know that objects exist as you see them.

But I believe we can know things by the revelation of Scripture.

Yes, you know things by revelation but such knowledge does not comport with your presuppositions since given your presuppositions you cannot know that the Bible you are reading is God´s word!

Ron

 

[Ron]

Sean,

I believe we might agree. I would be more confident we do if you could help Civbert!

Ron

 

[Ron]

One of the problems Civbert might be having is that he might believe that the knowledge of objects presupposes inductive inference.

Ron

 

[Ron]

Originally posted by Civbert
To return to your original post on red cars and stealing, you said:

Either he sees a physical red car, or he sees an illusion of a red car. One is true, but he doesn´t know which. However, this can´t be true, otherwise, he couldn´t be guilty for actually steeling a red car! God doesn´t hold us accountable for sinning if we don´t know that we are sinning.

The you argued that "actually steeling" presumes an "actual object" is stolen for it to be a sin of "actual steeling" - and therefore if we can not know there is an actual object to steel, we can't know if we have sinned (according to Chueng's epistemology).

My response is:

A: We don't need to "know"if we have acted out particular instances of sins to "know" we have "all sinned and fallen short of the glory of God". The fact that we Scripture tells us we have sinned is enough to prove to us that we have sinned and are guilty and accountable. (See Rom 3:23)

B: We don't need to commit the physical act of steeling a physical object to commit the actual sin of steeling. The sin is first committed in the mind - and once that is done, no physical action needs follow for it to be accounted to us as sin. (See Mat 5:28)

Do you disagree with A and B? If you agree with both, them maybe I have not understood you argument and you might want to rephrase your objection to Chueng's epistemology.

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by Civbert]

I'll make an unpopular sort of remark. Civbert, maybe you're just not smart enough to know that your arguments are fallacious. As I pointed out above, although the Bible speaks of sins of the heart that deal with known non-physical objects, it also speaks of sins in which people can know pertain to objects. In fact, Jesus taught that we should not be deluded into thinking that a known sin of the heart does not entail judgment as a known sin that entails known physical objects! Again, I suspect the problem you are having is that you think that knowing objects exist is inferential.

Ron

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Thanks to all on this thread. One question:

I noticed in another thread that Dr. R. Scott Clark affirms man, as an analogue, in God's image in his entire nature. Dr. Gordon Clark in the God and Logic article posted by Civbert only affirms that man is God's image only in his rational faculties. Is this difference why folks like Cheung and others consider things like eyeballs and ears and synapses to be inherently unable to process the word of God requiring "reason" to have revelation beamed into it apart from our senses?

I read both articles and believe Paul Manata nails the issue. I don't really find Cheung's argument convincing that one must prove infallibility of the senses. I just don't see a Biblical warrant that our knowledge must be perfect. I didn't see a single Scripture quoted in his entire blog article. If we are only left with direct revelation from God, unsure whether He is revealing Truth to us, how can we be sure of anything?

I also notice tremendous hubris in Cheung, as others have. Someone confident of this would have to be awfully proud to believe they have discovered the "killer" apologetic. In other words, in the history of Christendom, it would seem that Cheung believes that God has revealed Truth directly to his mind on this subject that He has withheld from all theological minds in history. He is, it would seem, after Christ and the Apostles, most blessed of all men that has ever walked the Earth.

I think if I were to accept Cheung's apologetic I would only be left with tremendous doubt as to whether God was deceiving me every time I read the Bible knowing how much I am in need of Grace from sinning in so many other areas. I suppose if I were so deceived and lazy, I might also conclude that all this learning is pointless - why even read books on apologetics, theology, etc if God will reveal Truth as He ordains? Does preparation impel God to be more gracious as to what He reveals?

Sorry, I said I had only one question but this whole thing leads me down so many rabbit trails...

[Edited on 3-9-2006 by SemperFideles]